Amicus Curiae Brief — Wright v. West

Supreme Court brief1992

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

—

No. 91-542 | FEB 3

In the Supreme Court of the Wuited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

ELLIS B. WRIGHT, JR., WARDEN, ET AL., PETITIONERS

Vv.

FRANK ROBERT WEST, JR.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONERS

KENNETH W. STARR

Solicitor General

ROBERT S. MUELLER, III

Assistant Attorney General

JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR.

Deputy Solicitor General

ANDREW G. MCBRIDE

Associate Deputy Attorney General

WILLIAM K. KELLEY

Assistant to the Solicitor General

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

(202) 514-2217

LL a SST SEAS

QUESTION PRESENTED

The United States will address the following

question :

In determining whether to grant a petition for

a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pur-

suant to a judgement of a state court, should a federal

court give deference to the state court’s application

of law to the specific facts of the petitioner’s case

or should it review the state court’s determination

de novo?

(1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

NE 1

Sealed daaiesaderenesencasnvetesveceewterceesreeenerees 2

Introduction and summary of argument ...............0.000....... 5

Argument:

I. A state court’s reasonable, good faith applica-

tion of law to fact in a criminal proceeding is

entitled to deference in subsequent federal

habeas corpus proceedings 0000000000000... ooeeeeeeeee ee 8

A. Teague and its progeny establish that fed-

eral habeas courts must not disrupt reason-

able, good faith interpretations of law by

ST 9

B. Factual findings in state criminal proceedings

are presumed to be correct in subsequent fed-

eral habeas corpus proceedings 0.0... 12

C. As a result of Teague and Section 2254(d),

current doctrine presents the incongruous

situation that the only issues effectively sub-

ject to de novo review on federal habeas

corpus are mixed questions of law and fact... 12

1. Our proposed harmonization of the stand-

ard of review would fully serve the pur-

poses of habeas corpus, and would avoid

the dilution of Teague that will inevitably

result if the current incongruous situa-

I. eecmenuvewcccescerers 13

2. Teague and its progeny undermined the

premises underlying the current treat-

ment of mixed questions of law and fact.. 18

II. In this case, the state courts acted reasonably

and in good faith in rejecting respondent’s suffi-

ciency of the evidence claim .....................00000.0...... 22

Conclusion .............. Tee icneuenoncee 24

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) 12, 21

Brown V. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) 12, 21

Bunch Vv. Thompson, No. 90-4001 (4th Cir. Nov. 27,

1991) a epee et 10,11

Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990) 6, 8, 10, 11

Coleman V. Thompson, 111 8. Ct. 2546 (1991) 8,13

Cosby V. Jones, 682 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982). 4

Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) 12, 21

Delo v. Stokes, 110 8. Ct. 1880 (19990) 18

Donnelly Vv. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974) 7.08

Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989) 15, 22

Engle Vv. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982) 2

Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475 (1991) 21

Fay Vv. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)... 22

Irvin V. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) ouiace a:

Jackson Vv. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) 3-4, 7, 8, 17,

18, 19, 20

Kuhlmann Vv. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) 13, 22

Lewis v. Jeffers, 1108S. Ct. 3092 (1990) 21

Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971) 9, 20

Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985). 12, 15, 16, 17, 21

Murray V. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) . ; 2

Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) 12, 21

Penry V. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) if)

Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 (1984) . 2

Rose Vv. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) 22

Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (19990) 6, 8,9, 10

Sawyer Vv. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990) 9,10, 15

Stone Vv. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) _. 15, 22

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) 12, 21

Sumner Vv. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981)... 12

Teaque V. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 13,

18, 20, 22

Townsend V. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) 12

I/nited States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982) 8, 20

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) 14

United States Vv. Restrepo-Contreras, 942 F.2d 96

(1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, No. 91-6502 (Jan.

21, 1992) 23

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) —... 2

Constitution and statutes: Page

U.S. Const. Amend. IV 15

28 U.S.C. 2254 Erase ats 1,3

28 U.S.C. 2254 (d) ote

28 U.S.C. 2255 8

Miscellaneous:

P. Bator, D. Meltzer, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro, Hart

& Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Fed-

eral System (3d ed. 1988) ~ eae ee 17

Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum.

Sis Sas GU 15

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

No. 91-542

ELLIS B. WRIGHT, JR., WARDEN, ET AL., PETITIONERS

FRANK ROBERT WEST, JR.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONERS

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES

This case presents the question whether a federal

court in a habeas corpus proceeding under 28 U.S.C.

2254 should defer to the state court’s application of

law to the specific facts of the habeas petitioner’s

case, or whether the federal court should review the

state court determination de novo. Resolution of

this issue requires assessment of the proper balance

between the scope of federal habeas corpus and in-

terests in comity and the finality of state determina-

tions. The United States, no less than the States, has

an interest in maintaining that proper balance. In

addition, the United States has in the past partici-

pated in several important habeas corpus cases. See,

(1)

e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Reed

v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 (1984); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S.

107 (1982); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U:S. 478 (1986).

STATEMENT

Sometime between December 13 and December 26,

1978, Angelo Cardova’s home in Westmoreland

County, Virginia was burglarized and items worth

about $3,000 were taken. Pet. App. 2. On January

10, 1979, while investigating an unrelated crime, law

enforcement authorities discovered goods stolen from

the Cardova home in the home of respondent Frank

West. The goods recovered included two television

sets, a mirror framed with shells, a wood carving,

groceries, a fake fur jacket with the name Esther

embroidered in the lining, a silk jacket decorated

with the term ‘‘Korea 1970” a mounted lobster, and

other property. /d. at 2-3. The value of these items

was about $1,100. Jbid.

Respondent was indicted and tried for grand lar-

ceny. He testified at trial that he had bought the

stolen goods at various flea markets. J.A. 21. In

particular, respondent maintained that he had pur-

chased some of the items from one Ronnie Elkins,

but could not recall when or where he had done so.

Id. at 22-28. The court of appeals characterized re-

spondent’s testimony as “somewhat confused,” and

noted that respondent was unable to account for how

he had obtained some of the stolen goods. Pet. App.

4, Elkins did not testify, and respondent explained

that he had not called Elkins as a witness because

he had not known until trial which items he had been

accused of stealing. /bid.

The jury was properly instructed as to the ele-

ments of the offense for which respondent was

charged, as well as to the fact that it must have a

moral conviction of respondent’s guilt beyond a rea-

sonable doubt in order to convict. J.A. 32-36. The

jury was also instructed concerning the long-estab-

lished Virginia common law inference that a person

in exclusive possession of recently stolen goods stole

those goods if he fails to explain, or falsely explains,

his possession. Pet. App. 4. The jury convicted. Re-

spondent moved to set aside his conviction on the

ground that the evidence was insufficient to support

the verdict, and the trial court denied the motion. On

May 30, 1980, the Supreme Court of Virginia re-

jected respondent’s appeal, having found no reversible

error. J.A, 37-41.

Seven years later, respondent filed a state habeas

corpus petition, arguing that the evidence against

him was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict.

J.A. 42-43. On May 13, 1988, the Supreme Court

of Virginia denied relief. Jd. at 48-49.

Respondent thereafter filed a habeas corpus peti-

tion in federal district court under 28 U.S.C. 2254,

alleging inter alia that his conviction was unconstitu-

tional because the evidence against him did not prove

his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The district

court denied relief, holding that credibility determi-

nations are beyond the province of a federal habeas

proceeding, and that a jury could rationally have

found respondent guilty beyond a reasonable doubt

based on the evidence presented. Pet, App. 23-33.

On April 29, 1991—almost eleven years after re-

spondent’s conviction became final—the court of ap-

peals reversed the district court, and ordered that

respondent be granted habeas relief, Pet. App. 1-22.

The court of appeals analyzed respondent’s claim

under the sufficiency standard of Jackson vy. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307 (1979), which requires the court to

determine whether, viewing all the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational

trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reason-

able doubt.

The court of appeals held that it was irrational for

the jury to infer from the basic facts proved by the

Commonwealth that respondent was guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.’ Pet. App. 20. The court acknowl-

edged that respondent’s testimony was confused, but

thought that his explanation was not “inherently im-

plausible” and could “not fairly be treated as posi-

tive evidence of guilt.” Jd. at 18-19. Respondent’s

testimony “was, at most, a neutral factor in assessing

the probative force of the inference.” Jd. at 19. Hav-

ing therefore removed from the analysis the fact that

the jury dishelieved respondent’s “confused” testi-

mony, the court held that the lapse in time between

the theft and the discovery of the stolen goods in re-

spondent’s home, the fact that the goods possessed by

respondent made up only a third of the value of the

stolen goods, and the lack of corroborating evidence,

made it impossible for any trier of fact to find guilt

bevond a reasonable doubt. /d. at 14-20. The court

held that respondent’s conviction therefore violated

due process and that he was entitled to habeas relief.

Id. at 20.

The court acknowledged “special caution and

anxiety” in concluding that a state jury of twelve

acted irrationally, and that a state trial and appellate

court. as well as a federal district court, were wrong

1 The court of appeals adopted, as a framework for analyz-

ing the rationality of a jury verdict based on the common law

permissive inference, the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis in Cosby

Vv. Jones, 682 F.2d 1373 (1982).

in ruling that the evidence was sufficient to convince

a rational trier of fact of respondent’s guilt. Pet.

App. 20-21. “Aware of its special delicacy * * * we

nevertheless have felt cbliged under the constitutional

test we apply to make that determination here.” Jd.

at 21.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In reviewing habeas corpus claims, federal courts

are confronted with three sorts of questions: purely

legal questions, mixed questions of law and fact, and

factual questions. This Court’s decision in Teague

v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and later cases apply-

ing its principles, altered the scope of federal court

review of state court legal determinations by restrict-

ing habeas corpus review of claims seeking “new”

rules of law. As a result of these recent decisions,

federal habeas corpus courts now must ordinarily

defer to reasonable, good faith interpretations of law

by state courts. As io factual questions, it has long

been established that state court factual conclusions

are presumptively correct in federal habeas corpus

proceedings. 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). Against this back-

drop, this case calls for the Court to determine

whether the third category—mixed questions of law

and fact—should continue to be the sole type of issue

subject to de novo review in federal habeas corpus

proceedings. It should not.

1. Federal habeas courts now defer to reasonable,

good faith interpretations of law by state courts.

This Court has established that habeas review is not

available if the habeas petitioner seeks to establish a

“new rule” to overturn his conviction; the Court has

in turn defined a “new rule” as one that was not un-

ambiguously compelled by existing precedent at the

time the conviction became final. See Teague v. Lane,

489 U.S. 288, 299-310 (1989) (plurality opinion) ;

Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 412-416 (1990) ;

Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990). The ques-

tion on habeas is not whether the state court’s legal

determination was the same one the federal habeas

court would make, but whether the state court’s de-

termination conflicted with an established rule so

clear as not to be “susceptible to debate among rea-

sonable minds.” Butler, 494 U.S. at 415. If it did

not, then the habeas petitioner seeking to overturn

that legal determination is seeking a “new rule” un-

der Teague, and is barred from habeas relief. The

end result of Teague and its progeny is to “vali-

date[] reasonable, good-faith interpretations of

existing precedents by state courts even though they

are shown to be contrary to later decisions.” butler,

494 U.S. at 414.

As to findings of fact, it has long been established

that factual findings in state criminal proceedings

are entitled to a presumption of correctness in fed-

eral habeas proceedings. 28 U.S. 2254(d).

2. The current habeas landscape is thus charac-

terized by the incongruous feature that mixed ques-

tions of law and fact are the only issues subject to

de novo review in federal habeas corpus proceedings.

As with legal and factual issues, however, the pur-

poses of habeas corpus are fully served by deferential

habeas review of application of law to fact. In terms

of the underlying functions of habeas corpus, there

is no meaningful! distinction between state court in-

terpretations of existing law and application of that

law to particular facts. A state court that has acted

reasonably and in good faith cannot be expected to

do more, and will not be prompted to act more care-

fully by the prospect of a reversal years later on fed-

eral habeas review of a reasonable, but technically

wrong, decision. ;

Unless this Court brings the standard of review

for mixed questions of law and fact into line with the

standard for reviewing legal questions and the stan-

dard for reviewing factual determinations, it is pre-

dictable that habeas claims will typically be couched

in terms that purport to seek application of settled

law to specific facts. Claims that in fact rest upon

a call for expansion of the law on habeas corpus will

be recast as claims regarding the sufficiency of the

evidence, or as claims going to the “fundamental

fairness” of the habeas petitioner’s trial. See Jack-

son v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979): Donnelly vy.

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974). This case illus-

trates that danger. Respondent’s real quarrel is not

with the sufficiency of the evidence at his trial, but

with the validity of the common Jaw inference that

the jury was permitted to apply. Yet a frontal as-

sault on the constitutionality of the permissive infer-

ence would have been barred by Teague and its

progeny.

The rule we advocate is undoubtedly in tension

with this Court’s past treatment of mixed questions

of law and fact. But the premises for de novo review

of such questions have been fatally undermined by

Teague and its progeny. In terms of the nature

and function of habeas corpus, there is no basis for

disparate treatment of legal and mixed questions. In

addition, the Court’s analysis in Jackson y. Virginia,

supra (establishing the rule that federal habeas

courts must review sufficiency of the evidence claims

to determine whether any rational trier of fact could

have found guilt heyerd a reasonable doubt), was

explicitly premised on the view that the federal

courts perform the same function on direct and col-

lateral review. 443 U.S. at 317-318. That premise

has since been undermined. See, e.g., Teague, 489

U.S. at 306 (plurality opinion); United States v.

Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164-165 (1982) (proceedings

under 28 U.S.C. 2255).

3. Applying a rule of deference to reasonable

state court treatment of mixed questions of law and

fact, the proper outcome in this case is clear. The

Virginia courts acted reasonably in concluding that

the evidence against respondent was sufficient to es-

tablish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

ARGUMENT

I. A STATE COURT’S REASONABLE, GOOD FAITH

APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACT IN A CRIMINAL

PROCEEDING IS ENTITLED TO DEFERENCE IN

SUBSEQUENT FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRO-

CEEDINGS

This Court’s recent decisions have emphasized the

basic purposes of federal habeas corpus—to ensure

that state criminal proceedings are conducted con-

sistently with the Constitution as interpreted at the

time of the proceedings, and to deter unconstitutional

action on the part of state courts. See Teague v.

Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306-307 (1988) (plurality opin-

ion): Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 413-414

(1990); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990).

The Court has also emphasized that, in determining

the scope of habeas corpus, the costs of habeas review

in terms of finality and comity must be considered.

Butler, 494 U.S. at 412-414; Coleman vy. Thompson,

111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554 (1991). The purposes of

haheas review are fully served, and its costs mini-

mized, by a rule that a state court’s reasonable, good

faith application of law to fact in a criminal proceed-

ing is entitled to deference in federal habeas corpus.

A. Teague And Its Progeny Establish That Federal

Habeas Courts Must Not Disrupt Reasonable, Good

Faith Interpretations Of Law By State Courts

In order to achieve the proper ends of habeas cor-

pus, while minimizing injury to important values of

finality and comity, this Court held in Teague that

a habeas corpus petitioner may not seek to overturn

his conviction based on a “new rule” of law. See 489

U.S. at 310 (plurality opinion); id. at 316-317

(White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the

judgment).* Teague defined a new rule as one that

is not “dictated by precedent existing at the time the

defendant’s conviction became final.” Jd. at 301

(plurality opinion).

In the wake of Teague, the Court in Butler, Saffle,

and Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990), reaf-

firmed this understanding of what constitutes a “new

rule” under Teague. The Court stated in Saffle that

a habeas petitioner is seeking a new rule unless “a

state court considering [the] claim at the time [the

petitioner’s] conviction became final would have felt

compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the

rule * * * was required by the Constitution.” Saffle,

494 U.S. at 488. For a claim to be compelled or

* This rule is subject to two exceptions: A claim seeking

a new rule is cognizable on habeas if the rule (1) places

certain kinds of primary conduct beyond the power of the

State to proscribe, or (2) is a watershed rule of procedure

without which the likelihood of an accurate verdict is seri-

ously reduced. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. at 311 (plurality

opinion) ; Penry Vv. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989): see

also Mackey Vv. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692-693 (1971)

(separate opinion of Harlan, J.).

dictated by existing precedent, it is not enough that

it “is within the ‘logical compass’ of an earlier deci-

sion, or indeed that it is ‘controlled’ by a prior deci-

sion,” because even in such circumstances it is often

possible to reach a “reasonable contrary conclu-

sion[].” Butler, 494 U.S. at 415. See also Saffle, 494

U.S. at 491 (if existing precedents “inform, or even

control or govern, the analysis of [the habeas peti-

tioner’s] claim, it does not follow that they compel

the rule that [he] seeks’); Sawyer, 110 8S. Ct. at

2828 (the fact that the rule sought by a habeas peti-

tioner was “‘a predictable development” based on ex-

isting law does not suffice to show that the rule is

not new). If the legal interpretation sought by the

habeas petitioner was “‘susceptible to debate among

reasonable minds” at the time his conviction became

final, Butler, 494 U.S. at 415, then it is a “new rule”

under Teague, Butler, Saffle, and Sawyer—i.e., one

that was not “dictated by precedent,” Teague, 489

U.S. at 301 (plurality opinion)—and the claim

based on that new rule is accordingly not cognizable

on federal habeas corpus.

Because Teague made the inquiry into whether a

habeas petitioner seeks a new rule #6 threshold ques-

tion, see 489 U.S. at 300-301, 315-316 (plurality

opinion), the effect of that case—together with the

elaboration in subsequent cases of what constitutes a

“new rule’—is to remove from federal habeas pro-

ceedings any room for disagreement over the appro-

priate legal standard to be applied.* If there is any

’ Our reading of the effect of Teague and its progeny is

confirmed by the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Bunch V.

Thompson, No. 90-4001 (Nov. 27, 1991) (Wilkinson, J.),

where the court held that the state court’s resolution of a

close legal question ‘“‘warrants respect from a federal habeas

reasonable difference in opinion as to the proper legal

standard, Saffe and Butler make clear that the

habeas petitioner is seeking a new rule; and Teague

held that claims seeking to establish new ruies are

not cognizable in habeas. Of course, there may be

instances in which state courts refuse to recognize

established law—that is, act unreasonably or in bad

faith—and under Teague and its progeny federal!

habeas corpus is available to correct and deter such

errors. The result of these developments, as Justice

Brennan correctly stated, is that a federal habeas

court ‘“‘must defer to the state court’s decision reject-

ing the claim unless that decision is patently unrea-

sonable.” Butler, 494 U.S. at 422 (Brennan, J.,

(lissenting ).*

court as one that reasonable jurists could make.” Slip op. 10.

The court recognized that mere disagreement with the state

court’s legal judgment would entail creation of a new rule

under Butler, and therefore refused to consider the habeas

petitioner’s claim. /d. at 5. Indeed, even the dissent in Bunch

did not dispute that a federal habeas court is bound to defer

to reasonable state court legal judgments, but argued that the

law was too clear to admit of reasonable dispute. Jd. at 23

(Sprouse, J., dissenting).

* See also Butler, 494 U.S. at 417-418 (Brennan, J., dissent-

ing) (“A legal ruling sought by a federal habeas petitioner

is now deemed ‘new’ as long as the correctness of the rule,

based on precedent existing when the petitioner’s conviction

became final, is susceptible to debate among reasonable

minds. Put another way, a state prisoner can secure habeas

relief only by showing that the state court’s rejection of the

constitutional challenge was so clearly invalid under then-

prevailing legal standards that the decision could not be de-

fended by any reasonable jurist.’’) (citation and internal

punctuation removed).

B. Factual Findings In State Criminal Proceedings

Are Presumed To Be Correct In Subsequent Federal

Habeas Corpus Proceedings

As to findings of fact, Congress has specifically

provided that state court factual determinations are

“presumed to be correct” in federal habeas, subject

to eight exceptions that generally go to ensuring that

the state court fully and fairly adjudicated the habeas

petitioner’s federal claim. 28 U.S.C. 2254(d); see

also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). In in-

stances in which one of the statutory exceptions ap-

plies, a federal district court on habeas review may

conduct an evidentiary hearing. State court factual

findings are, however, generally conclusive. See, e./.,

Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981).

C. As A Result Of Teague And Section 2254(d), Cur-

rent Doctrine Presents The Incongruous Situation

That The Only Issues Effectively Subject To De

Novo Review On Federal Habeas Corpus Are Mixed

Questions Of Law And Fact

Prior to the rule established by Teague, Butler, and

Saffle, this Court often treated mixed questions of

law and fact as subject to independent review in

federal habeas corpus. See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton,

474 U.S. 104, 112-118 (1985); Strickland v. Wash-

ington, 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984); Cuyler v. Sullivan,

446 U.S. 335, 341-342 (1980); Brewer v. Williams,

430 U.S. 387, 403-404 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409

U.S. 188, 193 n.38 (1972); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S.

717, 723 (1961); Townsend vy. Sain, 372 U.S. at 309

n.6, 318; Brown vy. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 507-508

(1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). Subsequent

developments in the law have fatally undermined the

legal premises of that pre-Teague rule. As matters

presently stand, only unreasonable state court inter-

pretations of /aw are subject to habeas review, and

state court determinations of fact are ordinarily con-

clusive. It is accordingly incongruous that state court

application of settled law to historical fact should be

subject to independent review in federal habeas.

Nothing in reason or experience suggests that federal

habeas review of mixed questions of law and fact

should be move searching than review of pure ques-

tions of law.

1. Our Proposed Harmonization Of The Standard

Of Review Would Fully Serve The Purposes Of

Habeas Corpus, And Would Avoid The Dilution

Of Teague That Will Inevitably Result If The

Current Incongruous Situation Is Maintained

In determining the scope of habeas corpus review,

the Court has stated that the purposes of the writ

must be considered in conjunction with interests in

finality and comiiv. Teague, 489 U.S. at 308 (plural-

ity opinion); Coleman vy. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. at

2554; see also Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436,

447 (1986) (plurality opinion). In adopting the doc-

trine that “new rules” are not cognizable in habeas,

the Court recognized that the purposes informing

habeas—giving due latitude to countervailing in-

terests in finality and comity—are fully served if

federal oversieht of state court legal interpretations

is limited to determining that the state court acted

reasonably and in good faith. Moreover, this is so

even if the state court is later proved to have been

wrone.” In terms of the underlying functions of

®* Under Teague and the cases applying it, a state court’s

interpretation of federal law that is later shown to be errone-

ous nonetheless is not supplanted in a federal habeas proceed-

ing as long as the state court’s interpretation reflects a rea-

sonable, good faith construction of the law. It necessarily

habeas corpus, no meaningful distinction can be

drawn between state court interpretations of existing

law and application of that law to the facts of a par-

ticular case.

Just as a reasonable, good faith interpretation of

the Constitution by a state court may be wrong (but

nonetheless is not cognizable on habeas because the

interpretation showing the state court’s view to be

wrong would constitute a new rule) so, too, a rea-

sonable, good faith application of law to fact in

light of the prevailing legal standards at the time of

the conviction is similarly deserving of deference.

Habeas corpus must serve the important purpose of

policing and deterring unconstitutional state court

criminal convictions, but, for the reasons set forth in

Teague and its progeny, that purpose is fully served—

and the costs of habeas are minimized—by a habeas

standard that defers to reasonable, good faith appli-

cation of law to facts by the state courts.

There is no reason to think that deferential review

of state court determinations of mixed questions of

law and fact wil! undermine the deterrent purposes

of habeas. A state court that has acted reasonably

and in good faith cannot be expected to do more; such

a court will not be prompted to act differently by

the prospect that a federal habeas court years down

the road will overturn its judgment regarding the

legal import of the facts before it. Cf. United States

v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918-919 (1984) (the exclu-

sionary rule cannot be expected to deter objectively

reasonable law enforcement activity). Moreover, any

Suggestion that the state courts do not endeavor con-

follows that, under Teague, the purposes of habeas corpus are

fully served if the federal courts ensure that state criminai

proceedings are conducted reasonably and in good faith.

scientiously to apply constitutional law to the facts

before them is “premised on a skepticism of state

courts” that this Court has roundly condemned. Saw-

yer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 2831. See also Monaghan,

Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 229,

272 (1985) (“The premise that state courts are to

be suspected of distorted factfinding and law applica-

tion is disquieting. After all, the Constitution pre-

supposes that the state courts will enforce declared

federal law fairly.’’).

Since this Court’s decision in Stone v. Powell, 428

U.S. 465 (1976), Fourth Amendment claims—which

involve application of law to facts—have been cate-

gorically excluded from habeas review so long as an

opportunity for full and fair adjudication of the

claim was afforded at the state level. The Court took

this step in recognition of the fact that a contrary

rule would not appreciably further the underlying

purposes of habeas corpus review, including its deter-

rence function, and therefore could not be justified

in light ef the significant costs associated with habeas

review generally. See also Duckworth v. Eagan, 492

U.S. 195, 205-214 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring)

(arguing that Stone rule should apply to Miranda

claims). Nothing suggests that limiting federal court

oversight of state court treatment of Fourth Amend-

ment claims to direct review has caused the state

courts to be any less vigilant in discharging their

duty to uphold the Fourth Amendment.

The standard of review we advocate also has the

considerable virtue of workability. As this Court

has recognized, it is often difficult to discern the line

between mixed questions of law and fact and pure

questions of law. Miller vy. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113

(1985). In Miller, the Court acknowledged that it

“has not charted an entirely clear course in this

area,” and that “the appropriate methodology for

distinguishing questions of fact frem questions of law

has been, to say the least, elusive.” /d. at 113. More-

over, “much of the difficulty in this area stems from

the practical truth that the decision to label an issue

a ‘question of law,’ a ‘question of fact,’ or a ‘mixed

question of law and fact’ is sometimes as much a

matter of allocation as it is of analysis.” /d. at 115-

114. On the facts in Miller, the Court thus focused

upon which judicial actor was best positioned to make

the judgment in question. /d. at 114."

As a result of Teague, the determination whether

a habeas petition presents a mixed question of law

and fact or a purely legal question is crucial.’ It is

®In Miller, the Court concluded that the mixed question of

law and fact at issue (whether a confession was involuntary)

was subject to independent federal review in habeas corpus.

474 U.S. at 112. This stemmed from the Court’s belief that

the federal courts were as well situated as the state courts to

make the determination, and the Court’s view that federal

oversight in this area has “traditionally played an important

parallel role’ in protecting constitutional rights. Jd. at 117-

118. The underlying premise of Miller—that federal courts

review legal questions on a de novo basis—has, as we have

shown, changed as a result of Teague, Butler, and Saffle. It

would be incongruous to require federal courts to defer to

state court legal conclusions (judgments that the federal

courts are undoubtedly as capable as the state courts to make),

but to subject state court application of law to facts to de novo

review.

7 Prior to Teague, the distinction between a factual ques-

tion and a mixed question was similarly important. If a ques-

tion was found to be factual, the state court resolution was

entitled to Section 2254(d) deference; if it was found to be

legal, independent federal habeas review was the rule. As

this Court has recognized, this resulted in questionable con-

entirely predictable that habeas petitioners with

claims that in reality seek a new rule will now couch

those claims in terms that purport to seek application

of settled law to the specific facts of their cases. Ap-

plying a different standard of review to so-called

mixed questions of law and fact would thus facili-

tate end-runs around Teague and its progeny. Ha-

beas claims that, in truth, rest upon a call for expan-

sion of the law will be recast as claims regarding the

sufficiency of the evidence, or as claims going to the

“fundamental fairness” of the trial or penalty phase.

See Jackson vy. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Don-

nelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974) (outside

of any specific constitutional guarantee criminal trial

may be so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a

denial of due process).

This case vividly demonstrates the danger. Re-

spondent’s real quarrel is with the common Jaw infer-

ence that one in possession of recently stolen goods

who fails to explain, or falsely explains, his possession

is responsible for the theft of those goods. The lower

court’s opinion roundly criticizes the common law

inference as out of touch with modern reality. See

Pet. App. 11-13. Yet because Teague forecloses a

frontal assault on the inference through the creation

of a new rule on habeas corpus, respondent and the

court below recast his claim as one going to the suffi-

ciency of the evidence under Jackson. This practice

will surely be repeated in other habeas cases unless

tortions of mixed questions into the factual or legal rubric,

depending upon the context. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. at

112-113 (gathering examples) ; see also P. Bator, D. Meltzer,

P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro, Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts

and the Federal System 1565-1566 (3d ed. 1988) (same).

the standards of review under Teague, Section 2254 (d),

and the mixed question cases are harmonized.”

2. Teague And Its Progeny Undermined The Prem-

ises Underlying The Current Treatment Of Mixed

Questions Of Law And Fact

We recognize that the doctrine we are proposing is

inconsistent with this Court’s pre-7'eague statements

concerning mixed questions of law and fact on habeas

corpus review. We believe, however, that the tension

is produced by the anomalous nature of those deci-

sions in light of this Court’s recent habeas corpus

decisions. In short, the underlying premises for de

novo review of mixed questions have been undermined

by Teague and its progeny.

Of particular relevance is Jackson vy. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307 (1979). There, the Court held that the

standard of review for a federal habeas court con-

* Maintaining a different and less stringent standard for

so-called mixed questions of law and fact thus carries the

danger of encouraging abuse and nullifying this Court’s deci-

sion in Teaque. Teague and its progeny responded in part to

a growing problem of repetitive and abusive habeas corpus

filings, particularly in capital cases. See, e.g., Delo V. Stokes,

110 S. Ct. 1880 (1990) (fourth federal habeas corpus petition

filed within days of date set for execution). Before Teaque,

prisoners would often dress old claims in the guise of recent

decisions of this Court—circumventing procedural default and

abuse of the writ doctrines by contending that their claims

were based on “new law” previously unavailable to them.

Teaque’s holding that retroactivity is a threshold question and

its conclusion that “a case announces a new rule if the result

was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defend-

ant’s conviction became final,” 489 U.S. at 301 (plurality

opinion), together constitute a substantial barrier to abusive

filings. That barrier will be worth littie if it can be cireum-

vented by the simple expedient of labelling a claim a mixed

question.

sidering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting a state conviction is whether, viewing all

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prose-

cution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. /d.

at 318-319. In making that judgment, the Jackson

Court stated, a federal habeas court “has a duty to

assess the historical facts when it is called upon to

apply a constitutional standard to a conviction ob-

tained in a state court.” Jd. at 318. The Court

equated the standard of review of a criminal convic-

tion on direct review with that on collateral review.

Ibid.

In our view, the premises underlying Jackson no

longer obtain.’ First, Teague, Butler, and Safle

mean that even purely legal determinations are sub-

ject to deferential review, limited to determining

whether the state court acted reasonably and in good

faith. Moreover, the Court in Jackson viewed a fed-

eral court’s role in a habeas corpus proceeding as no

different from that undertaken in direct appeal from

either a federal or state criminal conviction. See 443

U.S. at 317-318. Thus, the Court relied upon federal

criminal cases and cases on direct appeal as support

for the application of the same a, of the evi-

dence standard in habeas corpus and on direct review.

Id. at 318. Indeed, the Court noted the practice of

the federal courts independently to assess the facts

supporting a criminal conviction on direct review,

and explicitly stated that “‘[t]he same duty obtains

in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.” Ibid.

"We do not question Jackson’s substantive standard for

determining whether evidence was sufficient to support a

criminal conviction, but only the standard of review for ap-

plying it in federal habeas corpus.

This Court’s decisions since Jackson have emphat-

ically rejected any analogy between habeas corpus

review of state judgments and review on direct ap-

peal. The Court’s adoption of Justice Harlan’s ap-

proach to retroactivity in Teague was itself premised

upon a recognition that a criminal conviction becomes

final after a direct appeal, and that a habeas pro-

ceeding is a subsequent and separate action, in which

different legal standards should apply. Habeas corpus

is “a collateral remedy, providing an avenue for up-

setting judgments that have become otherwise final.

It is not designed as a substitute for direct review.”

Teague, 489 U.S. at 306 (plurality opinion), quoting

Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. at 682-683 (sepa-

rate opinion of Harlan, J.). See also United States

v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982) (“we have long

and consistently affirmed that a collateral challenge

may not do service for an appeal”’).

Thus, in Teague the Court approached the question

of retroactivity on habeas corpus, not by reference to

direct appeal, but by analysis of the “nature, func-

tion, and scope of” habeas corpus. 489 U.S. at 306

(plurality opinion), quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 682

(separate opinion of Harlan, J.). This inquiry, which

should be the basis for analyzing the proper standard

of review in this case, was not one that the Court un-

dertook in Jackson. After Teague, the ‘nature, func-

tion, and scope” of habeas corpus indicates that def-

erence to state court application of law to facts is

appropriate. It serves no function, and imposes great

costs on the federal system, when federal habeas re-

view results in invalidation of a ten-year old state

criminal conviction based on mere disagreement over

what is concededly a “judgment” call.

Apart from its decision in Jackson v. Virginia, this

Court has elsewhere treated mixed questions of law

and fact as subject to de novo review in habeas

corpus proceedings. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S.

104 (1985) ; Strickland vy. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

698 (1984); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 341-

342 (1980); Brewer vy. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 403-

404 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 193 n.3

(1972); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961);

Brown vy. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 507-508 (1953) (opin-

ion of Frankfurter, J.)."” In our view, although there

iS no reason to question the substantive standards

established by these cases, the underlying legal prem-

ise for the rule that the scope of review of mixed

questions is de novo has been undermined by this

Court’s decisions in Teague, Butler, and Saffle. For

the reasons we have stated, the values of consistency

and workability, as well as the fundamental function

of habeas corpus in our federal system, would be best

served by affording deference to reasonable, good

faith state court application of law to facts in crimi-

nal proceedings.

Adoption of this rule is needed in order to bring

the law into line with Teague and its progeny. This

Court has recognized that it has not “always fol-

lowed an unwavering line in its conclusions as to the

availability of the Great Writ. [The] development of

Court has on occasion considered habeas corpus claims based

on application of settled law to historic facts, and has not

questioned that the proper standard of review is de novo. See,

e.g., Lewis Vv. Jeffers, 110 S. Ct. 3092, 3102-3104 (1990)

(reviewing state appellate court factual findings under the

Jackson V. Virginia standard and determining that the state

court’s application of law to fact was rational); Estelle v.

McGuire, 112 8. Ct. 475 (1991) (rejectfng claim that admis-

sion of certain evidence at a state criminal trial violated due

process). The question of the proper standard of review was

not, however, briefed or argued in either case.

the law of federal habeas corpus has been attended,

seemingly, with some backing and filling.” Teague,

489 U.S. at 308 (plurality opinion), quoting Fay v.

Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 411-412 (1963). See also Stone v.

Powell, 428 U.S. at 474-482. As Justice O’Connor

has noted, “the Court has long recognized that habeas

corpus has been traditionally regarded as governed

by equitable principles * * * and thus has long de-

fined the scope of the writ by reference to a balanc-

ing of state and federal interests.” Duckworth v.

Eagan, 492 U.S. at 213 (O’Connor, J., concurring)

(internal quote and citation removed). See also Kuhl-

mann vy. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (plurality

opinion); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 546-548

(1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

Il. IN THIS CASE, THE STATE COURTS ACTED REA-

SONABLY AND IN GOOD FAITH IN REJECTING

RESPONDENT’S SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVI-

DENCE CLAIM

Applying a rule of deference to reasonable state

court treatment of mixed questions of law and fact,

the outcome in this ease is clear. Here, a federal] ap-

pellate court reviewed a stale record more than ten

years after the state judgment became final, and con-

cluded that a unanimous jury of twelve citizens of

the Commonwealth of Virginia acted irrationally.

The court further decided that a state trial and ap-

pellate court (not to mention a federal district court)

were incorrect in concluding that a rational fact

finder could conclude that the evidence against re-

spondent established his guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.

The court of appeals did not question that the

proper legal standard was applied at all levels of the

state proceedings. The court of appeals recognized

that it was making a “judgment” call, but it con-

cluded that the jury was irrational in inferring that

respondent’s false explanation of where he obtained

the goods in question indicated that he had stolen

them. Although the court of appeals recognized that

the jury disbelieved respondent’s explanation, it ig-

nored the probative force of the conclusion that nec-

essarily follows from that disbelief—that respondent

committed perjury in explaining how he came to

possess the goods in question. It was not irrational

for the jury to infer from respondent’s perjury that

he in fact stole those goods. See, e.g., United States

v. Restrepo-Contreras, 942 F.2d 96, 99 (lst Cir.

1991) (jury entitled to treat incredible testimony as

evidence of guilt), cert. denied, No. 91-6502 (Jan. 21,

1992).

Thus, there is no basis on which to conclude that

the state courts acted unreasonably or in bad faith

in determining that the evidence against respondent

was sufficient to support his conviction. Indeed, what

happened in this case demonstrates the need for the

rule of deference that we advocate. There is no rea-

son that the Fourth Circuit, ten years after the fact,

was better situated than the state courts to make the

necessary judgment call.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the court of appeals should be

reversed.

Respectfully submitted.