Opposition Brief — United States v. R. L. C.
Supreme Court brief1992
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
a
e
OhGINAL= =
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1990
NO. 90-1577 RECEIVED
meine
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 80 1991
OFFICE ~* THE cuEpg
Petitioner, | SUPREME Court, u.$
Vv.
R.L.C., a juvenile,
Respondent.
MOION FOR LEAVE TO
PROCEED
IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section
3006A(d)(6) and Rule 46 of this Court, respondent asks leave to
file the attached Respondent’s Brif in Opposition to the petition
for Writ of Certiorari from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit without prepayment of fees or costs and to
proceed in forma pauperis. Respondent was represented by counsel
appointed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A in the district court and
on appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Dated: M 4 1991 eae :
=" ia a Gott
DANIEL M. SCOTT
Federal Public Defender
District of Minnesota
Attorney ID No. 98395
174 U.S. Courthouse
110 South Fourth Street
Minneapolis, MN 55401
Attorney for Respondent
KATHERIAN D. ROE
Assistant Federal Defender
No.
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1990 RECEIVED
NO. 90-1577 MAY 30 199]
OFFICE *~ THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT, U.S.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner,
Vv.
R.L.C., a juvenile,
Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
DANIEL M. SCOTT
Federal Public Defender
District of Minnesota
Attorney ID No. 98395
174 U.S. Courtouse
110 South Fourth Street
Minneapolis, MN 55401
(612) 348-1755
Attorney for Respondent.
KATHERIAN D. ROE
Assistant Federal Defender
ANDREA K. GEORGE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED... -+-eeeeecccrcrceccerrscrrccene covccece
TABLE OF CONTENTS... cc ccceeereeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee - Ss F&F Ss *enereee
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES... .--eeeeeceeeceeererserrrrerereree coee
JURISDICTION. ..cecccsccecrsceeeererereerssesereeeeeesseenees
STATEMENT . oc cccccccccccccccccesssessesssessssesesessessessres
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT...---eeeeeeeeerers eoccccecceces
CONCLUSION. .ccccccccccccccsccessssesesssssssseseserssssseeess
APPENDIX A.weeeeeseeerees coc cccccccces TETTTELELE TE
APPENDIX B...cccccccccccccsccsecsssesssssssssssssssssssssses
APPENDIX C..cccccccccccccccccccsecessesessesesessssssssesess
APPENDIX D..cccccccccccccccccesseeesssesesesessssssseseseses
2
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES:
Brown Transport Corp. v. Atcon, Inc, 439 U.S. 1014 (1978) . . 13
455 U.S 994 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Ex Parte Ralston, 119 U.S. 613, 7 S.Ct. 317 (1887) ......49
Gilliard v. Mississippi, 464 U.S. 867 (1983) ......++-. 12
Greco v. Orange Memorial Hospital Corp., 423 U.S. 1000 (1975) 13
Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Electric Inc., 454 U.S. 1060 (1981) 13
McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963 (1983) .....+++.-. 12
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 332 (1977) . 9, 10
Vv. Ww , 392 U.S. 40, 53, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1697
(1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . -_ . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 10
it. Pierre vy. United States, 319 U.S. : rll S.Ct. —
(1943) . . . .* * . . 8, 9
Towson v. United States, 455 U.S. 1006 (1982) ....+ +++ 123
cert. arom 110 S. Ct. 369 (1989) oevetvet &*s 6 6 « eae
STATUTES :
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 (CCCA), Pub. L.
No. 98-473, Tit. II, § 218(a)(8), 98 Stat. 2027 .... 16
Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. 5005-5024 (1982) .... +. +. 217
Youth Corrections Act, Pub.L. atlas: Title = eet
98 Stat. 2031 (1984) ..... oceo
46 ©.8.6. 2128800) . s-s eee eee ee ee eee
18 @.8.C. 6 3068 (DB) «ott th hee ee eee
10 U.8.0. CBE «ee cto eee eee eee
16 0.6.6. 9089 . . et eo 0 6 6 6 ee eee
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Continued
STATUTES CONTINUED:
~~~) «6 6s 6G eee eee e sees
Es 2. 6 ¢ e's» éeee eee ee « fhe
rs £1. « sc oe eesécsene seo Ge Ot
18 U.S.C. § 5037(c)(1)(B)
.
~
+
*
~
oO
*
28 U.S.C. 994 . . . . . .
28 U.S.C. 1254(1) . . . . .
CONSTITUTION AND REGULATIONS:
U.S. Const. Amend. V (Due Process Clause)
Justice Brennan, Some Thoughts on the Supreme Court’s
Wonkload, 66 Judicature 230, 233 (1983)
Justice Stevens, Some Thoughts on Judicial Restraint, 66
Judicature 177, 183 (1982) :
Rule 41(b), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure .. . 8, 10,
Sup. Ct. R. 22.2.
S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 114, reprinted in =
1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3297
S. Rep. No. 278, 99th Cong., 2d Sess 3 (1986)
U.S.S.G. ch.5, pt. A--Sentencing Table
United States Sentencing Commission, Questions Most
Frequently Asked About the nape Guidelines 1
(Nov. 30, 1988) ; »
17
12
12
ll
17
16
17
17
15
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1990
NO. 90-1577
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner,
v.
R.L.C., a juvenile,
Respondent.
JURISDICTION
The judgement of the court of appeals was entered on September
12, 1990. A petition for hearing and suggestion for rehearing en
banc was denied on December 18, 1990. App., infra, 15a. On March
12, 1991, Justice Blackmun extended the time within which to file
a petition for a writ of certiorari to and including April 17,
1991. The petitioner asserts that the jurisdiction of this Court
is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1254(1). Respondent asserts that
the Court lacks the jurisdiction to hear this case because the case
is moot. Respondent’s mootness argument will be fully discussed in
the portion of the brief entitled, “Reasons For Denying the
Petition”.
STATEMENT
1. Respondent, a juvenile, was charged in a one-count
information with involuntary manslaughter. The charges arose from
a car accident which had occurred on the Red Lake Indian
Reservation. That car accident had resulted in the death of La
Tesha Mountain. La Tesha had died as a result of head and neck
injuries that she received when she was thrown from the back seat
to the front seat of the car during the accident. App., infra, 2a.
2. The car which struck the vehicle that La Tesha Mountain
was riding in, was a stolen Chevrolet Camaro occupied by respondent
and James White, Jr. Both admitted to an evening of heavy drinking
which had resulted in their stealing the car and driving it around
the reservation. App., infra, 2a.
3. Following a trial to the court, the district court found
that respondent had been driving the car while intoxicated and in
a reckless manner at the time of the accident which resulted in
Mountain’s death. The court found that this conduct constituted
involuntary manslaughter, in violation of 18 U.S.C. lll2(a). The
court found respundent to be a juvenile delinquent under 18 U.S.C.
5031. App., infra, 2a-3a.
4. On January 24, 1990, the court sentenced respondent to
three years detention to be served at the Missouri River Adolescent
Center in Chamberlain, South Dakota. App., infra, 3a.
5. Respondent appealed. The court of appeals upheld the
finding of delinquency, but vacated the sentence and remanded the
case for resentencing. App., infra, la-l4a. It was the court’s
determination that the thirty-six month sentence that the
respondent had received, exceeded the period of confinement that he
could have received if he “had been tried and convicted as an
adult". Thus the thirty-six month sentence imposed was in violation
of 18 U.S.C. 5037(c)(1). App., infra, 3a-l4a. The court summarized
its findings in the following way: “We hold that the phrase
‘maximum term of imprisonment that would be authorized if the
juvenile had been tried and convicted as an adult’ prohibits a
court from sentencing a juvenile to a term of imprisonment greater
than the juvenile could have received had he been sentenced as an
adult under the sentencing guidelines." App., infra, 12a-i3a.
6. The government filed a petition for rehearing and
suggestion for rehearing en banc. The panel denied the petition
for rehearing and the full court declined the suggestion for
rehearing en banc. App., infra, 17a.
7. On January 25, 1991, the district court resentenced the
respondent to a term of eighteen months. App., infra, 18a.
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
The Petitioner failed to petition for a stay of the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals mandate in this case. As a result, the
respondent was resentenced on January 24, 1991, and as of March 20,
1991 had completed his sentence. There are no collateral
consequences that could result from the ruling the Petitioner asks
this Court to make. Therefore, this case is moot.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals fully considered and
correctly decided the issue presented in the Petition for Writ of
Certiorari. In the petition, the Petitioner has overstated the
opinion set forth by the court of appeals. The court did not hold
that the sentencing guidelines “must” be applied when determining
a juvenile’s sentence. Rather, the court recognized that 18 U.S.C.
§ 5037 prohibits a court from sentencing a juvenile to a term of
imprisonment greater than he could have received if he had been
tried and convicted as an adult. In an effort to comply with this
provision, the court of appeals held that the sentencing court must
look to the guidelines as a guide to determine what the maximum
sentence for an adult would have been. Once that determination has
been made, the sentencing court may then determine the appropriate
sentence for the juvenile.
1. This Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this case.
On December 26, 1989, the United States District Court Judge Harry
H. MacLaughlin adjudged R.L.C. to be a juvenile delinquent under 18
U.S.C. § 5031. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5037 the court sentenced
R.L.C. vo a term of thirty-six months “official detention", to be
served at a juvenile facility. Respondent appealed to the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals. On September 12, 1990, the Court of
Appeals vacated the sentence imposed by the District Court and
remanded the case for resentencing. The government filed a
petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc, which
was denied by the Court on December 18, 1990. However, the
government did not petition the appellate court for a stay of the
mandate under Rule 41(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. On
January 25, 1991, the district court resentenced the respondent to
a term of 18 months. On March 20, 1991, respondent was released
from custody, having completed his sentence. The government filed
its petition for writ of certiorari on April 17, 1991.
Respondent has completed his sentence. Further, there are no
collateral consequences that could result from the ruling the
government asks this Court to make. The case is therefore moot.
In St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41, 63 §.Ct. 910
(1943), this Court held that if a petitioner has already served his
or her sentence, “the case is moot because, after petitioner’s
service of his sentence and its expiration, there was no longer a
subject matter on which the judgment of this Court could operate.”
St. Pierre, 319 U.S. at 42, 63 S.Ct. at 911. The Court also held
that the petitioner could have taken steps to preserve his case,
but that “he did not apply to this Court for a stay or a
supersedeas," an avenue likewise available to the Petitioner in
this case. Id. The Court recognized two situations overriding
mootness where the imposed sentence had been served: 1) where the
petitioner, through no fault of his own, could not have brought the
case prior to the completion of the sentence; and 2) where further
penalties could be imposed as a result of the catisfied judgment
(the "collateral consequences” exception). Id. 319 U.S. at 43, 63
S.Ct. at 911.
In Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1897
(1968), the Court expanded on the St. Pierre exceptions, stating
that a criminal case becomes moot by 1) the full service of a
prison sentence, if 2) no collateral legal consequences will be
imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction. In Sibron, the
petitioner could not have obtained review of his conviction before
completing his six month sentence for two reasons. First, New York
law prohibited bail for the offense of which Sibron had been
convicted. Second, a stay of mandate or supersedeas "may issue
only in connection with an appeal actually taken," and Sibron did
not have the opportunity to appeal his case prior to serving his
sentence. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 53 n.13, 88 S.Ct. at 1897 n.13
(citing Ex parte Ralston, 119 U.S. 613, 7 S.Ct. 317 (1887)).
In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 332 (1977),
this Court stated that completion of a sentence does not
necessarily preclude the government from petitioning for writ of
certiorari:
If the prospect of the State’s visiting such collateral
consequences on a criminal defendant who has served his
sentence is a sufficient burden as to enable him to seek
reversal of a decision affirming his conviction, the
prospect of the State’s inability to impose such a burden
following a reversal of the conviction of a criminal
defendant in its own courts must likewise be sufficient
to enable the State to obtain review of its claims on the
10
merits here. In any future state criminal proceedings
against respondent, this conviction may be relevant to
setting bail and length of sentence, and to the
availability of probation.
Id. 434 U.S. at 109 n.3, 98 S.Ct. at 332, n.3 (citations omitted).
This line of decisions, including Sibron and Mimms, deal with cases
where reversal of the underlying conviction is at issue. They
address the collateral consequences arising from any conviction;
specifically bail, length of subsequent sentences and the
availability of probation. In the present case, the Eighth Circuit
did not reverse the District Court’s finding of juvenile
delinquency. Rather, the Court of Appeals merely remanded for
resentencing. Respondent’s sentence was reduced from 36 months to
18 months. The collateral consequences arising from the District
Court’s finding of juvenile delinquency were unaffected by the
appeal. Thus, the concern enunciated in Mimms -- that the
government not be foreclosed by the doctrine of mootness from
obtaining review of a reversed conviction where collateral
consequences followed from that conviction -- simply does not exist
in the case at bar.
Petitioner could have acted to prevent mootness. However, by
failing to petition for a stay of the Eighth Circuit’s mandate
before filing its petition for writ of certiorari, petitioner
allowed respondent to complete his full sentence. Rule 41(b) of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure is a measure by which a petitioner
may stay the mandate of an appellate court during the pendency of
review by the Supreme Court. The stay can continue until final
disposition by the Supreme Court. Rule 41(b), Federal Rules of
1l
Appellate Procedure. A stay is appropriate when the petitioner
would be adversely affected if the judgment of the lower court were
carried out prior to Supreme Court review.
Based on petitioner’s failure to request a stay under Rule
41(b), the mandate was issued and respondent was resentenced by the
district court. Respondent thus completed his sentence prior to
the government’s filing of the petition. In other words,
petitioner could have prevented mootness, but failed to take the
appropriate procedural steps to do so.
12
2. In its opinion, the Eighth Circuit recognized that its
holding conflicted with the Ninth Circuit opinion in United States
v. Marco L., 868 F.2d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 110 S.Ct.
369 (1989). The only apparent conflict is between the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits. This Court’s policy of "letting tolerable
conflicts go unaddressed until more than two courts of appeals have
considered a question” should apply here. Justice Brennan, Some
Thoughts on the Supreme Court’s Workload, 66 Judicature 230, 233
(1983).
The existence of differing rules of law in different
sections of our great country is not always an
intolerable evil. .. . It would be better, of course, if
federal law could be applied uniformly in all federal
courts, but experience with conflicting interpretations
of federal rules may help to illuminate an issue before
it is finally resolved and thus may play a constructive
role in the lawmaking process. The doctrine of judicial
restraint teaches us that patience in the judicial
resolution of conflicts may sometimes produce the most
desirable result.
Justice Stevens, Some hts on dici nt, 66 Judicature
177, 183 (1982). See also McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963
(1983) (Stevens, J.) (certiorari denied where issues needed further
development by lower courts); Gilliard v. Mississippi, 464 U.S. 867
(1983) (Marshall, J. dissent from denial of certiorari) (Court
should have postponed consideration of the issue until federal
courts had experimented with a solution to the problem).
The time is not ripe for the Court to resolve the apparent
conflict. As in these cases, awaiting further litigation in the
lower courts is likely to produce a consensus or a satisfactory
majority view among the circuits.
13
The Court has often denied certiorari even when faced with
direct conflicts on important issues. In Brown Transport Corp. Vv:
Atcon, Inc., 439 U.S. 1014 (1978), Justice White, in his dissent,
detailed 14 cases on the list of the opening day of the 1978 Term
in which the Court refused to grant certiorari despite conflicts
between appellate courts or with the Court’s precedents. see
also Greco v. Orange Memorial Hospital Corp., 423 U.S. 1000 (1975);
Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Electric Inc., 454 U.S. 1060 (1981);
Chelsea House Publishers v. Nicholstone Book Bindery Incs, 455 U.S.
994 (1982); Towson v. United States, 455 U.S. 1006 (1982).
Further, the issue in this case is not likely to arise
frequently. The number of juvenile delinquency proceedings in
federal courts is significantly less than 1% of the total number of
federal criminal cases heard each year. In 1990, there were a
total of 47,335 federal criminal cases versus 168 juvenile
delinquency proceedings.’ Thus, the apparent conflict involved in
this case does not have widespread significance.
=
" federal criminal
° 1986, there were a total of 41,420
cases ona 129 juvenile proceedings; in 1987, 43,280 — 81
in 1988, 43,688 versus 132; gegen <3 00775 vere cnaniae
Administrative Office of the U.S. Cou .
oe van Judicial Workload Statistics, Table D (December 31,
1986 - December 31, 1990).
14
3. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals fully considered and
correctly decided the issue presented in this case. The court of
appeals’ analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 5037 and the related legislative
history clearly indicates that Section 5037(c)(1) prohibits a court
from sentencing a juvenile to a term of imprisonment that would be
greater than the term he could have received if he had been an
adult sentenced under the sentencing guidelines.
a. In an effort to resolve the issue presented, the Eighth
Circuit began with an analysis of Section 5037. However, because
Section 5037 provided no definition of the phrase “maximum term of
imprisonment that would be authorized if the juvenile had been
tried and convicted as an adult", the court also undertook an
extensive analysis of Congress’ intent in enacting Section
5037(c)(1)(B).
The language of Section 5037 provides that a juvenile’s
sentence must be the lesser of the period of time between
sentencing and the juvenile’s twenty-first birthday and “the
maximum term of imprisonment that would be authorized if the
juvenile had been tried and convicted as an adult." 18 U.S.C.§
5037(c) (1988). The court reasoned that the language "if the
juvenile had been tried and convicted as an adult" suggested that
in determining the maximum sentence that the juvenile would be
subject to, the sentencing court should consider “those
individualized, subjective factors that would be relevant to
sentencing the same individual as an adult." App., infra, 5a.
15
If R.L.C. had been an adult the sentencing guidelines would
have applied. It is not disputed that the sentencing guidelines
themselves do not apply to individuals sentenced as juveniles.
See United States Sentencing Commission, Questions Most Frequently
Asked About the Sentencing Guidelines 1 (Nov. 30, 1988). However,
Section 5037 specifically provides that the sentencing court should
consider “any pertinent policy statements promulgated by the
Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994" when determining
the disposition that would be appropriate for the offense. 18
U.S.C. 5037(a) (1988).
By looking to the guidelines in an effort to determine what
the applicable guideline range would be if the juvenile offender
was in fact an adult, the sentencing court would then use the
resulting range as a guide in sentencing the juvenile. As stated
by the Eighth Circuit, this would "eliminate unwarranted disparity
between juvenile and adult sentences" and “further Section
5037(c)’s goal of avoiding harsher penalties for juvenile offenders
than for similarly situated adults." App., infra, 6a.
Petitioner argues that the most “natural” reading of the
“maximum punishment" clause in 13 U.S.C. 5037(c)(1) refers to the
“maximum term of imprisonment authorized in the law defining the
offense." Petition at 8. There is nothing natural about this
interpretation. If in fact this was Congress’ intent, it would
have been simple for the clause to have been worded in exactly that
way. However, it is clear from the language of the statute and the
legislative history that what Congress intended was that a juvenile
16
offender not be subject to a longer term of imprisonment than he
could have received "if he had been tried and convicted as an
adult." This is what the clause states, and is the most natural
reading of the “maximum punishment" clause.
The Eighth Circuit conducted a detailed review and analysis of
the legislative history of Section 5037 (c)(1)(B) and the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 (CCCA).’ After a
complete review and analysis, which will not be included in the
text of respondent’s brief,’ the court determined that Congress had
considered and rejected establishing statutory maximum sentences as
the maximum sentence of imprisonment that a juvenile offender could
receive.‘ The CCCA’s legislative history indicates that upon the
effective date of the sentencing guidelines, Congress intended the
statutory maximum sentences prescribed in 18 U.S.C. § 3581 (b), to
represent “the greatest period the Congress should allow a judge to
impose for an “offense committed under the most egregious of
circumstances." S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 114,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3297. The
guidelines were constructed to reserve the upper range of the
maximum sentence "for offenders who repeatedly commit offenses or
*Section 5037 (c)(1)(B) was amended as part of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act. It was this legislation that
authorized the establishment of the sentencing guidelines.
*The Eighth Circuit’s analysis of the relevant legislative
history is a lengthy one. In an effort to comply with Sup. Ct.
R. 22.2, which encourages brevity, respondent refers the Court to
Appendix A, pages 5a-l2a.
“A brief discussion of the legislative history relating to
this issue is contained in App., infra 7a, footnote l.
17
those who commit an offense under particularly egregious
circumstances.” Id.
Under the government’s interpretation of the ‘maximum
punishment" clause of Section 5037, a sentencing court could
sentence any juvenile adjudicated a delinquent for committing
involuntary manslaughter to three years of imprisonment.*® However,
an adult could be sentenced to three years only if he had an
extensive criminal background or had committed an offense which
involved aggravating factors qualifying as grounds for an upward
departure.* See U.S.S.G. ch.5, pt. A--Sentencing Table.
Promoting such a disparity in sentencing was not the
legislative intent underlying Section 5037. Congress amended
Section 5037 in 1986. The legislative history indicates that the
purpose of the amendment was to ensure that juvenile offenders
would not receive a more severe punishment than adult offenders.
See S. Rep. No. 278, 99th Cong., 2d Sess 3 (1986).
b. The petitioner argues that under the Youth Corrections Act,
18 U.S.C. 5005-5024 (1982), the courts consistently held that it
did not violate equal protection principles or the Due Process
°R.L.C. was originally sentenced to serve three years
“official detention".
*For an adult offender with no criminal history to receive a
sentence of three years imprisonment for the offense of
involuntary manslaughter, the sentencing court would have to find
aggravating factors sufficient to increase the base offense level
by five levels.
18
Clause’ for a juvenile offender to be sentenced to a period of
custody that exceeded the maximum possible for an adult who had
committed the same crime. But in 1984 Congress implemented
significant changes with respect to juvenile sentencing with the
enactment of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act. The most
significant change was that the CCCA repealed the Youth Corrections
Act in its entirety. Pub.L. 98-473, Title II, 218(g), 98 Stat.
2031 (1984). And in making such changes, CCCA’s explicit goal was
to promote fairness, consistency and uniformity in sentencing.
If a Court were to adopt petitioner’s reading of the “maximum
punishment" clause, the essential purposes of the CCCA and
Congress’ directive would be undercut. Juveniles would be in
jeopardy of being subjected to proportionally more severe and
disparate sentences than adult offenders who committed the same
offense. The Eighth Circuit gave careful consideration to the
consequences of such an interpretation when it rejected the
government’s argument.
In summary, the Eighth Circuit’s analysis of Section
5037(c)(1)(B) was both thorough and correct.
"Respondent is not asserting that the sentencing disparity
is a violation of equal protection or due process. Respondent is
asserting that 18 U.S.C. section 5037 prohibits a sentencing
court from sentencing a juvenile offender to a term of
imprisonment greater than what he could have received if he had
been tried and convicted as an adult.
19
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth, the petition should be
denied.
Dated: mage), 1991
20
DANIEL M. SCOTT
Federal Public Defender
District of Minnesota
Attorney ID No. 98395
174 U.S. Courthouse
110 South Fourth Street
Minneapolis, MN 55401
Attorney for Respondent
KATHERIAN D. ROE
Assistant Federal Defender
ANDREA K. GEORGE
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 90-5048
UNITED STATES, APPELLEE
Vv.
R. L. C., JUVENILE MALE, APPELLANT
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota
Submitted: August 14, 1990
Filed: September 12, 1990
Before LAY, Chief Judge; HEANEY and BRIGHT,
Senior Circuit Judges.
HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge.
R.L.C., a juvenile, appeals from the district court’s
finding of juvenile delinquency for involuntary man-
(la)
2a
slaughter pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031, 1112(b),
and 1153. He also appeals from a sentence of three
years detention in a federal juvenile correctional
facility. We affirm the finding of juvenile delin-
queiiey but vacate R.L.C.’s sentence and remand to
the district court for resentencing.
BACKGROUND
R.L.C., 16, was charged in a one-count information
with involuntary manslaughter on the Red Lake
Indian Reservation for causing the death of LaTesha
Lynn Mountain while driving a car in a reckless man-
ner while intoxicated.
Following an evening of heavy drinking, R.L.C.
and another juvenile, James White, Jr., stole a car
_ on the Red Lake Reservation. Shortly after the car
was stolen, a witness saw it rear-end a car driven by
_ Deborah Garrigan while travelling east on Highway 1
in Red Lake. Mountain, Garrigan’s daughter, died
from head injuries she received when she was thrown
from the back seat to the front seat of Garrigan’s
ear during the accident. The stolen car was later
found in flames in the words southwest of the acci-
dent scene.
R.L.C. and White both admitted drinking, stealing
the car, and driving it at some point during the -
evening. Both denied having driven the car, however,
at the time the accident occurred. Three witnesses,
including White, placed R.L.C. behind the wheel at
or immediately before the time of the accident.
R.L.C. stated that he was sleeping in the passenger
seat when the accident occurred, and did not awaken
until the car crashed and ignited in the woods.
Following a trial to the court, the district court
found that R.L.C. had been driving the car while in-
3a
toxicated and in a reckless manner at the time of the
accident which caused Mountain’s death and that this
conduct constituted involuntary manslaughter within
the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §1112(a). The district
court adjudged R.L.C. to be a juvenile delinquent
under 18 U.S.C. § 5031.
At sentencing, the prosecution requested that
R.L.C. receive the statutory maximum penalty for
involuntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. §1112
(b), three years. The district court acceded to the
request and sentenced R.L.C. to three years detention
at the Missouri River Adolescent Center in Chamber-
lain, South Dakota. R.L.C. appeals.
DISCUSSION
R.L.C. raises two issues on appeal. He claims that
the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove bevond
a reasonable doubt that he drove the car at the time
of the accident. After carefully reviewing the record,
we believe the trial testimony adequately supports the
district court’s finding that R.L.C. was driving the
car when the accident occurred. Accordingly, R.L.C.’s
sufficiency of the evidence cleim is without merit.
R.L.C. also claims that the district court erred in
sentencing him to the three-year maximum statutory
penalty for involuntary manslaughter when an adult
sentenced for the same offense under the sentencing
guidelines would have received a maximum sentence
of only twenty-one months.
As a juvenile delinquent, R.L.C. was sentenced
under 18 U.S.C. § 5037. Section 5037(c) states:
The term for which official detention may be
ordered for a juvenile found to ‘be a juvenile
delinquent may not extend—
4a
(1) in the case of a juvenile who is less
than eighteen years old, beyond the lesser
of—
(A) the date when the juvenile be
comes twenty-one years old; or
(B) the maximum term of imprison-
ment that would be authorized if the
juvenile had been tried and convicted as
an adult[.]
18 U.S.C. § 5037(c) (1) (1988).
R.L.C. argues that the phrase “maximum term of
imprisonment that would be authorized if the ju-
venile had been tried and convicted as an adult”
means the maximum sentence an adult could receive
under the sentencing guideline for the same offense.
Guideline section 2A1.4(a)(2) provides a base of-
. fense level of 14 for involuntary manslaughter caused
by reckless conduct. At a criminal history category
of I, a base offense level of 14 yields a sentencing
range of 15-21 months. R.L.C. therefore argues that
his sentence of three years violates 18 U.S.C. § 5037
(c)(1)(B). :
The government argues that “maximum term of
imprisonment that would be authorized if the juvenile
had been tried and convicted as an adult” refers to
the statutory maximum sentence for the particular
offense committed. The maximum sentence for in-
vountary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. §1112 is
three years. 18 U.S.C. §1112(b) (1988). The gov-
ernment argues that R.L.C.’s three-year sentence is
the same as the maximum term of imprisonment an
adult could have received if convicted of the same
offense, and that the sentence therefore is permitted
under 18 U.S.C. § 5037(c) (1) (B).
5a
Section 5037 provides no definition of “maximum
term of imprisonment that would be authorized if the
juvenile had been tried and convicted as an adult.”
In light of this failure, we must determine the intent
of Congress in enacting section 5037(c)(1)(B) to
resolve its ambiguity. See United States v. Jones,
811 F.2d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 1987).
In construing a statute to ascertain its drafters’
intent, we look first to the languaye of the statute
itself, then to its legislative history. See Blum v.
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984). As further aids
in the determination of legislative intent, we may also
properly consider a statute’s subject matter, the ob-
ject to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, the
underlying policies, and the consequences of various
interpretations. Kifer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 777
F.2d 1325, 1332 (Sth Cir. 1985). An examination of
all these factors persuades us that Congress did not
intend juvenile delinquents ordinarily to be subject
to penalties harsher than those received by adults
convicted of the same offense.
Section 5037(c)(1)’s lanruage expresses a pref-
erence for juvenile sentences which are the lesser of
the period of time between sentencing and the ju-
venile’s twenty-first birthday and “the maximum
term of imprisonment that would be authorized if the
juvenile had been tried and convicted as an adult.”
18 U.S.C. §5037(c) (1988). The phrase “if the
juvenile had been tried and convicted as an adult”
suggests that the sentencing court should focus on the
actual maximum sentence the particular juvenile in
question would have been subject to but for his age,
considering those individualized, subjective factors
that would be relevant to sentencing the same indi-
vidual as an adult. Had R.L.C. been tried for and
6a
convicted of involuntary manslaughter as an adult,
he would have been sentenced under the sentencing
guidelines, which provide a maximum sentence of 21
months for an individual with R.L.C.’s criminal his-
tory. The sentencing guidelines establish the permis-
sible maximum and minimum sentence in all cases
except those in which the sentencing court finds “that
there exists an aggravating or mitigating circum-
stance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines and that should result in
a sentence [above or below the guideline range].”
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988).
The sentencing guidelines themselves do not apply
to individuals sentenced as juveniles. See United
States Sentencing Commission, Questions Most Fre-
quently Asked About the Sentencing Guidelines 1
(Nov. 30, 1988). Section 5037 provides, however,
that after a finding of juvenile delinquency, the court
should consider any pertinent policy statements pro-
mulgated by the Sentencing Commission in determin-
ing the disposition appropriate to the offense. 18
U.S.C. §5037(a) (1988). Using the - sentencing
guidelines to fix the maximum sentence a juvenile
delinquent could receive would serve as a guide to
courts to eliminate unwarranted disparity between)
juvenile and adult sentences. Using the upper limit
of the applicable guideline sentencing range as the
maximum sentence a juvenile could receive thus
would further section 5037(c)’s goal of avoiding
harsher penalties for juvenile offenders than for simi-
larly situated adults.
Section 5037’s legislative history also suggests that
Congress intended the “maximum term of imprison-
ment” in subsection (C)(1)(B) to be the maximum
Ta
term the juvenile in question actually could have re-
ceived if sentenced as an adult under the guidelines,
rather than the statutory maximum sentence for the
offense committed.
Section 5037(c) (1) (B) was amended as part of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 (CCCA),
the same legislation that authorized the establishment
of the sentencing guidelines. See Pub. L. No. 98-473,
Title II, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984).' This legislation made
sweeping reforms in the sentencing of both adult and
juvenile federal offenders. The CCCA’s sentencing
reform policies and goals, when considered in con-
junction with other changes the CCCA made in the
disposition of juvenile offenders, persuade us that
Congress did not intend the real time served by ju-
1The CCCA’s legislative history states that: “[p]roposed
18 U.S.C. 50387(c) provides the maximum periods for official
detention of a juvenile found to be a juvenile delinquent.”
S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 155, reprinted in 1984
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3338. The 1984 amendment
to section 5037(c) (1) (B) differed slightly from the current
version of the statute. A 1986 amendment, which took effect
on November 1, 1987, deleted the words “by section 3581 (b)”
following the phrase ‘maximum term of imprisonment that
would be authorized.” See Pub. L. No. 99-646, § 21 (a) (2)
(1986) (cited in 18 U.S.C.A. § 5037 historical and statutory
notes (West Supp. 1990)). Section 3581(b), also enacted as
part of the CCCA, sets forth the maximum authorized terms
of imprisonment for nine classes of federal felonies and mis-
demeanors. 18 U.S.C. §3581(b) (1988). The import of the
1986 amendment is that Congress reconsidered and rejected
establishing these statutory maximum sentences as the maxi-
mum terms of imprisonment juvenile delinquents could re-
ceive. The language of the 1984 amendment also suggests
that if Congress wished to subject juveniles to the maximum
sentences authorized by particular statutes, it knew how to
say so.
8a
venile offenders to exceed the real time that would
be served by adults convicted of similar crimes.
The CCCA sought to establish a comprehensive and
consistent system of sentencing that would promote
fairness by eliminating unwarranted sentence dis-
parity. S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 50-52,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
3133-35; see also U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, § 3 The Basic
Approach (policy statement) (Congress’ goals in sen-
tencing reform were to achieve honesty, uniformity,
and proportionality). Additionally, the legislation
sought to promote certainty in sentencing by abolish-
ing the parole system in federal law. See Pub. L.
No. 98-473, Title II, § 218(a) (5), 98 Stat. 2027 (Oct.
12, 1984); S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 56-
58, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 3239-41.
The CCCA’s legislative history notes that the
amended section 5037(c) “parallels the 1974 Act pro-
vision set forth in current law for juveniles under 18
at the time of the proceeding.”’ S. Rep. No. 225, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 155, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 3338. Juveniles sentenced un-
der the forerunner of current section 5037(c) (1) (B)
were immediately eligible for parole. 18 U.S.C. § 5041
(1982) (repealed effective Nov. 1, 1987). The CCCA
eliminated the possibility of parole for juveniles,
meaning that each sentence imposed under section
5037(c)(1)(B) for offenses committed after Novem-
ber 1, 1987 represents the period of time the sen-
tenced juvenile actually will be incarcerated. See S.
Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 156, reprinted in
1984 U.S. Code Cone. & Admin. News 3339 (‘It is
expected that the time sect at the disposition hearing
for a juvenile placed in the custody of the Attorney
9a
General pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 5037(b) will represent
the real time to be spent by the juvenile in a manner
similar to that for adult offenders under the bill.’’).
Under the law in existence prior to the CCCA,
both juveniles and adults were subject to the statu-
tory maximum sentence provided in the statute de-
fining the offense. Both juveniles and adults were
also eligible for parole; juveniles immediately on be-
ing sentenced, and adults after having served one-
third of their sentences. See 18 U.S.C. $$ 5041, 4205
(1982) (repealed effective Nov. 1, 1987). After No-
vember 1, 1987, the effective date of the CCCA’s sen-
tencing reforms, adults were subject to the maximum
sentences provided in the sentencing guidelines and
were no longer eligible for parole. Juveniles were
also no longer eligible for parole. The drafters of
amended section 5037(c)(1)(B) intended its opera-
tion to parallel prior law. Accordingly, after Novem-
ber 1, 1987, juveniles sentenced under the amended
statute should be subject to maximum, real time sen-
tences no greater than those which adult offenders
could receive under the sentencing guidelines.
Allowing a juvenile sentenced under section 5037
(c)(1)(B) to remain subject to the pre-guideline
statutory maximum penalty provided for the offense
committed would produce juvenile sentences incon-
sistent with those received by adult offenders and
relatively harsher than those to which juveniles were
subject before November 1, 1987. It seems unlikely
that Congress would seek to reduce sentence dis-
parity and to increase certainty by creating a system
under which juvenile offenders would automatically
become subject to the real time equivalent of pre-
guidelines statutory maximum sentences while simi-
larly situated adults would ordinarily be subject only
10a
to the maximum guideline sentence for the same of-
fense.
Once the sentencing guidelines took effect, Congress
intended the statutory maximum sentences prescribed
in 18 U.S.C. § 3581(b), see supra note 1, to repre
sent “the greatest period the Congress should allow
a judge to impose for an offense committed under the
most egregious of circumstances.” S. Rep. No. 225,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 114, reprinted in 1984 US.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 3297. Similarly, the
guidelines were to reserve the upper range of the
maximum sentence “for offenders who repeatedly
commit offenses or those who commit an offense un-
der particularly egregious circumstances.” Jd. The
CCCA’s legislative history notes that these statutory
maximum penalties were “no more intended to indi-
cate the actual sentence a judge is expected to impose
in each case than are the analogous provisions of
current Federal statutes that also customarily set
forth only the maximum limit on the judge’s discre-
tion.” Id.
The Senate Judiciary Committee was also critical
of existing statutory maximum penalties, suggesting
that they could contribute to disparity and unfairness
in sentencing. See id. at 39, reprinted in 1984 US.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 3222 (‘These maximums
are usually prescribed with little regard for the rela-
tive seriousness of the offense as compared to similar
offenses.’’) ; id. at 87, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 3270 (“Current maximum
penalties are set at very uneven levels, and some are
so inconsistent with the relative seriousness of the of-
fense that the Sentencing Commission will probably
find it necessary to reccemmend s*me amendments be-
fore sentencing guidelines are in place.’’).
lla
These experts indicate that Congress intended stat-
utory maximum penalties after the effective date of
the sentencing guidelines to serve only as an upper
limit on judicial discretion and to be applied to adults
only in relatively rare and egregious circumstances.
The guidelines’ structure reflects this intent. For ex-
ample, an adult convicted of involuntary man-
slaughter could be sentenced under the guidelines to
the statutory maximum of three years imprisonment
only if he had a criminal history category of V, rep-
Te the equivalent of four prior felony convie-
ions.
Given the CCCA’s goals of promoting consistency,
uniformity, and fairness in sentencing and the rela-
tive disfavor in which its drafters held existing stat-
utory maximum penalties, the interpretation of sec-
tion 5037(c)(1)(B) which the government urges
seems clearly wrong. If we were to adopt this con-
struction, any juvenile adjudicated a delinquent for
committing involuntary manslaughter could be sen-
tenced to three years imprisonment with no possi-
bility of parole. An adult convicted of the same of-
fense, however, could receive the same sentence only
if he had an extensive criminal record or if his com-
mission of the offense included aggravating factors
sufficient to increase his base offense level by fi'e
levels under the sentencing guidelines. Sce U.S.S.G.
ch.5, pt. A—Sentencing Table. Such disparate re-
sults seem particularly unreasonable in light of the
guidelines’ admonition that age is not ordinarily a
factor relevant to decisions among sentencing options
See id. § 5H1.1 (policy statement). |
Rules of statutory construction also counsel avzinst
adopting an interpretation of section 5037(c) (1) (RB°
that would subject juveniles to the maximum statu-
tory penalty for the offense committed. Criminal
12a
statutes must be strictly construed. See Dowling v.
United States, 473 U.S. 207, 213 (1955).” The rule
of lenity states that a court cannot interpret a fed-
eral criminal statute “so as to increase the penalty
that it places on an individual when such an inter-
pretation can be based on ro more than a guess as
to what Congress intended.” Ladner v. United States,
958 U.S. 169, 178 (1958). This principle of con-
struction applies to sentencing provisions as well as
to substantive criminal statutes. Bifulco v. United
States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980) ; Rowe v. Lockhart,
736 F.2d 457, 461 (Sth Cir. 1984). The rule of lenity
favors the statutory construction that yields the
shorter sentence.
Section 5037(c) (1) (B)’s language and legislative
history, the policies underlying federal sentencing re-
form, the consequences of the possible interpretations,
and the rule of lenity require us to adopt the con-
struction of the statute tht subjects juveniles sen-
tenced under it to the lesser penalty; in this case,
the construction urged by R.L.C. We hold that the
phrase “maximum term of imprisonment that would
be authorized if the juvenile had been tried and con-
2 Although an adjudication of juvenile delinquency under
18 U.S.C. § 5031 is a determination of status rather than a
criminal conviction, United States v. Frasquillo-Zomosa, 626
F.2d 99, 101 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 987 (1980), the
Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act entitles a juvenile to all
rights that would be accorded an adult in a criminal prosecu-
tion except that right to a grand jury indictment. S. Rep. No.
93-1011, 938d Cong., 2d Sess. 38, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 5321. Because statutes imposing penal-
ties on juvenile delinquents involve deprivations of liberty
_ gimilar to those attendant on criminal conviction, they should
be construed no less strictly than statutes imposing criminal
sanctions on adults.
l3a
victed as an adult” prohibits a court from sentencing
a juvenile to a term of imprisonment greater than
the juvenile could have received had he been sen-
tenced as an adult under the sentencing guidelines.’
This holding requires a particularized, subjective de-
termination in each case of the upper limit of the
appropriate guideline range. In cases involving ag-
gravating circumstances not contemplated by the
guidelines, a court sentencing a juvenile delinquent
could make a finding that the prescribed range did
3Our holding conflicts with that of the Ninth Circuit in
United. States v. Marco L., 868 F.2d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 369 (1989). We find that decision’s
reasoning unpersuasive for the reasons discussed above, and
believe that its holding will lead to inequitable results incon-
sistent with the goals of federal sentencing reform.
The Ninth Circuit found persuasive language in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3559, which deals with the classification of federal offenses
under the sentencing guidelines. Subsection (a) provides
that offenses which do not contain a letter classification can be
classified based upon the length of imprisonment authorized
by the statute defining the offense. The Marco court points
to section 3559(b), which is entitled “Effect of Classification,”
and states that “‘[a]n offense classified under subsection (a)
carries all the incidents assigned to the applicable letter desig-
nation, except that the maximum term of imprisonment is the
term authorized by the statute describing the offense.” The
Marco court reasoned that this language shows that “Con-
gress has defined the ‘maximum term of imprisonment’ to
be that term prescribed by the statute defining the offense.”
Id. at 1124. The sentence in section 3559(b), however, re-
fers only to language in section 3559(a), and seeks to estab-
lish what no one contests: that no matter what letter classi-
fication an offense is given, the maximum term of imprison-
ment a judge can impose is the term listed in the statute
defining the offense. Section 3559(b) was not meant to func-
tion as an overaching definition of “maximum term of im-
prisonment” for the entire federal criminal code.
l4a
not adequately reflect the severity of the offense, and
could deviate from that range accordingly.
CONCLUSION
We vacate the sentence imposed by the district
court and remand this case for resentencing consist-
ent with this opinion.
A true copy.
Attest:
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
l5a
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Crim. 4-89-175
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF
Vv.
R. L. C., a JUVENILE, DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Jerome G. Arnold, United States Attorney, and
Jeanne J. Graham, Assistant U.S. Attorney, 234 U.S.
Courthouse, Minneapolis, MN 55401, for plaintiff.
Katherian D. Roe, 174 U.S. Courthouse, Minne-
apolis, MN 55401, for defendant.
This matter is before the Court on a certification
filed by the government pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5032
charging defendant, a juvenile within the meaning of
18 U.S.C. § 5031, and an Indian, with involuntary
manslaughter pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§1112 and
1153, such violation constituting “juvenile delin-
quency” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5031.
Based on all the evidence presented at trial, and on
the factual stipulations of counsel, the Court finds
that the government has proven beyond a reasonable
doubt that:
1. defendant was the driver of the vehicle which
in the early morning hours of November 5, 1989 col-
l6a
lided with a vehicle in which LeTesha Lynn Mountain
was a passenger;
2. LeTesha Lynn Mountain jlied as a result of
injuries sustained as a result of (at collision;
3. defendant was driving the motor vehicle in-
volved in the collision without the authorization of
the vehicle’s owner;
4. at the time of the collision defendant was in-
toxicated ;
5. at the time of the collision defendant was oper-
ating the motor vehicle in a reckless and unsafe
manner in excess of the applicable speed limit;
6. such conduct constituted involuntary man-
slaughter within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a) ;
7. at the time of the incident, defendant was an
Indian, residing on and within the Red Lake Indian
Reservation within Indian country in the State and
District of Minnesota;
8. at the time of the incident defendant was a
juvenile within the meaning of 18 U.S.C, § 5031.
Pursuant to the foregoing findings, IT IS
HEREBY ADJUDGED that defendant is delinquent
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 5031. -Defendant
shall remain in the custody of his uncle, Donald Cook,
until the Court holds a dispositional hearing pursu-
ant to 18 U.S.C. § 5037.
/s/ Harry H. MacLaughlin
JUDGE HARRY H. MACLAUGHLIN
United States District Court
DATED: December 26, 1989
17a
APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 90-504SMN z
UNITED STATES, APPELLEE
vs.
R. L. C., JUVENILE MALE, APPELLANT
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
REHEARING AND SUGGESTION FOR
REHEARING EN BANC
Appellee’s suggestion for rehearing en banc has
been considered by the court and is denied by reason
of the lack of a majority of the active judges voting
to rehear the case en banc. Judges Bowman, Woll-
man, Magill and Beam would have granted the peti-
tion.
Petition for rehearing by the panel is also denied.
December 18, 1990
ORDER ENTERED AT THE DIRECTION OF THE COURT
/s/ Robert D. St. Vrain
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
WT ov. &. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFrice, 1991 282061 20430
18a
aD 245 (Rev 7190) Judgment in a Commune Case 2 APPENDIX D p
Bnited States District Court
District of __ Minnesota
A CRIMINAL CASE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA =—s- REVISED JUDGMENT IN ——
V. —
Case Number: Cr. 4-89-175
Robert Lee Cook
Katherian Roe al
Defendant's Atorney
(Name of Defendant)
THE DEFENDANT:
eaded guilty to count(s) : ,
_ heel guilty on courit(s) _l_of 1_count information
plea of not guilty.
he following offenses
i nt(s), which involve tne followinc O
Accordingly, the defendant is adjudged guilty of such cou (s)
Date O™ense Count
onciuces Number(s)
Title & Section Nature of Offense . | cs ci cee Nun
T@ lll2(b) & 1153 Involuntary manslaughter on an Indian 11/5/78: —
reservation.
© The defendant has been found not guilty on count(s) —$<$—$— $$ $—— — —_——————
and is discharged as to such count(s)
(is)(are) dismssec OF the motion of tne Unitec 2 ales
©) Count(s), —$— $$ _—_
HAT: .
gry ing rly 3 € the Bureau of Prisons Of tne
one sttendent is hereby committed to the custocy of - Burea
United States for imprisonment for ea term of 18 months.
*}
’ ’ Foti dant's offense within
The Court finds that Debra Garrigan is a victim of ae age ee otade that tht
the meaning of the Victim and Witness Protection Act. the Court ace at eenetaunien.
financial resources of the Gefendant are inadequate to justity © .
A true copy in / sheets of
the original record in my custody.
Certified /- J)? 19 SI
Francis E. Dosal, Clerk
By: yr. CAR xy
Deputy Clerk
E that aditions of probation
in addition to any conditions of probation imposed above, IT IS ORDERED that the cone! p
set out on the reverse of this judgment are imposed.
AD 245 (Reverse ‘¢ ts f r
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION
While the defendant 1s on probation pursuant lo thus judgment, the defendant:
1) snail not commit anotner federal. state or local owne.
2) shall not ieave the judicial district wathout the permission of the Court oF probation ofice!:
3) shall repon oi cisncer as axecied by te COUT of probation officer and shall suDMmM a nviul and complete wrmen repor watun ine WS ive
days of each monn.
4) shall answer truthtully atl inquires Dy ine probation officer and toliow the instructions of the probation ofticer.
5) snail support his or her dependents anc meet otner farmuly
7) snail natty the probation officer within seventy-two hours of any change in residence or employer
aoa ce use ot alcoho) and shal Nol PUXChase, POSSESS. uBe. dstnbule, OF a@mueusier any narcolic OF xner COnWaHed SUDSIANS, Ot
sry paraphemalia related to such sudstances, except as prescribed Dy 8 physician:
9) ay not wequent places where coniolied substances are legally sokd, used, distributed, o* admuensieiee
10) eral ot requ Pi ary persons engaged merminal actly, and shall ot associate with any person corwiteg ot elony ves Gramied ermS8"
to do so by Ine probation officer:
any time at home ar elsewhere and shall perm confiscation of any contraband observed in plain wew
” 42) Oy i oy ine probation officer wanun seventy-two hours of Being arrested or questioned by a law eniorcement Seat
sore an iniormet of a special agent of a law enforcement agency without the permission of We Coun
1S) nan ee ine pedoaon fice. sal notty Hor partes of rks tat may be occasioned Oy oelendas rue SSO Bes
as decid by the proDaton otic probauon ofce’ 0 make Such notifications ang 1o confirm the detendan’s comeuance win wen moulin
requirement
15) shalt pay any fine or obligation imposed by this judgment.
16) shall not possess 4 firearm of destructive device.
, for count(s)
(CD IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant shall pay a special assessment o! $
_which shall be due © immediately D as follows:
attorney for this district within 30 days of any
{IT IS FURTHER ORDERED thai the defendant shall notity the Unitec States
s. and special assessments imposed by this
change of name, residence, OF mailing address until all fines, restitution, Cost
judgment are fully paid.
(9 The court orders commiutmen: to the custody of the Attorney Genera! anc recommencs
legate ae ek ae, cane gn greats nore Center in Chamberlain, South
Dak for service of tne ance of the sen :
Detendant’s Soc. Sec. No.: —__474=84=955] tence
Defendant's Date of Birth
~ 8/33/72 _ January 25, 199)
Date of Imposition of Sentence
Defendant's Mailing Accress
In Custody LU ~~ Henn /—
Signature of Judicial Officer
Detencants Residence Accres Judge Harry EH. MacLaughiis
In Custody Name & Title of Jucicial Officer
ee . 7 —EE —E } as, 197 /
. Date
RETURN
Ihave executes In ner .
Detencan: celiverec on 7 — t ————— omnia _ at
— on — EE ll thn 8 COPIED CODY of this pusg ment
United States Marsna!
By —
Deputy Marsa!
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.