Amicus Curiae Brief — Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist.
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1992
LARRY ZOBREST, ET AL..
Petitioners,
v.
CATALINA FOOTHILLS SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Respondent.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF
ARIZONA SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION, INC.
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT
a
__ Robert J. DuComb, Jr.
Counsel of Record
Sharon B. Shively
SACKS, TIERNEY & KASEN, P.A.
2929 North Central Avenue, 14th Floor
Phoenix, Arizona 85012-2742
Thomas W. Pickrell
General Counsel
ARIZONA SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION, INC.
3852 N. 29th Avenue
Phoenix, Arizona 85017
‘BEST AVAILABLE COPY
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,
20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (1988 & Supp. III 1991), or its
implementing regulations, require a state governmental agency to
provide a sign-language interpreter to a deaf child in a sectarian
school.
2. Whether the present controversy should be resolved by
application of the three-part Lemon test.
3. Whether the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment bars a public school district from providing a sign-
language interpreter to a deaf child at a sectarian school.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ...............
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..............
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS .............
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND
REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
II.
NEITHER THE IDEA NOR ITS
IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS REQUIRE
CATALINA FOOTHILLS TO PROVIDE AN
INTERPRETER TOA DEAF CHILD IN A
SECTARIAN SCHOOL
A.
IDEA does not require a local education
agency to provide an interpreter to a deaf
child in a sectarian school. ..........
The Courts below did not rule on the
question of whether the IDEA requires
Catalina Foothills to provide an interpreter
to a deaf child at a sectarian school... . . .
THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY
SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY
APPLICATION OF THE THREE-PART
LEMON TEST
7 = an ae a ee ee eS Oe Se Ss eS a a ae eG o& CU
CONCLUSION
APPENDIX
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE BARS
A PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT FROM
PROVIDING AN INTERPRETER TO A
DEAF CHILD AT A _ SECTARIAN
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)... ...... 11, 12, 14
Califano v. Yamasaki, 422 U.S. 682 (1979)... 22... 10
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. $78 (1987) ........... 1
Goodall by Goodall v. Stafford
County School Board, 930 F.2d 363 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, _ U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 2649
RE ARR os PERE RE oa A ag i 5, 6, 12, 13
Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball,
UU I 13
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1972) .............. 13
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) ....... 10, 12, 14
McNair v. Cardimone, 676 F. Supp. 1361
(S.D. Ohio 1987), aff'd,
McNair v. Oak Hills Local Sch. Dist. ,
872 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1989) ..................... 5
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1974) ._.......... 11, 12
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) _.......... 12
Witters v. State Commission for the Blind,
112 Wash.2d 363, 771 P.2d 1119, cert. denied,
RINE, ote a 6
Witters v. Washington Department of
Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) ............ 6
IV
Cases Page
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) ... 2... .. 13
Work v. McKenzie, 661 F. Supp. 225 (D.D.C. 1987) ...... 5
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,
ay 9
Constitutions
United States Const. amend. 1 ............. i, 5, 6, 7, 12
eS 6
Washington Const. art. 1,§ 11 .................... 6
Statutes and Regulations
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34 C.F.R. §§ 76.651-76.662 ..................... 4
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LARRY ZOBREST, ET AL...
ES Re ER Gee Se hale pe meee 4 Petitioners.
Stanley G. Feldman & David L. Abney, CATALINA FOOTHILLS SCHOOL DISTRICT,
The Double Security of Federalism: Respondent.
Protecting Individual Liberty Under
bam RLS. 7 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
Ne ee a ee OF FOR THE N Cir
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF
ARIZONA SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION, INC.
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT
<=
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS
This brief is filed with consent of both parties. Letters of
consent are on file with the Clerk of this Court.
Anzona School Boards Association, Inc. (ASBA), is an
Anizona nonprofit corporation, the members of which are the
governing boards of most of the 223 public school districts in the
State of Arizona, including Respondent. ASBA’s members, as local
education agencies, are charged with the responsibility of providing
special education and related services in accordance with the
vi
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400
et seq. (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND
REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
ASBA adopts Petitioners’ and Respondent's listing of
constitutional and statutory provisions involved in this matter.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ASBA incorporates by reference the statement of the case
contained in the brief of Respondent Catalina Foothills School
District ("Catalina Foothills”).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has correctly
affirmed the judgment of the District Court by holding that the
Establishment Clause bars a public school district from providing a
sign-language interpreter to a deaf child at a sectarian school. In so
ruling, however, neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals
reached the question of whether the governing statutory scheme, the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 er
seq., and its implementing regulations, require a state governmental
agency to provide a sign-language interpreter to a deaf child in a
sectarian school.
This present controversy can and should be resolved by
application of the three-part Lemon test. This Court should
conclude, as a result, that the Establishment Clause bars a public
school district from providing a sign-language interpreter to a deaf
child at a sectarian school.
NEITHER THE IDEA NOR ITS
IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS
REQUIRE CATALINA FOOTHILLS TO
PROVIDE AN INTERPRETER TO A
DEAF CHILD IN A_ SECTARIAN
SCHOOL
Petitioners Zobrest claim in their reply to brief in opposition
to the petition that the IDEA requires Catalina Foothills to provide
an interpreter to a deaf child in a sectarian high school and that this
legal conclusion was adopted by the courts below. (R. Br. Op. 1)’.
These allegations, however, are incorrect in both respects.
I.
A. IDEA does not require a
local education agency to
provide an interpreter to a
deaf child in a sectarian
school.
In 1970, Congress enacted the Education of the Handicapped
Act, now known as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
("IDEA"). Congress provided in Subchapter II of the IDEA for a
program of federal grants to aid state and local authorities in
providing educational assistance for children with disabilities. See
20 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1420 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
The fundamental requirement for obtaining a grant under the
IDEA is that the State make available “a free appropriate public
education for all children with disabilities” in the State. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(2)(B) (Supp. II] 1991). Section 1413(a)(4) (1988 & Supp.
II] 1991) directly addresses the State's obligations with respect to
children in private scitools. If school authorities have selected the
'"R. Br. Op.” refers to the Reply to Brief in Opposition to Petition
for Writ of Certiorari.
private school as the means of providing a “free appropriate public
education” to the child, Section 1413(a)(4)(B) (Supp. III 1991)
requires the State to provide the appropriate services in all cases “at
no cost to * * * parents or guardian." With respect to children
placed by their parents in private schools after rejecting an appropri-
ate public school placement, the public agency need only make
provision for the participation of such children in the appropriate
special education or related service. Section 1413(a)(4)(A) (Supp.
III 1991).
This statutory direction is explained more fully in the regula-
tions which implement the grant program established by the IDEA.
See 34 C.F.R. Pt. 300. Section 300.403(a) provides that when
children with disabilities are placed in a private school by their
parents’ choice "the public agency is not required by this part to pay
for the child’s education at the private school or facility." Instead,
the agency is required only to "make services available to the child
as provided under §§ 300.450-300.452." Section 300.452, in turn,
provides that the agency "shall provide special education and related
services designed to meet the needs of private school children with
disabilities residing in the jurisdiction of the agency."
The meaning of this requirement is clarified by the provisions
of 34 C.F.R. §§ 76.651-76.662, which establish general regulations
for participation by private school students in the various grant
programs administered by the Department of Education. Those
regulations require the agency to “provide students enrolled in
private schools with a genuine opportunity for equitable participation
[in the programs offered by the agency to other students]." Section
76.651(a)(1). Benefits provided to students in private schools must
"be comparable in quality, scope, and opportunity for participation
to the program benefits that the [agency] provides for students
enrolled in public schools. Section 76.654(a). Where "necessary to
provide equitable program benefits” that are “not normally provided
by the private school," the agency “may use program funds to make
public personnel available” in the private school’s facilities. Section
76.659.
The direction to provide or make available the special program
or service, of course, does not translate into a mandatory require-
ment to provide and make available the program or service on the
premises of a private school. The provision and availability of the
service can easily be accomplished by offering the service at a free
public school. Indeed, these statutes and regulations make clear
that, while the IDEA allows a public agency to provide the services
of an interpreter at a private school, it is not required to do so unless
placement of the child at a private school has been selected by public
school authorities as the means by which to educate the child. See
Goodall by Goodall v. Stafford County School Board, 930 F.2d 363
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, _: U.S. __, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1991);
McNair v. Cardimone, 676 F. Supp. 1361 (S.D. Ohio 1987), aff'd,
McNair v. Oak Hills Local Sch. Dist., 872 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1989);
Work v. McKenzie, 661 F. Supp. 225 (D.D.C. 1987).
Indeed, the unresolved legal question is not whether the IDEA
requires a public agency to provide interpretive services, but whether
such services are prohibited in this context. The Education
Department General Regulations (EDGAR) specify that:
1. No State or subgrantee may use its grant or
subgrant to pay for any of the following:
a. Religious worship, instruction,
or proselytization.
b. Equipment or supplies to be
used for any of the activities
[described above. ]
34 C.F.R. § 76.532(a)(1). The United States, as amicus curiae, has
contended that this provision is intended to reach no farther than the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. See Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Petitioners, p. 23.
But the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has
interpreted and applied this provision without reference to the
Establishment Clause and, under a set of facts that were substantially
5
the same as those of this case, held that this provision prohibits the
delivery of cued speech interpretive services at a sectarian school.
Goodall, 930 F.2d at 369.
The resolution of this legal issue will also require a determina-
tion as to whether delivery of interpretive services at a sectarian
school would violate the Arizona Constitution. Article 2, Section 12
of the Arizona Constitution states:
No public money or property shall be appropriated for or
applied to any religious worship, exercise, or instruction,
or to the support of any religious establishment.
Arizona’s Attorney General has opined that the provision of interpre-
tive services under the circumstances of this case would violate the
Arizona Constitution. (J.A. 9-18)’ The Attorney General’s
analysis appears to assume that the reach of Article 2, Section 12 of
the Arizona Constitution is the same as that of the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment, but the Arizona courts have not
endorsed this analysis. To the contrary, the broader and more
specific prohibitions expressed in Article 2, Section 12 of the
Arizona Constitution suggest that this provision has a greater scope
than that of the Establishment Clause.’ Indeed, the then Vice Chief
Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court (now, Chief Justice) has stated
? "J.A." refers to the Joint Appendix.
> In Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474
U.S. 481 (1986), this Court ruled that financial assistance paid directly to
a blind recipient under a state vocational rehabilitation program did not
violate the First Amendment. This Court remanded the matter to the state
courts for a determination as to whether the financial assistance would
violate Article 1, Section 11 of the Washington State Constitution, a
provision which is similar to Article 2, Section 12 of the Arizona
Constitution. On remand, the Washington Supreme Court concluded that
the financial assistance did violate its State Constitution. Witters v. State
Commission for the Blind, 112 Wash.2d 363, 771 P.2d 1119, cert. denied,
493 U.S. 850 (1989).
that the textual protections of the First Amendment in the United
States Constitution are much narrower than the Arizona Constitution:
[OJur constitutional framers not only adopted the
suggestions from Congress, they went much farther in
delineating the proper scope of church and state
interaction, banning public support of sectarian schools
and prohibiting sectarian instruction at state schools.
Under the first amendment’s establishment clause, the
United States Supreme Court has allowed the limited use
of public funds for support of sectarian schools. For
instance, the court upheld noncategorical grants to
religious colleges and universities, reimbursing church-
sponsored public schools for performing various testing
and reporting services mandated by state law, loaning
public textbooks to sectarian students, tax deductions for
expenses incurred by taxpayers in sending their children
to parochial schools and providing classes to sectarian
students in public facilities on a “shared-time” basis. All
of these direct and indirect aids to religious educational
institutions would face a difficult examination under the
broad, specific textual provisions of the Arizona
Constitution. For instance, the prohibition against
appropriating and applying public funds to property to
support even a religious “exercise” refers to more than
legislative appropriation: iit includes executive and
administrative contact.
Stanley G. Feldman & David L. Abney, The Double Security of
Federaliem: _P ing Individual Lil Under The Ar
Constitution, 1988 Ariz. St. L.J. 115, 143-44 (footnotes omitted).
B. The Courts below did not
rule on the question of
whether the IDEA requires
Catalina Foothills to provide
an interpreter to a deaf child
at a sectarian school.
Regardless of whether the legal issue is whether the IDEA
requires, permits or prohibits the delivery of interpretive services to
a deaf child at a sectarian school, a ruling on this legal issue was not
made by the lower courts in this case. Zobrests claimed in their
verified amended complaint that the IDEA required Catalina
Foothills to provide an interpreter. (J.A. 21-22) This allegation was
denied in Catalina Foothills’ answer. (J.A. 55) In their stipulation
of facts, the Zobrests and Catalina Foothills agreed only that
Catalina Foothills “would be obligated under the [IDEA] to pay the
cost of a certified sign-language interpreter for James Zobrest if he
were enrolled in a local public high school." (J.A. 86) Upon cross-
motions for summary judgment, the District Court ruled that:
Based upon the stipulated facts in the record it is clear
that plaintiff James Zobrest requires the services of a sign
language interpreter at Salpointe Catholic High School.
However, the provision of a publicly-paid sign language
interpreter at Salpointe, a pervasively sectarian school,
would violate the separation of church and state.
There is no indication in the District Court’s opinion that it
concluded, as a preliminary matter leading to the constitutional basis
for its ruling, that the IDEA required Catalina Foothills to provide
James Zobrest with a sign-language interpreter at Salpointe Catholic
High School. Rather than ruling on the statutory question, the
District Court perhaps assumed, at least for the purposes of the
cross-motions for summary judgment, that Catalina Foothills might
voluntarily agree to provide an interpreter if it was not barred from
doing so by the Federal or Arizona Constitutions. In any event,
there is no indication that it considered the issue of whether the
IDEA required, as opposed to permits, the Catalina Foothills School
District to provide an interpreter for James Zobrest.
In affirming the District Court’s summary judgment, the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that it did not feel any need
to rule on the statutory question because it believed that a stipulation
of the parties permitted the Court to bypass the issue:
For the purposes of this litigation, the parties do not
dispute that sign language interpretation is one of the
“special education and related services” to which James
is entitled. The parties agree that, if James’ parents
enrolled him in a non-sectarian private school or public
school, the School District would be obligated to provide
a sign language interpreter for him.
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 963 F.2d 1190, 1192
n.1 (9th Cir. 1992). The problem here, however, is that there was
no stipulation to the effect that a sign-language interpreter is a
“special education related service” to which James would be entitled
to receive in a private school. Rather, the only stipulation was that
~ > entitled to these services in a public school setting. (J.A.
Regardless of whether the Ninth Circuit correctly or incorrectly
characterized the disputed facts or the parties’ stipulations, the
unalterable fact is that neither the District Court nor the Ninth
Circuit considered the merits of, or ruled on, the issue of whether
the IDEA requires the placement of a sign-language interpreter in
any setting other than a public school. Whether the School District
voluntarily would have provided an interpreter is no longer of any
concern. James Zobrest has graduated from school, and thus any
issue as to voluntary provision of such services is moot. In addition,
as described above, and as indicated in the Arizona Attorney General
Opinion rendered on this very situation, (J.A. 9-18), the Arizona
Constitution would prohibit the School District from voluntarily
providing services.‘
The important point is that no court has yet addressed the issue
of whether the IDEA requires the services at issue here to be
provided. ASBA urges the Court to avoid any confusion regarding
this point by clarifying in its opinion that the question as to whether
the IDEA requires a public agency to provide an interpreter to a deaf
child in a sectarian school has not yet been addressed. If the case
is affirmed, there is no need to reach this issue. If the Court
reverses on the constitutional issue, it should remand this case to the
District Court to resolve the remaining issues in the case, including
the issue as to the required, as opposed to permissive, application of
the IDEA to the parochial school fact situation presented. In the
alternative, this Court could dismiss the grant of certiorari as
improvidently granted on the basis that the lower courts should have
resolved the statutory issue before addressing the constitutional issue.
See Califano v. Yamasaki, 422 U.S. 682, 692 (1979). This,
perhaps, would be the desirable course of action to avoid completely
the necessity of adjudicating the constitutional issue presented.
Il. THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY
SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY
APPLICATION OF THE THREE-PART
LEMON TEST
The briefs filed by the Zobrests and Catalina Foothills indicate
that both parties believe that the present controversy can and should
be resolved by a straightforward application of the three-part inquiry
recognized by this Court in Lemon v. Kurtynan, 403 U.S. 602
(1971). Various amici filing briefs in support of the Zobrests,
however, have suggested that this Court should reexamine the use of
the Lemon test in its Establishment Clause analysis. See, e.g., Brief
of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, p. 15,’
* Note that Catalina Foothills determined that it would follow the
dictates of the Attorney General Opinion. (J.A. 94).
10
n.11. While ASBA recognizes the concerns of some members of
this Court regarding the difficulty in applying the Lemon test, see,
e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 429 (1985) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987)
(Scalia, J., dissenting), ASBA urges this Court to continue to
recognize the three-part approach — purpose, effect and
entanglement — as the proper framework of analysis for
determining whether government action impairs the objectives of
the Establishment Clause.
The religious heritage of this country is extraordinarily
diverse and becoming more so. Public education in America has
remained relatively free of religious strife because of this Court’s
efforts to establish and maintain a set of standards that ensures a
meaningful separation of church and state. If the Court in this case
develops a “new test,” that action assuredly will send out a
message to schools, students, parents and communities throughout
this country that all of the religion-in-the-schools cases are no
longer “good law” or at least are questionable. Any serious move
away from the strong stand this Court has held in the past to
separate religion and the state will be a clarion call to those who
are eager to establish religion in the schools. Schools will then
face “successive opportunities for political fragmentation and
division along religious lines, one of the principal evils against
which the Establishment Clause was intended to protect." Meek v.
> Justice Powell’s admonition about the risk of political divisiveness
stemming from aid to religion is particularly appropriate:
Public schools, as well as private schools, are under
increasing pressure to meet real and perceived needs. Thus,
any proposal to extend direct governmental aid to parochial
schools alone is likely to spark political disagreement from
taxpayers who support the public schools, as well as from
nonrecipient sectarian groups, who may fear that needed
funds are being diverted from them. In short, aid to
parochial schools of the sort at issue here potentially leads to
“that kind and degree of government involvement in religious
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1974); see also Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. at 622-23.
Il. THEESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE BARS
A PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT FROM
PROVIDING AN INTERPRETER TO A
DEAF CHILD AT A SECTARIAN
SCHOOL
The employment by a public school district of a sign-language
interpreter to accompany a student through all of his activities at a
Catholic high school, including morning mass and religious classes,
to interpret all communication that occurs in the student’s presence,
including prayers and other religious communication, violates the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Judged in light of the three-part Lemon test, provision
of an interpreter under these circumstances would have the primary
effect of advancing religion and would create excessive entanglement
between church and state.
The sign-language interpreter’s presence, at public expense, in
a parochial high school would have the impermissible effect of
advancing religion because the interpreter would benefit the
religious-oriented educational function of the sectarian school, serve
as a conduit for all religious communications to and from the
student, and be used as a tool to facilitate religious interaction. See
Goodall by Goodall v. Stafford County School Board, 930 F.2d at
370-71; see also Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 366 (State aid in the
form of instructional materials and equipment which “flows to an
institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion
of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission . . . has the
life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and
Frequently strain a political system to the breaking point."
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 416-17 (1985) (quoting Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (opinion of Harlan, J.))
12
impermissible primary effect of advancing religion,” quoting Hunt
v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1972)); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S.
229, 250 (1977) ("In view of the impossibility of separating the
secular education function from the sectarian, the state aid [instruc-
tional materials and equipment] inevitably flows in part to support
the religious role of the schools.").
The presence, furthermore, of a publicly paid employee in a
parochial classroom, transmitting religious communications, would
create an impermissible symbolic union between the government and
the religious school. See Goodall by Goodall v. Stafford County
School Board, 930 F.2d at 370-71; see also Grand Rapids School
Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 392 (1985) (Remedial and supplemen-
tary programs conducted by public school employees on premises of
parochial school creates an unacceptable “symbolic union of govern-
ment and religion in one sectarian enterprise.") This Court has
recognized “the danger that publicly employed personnel who
provide [therapeutic] services ... might transmit religious
instruction and advance religious beliefs in their activities.” Wolman
v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 247. There is no question in this case that
the interpreter, acting as a state employee, would transmit religious
instruction in a sectarian school.
Zobrests try to defend this untenable situation by characterizing
an educational interpreter as nothing more than a human hearing aid.
This is simply at odds with reality. According to the National Task
Force on Educational Interpreting:
The educational interpreter is a member of the education-
al team, and is relied upon by the teacher, the deaf
student, and hearing peers, to relay information accurate-
ly and intelligibly both to and from the deaf students and
others as needed. *** While interpreting is the
educational interpreter’s primary role, and the first order
of priority, it may not be his or her only role.
13
(A-2)*. Educational interpreters may be called upon to perform a
number of noninterpretive tasks, including tutoring and other routine
classroom duties. (A-2). In addition, an “educational interpreter’s
responsibilities should include provisions for what might be called
“educational planning” [,] . . . time that is set aside for the
educational interpreter and teacher to discuss course content, lesson
plans upcoming tests, etc.” (A-8). Clearly, an educational
interpreter is not a hearing aid but a teacher's aide, an education
professional who, as part of an education team, is expected to master
the curriculum, including its religious elements, and provide a
supportive role to the teacher and deaf student.
Finally, the need for periodic evaluation by other public
employees of the interpreter’s performance, as well as the need for
periodic review by the District of the suitability of the special
education services provided to the student, would create excessive
entanglements between the public and parochial enterprises. See
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 413 (1985) ("We have long
recognized that underlying the Establishment Clause is “the objective
. . . t© prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either church or
state into the precincts of the other,” quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. at 614).
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, ASBA respectfully requests
that this Court (1) clarify in its opinion that it will not address the
legal issue of whether the IDEA requires a local education agency
to provide an interpreter to a deaf child in a sectarian school, (2)
* “A” refers to the Appendix to this Brief.
14
continue its support of the Lemon test in its Establishment Clause
analysis, and (3) affirm the decision below.
Respectfully submitted,
Robert J. DuComb, Jr.
Counsel of Record
Sharon B. Shively
SACKS, TIERNEY & KASEN, P.A.
2929 North Central Avenue, 14th Floor
Phoenix, Arizona 85012-2742
Thomas W. Pickrell
General Counsel
ARIZONA SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION, INC.
3852 N. 29th Avenue
Phoenix, Arizona 85017
15
EDUCATIONAL INTERPRETING
FOR DEAF STUDENTS
Report of the National Task Force on
Educational Interpreting
Sponsoring Organizations
Alexander Graham Bell Association for the Deaf
Conference of Educational Admunistrators Serving the Deaf
Conference of Interpreter Trainers
Convention of American Instructors of the Deaf
National Association of the Deaf
Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf
Editors:
E. Ross Stuckless
Joseph C. Avery
T. Alan Hurwitz
- 1989 -
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itt. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Roles
The fundamental role of the interpreter, regardless of specialty
or place of employment, is to facilitate communication between deaf
persons and others. Educational interpreters facilitate communication
between deaf students and others, including teachers, other service
providers, and peers, within an educational environment, usually a
mainstream or quasi-mainstream setting. The educational interpreter is a
member of the educational team, and is relied on by the teacher, the deaf
student, and hearing peers, to relay information accurately and intelligibly
both to and from the deaf student and others as needed.
The usefulness of an interpreter presupposes that the deaf
student has at least the foundation of a language system, be it English or
a form of sign language. Unfortunately this is not always the case,
particularly among young school-age children. Likewise the usefulness of
an interpreter presupposes that he or she is qualified to interpret in a form
used by the child. If a continuing situation occurs in which the deaf
student is unable to profit from interpreting services, the presence of an
educational interpreter may be a poor use of resources and the child’s
placement or the interpreter assignment should be re-examined. With
young children it is common to use teachers’ aides rather than educational
interpreters in support roles.
At least one national professional organization recommends
that where possible, deaf children interact directly with their teachers in the
early grades when major attention is given to language acquisition.
Consensus among educators of the deaf in support of educational
interpreting increases as the deaf child progresses into the upper elementary
level and beyond.
While interpreting is the educational interpreter’s primary
role, and the first order of priority, it may not be his or her only role.
With appropriate training and skills, the role of the educational interpreter
may extend into non-interpreting areas. These will be discussed under
"Responsibilities."
The relative proportion of time spent by the educational
interpreter in interpreting and non-interpreting roles can be influenced by
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a number of factors. Among these are local circumstances such as number
of deaf students being served in the school district and their distribution
across grade levels and school buildings. Another involves the
qualifications and availability of the interpreting staff and other personnel.
Obviously, the educational interpreter’s background and skills should be
considered in the assignment of non-interpreting tasks.
Also, if an educational interpreter is employed full time by the
school district or institution, he or she is more likely to have non-
interpreting duties than if employed on a part-time or hourly basis. This
is due in part to the fact that interpreters cannot be expected to interpret
continuously and without relief throughout a full school day, particularly
in lecture-type classes where there is little or no respite. This will be
discussed further under the topic of "Working Conditions."
Additionally, in situations where the educational interpreter
works with the same teacher and class throughout the day, the educational
interpreter is likely to have more non-interpreting duties than if he or she
moves from class to class. The educational interpreter is most likely to
have expanded roles that include non-interpreting duties at the primary and
elementary levels.
It is stressed that the educational interpreter’s primary role and
first priority is as an interpreter. While engaged in interpreting, he or she
should not be asked to interrupt this activity in order to perform some
other task. Similarly, when the need arises for both interpreting and some
other task, interpreting should take priority.
This does not imply that the educational interpreter, when not
actually interpreting, should avoid other tasks because of the need to
remain "on call" for interpreting. Judgment is required in each situation.
(See also “Responsibilities and Ethical Considerations.")
Attention should be brought here to what is considered to be
an inappropriate non-interpreting role for the educational interpreter. The
role of the educational interpreter should not include classroom
management, i.e., formal instruction or classroom supervision. Very few
educational interpreters are also trained and certified teachers, and even if
they are, may be qualified to teach only at particular grade levels and in
particular content areas. If the educational interpreter’s duties include
tutoring, it should be under the teacher’s supervision.
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A quality education for deaf students who spend all or part of
their school day in a mainstream educational environment depends on
services and people with varied roles. An understanding of the overlapping
and distinguishing roles of teacher, student, educational interpreter,
parents, and others involved in the deaf student’s education should be
understood by all these persons.
Responsibilities
An educational interpreter’s responsibilities are likely to vary
considerably from one work setting to another. Several factors that may
lead to different responsibilities are mentioned under “Roles.”
One major factor has to do with the kinds and levels of
training and experience the educational interpreter brings to the task.
Obviously, the educational interpreter should not be assigned
responsibilities for which he or she is not qualified. By the same token,
the broadly qualified educational interpreter most likely can carry out
numerous responsibilities in addition to interpreting. Sign language
instruction is a good example. Salary, benefits, and other working
conditions should be commensurate with these responsibilities.
Written guidelines and inservice training are one way to
ensure that the educational interpreter’s roles and responsibilities are
understood by teachers and others who make up the educational team, by
the students who will be using the service, by their parents, and of course
by the educational interpreter.
It is also important that a member of the educational
administration staff supervise the activities of the educational interpreter.
While in most instances the supervisor is unlikely to have interpreting
skills, he or she should have a general knowledge of interpreting
requirements. The selection of an individual depends on conditions in the
local system, but in general, neither an outside agency/consultant nor a
teacher in whose class the educational interpreter works is recommended
as the interpreter’s supervisor.
Interpreting Responsibilities
The local educational authority is responsible for prescribing
the mode(s) of communication to be used with deaf students. Those
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mode(s) should be indicated in the interpreter’s job description. It follows
that it is not the interpreter’s responsibility to select the mode(s) of
communication to be used in class. (See also "Responsibilities and Ethical
Considerations.” )
As an important language model for the deaf student, the
educational interpreter should be skilled in the mode(s) of communication
that is/are indicated in the job description and prescribed for classroom use
with the student.
Based on his or her training and experience, the educational
interpreter should also be able to determine whether, and to what extent,
the student understands the mode(s) of communication being used. If the
student has difficulty with instructional content due to not understanding
the mode(s) of communication in use, the educational interpreter should
inform the appropriate member of the educational team.
"In class" interpreting. The instructional content of "in class"
interpreting varies by class and level. Interpreting responsibilities at the
elementary level most likely include a broad range of subject areas, such
as mathematics, social studies, and the language arts, but the depth of
knowledge needed by the educational interpreter in each subject area is not
likely to require special technical background.
The instructional content at the secondary level takes on more
depth, and may necessitate the educational interpreter’s having more
technical knowledge of a particular content area. For interpreting at the
postsecondary level, it is important that the educational interpreter have an
academic background and/or technical knowledge in one or more college-
level disciplines.
In short, the depth of subject knowledge needed to interpret
a third grade class in arithmetic is quite unlike that needed to interpret a
course in calculus or law. It is essential that the educational interpreter
have sufficient knowledge of the content to be able to interpret its concepts
and vocabulary accurately and meaningfuliy. This is likely also to call for
preparation time, e.g., to meet with the instructor, read lecture outlines,
skim required readings in textbooks, and preview uncaptioned instructional
videotapes.
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“Out of class" interpreting. The educational interpreter’s
responsibilities probably will include interpreting coverage of “out of class"
or extracurricular activities. These should be distinguished from other
duties such as lunchroom or playground supervision and duties as a bus
attendant.
Out-of-class activities are those in which the educational
interpreter is present primarily to interpret for the deaf student and others
outside the classroom. Such activities might include field trips, club
meetings, assemblies, counseling sessions, course registrations, athletic
competitions, and other school-related activities. In some school programs,
interpreters may be asked to interpret for deaf parents, deaf teachers, and
other deaf employees.
Out-of-class interpreting assignments requiring hours beyond
the regular working hours should be compensated in some form per local
policy, e.g., stipend, compensation time off, or overtime. Volunteer
activities are at the discretion of the educational interpreter.
Non-Interpreting Responsibilities
Educational interpreters should not be asked to assume
responsibility for duties for which they do not have the needed training
and/or background knowledge. In these cases, time may need to be set
aside by the interpreter and other appropriate staff for “on-the-job” training
and/or support for the interpreter to take workshops and other formal
training elsewhere.
Tutoring. Programs that offer special tutoring services to
their deaf students frequently use educational interpreters to provide this
service. However, as of 1989, very few interpreters had received special
training for tutoring.
If tutoring is part of an educational interpreter’s
responsibilities, it should be carried out under the direct supervision of the
teacher, since the teacher ultimately is responsible for teaching and
assessing student progress.
The educational interpreter and the deaf student are more
likely to be able to communicate directly with one another than are other
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members of the educational staff with the same student, and of course this
is very important in tutoring.
Communication notwithstanding, the educational interpreter’s
ability to tutor effectively depends also on the interpreter’s level of
knowledge about the subject matter being covered. In this respect, at least,
tutoring may indeed be easier to do at the elementary level than at the
secondary level, and easier at the secondary level than at the postsecondary
level where the interpreter may not have indepth knowledge of the course
content. For this reason, among others, it is more common to include
tutoring among the responsibilities of educational interpreters at the K-12
levels than at the postsecondary level.
General classroom assistance. The presence of a deaf student
in the regular class most likely adds to the work of the teacher, particularly
at the elementary level where the student can be quite dependent on the
teacher for special attention and assistance. At times when their services
are not needed for interpreting, educational interpreters may volunteer or
be asked by the teacher to assist with some of the more routine classroom
duties, particularly when the interpreter is assigned to the same teacher and
class for most or all of the school day.
This potentially sensitive area for both teacher and interpreter
should be closely monitored by the supervisor. For the protection of both
teacher and interpreter, and for the maintenance of a positive classroom
climate, there must be a good understanding between both as to the level
and kind of general classroom assistance the educational interpreter can
provide the teacher and class without interfering with his/her primary
responsibility for interpreting. In this context, it is emphasized that the
educational interpreter should be prepared to interrupt other classroom
activities when interpreting services are needed. (See also "Responsibilities
and Ethical Considerations." )
Under no circumstances should the educational interpreter take
on the responsibility of the teacher for management of the class.
Sign language instruction. Educational interpreters frequently
are asked to assume an instructional role in teaching sign language to
groups of students and school staff members. The usual preparation and
certification for interpreting does not cover this area of responsibility, and
most interpreters, while capable of providing informal instruction for
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enrichment, are not well prepared to teach formal sign language courses.
However, training and several levels of certification in sign language
instruction are available through the Sign Instruction Guidance Network
(SIGN) of the National Association of the Deaf, and the educational
interpreter might be encouraged to make this a part of his or her
professional development plan.’
Educational planning. The educational interpreter’s
responsibilities should include provisions for what might be_ called
"educational planning". This includes time that is set aside for the
educational interpreter and teacher to discuss course content, lesson plans,
upcoming tests, etc., in order to coordinate educational planning for the
deaf student. At the elementary level, where the educational interpreter is
likely to be working with the same teacher and class over the year, these
meetings should be scheduled on a regular basis, particularly if the
interpreter’s educational duties include tutoring and/or general classroom
assistance.
Educational planning should also include provisions for
"preparation time” — time to preview textbooks and other instructional
materials, to become oriented to subject content and vocabulary and to
selected vocabulary signs, etc. — to enable the interpreter to prepare a
better interpretation. (See also "Schedule.")
Reference was made earlier about the need for continuing skill
development by the educational interpreter, much of which needs to be on
an inservice basis as part of educational planning. This remains essential
until more interpreter preparation programs provide the curriculum to
prepare interpreters to work as specialists in the educational setting.
Responsibilities and Ethical Considerations
In 1979, the Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf (RID)
developed a Code of Ethics, consisting of eight principles and a series of
guidelines. This code was developed essentially for general situations
' For more information, write SIGN, National Association of the
Deaf, 814 Thayer Avenue, Silver Spring, Maryland 20910.
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involving deaf adults as clients, without reference to interpreting for
children or interpreting in educational settings (Frishberg, 1986)’.
As might be expected, the RID Code of Ethics has more
immediate relevance to interpreting for deaf adults than for deaf children,
and for students enrolled in postsecondary and continuing education classes
than for those enrolled at the elementary or secondary levels. Educational
interpreters, therefore, frequently express concerns about the applicability
of particular principles of the RID Code to educational situations.
One of these principles stresses the importance of keeping all
assignment-related information strictly confidential. This importast aspect
of the client-interpreter relationship generally applies to the student-
interpreter relationship as well. A climate of trust should be maintained
between interpreter, teacher, and student. Interpreters should be careful
not to damage that trust by critiquing teachers’ classroom behaviors to
outside parties.
As with many ethical guidelines, exceptions to the
confidentiality principle may occur, particularly when the safety and
welfare of a child or adolescent are involved. For example, as a member
of the educational team, the interpreter should exercise judgment in sharing
information that is relevant to a deaf student’s educational progress with
other members of the team and his or her supervisor. In this regard,
educational interpreters must be aware of, and adhere to, policies and
procedures established by the district for its employees. .
The RID Code also indicates that the interpreter should
interpret in the language most readily understood by the person(s) whom
he or she is serving. However, in the educational setting, it is the
responsibility of school administrators, not interpreters, to determine the
language to be used. If it is clear to the educational interpreter that the
student is deriving little information from the prescribed form of
communication, with consequences for that student’s educational
? Frishberg, N, (1986), Interpreting: An Introduction, Silver
Spring, Maryland: RID Publications.
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development, the interpreter should feel free to discuss this with other
members of the educational team and his or her supervisor.
The RID Code of Ethics addresses interpreting assignments
only. It does not cover the additional responsibilities that are so common
among educational interpreters. Some educational interpreters infer from
this that the RID Code discourages interpreters from assuming
responsibilities in the school beyond interpreting. It does not.
The prevailing opinion among educational interpreters serving
students at all educational levels is that the RID Code of Ethics offers
useful guidance. With some adaptations and the insertion of guidelines that
more closely reflect needs and circumstances within various educational
settings serving deaf students, the Code can provide an appropriate
foundation of ethical principles for educational interpreters.
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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.