Amicus Curiae Brief — Quill Corp. v. North Dakota

Supreme Court brief1992

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. 91-194

LED

IN THE 0

Supreme Court of the United Styted’Y 27 oc,

OCTOBER TERM, 1991 OFFicE

QUILL CORPORATION,

y. Petitioner,

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

By AND THROUGH ITS TAX COMMISSIONER,

HEIDI HEITKAMP,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE ARIZONA MAIL ORDER

COMPANY, INC., BASS PRO SHOPS, INC.,

BLOOMINGDALE’S BY MAIL LTD., THE BRADFORD

EXCHANGE, LTD., CABELA’S, INC., CURRENT, INC.

DOUBLEDAY BOOK & MUSIC CLUBS, INC.,

FINGERHUT COMPANIES, INC., HANOVER DIRECT

INC., HARRY AND DAVID, LILLIAN VERNON

CORPORATION, MBI, INC.. NEW HAMPTON, INC., THE

NEIMAN MARCUS GROUP, INC., PUBLISHERS

CLEARING HOUSE, RODALE PRESS, INC.,

SFA FOLIO COLLECTIONS, INC.,

AND USAA BUYING SERVICES, INC.

IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITIONER

Of Counsel: MARYANN B. GALL

MICHAEL J. MEEHAN (Counsel of Record )

Roy W. KYLE LAURA A. KULWICKI

22nd Floor 1900 Huntington Center

33 North Stone Avenue 41 South High Street

Tucson, Arizona 85701 Columbus, Ohio 43215

° J OJ te 9

Counsei for Arizona Mail Order (614) 469-393

Company, Ine. TIMOTHY B. Dyk

EDWARD K. BILICH

JONES, DAY, REAVIS & POGUE

, . ; Metropolitan Square

1340 East Woodhurst 1450 G Street, N.W.

Springfield, Missouri 65804 Washington, D.C. 20005

Counsel for (202) 879-3939

Bass Pro Shops, Inc. Counsel for Amici Curiae

(Additional Counsel Listed on Inside Cover)

JOE C. GREENE

GREENE & CURTIS

WILSON - EPes PRINTING Co., INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

FRANK G. JULIAN

7 West Seventh Strect

Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

Counsel for

Bloomingdale's By Mail Ltd.

Davip J. BRADFORD

The Bradford Exchange, Ltd.

9333 Milwaukee Avenue

Niles, Illinois 60648

Counsel for

The Bradford Exchange, Ltd.

GEORGE S. ISAACSON

MARTIN I. EISENSTEIN

BRANN & ISAACSON

184 Main Street

P.O. Box 3070

Lewiston, Maine 04243-3070

Counsel for Cabela’s, Inc.

and Lillian Vernon Corp.

Davip W. FRANCIS

CURRENT, INC.

1005 East Woodmen load

Colorado Springs, C() 80920

Counsel for Current, Inc.

ROBERT J. POSCH, JR.

DOUBLEDAY Book &

Music CLuss, INc.

501 Franklin Avenue

Garden City, New York 11530

Counsel for Doubleday Book &

Music Clubs, Inc.

ROBERT C. KIEFFER

FINGERHUT COMPANIES, INC.

4400 Baker Road

Minnetonka, Minnesota 55343

Counsel for

Fingerhut Companies, Inc.

STUART A. SMITH

SHEA & GOULD

1251 Avenue of the Americas

New York, New York 10020

Counsel for Hanover Direct Inc.

LINDA L. RANKIN

2518 S. Pacific Hwy.

Medford, Oregon 97501

Counsel for Harry and David

MARYANNE D. LADINO

THE NEIMAN MARCUS

GRoupP, INC.

27 Boylston Street

P.O. Box 9187

Chestnut Hill, MA 02167

Counsel for The Neiman Marcus

Group, Inc.

CHRISTOPHER F.. KLINK

New Hampton, Inc.

5000 City Line Road

Hampton, Virginia 23661

Counsel for New Hampton, Inc.

ROBERT D. WALLINGFORD

MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS

101 Park Avenue

New York, New York 10178

Counsel for

Publishers Clearing House

PAUL A. MCGINLEY

Gross, MCGINLEY,

LEBARRE & EATON

33 S. 7th Avenue

Allentown, Pennsylvania 18103

Counsel for

Rodale Press, Inc.

JOAN F. KREY

55 Tuckahoe Road

Yonkers, New York 10710

Counsel for

SFA Folio Collections, Inc.

LINDA D. GIESSEL

USAA Building

San Antonio, Texas 78288

Counsel for

USAA Buying Services, Inc.

;

y &

TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT OF INTEREST ....0220222...eeeeeeeeeeeneeeeeee

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY ©...

Neen Tiscali sins ndentncesstcevemetooreceneveseuvers

THIS COURT SHOULD REAFFIRM ITS DECI-

SION IN NATIONAL BELLAS HESS, INC. v.

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 386 U.S. 753

ED shit chiebionecees aieeisiabetaabsenintenbertecsssenieienncseeseces

II.

ITT.

IV.

MAIL ORDER COMPANIES HAVE JUSTIFI-

ABLY RELIED ON BELLAS HESS FOR

NEARLY TWENTY-FIVE YEARS ...........

BECAUSE MAIL ORDER COMPANIES

HAVE ORDERED THEIR AFFAIRS IN RE-

LIANCE ON BELLAS HESS, OVERRULING

THAT DECISION COULD IMPOSE POTEN-

TIALLY MASSIVE RETROACTIVE LIABIL-

ITY ON THOSE COMPANIES .......... ssaleridiognacs

SINCE JUSTIFIED, SETTLED EXPECTA-

TIONS ARE AT STAKE, THE COURT

SHOULD ADHERE TO BELLAS HESS .......

IF THIS COURT WERE TO OVERRULE

BELLAS HESS, |T SHOULD LIMIT THAT

DECISION TO SOLELY PROSPECTIVE

a EE OC a e

dian cdi csctaneecsenvenrensesseseusctennscnsecevaceses

APPENDIX A INTEREST OF AMICI .......00000000......

APPENDIX B STATE STATUTES THAT DEFINE

NEXUS TO INCLUDE MERE CAT-

ALOG SOLICITATION (PRE-

BEM EBD) .....000.-0.01ereceeneceseeee sakes

APPENDIX C STATE STATUTES DRAFTED TO

SPECIFICALLY CHALLENGE

MERI BECO nncccncccensccnccsececacsencssenees

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

APPENDIX D STATE STATUTES OF LIMITA-

TIONS FOR THE ASSESSMENT

OF USE TAX WHEN NO RETURN

OOP NE challeiiagee tng ec

APPENDIX E ESTIMATED POTENTIAL RETRO-

ACTIVE TAX LIABILITY (IN

MILLIONS) FOR THE YEARS 1985

THROUGH 1991 IF NATIONAL

BELLAS HESS, INC. v. DEP’T. OF

REVENUE, 386 U.S. 753 (1967)

WERE OVERRULED | cea

APPENDIX F ESTIMATED POTENTIAL RETRO-

ACTIVE TAX LIABILITY (IN

MILLIONS) FOR THE YEARS 1986

THROUGH 1991 IF NATIONAL

BELLAS HESS, INC. v. DEP’T. OF

REVENUE, 386 U.S. 753 (1967)

WERE OVERRULED (BASED ON

NEWLY ENACTED STATUTES

ONLY) ..

APPENDIX G COMMERCE CLAUSE DECISIONS

OVERRULED BY THE UNITED

STATES SUPREME COURT

Page

ili

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Pag

Alabama v. Lane Bryant, Inc., 171 So. 2d 91 (Ala.

SRT eC a leer i Meme ELD a

Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 769

P.2d 193 (Or. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 717

I 9

American Trucking Associations, ‘Ine. v. Scheiner,

483 U.S. 266 (1987) ............... paeedaseateds 21

Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203 (1984) | . 4, 20

Arkansas Electric Cooperative Co. v. Arkansas

Publie Utility Commission, 461 U.S. 375 (1983) .. 21

Avco Financial Serv. Consumer Discount Co. One,

Inc. v. Director Div. of Taxation, 494 A.2d 788

IRS EIS ot Eee 8. TRENT nate 9

Bloomingdale's By Mail Ltd. v. _ Huddleston, No.

89-3017-II (Davidson Cty. Chancery Ct. Tenn.

March 8, 1991) ; 9

Bloomingdale's By Mail, Ltd. v. De p 7 of Revenue,

591 A.2d 1047 (Pa. 1991), aff'g 567 A.2d 773

(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989), cert. filed, No. 91-383

9,14

a ee :

Book-of-the-Month Club, Ine. v. Porterfield, 268

fk tf. g.. 'S. ;:) ane

Boswell v. Paramount Television Sales, Inc., 282

So. 2d 892 (Ala. 1973) 9

Burke & Sons Oil Co. v. Director of Revenue, 757 .

S.W.2d 278 (Mo. App. 1988) . |

Burnet v. Corenado Oil & Gas Co., 285 US. 393 iz

(1932) ae | . 23,

Cally Curtis Co. v. Groppo, 572 ‘ 2d 302 (Conn. ),

cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 77 (1990) 9

Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209 -

| EERE ae ee IR WAP OY Se aR ae a

Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971) . 25, 26

City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive

Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) .. Jaan 20

Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montane, 453 US. .

609 (1981) ~

Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. ‘Brady, 430 U. S. 274 pee

(1977) oad eiscacdnbiabaseiacen Paes ce A Ser en ;

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433

U.S. 36 (1977) ........... ; ot ET Se 24

Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 7 (1958) - NRE cee 10

Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,

467 U.S. 752 (1984) tics 4

D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24

(1988) . x

Direct Marketing v. Bennett, No. Civ. S-88- 1067

(E.D. Cal. July 12, 1991) (1991 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 10736) ............ ES SE

Felt & Tarrant Mfgq. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 6§2

(1939) ........... 7

General Trading Co. v. Tar Comm’ n, 322 U. S. 335

(1944) 7

Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 US. 252 (1989) x

Good's Furniture House, Inc. v. lowa State Bd. of

Tax Review, 382 N.W.2d 145 (lowa), cert. de-

nied, 479 U.S. 817 (1986) 0. if)

Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656

(1987) RPP a Th) De cE Pe at 5

Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 US. 314 (1987) | 25

Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 (1943) 22, 23

Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940) 6

“Youston & Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S.

I ak a 24

Illinois Commercial Men’s Ass’n v. State Bd. of

Equalization, 671 P.2d 349 (Cal. 1983), app.

dism’d, 466 U.S. 933 (1984) 9

James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S.Ct.

2439 (1991) ................. Z 25, 26

Jimmy Swaggart Ministries ; v. ‘Ba. of Equalization,

110 S.Ct. 688 (1990) 8

L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,

516 A.2d 820 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986) ss 13

Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954). 7

Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 4836 U.S. 658

(1978) . a aa fy

Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Ine., 398 U.S. 375

(1970) ........ ih ce 21

National Bank v. Whitney, 103 U. S. 99 (1880) ... 21,24

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Reve-

nue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967) _......... _...... passim

National Geographic Society v. California Ba. of

Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977) tat

Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 US. 373

(1941) Cee 7 as 7

Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359

(1941) : 7

Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164

(1989) ESE I ee AON reo eee eee RE Bi

Payne v. Tennessee, aq S.Ct. 2597 (1991) ' 4,5, 21

Pearle Health Services, Inc. v. Taylor, 799 S.W.2d

655 (Tenn. 1990) _............... Tah ot AO 9

Renovator’s Supply, Inc. v. Sharp, No. 91-9493

(Tex. Dist. Ct., filed July fh | Ener 16

SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Bannon, 585 A.2d

666 (Conn.), cert. denied sub nom. Commis-

sioner of Revenue Services v. SFA Folio Collec-

tions, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 2839 (1991) | 9,14

SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Huddleston, No. 89-

8015-III (Davidson Cty. Chancery Ct. Tenn.

March 11, 1991) . I a i)

SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Tracy, No. 91-295

(Ohio Bd. of Tax Appeals, appeal filed March 8,

1991) ae ee ween 16

Scripto v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960) peau 7

Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965) 5

South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wun-

nicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) | 23

The Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. v. Meehan, No.

387601 (Conn. Super. Ct., appeal filed Dec. 10,

1990) . sia ars 16

Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U. S. 261

(1980) . 21,24

Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians

and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) 20, 23

United States v. South Buffalo R. Co., 333 U.S. 771

(1948) - .

Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 US. 254 (1986)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Public

Transportation, 483 U.S. 468 (1987) | 4

Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) one 6

U.S. Constitution

U.S. Const. art.1,§8,cl.3................. . 4,23

Statutes

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-26-102 (3) (6) (Supp. 1991) 17

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-26-301 et seq. (Supp. 1991) 17

Conn. Gen. Stats. Ann. § 12-407(12), (15) (West

Ste Seale a el ese hc 15

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 212.12(2) (a) (West 1989) oats 19

Ga. Code Ann. § 48-8-1 (Michie 1982) 5 sits 14

Idaho Code § 63-3046 (0) (Michie 1989) _ » See 19

La. Stat. Ann. § 47-305E (West Supp. 1990) ee 17

N.J. Stat. § 54:49-4 (West 1991) | 19

N.J. Stat. § 54:328-2(i) (1) (C) (1966) 11

N.Y. Tax Law § 1101 (b) (8) (McKinney 1991) | 14

Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 72 §7201(b)(3) (Purdon

Ra Aenea ae le, ea 13

Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6- 102(4) (J) (1983) 13

W. Va. Code § 11-15A-6a (Supp. 1990) a F |

Legislative History

Collection of State Sales and Use Taxes by Out-

of-State Vendors: Hearing on S. 639 and S.

1099 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt

Management of the Senate Comm. on Finance,

100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987). 10

Connecticut House of Representatives, Hearings

on SB702 (April 5, 1989) 15

H.R. 1891, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987) Saban eens 10

H.R. 3521, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987) ss” 7

H.R. Rep. No. 565, Report of the Subcomm. on

State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 89th

Cong., Ist Sess. (1965). an {

H.R. Rep. No. 2013, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) 5

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Interstate Sales Tax Collection Act of 1987:

Hearing on H.R. 1242 Before the Subcomm. on

Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm.

on Ways and Means, 100th Cong., Ist Sess.

PE, a deeendbannninotonnemieennennetes

nae Sales Tax Collection Act of 1987 and

the Equity in Interstate Competition Act of

1987: Hearings on H.R. 1242, WR. 1891, and

H.R. 3521 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies

and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the

Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988)

S. 2368, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) .

State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Hearing

on S. 1510 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation

and Debt Manageme t of the Senate Comm. on

Finance, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985)

Miscellaneous

1 Aijl St. Sales Tax Rep. (CCH) ‘ 2-025 (1991) _

1A All St. Sales Tax. Rep. (CCH) ‘ 8-350

A. a Fea The Fede ralist, No. 78 (H. Lodge ed.

Pig & C. Zimmerman, Efforts to Collect

Sales Tax on Interstate Mail Order Sales:

Recent State Legislation (National Conference

of State Legislatures: June 1990)

Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Rela-

tions, Estimates of Revenue Potential from

State Taxation of Mail Order Sales (1987) . -

Bloomingdale’s By Mail Ltd. v. Huddleston, No.

01-S-91-9106-CH-00047, Order of October 28,

1991 (Tenn. Sup. Ct.) (per curiam)

Brief for Appellant, National Bellas Hess, Ine. v.

Department of Revenue (O.T. 1966, No. 241)

DM News, Aug. 1, 1989, at 1

Douglas, State Officials Determined ty ‘Tar Daten.

state Mail Order Sales, 47 Tax Notes 1048

(1990)

Page

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Greenhouse, Court to Review Mail-Order Tax

Curb, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1991, at D1, col. 3... 18

Hartman, Collection of the Use Tax on Out-

of-State Mail Order Sales, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 993

REN LE ae Ee 24

Hellerstein, Significant Sales and Use Tax Devel-

opments During the Past Half Century, 39 Vand.

L. Rev. 961 (1986) ........... A TLEE RTE Vi, BES a 24

J. Ayre, Corporate Legal Departments: Strategies

I a, 21

Letter from J. William Norman, Technical Assist-

ant, Florida Dep’t of Revenue, to Laura A.

en 16

Letter from J. William Norman, Technical Assist-

ant, Florida Dep’t of Revenue, to Laura A.

Kulwicki (Jan. 31, 1990) ....................................... 17

Letter from Joanne Limbach, Ohio Tax Commis-

sioner, to Daniel T. White (Apr. 24, 1990) 16

Letter from Jim Jennison, Idaho Tax Discovery

Officer, to SFA Folio Collections, Inc. (May 8,

ERMAN AREES OT ecm rine area ceo Da ee LED 17

Letter from Jim McLeod, Chief of Field Audits,

Sales and Use Tax Division, Tennessee Dep’t of

Revenue, to Bloomingdale’s By Mail Ltd. (Aug.

RRR ry 7 en 13

Massachusetts Dept. of Revenue Technical Infor-

mation Release No. 1988-13 (Dec. 8, 1988)... 17

Nebraska Attorney General Opinion No. 87020

I I anc 15

Prentice-Hall’s Guide to Sales and Use Taxes

III sa.coliipaleadiiabinatiintiichcte ainda pan Nia eran ies eS + 20

R. Nathan Associates, Inc., An Economic Study

of the Likely Impact of Overturning the Bellas

Hess Decision on State Tax Revenues (1986) _. 18

S.C. Information Letter +89-15 (June 13,1989) 17

Tennessee Tax Quarterly, Department of Revenue,

Vol. 8, No. 3 (July-Sept. 1988), reprinted in

Tenn. Tax Rep. (CCH) © 400-162 (1988) 16

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

W. Knepper, Liability of Corporate Officers and

Directors § 14.02 (3d ed. 1978) .........................- 21

White, Emerging State Use Tax Collection Legisla-

tion and the Out-of-State Mail Order Vendor:

One Constitutional Step Beyond Scripto and Na-

tional Bellas Hess, 42 Fla. L. Rev. 775 (1990) .... 15, 16

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1991

No. 91-194

QUILL CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

By AND THROUGH ITS TAX COMMISSIONER,

HEIDI HEITKAMP,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE ARIZONA MAIL ORDER

COMPANY, INC., BASS PRO SHOPS, INC.,

BLOOMINGDALE’S BY MAIL LTD., THE BRADFORD

EXCHANGE, LTD., CABELA’S, INC., CURRENT, INC.,

DOUBLEDAY BOOK & MUSIC CLUBS, INC.,,

FINGERHUT COMPANIES, INC., HANOVER DIRECT

INC., HARRY AND DAVID, LILLIAN VERNON

CORPORATION, MBI, INC.. NEW HAMPTON, INC., THE

NEIMAN MARCUS GROUP, INC., PUBLISHERS

CLEARING HOUSE, RODALE PRESS, INC.,

SFA FOLIO COLLECTIONS, INC.,

AND USAA BUYING SERVICES, INC.

IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITIONER

STATEMENT OF INTEREST '!

Amici are large mail order companies that conduct

their business in interstate commerce.? Despite differ-

1 Counsel for all parties have consented to the filing of this

amicus brief. Amici have filed those consents with the Clerk of

this Court.

2 Appendix A briefly describes the interest of each individual

amicus.

ences in product line and customer base, these amici

share certain characteristies: they each solicit orders

from customers throughout the United States by mail,

receive orders, generally fill them from a central fulfill-

ment center, and ship these orders by mail or common

carrier. In states where they have a physical presence

and hence nexus with the taxing state, these amici have

recognized their obligation to collect use tax from their

mail order customers and remit that tax to state authori-

ties. However, in those states where they have not had

physical presence, they have generally not collected use

tax, relying on this Court’s long-standing decision in

National Bellas Hess, Ine. v. Department of Revenue,

386 U.S. 753 (1967).

These amici could face staggering potential retroactive

tax liability if this Court were to overturn Bellas Hess

and allow states to force mail order companies to remit

use tax for past periods based on nexus less substantial

than physical presence. The burden of this retroactive

tax liability would fall directly on these companies, since

once a mail order transaction has been completed, it is

virtually impossible for the company to collect the use

tax from the customer.

Amici estimate that their potential retroactive tax lia-

bility is in the millions of dollars for each company and

that the potential retroactive tax liability of mail order

companies throughout the United States is in the billions

of dollars. These amici believe that the imposition of

such retroactive ta» liability would be both unfair and

inconsistent with principles of orderly judicial decision-

making. While they urge that Bellas Hess was correctly

decided and should be reaffirmed on that ground, they also

urge that, even if this Court would reach a different re-

sult as an original matter today, principles of stare

decisis should in and of themselves lead this Court to

adhere to Bellas Hess.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

This Court has repeatedly recognized that a state can-

not impose tax obligations on an out-of-state business un-

less the business has a “substantial nexus” with the tax-

ing state. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S.

274 (1977). For nearly a quarter of a century, this

Court’s leading decision defining the required nexus in

the context of interstate mail order sales has been Na-

tional Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386

U.S. 753 (1967). There, this Court ruled that states

cannot impose use tax collection and payment obligations

on out-of-state mail order companies having no physical

presence within the state.

The Court noted that the requirement that a company

be physically present (i.¢., have “retail outlets, solicitors,

or property” within the taxing state) before being sub-

ject to use tax obligations was a “basic distinction” which

had been “generally recognized by the state taxing au-

thorities.” Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758. The Court

applied this bright line rule to mai] order companies,

declining to adopt an alternative which would have based

states’ ability to impose use tax collection obligations on

an uncertain assessment of whether a mail order com-

pany “regularly and continuously engage[s] in ‘exploita-

tion of the consumer market’” in the state. Jd. at

762 (Fortas, J., dissenting). The Court found that, with-

out this bright line distinction, mail order companies

would be subject to “a virtual welter of complicated obli-

gations to local jurisdictions,” which would impose “un-

justifiable local entanglements” on interstate commerce.

Id. at 759-60. The Court left it to Congress to fashion

legislation which would address the “unjustifiable loca!

entanglements” that inconsistent state use tax laws would

have imposed on interstate commerce, noting, “Under the

Constitution, this is a domain where Congress alone ha:

the power of regulation and control.” Jd. at 760.

Amici urge that Bellas Hess was sound when decided

and that its analysis of use tax collection and payment

burdens continues to be accurate today. The burdens on

interstate companies of inconsistent regulation have actu-

ally increased, rather than decreased, with time, and tech-

nological advances in the mail order industry have not

alleviated these burdens. Nor has the industry changed

in any constitutionally significant manner since this

Court’s Bellas Hess decision. Bellas Hess continues to be

especially important because it protects interstate com-

merce from the discrimination which would inevitably

flow from imposing significantly greater collection costs

on interstate companies than on their intrastate competi-

tors. However, since petitioners and other parties will

address those issues, this brief will focus on why prin-

ciples of stare decisis require that the Court adhere to

Bellas Hess whether or not as an original matter it would

decide Bellas Hess today the same way that it did in

1967.

A party seeking to have this Court overrule one of its

decisions must provide “special justification.” Arizona v.

Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984).* In determining

whether to adhere to past decisions, this Court has ex-

amined a variety of considerations, including whether

the earlier decision was based on incomplete analysis; ‘

whether the law, factual context, or policies underlying

the decision have changed since the precedent was de-

*“(T|t is indisputable that stare decisis is a basic self-governing

principle within the Judicial Branch, which is entrusted with the

sensitive and difficult task of fashioning and preserving a juris-

prudential system that is not based upon ‘an arbitrary discretion.’ ”

Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989), quot-

ing The Federalist, No. 78, p. 490 (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (A. Hamil-

ton); see also Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991);

Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Public Transportation, 483

U.S. 468, 494 (1987) (“the doctrine of stare decisis is of funda-

mental importance to the rule of law’).

* See, e.g., Copperweld Corp, v. Independence Tube Corp., 467

U.S. 752, 766 (1984).

cided; ° whether the precedent provides a workable stand-

ard;* and whether overruling the precedent would frus-

trate legitimate reliance interests.’ These considerations

support continued adherence to Bellas Hess. The Bellas

Hess case was thoroughly briefed, based on contempor-

aneous Congressional hearings which had fully addressed

the use tax collection issue." Neither the law nor the

factual context has changed since Bellas Hess: this Court

has continued to demand that states demonstrate a sub-

stantial nexus between themselves and the business they

seek to tax. See infra pp. 7-9. Furthermore, it is indis-

putable that the “bright line” rule of physical presence

articulated in Bellas Hess provides a far more workable

standard for judging states’ ability to impose use tax

collection obligations than any other alternative measure

of nexus.”

This brief, however, focuses on the fourth stare decisis

factor: reliance interests. As this Court noted last Term,

“considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme

in cases involving property and contract rights, where

reliance interests are involved... .” Payne v. Tennessee,

5 See, e.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 659-62

(1987): Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 1738

(1989).

® See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 124-25 (1965).

7 See, e.g., Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 700

(1978).

8 See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758-59 n.11 (citing H.R. Rep. No.

565, Report of the Subcomm. on State Tazation of Interstate

Commerce, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965) ); see also id. at 760 n.15

(referencing H.R. Rep. No. 2013, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) ).

® The protean test applied by the court below, copied substantially

from the subjective “economic presence” test rejected in Bellas

Hess (see Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 762; Quill, Pet. App. A5-A9), is

of little use in adjudication and essentially no use to businesses

seeking to plan their affairs with certainty. The North Dakota

court as much as admitted this, noting its test was a “more case-

specific” approach. Quill, Pet. App. A7.

ile

111 S.Ct. at 2610." For nearly a quarter of a century,

amici and others have reasonably relied on Bellas Hess:

they have collected use tax when they have been physically

present in a state, and generally have not collected it

when they are not. Nothing has indicated that mail

order companies should question their reliance on the

physical presence test as articulated in Bellas Hess. For

the past 24 years, this Court has acknowledged and ap-

plied Bellas Hess as controlling law. The state supreme

courts, with the exception of the decision below, have

uniformly recognized its continuing validity, and Con-

gress has refused to legislatively “overrule” the prece-

dent.

If Bellas Hess were now overruled, mail order com-

panies could face potential retroactive tax liabilities to-

talling billions of dollars. See infra pp. 11-20. None

of this retroactive liability could be recovered from the

customers originally liable for the tax. The Court should

not sanction such fundamental unfairness, especially when

Congress has the authority and ability to fashion forward-

looking legislation that would enable the states to utilize

out-of-state companies to collect use tax, reduce the bur-

dens now associated with such collection efforts by a uni-

form national approach, and avoid the imposition of

unfair, retroactive tax liability.

The core of stare decisis is that the principle furthers ‘the

stability and predictability required for the ordering of human

affairs over the course of time.” Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78,

127 (1970) (Harlan, J.. concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Stare decisis ensures that “the law will not merely change erratic-

ally,” and “permits society to presume that bedrock principles are

founded in the law rather than in the proclivity of individuals.”

Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986). It “embodies an im-

portant social policy. It represents an element of continuity in

law, and is rooted in the psychologic need to satisfy reasonable ex-

pectations.” Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940).

ARGUMENT

THIS COURT SHOULD REAFFIRM ITS DECISION IN

NATIONAL BELLAS HESS, INC. v. DEPARTMENT OF

REVENUE, 386 U.S. 753 (1967)

I. MAIL ORDER COMPANIES HAVE JUSTIFIABLY

RELIED ON BELLAS HESS FOR’ NEARLY

TWENTY-FIVE YEARS

This Court’s 1967 decision in Bellas Hess did not break

new ground; to the contrary, Bellas Hess was clearly

foreshadowed by the Court’s prior decisions in the use

tax area. In each of the use tax decisions leading up to

Bellas Hess, this Court based its finding of nexus upon

physical presence.'' Thus, when Bellas Hess announced

that a mail order company with no physical presence in

the State could not be forced to collect use taxes, the case

was no anomaly.

However, the North Dakota Supreme Court here con-

cluded that since 1967 “the foundational basis of Pellas

Hess has been eroded .. .” because a “striking shift’ in

this Court’s jurisprudence occurred in Complete Auto

Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). See Quill,

Pet. App. Al3. But Complete Auto, in announcing a new

four-part test for invalidating state tax laws under the

Commerce Clause (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3), did not

question Bellas Hess. It continued to require a “sub-

stantial nexus” between the state and the company the

state wants to tax. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279.

11 See Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939)

(presence of the company’s agents and subagents in the state);

Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941) and Nelson v.

Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373 (1941) (maintenance of

local retail stores, local advertising, and performance of business

related to mail order sales); General Trading Co. v. Tax Comm'n,

322 U.S. 335 (1944) (retailer sent a sales force into the jurisdic-

tion); Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954) (where there

was regular and continuous solicitation, but no local stores or local

agents, the State has not established use tax nexus and may not

force collection of the tax); Scripto v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960)

(presence of ten of the company’s wholesalers in the state).

And since Complete Auto, this Court has repeatedly re-

affirmed its adherence to Bellas Hess.

For example, in National Geographic Society v. Cali-

fornia Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977), decided

less than a month after Complete Auto, the Court applied

the “bright line” substantial nexus rule of Bellas Hess and

rejected a claim that a company’s “slightest presence” in the

state was sufficient. Jd. at 556. In doing so the Court

reaffirmed Bellas Hess’ “careful{] underscor[ing of] .. .

the ‘sharp distinction . . . between mail order sellers with

retail outlets, solicitors, or property within [the taxing]

State, and those [like the company in Bellas Hess] who

do no more than communicate with customers in the State

by mail or common carrier as part of a general interstate

business.’”” Jd. at 559 (quoting from Bellas Hess, 386

U.S. at 758). Four years later, in Commonwealth Edison

Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981), the Court clarified

that Bellas Hess is the touchstone of the first prong of

the Complete Auto test,’* and in each of the last three

years this Court has referred to Bellas Hess with ap-

proval."* Before this Court’s grant of certiorari in this

“Under this threshold test, the interstate business must have

a substantial nexus with the State before any tax may be levied

on it. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. lilinois Revenue Dep't, 386

U.S. 753 (1967).” Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 626 (em-

phasis in original).

18 See D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 33 (1988)

(“In National Bellas Hess, we held that the State of Illinois could

not, consistently with the Commerce Clause, compel an out-of-state

mail order company to collect a use tax on purchases of goods by

Illinois residents when the seller’s only connection with its Illinois

customers was by mail or common carrier’); Goldberg v. Sweet,

488 U.S. 252, 263 (1989) (Court noted that Bellas Hess is bench-

mark of substantial nexus: “We aiso doubt that termination of

an interstate telephone call, by itself, provides a substantial enough

nexus for a State to tax a call. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v.

Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 (1967) (receipt

of mail provides insufficient nexus)”) ; Jimmy Swaggart Ministries

v. Bd. of Equalization, 110 S.Ct. 688, 699-700 (1990) (Bellas Hess

and National Geographic control issue of substantial nexus).

case, it had previously declined two invitations to revisit

its Bellas Hess precedent within the last year.'* And, be-

fore this case, no opinion of any Justice had expressed

disagreement with Bellas Hess.

With the exception of the decision below, state appellate

and supreme courts have reinforced mail order companies’

reasonable reliance on Bellas Hess by repeatedly recog-

nizing the precedent’s control of the use tax nexus issue.'”

14 See SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Bannon, 585 A.2d 666

(Conn.), cert. denied sub nom. Commissioner of Revenue Services

v. SFA Folio Collections, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 2839 (1991); Cally Curtis

Co. v. Groppo, 572 A.2d 302 (Conn.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 77

(1990).

15 See, e.g., SFA Folio Collections, supra n. 14; Cally Curtis,

supra n. 14; Bloomingdale's By Mail, Ltd. v. Dep’t of Revenve, 591

A.2d 1047 (Pa. 1991), aff’y 567 A.2d 773 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989),

cert. filed, No. 91-383 (Sept. 3, 1991); Pearle Health Services, Inc.

v. Taylor, 799 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tenn. 1990); Alaska Airlines, Inc.

v. Dep’t of Revenue, 769 P.2d 193, 198 (Or. 1989), cert. denied,

110 S.Ct. 717 (1990) ; Burke & Sons Oil Co. v. Director of Revenue,

757 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Mo. App. 1988); Good’s Furniture House,

Inc. v. lowa State Bd. of Tax Review, 382 N.W.2d 145, 150 (Towa),

cert. denied, 479 U.S. 817 (1986); Avco Financial Serv. Consumer

Discount Co. One, Inc. v. Director Div. of Taxation, 494 A.2d 788,

795 (N.J. 1985); Illinois Commercial Men’s Ass'n v. State Bd. of

Equalization, 671 P.2d 349, 355 (Cal. 1983), app. dism'd, 466 U.S.

933 (1984); Boswell v. Paramount Television Sales, Inc., 282 So. 2d

892, 897 (Ala. 1973); Book-of-the-Month Club, Inc. v. Porterfield,

268 N.E.2d 272, 274 (Ohio 1971). Apart from the decision below,

the only other decisions questioning Bellas Hess have been two

lower court decisions in Tennessee, neither of which is final. See

SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Huddleston, No. 89-3015-III (David-

son Cty. Chancery Ct. Tenn. March 11, 1991) and Bloomingdale's

By Mail Ltd. v. Huddleston, No. 89-3017-II1 (Davidson Cty. Chan-

cery Ct. Tenn. March 8, 1991). The ruling in the By Mail case is

on appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court, and that court is hold-

ing the case pending the outcome of this case. See Bloomingdale's

By Mail Ltd. v. Huddleston, No. 01-S-01-9106-CH-00047, Order of

October 28, 1991 (per curiam). The Folio case has been placed on

inactive status pending the By Mail appeal. As noted above, in

1990 the Tennessee Supreme Court in Pearle recognized the con-

tinued vitality of Bellas Hess.

]

’

;

Two of these decisions have been rendered in the last

eight months,"* and just four months ago, a federal dis-

trict court enjoined California’s attempt to impose use tax

collection obligations on direct marketing companies with

no physical presence in that State."

Even the North Dakota Supreme Court’s decision in

this case refusing to follow Bellas Hess could not be said

to provide notice of any impending change in the govern-

ing constitutional law. Under the Supremacy Clause, this

Court’s decisions bind the lower courts, as well as state

executive officers and legislators.'* Similarly, the fact that

some states have changed their use tax statutes to base

nexus on mere catalog solicitation does not suggest that

mail order companies should no longer follow Bellas Hess.

Enforcing such statutes while Bellas Hess still controls

tne issue of use tax nexus is simply unconstitutional.

Continued reliance on Bellas Hess has also been justi-

fied by Congress’s consistent refusal to overrule that pre-

cedent. For many years states have lobbied for legislative

overruling, and in recent years numerous bills have been

introduced to achieve legislatively the goal that North

Dakota seeks before this Court.’” But Congress has not

16 See supra n. 15.

17 Direct Marketing v. Bennett, No. Civ. S-88-1067 (E.D. Cal.

July 12, 1991 (1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10736) (notice of appeal

filed 9th Cir. July 16, 1991).

18 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958); see also, e.g., Chesa-

peake & Ohio Ry. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209, 221 (1931).

' See, e.g., S. 2368, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); H.R. 3521,

100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987); H.R. 1891, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.

(1987). Hearings have been conducted on a number of legislative

proposals. See, e.g., State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Hear-

ing on S. 1510 Before the Subcomm. on Tazation and Debt Man-

agement of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.

(1985); Interstate Sales Tax Collection Act of 1987: Hearing on

H.R. 1242 Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the

House Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987) ;

Collection of State Sales and Use Taxes by Out-of-State Vendors:

taken any action, conveying to all parties—state taxing

authorities and mail order companies alike—the continu-

ing vitality of Bellas Hess.

Thus, mail order companies have reasonably concluded

that Bellas Hess continues to govern the issue of use tax

nexus.

Il. BECAUSE MAIL ORDER COMPANIES HAVE

ORDERED THEIR AFFAIRS IN RELIANCE ON

BELLAS HESS, OVERRULING THAT DECISION

COULD IMPOSE POTENTIALLY MASSIVE RETRO-

ACTIVE LIABILITY ON THOSE COMPANIES

If Bellas Hess were overruled, mail order companies

would be threatened with liability for uncollected taxes

(plus accrued interest and sizeable penalties) in the

thirty-eight states that currently define nexus by refer-

ring to catalog distribution or other ferms of advertising.

Of those thirty-eight states, twenty have had such “cata-

log nexus” provisions in effect in some form for decades.

many dating back to the 1940’s and 1950’s. See Appendix

B. In 1966, for example, New Jersey amended its defini-

tion of a “vendor” subject to use tax collection obligations

to include any “person who solicits business . . . by dis-

tribution of catalogs and other advertising matter... .” *”

Such statutes were in effect when this Court decided

Bellas Hess in 1967 and appear to include all mail order

sales within their scope, inasmuch as they are specifi-

cally drafted to make catalog solicitations a sufficient

nexus.

Hearing on S. 639 and S. 1099 Before the Subcomm. on Taxation

and Debt Management of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 100th

Cong., Ist Sess. (1987).

2ON J. Stat. § 54:32B-2(1)(2)(c) (1966).

Nevertheless, even before Bellas Hess, most states re-

fused to enforce existing catalog nexus provisions against

out-of-state sellers engaged solely in disseminating cata-

logs and shipping goods into the state by mail or common

carrier.*' This position stemmed from prevailing “uncer-

tainty as to the constitutional limits of the State’s au-

thority,” ** an uncertainty well founded on this Court’s

jurisprudence. See supra p. 7.

Bellas Hess resolved any uncertainty and rendered the

existing catalog nexus statutes unenforceable against in-

terstate mail order sellers. Between 1967 and 1986, state

taxing authorities generally abided by Bellas Hess and

did not attempt to impose use tax collection and payment

obligations on mail order sellers with no physical presence

in the state, even though such sellers fell within many

statutory definitions of nexus.**

Although there has been no change in this Court’s jur-

isprudence, this policy of nonenforcement began to erode

in 1986, when some states abandoned their longstanding

practice of administrative forbearance and aggressively

sought to enforce their catalog nexus statutes against

*! Brief for Appellant at 13, Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. 753 (0O.T.

1966, No. 241) (stating that the states with catalog nexus pro-

visions “have rarely attempted to enforce the obligation”); see also

Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758 n.11 (citing Congressional testimony ).

The one state court that specifically considered the issue prior to

Rellas Hess construed its statute to avoid invalidation on Federal

constitutional grounds, and found that Alabama’s statute did not

apply to purely interstate mail order sellers. Alabama v. Lane

Bryant, Inc., 171 So. 2d 91 (Ala. 1965).

22H.R. Rep. 565, Report of the Subcomm. on State Taration

of Interstate Commerce, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. at 627, 633 (1965).

“3 In one instance where tax authorities attempted to seek such

obligations, they were rebuffed. See Book-of-the-Month Club, supra

n. 15.

traditional mail order sellers.** For example, in Pennsyl-

vania, the Department of Revenue attempted to enforce

the State’s old catalog nexus statute against an out-of-

state mail order seller. The Pennsylvania statute, effec-

tive since 1959, imposed use tax obligations on sellers

“maintaining a place of business” in the Commonwealth,

defined to include those sellers which are “[r]Jegularly or

substantially soliciting orders within [Pennsylvania] by

means of catalogues or other advertising ... .” Section

201(b) (3) of the Tax Reform Code of 1971, Pa. Stat.

Ann. tit. 72 § 7201(b) (3) (Purdon 1990). The Depart-

ment argued that “a mail-order seller . . . falls within

the ambit of Section 201(b) (3).” See L.L. Bean, Ine. v.

Commonwealth Dept. of Revenue, 516 A.2d 820 (Pa.

Commw. Ct. 1986). Similarly, after 20 years of comply-

ing with Bellas Hess, Tennessee recently adopted a new

tax policy that challenges prevailing constitutional limi-

tations,” relying on its new interpretation of pre-existing

Tennessee law,?® which required a company to collect use

taxes if it “[d]istributes catalogues or other advertising

matter and by reason thereof receives and accepts orders

from residents of [the] State.” *

If this Court were to alter its prior constitutional in-

terpretation, any state with a catalog nexus provision

24 See Douglas, State Officials Determined to Tax Interstate Mail

Order Sales, 47 Tax Notes 1048 (1990) (citing fiscal constraints

and frustration with the decision of Congress not to overrule

Bellas Hess as major factors in states’ new attempts to impose use

tax obligations) .

*5 See Letter from Jim McLeod, Chief of Field Audit, Sales and

Use Tax Division, Tennessee Dep’t of Revenue, to Bloomingdale’s

By Mail (Aug. 10, 1989). Representative letters have been lodged

with the Clerk of the Court for the convenience of the Court.

*6 Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6-102(4) (J) (1983) (later renumbered

-102(6)(J)).

27 For a portion of the assessment period the State also relied on

a recent amendment to the Tennessee use tax provisions which

further expanded their scope. See letter supra n.25.

could change its entrenched policy of nonenforcement and

adopt this new construction. The overwhelming number

of states have never judicially construed their catalog nexus

provisions in this context. In all but one of the states

where the judiciary has addressed the question, the only

barrier to the reinterpretation of most existing laws to

cover mail order sales is this Court’s decision in Bellas

Hess; thus, nineteen states would be free to interpret

their longstanding statutes so as to reach mail order

sellers.**

The jeopardy to mail order sellers arises not only from

the reinterpretation of existing law. In recent years

many states have supplemented existing catalog nexus

statutes with new statutes that directly contradict Bellas

Hess. “Since 1987, a movement has quietly developed

' among the states to challenge industry interpretations of

the scope and applicability of Bellas Hess through the

passage of state legislation.” *” At least thirty-five states

*8 See Bloomingdale's By Mail Ltd. v. Dep't of Revenue, supra

n. 15; SFA Folio Collections, supra n. 14; Book-of-the-Month

Club, supra n.15; but see Lane Bryant, supra n.21 ( Alabama's cata-

log nexus provision already construed not to apply to interstate

mail order sellers).

The determination of states to extend their jurisdiction to

the maximum possible constitutional limits is often expressed in

the legislation itself. See, e.g., N.Y. Tax Law §$1101(b)(8) (Me-

Kinney 1991) (“regular or systematic” solicitation by mail creates

liability if such solicitation “satisfies the nexus requirement of the

United States Constitution”); W. Va. Code §11-15A-6a (Supp.

1990) (“substantial and recurring” solicitation by mail creates

liability if seller has physical presence or “any other presence that

provides the necessary minimum contacts for a constitutionally

\y_ Snfficient nexus”); see also Ga. Code Ann. § 48-8-1 (Michie 1982)

(it is the intention of Georgia to “exercise its full and complete

power to tax” retail sales and uses of tangible personal property

“except to the extent prohibited by the constitutions of the United

States and of [Georgia]’’).

“A. Morse & C. Zimmerman, Efforts to Collect Sales Tax on

Interstate Mail Order Sales: Recent State Legislation 1 (National

Conference of State Legislatures: June 1990).

(17 of which already had catalog nexus stavutes), in-

cluding North Dakota, have passed laws which purport

to create use tax obligations for interstate sellers that

are not physically present in the state, but which solicit

sales by mailing catalogs to residents there. See Appendix

C. Although specific state formulations vary, every state

which has passed an “anti-Bellas Hess” statute in essence

adopts the “economic nexus” test expressed by Justice For-

tas in his Bellas Hess dissent.” Some impose use tax col-

lection duties on sellers who engage in “regular or sys-

tematic” solicitation by mail, catalog or other interstate

means, while others refer to “substantial and recurring”

solicitation or “purposeful or systematic exploitation” of

the marketplace. See Appendix C. In whatever language

used, each of these new statutes ignores Bellas Hess by

directly defying its prohibition against traditional mail

order taxation. For example, in broadening Connecticut’s

statute to include “engaging in regular or systematic sales

of tangible personal property in this State... by the

distribution of catalogs,” *' legislators observed that the

amendment “flies in the face of a Supreme Court case”

and “would not comply with the requirements in

Bellas Hess.” ”

Some of the states with newly enacted legislation have

aggressively sought to enforce their purportedly expanded

taxing powers by targeting mail order companies, re-

” See White, Emerging State Use Tax Collection Legislation and

the Out-of-State Mail Order Vendor: One Constitutional Step Be-

yond Scripto and National Bellas Hess, 42 Fla. L. Rev. 775, 778

(1990).

41 Conn. Gen. Stats. Ann. § 12-407(12), (15) (West Supp. 1991).

%2 See Connecticut House of Representatives, Hearings on SB702

at 2647, 2618 (April 5, 1989); see also Nebraska Attorney General

Opinion No, 87020 (Feb. 17, 1987) (“[WJe believe certain aspects

of the | Nebraska anti-Bellas Hess| amendment pose serious con-

stitutional difficulties under the standards enunciated by the Su-

preme Court”).

questing that they register and begin collecting tax, and

issuing assessments against those who rely on Bellas Hess

and refuse to comply.” In California alone, state taxing

officials issued assessments against more than 200 mail

order companies in the months following passage of Cali-

fornia’s statute. DM News, August 1, 1989, at 1. Rep-

resentatives from the Florida Department of Revenue

in enforcement letters to out-of-state mail order sellers

have stated that Bellas Hess “is contrary to the current

official position of this Department ... .”** These en-

forcement efforts have prompted litigation to challenge

the new statutes in at least five states in addition to

North Dakota.”

It is equally clear that states such as North Dakota

intend to assess taxes retroactively.” In only a few states

4% See State Enforcement Letters (lodged with the Court); Ten-

nessee Tax Quarterly, Department of Revenue, Vol. 8, No. 3, July-

Sept. 1988), reprinted in Tenn. Tax Rep. (CCH) { 400-162 at 22,276

(1988) (“Tennessee plans a very aggressive program to ensure

compliance. An effort to notify probable dealers of their responsi-

bility is a part of the program. .. . Dealers who fail to comply

voluntarily may be audited and held liable for any uncollected

taxes plus applicable penalties and interest dating to the law’s

enactment date”’).

“4 Letter from J. William Norman, Technical Assistant, Florida

Department of Revenue, to Laura A. Kulwicki (Feb. 7, 1990); see

also Letter from Joanne Limbach, Ohio Tax Commissioner, to Daniel

T. White (Apr. 24, 1990), quoted in White, Emerging State Use

Taz Collection Legislation, supra n.30 at 791 n.111.

*5 See Bennett, supra n.17; SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Tracy,

No. 91-295 (Ohio Bd. of Tax Appeals, appeal filed March 8, 1991),

appeal from SFA Folio Collections, No, 910002000 (Ohio Tax

Comm’r, Feb. 8, 1991); Renovator’s Supply, Ine. v. Sharp, No.

91-9493 (Tex. Dist. Ct., filed July 5, 1991); see also supra n.15

(Tennessee litigation). State attempts to impose obligations con-

trary to Bellas Hess continue even in states such as Connecticut,

where the state supreme court has continued to follow Bellas Hess.

See, ¢.g., The Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. v. Meehan, No. 387601

(Conn. Super. Ct., appeal filed Dec. 10, 1990).

%6 See supra n.35 (proceedings pending in Tennessee, Penn-

sylvania, California, Ohio, Texas, and Connecticut). Idaho's

have the statutes been written to protect against retro-

active liability; thus, reinterpretation and enforcement

of old catalog nexus statutes, coupled with enforcement of

new anti-Bellas Hess legislation, would likely create enor-

mous retroactive tax consequences for mail order sellers

if Bellas Hess were overruled.” This is so because most

notification letter to mail order sellers informs them that if “court

decisions support Idaho’s law, businesses that have not collected

and remitted sales/use tax may be faced with a retroactive tax

liability.” Letter from Jim Jennison, Idaho Tax Discovery Officer,

to SFA Folio Collections, Inc. (May 8, 1990). South Carolina simi-

larly asserts that “|a|ny nonresident retailer ... who has the requi-

site ‘nexus’ with South Carolina, may be held accountable for all

use tax due and owed the State, for all periods open under the

statute.” S.C. Information Letter #89-15 (June 13, 1989). Flor-

ida officials assert that “future decisions affirming state power in

this area could result in substantial liability for taxes that should

have been collected over a number of years in the past.” Letter

from J. William Norman, Technical Assistant, Florida Dept. of

Revenue, to Laura A. Kulwicki (Jan. 31, 1990).

*? So far as we are aware, no state has expressly disclaimed

retroactive liability, but in a few states the statute bars enforce-

ment until a change in this Court’s jurisprudence or the passage of

federal legislation. See, ¢.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-26-301 et seq.

(Supp. 1991) (creating use tax liabilities for out-of-state sellers,

but only after “passage of federa! legislation authorizing states to

require out-of-state retailers to collect sales or use taxes”): La.

Stat. Ann, §47-305E (West Supp. 1990) (liability arises for sales

promoted through catalogs “and for which federal legislation or

federal jurisprudence enables taxation”); Massachusetts Depart-

ment of Revenue Technical Information Release No. 1988-123 (De-

cember 8, 1988) (the “clear legislative intent” behind enactment

of the statute “was that the expanded Massachusetts jurisdiction

would not be exercised until federal statutory or case law specif-

ically authorizes each state to require foreign mail order vendors

to collect sales and use taxes on goods delivered to that state’’).

It is unclear whether the Louisiana and Massachusetts statutes

would be interpreted as barring retroactive liability once Bellas Hess

were overruled. In Colorado the new statute was conditioned on the

passage of federal legislation, but an earlier unqualified statute

remains on the books. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-26-102(3)(6) (Supp.

1991). In view of this lack of clarity, we have excluded these three

states in computing retroactive liability in Appendices E & F.

states possess virtually unlimited authority in assessing

back taxes.** As a result, mail order sellers could face

exposure for uncollected taxes on sales dating back to the

effective date of each state’s catalog nexus statute, which

in some instances is theoretically more than forty years *

and includes virtually all past sales made by many mail

order companies.

The resulting economic burden can be quantified by

referring to estimates of “lost” tax revenues attributable

to mail order sales protected by Bellas Hess. Recent esti-

mates of revenue loss range from $694 million to $3 bil-

lion per year.*°

The economic consequences of states’ express attempts

to enforce old catalog nexus statutes in a manner di-

rectly inconsistent with Bellas Hess would threaten the

economic health—if not the very existence—of many mail

order companies. Even limiting liability to uncollected

taxes on sales made since 1985 (see infra n. 42), and

using the revenue estimates provided by the Advisory

38 Of the 44 states and the District of Columbia that currently

impose sales and use taxes, 35 states do not impose any period of

limitations on assessments when no return is filed. The remaining

ten jurisdictions permit the taxing authorities to assess taxes for

past periods ranging from three to eight years. See Appendix D.

5° See Appendix B.

Interstate Competition Act of 1987: Hearings on H.R. 1242, H.R.

1891, and H.R. 3521 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and

Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th

Cong., 2d Sess. at 95 (1988) (testimony of Direct Marketing Associ-

ation) (citing 1986 study by Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc., An

Economic Study of the Likely Impact of Overturning the Bellas Hess

Decision on State Tax Revenues (1986) (estimating a $694 million

annual loss)); Cf. Greenhouse, Court to Review Mail-Order Taz

Curb, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1991 at D1, col. 3 (states estimate a

$3 billion annual revenue loss).

Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,*! mail order

sellers could be held accountable for as much as $9.5

billion in past taxes. See Appendix E.* This figure does

not even account for additional liabilities imposed by in-

terest and penalty assessments authorized by every taxing

statute. Penalties for failure to collect and remit taxes

average twenty-five percent of the unpaid tax, and inter-

est rates range from eight to 28 percent. 1A All St. Sales

Tax Rep. (CCH) ¥ 8-350 at 9733-9735 (1991); see, e.g.,

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 212.12(2)(a) (West 1989) (penalty

of 5 percent per month up to a maximum of 25 percent) ;

Idaho Code § 63-3046(0) (Michie 1989) (penalty of 5

percent per month up to a maximum of 25 percent) ;

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 54:49-4 (West 1991) (penalty of

$100.00 per month plus 5 percent per month up to a

maximum of 25 percent). If the calculations are limited

to liabilities under recently enacted statutes, mail order

sellers face approximately $5 billion in liability for un-

collected taxes. See Appendix F.

The billions of dollars at stake would come directly

from mail order sellers. While the tax itself is owed by

the consumer, not by the mail order seller, states have

claimed the power to directly assess sellers who fail to

*! See Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,

Estimates of Revenue Potential from State Taxation of Mail Order

Sales 9 (1987) (“ACIR Study”) (estimating mail order tax rev-

enue in 1988 at approximately $2.4 billion). The ACIR Study fig-

ures are disputed by many parties, but even using the most con-

servative estimate ($694 million annually), the potential retroactive

tax liability for past years is huge.

#2 Although the states could conceivably attempt to reach back to

impose back tax liability on sales made since the effective date of

the catalog nexus provisions (as early as the 1940’s in some states),

such efforts would be severely impaired by practical constraints re-

sulting from the lack of available records. In estimating the po-

tential exposure faced by mail order sellers, a seven-year period

was selected to provide a conservative estimate of the realistic

exposure, See Appendix E.

collect the required use tax.** As a practical matter none

of this retroactive tax liability can be recovered from the

consumer that owed the tax. The resulting hardship

would occur not as a consequence of a calculated busi-

ness gamble in refusing to collect tax, but in express

reliance on direct Supreme Court precedent that unam-

biguously defined the scope of the seller’s obligation.

Ill. SINCE JUSTIFIED, SETTLED EXPECTATIONS

ARE AT STAKE, THE COURT SHOULD ADHERE

TO BELLAS HESS

Under these circumstances, this Court should reaffirm

Bellas Hess and the principle that mail order companies

cannot be subject to use tax obligations unless they are

physically present in the taxing state. To be sure, Bellas

Hess is a constitutional case, and the Court has noted

that stare decisis has “more force in statutory analysis

than in constitutional adjudication because, in the former

situation, Congress can correct [the Court’s] mistakes

through legislation ....” Monell v. Dep’t of Social Serv-

ices, 486 U.S. 658, 695 (1978). Yet in constitutional

cases as well, “[t]here is a strong public interest in sta-

bility, and in the orderly conduct of our affairs, that is

served by a consistent course of constitutional adjudica-

tion.” * Thus, “any departure from the doctrine of stare

decisis demands special justification.” Arizona v. Rumsey,

467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984).*

Among the “weighty considerations” which “underlie

the principle that courts should not lightly overrule past

decisions,” first is the desirability of enabling individuals

“to plan their affairs with assurance against untoward

43 See 1 All St. Sales Tax Rep. (CCH) {% 2-025 at 2012 (1991);

Prentice-Hall’s Guide to Sales and Use Taxes 28, 29 (1985).

44 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gyne-

cologists, 476 U.S. 747, 780-81 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).

45 See also City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive

Health, 462 U.S. 416, 419-20 (1983).

surprise... .” Moragne v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 398

U.S. 375, 403 (1970). “When rights have been created or

modified in reliance on established rules of law, the argu-

ments against their change have special force.” Thomas

v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 (1980).

Since amici and others have operated their businesses

under Bellas Hess for nearly a quarter of a century, there

are “strong reliance interests that would be threatened” *

—and indeed frustrated—if this Court overruled Bellas

Hess. Since 1967, “the reliance interest sought to be pro-

tected by the doctrine of stare decisis has grown up

around the settled rule.”** A number of considerations

strongly suggest that reliance interests are even more

weighty in this case than in most constitutional cases:

First, while reliance interests always require this Court

to reassess precedents with caution, reliance is especially

important for business decision-making. As noted above,

“{e]Jonsiderations in favor of stare decisis are at their

acme in cases involving property and contract rights,

where reliance interests are involved... .” Payne, 111

S.Ct. at 2610. Businesses carefully tailor their operations

to this Court’s decisions.** Where businesses have justifi-

ably relied on precedent, overruling severely disrupts

business planning and operation.

Thus, the Court has strongly preferred stability in

cases impacting business planning. In National Bank v.

Whitney, 103 U.S. 99 (1880), for example, the Court

considered whether it should overrule National Bank v.

46 Arkansas Electric Cooperative Co. v. Arkansas Public Utility

Commission, 461 U.S. 375, 392 (1983).

47 American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S.

266, 300 (1987) (O’Connor and Powell, JJ., and Rehnquist, CJ.,

dissenting ).

48 See, e.g., W. Knepper, Liability of Corporate Officers and Di-

rectors § 14.02 at 418 (3d ed. 1978); J. Ayre, Corporate Legal De-

partments: Strategies for the 1980s 98 (1984),

Matthews, 98 U.S. 621 (1878), which had interpreted an

‘Act of Congress to allow a national bank to enforce a

mortgage of lands against the mortgagor and parties

claiming under him. The Court noted that “lilt is not

unreasonable to suppose that [national banks] have con-

ducted their business and made loans to a large amount

in reliance upon |Matthews|, and that in many cases

great injury would follow a departure from it.” Whitney,

103 U.S. at 102. Under these circumstances the Court

declined to overrule Matthews.

Judicial decisions affecting the business interests of

the country should not be disturbed except for the

most cogent reasons, certainly not because of subse-

quent doubts as to their soundness. The prosperity

of a commercial community depends, in a great de-

gree, upon the stability of the rules by which its

transactions are governed.”

Second, adherence to Bellas Hess is particularly ap-

propriate because it would affect the tax consequences

of past conduct. The Court has been especially hesitant

to impose massive retroactive tax liabilities, recognizing

that tax planning is one of the foundations of business

operations.

For example, in Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371,

402 (1943), the Court refused to find that Congress had

intended a statutory change in the tax law seven years

previously to overturn, sub silentio, Eisner v. Macomber,

252 U.S. 189 (1920), which had held that stock dividends

were not taxable. In language strikingly applicable to this

Court’s reconsideration of Bellas Hess, the Griffiths Court

noted that: “We are asked to make a retroactive holding

that for some seven years past a multitude of transactions

‘have been taxable although there was no source of law

from which the most cautious taxpayer could have learned

of the liability.” Griffiths, 318 U.S. at 402. The Court

explained that such a change in tax administration would

49 Whitney, 103 U.S, at 102.

be extremely detrimental: “To rip out of the past seven

years of tax administration a principle of law on which

both Government and taxpayers have acted would pro-

duce readjustments and litigation so extensive we would

contemplate them with anxiety.” Jd. at 403.

Third, this case involves the interpretation of the

Commerce Clause—a constitutional provision that was it-

self designed to promote stability in commerce. So far

as we have been able to determine, in the Commerce

Clause context this Court has never overruled a prece-

dent where it has been shown that this would have im-

posed substantial retroactive liability resulting from jus-

tified reliance on an overruled decision. As we demon-

strate in greater detail in Appendix G, in many overrul-

ing cases the Court dealt with newly enacted statutes

which presented no significant problem of retroactivity.

In others the Court either overruled prospectively or indi-

cater that protection from retroactive liability remained

an open question.

Fourth, Congress’ power to legislatively modify or

overrule Bellas Hess suggests that Bellas Hess merits

even greater deference than would be accorded to most

constitutional decisions of this Court. Here, the Court

is not addressing a fundamental right that even Con-

gress cannot reach with legislation; rather, the Court

is reassessing a Commerce Clause precedent, which Con-

gress can modify using its active Commerce Clause

power.”

0° Cf. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 787 (White, J., and Rehnquist,

CJ., dissenting); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,

406-07 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“in cases involving the

Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action

is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier

decisions”) (emphasis added).

51 See Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also, e.g., South-Central Timber

Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87 (1984). National

Bellas Hess also challenged the Illinois use tax statute on Due

In fact, in Bellas Hess this Court specifically recog-

nized Congressional power to change the result, noting

that “{u]nder the Constitution, this is a domain where

Congress alone has the power of regulation and control.”

Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 760. But that is an invitation

which Congress has long declined. See supra p. 10.

Bellas Hess is therefore entitled to extreme deference

since, as in the case of statutory interpretation, “correc-

tion can be had by legislation.” ** Here, as in statutory

cases, legislation can make a change “with infinitely less

derangement of [reliance] interests than would follow a new

ruling of the court, for statutory regulations would oper-

ate only in the future.” Whitney, 103 U.S. at 102.”

]

Finaily, this Court’s recent decisions severely restrict-

ing the availability of prospective overruling suggest that

Process grounds. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756. The Court noted

that the Due Process and Commerce Clause claims “are closely re-

lated” (id.), and invited Congress to change the Bellas Hess result

if it saw fit (id. at 760); thus, the Court apparently assumed that

any Due Process problems with use tax nexus could be resolved

by Congressional “regulation and control.” IJd.; see also, e.g.,

Hellerstein, Significant Sales and Use Taz Developments During

the Past Half Century, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 961, 983-92 (1986) (Con-

gress possesses power to legislate in areas protected by Due

Process Clause); Hartman, Collection of the Use Tax on Out-of-

State Mail-Order Sales, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 993, 1021-31 (1986)

(same).

52 Burnet, supra n.50; see also, e.g., Monell v. Dep't of So-

cial Services, 436 U.S. 658, 695 (1978); United States v. South

Buffalo R. Co. 333 U.S. 771, 774 (1948); Continental T.V., Inc. v.

GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 60 (1977) (White, J., concurring).

53 Compare Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261,

272 n.18 (1980) (stare decisis is entitled to less deference in a full

faith and credit case, where Congress does not act with unfettered

authority) to Houston & Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S.

342, 350 (1914) (noting “the complete and paramount charatcer

of the power confided to Congress to regulate commerce among the

several States”).

the Court should adhere even more faithfully to princi-

ples of stare decisis. For more than twenty years, when

faced with a perceived need to overrule precedent, this

Court has dealt with especially troublesome reliance in-

terests by limiting the retroactive effect of the overruling

decision so as to avoid upsetting settled expectations. See

p. 26 infra. Recently, however, this Court has ques-

tioned whether prospective overruling is ever permis-

sible.** If prospective overruling is no longer available,

stare decisis is even more fundamental to fairness for

litigants: “Because it forces us to consider the disrup-

tion that our new decisional rules cause, retroactivity

combines with stare decisis to prevent us from altering

the law each time the opportunity presents itself.” James

B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 2450

(1991) (Blackmun, Marshall, and Scalia, JJ., concurring

in the judgment) .”

54 James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. at 2446

(opinion of Souter and Stevens, JJ.) (“{a]ssuming that pure

prospectivity [in civil cases! may be had at all... its scope must

necessarily be limited to a small number of cases ... .”); ef.

Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) (announcing a rule of

absolute retroactivity in criminal cases).

*5 Some Justices have argued that prospective overruling re-

spects stare decisis because it allows the Court to change its mind

without disappointing settled expectations. “At its core, stare

decisis allows those affected by the law to order their affairs

without fear that the established law upon which they rely will

suddenly be pulled out from under them .... By not applying a

law-changing decision retroactively, a court respects the settled

expectations that have built up around the old law.” Beam, 111

S. Ct. at 2452 (O’Connor and Kennedy, JJ., and Rehnquist, CJ.,

dissenting). Others have argued that prospective overruling is

bad, because it gives the Court too much flexibility and thereby

undermines stare decisis, “By announcing new rules prospectively

or by applying them selectively, a court may dodge the stare

decisis bullet by avoiding the disruption of settled expectations

that otherwise prevents us from disturbing our settled prece-

dents.” Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2450 (Blackmun, Marshall, and

Sealia, JJ., concurring in the judgment).

Thus, whenever this Court has reassessed one of its

precedents, it has recognized that it must avoid disrupt-

ing settled expectations. This case involves a valid prece-

dent on which nearly twenty-five years of business plans

have been based. Under these circumstances, stare decisis

supports reaffirmation of Bellas Hess.

IV. IF THIS COURT WERE TO OVERRULE BELLAS

HESS, IT SHOULD LIMIT THAT DECISION TO

SOLELY PROSPECTIVE EFFECT

The same concerns that drive stare decisis also strongly

counsel that, if Bellas Hess is overruled, such a decision

be only prospective in application if that approach remains

available. Under Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97

(1971), the Court may limit the retroactive effect of a

decision provided that the case meets three criteria: (1)

the decision “establish{es] a new principle of law, either

by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may

have relied, . . . or by deciding an issue of first impres-

sion whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed”; (2)

the Court has “weigh{ed] the merits and demerits . . .

by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its

purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation

will further or retard its operation”; and (3) the Court

56 Amici recognize that this Court may not sanction “modified,

or selective prospectivity,” in which “a court may apply a new

rule in the case in which it is pronounced, then return to the old

one with respect to all others arising on facts predating the pro-

nouncement.” Beam, 111 S.Ct. at 2444 (opinion of Souter and

Stevens, JJ.); see id. at 2448 (White, J., concurring in the judg-

ment); id. at 2449 (opinion of Blackmun, Marshall and Scalia,

JJ., concurring in the judgment); see supra p. 25. But we under-

stand the Court not to have foreclosed its ability to apply an

overruling decision with complete prospectivity, “under which a

new rule is applied neither to the parties in the law-making deci-

sion nor to those others against or by whom it might be applied

to conduct or events occurring before that decision.” Jd. at 2443

(opinion of Souter and Stevens, JJ.); see id. at 2449 (White, J.,

concurring in the judgment), 2452-56 (opinion of O’Connor and

Kennedy, JJ., and Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).

has “weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive appli-

cation” and found that the new ruling “could produce

substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively

..+. Id. at 106-07 (citations omitted).

Amici have already demonstrated that this case quint-

essentially satisfies the first and third prongs of Chevron

Oil. As shown above, any decision overruling Bellas Hess

would contradict nearly twenty-five years of this Court’s

decisions, and, if such a decision were applied retroac-

tively, it would pose substantial and unjust hardship.

This case also satisfies the second prong of Chevron Oil.

The policies behind any overruling of Bellas Hess would

not be furthered by applying the decision retroactively,

for several reasons:

First, the principal purported interest of the states in

advancing the new “economic nexus” test is to raise state

revenues by forcing mail order companies to collect and

remit use taxes from consumers, who are said to “escape”

taxation.” Amici disagree with the premise,** but even

if the interest were a legitimate basis for overruling

Bellas Hess, the policy simply is not served by retro-

active overruling. Retroactive overruling would create

new and purely retroactive liabilities for mail order com-

panies, as opposed to the consumers who are said to be

“escaping” taxation. The end result would be to make

mail order companies, rather than consumers, pay the

tax.

Second, another argument advanced for overruling

Bellas Hess is to make mail order use tax nexus comport

with allegedly new factual and legal conditions in the

mail order industry.’ While, as noted above, amici dis-

agree with this argument,” in any event that policy ap-

57 Quill, Pet. App. A25.

58 See Brief of Petitioner.

5° Quill, Pet. App. A10-A11.

60 Supra pp. 7-9.

Oa a a

pears fundamentally prospective in nature. The Court

would be judicially noting that factual or legal changes

in the industry have forced the introduction of a new

standard of nexus. The policy behind such a _ holding

would not be furthered by allowing states to reach back

in time and collect monies that they were not owed under

Bellas Hess.

Finally, some have argued that overruling Bellas Hess

would eliminate a perceived disparity between interstate

and intrastate retailers."' Again, amici disagree that any

such disparity, if present, could justify the introduction

of a new disparity favoring in-state retailers. Never-

theless, if this interest were to underlie a decision to

overrule Bellas Hess, it would hardly be served by should-

ering mail order companies with a substantial retroactive

tax liability not borne by local retailers. Yet that would

be the inevitable result of any decision to overrule Bellas

Hess with full retroactive effect. Thus, if the Court de-

cided that it must overrule Bellas Hess, under Chevron

Oil the Court should limit the retroactive effect of its de-

cision to avoid the inequities that would otherwise result.

Amici have argued that stare decisis supports reaffirma-

tion of Bellas Hess, and that alternatively, if the Court

determined to overrule Bellas Hess, it should do so only

prospectively. Neither argument, however, should obscure

two central facts: Bellas Hess was correctly decided in

1967, and the precedent continues to protect mail order

companies from unjustifiable and discriminatory burdens

on interstate commerce that would inevitably result in its

absence.

Congress remains the proper forum for addressing

states’ concerns about the ability to raise revenue and

mail order companies’ justified fears about collection

*1 Quill, Pet. App. A24-A25.

62 Supra p. 4 (noting discrimination which would flow from im-

posing use tax collection burdens on interstate sellers).

burdens. There, the question of how much entanglement

of interstate commerce should be tolerated in light of

state fiscal concerns can be addressed based on a com-

plete factual record, and burdensome and discriminatory

obligations could be avoided. If Congress were persuaded

to act, it could do so prospectively, to avoid upsetting re-

liance interests, and could implement changes using a

phase-in period that would not sudenly impose new collec-

tion burdens on mail order companies. Until and unless

that occurs, Bellas Hess should not be disturbed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse

the judgment below.

Respectfully submitted,

MARYANN B. GALL

(Counsel of Record )

LAURA A. KULWICKI

JONES, Day, REAVIS & Pocue

1900 Huntington Center

41 South High Street

Columbus, Ohio 423215

November 21, 1991

Of Counsel: (614) 469-3939

MICHAEL J. MEEHAN TimMoTHY B. Dyk

Roy W. KYLE EDWARD K. BILICH

MOLLOY, JONES & DONAHUE JONES, Day, REAVIS & PoGcuE

22nd Floor Metropolitan Square

33 North Stone Avenue 1450 G Street, N.W.

Tucson, Arizona 85701 Washington, D.C. 20005

Counsel for Arizona Mail Order (202) 879-3939

Company, Inc. : Counsel for Amici Curiae

JOE C. GREENE

GREENE & CURTIS

1340 East Woodhurst

Springfield, Missouri 65804

Counsel for

Bass Pro Shops, Inc.

FRANK G. JULIAN

7 West Seventh Street

Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

Counsel for

Bloomingdale’s By Mail Ltd.

DAVID J. BRADFORD

The Bradford Exchange, Ltd.

9333 Milwaukee Avenue

Niles, Illinois 60648

Counsel for

The Bradford Exchange, Ltd.

GEORGE S. ISAACSON

MARTIN I. EISENSTEIN

BRANN & ISAACSON

184 Main Street

P.O. Box 3070

Lewiston, Maine 04243-3070

Counsel for Cabela’s, Inc.

and Lillian Vernon Corp.

Davip W. FRANCIS

CURRENT, INC.

1005 East Woodmen Road

Colorado Springs, CO 80920

Counsel for Current, Inc.

ROBERT J. POSCH, JR.

DOUBLEDAY Book &

Music CLuss, INC.

501 Franklin Avenue

Garden City, New York 11530

Counsel for Doubleday Book &

Music Clubs, Inc.

ROBERT C. KIEFFER

FINGERHUT COMPANIES, INC.

4400 Baker Road

Minnetonka, Minnesota 55343

Counsel for

Fingerhut Companies, Inc.

STuaRT A. SMITH

SHEA & GOULD

1251 Avenue of the Americas

New York, New York 10020

Counsel for Hanover Direct Inc.

LINDA L. RANKIN

2518 S. Pacific Hwy.

Medford, Oregon 97501

Counsel for Harry and David

MARYANNE D. LADINO

THE NEIMAN MARCUS

Group, INC.

27 Boylston Street

P.O. Box 9187

Chestnut Hill, MA 02167

Counsel for The Neiman Marcus

Group, Ine.

CHRISTOPHER F.. KLINK

New Hampton, Inc.

5000 City Line Road

Hampton, Virginia 23661

Counsel for New Hampton, Inc.

ROBERT D. WALLINGFORD

MorGAN, LEwis & BockKIUS

101 Park Avenue

New York, New York 10178

Counsel for

Publishers Clearing House

PAUL A. MCGINLEY

Gross, MCGINLEY,

LEBARRE & EATON

33 S. 7th Avenue

Allentown, Pennsylvania 18103

Counsel for

Rodale Press, Inc.

JOAN F. KREY

55 Tuckahoe Road

Yonkers, New York 10710

Counsel for

SFA Folio Collections, Inc.

LINDA D. GIESSEL

USAA Building

San Antonio, Texas 78288

Counsel for

USAA Buying Services, Ine.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

INTEREST OF AMICI

Arizona Mail Order Company, Inc. is a national mail

order company located in Tucson, Arizona, selling

women’s fashion merchandise by mail from its facilities

in Arizona. Arizona Mail Order Company is currently

involved in use tax collection proceedings in California.

Bass Pro Shops, Inc. is a mail order company selling

sporting goods. Bass Pro Shops faces numerous claims of

retroactive tax liability, and is currently litigating use

tax collection cases in Arkansas and California.

Bloomingdale’s By Mail Ltd. is a New York corpora-

tion conducting a general merchandise mail order busi-.

ness from its fulfillment center in Cheshire, Connecticut.

By Mail is currently involved in use tax litigation in

Tennessee and Pennsylvania, and has received numerous

requests from states to register and begin collecting use

tax, despite a lack of physical presence.

The Bradford Exchange, Ltd., located in Niles, Illinois,

sells collectors’ plates by mail in all 50 states. Many of

its customers purchase from single page advertisements

in national magazines and pay by check. The Bradford

Exchange is very concerned about the possibility of retro-

active use tax liability, having received requests from

many states that want the company to collect and remit

use taxes.

Cabela’s Inc., is a mail order sporting goods company

located in Sidney, Nebraska. Cabela’s sends its catalogs

throughout the United States and many foreign countries,

and receives and fills orders from around the world. Ca-

bela’s is currently involved in use tax administrative pro-

ceedings in California and Tennessee, and has received

requests from numerous other states that the company

presence in those states.

Current, Inc. is a Delaware direct marketing company

that sells primarily paper goods and stationery from its

facilities in Colorado Springs, Colorado. Current is in-

volved in use tax litigation in Tennessee, and many states

have informed Current that the states will seek to impose

use tax collection obligations.

Doubleday Book & Music Clubs, Inc. is a national direct

marketer of books and music operating in New York and

Pennsylvania. Doubleday Book & Music Clubs has re-

ceived a request from Ohio to register and collect use tax.

Fingerhut Companies, Inc. is the nation’s fourth larg-

est catalog marketing company, located in Minnesota.

Fingerhut Companies sells name brand and private label

merchandise primarily to a lower middle income market,

with an active base of more than 13 million customers.

The company employs approximately 7,000 people at lo-

cations in Minnesota and Wisconsin. Fingerhut Com-

panies has received requests from many states to register

and collect use tax, and one affiliate has been subject to

administrative proceedings in California.

Hanover Direct Inc., located in Hanover, Pennsylvania,

is one of the largest direct marketing firms in the United

States. Hanover Direct offers four different lines of mer-

chandise through its 22 mail order catalogs.

Harry and David is a mail order seller of premium

gift food items, located in Medford, Oregon. Harry and

David is involved in use tax litigation in Tennessee, and

has been contacted by other states attempting to impose

use tax collection obligations despite a lack of physical

presence.

Lillian Vernon Corp. is a Delaware specialty mail order

company offering gift, household, decorative and chil-

dren’s merchandise to customers throughout the United

States from its location in Virginia. Lillian Vernon is

involved in use tax proceedings in California and Ten-

nessee.

Ae A ee eal. 6 arin Tl RI A a ea. HA AE te Oe HS

OO OAD Sc TC at «AE en cls Cea Pe.

MBI, Ine. is a Connecticut mail order company that

markets collectibles from its facility in Norwalk, Connec-

ticut. Many states have requested that MBI collect and

remit use taxes, and the company is concerned about the

possibility of retroactive tax liabilities, given states’ ap-

parent disregard of Bellas Hess.

The Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. is a Delaware cor-

poration whose Neiman Marcus, Bergdorf Goodman, and

Horchow Collections divisions participate in direct mar-

keting throughout the United States. The Neiman Marcus

Group, Inc. collects and remits use taxes where it is

physically present, but has not done so where nexus has

not been demonstrated. The Neiman Marcus Group, Inc.

is currently involved in use tax litigation in Tennessee

and Connecticut.

New Hampton, Inc. is a mail order seller of .women’s

and children’s clothing based in Hampton, Virginia. New

Hampton has been contacted several times by most of the

states that are actively attempting to challenge Bellas

Hess, and has received retroactive assessments of approxi-

mately $3 million from two states.

Publishers Clearing House is a multi-magazine sub-

scription agency located in New York that sells na-

tionwide via direct mail for over 200 leading publishers

located in the United States and Canada. Publishers

Clearing House has received requests from numerous

states to register and collect use tax.

Rodale Press, Inc. is a publisher of books and maga-

zines. Rodale Press has been contacted by numerous

states attempting to impose use tax collection obligations

despite the prohibition of Bellas Hess.

SFA Folio Collections, Inc. is a nationwide mail order

company located in Yonkers, New York, offering general

merchandise. Folio is currently involved in use tax liti-

gation in Tennessee, and has received numerous requests

to register and begin collecting use tax in states in which

it is not physically present.

amy

Ad} POU TULSTPAGAPE 10440

IO SaNnDopezed JO UOTNGLAYSIpP

Aq * * * SSOUISNG SPLOITOS

oym uossad A19A9,, =, 1o[B9C,,

(3) (Z)90' BIS §

‘uUy “IIS “FLA

eplold

ecél wl

BUISTIAIAPE 1IYZO 10 SANSOTEPBS JO ( (9) (ZZ) S-S-BST $ Agenys}20)

“" gornqiaystp Aq ** * BULWOTI08,, (4) 8 BOT-96-08 S anaes

LOGI = ,,ayeys Sty} Ur SsauIsng Suloq,, Wig “AY “JOD ’

Zurstjzeape Aq ‘sepso [yeu Aq ay

: isyredoad jeuosaad a1qisury ((P)FOTE FSS sours 20

O sayes Buryeu ul pesesue aS GOI-8S- . '

L961 , come AAAI, = , AOPUA,, uuy IIS “NAV SesUuryAYy

((1e4u

ZI “d vudns) uorzEplyeAutl jBUoTpNyNsSUoD

[Bsepag PIOav 0} G9GT Ul pantjsuod )

_ Bureqeyy JO aBys 4p ULYITM

ue Ise WOIJ SIapso §}de00" ae

or SPATIAL JOILIY] UOSBL (OGL § TG “39 AeUlsito )

Aq puy Jayyew JUtstp1oApe 99-82-0F N aanael

cProl Jay}O 1O SaNZoTepeI SozNQlIstP,, apon “VIV

ayed Ayrypiqer'y Jo uordtosed (s)aynqyeig Ars

aATPoOPA

«e(SSAH SVWTT44-Au

d) NOILYLIOITOS DOTVLVO FAN AQGNTIONI, OL

SOXAN ANIGAC LVHL SALALVLS ALVLS

a@ XIGNGddV

USAA Buying Services, Inc. is a nationwide mail order

company located in San Antonio, Texas. USAA Buying

Services solicits sales throughout the United States by

catalogs offering jewelry, electronics, and gift items.

USAA Buying Services has received many requests from

states that want the company to register and collect use

tax, despite the prohibition of Bellas Hess.

——

9961

6861

9961

6S61

gg6l

, SAIWOISND [VIPUI}Od 7B pezdo Ip

urei301d SaTes 19430 10 SUISTPIVAPB

uv Jo aduanbesuod B sv syonpoid

shies BuLIIATPP,, = ,APAIPY,,

Oyeys SIYZ UT aS 1OJ*** Aysodoad

S]JO8 OW”. ‘SJOxYAIVUT 8 ,OOTXOW

MAN 70; ixe 03 Surzdwsz3ze

ayeys SIYZ UIYZIM AZLATIOV

Aue UO Poles aq 07 Sursnvo

10 uo SutArred uossed AIA,

(uoruyep SNxeuU OU) ,,27"}8

sty} ul * ** asn** * 40 Aytodoid

jeuosiad ajqisury Bul|[as

Ja[ieyad,, J] xB} asn 04 Polqns

.2VE4S 94} UTYZLM SUOs..Ed

0} SaTVs SOYVU JOI19Y} UOS¥AL Aq pu

IF}JOU ZBUISTPABAP 19470 10 SBO["PVI

jo uorpnqiaysip Aq * * * Sseursnq

S}II]OS OYM UOSied B,, = ,JOPUDA,,

, Suistpeape Aq ‘1epso [Tew

hq Aysadoad peuosaad afqisuey

jo sajes Suryew ul pesesue

uosiad AI9AA,, = , JOPUDA,,

2VEYS STYZ UTYPIM

vipew Auv ysno1Yyy SUIST}LoApV

10 ‘S19PLO BUTZLLOS,,

= ,,0784S SIY} Ul SseuIsNq

jo aoujd B SULUIRULBU Ao[IB}oU,,

9961 Jo sme]

‘OT § ‘LP 4D

Q-LI-ZL § “UUY “81S "WN

(D) (1) (1) 2-828? FS §

‘7218 “'N

(1T)SO9 PFT §

‘UUy “JeUS “OW

((T1)ZO-9FTOT § 491489)

€-L9-LZ §

“UUY 8Po+) “SSI

«UBS IYI

ul Aytedoud jeuosuad cuban

JO Soles Surzo1JOs Apaarjow

[eures |

OdIXOW MON

Aasiof MON

Lanosst IN

Iddississt jy

T96I ;

yn. : 92°S0Z “4

O[[98 9}BI8-JO-yno,, 8poH “UIMIpY "Yor UBSIY W

« SUISTPIZAPR 19440 10 SONSOleIBI Jo e

Suveul Aq SiasN WO a}e4s S14}

a SLopto Surzra1]os

| SUISESua,, = ,9}848 a

S96I Ul SsouIsNg Sulop rojrejaz,, pn meen

sesue

« SUISTPIOApE :

49430 10 anSOlezBd Jo suvaw

Aq 84asn Wo1J 94848 SIy} UryyiM

S19p4O SulzIO1[Os ul Sursesua

= ,,9} 84S S14} UI SsauIsN 0 j

1961 coud Aurureyurew 10pre0, “auy "WS

slour

«FES SY} eke

Ul SIOWINSUOD WOIJ SAapso sydacov

PUB S8ATIIAI UOIZBYIDI}OS ayy JO

F ney Aq puv 49})eW Zurstzaape (P'0SIz-

eyyo oy a JO UOIPNGIaySIp (8) (9) 1osh-vi6 § yA ay

TS6I *** OuM pte Pmcenpanty a. CH) 2% .

9A9,, = , 1dT8a(],, ‘uuy 0% Bis

131095)

eyed

onan APIGeI'] Jo uoNdl 198g (8)aqnqRIg

MES

696T

gg6t

TS6r

996T

loyeu

BUISIZAIAPR 19430 10 SoNnZoley}vd Jo

Wor NII}sIp Aq * * * ssouIsNq

S}IOT]OS OYM UOSiad B,, =, JOPUdA,,

«PBS

SITY} JO S}UIPISel WOLJ S19P1O

S}da00R puv SaATa001 JO9I9Y}

uosvai Aq puv 1a}}eW JZUISIZIZApe

1ayjO 10 SaNSOTeYwI sayNqlaysiIp

oyM ** * uosted Auv,, = layvap,,

«PPEYS OY} UTGPIM

S}UIPIsel WO} Siaps0 S}da00"

puke SeAI9001 JOIIIY} UOSBaI Aq

pUuv 13}} BU JUISIPIEAPR 19430

410 SaNSO[e{wD SsayNqliysip

oym Auedwod 10 uosued A193Aq,,

DFR

SITY} JO SPUSPISEs 0} 93B}S SITY}

UIYPAM PezNqlsysIp 10 07 po[leul

** * sZoreyeo * * * Jo suvau Aq

ayes STU} Ul ZUISTLIOApR

PUB S1OPIO JO UOTZEZII1]O8,,

2484S

SIG} JO SJUAaPIse WO1J S19P10 JO

WOrzBFTOI]0s auoYydalay puB ‘27k 3s

SIY} JO SJUaPISEl 0} 9748 STY}

UIYILM PINGLIySIp 10 ‘oy payreur

6961

[BL1o}eW Suis(yaape aejiwis pu

‘sajdures ‘suodnoo ‘siejnaato Aq

"* * 97838 SIQ} Ul SuIstzsape

PUB SIOPIO JO UOIZHA 191/05,

=,,SSouisng ul Suisesua,,

. SUISTTIBAPE

19430 10 san3o[e}ed Jo suvaui Aq

"* * GyBeMUOUTUOD Sty] UTYIIM S1aps0

BUr}II]08 A][VIZUBISQns IO

A£[1B[NBA1,, = ,,Y}[BIMUOWTWIO,) S14} Ul

ssoursng Jo aoujd & Zururequrew,,

«9384S SITY} UIYIIM SuauINsUOD

woul Aj1adoid peuosiad afqi8ur} 103

S19ptO BUIAIIII ‘Joaray} UOSBa.I

Aq put ‘iaaa0szeym suvau Aue Aq

10 ‘19}} BUI ZUISIZAVAPe 19Y}0

IO $B0[¥z¥d JO UOTyNGIIYSIp Aq

SSOUISNG SUIZOOS,, = 2383S SIY. UT

Zul[jas JO ssaursnq 3y} ur posesuq,,

«A9} BU

SUISTZAVAPR J9y}O 10 SanZolezed Jo

“OrNg!43sIp Aq * * * ssaursnq

SPIOTJOS OYM UOSAdd B,, = JOPUaA,,

” “

(9) (6) LOLG §

SE “389 “UUW “FBIS TA

(€9°8FZT § Joq]1¥2)

ZOL-9-L9 §

‘UUY @pog ‘uuay

(FZPI-S9 § 4atjave)

OF8-SE-ZI §

‘UUY pon “9's

[pepucure sv}

(9) €3-81-bP § SMe uy “TY

(8) (9) LoZz §

6L “313 “UY “FBIg “Bg

(H)TO'TELS §

‘UUY 8POD “Ady o1ryO

(8) (4) TOIT §

MBT XBL “AN

qUOULIa A

eassquuaL,

BUT]OIBD WANog

[eures }

puvys] epouy

BruealAsuuag

o1“o

y4OX MAN

AWRY] Jo uordrazssaq

(s)aqnqRg

arg

9784S OY} Ul ,SSOUISNd JO oul]

IVIIWIS BIO BUYS BY} Ul,, aye We

£*9Ja ‘UOTZDETJOO JQop ‘Buroueuy (1661 “ddng

‘Buryued Wosy syyouad puv uolzeyzlo1/08 SLET 389M) G0Z9 §

88-TO-T .SULLINIBA PUB [BIPUBYSqNs,, OPO) “XBL PY Ady [BD BIUAOF ITB)

(6861 “ddng)

VIPIUT 10 Zopezwo ‘[eul Aq ,,UOTPHPIII[OS (q) TZ1-8¢-92 §

L8-TO-L dtyBMeysAs AO IB[NZaI ‘snonurzuod,, ‘uuYy 381S “YAV seusuRyIy

‘Na “UOTYa][09 Yop ‘Burouvuy (6861 “ddng)

‘Buryuvg Woiy spyousq + UOrzezIOT[Os (q)(G) TOPT-2P §

68-ST-6 . SULLINIAL PUB [BIZUBYSqNs,, “UUYy “F815 “ANY “ZV wuosy

(0661 “ddng)

a uOoryNqIaysIp (TL8 “a H)

”“ Zopezeo ‘ UorzDe][09 Jqup ‘Zursuvuy 9LS PY Aq pepusuTE

‘BulyuRqg Wor syyaua + UO!}R}I91]08 ‘89-£2-0F §

_ 16-10°6 .SULLINII PUB [VIJUBYSqNs,, apo) “RIV

qUaZe S1a]]aS aq 0} AdIAJag [eISOg (¢)(®) 1-82-08 §

98-08-F "S'() 40 JaIL1B9 UOUTUIOD SsUI9a(| apoD “BIV vueqely

ayeq Ayyiqeryy Jo uorydi19seq (8)aynqzeyg ayeI1S

eATPIPA

SSAH SV71144 ADNATIVHO ATIVOIMIOAdS OL GALAVUd SALALVLIS ALVIS

9 XIGNGddvV

po sp oe : S19p40 Buyy191]08 A[A¥[NBad,, SapNpou! ,,YyVeMUOUIWIOD ayy UL naan Bn, cin > Pr

csunanel pounded exe oniees om pon eothy Ma ty. ay en pn smeomapay ae oa <

ss ; . : 1s! JO 40 [Feu YOIIP Aq UOIZeYLIIFOS Jo AJaTOs ySIsUOD,, sat

TAI}OW BSOYM JaI[IS B YsUIesY JUBWIa.I0JUa pazyIqiyoud 4 dxa sjuaw —iomes I . » SOly

. ; tq! [S84 pusuv yuenbesqng ‘suorsiAoad snxau Zo

B}EO POUTEZUOD YIIYM So}Nj}EIS XB} asN pey s}jesnyoussep pue oyEpy yI0q ‘LOGT Ul Paplsep sem ssazz sopag map **

Joye

SUISTPIIAPE 1J9y}0 10 sanZojejzeo

JO WoryNqtaysIp Aq * * * a7e4s

2 S14} UI SseuTSNq §}IDI]08 (Y)ZT'ThP-Bg §

9961 OyM Uosied A19A9,, = ,JaTeec,, ‘UUY @pog "BA BIUIZITA

eq £

ume VqeryT Jo uordrs9saq (s)aynqzRyg HIS

UONPXE} , Sajquue souepnadstint

[VLIPOF 10 UOTZRISIFa] [BAapay YOryM 10J

(T66T “ddng 4804 )

06-T0-L PUB,, SBO[EBS YINorYy} pojowosd sares AGO: LES [owes |

(T66I “ddng 4s0,4)

‘Mo “VIPS “SursrpAVApe ‘sFopwyBd ‘[rew Aq (1) (h) TOS: LFS

06-10-L UONPEPIOOS , IYwUlaysAs IO sB[NFar,, “UUY “JRIS “AY “eT BUBISINO']

PFBYS SITY} UL POzBIO] BLAIS

Jo AY Ivy 19y}0 Jo “erpew qurad ‘QOLAIOS

UOISTAI[9} BBO “UOT}EIS UOTSLAVJe} JO OIpRs

‘W94SAS UOlBITUNWWOIE]a} “‘UOIPN{IYsSUI

[BrouBvUY,, S8ZI[r}N Japso Jo JuauAEd JO (L661 eryoryy )

quaUTasE]d “UOIZeALOT]OS JI UOTZHALOTJOS (Z)OFE'6ET §

S8-SI-2 .Orjeuiaysfs JO re[N3ai ‘snonuruos,, “UUY “ZBI “Ady “AY Ayonqjuoy

(0661 “ddng)

BIPEU 10 SUISIZAVAPE ‘SZoleywo ‘|reu Aq (Y)ZOLE-6L §

06-TO-L UONEPOI]OS I yVUais{s 10 IU[NZe,, ‘UUYy “Jeg “URYy sesury

«SFEYS OG} UI

SSOUISN JO Ul] AB[IWIS 10 sures, UT

POSEIUS VIBE : Da ‘UOTIIAT}O9 yQap

‘Bulouvuy ‘Buryueq wory syyauaq pur (O66T 382,44)

[eu Aq UONRYIOTOS , IyBWAYSAs (ZT) EF Zar §

88-10-L 10 [Buos¥es “Te[NZa1 ‘snonurjuoo,, ‘UUY 8poy BMoT BMO]

«OTEIS SIYY UT SSAUISNG Jo aul]

TB[IWIS 10 VWBS,, UI pasesua erpye

+918 ‘UOT}I9T[OD YQap ‘Burouruy (T66T PANH-Gyruls )

‘Buryueq Woy syyauaq puv uoryeyrI[0s 2'68F | OZT “YO

06-TO-T SULLINIIA PUB [BVURYSQnNs,, ‘PVYS “UU “TI sroulll|

«2784S OY} Ul SSOUISN Jo aut]

T[NWIS IO cules, Ul pedesue ayEljyE

*°999 “WOI}IA/JO9 YQop ‘Burouvuy (6861 “ddng)

‘BUIYURG WorJ SyYouag + UOIZHZI01]08 (ST) ‘(ZL )LOF-ZI 8

68-10-L SULLANIA PUL [BIQUBYSqns,, apo.) oyep] oyep|

(1661 ‘ddng)

VIPs 4O SUISTLI@ApE ‘sFojeywo Aq (H) (8) Z-8-8F §

06-TO-L FONEPOI[OS IABUIIISAS 10 AejNSai,, “UUY 9po,) “By BIBIOSL)

BipewW 40 Surstpieape

‘sdojepwo Aq ,.Joyawul vy] Sulplojaxe (T66I “ddng ysa44 )

A][BotyeUeaysAs 40 Aypnjesod.ind,, 9690°Z1z §

L8-10-01 J9[VSP J! ,,Sa[WS Japs0 [Ieul,, sax¥y “UUY “3BY5 “BLY Vplold

2}8}8 94} UI Ssoursng

JO OUT] , AB[IWIS 10 SB aUTES,, Ut (T66T “ddng yoy )

OVEI[WE : BIPSUT “Zolwywd ‘|reur Aq (SL) (ZL) LOP-ZI §

68-10-L UONEPI[OS I YBVWa}sAs JO Ae[NJau,, “UUY “FU}g “Uat) “UUOD qNII}IeuU,)

(‘S1S9] [B4apaz

Jo adessed (1661 ‘ddng)

uodn "yea ) UOIZR[SIJa] [B4apay Aq xv] 04 ‘DIS 19 1O8-9Z-6E §

0661 Peyovug qe(QNs Jo]! Bjad a4vjs-Jo-7No0 ‘PRIS “AVY “OfOD OpB40[O,)

aed AP[GeIT Jo uoIdl198aq (8)agnqRS eS

sATPIYT

‘aa “wIpaur

(6861 “ddng)

‘BUISIPIIAPR ‘Zoleywo ‘[rew Aq 10-2 OP-LG §

-To- . OF-LS §

L8-10-L UOLPEPOOS , IIJBWUII{SAS 10 AL[NZeI,, 9P0D WUeD “d'N ByOHVC YON

‘42 “VIPIW “SUIST}AVAPe ‘Bolejwo (6861)

[eur Aq Surzroryos , A[pBoryeuaysAs 8'FIT-SOT §

a Jo Ayngasodand,, 31 xvq 04 yoofqns s1 'S'P9T-SOT §

ToT «®[8S JIPAO [[VU,, B SOYVU OYM J9[Ie}o1 "S}BYS “UH “O'N Buljorey) YON

“ySU0D “Sf 9y4}3 JO , JUeWarINbes

SNXOU 9Y} SOYSIZVS,, UOT}PRYIDI[OS (1661 “‘ddng Asuuryoyq )

yous JI ‘suvaul 19440 JO [eu Aq (8) (q) TOIT §

| 68-10-6 UOLPEPI]OS ,II}BWISAS 10 IB[NZait,, ABT XBL AN yo X MON

re) [fBUl JO9ITP 10 BIpeuT

‘auoydeye} ‘1adedsmou Aq ,,sjayrew

16-T0-L OoIxeW MAN Sz10[dxe A[TE[Nsa,, b: (G8 UD “Bey OoTXOW MON

9484S 94} Ul , SSOUISNG JO GUI] IB[IUIS

IO DUBS Ul,, FVI[WR £°93a ‘UOT}IaT]OO

3ep ‘Suloueuy ‘Buryueq wWory syyoueq (686T “ddng oryor)

pue® XV Jo [reur Aq worzezOII0s SZL'SLE §

68-T0-0T .SULLINIGL puv [BIVURISqNs,, “UUY “FBYS “AVY “AON BpBaon

«PFE4S SITY} Ul SSIUISNG JO

OUI] IV[TUIIS 1O UIBS UL,, azeIpyse f*9}a

*UOT}99][09 Fqap “Bulouvuy ‘Buryuvq wory (0661)

SPYoued PUL UOTZEPI]OS ,,IIJBUII}SAS (1Z)ZOLZ-LL §

L8-T0-0T Io [euosves ‘1e[nZer ‘snonurquod,, ‘4qRIS “AOY “GaN BYSBAGIN

a =

qdwexe rv (UOITI oZI$

UBY} SSI] SITBS 9PIMUOTZVU 10) 000'OOSS

UBY} S89] 918 SOTVS LINOSSIT SOY

pu o4B}S 94} UI SSeuISNq Jo aovid 10

S$]UIZE OU YIM S19][9S * ,,9FB}S SIG} UL

SSOUISN JO GUT] AB[IUWIS 10 BUIeS UI,,

OVBI]We ‘ojo “BIpeul “sZo[ezvo (T66T “ddng 4804)

‘Trew yooutp Aq yoxsVUL , Burz1opdxe (Z)S09°PFT §

06-T-0T AlyeoryeureysAs 10 Aynzasodind,, ‘UU “38S “OW noes!

“yo ‘erpoul os

‘UOIINIIISIP BoTezwo pozroljosun “[reus (6861 “ddng)

qoortp Aq yoyYAVU JoUINSUOD ,BUTzIO[dxe P-L9-LZ §

88-T0-L AjjeoryeussysAs 10 Ajjnzosod.ind,, ‘UUY 9pod “Sst tddississ!

3 Ajyenuue

SUOTJIVSUBI} 84BIS-Ul YOT UBY} a10UI IO

000‘00TS 1230} Seles BOSouU! WW [BNUUE FI

‘ule}sAS UOT}BIIUNUIWOD Aue Io vipeu Aq (1661 “ddng 3804 )

UOTZEPTOTJOS JO “[reur Aq SUOTZEzIDT[OS (PF) TZ VL6Z §

88-10-9 Ua}{LIM 10 SZOTe{wd JO uOTINGIIySIC] ‘uUYy “eI “UU Bosouul

(1661 ‘ddng

‘Q]2 “BIpeur ‘BurstpAeape ‘[rew Aq ,,jay41VU "do-0c) "Me'T)

Sales [TejJ21 ayy Surz1ojdxe,, 10 sees ‘g)1T § HP9 “YO

68-TO-T Buryoros ,,A[peoryeureysAs 10 Ajre[nsa,, SMB] “UUY “SSP S}JEsNyousse fq

neq Aqyrqery Jo uorydrsz0seq ($)9qNzBIS 8784S

sATPoHPA

68-10-P

T6-TO-L

68°23"9

06-T0-L

L8-32-L

68-10-T

L8-Z2-9

06-10-6

98-TO0-L

06-8T-L

quatind

: L8-S0-0T

9784S Ul

«SSdUISNG JO dUl| AB[IWIS 10 oWEs,,

Ul OFEI[We : dja “VIpaw ‘[IeW 4YdaaIp

‘SSOTBYWO YFNO1Y} sov[dyayavu s}lojdxa

AleorzeuaysAs 10 Aynyasodand,,

YyPeMUOUIUIOD

OY} Ul Po} Boo] VFBITWe + °9}9 “UOT{DaT]00

3q9p ‘Surouvuy ‘Buryueq wos syyauaq

+ [few Aq UorzezIOI[OS , DIyBVUIAYSAS

410 [Buosves ‘1elnZad1 ‘snonurquod,,

«9984S 94} Ul SSoUISNG

JO OUI] TB[IUWIIS 10 BUIBS BY} UI pasesue

uosied B S]0.1}U0d 10 SUMO,, OYM UOS.Od

B SOpNpourl Os[e ,1OpurA,, + 00'000'OS$

38Bo] 7B JO Saves JUOULIA A [eNUU SoyeU

Aa[[9S JI “940 “VIpeul ‘Buistyzzaape

‘830/878 ‘LeU Aq ,,UOTZeYIDTJOS

[BUOSBAS 10 ‘DIZBUIEASAS ‘IB[NZa,,

‘O40 “BIPeUl ‘BuIsip1aape ‘[rew ‘sZorezvo Aq

UOTPBPLOOS ,IIBVUaISAS IO IB[NZat,,

‘048 ‘UO1}99][09 Jqop ‘Buloueuy ‘Buryueg

Wors S}Yousq pus [IBU Aq UOTZEzIDI[OS

SULINIGA PUB [BIVURYSqNs,,

‘je “BIpaul ‘Zoey ‘[rew Aq

UOMJEPOOS ,ITJBWIIISAS 10 AB[NZa.1,,

, Senbiuyse} SuUIZ@yYAVW 19Yy}O puw

‘S9DIAIVS ,.006,, FU0Yydatea} ‘smoys

pue syiomjou Surddoys uoIstAaja}

‘sales Japio [Ivw YsNoi1Y} JoxIVWI

BUT[oIBD YyNog ay} [Fut }z10;dxa,,

XB} BY} 4991/00 [[BYs ‘SBorezvo Aq

Sa[VS SPIII[OS OYM 4Nq “o7B}S BY} Ul BIyJO

UB UIBJUIVU YOU SBOP jLY} Jajjes AUB

BUISIPAOApe A} pus Opel

10 ‘UOTPePITJOS suOYydala} ‘BurstjAaape

1ayjO puv SZo[ezvO Jo suvaw Aq *]"Y UI

SuISIPAVAPS pu’ S1apso0 JO UOTZEZIII[OS

suorzeotqnd Zo[e}eo 10 Japs0 [1 eur

YysNo1y} JUIWASIPABAPB Aq ,,WOTzezLII[OS

aiyeulaysAs JO AB[NZa1 “SnONuryUod,,

o7e4S Ul “98

‘u01}d9]]09 Jqap ‘Zurouvuy ‘Surjueq

WoIJ S}YaUEq Jaljas JI ‘s}svoproiq

vipeu 10 [rew Aq ,,ZUIST}IApe

jo usazyed Burnurzuod & SsyoNpUoD,,

(6861)

1ZZ-0-89

epoy “uIMIpPY “Ys AA

(1661)

(D)Z19-T'Rag §

‘UUY 9pOD "BA

(0661 ‘ddng)

(6) 10L6 § 28 40

“uUY "81S “JA

(0661 ‘ddng)

(9) (6)Z0T-Z1-6¢ §

2popy Ye

(1661 “ddng uous, )

LOUIST §

‘UUY 9pod) XB] *xay

(686T)

(£)(9)Z0I-9-19 §

‘UUY 9poD ‘uuay

T66T SMP] ‘2178 “AH

Aq pepuswe se

‘0661 SMB'T ‘ZI9 PV

(0661 ‘ddng

*do-09 "“MB'T)

OFET-9E-ZT §

‘OL-98-ZT §

apopg “O'S

EZ-S1-PF §

SMB’ “U9 “['Y

(1661 “ddng 489)

ZPSET ‘TPSET §§ 89

‘uuYy “JIS “BLIO

(0661 “ddng uossepuy )

(H)TO'TPLS §

“uUY 9poD “Asdy OUD

UopBUIYysE AA

Blu BATA

BUIJOIBD YNOS

puyys] epouy

BUoYe]xO

o1yO

aye

aAtpeaya

Ayquyy Jo uorydrs9saq

(8) aqnqe4g

ras

jill

Effective

Date

Description of Liability

Statute(s)

State

7-01-89

ally sufficient nexus”

etc. IF seller has physical

presence or “any other presence that

rom banking, financing,

"substantial and recurring” solicitation

rovides the necessary minimum contacts

debt collection,

for a constitution

and benefits f

W. Va. Code

§ 11-15A-6a

(Supp. 1990)

West Virginia

APPENDIX D

STATE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS FOR THE

ASSESSMENT OF USE TAX WHEN NO RETURN IS FILED

Limitations

Period If No

State Statute(s) Return Filed

Alabama Ala. Code § 40-23-76 (1985) None

Arizona Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 42-113B1(b) None

(1991)

Arkansas Ark. Code § 26-18-306(f) (1987) None

California Cal. Rev. & Tax Code § 6487 8 Years

(West 1987)

Colorado Colo. Rev Stat. § 39-26-210 (1990) 3 Years

Connecticut Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 12-415(7) None

(West Supp. 1991)

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 12-416(1)

(West Supp. 1991)

District D.C, Code Ann. § 47-2011 (1990) 3 Years

of Columbia

Florida Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.091(3) (a)1(d) None

(West Supp. 1991)

Georgia Ga. Code Ann. § 48-2-49(c) None

(1991)

Idaho Idaho Code § 63-3633(c) (1989) 7 Years

Illinois Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 120 { 439.12 None

(Smith-Hurd 1991)

Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 120 % 444

(Smith-Hurd 1991)

Indiana Ind. Code Ann. § 6-8.1-5-2(d) None

(West Supp. 1991)

lowa Iowa Code Ann. § 422.54 None

(West 1990)

Iowa Admin. Code r. 701-11.2

Kansas Kan. Stat. Ann. § 79-3609 (1989) 3 Years

Kentucky Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 139.620 None

(Michie 1991)

Limitations

Period If No

State Statute(s) Return Filed

Louisiana La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 47:1580(A)(5)

(West 1990) None

Maine Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 36

§ 141(2)(C) (1990) None

Maryland Md. Tax-Gen. Code Ann. § 13-1102(b) None

(1988)

Massachusetts Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 62C § 26(d) None

(West 1988)

Michigan

Minnesota

Mississippi

Missouri

Nebraska

Nevada

New Jersey

New Mexico

New York

North Carolina

North Dakota

Ohio

Oklahoma

Pennsylvania

Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 205.27a(2) None

(West Supp. 1991)

Minn. Stat. Ann. § 289A.38, None

Subdiv. 5 (West 1991)

Miss. Code Ann. § 27-65-42 (1990) None

Mo. Ann. Stat. § 144.220(i) None

(Vernon Supp. 1991)

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-2709(5) (c) 5 Years

(1990)

Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 372.430 8 Years

(Michie 1986)

NJ. Stat. Ann. § 54:32B-27 None

(West 1986)

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-1-18 (1988) 7 Years

N.Y. Tax Law § 1147(b) None

(McKinney 1987)

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-241.1(e) None

(1990)

N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 57-39.2-15 6 Years

(1991)

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5741.16B None

(Baldwin 1986)

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 68 § 223(c) None

(West 1966)

72 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7259 None

(Purdon 1990)

—$__

Limitations

Period If No

State Statute(s) Return Filed

Rhode Island R.I. Gen. Laws § 44-19-13 (1988) None

South Carolina §S.C. Code Ann. § 12-54-80(1) None

(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990)

South Dakota S.D. Codified Laws None

Ann. § 10-59-16 .

(1989) ;

Tennessee Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-1-1501(b) (1) None

(1989)

Texas Tex. Tax Code Ann. None

§ 111.205(2)

(Vernon 1982 & Supp. 1991)

Utah Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-110(9) None

(1987)

Vermont Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32 § 9815(b) None

(1981 & Supp. 1990)

Virginia Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-634 (1991) 6 Years

Washington Wash. Rev. Code § 82.32.100 None

(Supp. 1991)

West Virginia W. Va. Code § 11-10-15 (1987) None

Wisconsin Wis. Stat. Ann. § 77.59(8) None

(West 1989)

Wyoming Wy. Stat. § 39-6-510 (1991) None

“SUOTPEPIUT] JO V]NZVYS 8,9}e}8 ay} Aq potieq

SI JUOUISSESSY YOIYM Ur JO ‘UOIsIAOId snxeu Zoreywo sArjoeyea ou pey 2e}s JB[NSTjAed B YOIYM UI SuBvad JOJ

019Z Oq 0} PoulNsse sem APILIGVITT “L861 10J posn sem ainsy YUlOV Pesn(pe gggi ey, ‘suved 9804} JOJ alqe

“[TBAB O19M SOPVULIISO BIS YTHY OU BUIs “EET PUP OGEI ‘GRGI 403 posn arom SaInsYy YIOV pewsn(pe ggg eyL (¢)

"(@[04M B SB $948} 5 pozus) ey} 40J ayeuIT}sa

UIOV UO peseq) 978}s 94} UI soUussead [eoIsAyd B YZLM SuaTas Aq apeur SoBs Jepso [eu Of aIQeINqQII7z3e eNUaA[I

doy yunosw 07 %IT Aq paysn(pe sem ainBy siyy, ‘(SuON[IW Ul] [0] enuessy yenuuy peyeuns” YIOV (2)

“UOTSTAOId SNXBU Zorezed ysatjrvea Jo ayep aAT}IOYe 9y} SI UMOYS BI"Nq (T)

‘(L86I “Wdag) 820g 4apsc Noy 23%)g-fo-ynQ fo UONRDED] 9303S wosf p1zUa}0g

anuaaay fo sazpwijsg ‘aodey uolneusojul yg ‘SUOIZV[EY [eJUSUIUIBAOZIAjUT UO UOISSIUIWIOD AIOSIADY :aarn0g

(T96T)

E286 Perl Pe'PI PE PI Pe PI 2z'al Zeal €¢°II sesuryiy

A (6861)

I8'Sz Izze Izze 6£'6 0 0 0 0 euozlay

eAWIGerT 1661 0661 6861 < 8861 L861 z 9861 2 S861 rams

xBL

[eryua}og

payeuns|

1301,

I66I - SR6T

aa 1INYuaAO

GUAM (L961) SSL “S'D 988 ‘PONAARY AO L.ddd ‘ONI ‘SSAH SWTI9G TVNOILVN AI 1661 HDNOUHL

$861 SUVGA AHL WOd (SNOITTIIN NI) ALITIGVIT XVL SAILOVOULTY TVILNALOd daLVWILSa

a XIGNGdd¥

; (1961)

6e'ILI 98°92 98°92 98°92 98°92 LY'2% Lv'2Z 10'Iz Buljorv,) yyNog

; (8961)

68°89 Z8'6 28'6 28°6 Z8'6 Le°8 Le'8 L8'L puyjs] epoyy

: (6961)

86°0FL eLetr = SLSIT =—sGL'ETT =—saGu'eTT §~— 9696 96°96 PI'Z6 BluBalAsuuag

. . . . (9861)

9P' 101 22'6I 2261 22'6I Z2'6I 68°91 618 0 BWOYr}AO

. (2961)

86°98 86°68 86°68 86°68 86°68 IL'9L IL'9L r9'8L o14o

. ; . (2861)

08'bz or'g ore ore ors 0L2 0 0 r0yeq yRION

(6861)

LZ'921 60'Zb 60°ZP 60°ZP 0 0 0 0 BUIJOIE) YLION

re . ($961)

sLucoT =66rest = SST = GOBST = GOTBST = oz'sst = oz'set —sperzzi YIOX MON

) (9961)

PI'89 ZL'01 ZL'01 ZL'01 ZL'01 S1'6 S16 96°9 oorxeW MeN

. . | (9961)

ZI's19 GE°96 C8'96 G8°S6 98°96 6Z'18 62°18 PIPL Aasiap man

| (6861)

£9°SZ 68°IT 6e°IT id 0 0 0 0 epeaan

. (L861)

LZ'eb Lz01 Lz'01 Lz'01 Lz'01 60% 0 0 vysesqan

. (6961)

I¢¢9% = 98'0F 98°0F 98°0F 98'0F 68'bs €8'bs Iv'Zs LInosst

; (¢g61)

LI'Set 6L'0Z 6L'0Z 6L'0Z 6L'0Z SL'LI SL'LT eo'9I tddissrsstyy

($861)

Z8°IST LE@P LEZb LEZb IL'¥2 0 0 0 POsoUU

(1961)

6g0lb 86°29 96°29 96°29 96°29 19°89 19°89 Sz'1g uesIYOT

(8861)

Ol'bOI or'og or'og Org 08°sI 0 0 0 Ayomuay

(9961)

02°89 Or'6I Or'6I or'6I 0 0 0 0 sesury

(8861)

¢3'89 L961 L961 L961 F8°6 0 0 0 BMo]

(1961)

Os's0L O8801 OF801 OF 80I os sor sEze 98°26 09°18 stout]

(6861)

L6'0Z 68'8 68'8 6I'b 0 0 0 0 ouRp]

(1961)

i Oc GL'Sé SL'se SL'Sé GL'ge 8h 08 8P'0E Lg'LZ B1B.10a4)

(g96r)

90099 «= SS TOT «= SS IOT «= SOT «= BSTOT «~—SsTg'98 19°98 Z9'08 eplolg

(6861)

Ivsel Sores SOE 80°12 0 0 0 0 qNdIyaeuUO, )

(8861)

9 LZET G66ISE G66ISE 66188 66'TEE 0 0 0 BrUIO;I/eD)

AVqeYT L661 0661 6861 8861 L861 9861 o86I RIS

[erjuaog

payeunysg

[PIO],

‘SUOTJEINdWIOD PRGgT 10OJ pasn sem einsy pajsn(pe 9ggT eyy, “saved

PSOY} AOF JIQUIIVAR SUM aJeUITISA YH YW ou S0UIS “T6GT PU OGET ‘GRGT Ur UorJeNdWOd 40J pasn ose ara Ssainsy

UIOV pewsnlpe gggt ayy, ‘aouasard [vorsdyd 07e4s-Url Ue YUM setuvdwios Aq opewl sares Aopio [TRU JO} yuNOdOR

0} poysn{pe ‘jeruajod anuaaas Poyeultyss 10J sainsy yoy peysnfpeun ggET pue gRET BUISN “TG6-1E-Z1 OL (Zz)

‘(9JOYM B sv sazeyg paz ayy 1OJ ayVUIT}sSa

UIOV Uo paseq) 974s ay} ul aouasaad [worsAyd & YRIM Suayjas Aq apeu Sees Jopso [eur 04 ajqeynqiiy4e anuaaar

1OF JUNOW OF BIT Aq paysn{pe sem oanzy sty], ‘[SuOTI[ Ut) [OL onuasey jenuuy peyeMysA YIOV (1)

‘(L861 “Idag) sag sapig poy a9mg-Jo-nQ fo MONDEDL 93S wosf poryUurj0g

anuaaay fo saypwuysy ‘Wodey UoreuLIoOjUy PRS ‘suonrvpy [B}USWIUIBAOZII{UT UO UOISsTUTUIOD AIOSIAPY :201n0g

96°LZ'T 66° TEE 66 TSE 66 TES 66 TES 0 0 88/T0/TO BIUIOFITBD

eo rg PES Pr be Pr be PI Pe Pl LUL 0 L8/1T0/L0 sesuByly

T8ez ars 3 ars ss 68°6 0 0 0 68/81/60 vuozliy

68°ZFI 9E°9Z 9f°92 98°92 9€°92 Svs LOFT 98/08/F0 vueqeiy

z Ayyiqery T1661 0661 6861 i 8861 t LR6I 986I aeq FBS

xB], ‘Ba a

lenuajog

payeunsg

[30.1

(NINO SHLALVLS GSLOVNA AIMAN NO GaSVd) GaTAYUAAO

GUAM (L96T) SSL “S°D 988 ‘FUNGTATY JO Lddd “¢ ‘ONI‘SSAH SVT144 TYNOILYN dl 1661 HDAOYHL

9861 SHYVGA AHL YOd (SNOITTIIN NI) ALITIGVIT XVL FAILOVOULTY IVILNGLOd GALVWILSS

fd XIQGNAddV

000°086'F6S'6$ 9 - [ROL

(6861)

90°98 Zbl Zb'PT 1Z'h 0 0 0 0 BIUIBITA ISAM

(6861)

98°L9T rO'19 P0'19 BL'oP 0 0 0 0 uopsUTYSE

(9961)

89618 68°6F 68'6P 68°6P 68°6P A i 96° FS BIULBITA

(6961)

Ze bz PL'g PLS bL’s PLS gI'e gI's 06°2 }UOULIA A

(0661)

99°1Z aa Ze'L 0 0 0 0 0 ym

(L861)

PS TOL 80°191 80° 191 80°191 80191 2zL¢ 0 0 sexe,

(9961)

61 88% Loeb LOSE L9' 8h Lo'eP €2'L8 €2'LE Ore aosswouua |

AWNGeYT = 166T 0661 6861 8861 L861 9R61 CR6I ang

xB,

[eryUa}0g

payeuirys |

[MOL

00°000'088*68z‘e$

SO'9¢ oP Pl

33 98° LOT bo 19

S6°F% C6°F%

St'6 PLS

99°12 br Pr

Po TOL 80°T9T

TO'TST LO'SP

89°9TT 98°92

60°ST 686

OF TOT Go 61

OT6LE 86°68

Of FZ OFS

[POL

oP Pr

rO'19

PLS

oo L

80° TST

LO'SP

98°92

Los

6s 61

86°68

ors

68/10/L0

68/10/60

16/10/20

68/22/90

06/10/L0

L8/22/L0

68/T0/TO

L8/22/90

06/10/60

98/10/20

48/80/01

L8/1T0/L0

BIUIBITA 489,44

UOASUIYSE AA

BIULRAT A

JUOULIO A

ura)

SBxa],

vossouua

wurpore,) qynog

pues] epoyy

vWOYrLYO

oro

Boye YLION

LZ'921 60°SP 60°3P 60°SF 0 0 0 68/10/10 BUIOIRD YON

LZ 0L8 69°8ST 69°8ST 68°29 0 0 0 68/10/60 YOK MON

9¢°¢ 9¢°¢ 0 0 0 0 0 16/10/20 OOxXIaW MON

€9°Sz 6E°1T 6E°1T os 0 0 0 68/T0/0T BpeAaaNn

LSP LZ01 Lz 01 Lz‘01 LZ 01 61'% 0 18/10/01 BYSBIgeN

80°1S 98°0F Zz 01 0 0 0 0 06/10/0T LInoss!

9L'ZL 6L°0Z 61°02 6L°0Z 6°01 0 0 88/10/L0 tddississ1 jy

Z8° 1ST LE CP LE'sP LE CP TL'bZ 0 0 88/10/90 BJOSOUUT

Ol FOT oros ores OT'0S 08ST 0 0 88/S1/L0 Ayonquay

0162 OF'6I 0L'6 0 0 0 0 06/10/L0 sesuvy

ajséS8"89 19°61 L961 L961 P86 0 0 88/T0/L0 BMO]

09°91Z 0€ 80T 08801 0 0 0 0 06/10/10 sIour|]

L602 6e°8 688 61°F 0 0 0 68/10/20 oyep]

e9°e¢ GL'Sg 88°LT 0 0 0 0 06/10/L0 BIBIOdL)

L6'LZP 89° 101 8101 8S 101 8S 101 e9'1Z 0 18/10/01 eploly

IP SSI COTS cOlFS 80°L2 0 0 0 68/10/L0 yNoT}IeUUOD

AYIQery] 1661 0661 6861 8861 L86I 986I aed aFIS

xBL Ba

[erqUa}0g

poyewiysg

[FIO

‘PIepIBAUL pue pasuay

“Tey? Ajezerpawuy! aynqeys ayes Mou

PARIS JV AZTIGUIT @aAOVOIZAI ON

“poyepryeaur

pue pesuayeyo aynqejs ayes mou

OAS JB APTIGUIT PATjovOIZoI ON

"9UL0Q8Q UO paseq a3n4Rjs

SIOFUD OF pajyduiayye 93e}s—pajeays

“uoWlap = AITTIGVIT aAtIROIYWaI «oO N

"87d1999y ss04y hon DY

“0 LVL 232} uo paseq SOIZITIQeI] xB}

9010JUd 0} paydwaqqe 9} 81S—po}eijs

“uowlep = =ALITIGeT] SATPRVOIJAI ON

‘Peyepryeaur puw pasualjeys Ajaye

“Poul! 83N7zB{s a7e}s MIU—Pd7zB14s

“uowap = AzryIqery SATPVOIJOI ON

($161) 89 “S'n 1gz

‘S}JasnYyovSsD py “a ‘0g Burma 229)0g

(LP8T) FOS (‘MoH g)

‘S11 Ob ‘szjasnyovsspy ‘a mopsny ys

($L81) 6Lb CHEM

91) “SA $8 ‘anqowy ‘a aULOQSO

($281)

b8e CIIPM SI) ‘S'n Ze ‘s)d199

“9Y 8804) fvompoy uo IDL 33n}g

(LL81) POTS’

16 “OD “AY “MN P Obv2YD ‘a mag

(S261) 0% “S'1 892 ‘s77asnyons

“SD 4 OD) QuaMAD Purn.og DYdy

(0681) 001 'S'D SEI ‘upsny ‘a Asra7

(8881) OF9

‘SN LEI “enqow fo j40qg ‘a dnojary

(L88T)

928 ‘“S') 221 “Drupaphisuuag ‘a “og

‘SS LOW Usayynog PY niydpapopyg

. (988T) L¢¢"S"n SIT

SWIG APANIO.VY

jo uOT{N[OSeYy

(8) UOIsIoag paynss2aAG

UOISII8G Bulpns119ag

NOD asuaadng saywyg payuy

24} Aq pa[n119AQ suorsizag asney) a01IUIUIOD

9 XIGNAddV

esse

‘ynog

awWaidng ay} a10jaq Ppejeliq jou yuaw

“nBie A}IArIvOIVaI pue ‘peyeordut

AP[IGVI eATOBOTWaA JUBIYIUSIS ON

‘OG'U Z99 38 “S'N ZzE

USSY S49zUNAOpUL) °° * Py uvew

“4904S 94} Japun uorndesoid peurwiiss

BV 0} asUaJap B se pepwad aq sede

P[NOD Pd.MIUIUIOD, JOU SI aoUBINSUT

WY} Sas¥ Jo auT] DIU424 ‘a mvg

24} Ul JINOD sry} Jo 8}U9UI9}84S JaI

“[4¥9 UO soUBITAI Jayyey[M],, JO uot

-sonb paaresar WNOD sulaidng ‘eyes

ye Aqyrqery SATPBOIJAI JUBOYIUZIC

“NOY a4} a10Jaq yovdurr 9AIZDBOI} AI

JO UOISSNISIP OU ‘osTyY *( (ZT ‘ON

‘IhGT “\L'O) Mmusofywa -a spavmpy

bZ ‘b 38 aayjeddy ayy jo JTeYyeq uo

BIUIOFITV JO Ig OY} Jo [B49uat)

Aaui0jyy ay} Jo JIG 998) uorjepr

“BAU! S}I 0} Jolad read ayy ut ydaoxe

BIS 943 Aq padiozua useq jou pey

(suedned apnjoxe 03 ayeys ZuLMojye )

9889 SITY} Ul POPEpPI[BAUL MB] 9}BIS

‘MB] Zurysixe YM AuoW

-ivy Ul SBM Peseq SBM sSUOTPIIAUOD

Jouvewepsiu yorum uodn ajnjzeis

sny} “(OTT 38 “S'N SIE “uosdmoyz)

aouepnidstinf s}jl woiy ,ainyed

“9P,, SBM ORUDSIGT punoyY 4iNO)

‘LI-9ITI

ye ‘py ‘“pepunojsun Ajezejduios sem

4IWUWDH UO sDUBI[aI AUB YeY} PUNO

yANoD pue “(GOT 3 "Ss" ZI ‘Agqunq)

possed sem (0901 “3831S ZG) SE6I JO

PY Splvpuvys 4oqev’'y] Awe y ay} 1o4z¥

P2Lind00 4BYy} AOLABYaq AjUO azI;eued

04 yy3nos Ajjuervdde yuseWydIpu]

‘(8SP “ON “OSGI “L'O) 4auorssrm

“UO TDL “a "OD SDE) 0140 780q “6

ye svojjeddy jo Jog 9ag “yuepedead

poyepryeaul uo patjed you pey saAvd

-XB} S0UIS ‘ayBIS Fe aJaM S}SaTO}UI

aoUuBI[el JUBOYIUS'S OU PUB ‘ansSsI

APIANPIVOI}A1 BSIVI YOU PIP saizIVg

(9061)

60F ‘SN 202 ‘Ayonquay “a ‘09

WL P4oT sahy ‘(egg T) 662 “S')

861 “murs, “a ‘OD diysmpaygs uor

“U“OT PIO *(TL&T) SzF CPA TT)

‘'S'N 82 ‘Aundwoy Ahssag “a sino'T 38

($681) 8F9 "S'n ger

MULofyD “a sadooH ‘(G698T) g9T

CHEM 8) “S*1 Gz ‘mrub424 “a mg

(LE8T) ZOT

(Pd IL) ‘SN 98 “Un ‘4 y404 Man

(L261) 68

‘S11 SLz “vrwpajisuuag ‘a opuvgiq

(8161) 192

‘SO LIZ ‘Q4vyuebvog ‘a ssmuny

(OZ61)

€% ‘S'N 29% “wowsmwoy anasag

9NqQNq “& ‘09 SV Mmupajisuuag

(661) 69I ‘S'N 9E8 “0D

aur] abavg hay, rddississiy ‘a 73¢

(PPG)

86S ‘SN 32k ‘Ussy ssagumsap

Ul) ULIISDAYINOS *a saIMIg pazrU,/)

(LP6L)

O9T “SL HIE “DImsofipDD ‘a spavnpgy

(TP6T) GOT

‘SN SIE ‘wosdwoyy “a viuwstofyv)

(IPGL) OOT

‘SA Zig ‘Aqsvq ‘a 833g pazuy

(TS61) S9P ‘S'N E82 ‘4auors

“SIMUOD IDE “a “OD SV) OLYO 180q

suaqoIg APATIVOIQAY

Jo uorynjosay

(S)UOIsI9aq po[n.410AG

UOISIDO(] BulpN.119aQg

B68 18 “S' T9F “doog

991 svsUuDYAY *0410997))P Surna

~19A0 Aq ,,pauaywaryy oq pnom 7ey}

83S919}U! BuBIer Zu01s ou puy,,

PINOd 41 BY} pajyou yanog ay} sours

‘quapasead 101d uo aouetjar Jo ynsea

B SU OYRIS We AYTIGUI] aANOvOIIAI ON

‘aFBYS 9Yy} UO AZIIIq

“Bll PAT}OvOI}JaI Auv asodull jou pip

quapesead yey} Suypnszado ‘snyy {07

49904 figunog uospn yy uo doUBI[aI UI

‘yuLied B ynoyyLM Jeps0q ay} Ssoz9e

JoyVM SULLIAJSUBIY WOIJ syuvljoddy

urlofue 07 UOoT}Ie yYyZNnoIq peYy 81S

OFEIS JV AUPIGVI] BATJIVOAZJeI ON

(27845 Aq paztiyn yuapadoad

JO BUI[NIIGAO ayIdsep praydn 93N}e4s

“a't) 98889 Jo auI0D4N0 USAIS JURA

“9/9111 SBM Pue ‘pajyaliq you sem ans

“SI A}IATQIVOIYAI ‘osTy ‘peyrisnfun

SBM 49/820 UO aoUBIjeA Aue ‘snyy

‘ (ST-PT9 38 “S'D) Sep ‘uosipy YRoan

“WomUmLoD) UOTUTSIP a4e4SAa}UI

/eyeyseajzur ,,[estueyoour,, 8.491819 H

«P2Pafad GUIS Zuol,, pry yn ayy

‘OSB OY} Ul payeplyeaur ayn

“ye48 Aapun ayndesoid 073 Surf sem

97ejS—poywordu APATROIAT ON

‘uoTqoR quaWZpNl AtOZPBAB[VEp Ul

pasuajeyo AjayeIpowmw! SBM o4Nj}ezs

MoU :oxRIS Je APATPBVOIJOI ON

‘aiqeyrjsnfun sem

4020 40j0adg UO adURI[e1 AUB ‘SNYy

‘((Q9L6T) 881 ‘GPT “A°U “T “PA 29

‘aurpadi [BIUOJOD PUD [9245 PEessoid

pavpuryg wa LET | “ANOD

auasdng ayz puv ssauisng 2}0}8

-4aquy fO WOIZVEV], 7707S ‘Ul94SA0][9H

Burjonb) (182 3 “S' O8b ‘omy

aqajdwmog) ,, MOryexe, ayes Woy

QUNUIUII SI SSAUTSNG a4eys19}Ul Sulop

Jo adaiIAlad ayy yey} SULI}IOp 94} UT

Joljod SNOLaS B SULBPUTBU 4ANOL) 94}

yey} epnpouos pynom azaAevdxe} ouins

uns ysour ay} Aluo,,, ‘aso1e oyny

ajgajdwmog awry ayy Aq ‘yey, peyou

qanoy ayy ‘((6Z-9L “ON) OMY 907d

~My ‘9E-Eg We JuByjeddy jo jeg)

APIQVy, PATPBOAZeL «BOVE = pjNnom

yt yey} ponsiew yuvjjeddy ysnoyyy

‘ (L261) €8 SD E22

OD 247991T YP wvazg 010ga7pP ‘a

Ta fo uowssrmmoy sayy onqnd

(8061) 6h "S'N 60Z ‘497409

“OW “@ 0D 40304 Ajzunog uospny

(2261) Sb "S'A

098 “0D Asaimon snmoyy a sajsrazy

re (968T)

6TS “S' T9T “ymony20uw0D ‘a saan

(LOGIT) Z2b “S'D O88 “OD Sutsop

-a0ayg sayaay PY 492409 ‘a ydasors

pue ‘(LE6T) 06 “S' 208 “MoD rol

‘a "09 busopaaajg punog jebng

(1861) 209 “S’ OFE

‘40UU0D,O *& 92MLAgG 40;0 40j00dg

(861) SLE ‘SD T9P ‘wers

“SPUUMOD 291A4aS WGN svsUDYAY

‘@ "OD 901404190009 ‘901g svsuDysy

(2861) Th6 ‘S'N BoP ‘sm

“6n0q *ja4 xa DysDAgaN ‘a aspysodg

(T86T) 609 "S°N SF ‘Dung

“UOW “2 ‘0D UosIpy yI~wanuowwmoy

(6L61)

6& “SN [bh “pwoynyoO ‘a sayiny

(8L61)

PEL “SN Sep ‘Usspy SHusopsaas

‘a quamjzandag anuaaay Uuopburysv 4

(LL6T) PLZ °S'D O8b “Apy.g

"a ‘aul ‘VsUdAT OWN 9}2a)dWOyD

swa]qoig APAIROIPY

jo uoryNjosey

(8) UOISIIOG P2IN.112AG

UOISIDB(] BUI[N.AIIAG

[(o66r “ddng Fy L861) LZ-STIZ uorepeidiezU]

pue sisk[euy :Bolsoury JO S9zB}g Pe}UA oY} JO UOTNyI}SUOD oY], :adIAIag YIveseYy [BUOISSe1BUO/) :aaunog |

‘poyepleaul puw pasuaeyo jaye

-[paumUT 94N4B}S 97e]S MaU—oyB}S 7

AYTIGVI] eATJOBOIZeI YUBOYTUSIS ON

(0661) 8282

"40'S OTT “ys “a suorgmo0ssy Sus

“YMNLT UDIMIWY BdF “PozpUlT] 1078]

APIGel] SATPIVOIJOY “86-163 3" “SN

E8P ‘4aUIaYIS “JANOD 9}e}s 0} ONSS!

APAIPVOIJOI POpuUvUaT FANOD “9yeys

qe APIQUi, PATyOVOAJeI YUBOYIUSIS

"EG-19z 38 “S'N SBP ‘adid 4a7h

*PANOD 9384S 04 APLATJOVOTJII JO oNss!

pepuvuial jInog ‘ayeys ye ApTIGQeI]

OAIPROIZIA «YUBIyIUBIS Al[eI}UI}0g

(9961) SE ‘S'N PRE “49770780H

‘a ‘aur ‘suog P wosboag gq ydasor

(S61) $82 SN.

G6z ‘U,WMOD an1A4ag 9NQNd_ 116.4095)

a ‘0D pisupiy samoyhop o4ay

‘(LP6T) S6F ‘SN SEE ‘s4mwmon

‘ary fo ‘pg ‘a ‘dion pisuvsy samoy

-hvy o40Y ‘(0S6T) ZhS “SN 6S

‘alg “a saury punoyfiasy jozdvD

(P96T) 98h “S'N LLE “uo?

-Huryspyy *@ “d4og s40j0Wy [DLIUa‘)

(6861) 2s "S'n

6p “ouy ‘agngasuy 4aag ‘a fipoayH

(L861) 99% “S'N S8P ‘4auayrS

‘a suoizpwossp HulyonNsy, UDIAIUWY

(1861) 2&2 “SN

SBP ‘anuaaay fo ydaq 2305 Uoj)bu

~ysvy “a ‘oul ‘sawugsnpuy deg 49) J

sua[qoig APATpIVOIPOY

jo worpNjosey

(S$) UOISID0G pe[N.19AG

UOISIIEq BUI[NALIBAD

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.