Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Allen Lee Davis v. Florida

Supreme Court brief1985

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1984

ALLEN LEE DAVIS,

Petitioner, RECEIVED

_ MAR 2.0 1985

STATE OF FLORIDA, OFFiGe OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT, U.S.

Respondent. _ ae

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

MICHAEL E. ALLEN

PUBLIC DEFENDER

SECOND JUDTCIAL CIRCUIT

STEVEN L. BOLOTIN

ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER

SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

POST OFFICE BOX 671

TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32302

(904) 488-2458

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

(Member of the Bar of This Court)

QUESTION PRESENTED

QUESTION

IN LIGHT OF THE EXTENSIVE AND HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL

PRE-TRIAL MEDIA COVERAGE OF THIS CASE, AND IN

LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF

JURORS ACKNOWLEDGED HAVING BEEN EXPOSED TO THE

PUBLICITY, THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT

COUNSEL TO QUESTION PROSPECTIVE JURORS INDIVI-

DUALLY AND OUTSIDE OF ONE ANOTHER'S PRESENCE, IN

ORDER TO DETERMINE WHAT IN PARTICULAR EACH JUROR

HAD HEARD OR READ ABOUT THE CASE, DEPRIVED PETI-

TIONER OF HIS RIGHT, SECURED BY THE SIXTH AND

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS, TO BE TRIED BY A FAIR AND

IMPARTIAL JURY.

=a?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CITATIONS

CITATION TO OPINION BELOW

JURISDICTION

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROV ISIONS INVOLVED

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

HOW THE FEDERAL QUESTION WAS RAISED AND DECIDED BELOW

REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT

ESTION PROSENTED

IN LIGHT OF THE EXTENSIVE AND HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL

PRE-TRIAL MEDIA COVERAGE OF THIS CASE, AND IN

LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF

JURORS ACKNOWLEDGED HAVING BEEN EXPOSED TO THE

PUBLICITY, THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT

COUNSEL TO QUESTION PROSPECTIVE JURORS INDIVI-

DUALLY AND OUTSIDE OF ONE ANOTHER'S PRESENCE, IN

ORDER TO DETERMINE WHAT IN PARTICULAR EACH JUROR

HAD HEARD OR READ ABOUT THE CASE, DEPRIVED PETI-

TIONER OF HIS RIGHT, SECURED BY THE SIXTH AND

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS, TO BE TRIED BY A FAIR AND

IMPARTIAL JURY.

CONCLUSION

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

iii

|

21

22

TABLE TA

CASES

DAVIS V. State, 461 So.2d 67 (Fla. 1984)

.

Gannett’ Co. V., DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 378, 99 S.Ct. 2898,

61, h.Bd.2d 608 (1979)

%

Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d

751 (1961)

Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 602,

96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976)(Brennan, J.

concurring)

Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16

L.Ed.2d 600 (1966)

Sineer v. State, 109 So.2d 7, 24 (Fla. 1959

State v. Goodson, 412 So.2d 1077 (La. 1982)

State v. Stiltner, 491 P.2d 1043 (Wash. 1971)

United States v. Blanton, 719 F.2d 815 (6th Cir. 1984)

United States v. Chagra, 699 F.2d 241 (Sth Cir. 1982)

United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190 (Sth Cir. 1978)

United States v. Gerald, 624 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1980)

United States v. Hawkins, 658 F.2d 279 (Sth Cir. 1981)

United States v. Ledee, 549 F.,2d 990 (Sth Cir. 1977)

United States v. Nell, 526 F.2d 1223 (Sth Cir. 1976)

United States v. Rucker, 557 F.2d 1046 (4th Cir. 1977)

- iii -

17,18,

20,21

16,17

21

15,19

15,16,

18,20,2

15,19,2

15,16,

18-20

19

15,19

15,18,1

CITATION TO OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida is Davis v. State,

461 So.2a 67 (Fla. 1984), and is set forth in Appendix A. The motion

for rehearing and the denial thereof are set forth in Appendix

B and C.

JURISDICTION

Review is sought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1257(3). The judgment ,

below was entered on October 4, 1984, and petitioner's timely motion

for -rehearing was denied (in light of revised opinion) on January

17, 1985 [Appendix C].

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case involves a death sentence imposed pursuant to Section

921.141, Florida Statutes (1973), and involves the Sixth and Four-

teenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and specific»lly

the affirmative constitutional obligation of the trial court to

minimize the effects of prejudicial pre-trial publicity. See e.g.

Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368,378, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 61

L.Fu.24 608 (1979); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct.

1507, 16 L.Fa.2a 600 (1966); Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,

427 U.S. 539, 602, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976)(Brennan,

J., concurring).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner was charged by indictment returned May 27, 1982,

with three counts of first-degree murder, in the deaths of Nancy

Weiler and her daughters Kristina and Katherine Weiler. The murders,

and petitioner's arrest, had been the subject of extensive publicity

in the Jacksonville and Duval County media, much of it highly inflam-

matory and prejudicial in nature. [The disclosures of inadmissible

information and the emotional reportage and commentary which impacted

upon petitioner's ability to secure a fair and impartial jury is

discussed at pages 4-12, infra). On June 9, 1982, petitioner (then

represented by the Public Defender's Office) filed a motion for

individual and sequestered voir dire, asking that the trial court

allow counsel to question prospective jurors individually and outside

of one another's hearing, in order to ascertain their knowledge

of the case based on pre-trial publicity and to discern their atti-

tudes toward canital punishment [Appendix D]. The motion stated

“a

inter alia, the following grounds:

A. In order to obtain a fair and impartial jury, it

is absolutely essential to inquire of each prospective

juror about his knowledge of the offense, the parties,

and the witnesses. It is necessary to inquire what

the venireman's knowledge is and to ask questions

to determine how that knowledge will affect his deli-

berations.

1. By explaining what he has heard about the charges

or what he knows about parties or witnesses, a venire-

man may very likely impart his knowledge to the other

prosective jurors unless there is individual, seques-

tered voir dire. Such knowledge, which is often based

on opinion, rumors, hearsay, media coverage, and other

sources of inadmissible evidence, can taint the entire

venire that is exposed to it and serve to deny the

Defendant a fair trial by an impartial jury (citations

omitted).

2. Whenever there is believed to be a significant

possibility that individual talesman will be ineligible

to serve because of exposure to potentially prejudicial

material, the examination of each juror with respect

to his exposure shall take place outside the presence

of other chosen and prospective jurors. Standard No.

3.4, American Bar Association, Standards Relating

to Fair Trial and Free Press; (citation omitted).

On August 1l, 1982, the defense filed a motion for chance of

venue {Appendix E]. The trial court, over defense objection, deferred

ruling on the motion until an attempt had been made to select a

jury in Duval County. The Public Defender's Office was subsequently

allowed to withdraw from representation of petitioner on the basis

of conflict of interest. Attorney Frank Tassone was appointed to

represent petitioner. On January 7, 1983, Mr. Tassone filed a Notice

of Adoption of Previously Filed Motions, in which he adopted, inter

alia, the motions for change of venue and for individual and seques-

tered voir dire which had previously been filed on petitioner's

behalf.

The case proceeded to trial on January 31 - February 4, 1983.

Immediately prior to jury selection, defense counsel called the

trial court's attention to the pending motion for individualvand

sequestered voir dire, which the trial court thereupon denied.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned verdicts fing-

ing petitioner guilty as charged of three counts of first degree’

murder. The penalty phase of the trial was conducted on February

9, 1983. The jury recommended imposition of the death penalty as

to all three counts. In accordance with the jury's recommendation,

—— 2

the trial court, on March 2, 1983, imposed three sentences of death

upon petitioner. The convictions and death sentences were affirmed

by the Florida Supreme Court on October 4, 1984, and petitioner's

motion for rehearing was denied (in light of revised opinion) on

January 17, 1985.

HOW THE FEDERAL QUESTION WAS RAISED AND DECIDED BELOW

In his brief on direct appeal, petitioner raised five issues;

three of these related directly to the prejudicial pre-trial publi-

city. Petitioner contended that his right to a fair and impartial

jury, secured by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, was abridged

(1) by the denial of his motion for change of venue [see Appendix

F 22-42; G 1-5], (2) by the denial of his motion for individual

and sequestered voir dire [see Appendix F 43-50, 38-42; G 6-8],

and (3) by the denial of his challenge for cause to a prospective

juror who acknowledged that she had already more or less made up

her mind about the case from the news media accounts [see Appendix

F 50-57; G 9-12]. The Florida Supreme Court rejected each of peti-

tioner's contentions on the merits. Davis v. State, 461 So.?d 67,

69-70 (Fla. 1984)[The nature and content of the publicity was neither

set forth nor discussed in the opinion]. In this petition for cer-

tiorari, after consideration of the criteria governing review on

certiorari set forth in Supreme Court Rule 17.1(b), petitioner

(through undersigned counsel) has decided to address only the issue

regarding individual and sequestered voir dire."

’ In an excess of caution (made necessary by the State of Florida's

demonstrated propensity for interposing frivolous "procedural de-

fault" objections in order to frustrate federal habeas corpus

review), petitioner wishes to make it absolutely clear that he is

not waiving his remaining constitutional claims, nor should his

decision to focus this petition for certiorari on the one issue

be construed as an implicit denigration of the other claims. The

decision to emphasize a single issue in this case was necessitated

by Supreme Court Rule 21.4 (maximum page limitation of 30); while

the selection of the individual and sequestered voir dire issue

as the one to emphasize was based on Rule 17.1(b).

REASONS FOR NG WRIT

QUESTION PRESENTED

IN LIGHT OF THE EXTENSIVE AND HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL

PRE-TRIAL MEDIA COVERAGE OF THIS CASE, AND IN

LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF

JURORS ACKNOWLEDGED HAVING BEEN EXPOSED TO THE

PUBLICITY, THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT

COUNSEL TO QUESTION PROSPECTIVE JURORS INDIVI-

DUALLY AND OUTSIDE OF ONE ANOTHER'S PRESENCE, IN

ORDER TO DETERMINE WHAT IN PARTICULAR EACH JUROR

HAD HEARD OR READ ABOUT THE CASE, DEPRIVED PETI-

TIONER OF HIS RIGHT, SECURED BY THE SIXTH AND

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS, TO BE TRIED BY A FAIR AND

IMPARTIAL JURY.

THE NATURE OF THE PRE-TRIAL PUBLICITY

Petitioner was placed under arrest for the Weiler

murders

in the early morning of May 13, 1982. The probable cause statement

in the arrest report includes the following remarks:

Allen Lee Davis admitts (sic) being at the victims

home at approx. time of their death, @ P.M. ll

May

1982.’ Allen Lee Davis failed a polyoraph examination

conducted by the Jax. Sheriff's Office.

Petitioner's motion for change of venue contained, inter

alia, allegations that “[(the) State, through its agent,

ville Sheriff's Office, improperly released to the news

the Jackson-

media,

which was disseminated in the Duval County area, that Allen Lee

Davis was arrested after he faileda polygraph examination", and

also improperly disclosed petitioner's inculpatory statements

placing himself at the scene of the murders, improperly

petitioner's prior criminal record and the fact that he

felony parole at the time of his arrest, and improperly

in eaten statements of incriminating evidence which the

investigation had uncovered. [See Appendix E]. Appended

disclosed

was on

released

police

to the

motion was an affidavit of Assistant Public Defender Anthony

Zebouni, stating that he personally observed Sheriff's Office en-

ployees tendering copies of the arrest report, which contained

references to petitioner's having failed a polygraph and to his

statements placing him in the Weiler home, to television and radio

nersonnel at petitioner's bond hearing. Also included were affida-

vits of fifteen Duval County attorneys, who stated their opinions

tnat petitioner could not obtain a fair and impartial jury in the

county as a result of extensive newspaper publicity and

T.V. and

radio coverage of the case, and specifically the exposure of members

of the commur.ty t- the inadmissible evidence of petitioner's having

failed a polygraph examination, and his prior record of violent

crime, and to the dissemination of statements concerning peti-

tioner's presence at the crime scene at the time of the offense.

At the hearing on the motion for change of venue, the defense

introduced an audit report showing the daily circulation of the

Jacksonville newspapers. These figures were: Times-Union-115,666;

Journal-43,600; Saturday-132,279; Sunday-146,423. The Jacksonville

Journal of May 13, 1982, contained an article headlined “Suspect

charged in triple murder", which included-a photograph of police

and funeral home employees removing the bodies of Mrs. Weiler and

her daughters from their home. The article stated, inter alia:

Police said records indicate Davis, a shipyard

welder, was arrested in 1965 at Bangor, Maine, for

assault and in 1966 in Baltimore, Ma., for involun-

tary manslaughter with a vehicle.

Duval County Circuit Court records show he was sen-

tenced to a total of 15 years here in 1973 after

being convicted of two robberies and an attemSted

robbery. It could not be determined today if Davis

served any time in prison on those convictions.

The suspect agreed to take a lie detector test and

failed it, officers said. They declined to reveal

the test questions.

Homicide Detective Charles Kesinger said Davis told

him he had seen Mrs. Weiler early Tuesday evening,

the time members of the Duval County Medical Exami-

ner's Office believe the killings occurred.

The Journal of May 13, 1982, also contained an article head-

lined “Explaining girl's slaying a tough job for teacher." The

article dealt with the trauma faced by Kristy Weiler's fifth grade

teacher, in breaking the news of Kristy's murder to her classmates.

It read, in part:

Kristina, who was called "Kristy", was a bouncy,

“cheerleader type" who enjoyed doing handicrafts

with her mother, Ms. Robichaud said. She had been

selected by her classmates as the March “Supercitizen",

said school Principal Marilyn Duncan.

Yesterday would have been Kristy's 10th birthday.

She had planned a birthday party at her home after

school, and her class was taking a field trip to

the zoo.

“They were having a disco party for her birthday.

The invitations were so cute, she wrote them herself

and said, ‘Be sure to wear your disco clothes,’ Fddie

(a classmate) was so upset because he forgot his danc-

ing shoes," Ms. Robichaud said.

-

» & % ‘

“we did not tell that Kristy was the one that died,”

Mrs. Duncan said, adding that the children were told

the birthday party had been canceled because of a

death in the family “so these children wouldn't go

over and run right into the tragedy and all that

would be connected with it.”

Ms. Robichaud said Kristy's classmates did not seem

satisfied with the explanation.

“They wanted to know who had died and I said, ‘I

don't know.’ They wanted to know if the party would

be held.

“They said, “Why is your nose so red? Why have you

been crying? They know something is wrona, and I

hope the parents are understanding about it. I feel

sorry for those parents," Ms. Robichaud said.

But she knows she will have to do some explaining

to her class today.

"I'm going to be very honest with them. They're going

to be very scared, horribly scared. They're going

to want comforting and they're going to want to know

why it happened.

"I'm going to try to make it a normal day...with

a lot of silent meditation.” 4

The Times-Union of May 13, 1982, reported the reaction of Dr.

Nonafacio Floro, the assistant medical examiner:

When Floro left the house yesterday afternoon, he

wiped tears from his eyes and brushed aside reporters'

questions until he had made a preliminary examination.

He was visibly shaken.

"It was because there were kids involved and the way

_they were killed," Floro, himself the father of three «

children, a girl, 12, and two boys, 4 and 7, said

latér.

"You get emotional for anybody who had kids that died.

They're so innocent; they did not know what was going

on,” he said.

The Times-Union of May 14, 1982, contained an article headlined

“Welder held in slayings of mother, 2 daughters,” featuring a large

photograph of petitioner in handcuffs. The story begins, "A 37-year

old welder who was varoled from prison in 1979 or Petitioner is

described as a 6-foot 340-pound individual nicknamed “Tiny”. The

article continues: :

Circuit Court records showed that Davis pleaded guilty

in 1973 to armed robbery, attempted armed robbery

and carrying a concealed firearm, and that Circuit

Judge R. Hudson Oliff sentenced him to 15 years in

prison.

So

-

Davis was paroled Sept. 25, 1979, after servin st

of the six years at Doctors Inlet Road Prisog”4n Slay

County, said David Skipper, a spokesman f he state

Department of Corrections in Tallahassee.

He w@s paroled because he had a clean disciplinary

_xecord, good progress reports and showed a favorable

- prisor adjustment, Skipper said.

Court officialg said Davis also was convicted in 1966

in Baltimore of involuntary vehicular manslaughter

for which he was sentenced to three years.

And in 1961, Davis was convicted in Bangor, Maine,

of assauit end battery and was sentenced to six months

to three years.

Davis came under suspicion about eight hours after

the bodies were found at 1l a.m. Wednesday, police

said.

He was questioned hy homicide detectives Wednesday

night and voluntarily submitted to a lie-detector

test, said homicide Lt. Jim Suber. He was arrestcd

and booked about 2 a.m. yesterday.

Davis’ pickup truck, which was found near the Weilers'

house, was examined for physical evidence.

- “We got this thing under heavy investigation,” Suber

said yesterday. "We're trying right now to tie sone

loose ends. We haven't found the gun, and we can't

comment on the evidence we have."

On May 18, 1982, the Jacksonvjle Journal published an article

headlined “Alligator impedes probe." This article concerned police

efforts to recover the murder weapon, @ pistol. Divers were searching

several hodies of water, and there were apparently alligators in

the locations being searched. Homicide detectives said they didn't

know anything about alligators:

"I'm not verifying the information,” Lt. Jim Suber

said. “We're searching four’or five bodies of water.

This is just one more place."

Suber said any comments could hinder the investigation

and that if anything were printed, a guard would be

placed in the area being searched to prevent anyone

from tampering with evidence that might be found there.

“Whoever knows where that gun is, knows where the

water is” he said.

“You can never know for sure what people will do.”

Suber said his fears were not that another suspect

might be at large, but that relatives or friends of

Allen Lee Davis, the 37-year old shipyard welder

charged with the triple slayings could try to prevent

investigators from discovering evidence.

The defense called as a witness Steven Crosby, assistant news

’

director at WJXT Television, Channel 4, who presented “doves” (video

me iy

taped segments which appeared on the air)from newscasts concerning

the Weiler murders. One of these newscasts announced:

Thirty-seven-year-old Allen Lee Davis booked into

the Duval County Jail early this morning; he's charged

with triple murders of Nancy Weiler and her two child-

ren, ten-year-olc Christina and five-year-old Kathy.

Early in the investigation, attention focused on this

man, Allen Lee Davis, the son of the Weiler's next-door

neighbor. After questioning Davis, police found sub-

stantial evidence in both the suspect's truck and,

upon investigation of the house, linking him to the

crime.

He was in the presence of the yictims at the time

of their death and he admits to this and he has also

failed the polygraph test.

According to the police, Davis agreed to be interviewed

at the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office. This is not

his first brush with the law. Police say he was out

on parole and has a lengthy criminal record. He is

scheduled to be arraigned later this morning.

Jeff Silverstein, Channel 4, Eyewitness news.

Other channel 4 broadcasts carried the following information

and commentary:

The neighborhood in this community is a very close-nit

group. The only word is horrible. That is the only

word. Things like this don't happen in a nice neighbor-

hood and this is a nice neighborhood and they were

nice people.

Twelve-year-old blank blank was invited to the birthday

party planned for Cristina. She would have been ten

years old. I got of of the bus and I didn't want to

believe it at first. It's kind of senseless but I

found out it was a crime.

The crime was called untimely. He is the son of the

of the Weilers' next-door neighbor. Police say they

found cord similar to that used to bind the wrists

™of the Weiler child in the Chevrolet pickup. They

say his handgun is missing and has not yet been found.

Davis today has been charged with murder at 3:99 o clock

this morning, after he flunked a lie detector test.

Davis had already been convicted of assault and disor-

ly conduct. He was out on parole for armed robbery.

low shipyard workers and friends give a completely

different picture of Davis. They say he is a good

natured man who loves children, a good co-worker.

They say they can't believe he is a man who could

be guilty of committing three murders.

1/Q

O10

—in

Bill Palmer worked with Davis two years says he's

okay, he loved to sit down and talk about huntinc,

fishing and back in Maine, that's where he's fron.

I can't believe that this happend. I can't believe

it's true. I am sick about this whole thing. Since

leaving the North Florida Shipyard in the fall, friends

say Davis worked inother shipyards. They say he was

laid off a few weeks ago. Davis shared his Arlington

apartment with Mary Collins. It's unbelievable. 1

can't believe it. I really can't. Especially when

it comes to children, I can't believe |he would do

something like that. I really don't ieve he did

it. a

John Weiler is staying with friends after flying back

from Pittsburgh yesterday. He said he is trying to

make funeral arrangements for his family so brutally

taken away from him.

Wynn Farley, Channel 4 Eyewitness News.

There might have been some doubt in people's minds,

there was no doubt in our mind now that we have the

right suspect. Lt. Suber would not comment on the

circumstarces but here's what we know of evidence

from the individuals close to the investigation: During

several hours of questioning in the interrogation

room, the police said Davis told them he was in the

Weiler home the night of the murders but also said

he had a lapse of memory. The detective that made

up the arrest report wrote Allen Davis stated he could

not remember everything that happend while he was

at the victims’ home.

The Duval County Medical Examiner put the time of

death somewhere between 7:30 and 9:00 o'clock. John

Weiler told police he talked with his wife on the

phone at a quarter of 7:00 while she was preparing

dinner.

A neighbor said she called the Weiler home at 8:15

and there was no answer. Davis, himself, told the

police he was in the house around 8:00 o'cock. Police

first questioned Davis as a possible suspect witness

when his father, the Weiler's next-door neighbor,

reported his gun missing.

The police believ~ the gun to be the same kind that

the suspect used. They think it was a .357 caliber

revolver like this one as fragments of the wood from

the murder weapon were found by the victims which

were pistol whipped.

Sources close tothe investigation say the pistol

was a Black Hawk .357 Magnum. The insignia was all

that was found at the scene that would make it the

same type gun Davis’ father reported missing. The

whereabouts of the actual murder weapon remains a

mystery.

Among evidence taken from the truck was nylon cord

believed to be identical to one of the cords used

to tie up one of the children. Detectives secured

the scene at the time and Davis’ apartment, looking

for physical evidence. Their findings were brought

here to the Jacksonville Crime Lab where they will

look for fibers, hair an@é do ballistic tests.

I_ think we have a very significant se against him

at this int and I ho to have evén a better case

at trial time based on physical evidence-and witnesses.

Davis’ attorney said he will ask the Court to move

the case out of Jacksonvile. We predict it will be

a very sensitive case.

Denny Silverstein, Channel 4 Eyewitness news.

The video tape next depicted petitioner, handcuffed, wearing

«@-«

a baseball cap, and flanked by two officers, apparently being trans-

ported to the Duval County Jail during the night time.

The Channel 4 stories concerning the Weiler murders were aired

at noon, 6:00 p.m., and 11:00 p.m., and some may have appeared on

more than one newscast. According to an Arbitron survey covering

the period from April 28 - May 25, 1982, Channel 4 News had a poten-

tial weekday viewing audience” of 55,000 households or 72,000 persons

for the noon broadcast, 109,000 households or 174,000 persons for

the 6:00 p.m. broadcast, and 56,000 households or 92,000 persons

for the 11:00 p.m. broadcast. Crosby indicated that this survey

would include Duval County, and the surrounding counties of Baker,

Bradford, Clay, Columbia, Nassau, and Putnam. >

Gerry Howard, news director of WJKS-TV, Channel 17, presented

four taped news broadcasts concerning the Weiler murders. He esti-

mated that, altogether, these stories would have been aired a dozen

or more times. The third newscast, which was aired on May 13, 1982,

at 6:00 p.m., again at 11:09 p.m., and on Newswatch 17 update the

following morning, related the following information:

Davis was charged with the murders early this morning

after four hours of interrogation. Police said he

voluntarily submitted to a lie detector test and

failed. Other evidence includes rope found in the

back of pickup which may have been used to tie the

hands of Kathy Weiler who was found shdt to death.

Police say Davis who was denied bond admitted being

in the house around 8:00 p.m. Wednesday night.

Davis had been cgnvicted twice and released from

Raiford in 1969.

(T 162).

2 Crosby defined his "potential viewing audience" as the number of

households which, there would be good reason to believe, would have

television sets tuned to Channel 4 WJXT at a particular time.

3 The population of Duval County, according to the 1980 census, was |

570,981. The combined population of the six other counties was 221,206. |

According to voter registration statistics submitted by the defense,

there were 251,304 registered voters (and therefore 251,304 potential

jurors) in Duval County as of August 4, 1982.

‘ This date is incorrect. Davis was paroled from the Florida prison

system in 1979. The child whose hands were bound was Kristy Weiler.

- 10 -

Richard Padden” said he had spoken to Davis around

6:00 p.m. Tuesday night just about two hours before

the murders were committed. He shook my hand and told

me any time I needed anything, give him a holler.

Did he indicate to you why he was in such a good mood?

No. Looked like to me he had been out working. Police

are searching the waters in back of the Weiler home

in hopes of finding the murder weapon.

Howard indicated that approximately 20,000 people see the

6:00 p.m. newscast on Channel 17, and approximately 19,000 people

see the 11:00 p.m. newscast, Channel 17's signal encompasses a five-

al”

county area, including Duval, Clay, St. John's, Baker, afid Flagler. °®

Irene Shubert, administrative assistant to the news desk at

WTLV-TV Channel 12, presented several video taped news seaments

on the Weiler murders. The first story was aired at noon on May

12, 1982, and included the following comment (which was repeated

during the 6:00 p.m. broadcast):

The neighbors were in total shock, completely wiped

out. We never had anything happen before like this.

I have been in the Military but not next door -- the

murders came on the morning eve of the celebration

that was the birthday of nine-year-old Christy Weiler.

Another Channel 12 newscast, apparently aired on June 9, 1982,

(see T-173) conveyed the following information to viewers:

++. there were not just three deaths on May 11. Mrs.

Weiler was pregant at the time. The pregnancy is early

and 1 is unlikely another murder charge will result.

The police now have three witnesses that can pin down

Davis' whereabouts on the day of the murders. One

neighbor apparently spotted Davis near where the mur-

ders occurred with a gun in his hand. Neither the

police nor the Public Defender or prosecutor would

have any comment or action.

Assistant State Attorney Ralph Greene would not comment

on Davis’ case but he would talk about the use of

hypnosis testimony in court. We're not talking about

hocus pocus, you know, of a carnival show; it's well

recognized, well *hought of technique to help a person

remember. .

But the case against the unemployed shipyard worker

is growing more complicated, one that the defense

feels would have to be decided outside of Duval County.

~ Richard Padon testified at trial that he drove Davis to Davis’

father's house to commit a burglary in the neighborhood; that he

later picked Davis up; and that Davis had three brown paper bags,

one of which contained a Nikon camera. Padon did not mention any

of this to police until September, because he did not want to get

involved,

The combined 1980 population of the four surrounding counties

is 144,557, compared to Duval's 570,981.

To

In July, 1982, Channel 12 broadcast an editorial piece by

Allen Rothstein:

The murder occurred whil v was out on parole.

Allen Lee Pans i ccus L ng a Jacksonville

mother an er t c dren whil t on ole for

armed rebhery this year. I think that he needed to

serve a little more time th three ars. I mean

ild that he first killed. He was in court

that was a chi

today trying to stop the prosecution from using an

alleged conviction but he has not yet been tried for

the second trial -- (inaudible) parole and probation

people are letting people out on the streets too early,

that he's got a criminal out there.on the street.

Mistakes are made but -- we cannot predict what a

person will or will not do. We try to make the best

judgment we can based on the information that we have

(inaudible). Why should I agonize over a sentence

if they're going to take them over there in due time

and re-sentence them, why don't we try them and say

you all do what you want to with them?

Channel 12, Allen Rothstein.

According to an Arbitron survey, there are 169,000 households

in the WTLV viewing area. The estimated viewing audiences for the

news broadcasts are: Good Mezsning, Jacksonville - 10,000 households;

noon - 15,000; 6:00 p.m. - 40,000; and 11:00 p.m. - 33,000. Stories

are sometimes broadcast on more than one news program. The station's

major market is Puvel County; its signal reaches into south Georgia

and Clay, Nassau, and Baker Counties. ’

Summarizing the evidence in support of his motion for change

of venue, defense counsel asserted that the pre-trial media coverace

of this case was irreparably prejudicial in that it exposed the

Duval County community to 1) inadmissible evidence of petitioner's

prior criminal record including convictions of manslaughter, two

armed robberies, and attempted robbery; 2) inadmissible evidence

that petitioner was on parole at the time of the murders; 3) inadmis-

sible evidence that petitioner took a polygraph and failed it; 4)

petitioner's statements (the admissibility of which had yet to be

determined) to police, placing him in the Weiler home at the time

the medical examiner believed the murders ecourred, and claiming

that he had a lapse of memory while in the house; 5) ex parte state-

ments of evidence indicative of guilt which the police had assembled,

including the facts that a handgun belonging to petitioner's father

was missing, that a cord found in petitioner's truck matched the

cord which bound Kristy Weiler's wrists (T 186, 187), and that police

The combined 1 ~opulation of the latter three counties is 115,235.

- 12 «

had found three eyewitnesses who could pin down petitioner's where-

abouts, one of whom saw him in the neighborhood iain ss gun in his

hand; 6) statements by state officials expressing their certainty

of petitioner's guilt; that they had the right suspect, and that

they had a “very significant case" aainst him; 7) statements by

police to the effect that petitioner's friends or relatives might

interfere with their efforts to find evidence; specifically the

missing handgun; 8) inflammatory commentary strongly tending to

evoke community sympathy for, and identification with, the victims

(and, concomitantly, prejudice against the named suspect, Davis),

including an article about Kristy's schoolteacher having to break

the news of her death to her classmates, newscasts emphasizing the

reaction of the Weilers' close-knit, uppermiddle class, family--

oriented neighborhood to the horror and senselessness of the crim;

references to Mrs. Weiler's being pregnant at the time of her death;

references to Kristy's tenth birthday party which was to have been

held the next day, and the medical examiner's emotional reaction

as he left the house ; and 9) a telecast denouncing parole authorities

for releasing prisoners back onto the streets to commit crimes,

and referring specifically to petitioner as one who “needed to serve

a little more time" and who subsequently murdered a child.

Jury selection commenced on January 31, 1983. Defense counsel

called the trial court's attention to the pending motion for indivi-

dual and sequestered voir dire, which the court then denied. During

° acknowledged that they

voir dire, at least ten prospective jurors

had some prior knowledge of the case, from television, radio, news-

papers, or word of mouth. As a result of the group voir dire, however,

it was not possible to ascertain specifically what each of these

jurors had heard or read about the case without contaminating the

remainder of the venire. Early in the voir dire, a prospective juror

(unidentified in the record) said, "I must honestly say I read the

paper rather thoroughly..." and indicated that he was not sure at

that voint if he

These prospective jurors included Richardson, Lane, Stanley Johnson,

Jackson, Cassidy, Griswold, James Johnson, Robb, Price and Arceneaux.

« 83.«

em

could be open-minded or not. A second unidentified prospective juror

said the same applied to her. Prospective juror Lane said she knew

about the case from watching television, knew in her heart how she

felt about it, and had already more or less made up her mind [see

Appendix F 50-57, G 4-12]. Prospective juror Richardson (who served

on the jury) stated that she knew something about the case from

the newspaper and TV.Prospective juror Price, who had heard something

about the case, when asked by the prosecutor whether she could vote

for the death penalty, stated:

Well, the way it was expressed to me, sir, these people

get out on probation and they done these horrible

things, that's the only question that I would say

about capital punishment.

Four of the ten prospective jurors who acknowledged having

been exposed to the media coverage - Richardson, Jackson, Griswold,

and Arceneaux - ultimately served on the jury which convicted peti-

tioner and recommended imposition of the death penalty.

The Trial Court's Refusal to Permit Counsel to Question

Prospective Jurors Individually and Outside of One

Another s Presence, in Order to Determine What in

Particular Each Juror had Heard or Read About the

Case, Deprived Petitioner of his Right to be Tried

by a Fair and Impartial Jury.

In his concurring opinion (joined by Justices Stewart and

Marshall) in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,

602, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976), Justice Brennan observed

that, in order to protect the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment richts

of the accused in a case where thie has been incriminating publi-

city:

-+-.-the trial judge should employ the voir diré ‘to

probe fully into the effect of publicity. The judge

should broadly explore such matters as the extent

to which prospective jurors had read particular news

accounts or whether they had heard about incriminating

data such as an alleged confession or statements by

purportedly reliable sources concerning the defendant's

guilt. Sec, e.g., Hamm v. South Carolina, 409 U.S.

524, 531-534 (1973) (opinion of Marshall, J.); Swain

v. Alabama,, 380 U.S. 202, 209-222 (1965). Particularly

in cases of extensive publicity, defense counsel should

be accorded more latitude in personally asking or

tendering searching questions that might root out

indications of bias, both to facilitate intelligent

exercise of peremptory challenges and to help uncover

facts that would dictate disqualification for cause.

Indeed some be necessar) 9 guestic

on vo : prospect ive ro ndividually c n

ll groups both to maximize the like! ihooc

bers of the n will respond honest: > gues-

tions concerning bias, and to avoid contaminati

unbiased members of the venire when other members

disclose prior know edge of prejudicial information.

Although a trial court has broad discretion in its conduct

of voir dire, this discretion is limited by the requirements of due

process. United States v. Hawkins, 658 F.2d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 1981);

United States v. Gerald, 624 F.2d 1291, 1296 (Sth Cir. 1980). See

also United States v. Rucker, 557 F.2d 1046, 1049 (4th Cir. 1977);

United States v. Nell, 526 F.2d 1223, 1229 (Sth Cir. 1976) (exercise

of trial court's discretion in conduct of voir dire is limited by

“essential demands of fairness"). In order to satisfy the require-

ments of due process, the method of voir dire adopted by the trial

court must be capable of giving reasonable assurance that prejudice

would be discovered if present. United States v. Hawkins, supra,

at 283, 285; United States v. Gerald, supra, at 1296; United States

v. Nell, supra at 1229; United States v. Chagra, 669 F.2d 241, 253

(Sth Cir. 1982). In view of the volume of prejudicial publicity

and pre-trial disclosure of inadmissible evidence in the present

case, the trial court’s ruling, and the consequent examination of

the prospective jurors in each other's presence, virtually quaranteed

that any prejudice created by the publicity would not be discovered.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that where

the nature of the pre-trial publicity as a whole raises a significant

possibility of prejudice, and where one or more jurors acknowledge

some exposure to that publicity, the trial court must determine,

at minimum, what in particular each juror had heard or read and

how it affected his attitude toward the trial. Uniced States v.

Hawkins, 658 F.2d 279, 282-85 (Sth Cir. 1981); United States v.

Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 196-98 (5th Cir. 1978). Hawkins and Davis stop

short of requiring individual or small group voir dire in every

case in which there has been publicity. The Hawkins opinion distin-

guishes a prior decision as follows:

In United States v. Gerald, 624 F.2d 1291, 1297 (5th

Cir. 1980), fifteen of twenty-eight prospective jurors

were exposed to pretrial publicity. Although this

Court reaffirmed the principle stated in Davis that

cursory questioning of the jury is not enough when

the nature of the publicity as a whole, together with

the surrounding circumstances, raises a significant

possibility of prejudice, we noted that, unlike Davis,

the record in Gerald was “completely devoid of any

indicators of the nature and extent of pretrial publi-

- 15 -

city ...." 624 F.2d at 1297. Consequently, this Court

held that defendant's failure in Gerald to “direct

the trial court's attention to specific news items

so the trial court [could] make an initial determina-

tion of whether the information is prejudicial," 624

F.2d at 1298, defeated his claim that the district

court erred in failing to adhere to the strict require-

ments of Davis:

The time consuming, probing, preferably indivi-

dual voir dire described in Davis generally is

no* required in cases involving unsupported

general allegations of prejudicial pretrial

publicity or in cases where the publicity does

not ‘create a significant potential of prejudice.

United States v. Hawkins, supra, at 284.

To safeguard the due process rights of the accused, a trial

judge has an affirmative constitutional duty to minimize the effects

of prejudicial pre-trial publicity. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443

U.S. 368, 378, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979).°It is well

recognized that where a juror has been exposed to prejudicial publi-

city, his assurances that he can nevertheless be impartial and give

the defendant a fair trial are not necessarily dispositive. Sheppard

v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed. 600 (1966).

It is the responsibility of the trial court, not the juror himself,

to make the ultimate determination of whether his imoartiality has

been impaired. United States v. Hawkins, supra; United States v.

Davis, supra. Because the attorneys and the court in the present

case were unable to determine what each juror had heard or read,

the trial court was unable to fulfill this constitutional responsibi-

lity. See United States v. Hawkins, supra; United States v. Davis,

supra.

In State v. Stiltner, 491 P.2d 1043 (Wash. 1971) (in which

the media had revealed that the defendant, alone among the five

suspects, had not taken and passed a polygrah), the Supreme Court

of Washington recognized the "Catch-22" faced by defense counsel

in trying the ferret out the prejudice created by pre-trial disclo-

sure of inadmissible material. The trial judge in Stiltner had said:

Now this court recognizes the dilemma that Mr. Roy

{defense consel] is put in this matter and should

comment, it seems to me, at this point. He is ina

position where he must ask a juror whether or not

he remembers a certain thing that he doesn't want

him to remember and by doing so he may guicken or

refresh that memory as to a newspaper article that

may otherwise have been forgotten.

— oe

State v. Stiltner, supra, at 1048.

In the present case, counsel obviously could not ask a prospec-

tive juror if he had read or heard that petitioner failed a poly-

graph, or admitted being in the Weilers' home, or had served time

for several armed robberies, without conveying to the juror and the

rest of the venire the very information they hopefully did not know,

But if counsel had been permitted to examine the prospective jurors

outside one another's presence, then at least he could have asked

each juror what he knew about the case without running the risk

‘of the juror’s honest answer contaminating the entire venire. With

so much inadmissible evidence let loose in the community before

trial, and with at least ten prospective jurors admitting to some

exposure to the publicity, the chances of something like this occur-

ring were excellent. So neither the attorneys nor the court ever

determined the nature or extent of the extrajudicial knowledce which

these prospective jurors brought with them to court. Indeed, the

prosecutor on several occasions specifically cautioned jurors that

he did not want them to reveal the specifics of what they had read

or heard, but only whether they thought it would interfere with

their ability to be impartial.

In State v. Goodson, 412 So.2d 1077 (La. 1982), the Supreme

Court of Louisiana concluded that the defendant had failed to esta-

blish that the publicity in his case was of such a character as

to create a presumption of prejudice which would require a change

of venue without regard to voir dire. With respect to actual prejudice,

the court noted that, as there had not yet been a voir dire examina-

tion, it was impossible to determine whether it existed or not.

The court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions

to defer ruling*on a change of venue until completion of voir dire.

Because serious questions of potentially prejudicial publicity were

involved, the court further instructed the trial court that the

voir dire should be conducted according to the following auidelines,

based upon Section 8-3.5, American Bar Association Standards Relating

to Fair Trial and Free Press:

Since there is a significant possibility that indivi-

dual jurors will be ineligible to serve because of

exposure to potentially prejudicial material, the

> 68

examination of each juror with respect to exposure

shal] take place outside the presence of other chosen

and prospective jurors. An accurate record of this

examination shall be kept by court reporter or tape

recording whenever possible. The questioning shall

be conducted for the purpose of determining what the

prospective juror has read and heard about the case

and how any exposure has affected that person's atti-

tude toward the trial, not to convince the prospective

juror that an inability to cast aside any preconcep-

tions would be a dereliction of duty.

- Both the degree of exposure and the prospective

juror's testimony as to state of mind are rele-

vant to the determination of acceptability. A

prospective juror testifying to an inability to

overcome preconceptions shall be subject to chal-

lenge for cause no matter how slight the expo-

sure. If the prospective juror remembers informa-

tion that will be developed in the course of the

trial, or that may be inadmissible but does not

create a substantial risk of impairing judgment,

that person's acceptability shall turn on the

credibility of testimony as to impartiality. If

the formation of an opinion is admitted, the

prospective juror shall be subject to challenge

for cause unless the examination shows unequivo-

cally the capacity to be impartial. A_prospective

juror who has been exposed to and remembers

reports of highly significant information, such

as the existence or contents of a confession, o:

other incriminating matters that may be inadmis-

sible in evidence, or substantial amounts of

inflammatory material, shall be subject to chal-

lenge for cause without regard to the prospective

juror's testimony as to state of mind.

State v. Goodson, supra, at 1081.

Four of the people who served on appellant's jury acknowledged

having some extrajudicial knowledge about the case. Considering

the character of the pre-trial disclosures made by the police and

the media, there is a distinct possibility that some of this know-

ledge was inadmissible in addition to being highly prejudicial;

such knowledge on the part of a juror, if revealed on voir dire,

would have made him subject to a challenge for cause. Yet the method

of voir dire used in this case virtualiy ensured that such knowledge,

if it existed, would not be revealed. Consequently, the trial court's

denial of the defense's motion for individual and sequestered voir

dire not only deprived appellant of due process [United States v.

Hawkins, supra; United States v. Davis, supra], it also impaired,

indeed effectively destroyed, his ability to exercise his challenges

for cause and his peremptory challenges in a reasonably intelligent

manner. See United States v. Rucker, 557 F.2d 1046, 1048 (4th Cir.

1977), in which the appellate court observed that "a defendant is

- 18 -

entitled to have sufficient information brought out on voir dire

to enable him to exercise his challenges in a reasonably intelligent

manner", and further stated:

While the conduct of a voir dire examination is a

matter within the broad discretion of the trial judge,

Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594, 96 S.Ct. 1017,

47 L.Ed.2d 258 (1976); Ham v. South Carolina, 409

U.S. 524, 93 S.Ct. 848, 35 L.Ed.2d 46 (1973); Aldridge

v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 51 S.Ct. 470, 75 L.Ed.

1054 (1931), the exercise of that discretion is limited

by "the essential demands of fairness." Aldridge,

supra, at 310, 51 S.Ct. 470. A voir dire that has

the effect of impairing the defendant's ability to

exercise intelligently hig challenges is ground for

reversal f prejudice. Swain v. Alabama,

supra, 380 U.S. at 2197 85 S.Ct. 824; United States

v. Lewin, 467 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1972).

United States yw Rucker, supra, at 1049.

See also United States v. Ledee, 549 F.2d 990, 993 (5th Cir.

1977) ("... the reak issue is whether the voir dire examination

uncovers possibie prejudice and bias of any juror so that a fair

and impartial jury may be impaneled. Peremptory challenges are worth-

less if trial counsel is not afforded an opportunity to gain the

necessary information upon which to base such strikes").

As previously discussed, in order to satisfy the requirements

of due process, the method of voir dire adopted by the trial court

must be capable of giving reasonable assurance that prejudice would

be discovered if present. United States v. Hawkins, supra, at 283,

285; United States v. Gerald, supra, at 1296; United States v. Nell,

*

Supra, at 1229; United States v. Chagra, 669 F.2d 241, 253 (5th

Cir. 1982). In view of the inflammatory nature of the publicity

in this case, and the extensive pre-trial disclosure of inadmissible

facts, the trial court's refusal to allow counsel to question pros-

pective jurors individually virtually guaranteed that any prejudice

created by the publicity would not be discovered, unless the juror

himself both recognized and admitted that ne eoulé not be impartial.

And, as both this Court and the Florida Supreme Court have recog-

nized, “it is difficult for any person to admit that he is incapable

of being able to judge fairly and impartially." Singer v. State,

109 So.2d 7, 24 (Fla. 1959); see Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 7:7, 728,

81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961). Since it is the court, and not

the individual juror, who must ultimately decide whether the juror's

‘- 19 -

impartiality has been impaired by his extrajudicial knowledge or

his exposure to inflammatory publicity, the group voir dire enpleyes

wy

in this case was constitutionally inadequate. United States v.

Hawkins, supra; United States v. Davis, supra.

Supreme Court Rule 17.1, which sets forth the considerations

governing review on certiorari, states, inter alia:

A review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of

right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted

only when there are special and important reasons

therefor. The following, while neither controlling

nor fully measuring the Court's discretion, indicate

the character of reasons that will be considered.

(b) When a state court of last resort has decided

a federal question in a way in conflict with the

decision of another state court of last resort

or a federal court of appeals.

In the present case, the decision of the Florida Suprerie Court

is in clear (albeit silent) conflict with the decisions of the Fifth

Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. hawkins, supra, and

United States v. Davis, supra, as well as the decision of the Supreme

Court of Louisiana in State v. Goodson, supra. In petitioner's brief

on appeal, he set forth in detail the inflammatory and prejudicial

nature of the pre-trial publicity [see Appendix F 5-21), all of ¢

which had been presented to the trial court at the time he denied

a change of venue and subsequently refused to allow individual voir

dire. See United States v. Hawkins, supra; United States v. Davis,

Supra; contrast United States v. Gerald, supra. Petitioner relied

heavily on the Hawkins and Davis decisions in his brief, and argued

that under the circumstances of this case (as in the cited cases)

the method of voir dire adopted by the trial court was incapable

of giving reasonable assurance that prejudice would be discovered

if present, and therefore deprived petitioner of his Sixth Amendment

right to a fair and impartial jury. [See Appendix F 43-50, 3€-42,

G 6-8).

The Florida Supreme Court, without any reference to the nature

or content of the pre-trial media coverage in this case,rejected

petitioner's arguments without mentioning either Hawkins or Davis

or the cosntitutional basis of the issue:

Davis also claims that thé trial court erred by failing

- 20 =

J

to conduct individual and sequestered voir dire of

the prospective jurors as requested by the defense.

The granting of individual and sequestered voir dire

is within the trial court's discretion. Stone v. State,

378 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1979), cert.denied, 49 U.S. 986,

101 S.Ct. 407, 66 L.Ed.2d 250 (1980); Jones v. State,

343 So.2d 921 (Fla. 3d DCA ), cet.denied, 352 So.2d

172 (Fla. 1977). The purpose of conducting voir dire

is to secure an impartial jury. Lewis v. State, 377

So.2d 640 (Fla. 1979). Davis had demonstrated neither

the partiality of his jury nor an abuse of discretion

by the trial court, and we find no merit to this claim.

Davis v. State, 461 So.2d 67, 69-70 (1984)

In so holding, the Florida Supreme Court has misconstrued

or ignored the entire premise of petitioner's argument, and that

of the Hawkins, Davis, and Goodson decisions, which is that the

accused is unfairly deprived of an opportunity to "[demonstrate)]

... the partiality of his jury” where prospective and sitting jurors

have been exposed to inflammatory articles, editorials, and broac-

casts containing inadmissible and highly prejudicia’ information,

but where the method of voir dire adopted by the trial court pre-.

eeeiue both counsel and the court itself from ascertaining what

in particular each juror has heard or read.”

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully requests that this Court

grant his petition for writ of certiorari.

4

Respectfully submitted,

MICHAEL E. ALLEN

PUBLIC DEFENDER

SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

—- ;

Sa! ee ee

. STEVEN L. BOLOTIN

Assistant Public Defender

Post Office Box 671

: Tallahassee, Florida 32302

(904) 488-2458

-/

Attorney for Petitioner

,

’ A final reason why certiorari review in the instant case is appro-

priate is that the decisions of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

in Hawkins and Davis are themselves arguably in conflict with the

decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.in United States

v. Blanton, 719 F.2d 815 (Sth Cir. 1984) (See Supreme Court Rule

17.1(a)}. The original panel in Blanton had held (relying on Hawkins,

Davis, and other decisions) that the group voir dire conducted by

the trial court was constitutionally inadequate in light of the

prejudicial publicity in the case, and had reversed for a new trial.

700 F.2d 298. The Sixth Circuit, considering the case en banc

rejected the panel decision by a 6-4 vote, and affirmed the convic-

taons without mention of Hawkins or Davis.

.

o Mm «

NO.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1984

ALLEN LEE DAVIS,

Petitioner,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

APPENDIX

MICHAEL E. ALLEN

PUBLIC DEFENDER

SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

STEVEN L. BOLOTIN

ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER

POST OFFICE BOx 671

TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32302

(904) 488-2458

ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER

(MEMBER OF THE BAR OF THIS COURT

APPENDIX

A

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Davis v. State, 461 So.2d 67

4)

Motion for Rehearing

Order Denying Rehearing,

dated January 17, 1985

Motion for Individual and

fSequestered Voir Dire

Motion for Change of Venue

Initial Brief of Appellant

in The Supreme Court of

Florida

Reply Brief of Appellant

in The Supreme Court of

Florida

PAGE (S)

ance to the faculty

een the north side

Gon, so the way

normal care would

in cro: sing the ve

nity delibe rately de-

‘oO permanently re

us the day of the

sated was no great-

ywhere it is possi-

dblock. A govern-

‘y W warn pedestri-

‘er of crossing the

second certified

on the lack of a

rsection, which we

‘we

nether to install a

nm intersection is a

d with immunity,

with it the concom-

such time as the

absence of such

‘rap OY creates a

'y Spparent to per.

“rsection. For the

"er there was no

ier the factual cir-

The time delay

insta!! the traffic

‘allauion does not

uniy

at the plans envi

ld improve safety

“Y Can newther cre.

TM & patent dan

‘epene on the copns

bet abueme or non

Sop 3d 371. 27 I Dee

. the Plasntt’s chal

were forced to walk

valk ended abruptly

reyected the assertion

“ause wt had under

» sidewalk slung the

‘A passed an ord)

anfers to con*truct

MEN coge & mt

a

DAVIS v.

Cite as 461 S024 67 (Fla. 1984)

Accordingly, we approve the district

court decision.

It is so ordered

BOYD, CJ, and ADKINS, OVERTON,

ALDERMAN, MeDONALD and SHAW,

JJ., concur

Allen Lee DAVIS, Appellant,

v.

STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 63374.

Supreme Court of Florida

Oct. 4, 1984

Rehearing Denied Jan. 17, 1985

Defendant was convicted in the Circuit

Court, Duval County, Major B. Harding, J.,

of three counts of murder, and he appealed.

The Supreme Court he!d that. (1) trial

court did not err in failing to grant motion

for change of venue; (2) trial court did not

err by failing to conduct individual and

sequestered voir dire; and (3) evidence sup-

ported finding of five aggravating factors

Affirmed

Adkins, J. concurred in result, only

with the conviction and concurred with the

sentence ~

that even if the ordinance constituted a plan. the

plan had to be completed before habsliy at

tached

We find especially convincing the Resnik ra

a vat the duty to maintain arises because

* 06) ney depends on thes "hing a gesern

ent has undertaken to « Seplerne thes

to the Oper Ou Whom, aad

STATE Fla. 67

1. Criminal Law @ 115

Trial court may wait @& decide whether

to grant change of venue until after at

tempt to seat jury is made

2. Criminal Law 121, 1150

Application for change of venue is ad

dressed to court's sound discretion, and

trial court's ruling will not be reversed

absent palpable abuse of discretion

3. Criminal Law @426(2)

In prosecution for murder, trial court

did not abuse its discretion by failing to

grant defendant's motion for change of

venue based on pretrial publicity where all

who served on the jury indicated affirma-

tively that any prior knowledge could be

put aside, that they could serve with open

minds, and that they could reach a verdict

based on the law and evidence presented at

trial.

4. Jury 2913113)

Granting of individual and sequestered

voir dire of prospective jurors is within

trial court's discretion

5. Jury &131(1)

Purpose of conducting voir dire is to

secure impartial jury

6. Jury 131113)

In prosecution for murder, tria! court

did not err by failing to conduct individual

and sequestered voir dire of prospective

jurors where there was no demonstration

that jury seiectod was parti!

7. Jury x5

Competency of challenged juror is

mixed question of iaw and fact, determina-

tion of which is within trial court's discre-

tion.

mercial Curner Corp v. Indian River Counts

JP Svu.2d 1010 (fia 1979), coizens have a rea

sonable expectation thai those things provided

by ‘he government as a result of its planning

funwivon may be relied upon to continue to

— because of operational level mainte

na

Appendi ; a

mee

68 Fis

8. Criminal Law 11583)

Manifest error must be shown before

trial court's ruling on competency of jurors

will be disturbed on appeal

9. Jury 97/4)

In prosecution for murder, trial court

did not err by failing to excuse prospective

juror for cause where Juror indicated that

she could lay aside any bias or prejudice

and render verdict solely upon evidence

Presented and instructions given.

10. Criminal Law @10%6.10

Trial court is encouraged to state on

the record the reasons for ranting or not

granting challenge of juror fur cause.

Il. Criminal Law e388

Unless buth sides consent, results of

polygraph examinations are inadmissible in

adversarial proceedings

12. Criminal Law C92)

Mere mention of possibility of poly-

graph examination does not compel grant.

ing of new trial.

13. Criminal Law e867

In prosecution for murder, trial court

did not err in denying defendant's motions

for mistrial based on his father's testifying

that defendant went with police to take a

lie detector test where results of the test

were not admitted and where court directed

jury to disregard the reference

14. Criminal Law ©9699, 1154

Control of comments in closing argu-

ments is within trial court's discretion, and

court's ruling will not be overturned unless

clear abuse is shown

15. Criminal Law 103011)

In absence of fundamental error, fail-

ure to object precludes consideration of

points on appeal

16. Criminal Law 1037.11)

In prosecution for murder, any error in

Prosecutor's argument to the jury during

the penalty phase was not preserved for

review on appeal where defendant failed to

object.

* 461 SOUTHERN REPORTER. 24 SERIES

17. Homicide e354

Imposition of three Sentences of death

on defendant convicted of three counts of

murder was appropriate where. even

though evidence was insufficient w sup

port agyravating circumstance of avoiding

or preventing arrest, evidence Supported

agfravating §circumstanees of

atrocious, or cruel killings, premeditation,

Prior convictions, and attempted robbery

West's F.S.A. § 921.14]

_—_—_—_—

heinous.

Steven L. Bolutin, Asst Public Defender,

Tallahassee, for appellant

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen, and Andrew

Thomas, Asst Atty. Gen® Tallahassee. and

Kathryn L. Sands, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jack.

sunville, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Allen Davis appeals his convictions of

murder and sentences of death. We have

jurisdiction, article V, section XbM1), Flor

da Constitution, and affirm the eonvictions

and sentences

The state charged Davis with three

counts of first-deyree murder for the

shooting/beating deaths of a woman and

her five- and ten-year-old daughters in their

heme. The jury convicted him as charged

and recommended the death penalty for

each conviction. The trial court agreed

with the jury's recommendation and im

posed three death sentences.

On appeal Davis claims: (a) the trial

judge abused his discretion (1) by failing to

Grant 4 motion for change of venue, (2) by

denying a motion for indiv idual and seques.

tered voir dire, and (3) by denying a motion

for mistrial based on a witness’ testimony

on redirect examination; (b) the trial judye

erred in denying Davis’ challenge for cause

of one prospective juror; and (c) the prose

cutor's closing argument rendered the pen-

alty proceeding fundamentally unfair. Af

ter considering these points, we find that

no relief is warranted Morvover, our re

view of the record reveals that competent,

Substanual evidence Supports the convic

/ Se

> ~ cece

1

Uons and that the

Prepriate.

11) These murd

19s... the police arr

and w grand jury iy

On August 1i, 19>

for chanve of venus

had recewed Such «

he could not recew

County. Afwr a he:

Ural judye deferred

until an atlempt to

made" Jury selecti:

on January 31, 198%

from hebruary 1 thr

{2} Davis now «

judge's failure to 5

change of venue cor

discretion An appl.

venue is addressed &

cretion, and a trial co:

reversed absent a pal

tion. Straight », AY

(Fla.), cert denied, 45

556, 70 L.Bd.2d 418

State, 378 So.24 274

no such abuse here.

In Manning this «

test for changing w

McCaskill v. Slate, ¢

1977), The Court wer

_ ip applying that test

' @ determination m

, Whether the general

inhabitants of @ com:

_ by knowledge of the

* presented in the cour

$ 378 So 2d at 276. The t

avis did not meet this

13) At the hearing [

detailing media eo

1 A tnal court may wait

' HAA & change of venue ,

a!

‘<a :

a “ . - » i> . 4 3 at. «

*, OE eo m2 ;

' Sa ‘> Sy < ¢,

‘

‘ a »

A .

Lye mer

oe

entenées of death

f three counts of

e where, even

sufficient to Sup

tance of avoiding

idence supported

es of heinous,

ws, premeditation,

tempted robbery.

Public Defender,

a, and Andrew

Tallahassee, and

Atty. Gen., Jack-

is convicuons of

death. We have

"wn 3(bx1), Flori-

“m the convictions

avis with three

murder for the

of a woman and

. daughters in their

'« 3 him as charged

death penalty for

‘rial court agreed

‘ndution and im

cs

im (a) the trial

zs (1) by failing to

« of venue, (2) by

dual and se yes

\ tlenving @ motion

Hitess’ te stumony

v) the trial judge

halletace for cause

and tc) the prose-

rendered the pen

tally unfair. Af.

ts, we find that

Moreover, our re-

that competent,

ors the convic-

> af = ra + ee J

Ce RE DB

7 gust

,

DAVIS v. STATE

Fla. 69

Cite as 461 $0.24 67 (Fla. 1984)

ions and that the death sentences are ap

propriate. \ e

{1} These murders occurred on May 11,

1982, the police arrested Davis on May 13,

and a grand jury indicted him on May 27.

On August 11, 1982 Davis filed a motion

for change of venue, alleging that the case

had recewwed such extensive publicity that

he could not receive a fair trial in Duval

County. After a hearing on August 17, the

trial judge deferred ruling on that motion

until an attempt to select a jury had been

made. Jury selection subsequently began

on January 31, 1983, with the trial lasting

from February 1 through February 4.

[2] Davis now claims that the tnal

judge's failure to grant the motion for

change of venue constituted an abuse of «

disereuon. An applicauon for change of

venue is addressed to a court's sound dis-

cretion, and a trial court's ruling will not be

reversed absent a palpable abuse of discre-

tion. Straight v. State, 397 So.2d 903

(Fia.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct

556, 70 L.Ed.2d 418 (1981), Manning v.

State, 378 So.2d 274 (Fla.1979). We find

no such abuse here.

In Manning this Court reiterated the

test for changing venue as set out in

McCaskill v. State, 344 So.2d 1276 (Fla.

1977). The Court went on to explain that

in applying that test

a determination must be made as to

whether the general state of mind of the

inhabitants of a community is so infected

by knowledge of the incident and accom-

panying prejudice, bias, and preconceived

opinions that jurors could not possibly

put these matters out of their minds and

try the case solely on the evidence

presented in the courtroom.

47% So 2d at 276. The trial court ruled that

Davis did not meet this test, and we agree

(3) At the hearing Davis presented evi-

dence detailing media coverage of the case.

According to this evidence, the bulk of the

publicity on the case appeared from mid

May through early June 1982 with sporadic

1. A tral court may wart dedide whether to

era: nanwe of venue datl alter ap attempt

coverage after that By the time for jury

selection almost nine months had passed

since the murders. Of the forty-some pro

spective jurors called several acknowledged

having heard or read something concerning

the case. Either the defense or the state

used peremptory challenges to excuse

some of these prospective jurors, but the

final jury panel contained several persons

who had some prior knowledge of the case.

All who served on the jury, however, indi

cated affirmatively that any prior knowl

edge could be put aside, that they could

serve with open minds, and that they could

reach a verdict based on the law and the

evidence presented at tria!.

Media coverage and publicity are only to

be expected when murder is committed.

The critical question to be resolved, how-

ever, is not whether the prospecUve jurors

possessed any knowledge of the case, but,

rather, whether the knowledge they pos-

sessed created prejudice against Davis.

Straight. Davis has not shown a commu-

nity “so pervasively exposed to the circum-

stances of the incident that prejudice, bias,

and preconceived opinions are the natural

result.” Manning, 378 So2d at 276.

Moreover, following jury selection, Davis’

attorney announced that he had consulted

that both he and Davis were satisfied with

the jury selection even though they had one

peremptory challe.ge left On the facts

presented here we find that the tra! court

did not abuse its discretion by failing to

grant the motion for change of venue.

{46} Davis also claims that the tnal

court erred by failing to conduct individual

and sequestered voir dire of the prospec:

tive jurors as requested by the defense.

The granting of individual and sequestered

voir dire is within the tral court's dwere

tion. Stone v. State, 37% So.2d 765 (Fla.

1979), cert. denied, 449 US 986, 101 S.Ct

407, 66 L.Ed 2d 2 (1980), Jones rv State,

343 So.2d 921 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert denwd,

352 So.2d 172 (Fla.1977). The pupose of

to seat a jury 1s made =Marning » Ssate, 378

Sw 2d 274 (Fla 1979).

‘A -4%4

‘70 Pia

conducting voir dire is to secure an impar-

tial jury Lewis v. State, 377 So 2d 610

(Fla 1979). Davis has demonstrated nei-

ther the partiality of his jury nor an abuse

of discretion by the trial court, and we find

no merit to this claim

(7-9] As higelast point dealing with the

jury, Davis argues that the trial court

erred by not excusing 3 certain prospective

juror for cause. The competency of a chal-

lenged juror is a mixed question of law and

fact, the determination of which is within

the trial court's discretion. Christopher vr

State, 407 So.2d 198 (Fla.1981), cert de-

med, 456 US. 910, 102 S.Ct. 1761, 72

LEd2d 169 (1982). Manifest error must

be shown before a trial court's ruling wi!

be disturbed on appeal. Jd. “The test for

determining juror competency is whether

the juror can lay aside any bias or preju-

dice and render his verdict solely upon the

evidence presented and the mstructions on

the law given to him by the court.” Lusk

v. State, 446 So.2d 1038, 1041 (Fla.1984)

The prospective juror in question met that

test. When the defense challenged her for

cause the court pointed out that “the last

tue you inquired of her, she said that she

could listen to all of the evidence and ren-

der a verdict based on that, so I will deny

your motion.”

{10} Prospective jurors are frequently

amtuvalent, and their answers, as well as

the questions asked of them, are, some

times, not models of clarity. In such in-

stances, as here, it can be argued that the

words on the cold record have several

meanings and are subject to several inter-

pretations. It is of great assistance to an

appellate court if a trial court states on the

record the reasons for granting or not

granting a challenge for cause, and we

encourage trial courts to do so.

At trial the state called Davis’ father to

testify about a pistol missing from his

home. The following exchange between

the prosecutor and the witness occurred:

Q [Mr. Austin] While—did Allen subse

quently leave with the police to go to the

police station”

A [Donald Davis} Yes.

461 SOUTHERN REPORTER, 24 SERIES

Q Do you know whether he did that

freely and voluntarily or not’

A Yes, he did

Q He did’

A 1 heard him tell [Detective] Kessing

er, “Lat's go take a lie detector test and

get it over with”

Defense counsel then objected to the men

tion of a polygraph examination as being

highly prejudicial and moved for 4 mistrial

After discussion, the trial court denied the

motion and stated: “I don’t think there i

any prejudice. It was mentioned. There is

no evidence that [a polygraph examination}

was given and no evidence tho there is

[sic] any results.” The court then directed

the jury to disregard the witness’ reference

to a lie detector, Davis now claims that

the trial court erred in denying his motion

for a mistrial

{11-13} Unless both sides consent, the

results of polygraph examinations are inad

missible in adversarial proceedings. Walsh

v. State, 418 So.2d 1000 (Fia.1982). Here,

however, neither party sought to have any

such results introduced. The mere mention

of the possibility of a polygraph examina

tion does not compel the granting of a new

trial. See Sullivan v. State, 303 So.2d 632

(Fia.1974), cert. denied, 428 US. 911, 96

S.Ct. 3226, 49 L.Ed.2d 1220 (1976). The

trial court's cautionary instruction to the

jery cured any problem with this witness’

inadvertent reference to a polygraph exam.

ination, and we find no error on this point

{14) As his final point on appeal, Davis

contends that the prosecutor's argument to

the jury during the penalty phase rendered

those proceedings fundamentally unfair

After the jury charge, defense counsel ob-

jected to one of the prosecutor's remarks,

an alleged “golden rule” comment. The

court overruled the objection, finding that

the manner and context of the remark did

not constitute a “golden rule” argument

We agree. The control of commenis in

closing arguments is within a trial court's

discretion, and a court's ruling will not tx

overturned unless a clear abuse is shown

Teffetelier v. State, 439 So2d 840 (Fla

\

1983), cert. denied, —

1430, 79 LEdzd 75

Showing has been ma

115.16] Defense ex

to the other comments

appeal. In the absence

ror the failure to obye

ation of this point on

State, 449 So.2d ¥08 (

State, 438 So.2d 374

nied, — US. —-,

L Ed.2d 725 984) =D.

the comments constity

ror This simply is no

ments had no signifi

Jury's recommendation

posed. They did not r

of the conviction or ser

Even if this prosecu

been objected to there

error committed by +

State rv Murray, 443 :

1954), we stated that *

alone dues not warrant

unless the errors iy

to a fair trial that they

ed as harmiess.” Wey

the error must be so pr

the entire trial as judg

error rule from Chap:

386 US. 18 87 SCe fs

(1967)? Wide latitude i

ing to @ jury. Breed

Se.2d 1 (Pla), cert. den

103 S.Ct. 482, 74 L.Ed

this case the prosecutor

jury to recommend the

we do not find that b

Our review of the recor

prosecutor restricted h.

dence in the record and

ments on that evidence.

ally distinguishable fro

696 F.2d 940 (Lith Cir.

US. —, 3 S.Ct 354

(1983), on which Davis ¢

ecutor pointed out, the

and her two young child

8 terrible crime, and th

2 In Chepmen the Court

+ Sourt must be able ty do

S%e v.

i

hether he did that

y or not?

D * ctive] Kessing-

we detector test and

byected to the men-

.amunation as being

noved for a mistrial

rial court denied the

! don't think there is

mentioned. There is

_ graph examination)

dence that there is

court then directed

e witness’ reference *

vis now claims that

» denying his motion

h sides consent, the

aminations are imad-

proceedings. Walsh

10 (Fla 1952). Here,

sought w have any

1. ‘The mere mention

polygraph examina-

“he granting of a new

State, 303 So 2d 632

+4, 428 US. 911, 96

74 1220 (1976). The

Y struction to the

‘> " with this witness’

‘oa polygraph exam

*. error on this pomt

mt on appeal, Davis

erut~r's argument to

ralty phase rendered

ndatentully unfair

», defense counsel ob

Lroseculors femurks

“ale” comment. The

yeetion, findung that

«xt of the remark did

fon rule” argument

rol of comments in

withon a trial court's

~S ruling wil not be

lear abuse ws shown

‘+c 8 tn ete

DAVIS v. STATE

Che as 461 $0.24 67 (Fla 1984)

1983), cert. denied, — US. ——, 104 S.Ct.

1430, 79 LEd2d 754 (1984) No such

showing has been made here.

115,16] Defense counsel did not object

ww the other comments complained about on

appeal In the absence of fundamental er-

ror the farlure to object precludes consider.

ation of this point on appeal. Bassett r.

Statc, 449 So.2d #03 (Fla.1984), Mason +

State, 438 So.2d 374 (Fia.1983), cert. de-

nied, — US. —, 104 S.Ct 1330, 79

L.Ed 2d 725 (1984). Davis now claims that

the comments constituted fundamental er-

ror. This simply is not correct. The com-

ments had no significant impact on the

jury's recommendation or the sentence im-

posed. They did not go to the foundation

of the convicuon or sentence.

Even if this prosecutor's argument had

been objected to there was no reversible

error committed by the argument. In

State v. Murray, 443 So.2d 955, 956 (Fla.

1984), we stated that “prosecutorial error

alone does not warrant automatic reversal!

. unless the errors involved are so basic

to a fair trial that they can never be treat-

ed as harmless.” We went on to hold that

the error must be so prejudicial as to taint

the entire tnal as judged by the harmiess

error rule from Chapman v. California,

386 US. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed 2d 705

(1967)? Wide latitude is permitted in argu-

ing to a jury. Breedlove v. State, 413

So.2d 1 (Fla), cert. denied, 459 US. 1060,

104 S.Ct. 482, 74 L.Ed 2d 627 (1982). In

this case the prosecutor strongly ured the

jury to recommend the death penalty, but

we do not find that he went overboard

Our review of the record discloses that the

prosecutor restricted his argument to cvi-

dence in the record and to reasonable com-

ments on that evidence This case us factu-

ally distinguishable from Hance v Zent,

696 F.2d 940 (Lith Cw), cert. denied, —

US. —, 103 S.Ct. 3544, 77 L.Ed 2d 1393

(1983), on which Davis relies. As the pros-

ecutor pointed out, the killing of a woman

and her two young children in thei home is

a terrible enme, and the proof aguinst Da-

?_ tO man the Court he! “hat a reviewing

ores Ome sage o cwlvef thor [the

Pe-3

Fla 71

vis was substantial We therefore find no

merit to this point. -

In his sentencing order the trial court

found five apgravating factors (under sen-

tence of imprisonm« nt. previous conviction

of violent felony, committed during course

of a burgiary; heinous, atrocious, or crue},

and cold, calculated, and premeditated) ap

plicable to all three courts of the indict

ment plus one add:tional factor (avoid or

prevent arrest) applicable to the younger

daughter's death. The trial court found

nothing in mitigation

Davis’ appeliate attorney has not chal-

lenged the death sentences. In response to

a@ question asked at oral argument he stat-

ed that he had made a tactical decision not

to do so and gave several reasons for his

decision. First, he said that, in al) candor,

only the cold, calculated, and premeditated

and avoid or prevent arrest aggravating

circumstances could be argued against.

Moreover, because no mitigating circum-

stances existed and because the jury had

recommended the death sentence, the sen-

tence could be sustained even if this Court

found those aggravating circumstances im-

proper. Elledge v. State, 346 So.2d 98

(Fia.1977). Finally, defense counse! stated

that, taking the above into consideration,

he had decided to use his brief to attack the

convictions rather than the sentences, ever

though he disagrees with the sentences.

{17} Section 921.141, Florida Statutes,

however, directs this Court to review both

the conviction and sentence im a death casc,

and we will do so here on our own motwn.

Our review convinces us that ali but one

aggravating circumstance, avo or prevent

afrest, are supported by the record and

that the trial court properly applied them io

Davis. Davis had becn convicted previcus-

ly of several counts of robbery, attempted

robbery, and use of a firearm during coim-

mission of a felumy. At the ume cf these

murders Davis was on parole fron a fif-

teen-year prson sentence. Aduniwnally,

the person who had drepped Davis off so

error) was harmlcw tevend 4 reasnsle

doubt” 386 US at 24 87 S.Ct. at 823.

72 Fla

that he could commit a burglary stated that

when he picked Davis up again Davis had

in his possession a camera of the same

make as one belonging to the family of the

victims which the vicums’ husband and fa-

ther reported as missing after their deaths

The manner and method of these murders

supports the finding of heinous, atrocious,

or crucl—the mother had been beaten over

the head with a pistol almost beyond recoy-

nition, one child was tied up and then shot

twice, and the second child was shot once in

the back and then beaten, all of which

occurred in the mother’s bedroom and the

short haliway to that bedroom. See Breed-

love v. State. The state’s evidence is also

sufficient to support the court's finding of

cold, calculated, and premeditated in ayyra-

vation. Compare Harms v. State, 438

So.2d 787 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, — US

—, 104 S.Ct 2181, 80 L.Ed 2d 563 (1984)

(no evidence of planning, mstruments of

death all from victim's premises) with the

instant case (entering home armed with

pistol and with rope used to bind one of the

victims). We do not find, however, that the

evidence meets the standard of Riley v.

State, 366 So.2d 19 (Fla.1978), and Menen-

dez v. State, 368 So.2d 1278 (Fla.1979), and

we therefore strike the court's finding of

Avoid or prevent arrest in aggravation of

/ the younger child's murder.

In the sentencing order the trial court

Stated: “The Court finds that there are no

statutory mitigating factors existent in this

cause ...." The mitigating evidence was

not restricted to that listed in section 921.-

141, however, and we find the court's fail-

ure to mention nonstatutory mitigating evi-

dence to be merely inartful drafung of the

sentencing order.

Striking one of the aggravating circum-

stances leaves five valid ones for each

count, with nothing in mitigation. We

therefore affirm both the convictions and

the sentences of death

It is so ordered.

BOYD, CJ., and OVERTON, ALDER-

MAN, McDONALD, EHRLICH and

SHAW, JJ., concur.

—~—

461 SOUTHERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES

ADKINS, J., concurs in result only with

the conviction and concurs with the

tence.

sen

J. Robert ROWE, Appeilant,

v.

PINELLAS SPORTS AUTHORITY,

et al., Appellees.

PINELLAS RESORT ORGANIZATION,

INC., et al, Appellants,

v.

PINELLAS SPORTS AUTHORITY,

et al., Appellees. .

Nos. 65322, 65120.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Nov. 9, 1984

Rehearing Denied Nov. 21, 1954

Consolidated appeals were taken from

a judgment of the Circuit Court, Pinelius

County, James B. Sanderlin, J., which vali

dated revenue bonds to be used to firanc

a sports stadium. The District Court of

Appeal, Adkins, J., held that’ (1) ordinance

permitting use of tax revenues to secure

revenue bonds issued for certain projects

including sport stadiums complied with re-

quirements of statute permitting countics

to levy a tourist development tax; (2) Flori:

da law does not require that every substan.

tive provision of a proposed ordinance be

reflected on a referendum ballot; all that is

required is that the voters be given fair

notice of the questiun to be decided; (2)

since Pinellas Sports Authority charter was

enacted by subsequent special act, the au-

thority for pledying of tourist development

tax revenues by county to secure obl,:.-

ons issued by the PSA controlled over any

limitation imposed upon such a pledie by

Statute authorizing eq

ist development tax; ;

Opment tax did not vie

clause of the Flonda (

Affirmed

1. Courts ©2216

District Court of

Jurisdiction over bond

ing, also had jurisdict.

ing declaratory relief,

dated with the bond y

and which involved m:

sues as in the bond vy;

West's FSA. Const A

2. Administrative La:

e121

Languave of Flori¢

MOL api.) to gatherings

members and staff of d

tal entities; furthermor

erings constituted meet

ute, those gatherings -

level of decision-maki:

quired to violate the /

§ 286.011(1).

3. Counties 190(1)

Ordinance permitti:

bues to secure reveny

certain projects includ

* complied with requirem

_Mitting counties to levy

ment tax. West's F.S.,

4. Counties ©1901)

+ Since the full text o

been advertised and d

hearing calied to consid

pertaining to use of to

sufficiently complied w

quirements of the To

Act. Wests F .

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

ALLEN LEE DAVIS,

Appellant, g

v. g CASE NO. 63,374

STATE OF FLORIDA, $

Appellee. :

MOTION FOR REHEARING

Appellant, ALLEN LEE DAVIS, pursuant to Fla.R.App.P.

9.330(a), moves this Court for rehearing in the above-styled

case, and as grounds therefor states:

1. Four of the five issues presented in appellant's

brief - concerning his motion for change of venue, his motion

for individual and Sequestered voir dire, his Challenge for

C“4Se 20 a juror who had “more or less’ mace up her mind about

the case based on pre-trial publicity, and his motion for

mistrial when a state witness referred to a lie detector

test - were interrelated to one another, and each of these

issues was directly related to the pre-trial publicity*in

the case. Appellant's arguments were not primarily based

on the amount of publicity, but rather on the inherently

prejudicial nature of the publicity, and the fact that, as

@ result of the trial court's rulings, it was never ascertained

whether the ten potential jurors, or the four jurors who

actually served, who acknowledged having been exposed to the

publicity were aware of the-Inadmissible and highly prejudicial

information revealed in the media (including the fact that

appellant had taken and failed a lie detector test), or

wnether these jurors had been exposed to certain grossly inflane-

matory editorials, feature articles, and broadcasts (such as

the Rothstein “piece” on TV channel 12, which denounced Parole

authorities for releasing prisoners back onto the streets to

commit crimes, and referred Specifically to Allen Davis as

Aprendi:: 3

a - 6

one who “needed to serve a little more time" and who subse-

quently murdered a child. To briefly recapitulate, the media

exposed the Duval County community to: 1). inadmissible evi-

dence of Davis’ prior criminal record, including convictions

of manslaughter, two armed robberies, and attempted robbery;

2) inadmissible evidence that Davis was od paneho at the time

of the murders; 3) inadmissible evidence that Davis took a

polygraph and failed it; 4) Davis’ statements (the etnieai-

bility of which had yet to be determined) to police, placing

him in the Weiler home at the time the medical examiner

believed the murders occurred, and claiming that he had a

lapse of memory while in the house; 5) ex parte statement

“

of evidence indicative of guilt which the police hud assembicd,

including the facts that a handgun belongins to Davis’ father

was missinc, that a cord found in Davis’ truck matched the

cord which bound Kristy Weiler's wrists, and that police lad

found three eyewitnesses who could pin down Davis’ whereabouts,

one of whom saw him in the neighborhood with a gun in his

hand; 6) statements by state officials expressing their cer-

tainty of Davis’ guilt; that they had the right suspect, and

that they had a “very significant case" against him; 7) state-

ments by police to the effect that Davis' friends or relatives

might interfere with their efforts to find evidence; specifi-

cally the missing handgun; 8) inflammatory commentary strongly

tending to evoke community sympathy for, and identification

with, the victims (and, concomitantly, prejudice against thr

named suspect, Davis), including an article about Kristy's

schoolteacher having to break the news of her death to her

classmates; newscasts emphasizing the reaction of the Weilers'

close-knit, upper-middle class, family-oriented neighborhood

to the horror and senselessness of the crime; references to

Mrs. Weiler's being pregnant at the time of her death;

references to Kristy’s tenth birthday party which was to have

been held the next day; and the medical examiner's emotional

rwagetson as he left the house, and 9) the aforementioned

te

Rothstein "piece." See appellant's initial brief, p.7-18.

2. In its opinion affirming appellant's convictions and

Geath sentences, this Court treats the four issues referred

to above as if they had nothing whatsoever to do with one

another. As to Issue IV, concerning the reference to a poly-

graph examination, the opinion states that "[t]he mere men-

tion of the possibility of a polygraph examination does not

compel the granting of PF new trial," and guotes the trial

judge's comment, in denying the motion for mistrial, “I

don't think there is any prejudice. It was mentioned. There

is no evidence that [a polygraph examination] was given and

no evidence that there is [sic] any results." Nowhere in

the opinion is there any reference to the fact that the news

media (both daily newspapers and local network television)

had revealed that appellant had takcn and failed a polycraph

examination nor is there any recognition of the possibility

that, even if one or more of the jurors who had been exposed

to the media coverage had forcotten about the lie detector

test, the witness’ conment could easily have refreshed their

memories. As to the chance of venue and individual and

Sequestered voir dire issues, the opinion concludes that the

trial court did not abuse his discretion in denying these

motions, without any discussion of the nature and content of

the publicity complained of. In Coveland v. State, So. 2d

(Pla. 1984) (case no. 57,788, opinion filed September 13,

1984), decided less than a month before the Opinion in the

instant case was issued, this Court observed:

In Murphy v. Florida, the United States

Supreme Court said that a defendant might

possibly raise a presumption of partiality

by showing that the general atmosphere of

the community is deeply hostile to him.

Two ways to establish that such hostility

exists are by showiny that there was

intlaummatory publicity and by showing

great aifiiculty in Selecting a jury. App.l-

lant here has failed to establish such

hostility by cither of these methods. As

was the case in ‘urphy, the pretrial pub-

licity here was Tarceoly factual, rathor °

than emotional, in nature and mainl,

occurreu around the time of the crime and

the investigation, several months before :

the trial.

-3-«

a

In the instant case, appellant's arcument was directed

almost exciusively to the first method of establishing communit:

hostility, i.e. by showing that the media coverage was inflan-

matory and highly prejudicial. From a reading of the opinion,

the natural assumption would be that since the Court did not see

fit to discuss the content of the publicity, i+ must have been

(as in Copeland and Murphy) “largely factual, rather than emo-

tional, in nature.” Yet, that is clearly not the case.

3. Undersigned counsel understands that he cannot Gictate

to this Court what facts to put in its opinion and what fac

to leave out. However, a line of questioning which was pursucd

at oral argument in this case illustrates the problem which

concerns him. Undersigned counsel was asked, “How was the pube

licity in this case worse than in Debbert.2* Ungersicned

counsel could only reply to the effect that, "I don’t know hex

the publicity was worse than in Dobbert, because the Cpinion

in Dobbert doesn't indicate what the mature of the publicit;

was. All I can say is cither that the publicity in Debbert must

©

not have been as prejudicial as in the instant case, or else,

if it was as prejudicial, then Dobbert was wrongly Gecided.”

Several years from now, a lawyer from Miami or Tampa or sone-

where may well be asked by this Court, P'How was the publicity

in your case worse than in Davis," and}he will have tc give the

sone lame answer. Appellant submits that the inherently preju-

dicial and inflammatory nature of the media coverage in this

case, combined with the fact that at least ten prospective jurors

and at least four actual Jurors acknowledced exposure to it,

necessitated a change of venue Or, at the very minimum, an

Opportunity to question the jurors outside one another's pre-

sence. The trial ccurt'’s denial of both of these motions

violated appellant's constitutional right to a fair trial by an

voLbert v. State, 328 So.2d $33 (Fla. 1976)

* Oe.

4. In its opinion, this Court said:

Davis' appellate attorney has not challenged

the death sentences. In response to a ques-

tion asked at dral argument he stated that

he had made a tactical decision not to do so

and gave several reasons for his decision.

First, he said that, in all candor, only the

cold, calculated, and premeditated and avoid

or prevent arrest aggravating circumstances

could be argue“ against. Moreover, because

no mitigating circumstances existed and be-

cause the jury had recommended the death ;

sentence, death would still be the appropriate ‘

- penalty even if this Court found those aggrava- ;

ting circumstances improper. Finally, defensee™

counsel stated that, taking the above into

consideration, he had decided to use his bricf

to attack the convictions rather than the.

sentences. We appreciate counsel's candor.

f

This statement is substantially correct, but it contains

One misleading implication which Geeply concerns undersigned

counsel. What undersigned counsel stated at Oral argument,

in response to the court's inquiry, was that he made a tactical

decision not to challenge any of the trial court's findincs of

acgravating circumstances because 1) only two of these findings

could arguably be attacked and one ‘of those (avoid arrest)

a

ppliec to only one of the three death Sentences; 2) the trial

court found no mitigating circumstances, and there was no evi-

Gence from which it could be argued that a miticating circum-

Stance was established as a matter of law; and 3) since the jury

recommended the death penalty and since there were no mitigatins

circumstances found, a challerge to the two arguably improper

aggravating circumstances, even if successful, would be futile

in that this Court could (and, in the undersigned's professional

Opinion, unquestionably would) apply the so-called "Elledce °*

rule"? and affirm the death sentence based on the four remaining

aggravating circumstances. Moreover, undersigned’ counsel con-

cluded, on the basis of the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in

Zant _v. Stephens, 0.8. » 103 $.Ct. » 77 L.E@. 235

(1993), that a federal constitutional challenge to application

of the “Elledce rule” would have no chance of success. Con-

sequently, undersigned ee his efforts on the

2 Elledae v. State, 346 So.2d 998 (Fla. 1977)

.

four issyes relating to the conviction and to the fifth issue

challenging the fundamental fairness of the penalty proceeding

because of the prosecutor's repeated misconduct in closing

argument. ; ‘

Thus, it is true that undersigned counsel conceéed that

because no mitigating circumstances were found and because the

jury nad recommended death, then even if one aggravating circye-

stance (or, in one of the counts, two aggravating circumstances)

was found improper, this Court would still affirm the death

sentences, and could do so without violating existing law.

Unéersigned counsel did not concede, as the opinion seems to

indicate, that “because no mitigating circumstances existed

and because the jury had recommended the death sentence, death

would still be the appropriate penalty even if the Court found

those aggravating circumstances improper.”

This is no mere semantic distinction. Undersicn é counsel

stands by his statement as actually made at oral arcuncert es

&@ legitimate tactical decision based on the current state of

the law and on his assessment of the likelihood of a sicnifi-

cant change in the law. Bowever, if undersigned counsel, while

representing a defendant in a capital case, had conceded that

Geath was the appropriate penalty in the case (which under-

signed Gid not say and does not believe), this would have been

unethical and unprofessional conduct, mot to mention crossly

ineffcctive assistance of counsel. At least four of under-

signed’s colleagues at the Public Defender's Office, includine

Andrew Thomas, who was an Assistant Attorney General at the time

and was undersigned's opponent in the oral argument of this

case, were present at the oral argument, and each of them con-

d undersigned's recollection that he did not tell the

t that cceath was the appropriate penalty in this case.

onseyuently, undersicned counsel respectfully recuests that

this Court listen to the tape recording of the oral argurent,

ang correct its oOpinicr accordingly. ”

\e

a A e a

WHEREFORE, appellant respectfully requests that this

motion for rehearing be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

MICHAEL E. ALLEN

PUBLIC~DEFENDER

SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

s lice “4 Z bos Ot, f

sil - : STEVEN L. BOLOTIN

; q Assistant Public Defender

; Post Office Box 67]

Tallahassee, Florida 32202

(904) 488-2458

Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

T HEPEB

4 RUOREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing has been

tarnished by hand to Honorable Jim Smith, AttorneyfGeneral,

4

The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida, this [% dayAf Octcber,

1934.

c+ . / ‘ eee *- -

ee ey ee 3

STEVEN £. BOLOTI:

Assistant Public Defender

- 7 «

"eo ww

Srpreme Court of Florida

Appellee.

~

THURSDAY, JANUARY 17, 1985

oe CASE NO.

63,374

Circuit Court Case “OO. 32-4752-cr

(Duval County

The Motion for Rehearin

of the revised opinion is hereby denied.

A True Copy

cc:

Append... >

g having been considered in light

i

~~. .

te “o< aa ~*

ve J -t ive>

ye? .

ST e~winv isa >| "ed

Noe - _ id =

pup a! fe mawes

AL

or

Hon. S. Morgan Slaughter, Clerk

Hon. Major B. Harding, Judge

tSteven L. Bolotin, Esauire

Andrew Thomas, Esquire

Kathryn L. Sands, Esquire

Div.

State Attorney Numbe 82-29361 NCA: 6-9-82

IN T. . CIRCUIT COURT OF THE

FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN

AND FOR DUVAL COUNTY,

FLORIDA.

CASE NO.: 82-4752 CF

DIVISION: R

STATE OF FLORIDA

vs

L., —

ALLEN LEE DAVIS vi F J LED

JUN 9 1882

MOTION FOR INDIVIDUAL of,

AND SEQUESTERED VOIR DIRE cites Temcur cover _|

The Defendant, ALLEN LEE DAVIS, by and through the undersigned attorney,

the Public Defender for the Fourth Judicial Circuit of Florida, respectfully moves this

Honorable Court to order that prospective jurors in this cause be questioned in voir dire

individually and out of the hearing of other prospective jurors, for the purpose of

discerning their attitudes relating to engine’ punishment and their knowledge of the case

based upon pre-trial publicity, and asserts the following grounds in support of this motion:

A. In order to obtain a fair and impartial jury, it is absolutely essential to

inquire of each prospective juror about his knowledge of the offense, the parties, and the

witnesses. It is necessary to inquire what the venireman's knowledge is ‘and to ask

questions to determine how that knowledge will affect his deliberations.

1. By explaining what he has heard about the charges or what he

knows about parties or witnesses, & venireman may very likely impart his knowledge to

the other prospective jurors unless there is individual, sequestered voir dire. Such

knowledge, which is often based on opinion, rumors, hearsay, media coverage, and other

sources of inadmissible evidence, can taint the entire venire that is exposed to it and

serve to deny the Defendant a fair trial by an impartial jury. See Russ v. State, 95 So. 2d

594 (Fla. 1957); Moncur v. State, 262 So. 2d 688 (2 DCA 1972); Marrero v. State, 343 So. 2d

883 (2 DCA 1977); Kelly v. State, 371 So. 2d 162 (1 DCA 1979).

2. Whenever there is believed to be 4@ significant possibility that

individual talesman will be ineligible to serve because of exposure to potentially

prejudicial material, the exar ‘nation of each juror with respect to his exposure shall take

place outside the presence of other chosen and propsective jurors. Standard No. 3.4,

American Bar Association, Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press; U.S. ex rel.

Doggett v. Yeager, 472 F.2d 229 (3 CCA 1973)

Apyendix D

Motion for Individual an

Sequestered Voir Dire

Page Two

B. Prospective jurors in capital cases are routinely questioned by the court,

the prosecution, and the defense about their beliefs in the death penalty. Often, this

questioning is of a repeated and prolonged nature. Such questioning about the death

penalty in the presence of the other veniremen focuses attention on penalty before the

defendant has been found guilty. As a result, some jurors may be more likely to believe,

that the defendant is guilty as charged. The influence of this procedure, however subtle,

undermines the constitutional purpose and functioning of the jury in a criminal trial.

"When the case is close, and the guilt or innocence of the defendant is not readily

apparent, a properly functioning jury system will insure evaluation by the sense of the

community and will also tend to insure accurate fact finding. Ballew v. Georgie, 98 S.Ct.

1029 (1978), at p. 1038.

1. Jurors undergoing death-qualification would have reason to infer

that the judge and the attorneys personally believe the accused to be guilty or expect the

jury to come to that conclusion. Only such an inference could serve to explain to the

jurors why so much time and energy are devoted to an extensive discussion of penalty

before trial. Provided with these cues from people who are not only experts in the

courtroom but are also presumably acquainted with all the evidence in the case, the

relevant law, and the "correct" application of the one to the other, death-qualified jurors

may themselves become more inclined to believe that the accused is guilty as charged.

_

Hovey v. Superior of Alameda County, 616 P.2d 1301 at 1348 (Cal. 1980).

2. If a juror is predisposed by the very process of the death-qualifying

voir dire to believe the accused is guilty, the juror will tend, in consequence of that

perspective: (1) to selectively perceive the evidence—e.g., "forgetting," distorting, or

actually failing to perceive evidence which conflicts with his or her

preconceptions; (2) to draw only those inferences from the evidence which supported

those preconceptions and perhaps to "create" data to reinforce those beliefs; and (3) to

evaluate the evidence perceived—e.g., assess credibility of witnesses, weigh the

_* (erences drawn—in a manner which tends to fulfill his or her expectations. Moreover, a

juror who is predisposed to expect a guilty verdict will tend to arrive more readily at the

conclusion that the evidence presented amounts to proof beyond a reasonable coubdt.

Hovey, supra, at 1348.

Mertens fore Devetiw tetas) are? -

Secques

tered Voir Dire a ee

Page Three

3. <A capital jury, which has been predisposed by virtue of the very

process by which it has been selected to think the accused guilty in advance of trial, is

unlikely to function properly or maintain its neutrality. As 4 jury's neutrality decreases,

the quantum of evidence necessary to prove guilty also decreases.

Hovey, supra, at 1349. ;

C. In addition to making a capital jury prone to convict, the non-

sequestered method of death qualification may alter the states of mind of the jurors

exposed to it in ways which make them more likely to impose & death sentence. Death-

qualification of jurors in the presence of other veniremen therefore inhibits the ability of ¢

the jury to perform their constitutionally mandated function to "express the conscience of

the community on the ultimate question of life or death.” Witherspoon Vv. Illinois, 88 S.Ct.

1770 (1968), at p. 1775. "It is, of course, settled that a state may not entrust the

determination of whether a man is innocent or guilty to 4@ tribunal ‘organized to convict.’

(Citations omited) It requires but a short step from that principle to hold, as we do today,

that a state may not entrust the determination of whether a man should live or die to @

tribunal organized to return 6 verdict of death. Witherspoon, Supra, at p. 1776. The

process of non-sequestered death-qualification is constitutionally impermissible because,

as in Witherspoon, it produces a jury "yuneommonly willing to condemn a man to die.”

Witherspoon, supra, at p. 1776. y

1. During 4 death-qualifying voip dire, venirepersons are questioned in

open court about their attitudes toward the death penalty. The fact that the court

dismisses those venirepersons who express unequivocable opposition to the death penalty

is likely to be interpreted by the remaining jurors as an indication that the judge in

particular and the law in general disapprove of such attitudes. Jurors whose scruples

against capital punishment are not so irrevocable as to disqualify them under Witherspoon

feel that in the eyes of the law, their attitudes are improper, or et least suspect. Those

jurors may in consequence feel less willing to express or rely on such attitudes in their

consideration of penalty.

Hovey, supra, at 1350.

2. In a capital voir dire, prospective jurors are repeatedly promptec

to think about the penalty decision they may later be called upon to make. What wa:

—

Motion for Individuel ¢

Sequestered Voir Dire

Page Four

initially regarded as an onerous choice, inspiring caution and hesitation, may be more

readily undertaken simply because of the repeated exposure to the idea of taking a life.

Some jurors initially face the penalty decision with reluctance and aversion. This may

represent a significant viewpoint in the community. A process which systematically

erodes these attitudes would make the jury less representative of the community and

more inclined to impose death.

D. The most practical and effective procedure available to minimize the

untoward effects of death-qualification is individualized sequestered voir dire. Because

jurors would then witness only a single death-qualifying voir dire—their own—each

individual juror would be exposed to considerably less discussion and questioning about the

various aspects of the penalty phase before hearing any evidence of guilt. Such a

reduction in the pretrial emphasis on penalty should minimize the tendency of a death-

qualified jury to presume guilt and expect conviction.

Hovey, supra, at 1353.

E. To deny this motion is to deny the Defendant his right to a fair trial by

an impartial jury comprised of a representative cross-section of the community, in

violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution and Article I, Section 2, 9, 16, and 22 of the Florida Constitution.

F. Should the Court feel thet the allegations in this motion are f..se or of

questionable validity, the Defendant moves for an evidentiary hearing in which the

defense will prove the truth of each and every allegation in this motion.

l. Proof of these allegations will require the use of expert testimony

presented by one or more experts in this area of study.

2. In order that the Defendant may present such expert testimony,

the defense moves for the entry of an order approving the taxing of reasonable costs to

the county for expert — housing, and transportation. ,

3. The Defendant is indigent and has no means to pay for expenses

incurred in an evidentiary hearing.

4. The Public Defender's Office has no budgetary allotment for such

expenses.

Motion for Individua’ 4

Sequestered Voir D.

Page Five

5. To deny the Defendant the expenses necessary to conduct an

evidentiary hearing to prove the allegations of this motion is to deny the Defendant the

effective assistance of counsel, due process of law, and equal protection under the law, in

violation of Article I, Section 9 and 16 of the Florida Constitution and the Fifth, Sixth, and

Fourteenth Amendments to the U. S. Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the Defendant prays this Honorable Court to grant this motion.

Respectfully submitted,

LOUIS O. FROST, JR.

PUBLIC DEFENDER

Robert Link

Assistant Public Defender

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the above and foregoinz Motion for

Individual and Sequestered Voir Dire has been furnished to the Office of the State

Attorney, by hand, this i day of June, A.D., 1982.

tht Fock

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE

FILED

AUG 11 1982

FOURTH JUDICIAB CIRCUIT, IN

AND FOR DUVAL TY, FLORIDA

an

STATE OF FLORIDA \_

VS \' we at '

ALLEN LEE DAVIS a"

‘of nee See

cupen - CIRCUIT count

MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE

Comes now the Defendant,

ALLEN LEE DAVIS, by and through his

undersigned attorney, the Public Defender for the Fourth Judicial Circuit

of Florida, and pursuant to Rule 3.240 of

Procedure,

county within the State of Florida for trial.

this motion, the Defendant,

forth:

1. The Defendant was indicted and charged

of First Degree Murder.

the Florida Rules of Criminal

moves this Court for an order removing this cause to another

As grounds in support of

being duly sworn, hereby deposes and sets

with three counts

2. The death of the Weilers and the arrest of Allen Lee Davis

has been subjected to extensive media coverage via television, radio, and

newspapers in the Duval County area.

3, The State, through its agent,

Office, improperly released to the news media,

the Duval County area, that Allen Lee Davis was

a polygraph examination.

4, The State, through its agent,

Office, improperly released to the news media,

the Duval County area,

as the fact that the Defendant is currently on felony parole.

5, The State, through its agent,

Offi e, improperly released to the news

the Duval County area,

the Jacksonville Sheriff's

which was disseminated in

arrested after he failed

the Jacksonville Sheriff's

which was disseminated in

Allen Lee Davis's prior criminal record as well

,

the Jacksonville Sheriff's

media, which was disseminated in

statements of Allen Lee Davis to representatives

of the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office, placing him at the scene of the murders

at the time the victims were alleged to have been killed.

6. The State, through its agent,

Office, improperly released to the news media,

the Duval County areé,

fiber analysis and the searching of local waters for a weapon.

Popendix ©

Be 3

the Jacksonville Sheriff's

which was disseminated in

certain aspects of the police investigation, to wit:

MOTION FOR CHANGE OF V , ie

P4GE TWO

7. The State, through its agent, the Jacksonville Sheriff's

Office, improperly released to the news media, which was disseminated in

the Duval County area, certain evidence relating to a gun belonging to the

weapon or discription of the weapon i volved in the death the Weilers.

8. The State, through its Bgent, the Jacksonville Sheriff's

Office, released copies of the Arrest ¥

media at first appearance court wherei\

polygraph examination was Contained.

9. The Defendant's arrest, as well as subsequent court

appearances by the Defendant or his counsel, have been reported by the

local news media to the public in the Duval County area.

10. The knowledge of the case and of the Defendant as reported

in the news media is widespread in Duval County. The potential for

prejudice in the community as 4 result of such information or the exposure

to such inadmissible evidnece or testimony is great.

WHEREBY, due to the State's misconduct and the extensive

television, radio, and newspaper coverage, the Defendant, believing that

he cannot receive a fair trial or select an impartial jury in Duval

“County, Florida, because of the members of the community could not put

these matters out of their Minds and try the case solely on the ontianen

presented in the courtroom, respectfully requests that this Court grant

this Motion for Change of VenueNand order the r moval of this cause to

another convenient county where a mpartial trial can be had.

Able VJs ew ae

ACLEN LEE DAVIS ~ ”

STATE OF FLORIDA

COUNTY OF DUVAL

Before me, the undersigned authority, personally appeared ALLEN

LEE DAVIS, who being by me duly sworn, says the statements contained in

the foregoing Motion for Change of Venue are true and correct according

to the best of his knowledge and belief.

MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE

PAGE THREE

Sworn to and subscribed before me

this ¢/ day of August, A,D., 1982.

eat LAME

Rotary Pystic, State of Florida

At Large

My Commission Expires:

NOTARY PUBLIC, STATE OF FLORIDA

My Commissic

y Commission Eapires Apr. 5, 1985 Respectfully submitted,

Bonded by Transamerica Insurance Co

LOUIS 0. FROST, JR.

PUBLIC DEFENDER

OD, ob

Pub¥c Defender

CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH

] HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing Motion for Change of

is made in good faith and not imposed mer

delay.

1 HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the abov

for Change of Venue has been furnished to the Office of the

ely for the purpose of unnecessary

VAL

ar

e and foregoing Motion

State Attorney,

by hand, this [1 say of August, A.D., 1982.

ys Noe beim

\

a

t -

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

ALLEN LEE DAVIS,

Appellant,

v. CASE NO. 63,374

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT

OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,

IN AND FOR DUVAL COUNTY, FLORIDA

INITIAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STEVEN L. BOLOTIN

ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER

SPCOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

POST OFFICE BOX 671

TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32302

(904) 488-2458

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

“72ncix F

TABLE OF CONTENTS

‘TALLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CITATIONS

I PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Il STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

III ARGUMENT

ISSVE I

THE TRIAL COURT

FAILING TO GRAj

CHANGE OF VESCE

BUSED ITS DISCRETION BY

APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR

B. The Nature and Content of the Pre-

Trial Publicity in this Case was so

Irreparably Prejudicial to Appellant's

Fundamental Right to an Impartial Jury,

that Due Process Required a Change of

Venue, with No Requirement that Actual

Prejudice be Demonstrated on Voir Dire

C. The Prejudicial Impact of the Pre-Trial

Publicity was not Cured by the Voir Dire

Examination of Prospective Jurors

ISSUE Il

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN

DENYING THE DEFENSE'S MOTION FOR INDIVIDUAL

AND SEQUESTERED VOIR DIRE.

IssuE U1

THE. TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S

CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE TO PROSPECTIVE JUROR LANE.

ISSUE IV

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN

DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL,

WHEN A STATE WITNESS ON RE-DIRECT EXAMINA-

TION REFERRED TO APPELLANT'S POLYGRAPH

EXAMINATION.

43

50,4

uw

J

ms

TABLE OF CONTENTS ?

(Continued) < ,

PAGE

Ill AKGUMENT (Continued)

ISSUE V

THE PROSECUTOR'S INFLAMMATORY, EMOTIONAL, AND

THOROUGHLY IMPROPER ARGUMEN1 TO THE JURY

RENDERED APPELLANT'S PENALTY PROCEEDING FUNDA-

MENTALLY UNFAIR AND CONSTITUTIONALLY INTOLERABLE> 69

I¥ CONCLUSION 78

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ‘ 79

« ii

TABLE OF CITATIONS

CASES

Agee v. Wyrick, 546 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1976)

Akonom v. State, 394 A.2d 1213 (Md. App. 1978)

Bell v. State, 208 So.2d 474, (Fla. Ist DCA 1968)

Bollinger v. State, 402 So.2d 570 (Fla. Ist DCA 1981)

Breniser v. State, 267 So.2d 23, (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)

Carr v, Watts, 597 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1979)

Custor v. State, 365 So.2d 701 (1978)

Cochran v. State, 280 So.2d 42 (Fla. Ist DCA 1973)

Codie v. State, 313 So.2¢ 754 (Fla. 1975)

Commonwealth v. Barren, 417 A.2d 1156 (Pa. Super. 1979)

Commonwealth v. Casper, 392 A.2d 287 (Pa. 1978)

Commonwealth v. Frazier, 369 A.2d 1224, (Pa. 1977)

Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 372 A.2d 687 (Pa. 1977)

Commonwealth v. Kemp, 410 A.2d 870 (Pa. 1979)

Commonwealth v. Pierce, 303 A.2d 209 (Pa. 1973)

Corona v. Superior Court for County of Sutter, 101 Cal.Rptr. 411

18, (Cal.App. 1972)

Crawford v. State, 321 So.2d 559 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), approved

339 So.2d 214 (Fla. 1976)

Daniels v. State, 108 So.2d 755 (Fla. 1959)

Darden v. State, 329 So.2d 287 (Fla. 1976)

Darden v. Wainwright, 699 F.2d 1031 (11th Cir. 1983)

Daugherty v. State, 17 So.2¢ 290 (Fla. 1944)

Dean v. State, 325 So.2¢ 14 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)

Suse v. United States, 307 F.2d 883 (Sth Cir. 1962)

- iii >

PAGE(S)

74

48,54,57

i

«2

76

76

62,64

p+ oe be . 32

22,24,25,33

62,63

30

75

TABLE OF CITATIONS

(Continued)

CASES

Edwards v. State, 428 So.2d 357 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)

Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976)

Farmer v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 427 So.2d 187 (Fla. 1933)

Frazier v. State, 425 So.2d 192 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)

Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979)

Glassman v. State, 377 So.2d 208 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)

Green v. State, 427 So.2d 1036 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)

Croppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971)

Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d 940 (llth Cir. 1983)

Harper v. State, 421 So.2d 235 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)

Hembree v. State, 546 S.W.2d 235 (Tenn. 1976)

Henley v. State, 576 S.W.2d 66, (Tex. 1978)

Houston v. Estelle, 569 $.24 372 (sth cic. 1978)"

Hoy v. State, 353 So.2d 826 (Fla. 1977)

In re Miller, 109 Cal. Rptr. 648 (Cal.App. 1973)

Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961)

Johnson v. Reynolds, 121 So. 793 (Fla. 1929)

Johnson v. State, 102 So.2d 549 (1924)

Kaminski v. State, 63 So.2d 339 (Fla. 1952)

Kelly v. Stone, 514 F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1975)

Knight v. State, 316 So.2d 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)

Leon v. State, 396 So.2d 203 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1981)

Mackiewicz v. State, 114 So.2d 684 (Fla. 1959)

?

-iv-

PACL(S)

74

68

28,61,64

64

23,41,50

74

74,

22,37

69,73,76,78

74

62

22,27,28,35,3

69.76.77

23,27,35,39,4

22,26,42

21,37,53

53

74

61,62 ,64

69,77

74

38,44,48,53

30

o

TABLE OF CITATIONS

(Continued)

CASES

Maine v. Superior Court of Mendocino County, 438 P.2d 372

(Cal. 1968)

Manning v. State, 378 So.2d 274 (Fla. 1979)

Martinez v. Superior Court of Placer County, 629 P.2d

502 (Cal. 198i)

Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892)

Meade v. State, 431 So.2d 1031 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)

Melton v. State, 402 So.2d 30 (Fla. Ist DCA 1981)

Miller v. State of North Carolina, 583 F.2d 701 (4th Cir. 1978)

Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976)

Nichols v. State, 378 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. 1964)

Oliver v. State, 250 So.2d 888 (Fla. 1971)

Pait v. State, 112 S0.2d 380 (Fla. 1959)

-_- =

Pamplin v. Mason, 364 Feza 1 (5th Cir. 1966)

People v. Boudin, 457 N.¥.S.2d 302, (1982)

People v. Brocato, 169 N.W.2¢ 483 (Mich.App. 1969)

People v. Frechette, 155 N.W.2d 830 (Mich. 1968)

People v. Hogan, 647 P.2d 93, (Cal. 1982)

People v. Schiers, 96 Cal. Rptr. 330 (Cal.App. 1971)

People v. Yatooma, 271 N.W.2d 184 (Mich.App. 1978)

People v. York, 329 N.E.2d 845 (I11.App. 1975)

Peterson v. State, 376 Se.2d 1230 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)

Pollard v. District Court of Woodbury County, 200 N.W.2d 519

(lowa 1972)

Reed v. State, 333 So.2d 524 (Fla. Ist DCA 1976)

-Ve-

PAGE(S)

22,23,26,33

21,24,31,35

24-26,30,31

36

62,64

22,23,37

76,77

22,37

22,25,39

62,63

62

35,63,64

63

- ‘

TABLE OF CITATIONS

(Continued)

CASES FAGE(S)

Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) 21,27 . 33,37

Roleson v. State, 614 S.W.2d 656 (Ark. 1981) 62

Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) 37,41,48,50

Simpson v. State, 352 So.2d 125 (Fla. lst DCA 1977) 76

Singer v. State, 109 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1959) 23,24,31,37,

48,52,74

State v. Barber, 301 So.2d (Fla. 1974) 76

State v. Catanese, 368 So.2d 975 (La. 1979) 28,62

State v. Clark, 319 A.2d 247 (N.J.Super 1974), afi'd 33) A.2d 62,63

257 (N.J. 1975)

State v. Cuevas, 288 N.W.2d 525, (lowa 1980) 22

State v. Davis, 407 So.2d 702 (La. 1981)’ 61,62,64

State v. Descoteaux, 614 P.2d 179 (Wash. 1980) 62,63

State v. Edwards, 412 A.°1 “4 (Maine 1980) 62

State v. Goodson, 412 .©.2d 1077 ‘a. 1982) 38, 39,46-48,5

State v. Luna, 264 N.» %d 485 (S.". 1978) 76

State v. MorriSon, 557 S.. 4 445, (Mo. 1977) 49,54,56

State v. Parsons, 200 A.2d 340 (N.J. Super 1964) 62

State v. Perry, 142 N.W.2d 573 (Minn. 1966) 62-64

State v. Stiltner, 491 P.2d 1043 (Wash. 1971) 22,23,31,32,3

State v. Sutherland, 617 P.2d 1010 (Wash. 1980) eae

State v. Thompson, 123 N.W.2d 378 (Minn. 1963) 25

State v. Wilson, 202 S.E.2d 828 (W.Va. 1974) oo

Stewart v. State, 51 So.2¢ 494 (Fla. 1951) 74

Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) 54,57

- vi -

CASES

TABLE OF CITATIONS

(Continued)

Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. (1978)

United States

United States

United States

United States

United States

United Stutes

United States

United States

United States

United States

United States

United States

Vv.

Vv.

Vv.

Vv.

Vv.

Vv.

Vv.

Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1982)

Chagra, 669 F.2d 241 (Sth Cir. 1982)

Davis, 583 F.2d 190 (Sth Cir, 1978)

Garza, 608 F.2d 659 (Sth Cir. 1979)

Gerald, 624 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1980)

- Hawkins, 658 F.2d 279 (Sth Cir. 1981)

- Mobley, 656 F.2d 988 (Sth Cir. 1981)

- Nell, 526 F.2d 1223 (Sth Cir. 1976)

- Rucker, 557 F.2d 1046 (4th Cir. 1977)

Turner, 558 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977)

Williams, 523 F.2d 1203 (Sth Cir. 1975)

Vacendak v. State, 340 N.E.2d 352 (Ind. 1976)

Walsh v. State, 418 So.2d 1000 (Fla. 1982)

Williams v. State, 375 N.E.2d 226 (Ind. 1978)

Worthen v. State, 399 A.2d 272 (Md.App. 1979)

- vii -

\

- Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233 (7th Cir. 1979)

PAGE(S)

21,33,68

23,37,39,46,

49,50

23

49,54,57

46

44,48,49,57

49,54,57

22

62,63

60,62,63

61,62

54

IN THE SUPRE“E COURT OF FLORIDA

ALLEY LIE DAVIS,

Appellant, :

Vv. CASE NO. 63,374

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

DIITUAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT

I PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Appellant, ALLEN LEE DAVIS, was the defendant in the trial court and

will be referred to in this brief as appellant or by his proper name.

Appellee, the State of Florida, was the prosecution, and will be referred

to as the state. The record on appeal will be referred to by use of the

symbol "R". The transcripts of the pre-trial, jury selection, trial,

penalty, and sentencing proceedings will be referred to by use of the

symbol “T". All emphasis is supplied unless the contrary is indicated.

II STATEXENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

Allen Davis was charged by indictment returned May 27,°1962, with three

counts of first degree murder, in the deaths of Nancy, Kristina, and

Katherine Weiler (R-55-57). The Public Defender was appointed to represent

him (R-3).

On August 11, 1982, the defense filed a motion for change of venue,

asking that the trial be moved from Duval County (R-205-223). After a

hearing on August 17, 1982, the trial court, over defense objection, deferred

ruling on the motion until an attempt had been made to select a jury in

Duval County (T-271-72).

ee Yo

C (

On September 17, 1982, the defense moved to suppress certain statczents

and admissions allegedly made by appellant to police officers (R-237-38).

After a hearing on November 8-9, 1982, the trial court denied the moticn

to suppress these statements (R-259,268).

On Septamber 21, 1982, the Public Defender's Office filed a certifica-

tion of conflict ani motion to withdraw fram representation of appellant

(R-239). The trial court granted the motion to withdraw on October 5, 1982,

ans appointed Frank Tassone, Jr. to represent appellant (R-244, T-307).

Tnirce days later, the Public Defender's Office asked to re-appointed,

as the claimed conflict had turned out not to exist ( The trial

court Ceclined to re-appoint the Public Defender's Office (R-247). On

January 7, 1983, Mr. Tassone filed a Notice of Adoption of Previously Filed

Motions, in which he adopted, inter alia, the motions for change of venue

and for individual and sequestered voir dire which had previously been filed

by the Public Defender's Office (R-269).

Immediately prior to jury selection on January 31, 1982, the trial

court denied the defense's motion for individual and sequestered voir dire

(R-287, T-532). A jury was empaneled, and the case proceeded to trial

before Circuit Judge Major B. Harding on Raieunry 1-4, 1983.

The state presented thirty-four witnesses, including John Weiler,

husband and father of the victims, who testified that a Nikon 35 millimeter

camera was missing from his hame (T-840-41); Dr. Bonafacio Floro, the

~ ,

Due’ to th> anticipated length of this brief, and since appellant is net

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on arreal, the fol lowi

summary is not intended to be a complete statement of the evidence. The

facts of the case, as they relate to the particular issues faised, will he

set forth in the appropriate section of argument.

-2-

ie

4 (

assistant medical examiner, who determined that Nancy Weiler dicd as a

result of multiple blunt impacts to the —_ (T-975); Kristy Weiler had

been shot in the head and chest (T+997); and Kathy Weiler had been shot

in the lower back, and had also received several lacerations of the head

(T-1010-12); police officers Charles Kessinger, Derry Dedmon, Ray Snith,

and Leroy Starling who testified with respect to statements allegedly

mace by appellant, in which he adnitted being in the Weilers' house,

that he did not remember everything that happened there, and that he

"could have” taken his father’s gun with him [See Issue IV, infra); police

officers, including Kessinger and others, who testified with regard to

items of physical evidence seized from appellant, including a rope taken

from the back of his truck (T-1067-68) and articles of clothing taken from

his apartment (T-1169); Donald Davis, appellant's father and the next-door

neighbor of the Weilers, who testified that he told Detective Kessinger

that his .357 Ruger Black Hawk pistol, which he had placed on top of his

refrigerator a week or two before. the murders, was missing (T-1262-70);

Gloria Lee, Angelo Giovagnoli, and Ginny Baumgartner, neighbors of the

Weilers who testified that they saw appellant walking in the neighborhood

around the time of the murders; Paul Doleman, a forensic serologist,

who testified that blood found on one of appellant's boots and on one of his

shirts was not consistent with appellant's blood but was consistent with

Nancy Weiler's blood (T-1429-31); David varniment, an FDOLE firearms

examiner, who examined the metal fragments of five semi-jacketed bullets

which had been found in the Weiler hame, and determined that they were most

consistent with having been fired fram a .357 magnum Ruger Black Hawk,

Single-action revolver (T-1483-84); Warniment also examined several other.

metal fragments found at the scene of the murders and determined that

o3«

~~

4

C (

these fragments were consistent with once having been part of a Ruger Black

Hawk single action revolver (T-1503); Richard Padon, a friend of appellant's,

who testified that he drove appellant to his father's house for the purpose

of camitting a burglary in the neighborhood, and that when he later picked

appellant up, he had three paper bags with him, one of which contained a

35-millimeter Nixon camera (T-1520-21, 1529-31); Mary Lynn Henson, a

microanalyst with the FDLE, who stated her opinion that the piece of rope

with which Kristy Weiler's wrists were bound was at one tim attached to

a piece of rope seized from appellant's truck (T-1582); and Donald Havekcst,

a neutron activation analyst with the FBI, who stated his opinion that the

bullet fragments found in the Weiler home came fram the same source of

lead as the eighteen live cartridges contained in Donald Davis' ammunition

box (T1603).

Tne jury returned verdicts finding appellant guilty as charged on

all three counts of first degree murder (R-301-03, T-1770).

The penalty phase of the trial was conducted on February 9, 1983.

The jury recommended imposition of the death penalty on all three counts

(R-308-10, T+1849-51).

On March 2, 1983, the trial court adjudicated appellant guilty on

each of the three counts (R-316), and imposed three sentences of death

(R-218-20). The court, found, as aggravating circumstances, (1) that the

crimes were committed while under sentence of imprisonment (referring to

the fact that appellant was on parole), (2) that appellant was

previously convicted of prior violent felonies, (3) that the crimes were

committed during the course of a burglary, (4) (as to the murder of Kathy

Weiler only) that the crime was committed for the purpose of avoiding arrest,

(5) that the crimes were especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, and (6)

that the crimes were committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner

(R-324-28). ‘The ---->1 court found no mitigating factors (R-323-24).

. wee’ UL @ppe. «/t' “iled on March 3, 1983 (T-331)}.

i

ILI ARGUMENT

ISSUE 1

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING

TO GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE

A. The Nature of the Pre-Trial Publicity

Allen Davis was placed under arrest for the Weiler murders in the

early morning of May 13, 1982 (R-1-2, T-1078). The probable cause state-

ment in the arrest report includes the follewing remarks:

Allen Lee Davis admitts (sic) being at the

victims home at approx. time of their death,

8 P.M. 11 May 1982. Allen Lee Davis failed

a polygraph examination conducted by the Jax.

Sheriff's Office.

(R-2).

On August 11, 1982, the defense filed a motion for change of venue,

which contained the following allegations:

1. The Defendant was indicted and charged with three

counts of First Degree Murder.

2. The death of the Weilers and the arrest of Allen

Lee Davis has been subjected to extensive media

coverage via television, radio, and newspapers in

the Duva] County area.

3. The State, through its agent, the Jacksonville

Sheriff's Office, improperly released to the news

media, which was disseminated in the Duval County

1

While it is true that Davis admitted being in thg-Weiler home at around

8:00 P.M., and that he did not recall everything that happened there,

he did not admit to committing the murders or being aware of them (see

T-1061-62,1200,1214). Therefore, it appears that Detective Kessinger

juxtaposed Davis' admission of being in the house at 8:00 with someone

else's (presumably the medical examiner's) conclusion about the time

of death. [Dr. Floro testified at trial that the time of death was bet-

ween 6 P.M. and midnight (R-964)]. Accordingly, the statement in the

arrest report subtly implies that Davis admitted to an awareness of the

time of death, and thus to an awareness of the murders. This potentially

misleading implication was compounded . adred-fold in a television

newscast which stated, inter alia, that "[Davis] was in the presence

of the victims at the time of their death and he admits to this and

he has also failed the polygraph test" (T-145).

C : (

area, that Allen Lee Davis was arrested after he

failed a polygraph examination. ~

4. The State, through its agent, the Jacksonvilie

Sheriff's Office, improperly released to the news

media, which was disseminated in the Duval County

area, Allen Lee Davis's prior criminal record as well

as the fact that the Defendant is currently on felony

parole.

5. The State, through its agent, the Jacksonville

Sheriff's Office, improperly released to the news

media, which was disseminated in the Duval County

area, statements of Allen Lee Davis to representatives

of the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office, placing him at

the scene of the murders at the time the victims

were alleged to have been killed.

6. The State, through its agent, the Jacksonville

Sheriff's Office, improperly released to the news

media, which was disseminated in the Duval County

area, certain aspects of the police investigation, to

wit: fiber analysis and the searching of local waters

for a weapon.

7. The State, through its agent, the Jacksonville

Sheriff's Office, improperly released to the news

media, which was disseminated in the Duval County

area, certain evidence relating to a gun belonging

to the Defendant's father being reported missing,

which was consistent with the weapon or discription

of the weapon involved in the death of the Weilers.

8. The State, through its agent, the Jacksonviile

Sheriff's Office, released copies of the Arrest and

and Booking Report to the news media at first appear-

ance court wherein the information regarding the

polygraph examination was contained.

9. The Defendant's arrest, as well as subsequent court

appearances by the Defendant or his counsel, have been

reported by the local news media to the public in the

Duval County area.

10. The knowledge of the case and of the Defendant

as reported in the news media is widespread in Duval

County. The potential for prejudice in the community

as a result of such information or the exposure to

such inadmissible evidence or testimony is great.

(R-205-06).

N

C. C

Appended to the motion was an affadavit of Assistant Public

Defender Anthony Zebount, stating that he personally observed Sheriff's

Office employees tendering copies of the arrest report, which contained

references to Davis' having failed a polygraph and to his statements

placing him in the Weiler home, to television and radio personnel

at Davis’ bond hearing (R-208). Also included were affadavits of

fifteen Duval County attorneys, who stated their opinions that Allen

Davis could not obtain a fair and impartial jury in the county as ‘

result of extensive newspaper publicity and T.V. and radio coverage

of the case, and specifically the exposure of members of the community

to the inadmissible evidence of Davis’ having failed a polygraph

examination (R-209,210,211,212,213,214,215,217,218,220,223), and his

prior record of violent erties (R-213,217,218,219,223), and to the

dissemination of statements concerning Davis’ presence at the crime

scene at the time of the offense (R-222).

At the hearing on the motion, the defense introduced an audit

report showing the daily circulation of the Jacksonville newspapers.

These figures were: Times-Union-115, 666; Journal-43,600; Saturday-

132,279; Sunday 146,423 (T-128-29). Certain eniupepet articles were

introduced into evidence as Defendant's Exhibit 4 (t-130).

The ‘Jacksonville Journal of May 13, 1982 contained an article

headlined "Suspect charged in triple murder", which included a photo-

graph of police and funeral home employees removing the bodies of

Mrs. Weiler’ and her daughters from their home (R-50). The article

stated,inter alia:

1.5

The exhibits introduced at the change of venue hearing will be trans-

mitted to this Court. Two of the newspaper articles contained in exhibit

4 can also be found at pages 50-51, 53-54 of the record.

efe

Polic( aid records indicate Davis, a ( p-

yard Weader, was arrested in 1965 at Bangor,

Maine, for assault and in 1966 in Baltimore, Md.,

for involuntary manslaughter with a vehicle.

Duval County Circuit Court records show he was

sentenced to a total of 15 years here in 1973

after being convicted of two robberies and an

attempted robbery. It could not be determined

today if Davis served any time in prisonon those

convictions.

(R-50, see T-130).

The suspect agreed to take a lie detector test

and tailed it, officers said. They declined

to reveal the test questions.

Homicide Detective Charles Kesinger said Davis

told him he had seen Mrs. Weiler early Tuesday

evening, the time members of the Duval County

Medical Examiner's Office believe the killings

occurred.

(R-51, see T-130-31).

The Journal of May 13, 1982 also contained an article headlined

"Explaining girl's slaying a tough job for teacher." The article dealt

with the trauma faced by Kristy Weiler's fifth grade teacher, in breaking

the news of Kristy's murder to her classmates. It read, in part:

Kristina, who was called "Kristy", was a

bouncy, "cheerleader type" who enjoyed

doing handicrafts with her mother, Ms.

Robichaud said. She had been selected by her

classmates as the March "Supercitizen,"

said school Principal Marilyn Duncan.

Yesterday would have been Kristy's 10th birth-

day. She had planned a birthday party at

her home after school, and her class was

taking a field trip to the zoo.

"They were having a disco party for her

birthday. The invitations were so cute,

she wrote them herself and said, ‘Be sure

to wear your disco clothes.' Eddie (a

classmate) was so upset because he forgot

his dancing shoes," Ms. Robichaud said.

(Defendant's Exhibit 4, p. 4).

a ee ae

—_—¥

)

e.- (

“We did not tell that Kristy was the one

that died,” Mrs. Duncan said, adding that

the children were told the birthday party

had been canceled because of a death in the

family “so these children wouldn't go over

and run right into the tragedy and.all that

would be connected with it."

Ms. Robichaud said Kristy's classmates did

not seem satisfied with the explanation.

"They wanted to know who had died and I said,

"I don’t know.’ They wanted to know if the

party would be held.

“They said, "Why is your nose so red? Why

have you been crying? They know something

is wrong, and I hope the parents are under-

standing abcut it. I feel sorry for those

parents,” Ms. Robichaud said.

But she knows she will have to’do some ex-

plaining to her class today.

"I'm going to be very honest with them. They're

going to be very scared, horribly scared. They're

going to want comforting and they're going to

want to know why it happened.

“I'm going to try to make it a normal day...

with a lot of silent meditation."

(Defendant's Exhibit 4, p. 5).

The Times-Union of May 13, 1982 reported the reaction of Dr.

Bonafacio Floro, the assistant medical examiner:

When Floro left the house yesterday after-

noon, he wiped tears from his eyes and brushed

asiie reporters’ questions until he bad made a

preliminary examination. j

He was visibly shaken.

"It was because there were kids involved and

the way they were killed,” Floro, himself

the father of three children, a girl, 12,

and two boys, 4 and 7, said later. ~

"You get emotional for anybody who had kids

that died. They're so innocent; they did not

know what was going on," he said.

(Defendant's Exhibit 4, p. 6).

. se 9 i

4 (

The Times-Union of May 14, 1982 contained an article headlined

“Welder held in slayings of mother, 2 daughters," featuring a large

photograph of Allen Davis in handcuffs (R-53, see T-131). The story

. ’

begins "A 37-year old welder who was paroled from prison in 1979 ...

(R-53). Davis is described as a 6-foot 340-pound individual aicknamed

"Tiny" (R-53). The article continues:

Circuit Court records showed that Davis

Pleaced guilty in 1973 to armed robbery,

attempted armed robbery and carrying a

concealed firearm, and that Circuit Judce

R. Hucson Oliff sentenced him to 15 years

in prison.

Davis was paroled Sept. 25, 1979, after

serving most of the six years at Doctors

inlet Read Prison in Clay County, said David

Skipper, a spokesman for the state Department

of Corrections in Tallahassee.

He was paroled because he had a clean disci-

plinary record, good progress reports and

showed a favorable prison adjustment, Skipper

said.

Court officials said Davis also was convicted in

1966 in Baltimore of involuntary vehicular man-

Slaughter for which he was sentenced to three

years.

And in 1961, Davis was convicted in Bangor,

Maine, of assault and battery and was sentenced

to six months to three years. Fr

(R-53-54, see T-131-32) ,

Davis came under suspicion about eight hours

after the bodies were found at 11 a.a. Wednesday,

police said? .

He was estioned by homicide detectives Wednesday

night and voluntarily submitted to a lie-detector r

test, said homicide Lt. jim Suber. He was arrested

— ES — ---

and booked about ? a.m. yesterday.

eM ;

C (

Davis’ pickup truck, which was found near the

Weilers' house, was examined for physical evi-

dence.

“We got this thing under heavy investigation,"

Suber said yesterday. “We're trying right now

to tie some loose ends. We haven't found the

gun, and we can’t comment on the evidence we have."

(R-54, see T-132).

On May 18, 1982, the Jacksonville Journal published an article

headlined “Alligator impedes probe." This article concerned police

efforts to recover the murder weapon, a pistol. Divers were searching

several bodies of water, and there were apparently allisators in the

locations being searched. Homicide detectives said they didn’t know.

anything about alligators:

"I'm not verifying the information," Lt.

Jim Suber said. "We're searching four

or five bodies of water. This is just one

more place." ,

Suber said any comments could hinder the

investigation and that if anything were

printed, a guard would be placed in the area

being searched to prevent anyone from tampering

with evidence that might be found there.

“Whoever knows where that gun is, knows where

the water is" he said.

"You can never know for sure what people will do.”

Suber said his fears were not that another

Suspect might be at large, but that relatives

or friends of Allen Lee Davis, the 37-year old

Shipyard welder charged with the triple slavincs

could try to prevent investigators from discovering

evidence.

(Defense Exhibit 4, p. 12, see T-133).

The defense called as a witness Steven Crosby, assistant new.

director at WIXI Television, Chunne! S, who presented “dives” ccide

taped segments which appeared on the air) from newscasts concerai:

the Weiler murders (T-138-42). One of these newscasts announced:

Other

COM™ENHLAry:

C f°

Thirty-seven-year-old Allen Lee Davis booked )

into the Duval County Jail early this morning; j

he's charged with triple murders of Nancy

Weiler and her two children, ten-year-old

Christina and five-year-old Kathy.

Early in the investigation, attention focused

on this man, Allen Lee Davis, the son of the /

wWeiler's next-door neighbor. After questioning J

Davis, police found substantial evidence in both 4

the suspect's truck and, upon investigation cf 4

the house, linking him to the crime. aw

a ae CES . y

He was in the presence of the victims atthe tiné 5

of their death and he admits to this gad he-fas"

alio tailed the polygraph test.

According to the police, Davis agreed to be inter-

viewed at the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office. This

is not his first brush with the luw. Police say he

Was out on parole and has a lengthy criminal record.

He is scheduled to be arraigned later this morning.

Jeti Silverstein, Channel 4; Eyewitness news.

(1-145).

channel 6 broadcasts carried the tollowing information an

The neighborloud in this community ds a very clore-

Knit group. Tue only word is horrible. That is the

waly word. Things like this don't happen in a nice

neighborioud an! this is a nice neighborhood and thev

were nice people.

Twelve-yeat-old blank blany was invited to the birth-

day patty planned for Cristina. She would have been

ten yeats old. I! got off of the bus and I didn't

want Co Bellese it at first. fe's Kind of senseless

but 3 foutd out it was | crime.

(i-be5).

Ths cite was faiied wating ty. Be ts the ton @i the

cf the Wetton i” next-tout mesehbet. Folice sa. they

foun «eee Simiseat te tat red $e bing the wticts

ef She metbes « hide $o the Cheri ties sicker. thes

Paths Mamie. $2 5 oe tas oe Sez et yet bees fear,

ee 6 6 ems Cee sp emme ee oe

‘

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Davis today has been charged with murder at 3:00

o'clock this morning, after he flunked a lie

detector test. Davis had already been convicted

of assault and disorderly conduct. He was out on

parole for armed robbery. Fellow shipyard workers

and friends give a completely different picture

of Davis. They say he isa good natured man who loves

children, a good co-worker. They say they can't

believe he is a man who could be guilty of comuittin:

three murders.

Bill Palmer worked with Davis two years says he's

okay, he loved to sit down and talk about hunting,

fishing and back in Maine, that's where he's from.

I can't believe chat this happened. I can't believe

it's true. I am sick about this whole thing. Since

leaving the North Florida Shipyard in the fall, friends

say Davis worked in other shipyards. They say he

was laid off a few weeks ago. Davis shared his Arlirg-

ton apartment with Mary Collins. It's unbelievable.

I can't believe it. 1 really can't. Especially when

it comes to children, I can't believe he would do

something like that. I really don't believe he did

ic.

John Weiler is staying with friends after flying back

from Pittsburgh yesterday. -He said he is trying to

make funeral arrangements for his family so brutally

taken away from hin.

Wynn Farley, Cha:nel 4 Eyewitness News.

(T-146-47).

There might have been some doubt in people's ginds,

there was no doubt in our mind now that we have the

right suspect. Lt. Suber would not comment on the

circumstances but here's what we know of evidence from

the individuals close to the investigation: During

several hours of questioning in the interrogation room,

the police said Davis told them he was in the Weiler

hone the night of the murders but also said he had

a lapse of memory. The detective that made up the

arrest report wrote Allen Davis stated he could not

remember everything that happened while he was at the

victims’ home.

The Duval County Medical Examiner put the time of death

somewhere between 7:30 and 9:00 o’clock.® John Weiler

told pelige he talked with his wife on the phone at

a quarter of 7:00 while she was preparing dinner.

A neighbor said she called the Weiler home at 8:15

C C

and there was no answer. Davis, himself told the

police he was in the house around 8:00 o'clock. Police

first questioned Davis as a possible suspect witness

when his father, the Weiler's next-door neighbor,

reported his gun missing.

The petite believe the gun to be the same kind that

the suspect used. They think it was a .257 caliber

revolver like this one as fragments of the wood fron

the murder weapon were found by the victims which

were pistol whipped.

Sources close to the investigation say the pistol was

a Black Hawk .357 Magnum. The insignia was all that

was found at the scene that would make it the same

type gun Davis’ father reported missing. The whereabouts

of the actual murder weapon remains a mystery.

Among evidence taken from the truck was nylon cord

believed to be identical to one of the cords used

to tie up one of the children. Detectives secured

the scene at the time and Davis' apartment, looking

for physical evidence. Their findings were brought

here to the Jacksonville Crime Lab where they will

look for fibers, hair and do ballistic tests.

I think we have a very significant case against him at

this point and I hope to have even a better case at

trial time based on physical evidence and witnesses.

Davis’ attorney said he will ask the Court to move

the case out of Jacksonville. We predict it wili

be a very sensitive case.

Denny Silverstein, Channel 4 Eyewitness news.

(T-147-49) .

The video tape next depicted Allen Davis, handcutfed, wearing a

baseball cap, and flanked by two officers, apparently being transported

to the Duval County Jail during the night time (T-147).

The Channel 4 stories concerning the Weiler murders were aired

at noon, 6:00 p.m., and 11:00 P-™., and some may have appeared on more

than one newscast (T-142,150). According to an Arbitron survey covering

the period from April 28 - May 25, 1982, Channel 4 News had a potential

@lé<

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weekday viewing audience” of 55,000 households or 72,000 persons for

the noon broadcast, 109,000 households or 174,000 persons for the 6:00

p.m. broadcast, and 56,000 households or 92,000 persons for the 11:00

p.m. broadcast (T-150-51). Crosby indicated that this survey would

include Duval County, and the surrounding counties of Baker, Bradford,

Clay, Columbia, Nassau, and Putnan.”

Gerry Howard, news director of WJKS-TV, Channel 17, presented four

taped news broadcasts concerning the Weiler murders. ie estimated that,

altogether, these stories would have been aired a dozen or more tines

(T-157,163). The third newscast, which was aired on May 13, 1982 az

6:00 p.m., again at 11:00 p.m., and on Newswatch 17 update the following

morning (T-161, see T-157), related the following information:

Davis was charged with the murders early this

morning after four hours of interrogation.

Police said he voluntarily submitted to a lie

detector test and failed. Other evidence includes

rope found in the batk of pickup which may have

been used to tie the hands of Kathy Weiler who

was found shot to death. Police say Davis who

was denied bond admitted being in the house

around 8:00 p.m. Wednesday night.

e

Davis had been cpnvicted twice and released from

Raiford in 1969.

(T-162). : Ms

- . . . . . .

2

Crosby detined his potential viewing audience” as the number of house-

holds which, there would be sed reason to believe, would have televisicn

sets tuned to Channel 4 WS” «| a particular time (T-151).

3

The population of Duval County, g@ccording to the 1950 census, was

570,981. The combined populatiof oi the six other counties was 221,206.

According to voter registration statistics submitted by the defense, there

were 251,304 registered voters (and thereiore 251,304 potential juror.)

in Duval County as of August 4, 1982 (T-126).

“

This date is incorrect. Davis was paroled from the Florida Prison svysten

in 1979. (Sve R-325, T-1785). The child whose hands were bound was Kristy

Weiler.

e 1§8 «

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Richard Padden? said he had spoken to Davis around

6:00 p.m. Tuesday might just about two hours before

the murders were committed. He shook my hand and

told me any time I needed anything, give him a

holler. Did he indicate to you why he was in such

a good mood? No. Looked like to me he had been out

working. Police are searching the waters in back

of the Weiler home in hopes of finding the murder

weapon.

(T-162-63).

Howard indicated that approximately 20,000 people see the 6:00

P-m. newscast on Channel 17, and approximately 19,000 people see the

11:00 p.m. newscast (T-159-61). Channel 17's signal encompasses a

five-county area, including Duval, Clay, St. John’s, Baker, and

Flagler” (T-1°5).

Irene Shubert, administrative assistant to the news desk at WTLV-

TV Channel 12, presented several video taped news segments on the Weiler

murders. The first story was aired at toon on May 12,°1982, and included

the following comment (which was repeated during the 6:00 p.m. broadcasi):

The neighbors were in total shock, completely

wiped out. We never had anything happen before

like this. I have been in the Military but not

next door -- the murders came on the morning eve

of the celebration that was the birthday of nine-

year-old Christy Weiler.

(T-169).

On “Good Morning, Jacksonville” on May 13, an information officer

5

RicWard Padon testified at trial that he drove Davis to Davis'

father's house to commit a burglary in the neighborhood; that he later

picked Davis up; and that Davis had three brown paper bags, one of

which contained a Nikon camera (T-1518-35). Padon did not mention

any of this to police until September, because he did not want to get

involved (T-1535).

6

The combined 1980 population of the four surrounding counties is

144,557, compared to Duvai's $70,981.

=)

1

( (

from the Sheriff's Department was shown making the statement:

Time of death, according to Medical Examiner, was

approximately 5:00 p.m. At that porticular tire,

he was in the company of victims.

T-170).

Another Channel 12 newscast, apparently aired on June 9, 1932

(see T-173), conveyed the following information to viewers:

- there were not just three deaths on May 11.

Mrs. Weiler was pregnant at the time. The

pregnancy is early and it is unlikely another

murder charge will result.

The police now have three witnesses that can

pin down Davis’ whereabouts on the dav of the

murders. One neighbor apparently spotted Davis

near where the murders occurred with a gun in

his hand. Neither the police nor the Public

Detender or prosecutor would have any comment

or action.

Assistant State Attorney Raiph Greene would

not comment on Davis’ case but he would talk

about the use of hypnosis testimony in court.

We're not talking about hocus pocus, you know,

of a carnival show; it's well recognized,

well thought of technique to help a person

remember.

But the case against the unemployed shipyard

worker is growing more complicated, one that the

defense feels would have to be decided out-

side of Duval County.

(T-172).

In July, 1982, Channel 12 broadcast an editorial piece by Allen

Rothstein:

’

The murder occurred while Davis was out on parole.

Alien Lee Davis is accused of killing a Jacksonville

mother and her two children while out on parole for

armed robbery this year. I think that he needed to

serve a little more time than three years. I mean,

that was a child that he first killed. He was in court

today trying to stop the prosecution from using an

aileged conviction but he has not yet been tried for

the second trial -- (inaudible) parole and probation

elf

people are letting people out on the streets too

early, that he's got a criminal gut there on the

street. -"

Mistakes are made but -- we cannot predict what a

person will or will not do. We try to make the

best judgment we can based on the information that

we have (inaudible). Why should I agonize over

a sentence if they're going to take them over there

in due time and re-sentence them, why don't we try

them and say you all do what you want to with them?

Channel 12, Allen Rothstein.

(T-173).

According to an Arbitron survey, there are 169,000 households in

the WILV viewing area. The estimated viewing audiences for the news

broadcasts are: Good Morning, Jacksonville - 10,000 households; noon -

15,000; 6:00 p.m. - 40,000; and 11:00 Pp-m. = 33,000 (T-174). Stories

are sometimes broadcast on more than one news program (T-167). The

Station's major market is Duval County; its signal reaches into south

7

Georgia and Clay, Nassau, and Baker Counties.

Arguing in support of the motion for change of venue, defense

ccunsel asserted that the extensive pre-trial publicity in this éase

was irreparably prejudicial in that it exposed the Duval County comn-

unity to 1) inadmissible evidence of Davis' prior criminal record,

including convictions of manslaughter, two armed robberies, and attempted

robbery (T-163,136,187); 2) inadmissible evidence that Davis was on

parole at the time @ the wurders (T-184,185,186); 3) inadmissible

evidence that Davis: to»! a polygraph and failed it (T-183,184,185,186,137);

4) Davis’ statements (tie admissibility of which had yet to be determined)

to police, placing him in the Weiler home at the time the medical exeniner

believed the murders occurred, and claiming that he had a lapse of

memory while in the house (T-184,185,186,187); 5) ex parte statements of

7

The combined 1980 population of the latter three counties is 115,235,

- 18 -

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evidence indicative of guilt which the police had assembled, including

the facts that a handgun belonging to Davis’ father was missing (T-186),

that a cord found in Davis’ truck matched the cord which bound Kristy

Weiler's wrists (T-186,187), and that police had found three eyewitnesses

who could pin down Davis' whereabouts, one of whom saw him in the

neighborhood with a gun in his hand (T-187); 6) statements by state off-

icials expressing their certainty of Davis" guilt; that they had the

right suspect, and that they had a "very significant case" against hin

(T-186); 7) statements by police to the effect that Davis’ friends or

relatives might interfere with their efforts to find evidence; specifically

the missing handgun (T-185); 8) inflammatory commentary strongly tending

to evoke community sympathy for, and identification with, the victims

(and, concomitantly, prejudice against the named suspect, Davis), in-

cluding an article about Kristy's schoolteacher having to break the news

of her death to her classmates (T-184), newscasts emphasizing the reaction

of the Weilers' close-knit, upper-middle class, family-oriented neigh-

borhood to the horror and senselessness of the crime (T-186,187); references

to Mrs. Weiler's being pregnant at the time of her death (T-187); references

to Kristy's tenth birthday party which was to have been held the next

day (T-184, 186), and the medical examiner's emotional reaction as he

left the dite (T-184); and 9) a telecast denouncing parole authorities

for releasing prisoners back onto the streets to commit crimes, and

referring specifically to Allen Davis as one who "needed to serve a little

more time” and who subsequently murdered a child (T-137-88). J

Defense counsel argued that, as a result of these highly pre-

judicial disclosures by the media, and by the police through the mecia,

“the damage has already been done, [and] that in order to insure that a

e He

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fair trial is had, the Court has to change the venue" (T-223). The trial

court instead chose to defer ruling on a change of venue until an attempt

to select a jury in Duval County had been made (T-271). The defense

objected, and reiterated its position that the case should be meved to

another jurisdiction at this time (T-272).

Jury selection commenced on January 31, 1983. The trial court

granted each side three additional peremptory challenges, and denicd

the defense's motion for individual and sequestered voir dire (7-532)

[See Issue II, infra]. During voir dire, at least nine prospective

jurors indicated that they had some prior knowledge of the case*

from television, radio, newspapers, or word of mouth. Early in the

voir-dire, a prospective juror (unidentified in the record) said "1

must honestly say I read the paper rather thorougily..." and indicated

that he was not sure at that point if he could ve open-minded or not

(1-651). A second unidentified prospective juror said

the same applied to her (T-561). Prospective juror Lane said she

knew about the case from watching televison, knew in her heart how

she felt about it, and had already more or less made up her mind (T-644-_

46) [See Issue III]. Prospective juror Richardson (who served on the

jury) knew something about the case from the newspaper and TV (T-651).

Prospective juror Price, who had heard something about the case (T-763),

when asked by the prosecutor whether she could vote for the death

penalty, stated:

Well, the way it was expressed to me, sir,

8 °

These potential jurors included Richardson (T-599-600, 651), Lane (644-

46), Stanley Johnson (T-599, 646-47), Jackson (1-601-02, 650-51), Cassidy

(7-564,625, 636-37), Griswold (1-609), James Johnson (1-677, 685-89),

Robb (T-770), and Price (T-763, see T-741).

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these people get out on probation and they

done these horrible things, that's the .

only question that I would say about

capital punishment.

(T-741).

Three of the prosepective jurors who had some prior knowledge of

the case, Richardson, Jackson, and Griswold, ultimately served on the

jury (T-774, 1770-71, 1851-53).

B. The Nat

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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