Amicus Curiae Brief — Payne v. Tennessee

APR 8

In The

Supreme Court of the United

199]

October Term, 1990

+

PERVIS TYRONE PAYNE,

o Petitioner,

TENNESSEE,

Respondent.

+

On Writ Of Certiorari To The Supreme

Court Of Tennessee

>

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE JUSTICE FOR ALL

POLITICAL COMMITTEE, THE CONNECTICUT

LEAGUE OF VICTIMS INC., EASTERN

CONNECTICUT HOMICIDE SURVIVORS,

SURVIVORS OF HOMICIDE, INC., STAMFORD

SURVIVORS OF HOMICIDE, PARENTS OF

MURDERED CHILDREN OF NEW YORK STATE,

INC., LONG ISLAND CHAPTER OF PARENTS OF

MURDERED CHILDREN AND OTHER SURVIVORS

OF HOMICIDE VICTIMS, ALBANY (CAPITOL

DISTRICT) CHAPTER OF PARENTS OF MURDERED

CHILDREN AND OTHER SURVIVORS OF

HOMICIDE VICTIMS, SIBLING SUPPORT AND

ACTION GROUP, HOMICIDE CRISIS OUTREACH

PROGRAM, AND THE STEPHANIE ROPER

COMMITTEE, INC., IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT

+

SALLy S. KING Mario THOMAS GABOURY

Rosinson & Coie P.O. Box 1780

One Commercial Plaza Bridgeport, CT 06604

Hartford, CT 06103-3597

Paut G. GARLAND

(203) 275-8200 130 Old Church R

Counsel of Record aw oad

Greenwich, CT 06830

RayMonD T. DeEMEo

Rosinson & Coe

One Commercial Plaza

Hartford, CT 06103-3597

Attorneys for Amici Curiae

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6064

OR CALL COLLECT (02) 342-2831

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whether the Eighth Amendment to the United

States Constitution prohibits any form of victim impact

evidence to be considered at a capital sentencing hearing?

2. Whether the court should overrule its decision in

Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) and South Carolina

v. Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989) and permit a capital

sentencing body to consider some forms of victim impact

evidence in reaching its determination?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Questions Presented for Review ................... i

Bee GF BE be sneer ececiccecitsvieresiicaes iii

Identity and Interests of Amici Curiae.............. 1

Introduction and Summary of Argument........... 3

SEE wdebadstdescesudnesvesiesetscsveceness 5

I. Contrary to the Majority Holdings in Booth v.

Maryland and Gathers v. South Carolina, Consid-

eration of Victim Impact Evidence at a Capital

Sentencing Hearing, With Proper Constraints,

Does Not Taint the Fairness of the Proceeding 5

Il. The Majority Opinions in Booth and Gathers Lack

Constitutional Foundation and Usurp the Pol-

icy-Making Functions of the Legislature....... 8

Ill. Consistent with this Court’s Eighth Amendment

Jurisprudence, A Criminal Defendant at Capital

Sentencing Should be Held Accountable for All

of the Circumstances of his Offense, Including

co vvbdeseccccccesecescs. 10

IV. The Test of “Blameworthiness” Set Forth in

Booth and Gathers Is Ambiguous, And Its Appli-

cation Impairs the Values of Certainty and Pre-

dictability In Capital Sentencing............... 13

i hebhebaneeeebae00seisccececcescese: 14

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Booth v. Maryland, 107 S.Ct. 2529 (1987)......... passim

California v. Brown, 107 S.Ct. 837 (1987) ............ 7,8

Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982)........... 8, 11

Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982)............... 11

Furman v. Georiga, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)............. 9, 13

Gathers v. South Carolina, 109 S.Ct. 2207 (1989) .. passim

Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958)............. 9

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) ........... 6, 9, 10

Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)................ 6, 11

Mills v. Maryland, 108 S.Ct. 1860 (1987) ............ 6, 8

Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983)...............6008. 9

Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51 (1937) ............. 11

State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10 (1990) ..............-4-. 3

Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) ....... 5, 10

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)...... 6, 7

Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1982) ............045. 11

No. 90-5721

ao

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1990

+

PERVIS TYRONE PAYNE,

Petitioner,

v.

TENNESSEE,

Respondent.

+

On Writ Of Certiorari To The Supreme

Court Of Tennessee

+

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE

>

IDENTITY AND INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE

Justice for All Political Committee is a Connecticut

political action committee which advocates legislative

change to increase victim participation in the criminal

justice system. Its chairman, Paul Griffith Garland, is the

father of a murdered daughter. He also is the chairman of

the Crime Victims’ Rights Committee of the Connecticut

Bar Association.

The Connecticut League of Victims Inc. is a non-

profit corporation whose activities include the operation

of a homicide survivors group whose meetings are held

in Bridgeport, Connecticut. Its president, David Kniffin,

is the father of a murdered son.

Eastern Connecticut Homicide Survivors is a unin-

corporated association of homicide survivors, whose

meetings are held in Norwich, Connecticut. Its president,

Greg Vickers, is the father of a murdered daughter.

Survivors of Homicide, Inc. is a not for profit corpo-

ration whose activities include the operation of a homi-

cide survivors group in Hartford, Connecticut. Its

president, Gary Merton, is the father of a murdered

daughter.

Stamford Survivors of Homicide is an unincorpo-

rated association of homicide survivors, whose meetings

are held in Stamford, Connecticut. Its chairperson, Stuart

Brush, is the father of a murdered son.

Parent of Murdered Children of New York State Inc.

is a non-profit corporation whose activities include the

operation of the Queens County Bereavement Group, the

Bronx County Bereavement Group, and the Staten Island

Bereavement Group. Its State Coordinator, Ralph Hub-

bard, is the father of a murdered son.

Long Island Chapter of Parents of Murdered Chil-

dren and Other Survivors of Homicide Victims is an

unincorporated association of homicide victims, whose

meetings are held on Long Island, New York. Its presi-

dent, Barbara Connelly, is the mother of a murdered son.

Albany (Capitol District) Chapter of Parents of Mur-

dered Children and Other Survivors of Homicide Victims

is an unincorporated association of homicide victims,

whose meetings are held in the Albany, New York, area.

Its president, Patricia M. Gioia, is the mother of a mur-

dered daughter.

Sibling Support and Action Group is an unincorpo-

rated association of siblings who are homicide survivors,

whose meetings are held on Long Island, New York. Its

president, Kathleen Takhes, is the sister of a murdered

brother.

Homicide Crisis Outreach Program, based in White

Plains, New York, is a division of Westchester Commu-

nity Opportunity Program Inc., a non-profit corporation.

Its coordinator, Marianne Walsh, is the daughter of a

murdered father.

The Stephanie Roper Committee, Inc., which

appeared as amicus in South Carolina v. Gathers and Booth

v. Maryland, is a non-profit corporation based in Upper

Marlboro, Maryland, which dedicates itself to the

improvement of the standing of crime victims. Its presi-

dent, Roberta Roper, is the mother of a murdered daugh-

ter.

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—

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Murder is the ultimate act of depersonalization. The

murderer turns a sentient being into a corpse, to be

remembered at the murder trial by a series of grisly relics:

the police photographs, the bloody shirt, the dark stain

on the carpet. The crime silences the victim. This Court’s

unfortunate decisions in Booth v. Maryland, 107 S.Ct. 2529

(1987) and Gathers v. South Carolina, 109 S.Ct. 2207 (1989)

effectively silence those most capable of articulating the

full consequences of the murderer’s act: the survivors.

Payne v. Tennessee offers this Court the opportunity to

rectify the injustice to crime victims wrought by the deci-

sions of a narrow majority of this Court in Booth and

Gathers. As the facts of Payne so poignantly demonstrate,

the survivors of a capital crime are themselves victims.

They may suffer from depression, anger, or post trauma-

tic stress disorders. They may become dependent on

drugs and alcohol. They may become alienated from

spouses and siblings. The emotional, physical, and finan-

cial consequences they suffer are circumstances of the

crime that are properly considered in the sentencing

phase of capital, as well as non-capital cases. By unrea-

sonably establishing a per se exclusionary rule for victim

impact evidence, Booth and Gathers make it impossible for

the sentencing body to weigh and consider the full

impact of a capital crime on society.

The United States Constitution does not require the

disenfranchisement of victims of capital crimes. Nor does

it require that a sentencing body remain ignorant of the

personal characteristics of a deceased victim. A capital

sentencing body is entitled, if not obligated, to consider

the impact of the crime upon its victims. Amici join in

urging this Court to overrule Booth and Gathers.

—S

ARGUMENT

I. CONTRARY TO THE MAJORITY HOLDINGS IN

BOOTH V. MARYLAND AND GATHERS V. SOUTH

CAROLINA, CONSIDERATION OF VICTIM

IMPACT EVIDENCE AT A CAPITAL SENTENCING

HEARING, WITH PROPER CONSTRAINTS, DOES

NOT TAINT THE FAIRNESS OF THE PROCEED-

ING.

The majority’s decision in Booth and Gathers proceed

from an analytical framework that ignores victim’s rights.

Under Booth and Gathers, the only individual rights that

deserve consideration at a capital sentencing hearing are

those of the defendant. The majority opinions in these

cases stress that the capital defendant must be treated as

a “ ‘uniquely individual human bein(g].’ ” Booth, 107 S.Ct.

at 2533, quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,

304 (1976). By contrast, victim impact evidence is “irrele-

vant to the decision to*kill,” and “could divert the jury’s

attention away from the defendant’s background and

record, and the circumstances of the crime.” Id. at 2534.

Under Booth and Gathers, the rights of crime victims

either do not exist, or do not matter, in the context of

capital sentencing.

Amici curiae respectfully submit that the majority in

Booth and Gathers erred in concluding that the only indi-

vidual rights worthy of considering in capital sentencing

are those of the defendant. Victim participation at capital

sentencing hearings is not antithetical to the atmosphere

of fairness and impartiality that must be maintained in

this forum. Nor does giving the trier of fact a “glimpse of

the life that [the defendant] chose to extinguish” divert

attention from the ultimate question of the defendant's

culpability. Mills v. Maryland, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 1876 (1987)

(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). To the contrary, victim

impact evidence provides the sentencer with valuable

insight into the impact of the crime on the segment of

society most directly and viscerally affected by it: the

victim’s family and loved ones. This additional insight,

absent in a purely defendant-oriented inquiry, permits

the sentencing tribunal to make an informed and enlight-

ened decision as to whether the “circumstances of the

crime” merit the ultimate penalty of death.

The fault of the majority opinions in Booth and

Gathers lies not in their solicitous concern for the pro-

cedural rights of criminal defendants ‘at capital sentenc-

ing hearings. This Court has always recognized that cases

involving the possibility of the death penalty are different

in kind, as well as degree, from non-capital cases. See

Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978); Woodson v. Norti

Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) (plurality opinion).

Similarly justifiable is the Court’s concern that a capital

sentencing hearing not be tainted by inflammatory, preju-

dicial testimony from the victim’s survivors. “[W]here

discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so

grave as the determination of whether a human life shall

be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably

directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly

arbitrary and capricious action.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.

153, 189 (1976).

The majority in Booth and Gathers errs, however, in

concluding that because it is possible that victim impact

evidence may taint the necessary atmosphere of fairness

at capital sentencing hearings, all victim impact evidence

must be excluded from such hearings as a matter of

constitutional law. Certainly inflammatory victim impact

evidence has no place at a capital sentencing hearing. The

Booth majority was justifiably concerned about the preju-

dicial impact of the victim’s son’s testimony before the

capital sentencing jury that he “ ‘[didn’t] think anyone

should be able to do something like (the murder of his

parents] and get away with it,’ ” and the victim’s daugh-

ter’s expression of her view that the defendant “ ‘could

[never] be rehabilitated.’” Id. at 2535, 2536.

Assuring fairness to the convicted capital felon, how-

ever, does not require that the representatives of the

felon’s victim be muzzled. Victim impact evidence is

bound to be emotionally powerful; it is unrealistic to

expect the survivors of capital crimes to be bland and

dispassionate in describing their losses. This Court has

recognized a distinction, however, between evidence at a

capital sentencing hearing that is calculated to evoke a

purely emotional response, and proper evidence of mit-

igating and aggravating circumstances that may inciden-

tally provoke emotional reactions. See California v. Brown,

107 S.Ct. 837, 840 (1987). The Court has recognized that a

capital sentencing body is not only entitled, but constitu-

tionally required, to consider evidence introduced on a

defendant's behalf of “compassionate or mitigating factors

stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind.”

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)

(emphasis added); California v. Brown, 107 S.Ct. 837, 843

(1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Just as mitigating factors

such as the defendant’s youth or troubled family back-

ground may arouse a sentencer’s compassion, aggrava-

ting factors, such as the physical brutality of the crime or

the age of the victim, may arouse revulsion. In neither

case does the likelihood of an incidental emotional :ca--

tion impermissibly taint the sentencing proceeding.

Victim impact evidence, like other evidence intro-

duced at a capital sentencing hearing, deserves close

judicial scrutiny to assure that a death sentence is not

imposed out of “whim, passion, prejudice or mistake.”

Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 118 (1982) (O’Connor,

J., concurring). But the need for parameters on the nature

and scope of victim impact evidence does not justify the

per se constitutional ban imposed on such evidence by the

majority in Booth and Gathers. In order to make a “rea-

soned moral response” to the defendant's crime; California

v. Brown, 107 S.Ct. 837, 841 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concur-

ring); the capital sentencing body should be afforded “a

glimpse of the life that [the defendant] chose to extin-

guish.” Mills v. Maryland, 108 S. Ct. 1860, 1876 (1987)

(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

Il. THE MAJORITY OPINIONS IN BOOTH AND

GATHERS LACK CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDA-

TION AND USURP THE POLICY-MAKING FUNC-

TIONS OF THE LEGISLATURE.

Nothing in the text of the Eighth Amendment sup-

ports a constitutional ban on victim impact evidence at

capital sentencing hearings. Until Booth, Eighth Amend-

ment jurisprudence had never required or even sup-

ported such a result. As Justice O’Connor stated

forcefully in the dissenting opinion in Gathers, “Booth has

not even an arguable basis in the common law back-

ground that led up to the Eighth Amendment, in any

longstanding societal tradition, or in any evidence that

present society, though its laws or the actions of its juries,

has set its face against considering the harm caused by

criminal acts in assessing responsibility.” Id. at 2218

(O’Connor, J., dissenting). In other words, Booth and

Gather: represent judicial policy making cloaked in the

mantle of a constitutional mandate.

This Court has recognized that the criminal judicial

process must respect the interests of crime victims. Morris

v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.

238, 413-14 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting). It has also

frequently recognized that “determinations of appropri-

ate sentencing considerations are ‘peculiarly questions of

legislative policy.” Booth v. Maryland, 107 S.Ct. 2529,

2539 (1987) (White, J., dissenting), quoting Gore v. United

States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958). Legislatures across the

nation have recognized the rights of crime victims to

participate in criminal sentencing. Nova Legislative Direc-

tory, National Organization for Victim Assistance, Wash-

ington, D.C. (1988). The national legislative trend

favoring the admission of victim impact evidence at capi-

tal sentencing hearings, subject to statutorily-imposed

parameters, reflects a considered judgment that such evi-

dence furthers the valid penological goals of deterrence

and retribution. See generally Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.

153 (1976).

Capital sentencing is more than a referendum on the

personal characteristics of the defendant. Properly consti-

tuted, it is an expression of the community’s judgment on

the extent to which the action of the criminal has so

harmed his community that the ultimate sanction of

death is warranted. The Booth majority acknowledged

that in a capital case, “it is the function of the sentencing

10

jury to ‘express the conscience of the community on the

ultimate question of life or death.’” Booth v. Maryland,

107 S.Ct. 2529 at 2533, quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391

U.S. 510, 519 (1968). “[T]he decision that capital punish-

ment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is

an expression of the community’s belief that certain

crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity

that the only adequate response may be the penalty of

death.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 (1976).

If, as the Court has recognized, the sentencing body

is the conduit for the community’s response to a capital

crime, those members of the community most personally

and directly affected by the crime ought not to be

silenced at the capital sentencing hearing. The will of the

community, as expressed through its legislative bodies, is

that victims’ survivors should be afforded an opportunity

to be heard, in some fashion, at capital sentencing hear-

ings. This Court has the ultimate obligation to assure that

the introduction of victim impact evidence does not taint

the fundamental fairness of the capital sentencing hear-

ing. In doing so, however, it should limit itself to case-by-

case review, rather than proscribing any form of victim

impact evidence in the context of capital sentencing.

Ill. CONSISTENT WITH THIS COURT’S EIGHTH

AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE, A CRIMINAL

DEFENDANT AT CAPITAL SENTENCING

SHOULD BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR ALL OF

THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HIS OFFENSE,

INCLUDING ITS IMPACT ON VICTIMS.

Fundamental fairness requires that the sentencing

body in capital cases take into account “the circumstances

11

of the offense together with the character and propen-

sities of the offender.” Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51,55

(1937); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 111-12 (1982);

Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). In applying this

principle, this Court has frequently focused on the second

half of this phrase: “the character and propensities of the

offender.” The jurisprudential rule that has evolved is

that any aspect of the defendant’s character or personal

circumstances offered in mitigation of his crime is

required to be admitted at the capital sentencing hearing.

See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1977).

Unfortunately, this Court has offered scant exegesis

on what constitutes a “circumstance of the offense” rele-

vant to capital sentencing. It is clear that a capital sen-

tencing body may properly consider aggravating, as well

as mitigating circumstances of the offense in deciding

whether to impose the death penalty. Zant v. Stephens, 462

U.S. 862, 874-75 (1982). Until Booth, this Court had never

held that as a matter of constitutional law a state legisla-

ture could not, “if it chooses, include as a sentencing

consideration the particularized harm that an individ-

ual’s murder causes to the rest of society and in particular

to his family.” Booth v. Maryland, 107 S.Ct. 2529 at 2540

(1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Certainly this harm is

not so tenuous or remote that its consideration in senten-

cing is impermissible as a matter of constitutional law.

The Booth majority’s rationale for excluding victim

impact evidence is that such evidence has no bearing on

the defendant’s “ ‘personal responsibility and moral

guilt.’ ” Id. at 2533, quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.

782, 801 (1982). In making this determination, the major-

ity improperly establishes itself as an arbiter of national

12

moral standards. The legislative consensus in favor of

allowing victim impact evidence to be admitted at sen-

tencing shows that the view of the community, whom the

sentencing body represents, is that a criminal defendant

does indeed bear “personal responsibility” for the conse-

quences his crime inflicts on victim and victims’ sur-

vivors.

The Booth majority’s concept of what bears on a

defendant’s “moral guilt” is unconscionably narrow.

According to the majority, only those factors relevant to

“the decision to kill” reflect on blameworthiness. Id. at

2534. The Booth majority further notes that “defendants

rarely select their victims based on whether the murder

will have an effect on anyone other than the person

murdered.” Id. While this may be true, should the fact

that a killer has no regard for the suffering his act may

inflict on the family and loved ones of his victim absolve

him from “moral guilt” for these consequences? The Booth

majority’s conception of morality unwittingly condones

amorality.

The national consensus in favor of allowing victim

input in capital sentencing decisions reflects the moral

judgment of society, contrary to that of the Booth majority,

that people who kill other people should be held morally

responsible for the effects of their actions on the victim’s

survivors. This moral judgment is neither arbitrary nor

unreasonable, and should not be overruled by judicial

fiat.

13

IV. THE TEST OF “BLAMEWORTHINESS” SET

FORTH IN BOOTH AND GATHERS IS AMBIG-

UOUS, AND ITS APPLICATION IMPAIRS THE

VALUES OF CERTAINTY AND PREDICTABILITY

IN CAPITAL SENTENCING.

In dismissing the argument that the impact of a capi-

tal crime on a victim’s survivors is indeed a “circum-

stance of the offense,” the Booth majority failed to

anticipate fact situations such as those in the present case.

Here, the victim impact information showed the effect of

the crime on a three year old boy who was in the same

room where his mother and sister were murdered, and

who was himself assaulted in the same attack. As the

South Carolina Supreme Court aptly noted:

When a person deliberately picks a butcher

knife out of a kitchen drawer and proceeds to

stab to death a twenty-eight year old mother,

her two and one-half year old daughter and her

three and one-half year old son, in the same

room, the physical and mental condition of the

boy he left for dead is surely relevant in deter-

mining his “blameworthiness.”

State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 19 (1990).

Because Booth and Gathers turn on the murky philo-

sophical concept of a defendant’s moral blameworthiness,

they impair the values of certainty and predictability,

values which the defendant and the community have an

interest in maintaining in the context of capital sentenc-

ing. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 283 (1972). li is not

difficult to imagine variations on the facts presented to

the Court in this case that would confound philosophers,

as well as judges, seeking to evaluate the extent to which

14

a murderer could be held morally culpable for the conse-

quences on his victim’s survivors. For example, what if

the son had not witnessed his mother’s and sister’s mur-

ders, but had been depicted in a family photograph

prominently displayed at the murder scene? Is the defen-

dant morally responsible for the impact of the murders

on the child, thus making such impact evidence admissi-

ble at a capital sentencing hearing? Would “moral guilt”

depend on the prosecution’s proof that the defendant

actually saw the photograph?

Unfortunately, the admissibility of victim impact evi-

dence now depends on the answers to impossibly close

questions such as these. In Gathers, the majority found

significant the absence of evidence that the defendant

had read the religious tracts that his murder victim had

carried, noting, among other things, that the defendant

did not have a flashlight when he attacked the victim in a

dark, wooded area. Id. at 2211.

The practical difficulty in defining the scope of

“moral guilt” illustrates the fallacy of adjudicating ques-

tions of morality. Morality is an issue of public policy, not

jurisprudence. The mandate of public policy is that crime

victims should be heard at capital sentencing hearings.

Amici urge the Court to uphold that mandate by overrul-

ing Booth and Gathers.

>-

CONCLUSION

The reality of violent death is discomforting. But for

capital sentencing to meaningfully reflect the conscience

of society, the full reality of violent death must be

a

15

explored. The impact of a capital crime on its victims, and

its victims’ relatives and loved ones, is as much a circum-

stance of the crime, if not more so, than the psychological

and social factors that the defendant may claim militate

against a sentence of death. To ignore victim impact

evidence in capital sentencing is to ignore the truth about

capital crime. Amici join in respectfully requesting the

Court to restore truth and fairness to capital sentencing

proceedings by allowing the consideration of victim

impact evidence.

Respectfully submitted,

Amici Curiae

SALLY S. KING

Rosinson & Co ie

One Commercial Plaza

Hartford, CT 06103-3597

(203) 275-8200

Counsel of Record

RAYMOND T. DEMEo

Rosinson & CoLe

One Commercial Plaza

Hartford, CT 06103-3597

Mario THOMAS GABOURY

P.O. Box 1780

Bridgeport, CT 06604

Paut G. GARLAND

130 Old Church Road

Greenwich, CT 06830

Attorneys for Amici Curiae