Amicus Curiae Brief — Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent
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Table of Contents.
Table of Authorities Cited
Interest of Amicus Curiae
Summary of Argument 2
Argument 4
|. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT AIRPORT
CHARGES ARE EXCESSIVE 4
A. Airport Charges Have Not Caused Massive
Airline Losses 5
B. Airport Charges Have Not Produced Finan-
cial Windfalls 6
Il. THE ACCUMULATION OF NON-AIRLINE
OPERATING INCOME IS CONSISTENT
WITH CONGRESSIONAL EXPECTATIONS &
lil. THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY THE AIRLINES
WOULD UNDERMINE THE FINANCIAL IN-
TEGRITY OF THE NATION’S AIRPORTS 10
Conclusion 13
Table of Authorities Cited.
CASES.
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, Michigan.
738 F.Supp. 1112 (W.D.Mich. 1990), aff'd, 955
F.2d 1054 (6th Cir. 1992) 5
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
il TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED.
STATUTES.
‘Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L.
97-248, 49 U.S.C. App. §§ 2201 et seq.
49 U.S.C. App. § 2201(a)(2)
49 U.S.C. App. § 2201(a)(11)
49 U.S.C. App. § 2210(a)(9)
49 U.S.C. App. § 2210(a)(12)
49 U.S.C. App. § 2218
Airport and Airway Safety, Capacity, Noise Improve-
ment, and Intermodal Transportation Act of 1992,
Pub. L. 102-581, tit. II
§ 204(c)(1)
§ 204(d)(3)(G)
Anti-Head Tax Act, 49 U.S.C. App. § 1513
2, 4,9, 10n, 13
Aviation Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of 1990,
Pub. L. 101-508, tit. IX, subtit. B, 49 U.S.C. App.
§ 1513(e)
49 U.S.C. App. § 1513(e)(9)
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY.
H. Rep. No. 581, 1lOIst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990)
H. Rep. No. 22, 103rd Cong., Ist Sess. (1993)
MISCELLANEOUS.
Airport Council International—North America, Airport
Costs and the U.S. Airline Industry (1993)
Y
10, Lin
10
6n
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED.
American Association of Airport Executives, Survey of
Airport Rates and Charges 1991-1992 (undated)
Moody's on Airports, A New Look at Airport Debt in a
Changing Environment (1991)
National Commission to Ensure a Strong Competitive
Airline Industry, Change, Challenge and Competi-
tion: A Report to the President and Congress (Aug.
1993)
U.S. Government Accounting Office, Airport Improve-
ment Program, Opportunity to Consider FAA’s Role
in Meeting Airport System Needs, GAO/T-RCED-
93-43 (May 26, 1993)
On
No. 92-97
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
OcTOBER TERM, 1993
NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC... ET AL..
Petitioners,
V.
COUNTY OF KENT, MICHIGAN, Ef AL.,
Respondents.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.
BRIEF OF AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF
AIRPORT EXECUTIVES AS AMICUS CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS.
Interest of Amicus Curiae.
The American Association of Airport Executives (“AAAE”)
was founded in 1928 to assist airport managers tn fulfilling their
2
responsibilities to the nation’s airports, the traveling public
and the airport communities. The AAAE has members from
almost every commercial airport in the United States;4ts mem-
bership includes managers at airports that enplane 99 percent
of the nation’s airline passengers. The AAAE represents the
interests of airport managers before Congress and federal agen-
cies, and its staff works closely with federal officials to make
the nation’s airports safe and efficient.
The nation’s airports are an essential link in the air transpor-
tation system. In order to meet the needs of the traveling public
and aircraft operators, including the commercial airlines, the
airports must be adequately funded. The AAAE has filed this
brief as amicus curiae to show, contrary to the arguments of
the petitioning airlines (the “Airlines”) and the Air Transport
Association of America (the “ATA”), that the economics of
the nation’s airports do not provide any basis for the relief the
Airlines seek. Rather, if this Court were to reverse the decision
of the Court of Appeals, the ability of the AAAE’s members
prudently and effectively to manage the nation’s airports could
be greatly impaired. The AAAE respectfully urges the Court
to affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision. '
Summary of Argument.
The Airlines and the ATA claim that airports have generated
“excess” non-aeronautical operating revenues by using the
compensatory ratemaking method, and that these so-called
“surpluses” show that airport charges to commercial aircraft
operators for the use of airport facilities are “unreasonable”
under the Anti-Head Tax Act (the “AHTA”), 49 U.S.C. App.
§$ 1513, and the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const., art. 1, § 8,
Letters of consent for the filing of this brief as amicus curtae have been submitted
to the Clerk mm accordance with Rule 37.3 of the Rules of this Court
3
cl. 3. This claim has no evidentiary basis and reflects distorted
views about how airports finance their facilities.
Airports that use the compensatory method base their charges
to the airlines on the actual costs of the airport facilities the
airlines use. These charges have marginal impact on the airlines
and have not contributed to recent airline financial problems.
The generation of operating income is not evidence of exces-
sive charges, it is evidence of prudent airport management.
Airports have massive capital requirements that can only be
met if they have earnings sufficient to meet their debt service
obligations.
Congress has directed the nation’s airports to be “as self-sus-
taining as possible” and has reco: nized, by funding the Airport
Improvement Program and authorizing the use of passenger
facility charges, that airports cannot be expected to raise all
the capital they require even if they have operating surpluses.
Here, the Airlines seek to deprive an airport of its non-aero-
nautical operating incomc, by forcing it to charge less than
the actual costs of the airport facilities the Airlines use, without
assuming any obligation to ensure that the Airport is able to
meet its own capital requirements.
Airport owners generally use two alternative methods to
determine what they charge airlines for use of the airport: the
“compensatory” method, under which the airlines are charged
only the actual costs of the facilities they use, and the airport
retains non-airline revenues and control of its capital program;
and the “residual cost” method, under which the airlines agree
to pay whatever costs remain unpaid after all non-airline re-
venues are collected, and in return for this commitment, the
airlines share control of the airport's capital decisions. Both
of these methods align control of the revenue stream with
financial responsibility for the airport.
The Airlines seek to impose an unprecedented combination
of these methods which would give them the benefit of non-air-
4
line Operating income without the burden of assuming the risk
of non-airline operating losses. If the Court grants the relief
the Airlines seek, the revenue streams that support the debt
obligations of airports throughout the country will be
threatened.
Neither this Court nor Congress has ever suggested that it
is unreasonable for airport owners to recover their actual costs
of providing airport facilities to the airlines. There is no justifi-
cation for the below-cost charges the Airlines continue to pur-
sue in this appeal. The Court should reject the Airlines’ claims
and declare that the managers of this nation’s airports may
continue to use the compensatory method to set their airline
charges.
Argument.
1. THere Is No Evipence THAT AtRPORT CHARGES ARE EX-
CESSIVE.
The Airlines and the ATA claim that the nation’s airports,
including the Kent County International Airport, have accumu-
lated “excess revenues” and have therefore charged the Airlines
unreasonable rates which should be declared unlawful under
the AHTA and the Commerce Clause. The Airlines suggest
that these charges have led to their recent financial difficulties.
There is no evidence, however, that the nation’s airports in
general, or the Kent County International Airport in particular,
have charged unreasonable rates, accumulated excess reve-
nues, or contributed to the financial problems of the Airlines.
In fact, the economics of the nation’s airports compel the
affirmance, not the reversal, of the Court of Appeals’ decision
sustaining the use of the compensatory ratemaking method by
Kent County.
5
_ A. Airport Charges Have Not Caused Massive Airline Losses.
The ATA argues that airport charges have “risen virtually
unimpeded” and implies that the increase in airport charges
has been a significant cause of the airlines’ loss of $10 billion
over the past three years (ATA Brief, pp. 6-8). The Court
should give no weight to these claims, for two basic reasons.
First, there is no evidence that airport charges have exceeded
the actual costs of providing airport facilities to the Airlines.
The courts below correctly found that the airport in Kent
County only recovered its “break-even” costs from the Airlines
and that the compensatory ratemaking method, which ts used
in Kent County and at many airports throughout the country,
is designed to produce this result. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
County of Kent, Michigan, 738 F.Supp. 1112, 1115S, 1119
(W.D.Mich. 1990), aff'd, 955 F.2d 1054, 1057 (6th Cir.
1992).
Second, airport charges remain only a small fraction of the
airlines’ total costs and total revenues. Nationwide, charges
to commercial aircraft operators for the use of airport facilities
average only about 4% of total airline costs. Airport Council
International-North America, Airport Costs and the U.S. Air-
line Industry (1993), p. 14. For the Kent County International
Airport, the previous charges accepted by the Aulines were
only 1.2% of the Airlines’ revenues from their Grand Rapids
operations, and the challenged charges would have been only
1.5% of their revenues. Northwest Airlines, 738 F.Supp. at
1119.
It is, therefore, not surprising that when Congress recently
created the National Commission to Ensure a Strong Competi-
tive Airline Industry to investigate the financial health of the
airline industry, the Airlines did not claim and the Commission
did not find that airport charges have played a significant role in
6
the industry's losses in recent years.’ In fact, the Commission's
final report never mentions airport charges as a factor in the
airlines’ current financial predicament. See Change, Challenge
and Competition: A Report to the President and Congress
(Aug. 1993).
B. Airport Charges Have Not Produced Financial Windfalls.
The ATA also claims in its brief (pp. 8-9) that “many of the
nation’s airports are . . . generating excess revenues” and pro-
ducing “financial windfalls.” The ATA bases this claim upon
what it says are the results of the AAAE’s own Survey of
Airport Rates and Charges 1991-1992 (undated). Unfortu-
nately, the ATA has badly distorted the Survey in an attempt
to mislead the Court.
The AAAE’s Survey compiles the operating revenues and
operating expenses of airports throughout the country. The
Survey does not, however, purport to reflect the costs of capital
at the nation’s airports.’ It is meaningless to say, as the ATA
does, that the existence of operating income shows that airports
have generated “excess revenues” or “financial windfalls.”
The nation’s airports already have enormous capital costs, and
See Airport and Airway Satety, Capacity, Nowe Improvement, and Intermoda!
Transportation Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-581. tt. TH. § 204¢2)¢1) (directing the
Commission to “make a complete investigation and study of the financial condition
of the airline industry”) and § 204(d) 3G) (specifying “user fees imposed on
United States airlines” as a matter to be addressed); H. Rep. No. 22, 103rd Cong...
Ist Sess. (1993) (not mentioning user fees as a significant factor).
From time to ime, the AAAE surveys its members about the rates each airport
charges air carriers and concessionaires, the type of cost recovery system each
airport uses (compensatory or residual), the amount of revenue raised from each
type of user, and the charges for the use of each type of airport facility. The survey
is intended to p: ovide general information to the AAAE’s members as to how their
charges compare to the rates at similar airports throughout the country. The survey
is not designed to provide a complete financial picture of any specific airport or
of the airport industry as a whole
7
many airports plan huge capital improvement programs. A
brief look at the airports singled out by the ATA demonstrates
this critical point.
As reported in the AAAE Survey, the three major airports
operated by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
(John F. Kennedy International Airport, LaGuardia Airport
and Newark International Airport) had a combined operating
surplus of $304 million in 1991. This figure, however, does
not take into account the airports’ share of the Port Authority's
administrative expenses ($48 million), the depreciation of air-
port capital investments ($100 million), or any allowance for
debt service on the obligations of the Authority (which for all
of its facilities was $295 million in 1991). Moreover, the Port
Authority's current capital plan calls for additional investments
at these airports of $2 billion during the five year period 1993-
1997.
Similar patterns can be found at the Boston, Houston and
Las Vegas airports highlighted by the ATA. The Massachusetts
Port Authority produced an operating surplus at Logan Inter-
national Airport of about $58.5 million in 1991, but its debt
service and required reserve payments for the Airport were
approximately $34 million. Meanwhile, the Logan Airport
Capital Plan anticipates capital improvements of $1.3 billion
over the next ten years.
While the AAAE’s 1991-1992 survey showed net revenues
of $52.3 million for the Houston Intercontinental Airport, the
accumulated operating surplus generated by the Houston air-
port system, including Houston Intercontinental Airport, has
been used to pay administrative expenses, to meet debt service
obligations and to refund outstanding indebtedness and thereby
reduce the debt service of the airport system. Over the next
five years, the Houston airport system plans to spend about
$812 million on capital improvements.
While the Las Vegas McCarran International Airport gener-
ated an operating surplus of about $66 million, it had debt
8
service obligations of about $60 million in 1991. By agreement
with the Airlines, the remaining funds have been held for usc
on new airport capital projects, which are slated to cost about
$600 million by the end of this century.
Finally, at the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. the air-
lines have a residual cost agreement with the Airport which
provides that the operating surplus ($43.5 million) should be
devoted to debt service, coverage requirements and administra-
tive expenses. During the next ten years, this airport expects
to spend $1.3 billion on capital improvements.
In short, after existing debt service and future capital require-
ments are taken into account, there 1s no proof that any airports
have accumulated “excess revenues” or realized “financial
windfalls.” Rather, the evidence ts that the nation’s airports,
including Kent County International Airport, have capital
needs that vastly exceed their retained operating income.
If. THe ACCUMULATION OF NON-AIRLINE OPERATING INCOME
Is CONSISTENT WIttH CONGRESSIONAL EXPECTATIONS.
It is the responsibility of state and local airport operators to
build, operate, maintain and improve the nation’s airports.
Congress has required airport operators to set their charges for
the use of airport facilities so that each airport is “as self-sus-
taining as possible.” 49 U.S.C. App. § 2210(a)(9). To raise
the capital required for airport construction and improvement,
it is essential for an airport to generate operating revenues that
exceed its operating expenses (that is, in the words of the
ATA, to produce “excess revenue”). This so-called “surplus”
is necessary to pay debt service, maintain required debt cover-
age and reserve funds, cover the up-front costs of projects that
are eligible tor federal grants and permit capital expenditures
9
on a pay-as-you-go basis.* A ruling that either the AHTA or
the Commerce Clause prohibits airports from generating such
“excess revenues,” even when they only charge the airlines
the break-even costs of the airport facilities they use, would
cripple the efforts of the nation’s airports to be “self-sustaining”
and cannot be reconciled with the intent of Congress.
For many years Congress has recognized that it is very diffi-
cult for airports to be entirely “self-sustaining” and therefore
has provided massive financial assistance through the federal
Airport Improvement Program (“AIP”). Airport and Airway
improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-248, 49 U.S.C. App.
$§ 2201 et seq.. Even with the AIP, however, Congress has
recognized that the nation’s airports cannot meet their capital
requirements. As a result, Congress enacted the Aviation
Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-508,
tit. IX, subtit. B, which amended the AHTA to permit airports
> 99
to levy “passenger facility charges” (“PFC’s”) to augment their
‘The “surplus” challenged by the Airlines is required by federal grant assurances
to be used only for airport capital or operating costs. In order to receive federal
grants under the Airport Improvement Program, an airport must provide assurances
satisfactory to the Secretary of Transportation that “all revenues generated by the
airport . will be expended for the capital or operating costs of the airport, the
local airport system, or other local facilities which are owned or operated by the
owner or operator of the airport and directly and substantially related to the actual
air transportation of passengers or property.” 49 U.S.C. App. § 2210(a)(12). Thus,
as a matter of federal law any “excess” revenue must be reinvested in the airport.
The Secretary has power to enforce this requirement. 49 U.S.C. App. § 2218.
Congress declared that “the continuation of airport and airway improvement
programs” is “required to meet the current and projected growth of aviation and
the requirements of interstate commerce, the Postal Service, and the national de-
fense.” 49 U.S.C. App. § 2201(a)(2). Congress encouraged “airport construction
and improvement projects which increase the capacity of facilities to accommodate
passenger and cargo traffic, thereby increasing safety and efficiency and reducing
delays... .” 49 U.S.C. App. § 2201(aj‘11). From 1982 to 1992, the Federal
Aviation Administration provided AIP grants of about $13 billion “to help airports
sustain or increase their safety and capacity.” U.S. Government Accounting Office,
Airport Improvement Program, Opportunity to Consider FAA's Role in Meeting
Airport System Needs, GAO/T-RCED-93-43 (May 26, 1993), p. 3.
10
ability to finance approved capital improvement projects.° 49
U.S.C. App. § 1513(e). See H. Rep. No. 581, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1990), p. Il (over the years 1990-1995, airport
capital improvement projects are expected to cost $50 billion).
It is implausible that when it mandated that airports become
“as self-sustaining as possible,” funded the Airport Improve-
ment Program and authorized the use of PFC’s, Congress
intended that airports be stripped of the ability to generate the
non-aeronautical operating income they must have to raise
their own capital and pay required debt service.
Il. THe Revcier SouGHT By THE AIRLINES WOULD UNDER-
MINE THE FINANCIAL INTEGRITY OF THE NATION'S AltR-
PORTS.
The Airlines seek to compel the Airport to share its non-
aeronautical operating surplus with the Airlines even though
the Airport has only charged the “break-even” costs of the
facilities the Airlines use and the Airlines have not agreed to
assume any of the financial risks or obligations of the Airport.
This result would be unprecedented and unwise.
Airport operators use two alternative methods to recover the
costs of their airports: the “compensatory” method and the
“residual cost” method. Under a compensatory method, such
as the method used by Kent County, the airport charges com-
mercial aircraft operators only the actual costs of the airport
facilities they use; the airport itself retains any excess revenues
derived from non-aeronautical sources and has sole responsi-
bility for its own financial obligations and capital planning.
‘The ATA makes the perverse argument that the adoption of the PFC legislation
somehow makes “excess airport revenues uniformly unreasonable” (ATA
Bret, p. 12). This broad assertion completely misses the point. Congress reversed
federal policy and loosened the constraints of the AHTA to permit the use of a
specified form of “head tax” not because it found that existing airport revenues
were excessive, but because it found that they were imadequate to meet the needs
of this country’s air transportation system
11
Under a residual cost method, the airport and airlines agree
that the airport will charge the commercial airlines whatever
costs of the airport remain unpaid after all non-aeronautical
revenues have been collected so that the airport is assured that
it will break even overall. In exchange for this financial com-
mitment to make up any revenue shortfalls, the airlines gain
the ability to share the airport’s concession revenues and to
influence its capital planning.
Moody's has summarized the essential differences between
these two methods this way:
The fundamental differences between the residual
and compensatory approaches .. . are reflected in
who assumes the risk for financial operations and
who has control over airport capital decisions. Under
the residual approach, the airlines assume the risks
by guaranteeing annual cash flow sufficient to keep
the airport whole regardless of air traffic levels, con-
cession revenue yields, operating expenses, and
other financial factors. For this guarantee, airlines
share in non-airline revenues in the form of reduced
terminal rental and landing fee requirements, and
exercise certain controls over capital decisions
through MII provisions.’ Conversely, under a com-
pensatory approach the airport assumes the risk for
financial operations by allocating to airlines only
those expenses associated with airline space. Costs
associated with concession, public and vacant airline
rentable space are presumably funded by non-airline
~Mayjority-in-interest or “MII” provisions typically allow the airlines to disapprove
significant capital expenditures. These provisions sometimes allow airlines to veto
capital improvements that would aid competitors. Because of this potential for
anti-competitive behavior, Congress has provided that MII provisions may not be
invoked to restrict the construction of facilities financed with passenger facility
charges. 49 U.S.C. App. § 1513(en9)
12
sic] revenues. By assuming this risk, the airport
retains control over capital decisions and retains any
excess of non-airline revenues over non-airline ex-
penses.
Moody's on Airports, A New Look at Airport Debt In a Chang-
ing Environment (1991), p. 12.
The alignment of financial responsibility with control of the
revenue stream is critical because most airports use revenue
bonds to raise capital for airport improvement projects
(Moody's, p. 7). The authorizing bond ordinances and trust
indentures pledge airport revenue, rather than airport facilities,
as security for the bonds. To reduce the risk of default, these
indentures typically require net airport revenues to be at least
125% of annual debt service and require the funding of reserve
accounts to ensure that the pledged revenue stream continues
to flow to meet debt service obligations.
In this case, the Airlines seek to mandate an illogical and
dangerous combination of the compensatory and residual cost
methods which would force the Kent County International
Airport to reduce its charges below actual costs whenever tt
has “excess” non-airline revenues. If the Airlines succeed in
their appeal, they will have no financial obligation except to
pay below-cost charges for their use of Kent County's airfield
and passenger terminal; but the nation’s airports will lose the
ability to generate the non-aeronautical operating income they
require to meet their capital needs.
This result would undermine the financial integrity of the air-
ports throughout the country which rely upon the compensatory
method to raise the revenues they need to maintain and improve
the air transportation system. If the Airlines are entitled to the
Airport’s “surplus” non-aeronautical revenue, as they claim,
the revenue streams that support the debt obligations of many
13
of the nation’s airports will be threatened.* Such an outcome
is not consistent with the intent of Congress or with the prece-
dents of this Court.
This Court has never before outlawed the use of compensa-
tory ratemaking. There is nothing in the AHTA or the Com-
merce Clause that warrants the relief the Airlines seek. The
Secretary of Transportation, who is responsible for the admin-
istration of the federal aviation laws, has never suggested in
any way that the use of the compensatory method is forbidden.
The Airlines’ misguided attempt to divert non-aeronautical
revenues and destroy the ability of the nation’s airports to meet
the public’s need for a safe and efficient air transportation
system should be squarely rejected by the Court.
Conclusion.
For all of these reasons, the Court should affirm the decision
of the Court of Appeals and permit the nation’s airport managers
to continue to use a variety of financial tools, including the
compensatory method, to meet their obligations to the public to
build, operate, maintain and improve this nation’s airports.
Respectfully submitted,
SCOTT P. LEWIS
PALMER & DODGE
One Beacon Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02108
(617) 573-0162
“The Airlines have never specified how the amount of concession revenues they
claim ts to be determined. Any requirement that airports reduce their cost-based
charges to the airlines whenever they generate income from non-airline sources
would, however, mevitably reduce the revenue streams pledged to secure many
airport bonds and would, therefore, jeopardize the use of revenue bonds to fund the
immense capital improvements required by the nation’s air transportation system
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