Amicus Curiae Brief — INS v. National Center for Immigrants' Rights, Inc.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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BAe OP AUTTROIEEED occ cc ccc cccncccccccs iii
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ...........0200:: ]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................... 2
EE Sb 6bGSGUdED Dehn Sent becbsdecendas 3
I. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IS PART OF
THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, AND
WHERE POSSIBLE, STATUTES MUST BE
CONSTRUED CONSISTENTLY WITH IT ....... 3
A. International Agreements Constitute and
Contribute to Customary International
PT TTT CTT eee eer TTC rTeTTTe 4
B. Where Possible, Statutes Must be
Construed Consistently With Customary
| 6
Il. THE RIGHT TO WORK IS A HUMAN RIGHTS
NORM OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 6
A. What the Right to Work Means in This
TTT Tre Cree TET CT TEEPE TTTTe 7
B. The Right to Work is Protected Through
the United Nations Charter and Embodied
in Numerous International Agreements ...... 8
C. The Right to Work in Not Merely an
Aspirational Principle, But a Human
Rights Norm Capable of Immediate
ReaBantios ...ccccccccccscscccesccsses 12
D. The Right to Work is Not Foreign to
American Law, But is Closely Related to
the Constitutional Principle of Liberty to
Choose an Occupation .......-...0000e- 13
Ill. THE IMMIGRATION STATUTES MUST BE
CONSTRUED TO PROHIBIT ALIEN BOND "NO-
WORK" CONDITIONS WHERE THOSE
CONDITIONS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE
RIGHT TO WORK ....... cece cccecees 14
CONCLIUIBION .ncccccccccccssccccsesessssees 17
TABLE OF Al “HORITIES
CASES
Amenican Federation of Labor v. American Sash &
Door Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949) ...... cece
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) ....
Butcher's Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 US.
a
Coriolan v. I.N.S., 559 F.2d 993 (Sth
EE EES IPT TT TT TTT
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
Nn cweccncecce
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) ..
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963)
Long Grove Country Club Estates v. Village of Long
Grove, 693 F. Supp. 640 (N.D. Ill. 1988) ......
MacLeod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416 (1913) ...
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963) ..............
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) ........
Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2
DGGE hreccsccccccecsccces
Page(s)
Page(s)
Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) ............ 4
Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson,
654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981) ................. 16
Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801) ......... 6
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003
SEY 900k bn 4k0-ucabe aeeelibsGdescucss 3, 6
- The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815) .......... 3
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) ..... 3, 4, 5,9
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1989) ........ 13
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) ............. 8, 13
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (S Wheat.) 153 (1820) ... 4
Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982) ..........4.. 6
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) ........... 14
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) ...........20000e 4
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on
Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador),
opened for signature Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69,
reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 161 (1989) ............. 11
v
Page(s)
African [Banjul] Charter on Human and People’s
Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, entered into
force Oct. 21, 1986, O.A.U. Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5 (1981), reprinted in
BD Blas SCE cece scoveccceccccccces 11
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man, signed May 2, 1948, O.A.S. Off.
Rec. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 23/Doc. 21/Rev. 6 (English
1979), reprinted in 43 Am. J. Int'l. L. Supp. 133
(| PPPPPPTTTTITITTTT LITT 2, 10
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women,
adopted Dec. 18, 1979, entered into force
Sept. 3, 1981, G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/36
(1980), reprinted in 19 1.L.M. 33 (1980) ....... 10
European Social Charter, opened for signature Oct. 18,
1961, entered into force Feb. 26, 1965,
529 U.N.T.S. 89, Europ. T.S. No. 35 ....... 2, 11
International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, entered
into force Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S.3 ...... 9, 12
International Convention on the ion of All
Forms of Racial Di
adopted Dec. 21, 1965, force Jan. 4,
OGD, GOD UNG. TOPO teas ot cd ccc ccccse i)
Page(s)
Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the O.AS.
(Protocol of Buenos Aires), opened for signature
Feb. 27, 1967, entered into force Feb. 27, 1970,
21 U.S.T. 607, T.LAS. No. 6847, O.AS.T.S.
err Sr ore Peet Tee 10
Se TE. ccccnececececoucceses 7, 8,9
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
adopted Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(III), 3 U.N.
GAOR (Resolutions Part 1) at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948), reprinied in 43 Am. J. Int'l. L. Supp. 127
TE. n60rend dtetennieceesé cece 2, 4, 7, 8,9
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
concluded May 23, 1969, entered into force Jan. 27,
§ J iks | PRPYPTTITITT TTT Te 10
STATUTES
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.§ 1252 ..... 2
Immigration Reform and Control Act ...........55.: 2
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty:
A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny,
100 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987) .............- 3
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES ............ 3, 5, 6, 8
Schliter, The Domestic Status of the Human Rights
Clauses of the United Nations Charter, 61
CALIF. L. REV. 110 (1973) .........00ueeeeee
Wright, National Courts and Human Rights -- The
Fujii Case, 45 AM. J. INT'L. L. 62 (1951)
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1990
No. 90-1090
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, ef ail.,
Petitioners,
Vv.
NATIONAL CENTER FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS, et al.,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
BRIEF OF THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW GROUP AS AMICUS CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
The International Human Rights Law Group ("IHRLG") is
a non-profit organization that seeks to promote the observance
of international human rights. Founded in 1978, and incor-
porated in the District of Columbia, the IHRLG provides legal
assistance and information in the field of international human
rights law and has consultative status with the Economic and
Social Council of the United Nations. In lawsuits raising
questions of international human rights, the IHRLG provides
legal assistance largely through attorneys working on a pro bono
basis.
2
In this brief, the IHRLG addresses the issue of whether the
right to be free of governmental prohibition against employment
— a right violated by the “no-work" condition imposed by the
INS regulations at issue — is a principle of customary inter-
nationa! law incorporated into the federal law of the United
States.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The right to work is a recognized norm of customary
international law. It is embodied in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man, the European Social Chanter, and several other
international agreements, conventions, and declarations. Over
150 nations have become parties to instruments that recognize
the right to work.
Customary international law is part of the law of the United
States. The Court is obligated to adjudicate questions of
international law when they are duly presented to it.
The INS relies upon the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) and the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)
for the authority underlying its regulation imposing "no-work"
conditions on alien appearance and delivery bonds. The INA
and the IRCA, however, do not explicitly authorize :0-work
conditions. In keeping with traditional tenets of statutory
construction, the Court must make every effort to interpret the
INA and the IRCA so as not to conflict with norms of inter-
national law. The INS no-work condition violates the inter-
nationally recognized right to work by preventing detained
aliens from seeking employment after they have been released
on bond, leaving them in the dilemma of living without a job or
returning to detention.
Therefore, to construe the statutes consistently with inter-
national law, the Court must affirm the court of appeals’
3
decision that the statutes do not authorize the Attorney General
to impose no-work conditions on alien appearance and delivery
bonds.
ARGUMENT
I. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IS PART OF THE
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, AND, WHERE POS-
SIBLE, STATUTES MUST BE CONSTRUED CONSIS-
TENTLY WITH IT.
International law is part of the law of the United States.
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).' It has the
Status of federal common law.’ Customary international law, or
the "law of nations," was historically part of the law of England
and thus part of the law of the American colonies.’ Today,
with United States independence, "[c]ustomary international law,
like other federal law, is part of the ‘law... of the United
States.”
' "International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their deter-
mination.” Jd. at 700. See also The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423
(1815) (“the Court is bound by the law of nations which is a part of the law
of the land”).
* Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 810-11 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Bork, J., concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). But see Henkin,
The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese
Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 870-78 (1987) (arguing
that customary international law is superior to federal common law in that
it is not superseded by subsequent legislation).
* RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
na STATES (hereinafter "RESTATEMENT*), Chapter Two Introductory
ote, p. 40.
* RESTATEMENT § 111 and Comment e.
4
The Court has used principles of conventional and cus-
tomary international law to inform American legal standards in
a variety of situations. In striking down California’s Alien Land
Law, as applied, on constitutional grounds in Oyama v. Califor-
nia, 332 U.S. 633 (1948), four Justices joined opinions which
cited the statute’s inconsistency with the United Nations Charter
as among the reasons for its invalidation. Justice Murphy noted
that the law’s "inconsistency with [Article 55 of] the Charter,
which has been duly ratified and adopted by the United States,
is but one more reason why the statute must be condemned.”
Similarly, the Court has used the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights to give content to the due process clause, Zemel
v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 n.13 (1965) (upholding restrictions on
travel to Cuba); to demonstrate the "drastic consequences of
statelessness," Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 161
n.16 (1963) (holding unconstitutional statutes stripping citizen-
ship of Americans remaining outside the country during time of
war); and to support the upholding of a state "right-to-work"
amendment, American Federation of Labor v. American Sash &
Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 549 n.5 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring) (citing principle that "[nJo one may be compelled to
belong to an association").
A. International Agreements Constitute And Contribute
to Customary International Law.
Customary international law is ascertained from the "general
usage and practice of nations.” United States v. Smith, 18 U.S.
(5 Wheat.) 153, 160 (1820). One source of that usage and
practice is nations’ own stated commitments, as embodied in
international accords. International agreements constitute the
* Id. at 673 (Murphy, J. concurring). The statute forbade aliens ineligible
for citizenship from acquiring, owning, occupying, leasing or transferring
agricultural land.
* See also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700 (international law found
in “the customs and usages of civilized nations”).
5
"practice of states" and contribute to customary international
law.’ For example, a multilateral agreement may become part
of customary international jaw where it "is designed for ad-
herence by states generally, is widely accepted, and is not
rejected by a significant number of important states."*
As ‘shown in Section II of this brief, the right to work is
embodied in at least nine international accords. Each of these
instruments was designed for adherence by states generally (or
for states generally within a specific geographic region); each
has been widely accepted; and, of the many reservations and
exceptions registered by parties to these agreements, none has
dealt with the right to work.
It is the role of courts to “ascertain{] and administer[]}"
international law "as often as questions of right depending upon
it are duly presented for their determination." The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. Therefore, it lies within the Court's
duty to determine those relevant principles that have achieved
sufficient consensus among nations to be part of. customary
international law. The Paquete Habana illustrates the process.
Searching legal history and the writings of jurists and commen-
tators, the Court determined that a principle of common usage
and practice among nations — the neutrality of coastal fishing
vessels during war — had achieved the status of international
law. More recently, the Second Circuit conducted a similar
review in determining that the international consensus against
the practice of torture has developed to the point that freedom
from torture is now a right, the violation of which may be
” RESTATEMENT § 102, Comment i.
* Id.
6
remedied under the Alien Tort Statute. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).’
B. Where Possible, Statutes Must be Construed Consis-
tently With Customary International Law.
It is a basic principle of statutory construction that "an act
of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations, if any other possible construction remains." Murray v.
The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)
(Marshall, C.J.).° Recently the Court has reaffirmed the
continuing validity of the rule in The Charming Betsy as a strong
presumption against construing statutes in a way that would
violate principles of international law. Weinberger v. Rossi, 456
U.S. 25 (1982) (stating it would require an "affirmative expres-
sion of congressional intent to abrogate the United States’
international obligations”).
ll. THE RIGHT TO WORK IS A HUMAN RIGHTS NORM
OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW.
The right to work is recognized as a basic human right in
international law. It is embodied in numerous international
agreements and declarations, representing a consensus among
* The court in Filartiga found that the international prohibition against
torture sustained a cause of action under the Alien Tort Statute for a
foreign national living in the United States against an alleged tortfeasor. See
also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Edwards, J., concurring) (norms of international law develop over time),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
See also Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 43 (1801) (“the laws
of the United Siates ought not, if it be avoidable, so to be construed as to
infract the common principles and usages of nations . . ..”); accord, MacLeod
v. United States, 229 U.S. 416, 434 (1913). This rule of construction is
embodied in RESTATEMENT § 114: “Where fairly possible, a United States
Statute is to be construed so as not to conflict with international law or with
an international agreement of the United States."
7
the world’s nations. The internationally recognized "right to
work" necessarily includes, at a minimum, the right of freedom
to work — that is, the right to be free to seek and accept
employment.
A. What the Right to Work Means in This Case
The right to work at issue in this case is not the right to a
job, but rather the right to be free to seek and accept a job. It
includes the right not to be prohibited by the government from
obtaining employment. The INS regulation would violate that
right by prohibiting aliens released on bond from working,
absent special authorization. Article 23(1) of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights states: "Everyone has the right to
work, to free choice of employment .. .."" The United States,
which took a leading role in the promulgation of the human
rights provisions under the United Nations Charter, explained
its understanding of the right to work in a 1948 address to the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights:
In the opinion of the United States delegation, the right to
work, in this Declaration, meant the right of the individual
to benefit from conditions under which those who were able
and willing to work should have the possibility of doing
useful work . . .. The realization of those objectives meant
more to individuals in the United States than any guarantee
of full employment.”
" Adopted Dec. 10, 1948, G.A Res. 217A(II]), 3 U.N. GAOR
(Resolutions Part 1) at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), reprinted in 43 Am. J.
INT'L. L. Supp. 127 (1949). Forty-eight nations Signed the Declaration.
? Remarks of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, addressing the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights, Commission on Human Rights, 3rd Session,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR 64, p. 6.
8
The freedom to work represents a basic economic right. For
the individual, it serves as the foundation for the exercise of
other political and civil liberties in a modern society.”
B. The Right to Work is Protected Through the United
Nations Charter and Embodied in Numerous Inter-
national Agreements.
Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations, to
which the United States is a party, state that "Members pledge
themselves to take joint and separate action... for the
achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55," and that
among these are "universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms."“ The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which the United States and 47
other nations joined in proclaiming in 1948, gives definition to
Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter by identifying more precisely
what the members of the United Nations consider those "human
rights and fundamental freedoms" to be.” The Universal
® The right of freedom to work is a right “of the very essence... of —
personal freedom and opportunity.” Truar v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
Justice Bradley referred to an analogous right as the “liberty of pursuit -- the
right to follow any of the ordinary callings of life,” a right he deemed
“inalienable.” Butcher's Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 762,
764 (1884) (Bradley, J., concurring).
“ Although the commitment embodied in Article 55 of the Charter is
phrased in the nature of a pledge, it has been pointed out that “the
obligatory nature of the human rights clauses is today outside the realm of
serious controversy.” Schidter, The Domestic Status of the Human Rights
Clauses of the United Nations Charter, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 110, 126 (1973).
* The Universal Declaration is now considered by many as holding the
authority of customary international law. "U.N. declarations are significant
because they specify with great precision the obligations of member nations
under the Charter.” Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1980).
See also RESTATEMENT § 103, Comment e (stating that a declaration of an
international organization provides evidence of what states voting for it
regard the law to be; such resolutions "if not contradicted and if adopted by
9
Declaration identifies the "right to work, to free choice of
employment" as among those rights and freeJonss.
The mandates of Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter were
further clarified in 1966 with the adoption of the Jnternational
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights." Article Six
of the Covenant states that the parties "recognize the right to
work, which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to
gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts," and
that the parties "will take the appropriate steps to safeguard this
right." As a member of the United Nations and a signatory to
the Covenant, the United States should take the appropriate
steps to safeguard the right to work. The Court, as a co-equal
branch of government, has as great an obligation to "take the
a steps" as does either the executive or the legislative
ranch.”
Further evidence of the international consensus on the right
to work as a fundamental norm of international law is found in
Several other agreements and declarations that have been
entered into since the signing of the United Nations Charter.
The /nternational Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, Article 5(e)(i), states that “[{p]arties
undertake to guarantee the right of everyone . . . to equality of
consensus Or virtual unanimity, are given substantial weight” as evidence of
international law). The Universal Declaranon of Human Rights was adopted
by a 48-0 vote in the General Assembly, with eight members abstaining.
* Adopted Dec. 16, 1966, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T-S. 3.
93 nations have adopted the Covenant. The United States is a Signatory,
but has not yet ratified the Covenant.
" See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (stating that courts
must ascertain and administer international law). See also SchiQter, supra
note 14, at 134: “Nothing in the nature of the international human rights
obligations requires their execution exclusively by political organs .... On
the contrary, the effective protection of human rights may be regarded as
one of the traditional prerogatives of the national judiciary.”
10
law in the enjoyment of . . . the right to work, to free choice of
employment." Likewise, the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Article 11(a),
provides that "States Parties shall take all appropriate measures
to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of
employment in order to ensure, on the basis of equality of men
and women .. . the right to work as an inalienable right of all
human beings."” The United States has signed, although not
ratified, these two conventions.”
Regional international pacts also evince the universal
recognition of the right to work. The American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man, Article 14, declares that “[e}very
person has the right to work."” Similarly, the Protocol of
Amendment to the Charter of the O.A.S. (Protocol of Buenos
Aires), to which the United States is a party, states in Article 43
* Adopted Dec. 21, 1965, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S.
195. To date, 129 nations have become parties.
Adopted Dec. 18, 1979, entered into force Sept. 3, 1981, G.A. Res.
34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/36 (1980),
reprinted in 19 1.L.M. 33 (1980). To date, 95 nations have become parties.
* Under the terms of the widely-accepted Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (to which, however, the United States is not a signatory),
these facts alone would oblige the United States to recognize the right to
work pending its possible ratification of the Conventions. The Vienna
Convention provides that, after a state signs a treaty, but before it ratifies
the treaty (or makes Clear its intention not to do so), the "State is objiged
to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of [the]
treaty.” Article 18, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, concluded
May 23, 1969, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
*' Signed May 2, 1948, O.AS. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.L/V/II. 23/Doc. 21/Rev.
6 (English 1979), reprinted in 43 Am. J. INTL L. Supp. 133 (1949). 21
nations, including the United States, joined in adopting the Declaranon.
1]
that "[wjork is a right and a social duty." The Additional
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San
Salvador), Article 6(1), declares that "[e]veryone has the right to
work, which includes the Opportunity to secure the means for
living a dignified and decent existence by performing a freely
elected or accepted lawful activity."” Likewise, the European
Social Charter, Part Il, Article 1(2), states: "With a view to
ensuring the effective exercise of the right to work, the Contrac-
ting Parties undertake . . . to protect effectively the right of the
worker to earn his living in an occupation \freely entered
upon.’ Similar expression of the right is found in the African
[Banjul] Charter on Human and People’s Rights, Article 15,
which states: "Every individual shall have the right to work
under equitable and satisfactory conditions . . ."”
Through these instruments, protecting the right to work has
become the stated commitment of more than 150 nations. Such
protection is now part of the "general usage and practice of
nations,” from which customary international law is ascertained.
As an element of customary international law, it has become
part of the law of the United States. Recognition of the right
to work in this case requires the Court to interpret the statutes
at issue consistently with the international consensus recognizing
” Opened for signature Feb. 27, 1967, entered into force Feb. 27, 1970, 21
U.S.T. 607, T.LA.S. No. 6847, O.A.S.T.S. No. 1-A. To date, 31 nations have
become parties.
® Opened for signature Nov. 17, 1988, O.AS.T.S. No. 69, reprinted in 28
LL.M. 161 (1989). To date, 14 nations have become parties.
* Opened for signature Oct. 18, 1961, entered into force Feb. 26, 1965, 529
U.N.T.S. 89, Europ. T.S. No. 35. To date, 16 nations have become parties.
® Adopted June 27, 1981, entered into force Oct. 21, 1986, O.A.U. Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5, (1981) reprinted in 21 LL.M. $8 (1982). To date, 38,
nations have becor:: partes
12
the right to work and thereby to uphold the court of appeals’
decision.
Cc, The Right of Freedom to Work is Not Merely an
Aspirational Principle, But a Human Rights Norm
Capable of Lmmediate Realization.
Not all rights enumerated in international instruments are
intended to create immediately enforceable norms of inter-
national law. Some declared "rights" are aspirational in tone:
nations pledge to honor these rights to the best of their abilities,
or to foster conditions that will make the exercise of the rights
a practical reality. Examples of these rights are the right to an
adequate standard of living and the right to social security.”
Gradual implementation of these rights is the crux of the
international obligation undertaken by states party to the
relevant instruments. Accordingly, these rights may fall short of
being considered binding norms of customary international law.
By contrast, the right of freedom to work does not represent
a mere aspiration on the part of the world’s nations; it can be
achieved immediately. Protecting the right to work in this case
* See, for example, International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, supra note 8, Article 9 (right to social security), Article 11
(right to adequate standard of living).
” See Wright, National Courts and Human Rights -- The Fujii Case, 45
Am. J. INT'L. L. 62, 72 (1951) (Article 56 of the United Nations Charter
requires at a minimum that signatories abstain from action that would
13
D. The Right to Work is Not Foreign to American Law,
But is Closely Related to the Constitutional Principle
of Liberty to Choose an Occupation.
Although the right to work may be found in international
accords, the concept of the right freely to choose and accept
employment is also embedded in the constitutional fabric of
American law, as a liberty interest protected by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The Court declared early this
century that "the right to work for a living in the common
occupations of the community is of the very essence of the
personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the
[Fourteenth] Amendment to secure." Truax v. Raich, 239 US.
33, 41 (1915) (striking down Arizona statute requiring all
enterprises with more than five employees to hire 80 percent
non-aliens).” Similarly, in overturning a schoolteacher’s
conviction for teaching the German language in violation of
state law, the Court declared that "[w]ithout doubt, [the
Fourteenth Amendment] denotes... the right of the in-
dividual . . . to engage in any of the common occupations of
life." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).” Even
earlier, the Court recognized the deprivation of liberty that
violate human rights and fundamental freedoms.)
* Consequently, recognition of that right does not impose "the views of
other nations” on Americans. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868
n.4 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
® Indeed, by barring aliens from working at all, the INS no-work
condition is even more restrictive of an alien's right to seek employment
than the Arizona statute declared unconstitutional in Truax v. Raich.
” See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (quoting
Meyer v. Nebraska), Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 (1976)
(stating that civil service regulation which resulted in “ineligibility for
employment in a major sector of the economy” for noncitizens was “of
sufficient significance to be characterized as a deprivation of an interest in
liberty”).
14
occurs when a person is barred from access to his livelihood.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (overturning conviction
under discriminatory scheme for regulating laundries).
So, while United States law has never recognized a general
constitutional right to a particular job,” it has strongly sup-
ported the idea that denial of the right to work at all, or
restriction of that right to so narrow a sphere that it has no
practical meaning, is a serious infringement of an important
fundamental freedom. Thus, the United States has
demonstrated in its own constitutional law a "practice" of
protecting the right to work that contributes to the universal
practice supporting protection of that right in international law.
Viewed in this context, freedom to work, as embodied in
customary international law, is familiar to, and entirely com-
patible with, United States law. The nations of the world,
through multilateral international agreements, have recognized
and codified this freedom and established it as a standard of
international law.
III. THE IMMIGRATION STATUTES MUST BE
CONSTRUED TO PROHIBIT ALIEN BOND "NO-
WORK" CONDITIONS WHERE THOSE CON.
DITIONS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE
RIGHT TO WORK.
The INS “no-work" condition on alien appearance and
delivery bonds would deny the right to work to persons who are
awaiting adjudication of their residence status by barring them
frc n any form of employment. After release on bond, the alien
awaiting deportation hearings would face the stark dilemma of
trying to live during the interim without an income, or returning
to detention. The coercive nature of this choice perverts the
” Long Grove Country Club Estates v. Village of Long Grove, 693 F.
Supp. 640, 662 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
{
15
very purpose of a bond — which is premised on the idea that the
person released is legally entitled to remain in the country until
adjudicated otherwise — by tying the bond to the denial of a
basic freedom.
Neither the Immigration and Nationality Act nor the
Immigration Reform and Control Act conflicts on its face with
the right to work. The conflict arises only with the interpretation
given the Acts by the INS. The INS relies on these two statutes
to support its authority to impose "no-work" conditions on alien
bonds. Petitioner’s Brief at 13, 19. However, neither statute
offers such support. Of the two statutes, only the Immigration
and Nationality Act discusses the Attorney General's discretion
in issuing alien bonds. The Act does not affirmatively express
a Congressional intent to authorize the Attorney General to
deny a person’s right to seek employment. The relevant section
States only that a bond may contain "such conditions as the
Attorney General may prescribe.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). The
language of the Act certainly does not evince a clear statement
that Congress intended the Attorney General's authority to
supersede existing standards of international law. In the
absence of such manifest intent, therefore, the Court must
conclude that Congress intended the exercise of the Attorney
General's authority to be consistent with international law,
including the internationally recognized right to work. Accor-
dingly, under the principle established in The Charming Betsy,
the Court must construe the Act as not authorizing the Attorney
General to include "no-work" conditions in alien appearance
and delivery bords.
Nor can it be maintained that the INS "no-work" regulation
itself represents a controlling executive act that supersedes the
right to work as a statement of United States law. In a similar
situation, the Court has invoked the rule of The Charming Betsy
to overrule an executive decision by the National Labor
Relations Board where that decision was inconsistent with
international law. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros
16
de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963) (overruling NLRB decision
that it could regulate foreign flag ships). Likewise, in Rodriguez-
Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981), the
court referred to international law principles in holding that,
despite the Attorney General’s broad discretion in the area of
immigration, the INS could not hold a refugee in indefinite
detention. The court noted that "[i]t seems proper then to
consider international law principles for notions of fairness as to
[the] propriety of holding aliens in detention." Jd. at 1388.
Again, in Coriolan v. I.N.S., 559 F.2d 993 (Sth Cir. 1977), the
court ordered reconsideration of an INS deportation order,
noting that "[t]he sweep of [the Attorney General’s] discretion,
however, must now be measured in light of the United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees." Jd. at 996.
Similarly, in this case, the sweep of the Attorney General’s
discretion in issuing conditions on alien appearance and delivery
bonds must be measured in light of the international
agreements embodying the right to work. In that light, the no-
work condition cannot stand.
17
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the International Human Rights
Law Group respectfully urges the Court to affirm the decision
of the court of appeals.
Respectfully submitted,
STEVEN M. SCHNEEBAUM NICHOLAS W. FELS*
PATTON, BOGGS & BLOW MICHAEL J. CICERO
2550 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037 COVINGTON & BURLING
1201 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
JANELLE DILLER P.O. Box 7566
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN Washington, D.C. 20044
RIGHTS LAW GROUP (202) 662-6000
1601 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009 * Counsel of Record
July 12, 1991 Counsel for Amicus Curiae
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.