Amicus Curiae Brief — Lee v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.

s Sapreme Court, WS.

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Nos. 91-155 & 91-339 MAR 4 1992

| OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA

CONSCIOUSNESS, INC. and BRIAN RUMBAUGH,

Petitioners and Cross-Respondents,

VS.

WALTER LEE, Superintendent of Port Authority Police,

Respondent and Cross-Petitioner.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

_—————————————————————————————— __..________

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE

CRIMINAL JUSTICE LEGAL FOUNDATION

IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT

KENT S. SCHEIDEGGER*

CHARLES L. HOBSON

JEANNE M. ANDRACHEK

Criminal Justice Legal Fdn.

2131 L Street (95816)

Post Office Box 1199

Sacramento, California 95812

Telephone: (916) 446-0345

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

Criminal Justice Legal Foundation

*Attorney of Record

QUESTION PRESENTED

May the solicitation and receipt of contributions be

prohibited from the public concourses of airports?

(1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ee ance veces ss deee es eees i

EE iv

interest OF amiicus Curine ....................0000- |

Summary of facts and case ....................... 2

ee eed cc ce ccs voescceeces 3

EEE Ee 4

I

The Court should address the solicitation question before

Sees UU POEM 2... ee eee 4

II

Solicitation is not exempt from regulation ........... 6

A. Pre-scnasumbureg Cases ................... 7

B. The SI re 14

itl

The government has substantial interests in restricting

unin..ted personal solicitation for the immediate

EE 16

IV

The state may constitutionally ban such solicitation in the

airport, regardless of whether it is a public forum .. 20

ESTEE 21

eu, ence, ARG Manmer................. 24

EE ee 27

(iii)

iV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1991) . 6

Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622, 95 L. Ed. 1233,

ue Soh |: eerrerrr errr 6, 12, 13, 14, 18

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 84 L. Ed. 1213,

pf Re Pree e 8, 14, 16, 20

Clark v. Community for Creative Non- Violence,

468 U. S. 288, 82 L. Ed. 2d 221,

104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984) .......... 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26

Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, 85 L. Ed. 1049,

base 4. | Pperrererrerrr ere rey rrr sy 9

Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157, 87 L. Ed. 1324,

Gas A EU be idea ceesuvesesecdanaans 5

Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F. 2d 112

ef ere rer rere Port roe rer re 12

Green River v. Bunger, 58 P. 2d 456 (Wyo. 1936).... 12

Heffron v. International Society for Krishna

Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640, 69 L. Ed. 2d 298,

bee eee ree 18, 19, 25

International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.

Lee, 925 F. 2d 576 (CA2 1991) ............. 2,3, 24

International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.

Barber, 506 F. Supp. 147

(5): . & || ere A

International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.

Barber, 650 F. 2d 430 (CA2 1981) ............ 3, 18

Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 87 L. Ed. 809,

RP te Re GU 0 os ovis as ues sassananactees 9

Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 82 L. Ed. 949,

ree reer ray 8

Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 87 L. Ed. 1313,

Sr ae ae I 86 5's esi dA oa eee 5, 11, 13

Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 87 L. Ed. 1292,

GPS. CO BPC osc cee cece ee Oe OS

Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U. S. 395, 97 L. Ed. 1105,

a es WOE ag eos cng er seo 7

Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N.C., Inc.,

487 U.S. 781, 101 L. Ed. 2d 669,

SUS DS. Ct. SOG7 CIFUB) . wc ccc eee ces 6, 7, 22

Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment,

444 U.S. 620, 63 L. Ed. 2d 73,

ed be 6, 7, 14, 15, 21, 22

Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 84 L. Ed. 155,

ek a PEN ach See en cee oe eats 7,8

Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co.,

467 U.S. 947, 81 L. Ed. 2d 786,

Pe Gs UU 66 cS edb Cesctabannk anueee lee

Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 75 L. Ed. 1117,

PE GA PO RUMOED, 6 bn bb cee veccccedetouarouss 22

Swaggart Ministries v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization.

493 U. S. 378, 107 L. Ed. 2d 796,

PE Os UU: oh os cewe sect ee ee ewes 13, 26

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 105 L. Ed. 2d 342.

es I ei ee ee

Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1,

103 L. Ed. 2d 1, 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989)... 2.2.02... 13

Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 89 L. Fd. 430.

Pe ee ee 669 oto wc eebencin 11, 12, 16, 21

Vi

United States v. Kokinda, 111 L. Ed. 2d 571,

110 S. Ce. 3115 (1990) ...........3, 45,6, 16, 19,5

United States v. O’Brien, 39) U. S. 367, 20 L. Ed. 2d 672,

2 ee SAYS ere eee y 4 i

Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,

105 L. Ed. 2d 661, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989) ...... 25, 26

Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp. 341

A EE PEL N GT Eis CTR TET 6

Regulations

Airport Rules and Regulations, the Port Authority of

New York and New Jersey, Chapter II] .......... 20

jee ek RF OATS | Peereerrerrere Sorere 18

43 Fed. Reg. 38824 (1978) ........ VTP OI ere

Treatise

R. Stern, E. Gressman & S. Shapiro, Supreme Court

Peutns Fie COE. THD os on ks 55 0 Ws ve wte, 16

Miscellaneous

American Heritage Dictionary 294 (2d Coll. ed. 1985) . 10

Leo, Fighting for Our Public Spaces,

U. S. News & World Report, Feb. 3, 1992 ......... 2

Wilson and Kelling, Making Neighborhoods Saje,

Atlantic Monthly, Feb. 1989 .................... 2

Wilson and Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and

Neighborhood Safety, Atlantic Monthly, March 1982 . 2

a ee ee ee ree

a

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 199]

INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISIINA

CONSCIOUSNESS, INC. and BRIAN RUMBAUGII,

Petitioners and Cross-Respondents,

VS.

WALTER LEE, Superintendent of Port Authority Police,

Respondent and Cross-Petitioner.

_—-

a

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE

CRIMINAL JUSTICE LEGAL FOUNDATION

IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

The Criminal Justice Legal Foundation (CJLF)! is a

non-profit California corporation organized to participate

in litigation on behalf of victims of crime and the law-

abiding public.

In Question 3 of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari,

petitioner states the issue as involving “speech that, at

worst, might cause [travelers] momentary delay.” In

reality, the worst is far worse. The conduct which petition-

ers seek to engage in concurrently with their speech

creates a situation fraught with potential for fraud, duress,

and victimization of the helpless. These concerns are not

based on idle speculation. They are based on the judicial-

1. CJLF has received written consent of the parties to file this brief.

Le)

ly determined facts from prior litigation involving the peti-

tioner.

The cumbersome machinery of the criminal justice

system is suited for dealing with major crime. It is

dismally ineffective in dealing with the widespread petty

crime that plagues our society today. Such crime is a

major factor in the growing, malignant cancer of decay

and disorder. See generally Leo, Fighting for Our Public

Spaces, U. S$. News & World Report, Feb. 3, 1992, at 18;

Wilson and Kelling, Making Neighborhoods Safe, Atlantic

Monthly, Feb. 1989, at 46; Wilson and Kelling, Broken

Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, Atlantic

Monthly, March 1982, at 29.

A decision that government is powerless to regulate in-

person solicitation for the immediate payment of money

would be detrimental to the rights of law-abiding persons

which CJLF was formed to protect. CJLF therefore has

an interest in this case.

SUMMARY OF FACTS AND CASE

Petitioner, the International Society for Krishna

Consciousness, Inc. (“Krishna Society”), seeks to engage

in activities it calls sankirtan in the major New York

airports. Those airports are operated by the Port Authori-

ty of New York and New Jersey. Respondent is the late

Walter Lee, who was superintendent of police for the Port

Authority. As of this writing a new superintendent has

not yet been substituted as a party.

Sankirtan “consists of ‘going into public places, dissem-

inating religious literature and soliciting funds to support

the religion.’ While the distribution or sale of religious

literature is a major part of the ritual, its primary purpose

appears to be fundraising.” /nternational Society for

Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 925 F. 2d 576, 577

(CA2 1991). The Krishna Society and sankirtan are

FO ee AE ee

—_

described in detail in /niernational Society for Krishna

Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 506 F. Supp. 147, 151-154

(N.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 650 F. 2d 430

(CA2 1981). Barber notes that while sankirtan traditional-

ly depended on “true speech and gentle speech,” the

theory and practice in the modern American branch of the

religion are dramatically different. See 506 F. Supp., at

152-153.

The Port Authority promulgated a regulation forbid-

ding both “sale or distribution of . . . written material” and

the “solicitation and receipt of funds” inside the airport “if

conducted by a person to or with passers-by in a continu-

ous or repetitive manner.” 925 F. 2d, at 578-579. The

Port Authority does not seek to limit either activity on the

sidewalk outside the airport. /d., at 578, n. 2. The

District Court struck down the regulation as to both the

literature distribution and the solicitation limits.

The Court of Appeals reversed in part, upholding the

ban on solicitation. The majority found the case indistin-

guishable from United States vy. Kokinda, 111 L. Ed. 2d

S71, 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990), where this Court upheld a

similar ban on post office property. 925 F. 2d, at 582.

However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment

insofar as it struck down the ban on distribution of

literature. Jbid.

On the petition for certiorari, case 91-155, the Krishna

Society seeks to strike down the solicitation regulation.

On the cross-petition, case 91-339, the Port Authority

seeks to reinstate the literature distribution regulation. In

this Brief Amicus Curiae, CJLF will only address the

solicitation issue in the petition, ie. case 91-1595.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The concurring opinion in United States vy. Kokinda

stated that the government could prohibit personal

solicitation for immediate payment of money in the

circumstances of that case, regardless of whether the

location was a public forum. Whether this is correct ts an

important question that needs to be answered. The Court

should therefore address the solicitation issue first. The

public forum question can and should be addressed to

resolve the literature distribution question raised by the

cross-petition.

The statement that solicitation for a religious cause ts

“fully protected speech” is an oversimplification. A

careful analysis of precedents reveals that this sweeping

generalization is subject to important qualifications. First,

receipt of money or subscriptions is conduct, subject to

regulation. Second, solicitation is subject to reasonable

time, place, and manner restrictions, the same as any

other speech.

The government has a substantial interest in regulating

personal solicitation for immediate payment. Past cases

show that such solicitation creates a situation fraught with

potential for fraud, duress, and thievery, beyond the ability

of the criminal law to effectively check.

The solicitation regulation deals with the manner of

combined speech and conduct. It is valid if it passes

either the O'Brien test or the time, place, and manner test.

It passes both. It is nondiscriminatory, content-neutral,

and leaves open ample alternatives for conveying the

Krishna Society's message.

ARGUMENT

I. The Court should address the solicitation question

before the public forum question.

United States v. Kokinda, (11 L. Ed. 2d 571, 10S. Ct

3115 (1990) upheld a ban on solicitation on the grounds

of a post office without a clear resolution of the question

of whether the grounds were a public forum. The Ko-

Kinda plurality based its decision on the conclusion that

the post office and its grounds were a non-public forum.

lil L. Ed. 2d, at 584, 110 S. Ct., at 3121. However, the

fifth vote was based on the assertion that “personal

solicitation on postal property for the immediate payment

of money” can be prohibited as a time, place, and manner

restriction, regardless of whether the property is a public

forum. 111 L. Ed. 2d, at 589, 110 S. Ct., at 3126 (Kenne-

dy, J., concurring in the judgment).

Amicus CJLF respectfully submits that the Court

should address Justice Kennedy's position in Kokinda first.

The Court can then proceed to the public forum issue to

answer the literature distribution question raised by the

cross-petition. This case presents an opportunity to clear

up a half century of rampant confusion regarding solicita-

tion, and that opportunity should be not be passed up.

in 1943, this Court decided a trilogy of cases involving

the activities of Jehovah's Witnesses. Murdock v. Pennsyl-

vania, 319 U.S. 105; Martin v. Suthers, 319 U.S. 141:

Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157. Justice Jackson,

joined by Justice Frankfurter, wrote an opinion in Douglas

concurring in the result in that case and dissenting in

Murdock and Martin. After reviewing the record of the

Witnesses’ practices and the Court's decisions in Murdock

and Martin, he notes that “both opinions suggest that

there are evils in this conduct that a municipality may do

something about. But neither identifies it, nor lays down

any workable guide in so doing.” 319 U. S., at 177.

Such a workable guide is necessary, Justice Jackson

concludes. “|WJe must do our utmost to make clear and

easily understandable the reason for deciding these cases

as we do. Forthright observance of rights presupposes

their forthright definition. “I think the majority has failed

in this duty.” /d., at 182.

Justice Jackson’s warning proved correct. The field

remains confused. In Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622

(1951), the authors of Murdock and Martin stated that

those cases had been overruled. /d., at 649-650 (Black, J..

dissenting, joined by Douglas, J.). Schaumburg v. Citizens

for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 632 (1980) said

they had not. In Riley v. National Federation of Blind of

N.C., Inc., 487 U. S. 781, 796 (1988), the majority pro-

claims broadly that solicitation is “fully protected speech.”

Yet in Kokinda, supra, the plurality implies and the

concurrence holds that personal solicitation for immediate

payment is subject to substantially greater regulation than

pure advocacy of ideas.

As we will show in detail below, bans on solicitation in

general are different from prohibitions of the kind of face-

to-face solicitation for immediate payment of money

engaged in by the Krishna Society. Yet the lack of clear,

unequivocal authority for the distinction causes confusion.

Some district courts have applied broad language in some

of the cases to contexts far removed from the kinds of

activities involved in those cases. See, ¢.g., Young v. New

York Citv Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp. 341, 345 (S.D.N-Y.

1990), rev'd, 903 F. 2d 146 (CA2 1990), cert. denied, 111

L. Ed. 2d 516, 111 S. Ct. 516 (panhandling in subway):

Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1318 (N.D. Cal.

1991) (panhandlers accosting people on streets).

To clear up this confusion, therefore, amicus respect-

fully requests that this Court address the question of

whether a state can prohibit the personal solicitation for

immediate payment of money, regardless of whether the

place of solicitation is a public forum.

Il. Solicitation is not exempt from regulation.

“Our prior cases teach that the solicitation of charita-

ble contributions is protected speech,” the majority stated

in Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N.C.. Inc., 487

U. S. 781, 789 (1988). Like many sweeping characteriza-

tions, this one glosses over subtle but important distinc-

tions. “By their very vastness, the themes to be translated

into law lend themselves too readily to the innocent

deceptions of rhetoric.” Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345

U.S. 395, 415 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the

result). -

The word “solicitation” sweeps in a wide variety of

speech and conduct. Whether a_ particular form of

solicitation is protected is a question which cannot be

answered simply by pigeonholing it as “charitable solicita-

tion.” The statement “Give to my widows’ and orphans’

fund or I'll bash your face in” is not protected speech.

Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444

U. S. 620 (1980) is the case normally cited for the proposi-

tion that charitable solicitation is fully protected. Schawm-

burg is based on a discussion of a long line of cases. See

id., at 628-632. These cases do indeed support the

Schaumburg decision, but they do not support the more

extravagant extrapolations that have been made from that

decision. A review of these cases is necessary.

A. Pre-Schaumburg Cases.

In Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. i147 (1939)? the Court

struck down an ordinance requiring a permit for any

house-to-house canvassing. In that case, the Jehovah's

Witnesses went house to house, distributing literature and

showing a card which asked for a small contribution to

support the distribution effort. /d., at 1S8. The ordinance

made no distinction between solicitation and distribution

of literature. /d., at 157. “It bans unlicensed communica-

“ion of any views or the advocacy of any cause from door

to door, and permits canvassing only subject to the power

of a police officer to determine, as a censor. what litera-

R

- Sometimes cited as Schinetder v. Ininegton.

ture may be distributed from house to house and who may

distribute it.” /d., at 163 (emphasis added).

The ordinance was struck down under Lovell v. Griffin,

303 U. S. 444 (1938), which had invalidated a sweeping

ban on all literature distribution. 308 U.S, at 164. The

censorship potential of the ordinance, permitting some to

solicit while others were banned, was particularly obnox-

ious. Ibid. The Court was careful to note, however, that

“reasonable hours” and “other features of such activities

.. may be regulated in the public interest without prior

licensing or other invasion of constitutional liberty.” /d.,

at 165. Schneider does not stand for the proposition that

in-person solicitation and receipt of money cannot be

prohibited. That aspect of Schneider's conduct was not

the basis of the permit requirement.

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (19490) is another

prior restraint case, involving a license requirement for

solicitation.’ The statute empowered state officials to

decide which causes were “bona fide object|s| of charity”

and which were not. Only the approved charities received

the required certificate. /d., at 302.

This power of censorship vested in state officials

rendered the statute unconstitutional. /d., at 305. The

Cantwell Court was careful to note, however, that solicita-

tion for religious causes was not exempt from “general

and non-discriminatory legislation.” /d., at 304. “The

general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation,

which does not involve any religious test and does not

unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds, ts

not open to any constitutionai objection, even though the

collection be for a religious purpose.” /d., at 305.

3. Cantwell is more famous tor ats holding reversing delendant’s other

convicuion for breach of the peace. The latter conviction involves the

degree to which we must tolerate imtolerant expression, an issue belore

this Court in In re Rk { Vv. N\ ; QO-76)78.

In Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), a

license requirement for holding a parade was upheld. The

State court had construed the statute to require the

authorities to issue the license conditioned only on

reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. /d., at

575-576. Cases involving blanket bans on expression oF

vesting standardless discretion in the licensing officials

were distinguished. /d., at 577-578.

Jamison vy. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) involved

distribution of handbills. The handbills publicized a

meeting to be held later and also included an offer to

deliver books in return for a small donation. Jamison

distributed her handbills in an orderly and quiet manner.

The books were not sold on the street, but would have

been delivered later. The books cost Jamison more than

the donation she requested. /d., at 414-415.

The ordinance was struck down on the authority of

Lovell, Schneider, and Cantwell. Jamison’s “clearly reli-

gious activity” could not be prohibited “merely because

the handbilils invite the purchase of books for the im-

proved understanding of the religion or because the

handbills seek in a lawful fashion to promote the raising

of funds for religious purposes.” /d., at 417.

The Jamison Court appears to have been convinced

that the defendant was engaged primarily in communicat-

ing ideas, and that the fund- raising aspect of her activity

was merely incidental. The same is true of the case which

comes closest to supporting the Krishna Society's position:

Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).

Murdock involved a flat license tax on solicitation for

orders for goods of any kind. /d., at 106. The defendants

were, once again, Jehovah's Witnesses distributing their

literature. Whethei they were selling it or merely ee

it away and requesting donations was unclear. See id.. a

107. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, begins a a

10

long song of praise for the “colporteur,”* but then defines

the “single issue” narrowly: “the constitutionality of an

ordinance which as construed and applied requires

religious colporteurs to pay a license tax as a condition to

the pursuit of their activities.” /d., at 110.

Murdock then distinguishes religious activity from

“purely commercial.” /bid. In doing so, the Court takes

pains to stress that the fund-raising portion of the activity

was merely collateral, and that preaching and publicizing

the doctrine was the main object. /d., at 112.

It is clear from the discussion in Murdock that the

“purely commercial” does not include the press. The tact

that Thomas Paine’s pamphlets were sold is cited to

support the argument that sale does not equal “purely

commercial” activity. /d., at 111. Freedom of speech,

press, and religion are cited together as not being limited

“to those who can pay their own way.” /hid. Religious

groups and the press are again mentioned together as not

being free from all taxation. /d., at 112.

The Murdock holding is, therefore, not based on any

distinction between soliciting donations for religious

causes and selling newspapers. It is instead based on the

oppressive nature of the flat license tax. Even after going

to considerable lengths to characterize the activity as non-

commercial, Murdock relies on Commerce Clause prece-

dent for the onerous nature of this tax. See id., at 113.

The heart of Murdock is this: The tax “is a flat license

tax levied and collected as a condition to the pursuit of

activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the Furst

Amendment. Accordingly, it restrains in advance those

constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably

tends to suppress their exercise.” /d.. at 114 (emphasis

4 “A peddler of devotional Iterature.” Amerecan lerttave [Tncottonary 204

(2d Coll cd 1985S)

added). Read broadly, this passage may be taken to mean

that there is a constitutional right to solicit in person for

the immediate sale of printed matter or for a donation for

a religious cause. If that is what Murdock means, it has

long since been overruled, as we will show below. Read

narrowly, Murdock simply means that the flat license tax

is an oppressive burden on religion and the press, just as

it is ON Interstate commerce. If that is what Murdock

means, it is still good law, but it has no application to this

case.

Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), yet another

Jehovah's Witnesses case, was decided the same day as

Murdock, The ordinance in question prohibited persons

distributing literature door to door from ringing the

doorbell or knocking. /d., at 142. Citing Lovell, Schneider,

and Cantwell, the Court struck down this ordinance as a

violation of freedom of speech and press, not religion. /d.,

at 143.

Thomas vy. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) indicated that

the issue of solicitation as distinct from pure advocacy

remained open, despite the broad language of Murdock.

In Thomas, a labor union leader gave a speech in Texas

without the required organizer's card for labor solicitation.

He invited the crowd generally to join the union and also

singled out one member of the audience for an individual

appeal to join. Id., at 522-523.

The Court decided in favor of the labor leader.

However, it took pains to note that he did not receive or

solicit any funds, id., at S25, and that under the procedural

posture of the case the solicitation of the individual could

not be separately considered, id., at 528.

A permit cannot be required of one who seeks to

make a speech “to rally support for any social, business,

religious or political cause.” /d.. at 540. “Once the

speaker goes further, however, and engages in conduct

which amounts to more than the right of free discussion

|?

a

comprehends, as when he undertakes the collection of funds

or securing subscriptions, he enters a realm where a

reasonable registration or identification requirement may

be imposed.” /bid. (emphasis added). Conduct is differ-

ent from speech, and collection of funds is conduct.

This brings us to Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622

(1951). Breard, like the present case, involved a flat

prohibition on in-person solicitation. The ordinance in

Breard prohibited door-to-door sales or solicitation of

orders. /d., at 624-625. After rejecting due process and

interstate commerce challenges, id., at 629-641, the Court

turned to the First Amendment question.

Breard was in the business of selling magazine sub-

scriptions. /d., at 624. Therefore, he had a First Amend-

ment argument. “Only the press or oral advocates of

ideas could urge this point. It was not open to the

solicitors for gadgets or brushe. ” /d., at 641. Breard was

in the same category as the Jehovah's Witnesses and

different from the Fuller Brush Company. The Court

agreed “that the fact that periodicals are sold does not put

them beyond the protection of the First Amendment.”

Id., at 642. However, the selling “brings into the transac-

tion a commercial feature.” /hid.

Breard is consistent with a narrow reading of Murdock,

but not a broad reading. Murdock had held that the

Witnesses’ activities were not rendered pure/y commercial

by the fact that the literature was sold, 319 U. S., at IIL,

but recognized “that religious groups and the press are

Inot| free from all financial burdens of government,” id.,

at 112. Breard similarly recognizes that publications are

still entitled to First Amendment protection, even though

they are sold for a profit, but that the protection Is not

5 Such enactments are commonly called “CGireen River” ordinances aller

Green River v. Fuller Brush Co 065 Vo 2d V12 (OAV VOSS) and Green

River v. Banger, S8 P. 24d 456 (Wyo. 1936), appeal dismissed tor want of

a federal question, 300) U.S. 638 (1937)

13

absolute. The rights of others must be considered. 341

U.S., at 642. In each case, the Court approaches the

activity in question as a protected First Amendment

activity, but with a commercial aspect to it which subjects

it to reasonable regulation and taxation. Compare Mur-

dock, supra, 319 U.S., at 114 (“Tt [the tax] is in no way

apportioned.”) with Swageart Ministries v. Cal. Bd. of

Equalization, 493 U. S. 378, 389 (1990) (percentage sales

tax on Bibles, etc., constitutional): see also Texas Monthly,

Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 21 (1989) (plurality) (“unnec-

essary sweeping statements in Murdock” disavowed).

Breard is not distinguishable trom Murdock on the

ground that subscription magazines are different from

charitable donations in any way relevant to the First

Amendment question. As discussed above, the rationale

Murdock itself precludes such a distinction. The cases are

distinguishable in that the regulation in Breard was

deemed reasonable, notwithstanding the protected status

of the publications, while the tax in Murdock was not. See

Texas Monthly, supra, 489 U.S... at 23, n. 10. If Murdock

is read more broadly to create a right to solicit free of

reasonable regulation or taxation, then it is to that extent

overruled by Breard, Texas Monthly, and Swaggart.

Breard distinguishes Martin v. Struthers by emphasizing

that Martin involved only the free distribution of literature.

Breard, 341 U. S., at 642-643. Yet Martin was decided the

same day as Murdock, and Murdock saw no significant

difference between the sale of a publication and the

distribution combined with solicitation of a donation. See

319 U.S. at 111. The difference between Breard and

Martin is the manner of solicitation. Martin simply left

leaflets with people advising them of a meeting. 319

U.S. at 142.) Breard employed “possibly persistent

solicitor|s},” 341 U. S.. at 644, who confronted people in

their homes, asking them to make an immediate change in

legal position, ie. contracting to purchase magazines.

Notwithstanding the constitutional guarantee of freedom

of press, the city had the power to protect people from

I4

such confrontations. That, amicus submits, is the true

distinction between Martin and Breard.

Breard confirms what Cantwell said 11 years earlier. A

“State may by general and non-discriminatory legislation

regulate the times, the places, and the manner of soliciting

upon its streets... .” Cantwell, supra, 310 U. S., at 304.

The prohibition on door-to-door sales in Breard was a

reasonable regulation of the manner of solicitation,

justified by the interest of residents in avoiding “the

annoyances of house-to-house canvassing.” 341 U. S., at

644. The annoyance caused by salesmen is greater than

that caused by people distributing handbills. The ban on

door-to-door selling was therefore upheld in Breard, while

prohibitions on free distribution of literature in Lovell and

Martin were struck down.

B. The Schaumburg Case.

Schaumburg vy. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444

U. S. 620 (1980) dealt with a discriminatory prior restraint.

Charities were required to obtain a permit before solicit-

ing. /d., at 623-624. Some charities would be issued the

permit and some would not. Those that spent more than

75% of the proceeds for salaries and administrative

expenses would not be issued the permit. /d., at 624.

Schaumburg reviewed the history described above to

answer the contention that solicitation was completely

unprotected. See id., at 628. After reviewing the history,

Schaumburg concluded that charitable solicitation “has not

been dealt with in our cases as a variety of purely commer-

cial speech.” /d., at 632 (emphasis added).

This conclusion is fully consistent with the statements

in Cantwell and Breard that solicitation, whether for a

charity or a magazine, remains subject to reasonable

regulation. Unfortunately, in discussing Breard, Schawm-

burg dwells on the fact that charitable solicitation was not

involved in that case. 444 U. S., at 631-632. As explained

1S

ante, at 12-14, that is not the true distinction between

Breard on the one hand and Murdock and Martin on the

other.

On its facts, Schaumburg is straightforward. The 75%

requirement operated as a form of censorship. One

medium of communication, door-to-door solicitation, was

open to proponents of some causes but denied to those

deemed less worthy by the government. The connection

between the 75% requirement and the prevention of fraud

was too tenuous to justify such a regulation. /d., at 636-

637. There was no connection at all between the 75%

requirement and the protection of residential privacy and

safety. These interests are invaded to the same degree by

any solicitor. /d., at 638. :

Schaumburg thus plowed no new ground on the status

of solicitation. After Schaumburg, as before, charitable

solicitation is within the protection of the First Amend-

ment but subject to some regulation. The ordinance in

Schaumburg was simply held to be beyond the bounds of

permissible regulation. Schaumburg did not need to

discuss time, place, and manner regulations in any depth.

because the portions of the ordinance which imposed

those kinds of restrictions were not at issue. See id., at

622. n. 1, 639.

In part IV, we will explain why the Port Authority's

prohibition on the “solicitation and collection of funds” is

constitutionally permissible, both as a regulation of

conduct and as a time, place, and manner restriction.

First, though, we will explain in part III why the govern-

ment has a strong interest in regulating in-person solicita-

tion for immediate payment of money.

16

Ill. The government has substantial interests in

restricting uninvited personal solicitation for the

immediate payment of money.

Much of the confusion in this area results from a

failure to distinguish between solicitation in general and

a personal solicitation in which the target is asked to make

an immediate payment of money or some other change in

legal position. The difference was recognized in Thomas

v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 540 (1945). It is central to the

“reasonableness” determination of the plurality in United

States v. Kokinda, 111 L. Ed. 2d 571, 586, 110 S. Ct. 3115,

3123 (1990), and it is the cornerstone of the Kokinda

concurrence, id., 111 L. Ed. 2d, at 589, 110 S. Ct., at 3125

(Kennedy, J.).

The state has significant interests in the prevention of

fraud and the prevention of duress. See, ¢.g., Cantwell vy.

Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 306 (1940). As example of the

kinds of problems solicitation can involve, we refer to the

facts determined by the District Court in /nternational

Society for Krishna’ Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 506

F. Supp. 147 (N.D.N.Y. 1980). We do not cite them as

the record in this case or imply that the Krishna Society

has engaged in similar frauds in the Port Authority's

airports. We cite them as “published material containing

facts which bear upon the reasonableness of legislation.”

R. Stern, E. Gressman & S. Shapiro, Supreme Court

Practice 565 (6th ed. 1986). These past abuses would be

equally relevant to the reasonableness of the regulation it

they had been perpetrated by an entirely unrelated

organization. They are relevant regardless of whether any

solicitors are presently perpetrating them in the airports.

Government interest is not limited to locking the barn

door after the horse is stolen.

The Krishna Society’s practices in Barber contrast

sharply with those of the Jehovah's Witnesses in Cantwell.

The latter were considered obnoxious precisely because

they pushed their intolerant beliefs so vigorously. 310

17

U.S, at301. A principal complaint in Barber was that the

solicitors concealed their religious affiliation. 506

I. Supp., at 158-159. Rather than spreading their Word,

they falsely or misleadingly told targets that the money

was for “worldwide education and food nates

programs or children’s drug programs,” id., at 159,

“starving children,” id., at 161. Items to be given away or

sold were intentionally chosen a1.d marked to conceal the

solicitor’s Krishna affiliation. /d., at 162. The cryptic

acronyin “ISKCON” was used as a part of this effort. /d.,

at 161.

Nor was misrepresentation the only form of fraud.

The solicitors intentionally miscounted change. They

folded over bills to shortchange people. /d., at 160. They

even stocped to targeting the mentally retarded. /d., at

161.

In addition to traud, the Krishna Society practiced

various forms of duress. Some were subtle, some were

not. Couples with young children were targeted. They

were considered “easy marks because they cannot afford

to divert their attention for very long from watching the

children. Thus, the persistent Krishna solicitor can be

relatively assured of a contribution, just so he will go away

and let the couple go about their business.” Id., at 161.

A related tec hnique was to intentionally hold bills tor a

long time, pretending to make change, until the target was

too tired or distracted to insist on the amount of change

the solicitor had agreed to give /d., at 159, 163. Solici-

tors with less imagination simply disappeared into the

crowd with the change, in one case taken from a young

woman afflicted with cerebral palsy. /d., at 161.

The District Court in Barber tound that regulation of

in-person solicitation was necessary “to combat widespread

fraud that cannot be effectivel checked by the criminal

is

justice system.” Id., at 169 (emphasis added).’ Theft of

small amounts by oral misrepresentation, shortchanging,

or subtle duress is extremely difficult to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt. Any criminal prosecution would involve

an expenditure of the victim’s time worth far more than

the amount taken. This is especially so in an airport,

where the victim is probably from out of town. Indeed,

unscrupulous solicitors probably select airports and state

fairs for precisely this reason.’

Many sources have recognized the special problems of

personal solicitation for immediate payment or other

change of legal position. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S.

622, 644 (1951) noted the problem of the “persistent

solicitor.” The Federal Trade Commission has for 20

years held that it is “an unfair and deceptive act” to make

a door-to-door sale without a three-day “cooling off”

period for the buyer to change his mind. 16 C.FER. §

429.1 (1991).°

The Postal Service came to a similar conclusion. and

the Kokinda plurality quoted its findings with approval.

“Since the act of soliciting alms or contributions

usually has as its objective an immediate act of

charity, 1t has the potentiality for evoking highly

personal and subjective reactions. Reflection

o. The Court of Appeals reversed, 650 IF. 2d 430 (CA2 1981). but substan-

ually the same regulation was ultimately upheld in /effron v Internation.-

al Soctety for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).

7. In addition to traud and duress, people also have an imterest in not

being, to use the vernacular. “hassled.” This interest might not by itsel!

be sufficient, and the Krishna Society therefore attempts to portray it as

the only interesi involved. Sce Petition tor Writ of Certioran, Question

3. In addition to the other interests, amicus submits, the “hassle tactor™

weiwhs in the balance as a government miterest.

§. “Door-to-door” is not mited to in-home sales for this purpose. I would

meclude sales on the street. /d.. Note Ia)

19

usually is not encouraged, and the person solicited

often must make a hasty decision whether to share

his resources with an unfamiliar organization while

under the eager gaze of the solicitor. ” United

States v. Kokinda, 111 L. Ed. 2d 571, 585, 110 S. Ct

3115, 3123 (1990) (quoting 43 Fed. Reg. 38824

(1978)).

Justice Kennedy cites with approval a similar ban

promulgated by the National Park Service for the District

of Columbia Mall and other parks. 111 L. Ed. 2d, at S89-

S90, 11S. Ct, at 3126 (concurrence). These parks are

public forums. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-

Violence, 468 U. S. 288, 303, n. 2 (1984) (Marshall, J.,

dissenting).

Both Kokinda and Hejfron approved regulations which

banned or restricted in-person solicitation for immediate

payment in places where other forms of expressions were

freely allowed. Heffron was unanimous on this point. 452

U.S.. at 654; id., at 657 (Brennan, J., concurring in part):

id., at 663 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part). “{I|]n-person

solicitation deserves different treatment from alternative

forms of solicitation and expression.” Kokinda, 111

L. Ed. 2d, at 589: 110 S. Ct., at 3126 (Kennedy, J.. concur-

ring in the judgment).

A civilized society must make its rules without forget-

ting its most vulnerable members. lo the seasoned,

sophisticated “frequent flyer.” airport solicitation may be

only a delay, an obstruction, and a nuisance.’ To the

inexperienced, the naive, the frail, the frightened, the

harried, or the physicaily or mentally impaired, it can be

much worse.

7, Potivuoners’ contention that Airy i sohlicitlulmw iw” weepled pu whee.” Pet.

Brief 19. as overstated. Tt would be more accurate to sav that veteran

travelers ure resigned te at because they believe nothing can be dom

20

IV. The state may constitutionally ban such

solicitation in the airport, regardless of whether it is

a public forum.

The regulation at issue in this case is Airport Rules

and Regulations, the Port Authority of New York and

New Jersey, Chapter II], which reads in part as follows

(emphasis added):

“B. Non-commercial activity at Port Authority air

terminals which are not occupied by a lessee,

licensee or permittee is subject to the following

conditions and restrictions:

“|. The following conduct is prohibited within the

interior areas of buildings or structures at an air

terminal if conducted by a person to or with pass-

ers-by in a continuous or repetitive manner

“(b) The sale or distribution of flyers, brochures,

pamphlets, books or any other printed or written

material.

“(c) The solicitation and receipt of funds.”

The use of the conjunctive in paragraph (c) implies

that pure solicitation not accompanied by receipt would be

permitted. That is, a person who wished to explain his

cause to passers-by and ask them to make a donation

later, such as by mailing it in or by placing it in a collec-

tion box located somewhere else, would be permitted to

do so. Such a regulation, amicus submits, is precisely the

kind which this Court in Canavell v. Connecticut, 310-0. S.

296, 305 (1940) assured the nation would be permitted.

Paragraph (c) is valid regardless of whether the airport is

a public forum.

A. Conduct.

Collecting funds is conduct, and conduct is subject to

regulation, even when it is intertwined with advocacy.

Thomas vy. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 540 (1945). The tradi-

tional test for regulation of “expressive conduct” is the

four-part test of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367

(1968), the draft-card burning case. The O'Brien test

applies “when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ clements are

combined in the same course of conduct... .” /d., at

376. In such cases,

“a government regulation is sufficiently justified | 1]

if it is within the constitutional pewer of the Gov-

ernment; [2] if it furthers an important or substan-

tial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental

interest is unrelated to the suppression of free

expression, and [4] if the incidental restriction on

First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is -

essential to the furtherance of that interest.” /d.,

at 377 (numbers added).

The first point is rarely a problem. It refers to limita-

tions on government other than the First Amendment,

because otherwise the analysis would become circular.

O'Brien simply noted that the draft was within one of the

enumerated powers of Congress. /hid. The second part,

government interest, is discussed in part TIL, ane.

In Murdock v. Pennsvivania, 319 U.S. 10S, 112 (1943)

and Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Said 444

U.S. 620, 632 (1980), solicitation was held to be within

the category of noncommercial speech only because of its

connection within the religious and environmental messag-

es of the respective groups. The “free expression” in the

third part of O'Brien must therefore refer to the message

of the cause and not to solicitation itself.

The Port Authority's across-the-board ban on solicita-

tion and receipt of tunds meets the third part of the test.

9?

It applies equally to the Krishna Society and the Airline

Passengers’ Association. It is not being applied because

of disagreement with the message presented. See Clark v.

Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S. 288, 295

(1984). The regulation differs sharply from the statutes in

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397 (1989) (flag burning) and

Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (display of

red flag) which prohibit conduct typically only engaged in

by people of a disfavored viewpoint. Unlike the discre-

tionary permit cases, see ante, at 7-9, and percentage-test

cases, this regulation has no potential for favoring one

viewpoint over another.

For the fourth part of the O'Brien test, the word

“essential” must be read in the context of the facts and

holding of the case. No one could seriously contend that

a prohibition on draft-card burning was “essential” to the

draft in the sense that the Selective Service System would

collapse without it. It was enough that the continuing

availability of the cards “substantially furthers” the

functioning of the system and that “no alternative means

... would more precisely and narrowly assure” that

availability. 391 U.S., at 381.

The meaning of the fourth part of O’Brien is further

illustrated by Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Vio-

lence, supra. The Court of Appeals had held that a ban

on camping in Lafayette Park (the quintessential public

forum) was “unnecessary and hence invalid, because there

are less speech-restrictive alternatives that could have

satisfied the Government interest... .” 468 U. S., at 299.

This Court reversed, holding that the Court of Appeals’

suggested alternatives “represent no more than a disagree-

ment with the Park Service over how much protection the

core parks require or how an acceptable level of preserva-

10. Schaumburg, supra. Secretary of State of Md v. Joseph He Munson Co.

467 U.S. 947 (1984): Riley v. National Federation of Blind of NC. Inc,

487 U.S. 781 (1988).

23

tion is to be attained.” Ibid. (emphasis added). See also

post, at 26 (“narrow tailoring”).

Fraud and extortion can, of course, be criminally

punished. Yet the victim who is falsely told the money is

going for starving children, see ante, at 17, may never

know that it does not. The mentally retarded target will

also never know. The person who is sold a record in JFK

Airport will not know he has been cheated until he gets

home to Tucson and plays it. Only then would he discov-

er that it contains a Krishna song and not a performance

by Stevie Wonder, as he had been intentionally led to

believe. See Barber, supra, 506 F. Supp., at 162. It is

unlikely he will return to New York to press charges. The

person who gives a dollar to get a persistent solicitor to

stop blocking his path or stop following him with repeated

entreaties will likely not want to testify in a criminal case.

The elderly woman who feels physically intimidated,

though no overt threat is made, will probably be unable to

state a case for a criminal prosecution.

In-person solicitation for the immediate payment of

money is therefore fraught with potential for widespread

but low-level crime. The only legitimate donation is one

given by a person who understands the nature of the cause

and genuinely wishes to support that cause. When a

person gives because of misrepresentation of the cause,

because. giving is the easiest way to be allowed to proceed

in peace, or because of fear, that person has been cheated

or robbed.

The Port Authority has decided that a nondiscrimina-

tory ban on repetitive solicitation and receipt of funds is

necessary. The Krishna Society, like the Community for

Creative Non-Violence, simply asks this Court to disagree.

The answer should be the same.

24

B. Time, Place, and Manner.

A limit on expressive conduct is valid if it passes the

O’Brien test even if it is an outright prohibition rather

than a mere time, place, or manner regulation. Converse-

ly, a time, piace, or manner regulation is valid if it passes

the test for such regulations, even if it regulates “pure

speech” rather than expressive conduct. It follows, then,

that a regulation of the time, place, or manner of expres-

sive conduct need only pass one test or the other to be

valid. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,

468 U. S. 288, 298, n. 8 (1984). In practice, though, most

regulations will pass both tests or neither, because the two

tests are “in the last analysis ... little, if any, differ-

ent... .” Id., at 298.

The regulation in this case, like the one in Kokinda,

restricts the manner of solicitation. The Port Authority

allows speech generally. See Pet. Brief 41. Nothing stops

the Krishna Society's members from explaining their

religion and asking people to make a donation at some

other time and place. The least intrusive way to collect

donations is for donors to mail them in.’ Alternatively,

the Port Authority would permit the Society to collect

donations on the sidewalk outside the airport. See

International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,

925 F. 2d 576, 578, n. 2 (CA2 1991). For donations too

small to justify postage, departing passengers, having been

informed inside of the purpose of the collection, could

leave them with a collector on the sidewalk.

These sianners of solicitation differ trom the manner

involved in Kokinda and the present case in that they give

the potential donor a “cooling off” period, similar to the

one required by the FTC for door-to-door sales. See ante,

at 18. Away from the “eager gaze of the solicitor,” the

potential donor can better reflect whether he really has

11. Amicus CILE collects afl of its “grass roots” donations mum this manner.

sufficient information about this ostensible charity, or

whether his funds would do more good elsewhere.

“Restrictions of this kind are valid provided |]] that

they are justified without reference to the content of the

regulated speech, [2] that they are narrowly tailored to

serve a significant government interest, and [3]! that they

leave open ample alternative channels of communication

of the information.” Clark, supra, 468 U.S., at 293

(numbers added).

The first part of this test (the “TPM test,” for brevity)

is essentially the same as the third part of O'Brien.

Discrimination between viewpoints is the cardinal First

Amendment sin. A restriction passes muster if its “applies

evenhandedly to all,” and is not a “means of suppressing

a particular point of view.” Heffron v. International Society

for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640, 649 (1981).

“The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality,

in speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner

cases In particular, is whether the government has adopted

a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the

message it conveys.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491

U.S. 781, 791 (1989). The Krishna Society’s chosen

medium, not its message, is the basis of this regulation.

On this point, Heffron is dispositive. A nondiscrimina-

tory restriction on all would-be solicitors is content-

neutral. 452 U.S., at 648-649: see also Kokinda, supra,

111 L. Ed. 2d, 587-588. 110 S. Ct., at 3124-3125 (plurality):

id., LLL L. Ed. 2d, at 590, 110 S. Ct., at 3126 (Kennedy, J.,

concurring in the judgment). //e//ron also noted that a

restriction which “prefers listener-initiated exchanges to

those originating with the speaker” is both content-neutral

and within the realm of time, place, and manner regula-

tion. 452 U.S., at 649, n. 12. A separation of advocacy

from collection is no more restrictive, and probably less

SO.

26

The second part of the TPM test, narrow tailoring, ts

essentially the same as the fourth part of O'Brien. This

regulation passes the test for the reasons discussed ante,

at 22-23.

Ward, supra, sheds further light on this part of the

TPM test. Ward flatly rejected the contention that the

regulation must be the least restrictive means to be valid.

491 U.S., at 798. “Rather, the requirement of narrow

tailoring is satisfied ‘so long as the ... regulation pro-

motes a substantial government interest that would be

achieved less effectively absent the regulation. " /d., at

799. Clark, supra, applies the requirement by saying “if

the parks would be more exposed to harm without the

sleeping prohibition than with it, the ban is safe from

invalidation under the First Amendment as a reasonable

regulation of the manner in which a demonstration may be

carried out.” 468 U.S., at 297. The regulation here

clearly makes passengers less exposed to fraud and duress

than they would be without the regulation.

“The final requirement, that the guideline leave open

ample alternative channels of communication, is easily

met.” Ward, supra, 491 U. S., at 802. It is easily met in

this case as well. As we described at the beginning of this

part, ante, at 24, the Krishna Society is free to explain its

religion to travelers, if that is what it wishes to do. It is

free to encourage legitimate donations by mail or on the

sidewalk.

The only thing it is not free to do (as far as paragraph

(c) of the regulation is concerned) is collect donations

“under the eager gaze of the solicitor.” That method of

collection is most efficient for precisely the reason the state

has a strong interest in forbidding it. This manner of

solicitation collects money from people who would not

contribute if they thought it over and decided in private.

The First Amendment does not guarantee maximum

revenue. See Swageart Ministries v. Cal. Bd. of Equaliza-

tion, 493 U.S. 378, 391 (1990).

27

The regulation prohibiting solicitation and receipt

funds is valid if it meets either the O’Brien test or the

time, place, and manner test. It meets both.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it

upholds the solicitation regulation, should be affirmed.

March, 1992

KENI S. SCHIEIDEGGER*

CHARLES L. HOBSON

JEANNE M. ANDRACIIEK

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

Criminal Justice Legal Foundation

“Attorney of Record