Amicus Curiae Brief — Kungys v. United States

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“

_ ‘ .

efit X v.

(3) OCT 8 138

No. 86-228 lg

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1986

JUOZAS KUNGYS

Petitioner,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

BRIEF AND APPENDIX AMICUS CURIAE IN

SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR A WRIT OF

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS POR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

NESTOR L. OLESNYCKY

.955 Springfield Ave.

Maplewood, N.J. 07040

(201) 761-6480

Attorney for Amici Curiae

Ukrainian American Bar

Association, et, als.

THOR G. RAKOWSKY

Of Counsel

EDITOR'S NOTE

THE FOLLOWING PAGES WERE POOR

HARD COPY AT THE TIME OF FILMING.

IF AND WHEN A BETTER COPY CAN BE

OBTAINED, A NEW FICHE WILL BE

ISSUED.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. DID THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF

APPEALS MAKE IMPROPER DE NOVO FINDINGS

OF FACT AND, ON THE BASIS OF SUCH FIND-

INGS, CREATE A DILUTED “PROBABILITY”

STANDARD OF PROOF FOR “MATERIALITY”

UNDER THE SECOND PRONG OF CHAUNT V

UNITED STATES. 364 US. 350 (1960)”

Il. ARE MISREPRESENTATIONS OF DATES

AND PLACES OF BIRTH ON PETITIONS FOR

VISAS AND FOR NATURALIZATION “MATERIAL”

UNDER THE SECOND PRONG OF CHAUNT?

Appendix D — Displaced Persons in the United

“**

PAGE

Appendix E — DEP’T STATE BULL.., Vol. XV.

No. 386, Nov. 24, 1946, pp. 934-

ah 6 awe eu eee cs tsa

Appendix F — The Future of Displaced Persons

in Europe, Statement of Lt. Coll.

Jerry M. Sage. DEP’T STATE

BULL., Vol. XVII, No. 419,

July 13, 1947, pp. 86-88 ....... Sla

Appendix G — 22 C.F.R. 61.313. (i)(c)

CS 58a

Appendix H — DEPT STATE BULL. Vol. XVI,

No. 401, March 9, 1947, pp. 423-

DT ao 6 we eee cs cc ec 60a

Appendix | — UNRAA Order No. 52, Eligibility

For UN Assistance. June 24, 1946.

U.N.P.A.G.-4/4.2-82......... 75a

Appendix J — Constitution of the International

Refugee Organization......... 83a

TABLE OF CASES, STATUTES AND OTHER

AUTHORITIES CITED

CASES:

Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960) .

Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490

Pr. ree ay hae Ue

Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, et al.

SP es Ce CU a wobec ee bake 08

Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118

CUED Bh ee pe oecaebeentasesecoeces

United States v. Kairys, 600 F. Supp. 1254

(N.D. Ill. 1984) aff'd, 782 F.2d 1374 (7th Cir.

SP ae er Ty Oe eee

United States v. Kowalchuk, 744 F.2d. 301

(3d.Cir. 1984, publication withdrawn) 773

F.2d 488 (3d.Cir. 1985), cert. denied 106

DESPUES & occ ce ewdseadce ces.

United States v. Kungys, 793 F.2d. 516

eee eee eee ee

STATUTES:

@ Gees GD ED g wc cccccebeccecs

Displaced Persons Act of 1948, 50 U.S.C. App.

(1952 G6.) 608.3951 G2 OBR. 2. cece cc cces

De DOs Sb ccecn ce eneeenes

OTHER:

Constitution of the International Refugee

Se dss PWh ab We a bodkesee ces <

Federal Register, December 24, 1946:

22 C.F.R. Sec.61.313.(a)(3) (Supp.1946).....

22 C.F.R. Sec.61.329 (Supp.1946) .........

PAGE

DEP’T STATE BULL., Vol. XVI. No.401,

se dk eh ee abd a oe Oe x

DEP’T STATE BULL., Vol. XVII. No.419,

nh 206 62 tee h dee to ¢ 606 « 7

Immigration and Naturalization Service

Monthly Review, Vol. III, No. 7 (January

hh oe b @ eae 666 & O64 OO bet ee ee 5

Immigration and Naturalization Service

Monthly Review, Vol. IV, No. 5, (November,

IE ee tee 5.6

Immigration and Naturalization Service

Monthly Review, Vol. V, No. 7 (January,

it. aGeud thee cee Oh eeapeess 6,7

Report of the Repatriation Poll of Displaced

Persons in UNRAA Assembly Centers in

Germany for the period 1-14 May, 1946:

Analysis of Negative votes, Attachment 8.

U.N.P.A.G.-4/3.0.11.0.1.4:2 606 4

UNRAA Order No. 52, Eligibility for UN

Assistance, June 24, 1946. U.N.PAG-4/4.2-82. 8

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM 1986

JUOZAS KUNGYS,

y. Petitioner

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

BRIEF AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF

THE PETITION OF JUOZAS KUNGYS

FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

AMICI

The UKRAINIAN AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIA-

TION, UKRAINIAN NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,

JOINT BALTIC AMERICAN NATIONAL COMMIT-

TEE, ESTONIAN AMERICAN NATIONAL COUN-

CIL, LITHUANIAN AMERICAN COUNCIL,

AMERICAN LATVIAN ASSOCIATION IN U.S.A.,

INC., AMERICANS FOR DUE PROCESS, BALTIC

AMERICAN FREEDOM LEAGUE, BYELORUSSIAN

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION, UKRAINIAN AMERI-

CAN JUSTICE COMMITTEE, and THE COALITION

FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE AND SECURITY

are Organizations who represent or whose members include

naturalized United States citizens of Ukrainian, Latvian,

Lithuanian, Estonian and Byelorussian descent. Many of

these persons are former refugees or displaced persons who

fled from their homelands before the advancing Soviet

armies towards the end of World War II, subsequently refus-

ing to return to their homelands after the War for fear of

———————

political persecution by the Soviets, and eventually

obtaining immigration visas from United States Consulates

in Germany and Austria for entry into this country.

Amici Curiae have obtained the written consents of

counsel for petitioner and for respondent and pray that a

writ of certiorari be granted to review the judgmeni of the

Third Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Kungys.

793 F.2d. $16(3d Cir. 1986).

This amicus brief contains a fuller argument on the

absence of any legal requirement that a refugee also had to

be a victim of Nazi persecution to be eligible for a non-

preference quota immigration visa, and on the incorrectness

of the Third Circuit's conclusion that misrepresentations as

to date and place of birth are now “material.” These issues

are critical to countless naturalized citizens who fled from

Soviet-occupied lands. The Third Circuit's conversion of

heretofore immaterial! misrepresentations of date and place

of birth on immigration papers under the first prong of

Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350( 1960), into “mate-

rial” misrepresentations under the second prong of Chaunt

has resulted in a revision of history based on hypothesized

facts and jeopardizes the citizenship of those who cannot

establish that they were victims of Nazi persecution.

STATUTE

The federal statute involved in Section 340(a) of the

Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended, (8

U.S.C” 1451(a)), which provides in pertinent part for revo-

cation of naturalized citizenship “procured by concealment

of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation.”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in the instant case

made de novo findings of fact that the holding of a German

——————

residency permit “without specia! restrictions” by a Lithua-

nian refugee who had fled from the advancing Soviet front

and who had obtained such permit from the German civil

authorities in the Third Reich shortly before the end of the

war, “tended” to show that he was not a victim of Nazi

persecution. Applying a “probability” test to the second

prong of Chaunt, the Third Circuit concluded he was thus

ineligible to receive a non-preference. quota immigration

visa, which the Court further found could have been issued

only to victims of Nazi persecution.

The Third Circuit ignored the finding of the District

Court which rejected as “in error” the testimony of Sey-

mour Maxwell Finger, a former career Foreign Service

Officer who had testifica that at the time petitioner applied

for his visa, only victims of Nazi persecution were issued

non-preference, quota immigration visas. Mr. Finger con-

tended that the Nazi persecutee requirement was contempo-

rary immigration policy embodied in a regulation or

regulations, but no such regulation was produced or proffer-

red by the government at trial. Nevertheless, the Third

Circuit, ignoring the holding of this Court just two months

earlier in Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, et al, 106 S.

Ct. 1527(1986), that appellate courts are not to make de

novo findings of fact in cases tried without a jury in the

District Court, made its own finding of fact that such a

requirement did in fact exist.

Based upon that hypothesized disqualifying fact, the

Third Circuit concluded that misrepresentations or conceal-

ments by the defendant about his date and place of birth

became material under the second prong of Chaunt. The

significance to the Amici Curiae of the Third Circuit's fact

finding and holding lies in the creation of a novel judicial

test for proving “materiality”, whereby the mere status of

not having been a victim of Nazi persecution can be con-

strued to mean that such refugee or displaced person ille-

gally procured his or her visa. and misrepresentations as to

date and place of birth are now deemed “material” pursuant

to a diluted probability standard of proof under the second

prong of Chaunt.

It is a historical fact that thousands of Eastern Europe-

ans. who cannot prove that they were victims of Nazi perse-

cution. fled the advancing Soviet armies before the end of

the Second World War. or refused to go back to their coun-

tries of birth or origin afterwards for fear of persecution by

the Soviets. (See Appendix A: Report of the Repatriatior

Poll of Displaced persons in UNRRA Assembly centers in

Germany for the period 1-14 May, 1946: Analysis of Nega-

tive votes. Attachment 8. U.N. PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.4:2). It

stands to reason that left unchallenged, the Third Circuit's

decision will affect countless former refugees and displaced

persons who are now subject to denaturalization proceed-

not also victims of Nazi persecution.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI:

A. NATURALIZED CITIZENSHIP WILL BE

UNDULY JEOPARDIZED BY A DILUTED

“PROBABILITY” STANDARD OF PROOF

FOR “MATERIALITY” UNDER THE

SECOND PRONG OF CHAUNT, AS

DEMONSTRATED BY THE THIRD

CIRCUIT'S REVISION OF HISTORY BASED

ON HYPOTHESIZED FACT FINDING.

The District Court had before it in evidence (Peti-

tioner’s App. E, 140a-141a Exh D-34) the actual non-pref-

erence quota immigration visa regulations in effect

immediately after World War II. as published in the Federal

category 3(i)(c) for the issuance of non-preference visas to

“Displaced persons covered by the President's Directive of

December 22. 1945.” 22 C.F.R. 61.313(a)(3). Those visa

regulations which, were the governing law, remained in

effect until the passage on June 25, 1948 of the Displaced

Persons Act of 1948. 50 U.S.C. App. (1952 ed.) Sec.1951 et

seq. There is nothing in the regulations or in the Directive of

President Truman included therein which interprets “dis-

placed persons” to be coterminous with “victims of Nazi

persecution.” (See Petitioner's Appendix F, Page 143a).

Further evidence contrary to the findings of the Third

Circuit is contained in articles published contemporane-

ously by the Immigration and Naturalization Service in its

“Month, Review™ by then INS Commissioner Ugo Carusi.

Commissioner Carusi was designated by President Truman

as Chairman of an interdepartmental committee to super-

vise the execution of the President's Directive of December

22, 1945 so that visas would be distributed fairly among

persons of all faiths, creeds and nationalities. He reported

that “the major group affected by President Truman's

Directive of December 22, 1945 are displaced persons and

refugees who are natives of Central and Eastern Europe and

the Balkans.” (See Appendix B: President Truman's Plan

for Refugees, Monthly Review, Vol. Ill, No. 7 (January

1946). pp. 254-255).

In March of 1946, Commissioner Carusi went to Ger-

many with the head of the Visa Division of the State Depart-

ment and other members of the interdepartmenta!

committee and concluded that it was immediately necessary

to establish categories to describe those persons who could

properly be classified as displaced persons. He then

described five categories of displaced persons which

included “ .. . persons who feared to return to their

homes because of possible religious or political persecu-

tion.” (See Appendix C: Displaced Persons, Monthly

Review, Vol. IV, No. 5 (November 1946), p. 54.) Commis-

sioner Carusi further confirmed that “(t]he President had

requested that care be exercised to assure that no one group

would be favored over another nor discriminated against.”

Ibid. To have granted son-preference immigration visas

only w victims of Nazi persecution would actually have

been a violation of the law since the regulation was intended

to cover ali displaced persons. (See Petitioner's Appendix E

at p. 140a).

The actual number of “displaced persons” who were

admitted into the United States with quota visas under the

regulation contained in 22 C.F.R. 61.313 by November 30,

1947 was 26.801 from over 40 countries. (Appendix D:

Displaced persons in the United States, Table No. |,

Monthly Review, Vol. V, No. 7, (Jan. 1948) p.10*).

A Special Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs reported

that there were three principal groups of “ displaced per-

sons”:

“(1) the liberated forced-labe oe» » who were

brought into Germany from Pol», Yugoslavia

and the Ukraine; (2) the Baltic group, those who

fled from the Baltic States ahead of the armies in

1944 (the Balts include Latvians, Lithuanians,

and Estonians); and (3) the Jewish displaced per-

sons, most of whom come from the Eastern Euro-

pean countries.” /d at p. 103 and Displaced

Persons and the Internationa! Refugee Organiza-

tion: Report of a Special Subcommiittee on For-

eign Affairs, 80th Congress, First Session, p.2.

Washington 1947. (Appendix D, f.n.2, p. 103)

Despite this plethora of accessible historical! facts.

showing the wide scope of eligibility of displaced persons for

tions and the Truman Directive included therein, the Third

_ Circuit ignored the regulations and casually devoted a mere

footnote to its misreading of the President's Directive of

December 22, 1945 as speaking “only in general terms con-

cerning the need to resettle displaced persons and particu-

larly orphaned children.” (F.N.10, Petitioner's App. A.

33a). In fact the median age of the 28.789 displaced persons

admitted under the regulations was 31.9 years, with only

6.961 immigrants being under 2! years old. ‘Displaced Per-

sons in the United States, id. at p. 104).

Instead, the Third Circuit relied on the blatantly erro-

neous and totally unsubstantiated testimony of Seymour

Finger and came up with a revision of history. (See Appen-

dix E: Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. XV; No. 386, Nov. 24,

1946 at pg. 935; see also Appendix F: Dept. of State Bulle-

tin Vol. XVII, No. 419, July 13, 1947 at pp. 86-88).

Interestingly, the Court of Appeals cites 22 C.F.R.

sec. 61.329 (supp. 1946), yet fails to cite 22 C.F.R.

sec. 61.313 (supp. 1946), (Appendix G), which is found in

the very same volume as 22 C.F.R. 61.329, and which places

in the first priority nonpreference class of quota immigrants

the following: “Displaced Persons covered by the President's

directive of Dec. 22, 1945 and his directive of Oct. 31,

1946." ibid. Such selective citation is not only legally unac-

ceptable, But also has resulted in a judicial ruling that

threatens the naturalized citizenship of thousands. An over-

view of President Truman's position as to displaced persons

can be found in Appendix H: Dep't State Bull. Vol. XVI No.

401, March 9, 1947, pp. 423-429.

A brief review of documentation relating to two United

Nations agencies created to dea! with refugee problems for

citizenship, or previous residence” during the time period

Sept. |, 1939 until the cessation of hostilities.

On July |, 1947, the Internationa! Refugee Organiza-

tion (IRO) rules and regulations superceded and replaced

the prior UNRRA rules. UNRRA and IRO were the two

United Nations-formed agencies dealing with refugees and

persons displaced by the Second World War. Under either

the UNRRA or IRO standards petit*oner was prima facie

eligible for assistance, as were thousands of Eastern Europe-

ans fleeing from and refusing to return to the Soviet-occu-

pied territories. It is critical to note that neither the

UNRRA nor IRO standards (nor, for that matter, the Dis-

placed Persons Act, supra, which relied upon the IRO Con-

stitution for its eligibility criteria) made Nazi persecution

the sole determinant of eligibility. As an example of those

stated to be prima facie eligible were residents of the Baltic

countries (other than German Balts) as well as residents of

Poland, the USSR. the Ukrainian and Byelorussian SSRs.

Appendix J, the IRO Constitution, lists two eligible

classes of persons, refugees and displaced persons. Among

the classes of refugees, persecutees were only two of six

eligible categories, even under the most liberal reading of

the list. (Annex |, Part 1, Section A, 1-4.) Eligible refugees

were also defined in Section A, para. 2 as those who, other

than displaced persons, were outside their country and who,

os a a lm

as a result of events subsequent to the outbreak of the War

were unable or unwilling to return to their country. Nothing

is mentioned about persecution as a criterion of eligibility.

The conditions of IRO Eligibility are found in Sec-

tion C, and give a choice of repatriation or of going clse-

where if the refugee or displaced person had “valid

objections” to repatriation. These conditions clearly applied

to persons other than the victims of Nazi persecution.

Thus, there was no historical or regulatory basis for

Mr. Finger to have testified at trial that only Nazi per-

Sainy of cheusunte of Remora Gorepuans who exthfied the

is concurring

£40 US. 400 (1801) and bape for 0 chasthans

second prong of Chaunr.

B. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S HOLDING THAT

MISREPRESENTATIONS AS TO DATES

AND PLACES OF BIRTH IN VISA AND

NATURALIZATION PETITIONS ARE

“MATERIAL” UNDER THE SECOND

PRONG OF CHAUNT IS INCONSISTENT

WITH PRIOR HOLDINGS, EVEN WITHIN

THE THIRD CIRCUIT, AND WITH PRIOR

ENFORCEMENT POLICY OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

On the few occasions that courts have addressed even

peripherally the question of the materiality of incorrect

dates and places of birth in ummigration papers. the courts

have determined such misstatements to be immaterial.

In United States vs. Kowalchukh, 744 F.2d 30!

(3d Cur 1984) (pubhcanion withdrawn), even the dissenting

judge on the Third Circuit panel which had initially ruled in

favor of the defendant acknowledged that:

ws” musrepresentations having no bearing on

the sssues involved such as place of birth or per-

sona! data statements often made under duress to

avord repatriation, should not serve as a basis for

that Congress and the courts have chosen to

absolve”

Judge Rosenn’s dissent went on to cite this Court's

oprmon in Fedorenko vs United States. supra. and the legis-

latrwe history of the Immigration and Nationality Act of

1952, 212(a PO), § USC 1182(a 19) (1982) as authority

for the ummatenality of incorrect dates and places of birth

on immigration papers.

In United States v. Kairys, 600 F. Supp, 1254 (N.D.

Ill. 1984), aff'd 782 F.2d 1374 (7th Cir. 1986), the Govern-

ment sought to revoke the defendant's citizenship partly on

the grounds that he had provided a false birthdate and false

place of birth in his visa and naturalization papers. The trial

judge concluded that he“ . . . is persuaded that the false

information was wilfully represented by defendant. It is,

however, not material as that term has come to be defined.”

(600 F. Supp. at p. 1267). While the court went on to

acknowledge that the meaning of the Chaunt standards

remains unclear, and that the circuits are divided on this

issue, and further that the Seventh Circuit had yet to rule on

the issue, it left no doubt that, at least as far as the trial

court was concerned, false information as to date of birth

and place of birth is not material.

In a revealing footnote, the court wondered how denat-

uralization based upon the possibility that the disclosure of

non-disqualifying facts years earlier could conceivably have

led to the discovery of disqualifying facts squares with the

Supreme Court’s express recognition in Schneiderman v.

United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943) that denaturalization,

in which the government “seeks to turn the clock back” is

significantly different from the original naturalization.

(600 F. Supp. at p. 1265). As the Court in Schneiderman

concluded, citizenship once granted is a right which should

not be taken away without the clearest of justification and

proof. The trial court in Kairys recognized that a higher

burden of proof is required when the priceless status of

citizenship is being revoked and was properly concerned

that retroactive reliance upon previously non-material facts

in denaturalization proceedings so as to now make such

facts material might be contrary to the Schneiderman

requirement of a higher standard of proof.

Not only the courts, but also the Justice Department

has recognized that misstatements as to date and place of

birth are immaterial and should not be the basis for denatu-

ralization proceedings. Allan A. Ryan, Jr., (a former Direc-

tor of the Office of Special Investigations of the United

States Justice Department, a former attorney with the

Office of Solicitor General, and a former law clerk to a

Justice of the Supreme Court) recognized the reality that

numerous refugees from the Soviet front lacked authentic

proof of birth. or had misrepresented their dates and/or

places of birth. and publicly assured such persons that their

citizenship was not in jeopardy. In his speech to the Ukrain-

ian American Bar Association on October 30, 1982, in East

Hanover, N.J., Director Ryan promised:

“Many immigrants, otherwise innocent of wrong-

doing, gave false dates of birth or false places of

birth when they applied for a visa. Are they sub-

ject to prosecution? The answer is No.” (Address

of Allan A. Ryan, Jr., Director, Office of Special

Investigations, to Ukrainian American Bar Asso-

ciation, East Hanover, N.J., (October 30, 1982)).

Unfortunately, the Third Circuit has now provided an

unsound basis for denaturalizing citizens by retroactively

converting immaterial misrepresentations as to dates and

places of birth into “material” misrepresentations for those

who do not have the status of or cannot prove that they were

victims of Nazi persecution.

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, it is imperative that

the Supreme Court reverse the Third Circuits’s holding

which implies that inability to establish that one was a

victim of Nazi persecution means that an individual had

illegally procured his citizenship, and clarify that misrepre-

sentations as to date and place of birth in immigration

papers are not “material” within the meaning and intent of

Section 340(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of

1952, as amended, 8 U.S.C. 1451 (a).

Respectfully submitted,

NESTOR L. OLESNYCKY

Attorney for Amici Curiae

Ukrainian American Bar

Association, et als.

Date: October 7, 1986

APPENDIX A

REPORT OF THE REPATRIATION POLL

OF DISPLACED PERSONS

IN UNRRA ASSEMBLY CENTERS IN GERMANY

FOR THE PERIOD 1-14 MAY, 1946:

ANALYSIS OF NEGATIVE VOTES,

ATTACHMENT 8 P.A.G. — 4/3.0.11.0.1.4:2

Why the Displaced Persons Refuse To Go Home

GERMANY

MAY 1946

ATTACHMENT 8

The following analysis of reasons why approximately

82% of the displaced persons voted not to return home is

based solely on their own statements and on summary anal-

yses prepared by the town directors. who, through daily

contact with the DPs are best fitted to analyse their present

position with regard to repatriation.' Observations con-

tained herein should in no way be construed as representing

the views of the UNRRA staff in Germany. They are the

views of the private individuals in the centers, and are

' After following a policy of encouraging outright repatriation of “for-

mer Soviet nationals” and others whose homelands came under Soviet

control after 1945, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Adminis-

tration (UNRAA) found that about one million displaced persons (DPs)

under its care refused to be repatriated. Approximately fifty-two nationali-

ues were among these DPs, and they were dispersed among 920 camps in

Germany, Austria, and Italy. Not fully understanding their reluctance,

UNRRA officials in the U.S. Zone of Occupied Germany decided to con-

duct a secret poll among the DPs, during 1-14 May 1946. Each DP was

handed a sheet and asked to answer the following questions: (|) what

nationality do you claim”; (2) do you wish to be repatriated now”? (yes/no);

(3) if your answer to 2 is “no,” explain your reasons in the space below.

tetera erential

included for the purpose of presenting a comprehensive pic-

ture of the group motives, personal motives and repatriation

desires of the displaced persons. _

Due to the tremendous number of ballots received and

the variety of replies in a multitude of languages, it has been

impossible to make an accurate numerical calculation of the

different reasons. The percentages quoted in this report are

therefore based on the most reliable estimates available.

It is interesting to note that nationals of so-called West-

ern countries give both personal and economic reasons for

not going home now, while the Eastern Europeans generally

fall back on political factors as their primary explanation.

The Eastern Europeans seem to show a real fear in their

replies, the fear increasing the further east the home of the

voter. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that, among

many of these people, the political explanation serves merely

as a convenient justification and cover for underlying

motives which are essentially personal and economic. Camp

directors throughout Germany point to a genera! impression

of demoralization and inertia among the Poles particularly,

a reluctance to leave a comparatively secure and comforta-

ble existence for a life of toil and hardship in their war-torn

country.

Annex “A” contains some typical replies from the prin-

cipal nationalities.

No exact figures on the total number of respondents were given by

UNRRA, but the poll gave U NRRA and the US. military authorities their

first comprehensive understanding of the difficulties involved in repatria-

tion. Although some facts and analyses in the report are inaccurate and

muisieading. the document does shed light on why DPs did not want to return

home after the war. (Ed)

Estonians, Latvians. and Lithuanians

The displaced persons from the Baltic countries of

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania submitted an almost unani-

mous vote against repatriation. They can be considered as a

single group, since their backgrounds are similar and all of

their replies express the same unwavering determination not

to return to their homelands as long as they are occupied by

the Russians.

The principal groups among the Balts come from the

so-called “middie” and “upper-middie™ classes. Many are

well educated and enjoyed the prosperous, independent life

: of the average intellectual. professional or businessman

before the war. Others were independent farmers. small

artisans or craftsmen. They started coming into Germany in

large numbers in 1941-42, when the Germans first occupied

the Baltic lands. It is difficult to determine how many of

them came voluntarily, seeking better jobs. and how many

? Granted sovereignty in 1919, the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia. and

Lithuania were included in a plan secretly arranged by Nazi Germany and

the USSR for dividing these states into spheres of inflvence. In the secret

protocol of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, 23 August 1939, Finland, Estonia. and

Latvia were ceded to the Soviets. By the Nazi-Soviet frendship treaty.

28 September | 939, Lithuania was similarily brought under Sovnet domina-

uuon. Profiting from the German advance of May-June !|940 on the Western

border strip reserved for Germany by the friendship treaty. On |S June

1940 Soviet forces entered Lithuania, and two days later they were in Latvia

and Estoma In August |940 the USSR officially incorporated these states

unto the USSR as the fourteenth, fifteenth. and sixteenth Sovnet republics.

After the German invasion of the USSR. the three countries, together

with part of Belorussia, constituted the Reichskommissariat Ostiand. under

the direction of Geuleiter Heinnch Lohse, and were deprived of their auton-

omy With the end of the war, attempts to reconstitute independent govern-

ments failed and the Red Army restored the politica! situation of 1940 By

1946 there were an estimated 190,400 Balts under UNRRA care. (Ed)

»———————

were actually deported to Germany. It is significant. how-

ever. that very few of this group were persecuted by the

Nazis. and that practically none of them have returned

home. The bulk of the “displaced” Balts, however. appear

definitely to have entered Germany in late 1944, fleeing, not

from the enemy. but from the Russians.

Their primary objection to repatriation is based on

political reasons. Approximately 90-95% of them express an

Outspoken antagonism toward “Communism as a was of

life” and especially toward “the Russian occupation of their

countries.” (It is interesting to note that some of the answers

were anti-communistic as opposed to anti-Russian. but the

majority made no distinction between the two.) Most of

their reasons are not a mere parrot-like repetition of politi-

cal propaganda which characterizes the Polish vote. but

arguments apparently based on personal experience during

the Russian occupation of 1940/1 when relatives and

friends were “transported to Siberia in sealed cars without

food or water, never to be heard of again.” They express the

fear that the same may happen to them if they return. Some

refer to the time the Communist party was voted into power

in a “free election,” held after all the parties but one were

dissolved, in which everyone was forced to vote.

Th actual replies on the ballots vary from a guarded

“our cowntry is occupied” to ferocious denunciations of

“Russian dictatorship.” Such words as “sadism,” “reign of

terror,” “bestial,” “murderous” etc. appear frequently in

the descriptions of Communism. A few quoted Molotov's

Statement made in | 940 to the effect that the Baltic nations

must be destroyed. About 30-40% of the Baltic DPs state

that they have lost relatives or friends, either killed or

deported by the Russians. There is no way of telling whether

or not this figure is accurate, but their reasons for not desir-

ing repatriation seem to be motivated by a real fear of

personal persecution. deportation or even death at the hands

of the Russian secret police.

Closely linked with the political reasons for not desiring

repatriation are the economic ones. These were mentioned

by approximately 60% of the Balts, usually as a secondary

_— in connection with the communistic regime. Only

about 10% based their primary reason for not returning on

economic factors. A large number of these DPs were accus-

tomed to a fairly high standard of living before the war.

“The confiscation of all private property” has reduced many

formerly well-to-do Balts to a position where they could not

hope to return to their previous way of life. A number of the

Baltic farmers. particularly Lithuanians, claim to have had

their land taken away from thern during the Russian occu-

pation and were forced to join “Kolchozes™ !kolkhozy) or

farming communities. They now refuse to return. The

uncertainty of being able to buy food at normal prices. the

shortage of houses, the prospect of unemployment and the

unfavorable currency exchange. all vital problems to the

Poles, seem to be relatively insignificant factors contributing

to the anti-repatriation desires of the Balts, who for the most

——_.°-TSE

think about these problems.

peclinnstetidieerteriememneten Gites

of religious persecution is also mentioned as a secondary

reason for not wanting to go home. Some mention the days

in 1940/1 when they “weren't allowed to go to church”;

some fear reprisals for their former membership in religious

organizations, while others merely state that “in my country

today religion is suppressed and the institution of marriage

does not exist.”

The majority of the Balts sincerely want to return,

provided they can return to a “free, democratic country.”

Some of them are optimistic enough to state that they

“expect” to go home as soon as a democratic government is

established. A group of Latvians and Lithuanians in one

camp have reluctantly accepted the present situation in

their former countries as final and are hoping to immigrate

to either the U.S., Canada or Africa. However, the majority

of Balts seem to be waiting in Germany for the “occupa-

tion” of their countries to end, for there is very little mention

of resettlement as a solution to the Baltic “hard-core” prob-

lem. ’

Poles’

With very few exceptions, the Poles in the U.S. and

British Zones gave political reasons for their negative votes

in the repatriation poll. The three basic complaints,

repeated again and again. were the “presence of Russians in

Poland,” “the Communistic Warsaw government,” and “the

lack of personal freedom in Poland.” Although mst of the

Poles claimed the same reasons for not wanting to go home,

it is Clear from the comments on their ballots that they did

' These were persons considered to be non-repatriable. either because

they were unacceptable to their country of origin or were unwilling to be

repatriated. (Ed)

* On | September | 939 Poland was invaded by Germany and on |? Sep-

tember by the Soviet Lmon Polish army units were soon forced to surrender

to the Germans or the Red Army According to the 28 September | 939

agreement between Ribbentrop and Molotov Poland was divided along the

rivers, that 6, approximately along the Curzon Line (see

note 7) In the German sphere. some territories were incorporated directly

into the Reich. and the centra! part of the country was organized under the

Genera) Government of Occupied Poland

On 7 May 1945, the day the Germans capitulated, Poland was split

between a Polish government recognized by the Western Allies and a Polish

Commuttee of Nationa! Liberation recognized by the USSR A solution of

sorts was worked out with the creation of the Provisional Government of

Nationa! Unity in Moscow in June 1945 On 5 July 1945 the major Western

SS ee eae

exile. (Bd)

not all have the same motivation for their answers. In gen-

eral, the Poles who quoted politica! reasons can be broken

down into three groups.

The first and smallest of these groups is made up of

those so-called leaders and intellectuals who have an ideo-

logical conception of Poland as a “free democracy” and

refuse to return under present conditions. They claim to

abhor the thought of “Communism” in Poland, the “Rus-

sian-dominated Warsaw government,” the “occupation by

Russian troops,” the alleged repression of democratic free-

dom, and feel that they can do more for their fatherland by

not returning now. A few described the conditions under

which they would return: “When the Atlantic Charter is

applied; “When the Russians leave;” “When General

Anders returns,"* “When Democracy has been established

* The Atiantic Charter was a statemeni of fundamenta! principles for the

postwar world order, issued jointly by Roosevelt and Churchill after meet.

ings during 912 August 194) in Argenta Bay, Newfoundland The main

July 1941 He then formed an army of 75,000 citizens of Poland (inchuding

non-Poles) who fought on the British side in the Near East and participated

in the capture of Monte Cassino in May 1944 and of Bologna in April | 945

important role in the Polish answers as it does in those of the

Baits, the Russians and the Polish-Ukrainians.

The second group consists of people who have private

political reasons for fearing repatriation. The largest

back to Poland they would probably be sent to the newly

annexed western provinces which are now being settled by

the Poles.* This cannot properly be called repatriation, bu:

’ The Curzon Line refers to & proposal to settle the disputed frontier

between Poland and Russia, put to the Poles by Lioyd George, the British

Prome Minister, on 10 July 1920, and then dealt with by Lord George N

Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary. The line or demarcation stretched

from Grodno, through Brest-Litovsk and Praemyil, to the Carpathians. it

would have excluded from Poland the lands inhabited predominantly by

sad echenqueny smears rote oe ne Oo pp

and secured twee as a

Gewge Arte Nast Pare Ih Coe te

variations) Became the boundary between the German and Soviet spheres of

occupation. In 1945 i was accepted by the Polish Government as the

frontier wth the USSR. (Ba)

* At the Potsdam conference of I' July-2 August 1945, the Allies agreed

that Poland would occupy the German areas east of « line following the

Oder and Neinse rivers, from the Baltic Sea to the Ceschoslowsh frontier

sastern territories of interwar Poland were taken by the USSR. and

about |.4 million Poles left this territory in 1946-7 to settle in regions taken

from the Reich (Ba)

rather “pioneering” in an unfamiliar land. far from frends

and relatives. Most of the DPs now being maintained in

camps in Germany seem to lack a pioneering spirit to set

forth and build a new home and a new life in an area where

conditions are reported to be difficult

The third and by far the largest group of the so-called

political refugees (estimated roughly at about 60% of the

camps, and are centered around the camp leaders. who were

elected by a free vote, the members of the Polish guard units

10a

and the Catholic clergy * These political and clerical leaders

have been successful in persuading a large number of Poles

that it ts agaist their mmterests to return home until their

country is “freed from the Russians.” The Polish-Ukraini-

ans who are unanimously opposed to repatriation have also

had an effect on the other Poles. as well as the demoralized

group who have lost all ambition and are content to stay in

the camps. leading a comparatively comfortable life, until

forced to make a decision. Three other factors which have

recent, had an unfavorable effect on the Poles’ desire to be

repatriated are Hoover's speech describing starvation in

Poland. Churchill's “iron curtain™ speech and the dissension

at the foreign ministers’ conference at Paris."

Over half of the Poles quoted economic factors as a

secondary reason for not wanting to go home. These factors

are probably more basic than the political ones in determin-

ing repatriation desires of the Polish DPs. The Poles in

Germany are not entrely cut off from their homeland. They

* The term Potsh guard emts refers to duptaced persoms recremed to

guard Amercan supp) depots and other instailanens (Ed)

On © Fedruary 1946 Stale gave a speech @ eheck be argued that,

despete (be end of Dostiltees there eas to be comtumeed wugilance; there was

to be no peace at home or abroad Churchell deliwered the Western reply at

Femon Musoer on § March | 46 He argued for chose co-operation among

ibe wortd » Engiad-epeaking peopies. because “from Stettin in the Baltic to

Troeste the Adretc. an wor curtan has descended across the continent,”

allowmg “police gorerements” wo rele Eastern Europe. The month of

Marcd | 846 @ seen by many hestorans as the beginning of the Cold War.

A’ the Pare conference of Albed foreign ministers in May 1946, the

USSR ecowsed tbe L meeed Kongo of imperialism for its suppression of the

(oreek redelbor and crmenzed the Netherlands for its repressive actions in

ledomesa The Bros foregn minister, Ernest Bevin, responded by accus-

ong the Sewer Lesoe of emperialism. These disputes prevented any agree-

ment from beemg reached at the conference. (Ed.)

maintain contact through newspapers, letters, radio broad-

casts and friends who have returned to Germany after hav-

ing been repatriated. From these sources they receive a

description of destruction in the towns and cities, shortages

of food, clothes and housing, unemployment and the genera!

economic insecurity of life in present-day Poland.

These Poles who believe they have lost al! of their

former possessions naturally hesitate to return to their war-

torn country where they fear they cannot earn a living.

Their feeling of economic insecurity is expressed in the fol-

lowing typical comment by a Polish farmer: “At my house

now, no horse, no cow, no pig — only a picture of Stalin on

the wall.” The desire to remain in their present condition of

comparative security is quite natural on the part of these

people, who were suddenly taken from a state of slavery and

placed into an artificial society where they are cared for

without having to work. Many of them who could not main-

tain the same standards of living at home will continue to

live in the assembly centers as long as they exist.

Many of the Poles have not been content to live idly,

however, but have found some measure of real economic

security in the form of employment. This is particularly true

in the French Zone where a large number of DPs live and

work in the German communities. The fact that a large

percentage of Polish DPs are employed in the local economy

in the French Zone is reflected in the ballot, for only 64%

gave political reasons, the rest economic or persona! reasons

for wanting to stay in Germany.

Very few of the Poles gave only personal! reasons tor »ot

wanting to go home. Among those who did are the peupic

who have lost their homes, their families and their friends as

a result of the war and have nothing to which to return. They

don’t appear to have the courage to face the future alone in a

destroyed country, and many of them want to start life anew

l2a

in a western land, preferably the U.S. or Canada. They are

waiting hopefully for a declaration of emigration opportuni-

ties by the governments of these countries. Another group of

DPs have family ties which are holding them here. They are

engaged or married to Germans, to DPs of another national-

ity or to members of the Polish Guard Units stationed in

Germany and are unwilling to break up their families to

return home. Others can’t be repatriated now for health

reasons. Either they are old or sick or are staying with sick

relatives, until they can be moved. Some mothers don’t want

to expose their infants and small children to the uncertain

conditions in Poland, but prefer to remain in Germany until

after the harvest. Others will return when their personal

affairs are settled. Included in this group are those awaiting

news from home or abroad before they set out to join rela-

tives, and some who are still trying to locate lost members of

their families who were deported to Germany during the

war.

A very small number of Poles, chiefly the elderly people

from the eastern provinces, gave fear of religious persecu-

tion as their main reason for not going home. This factor

was mentioned, however, on a number of ballots in connec-

tion with political reasons.

Polish-Ukrainians

Despite repeated instructions from UNRRA directors,

this group insists on describing itself as “Polish-Ukrainian”™

or “Ukrainian Stateless”.'' The constant dissemination of

'' At the end of the war, approximately 2.5-3 million Ukrainians were in

the Third Reich. Some were prisoners of war who had served in the Polish or

Red Army; most had been forced labourers in Germany. A smaller number

were politica! refugees and concentration camp survivors. An estimated two

million Ukrainians found themse!ves in the occupied zones under Supreme

Headquarters, Allied European Forces (SHAEF) in Austria. Germany, and

l3a

nationalistic propaganda has compleiely alienated them

from the idea of adherence to either Poland or Russia, and

thereby has eliminated all chance for a voluntary repatria-

tion of Ukrainian peoples. Like the Poles, they give mainly

political reasons for not wanting to return home but they are

generally more violent in their attacks on Russia, and

express fear of forced labor conditions, even “deportation to

Siberia,” should they dare to return. Some give supposed

first hand accounts of previous persecution, such as “I don’t

wish to be repatriated to the Ukraine because my father was

killed by the communists for his political and reiigious ideas

and I was sent to Siberia, and had to stay for five years in a

concentration camp.” About 10% of the Ukrainians

Italy. After voluntary and forcible repatriation about 250,000 remained and

they refused to be repatriated. About one-third were former citizens of the

Soviet Union before 1939; the remaining two-thirds were from other coun-

tries, primarily from Poland.

Official UNRRA and other statistical information on the exact

number of Ukrainians is, however, not entirely reliable for several! reasons.

The Allies used citizenship rather than ethnic origin to classify DPs, but

because Ukrainian DPs came from the prewar territories of Poland, Czech-

osiovakia, Romania, and the Soviet Union their citizenship varied accord-

ingly. Also, the fear of repatriation was so great that many, especially those

from Soviet Ukraine, did not reveal their true nationality. In time, a change

in designation by officials was precipitated by the Polish government

because it insisted that Ukrainians from Poland be separated from “true”

Poles, arguing that Poland did not want Ukrainians back since their former

lands had been ceded to the USSR. Furthermore, they were to be repatri-

ated to the USSR. On 6 July 1946 Poland and the USSR concluded an

agreement to exchange Ukrainians in Poland for Poles in the USSR. More-

over, UNRRA and other authorities were not consistent in their use of the

term “Ukrainian.” Officially, Ukrainians were not designated by UNRRA

as @ separate nationality until the summer of 1947; however, even before

then, local UNRRA officials sometimes did allow refugees to designate

themselves as Ukrainians. For these reasons, official UNRRA statistics

underestimate the number of Ukrainians (100,000) and Soviet citizens

(10,000) while overestimating the number of Poles (275,000). (Ed.)

l4a

included in their reasons descriptions of the absence of polit-

ical, cultural, religious and persona! freedom at home, while

others compared “Bolshevik totalitarianism” with Nazism.

They claim that their country is occupied and since

they do not wish to become citizens of the USSR, they have

in effect no fatherland to which to return. Some stated that

they want a free, autonomous Ukrainian state, even within

the boundaries of the new Poland. An important factor in

this separatist movement has been the activity of the Greek-

Orthodox clergy, who constantly use their strong influence

against repatriation. As a logical consequence of this cleri-

cal influence, and the fact that Ukrainians are predomi-

nantly orthodox [sic], they seem to be much more concerned

over the lack of religious freedom than do the Poles.

A few of the Ukrainian DPs lost large land holdings in

the collectivization of estates by the Soviet government, so

that they have a bitter personal enmity toward the new

economic system. Others merely stated their dislike for a

system where there is no private property.

Russians [Soviet Citizens]

The few Russians who are still left in Germany belong

in three distinct categories, two of them comprising political!

refugees who refuse to return to Soviet Russia. The first

group represents those Russians and Russian Ukrainians

who came to Germany during the war as volunteers, desert-

ers, forced laborers or POWs. They express a hatred for

Communism and the “dictatorship” in Russia and would

rather stay in Germany for the time being. Eventually they

hope to emigrate to one of the western countries, when

opportunities are available.

The second group is composed of White Russians and

other Russian emigrants from 1919-20, displaced persons

|Sa

left over from the last war, who never adopted a new citizen-

ship. A few of them hold Nansen passports, while others

claim that theirs were lost or taken away by the German

authorities.'? Their return to Russian is out of the question,

as the majority of the older men were active counter-revolu-

tionists, and fear reprisal by the Communists, and the

younger ones, thé Children who were born abroad, have

never lived in Russia and have no desire to go to the country

from which their parents are exiles.

The third group all gave personal reasons for not going

home, such as illness or marriage to Germans, Poles or other

DPs.

Yugoslavs

The Yugoslavs in UNRRA camps are mostly Royalists

and therefore opposed to repatriation for political reasons. '’

'2 In 1921 Pridtjof Nansen (1861-1930), Norwegian explorer and later

politician, became the first head of the League of Nation's High Commis-

sion in Connection with the Problem of Russian Refugees in Europe. After

World War |, an estimated 800,000 refugees from tsarist Russia were scat-

tered throughout Europe; most refused to return to Bolshevik-controlled

Russia. Mandated to dea! with this major problem, Nansen called a confer-

ence in Geneva at which sixteen nations were represented. An agreement

was reached to issue for Russian refugees a specia! travel document, to be

known as the “Nansen certificate” or “Nansen passport.” By 1928 fifty-one

governments had agreed to issue and recognize this passport for refugees

from Russia and elsewhere. The passport gave the holder League of Nations

Protection and guarantees that they would not be arbitrarily treated or

forcibly repatriated to the Soviet Union. (Ed.)

') The Royalists were supporters of King Peter Il, who ascended the

Yugoslav throne in 1934. On 27 March 194! he assumed full royal powers

when a coup d'état in Belgrade overthrew the regency, but he had to flee on

6 April when the Germans attacked Yugoslavia. He established a govern-

ment-in-exile in London that supported the Serbian officer, Dragoljub

(Draza) Mihailovié and his Chetniks. King Peter made an accommodation

with the Communist partisans led by Josip Broz (Tito) in August 1944 but

was deposed in November 1945

16a

Like the Balts and Poles, they claim a passionate love for

democracy (which they interpret to be a restoration of the

monarchy). On the other hand they represent a different

problem from the Poles and Balts who are afraid to go

home, since the Yugoslavs are for the most part ex-POWs

who still consider themselves as part of King Peter's army.

They do not accept their present status as a lasting one but

are hoping for the chance to go home and fight Tito. In one

center in the U.S. Zone, for instance, the Yugoslav leader

began the poll with a spirited declaration that he and his

men were soldiers, wished to be soldiers and had no pian to

go anywhere, or do anything else. He then suggested that

UNRRA send them all home to fight the Tito government.

The following explanation from one of the ballots is

typical of the general feeling of the Yugoslav DPs. “We were

determined to fight against Hitler's Germany for high prin-

ciples of democracy and freedom. Now the war is over;

instead of democracy and freedom we have a dictatorship in

Yugoslavia. We expect nobody's charity or any reward.

What we expect and claim is the most elementary right to

choose our own form of government. This was proclaimed in

Article 3 of the Atlantic Charter.”

In 1946 there were about | $0,000 Yugoslav refugees, most of wh. m

were dispersed in UNRRA and military camps throughout Italy Among

them were monarchists, Sertian Chetniks, Croatian nationalists (Ustash:).

and former partisans united in their opposition to Tito's regime The Yugo

slav government was particularly adamant in demanding their forcible repa-

triation. (Ed.)

17a

Jews'*

The Jews in UNRRA centers in Germany expressed a

unanimous desire to immigrate, the majority of them either

to Palestine or to the U.S. By far the largest number of

Polish and Ukrainian Jews express a desire to go to Pales-

tine. This desire can easily be understood in the light of

strong nationalistic feelings among the eastern Jewry

persecution at the hands of the Nazis. not to mention some

of their own countrymen during the war. Tragic personal

histories on the ballots present vividly the reasons for not

returning. It is now impossible for the Jews from Eastern

Europe to return to their large Jewish communities for so

many of them have been wiped out, and tales of continued

anti-semitism drift in daily with new refugees coming out of

Poland, seeking refuge in UNRRA centers in Germany.

Aithough many would perhaps prefer to go to some western

country, the emigration quotas to these lands will be sa low

as to allow only a trickle of immigrants to enter. Palestine

appears to be the only solution to their problem. Hundreds

of ballots showed just one word as an explanation for not

returning home: “Palestine.”

The German Jews are also anxious to emigrate, most of

them to Palestine but a large number have relatives abroad

whom they wish to join in such countries as the U.S., Can-

ada, Great Britain, France, Sweden or South America. Like

the Polish and other Eastern European Jews these people

feel that they can't settle down again in the country which is

a constant reminder of their personal tragedies. Some even

In December 1945 UNRRA listed only 18.361 Jews as receiving

assistance in various zones in Germany. By June 1946 the number had

reached 97,333, and in June 1946, 167.531. The combined total of Jews

under UNRRA care in Italy, Germany, and Austria was close to 250,000 in

June 1947. (Bd)

18a

stated that they feared history would repeat itself in Europe

and that they or their children might have to go through the

same sort of persecution should they remain in Germany

now.

Czechs

Although there are only about 2,000 Czechs still in

Germany, a large percentage of them are staying for the -

same political reasons as the Poles, namely fear of Commu-

nism and the repression of personal freedom. Some fear a

war in the near future and state that Czechoslovakia is too

close to Russia for any measure of comfort, should a war

break out.

In some cases their homes were in that part of Slovakia

annexed to Russia, and they are afraid or unwilling to

become Soviet citizens.'*

On the whole the Czechs are not as violent as the Poles

in their criticism of their home government, or in their

refusal to return home. It is interesting to note that about

25% of them are holding up their decision pending the out-

come of the Czech national vote, whereas a much smaller

percentage are looking forward to emigration.

The reasons why the remaining Czechs don’t want to

return are personal. Some are sick, or are staying with sick

relatives, some are married to Polish DPs while others are

still searching for lost relatives in Germany. In addition,

there is a small number who are employed by UNRRA, or

'S Some of these Czechoslovak citizens were no doubt Ukrainians

(Lemkos) from the eastern provinces of Carpatho-Ukraine (Ruthenia),

ceded to the USSR after the war. It was an area of about 8,800 square

kilometers with a population of approximately 850,000. Not wishing to take

part in the “voluntary” transfer to the USSR, these Ukrainians fled primar-

ily to the U.S. Zone. (Ed.)

as i ee ee ee ee

ae i ei a

19a

the Military and have the permission of their national liai-

son officers to remain temporarily in the DP centers.

Western Europeans, British, U.S..,

and Smaller Groups

The small number of these nationals are staying in

Germany solely for personal or economic reasons. Either

they are married to Germans or other DPs whom they are

not yet allowed to take home with them, or else they wish to

settle in Germany where they have economic interests. The

last reason is particularly true in the French Zone where

many of the DPs are living privately and can carry on a

fairly normal! life in the German community. A few individ-

uals are probably collaborators who are trying to hide in

Germany, while others have lived in Germany for some time

before the war, and do not wish to move. ‘As in the case of

the Czechs, many of the Western Europeans are working for

UNRRA or the military authorities with the permission of

their national liaison officers. These jobs offer more security

than they could find at home. Several Frenchmen, Italians

and Dutchmen say that they fear to return to the present

unstable economic conditions in their countries. They know

of the shortages of food, clothing and employment possibili-

ties and prefer to stay in Germany under comparatively

favorable conditions until the situation in their homelands

improves. In the British Zone there are small numbers of

Dutch bargees [bargemen] who will return as soon as the

canals and waterways are opened.

Some so-called Armenians (including “Turks” and

“Iranians”) fear religious persecution in their homelands.

20a

ANNEX A

TYPICAL NEGATIVE REPLIES ON THE BALLOTS

OF THE PRINCIPAL NATIONALITY GROUPS

I. Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians

1. “Under the present circumstances I do not want to

return, for | know well enough who is ruling behind the ‘iron

curtain and what kind of life the people lead in this ‘most

liberal country’.”

2. “lam not a Communist.”

3. “I have already been a political deportee to Siberia

for four years.”

4. “I am a mother and | want to raise my child

myself.”

5. “My country has ceased to exist.”

6. “In Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania there is no dem-

ocratic government.”

7. “I cannot return. My brother, sister, father and

mother were deported to Siberia because they did not go to

the poll to vote for the Communists.”

8: “Russia.”

9. “I have never been a Russian citizen and I am not

interested to serve in the Russian army. Further I don’t

recognize the one-party system.”

10. “Stalin.”

11. “In all countries occupied by the USSR people are

physically and morally suppressed.”

12. “My country is occupied by the Bolsheviks.”

met te

statin teat akan ta a

2la

13. “In 1940 my father was arrested and killed

because he was a Russian officer under the Czars. My

mother was sent to Russia, then | escaped.”

Il. Poles

1. “Poland is not free.”

2. “The Russians are dominating the Polish Govern-

ment.”

3. “Quoting Mr. Churchill's speech; an ‘iron curtain’

is hanging from Stettin to Trieste. Behind it an ignorant

slave state is hidden from the eyes of us all, etc.” — “I ama

Democrat, not a Communist.”

4. “Communist dictatorship. No freedom of personal

opinion. Russians annihilate everything that is not Russian

and communistic.”

5. “Stalin annihilates people as well as Hitler.”

6. “I don’t trust Stalin and his government in

Poland.”

7. “Uncertain situation in Poland. The presence of

the Soviet Army is dangerous to the freedom of my coun-

try.”

8. “I don’t agree with the policy of the Government

and the persecution of the church and the lack of private

property and freedom.”

9. “I am afraid of Stalin, | am afraid of Siberia.

Pciand is not free.”

10. “After the election of a democratic government, I

shall return home.”

11. “The Russians occupy that part of Poland where |

lived. My home and family are gone.”

22a .

12. “I can’t find my family.”

13. “I am ill and tired after the hard work in Ger-

many.”

14. “If 1 go back I am sure they will kill me or send me

to Siberia.”

15. “They sent part of my family to Siberia and confis-

cated our farm.”

16. “I have been persecuted by the Communists and

condemned for exile to Siberia. I don’t want to try to live

under the Communists again.”

17. “My husband is not going back home and so |

don’t want to go.”

18. “When I get a letter from my family saying that

they are alive, then I| shall return home.”

19. “Because there is starvation in my country.”

20. “My family is in America. | shall wait until I can

also go there.”

Ill. Polish-Ukrainians

1. “I don’t want to live under dictatorship and ter-

”

ror.

2. “I am against violations and terror in the USSR. |

am against men who persecute religion, who turn peasants

into slaves. | am against the one-party system.”

3. “Two of my brothers were killed. My parents died

in jail after being there a long time. My brother was sen-

tenced to forced labor.”

4. “My homeland is at present occupied by Soviet

Russia, which follows the policy of general terror against

those who are. opposed to the communistic system. They

23a

persecute religion (Greek-Orthodox): bishops and priests

are sent to Siberia. Catholic churches are closed. Because of

these reasons | will not return.”

5. “I don't agree with the totalitarian system in the

USSR. Galicia belongs now to the USSR. I never was,

neither am, nor wish to be a citizen of the USSR. Persecu-

tion of the Greek-Orthodox Church.”

IV. Russians [Soviet Citizens]

1. “I don’t agree with Stalin-terror and oppression of

people. The system has nothing to do with democracy.”

2. “Ihave been persecuted by the NKVD since 1929

Most of the time I have been obliged to live under a false

name.”

3. “Democracy in the Soviet Union exists oniy on

paper. There is only freedom to vote for the candidates of

the Communistic Party and for its resolutions.”

4. “The Soviet regime is not a Russian government.

The main idea of the Soviet government is a world revolu-

tion.”

5. “Communism is even worse than Nazism.”

6. “In the Soviet Union there is no free work nor any

private property. There is only forced, slave-like labor in the

kolchoz[sic] (Government farms) and in the factories or

businesses, all run by the Government.”

Vv. Jews

1. “Palestine is my Fatherland.”

2. “Poland is covered with Jewish blood; even now

the Poles are persecuting Jews. We can visit the cemeteries,

but we cannot live there. Therefore | want to immigrate to

24a

the L.S. to join my relatives in the best democracy in the

world.”

3. “I have nobody left at home.”

4. “My husband was murdered by the Germans. I

spent three years in the KZ (concentration camp). My rela-

tives are in foreign countries. They will take care of me.”

5. “All my relatives were killed in Auschwitz. I can’t

live among the murderers of my parents.”

6. “Because of anti-Semitism in Poland, and | have

no family left there.”

7. “Because the Poles and Ukrainians are killing

Jews.”

8. “I am the only survivor of a family of eight. I have

no relatives in Europe. | am miserable and want to join

relatives in America. I have an affidavit.”

VL. Western Europeans and

Smaller Groups

1. “At present there is no job, life is too expensive in

France and as I am alone, I have nothing to look forward to

at home.”

2. “I will not be sent back because I have no job and

no home.” (Dutch)

2. “I don’t want to go back to Greece, because I have

no job and there is a food shortage.”

4. “I am married to a Pole, but the Dutch Govern-

ment won't allow her to come home with me. I shall wait in

Germany.”

Source: United Nations (UNRRA) Archives, New York.

PAG-4/3.0.11.0.1.4:2, “Council Resolution 92 etc.”

‘ial

ee eee

ots ite Lede ee

At hited wk

APPENDIX B

PRESIDENT TRUMAN’S PLAN FOR REFUGEES,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE IMMIGRATION

AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE MONTHLY

REVIEW (HEREINAFTER INS MONTHLY

REVIEW), VOL. III, NO. 7

(JAN. 1946. pp. 254-255)

On December 22, 1945 President Truman announced a

far-reaching program to facilitate the admission into the

United States, within the framework of existing immigra-

tion laws and regulations, of displaced persons and refugees

from Europe. The President’s plan encompasses two princi-

pal groups. The first of these is the group of refugees now in

the relocation camp at Oswego, N. Y. Almost 1,000 persons

were originally housed in this camp, after having been

brought to the United States on an emergency basis by order

of President Roosevelt. Some 900 refuges still at Oswego

may now become permanent residents of the United States

“through appropriate statutory and administrative

processes.” Officers of the Department of State and the

Immigration and Naturalization Service are presently

processing the cases of those of the internees who desire to

become permanent residents of the United States, and if

found eligible, they will be granted preexamination or other

appropriate relief to enable them to establish legal resi-

dence.

The major group affected by President Truman’s direc-

tive of December 22, 1945 are displaced persons and refu-

gees who are natives of Central and Eastern Europe and the

Balkans. The annual immigration quotas for these countries

total approximately 39,000. Statutory restrictions preclude

the allocation of more than 10 percent of the annual quota in

any single month. Consequently, no more than 3,900 visas

26a

may be issued in any one month to natives of the affected

countries. .

The President declared that “common decency and the

fundamental comradeship of all human beings require us to

do what lies within our power to see that our established

immigration quotas are used in order to reduce human suf-

fering.” Therefore he directed that the following procedure

be followed “to facilitate full immigration to the United

States under existing quota laws”:

“The Secretary of State is directed to establish

with the utmost dispatch consular facilities at or

near displaced person and refugee assembly center

areas in the American zones of occupation. It shall

be the responsibility of these consulars officers, in

conjunction with the immigrant inspectors, to

determine as quickly as possible the eligibility of

the applicants for visas and admission to the

United States.

For this purpose the Secretary will, if necessary,

divert the personnel and funds of his department

from other functions in order to insure the most

expeditious handling of this operation. In coopera-

tion with the Attorney General he shall appoint as

temporary vice counsuls, authorized to isst 2 visas,

such officers of the Immigration ard Naturaliza-

tion Service as can be made available for this pro-

gram.

Within the limits of administrative discretion,

the officers of the Department of Stote assigned to

this program shall make every effort to simplify

and to hasten the process of issuing visas. If neces-

sary, blocs of visa numbers may be assigned to

each of the emergency consular establishments.

oe =

2/a

Each such bloc may be used to meet the applica.

tions filed at the consular establishment to which

the bloc is assigned. It is not intended, however.

entirely to exclude the issuance of visas in other

parts of the world.

Visas should be distributed fairly among per-

sons of all faiths, creeds and nationalities. I desire

that special attention be devoted to orphaned chil-

dren to whom it is hoped the majority of visas will

be issued.

With respect to the requirement of law that

visas may not be issued to applicants likely to

become public charges after admission to the

United States, the Secretary of State shall cooper-

ate with the immigration and naturalization ser-

vice in perfecting appropriate arrangements with

welfare organizations in the United States which

may be prepared to guarantee financial support to

successful applicants. This may be accomplished

by corporate affidavit or by any means deemed

appropriate and practicable.

The Secretary of War, subject to limitation

imposed by the Congress on War Department

appropriations, will give such help as is practicable

in:

(A) Furnishing information to

appropriate consular officers and. immi-

grant inspectors to facilitate in the selec-

tion of applicants for visas; and

28a

(B) Assisting until other facilities

suffice in:

(1) Transporting immi-

grants to a European port;

(2) Feeding, housing and

providing medical care to such

immigrants until embarked;

and :

ties, billets, messes and transportation

for Department of State, Department of

Justice and United Nations Relief and

Rehabilitation Administration personnel

connected with this work, where practi-

cable and requiring no out-of-pocket

expenditure by the War Department and

when other suitable facilities are not

available.

The Attorney General, through the Immigra-

tion and Naturalization Service, will assign per-

sonnel on duty in the American zones of operation

to make the immigration inspections, to assist con-

sular officers of the Department of State in con-

neetion with the issuance of visas and to take the

necessary steps to settle the cases of those Allies

presently interned at Oswego through appropriate

Statutory and administrative processes.

The administration of the War Shipping

Administration will make the necessary arrange-

ments for water transportation from the port of

embarkation in Europe to the United States, sub-

ject to the provision that the movement of immi-

grants will in no way interfere with the scheduled

ee —

29a

return of service personnel and their spouses and

children from the European Theater.

The Surgeon Genera! of the Public Health Ser-

vice will assign to duty in the American zones of

occupation the necessary personnel to conduct the

mental and physical examinations of prospective

immigrants prescribed in the immigration laws.”

Ugo Carusi, Commissioner of Immigration and Natu-

ralization, was designated by the President to serve as

Chairman of an interdepartmental committee, which

includes representatives of the Department of State, War,

and Justice, the War Shipping Administration, and the Pub-

lic Health Service, to supervise the execution of President

Truman’s directive. Commissioner Carusi, accompanied by

Howard K. Travers, Chief of the Visa Division of the State

Department, and Dr. Ralph C. Williams, Assistant Surgeon

General of the Public Health Service, has left for Europe to

make arrangements for the speedy inauguration of the Pres-

ident’s program.

It is anticipated that officers of the State Departrnent,

the Public Health Service and the Immigration and Natu-

ralization Service will be stationed in the American zone of

occupation in Germany, to which immigration activities

under the President’s directive will be confined for the time

being, in order to pass on the qualifications of prospective

immigrants before they embark for the United States.

30a

APPENDIX C

DISPLACED PERSONS, BY INS COMMISIONER

UGO CARUSI, INS

MONTHLY REVIEW, VOL. IV, NO. 5,

(NOV. 1946 @ PP. 54-56)

By Commissioner Carusi

The Monthly Review! has previously reported the plans

which were made by the President to give some measure of

relief to the displaced people in Europe. In March of this

year I went abroad with Mr. Travers? of the Visa Division of

the State Department, Dr. Dunnahoo of the United States

Public Health Service and Lieutenant Colonel Buster of the

War Department to implement those plans.

We established our headquarters in Frankfort, Ger-

many, which was also the headquarters for the European

Theater Operations. Our job was to discover who the dis-

placed persons were, how many of them there were, what

countries they represented, what quotas were available for

those nationalities or countries, what transportation facili-

ties there were and what consular offices would have to be

established in order to process the displaced persons with the

greatest possible speed and the least amount of confusion.

After we had consulted with UNRRA, the Army and

the interested voluntary relief agencies, consulates were

established by the State Department in Berlin, Hamburg,

Stuttgart, Frankfort, and Munich and the task of processing

cases among the displaced persons who wished to come to

America was begun.

' See “President Truman's Plan for Refugees”, Monthly Review, Vol III,

No. 7 (January 1946) pp. 254-255.

2 Presently American Consul-General in Vancouver, British Columbia.

3la

It was immediately necessary to establish categories to

describe those persons who could properly be classified as

displaced persons. It was impossible to define displaced per-

sons because of the danger of including known pro-Nazis

who were dispiaced but obviously not contemplated by the

President’s Directive. Roughly stated, we did include per-

sons who were brought into Germany against their will for

forced labor, those who were forced to evacuate their homes

for military reasons other than for service in the army,

persons who feared to return to their homes because of

possible religious or political persecution, those who had fied

from their homes because they feared concentration and

relatives of such persons whose exclusion might break up

family groups. December 22 was chosen as the dav prior to

which the determination of a displaced person's status was

to be made, this date being selected in order to avoid an

influx of people into the American Occupation Zone other

than those coming to join families already there.

A large percentage of displaced persons were not in

camps. Many lived in communities with the help and guid-

ance of UNRRA. The displaced persons’ camps are mainly

former military barracks or concentration camps and the

present occupants were there as inmates when they were

concentration camps.

The President had requested that care be exercised to

assure that no one group would be favored over another nor

discriminated against. The available quotas are roughly

39,000 per year, of which about 25,000 are German. In the

entire Zone there were roughly 500,000 displaced persons,

about 200,000 of whom were Poles. There were also large

numbers from the Baltic States.

The procedure established for processing those people .

interested in coming to this country is, in general, as follows.

Questionnaires are sent to the areas within the American

32a

Occupation Zone asking for the information necessary to

the issuance of a visa and, in addition, questions as to reli-

gion and the location of relatives. Medical examinations are

conducted in the camps. The questionnaires are screened by

the Army for security reasons and by American Consuls

against their records. Those who pass muster are brought to

an assembly center near a Consulate from where they can

visit the Consul for the purpose of making the regular appli-

cations for visas. The normal procedures then prevaii. Upon

issuance of visas to sufficiently large groups, the Army

arranges transportation to the port of embarkation which is

in Bremen and the steamship tickets are provided either by

the individuals themselves or by some persons or organiza-

tions acting in their behalf. Immigration inspections are

conducted in this country but the thorough screening in

Europe makes the possibility of rejection on this side very

remote. They are treated as displaced persons in the matter

of food and handling until they board ship after which they

become regular passenger immigrants.

UNRRA and the voluntary relief agencies assist in the

distribution and execution of questionnaires so that the

Consular Offices are able to handle the cases with the great-

est possible speed. For obvious reasons, many people are

without birth or baptismal certificates and the Consuls are

empowered to make allowances and use discretion in the

matter of accepting unsupported statements. Many of these

people have become suspicious of authority and have trained

themselves over a period of years to lie in self-preservation.

This suspicion is breaking down, as we have been able to

inspire confidence and demonstrate that we are a different

sort of keeper. This is a difficult and complex problem

because we want to be sure that those who come can readily

adjust themselves to our mode of living, be self-sustaining

and make contributions to our society and economy.

33a

Seven social welfare agencies have furnished the Immi-

gration and Naturalization Service with corporate affida-

vits? as a guarantee that the displaced persons whom they

sponsor will not become public charges upon their arrival in

the United States. These organizations are the American

Christian Committee for Refugees, Inc., the Catholic Com-

mittee for Refugees, the Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant

Aid Society, the International Rescue and Relief Commit-

tee, Inc., the United Service for New Americans, the Vaad

Hatzala Emergency Committee and the United States

Committee for the Care of European Children, Inc. The

American Christian Committee for Refugees has signed a

corporate affidavit for 500 people and indicated that it will

increase that number as needed. Two hundred and sixty-

eight displaced persons have arrived under their sponsor-

ship. The Catholic Committee for Refugees has provided a

corporate affidavit for 200 Roman Catholic persons of

which 163 have been used. The Hebrew Sheltering and

Immigrant Aid Society has signed a corporate affidavit for

4,500 Jewish persons of whom 627 have arrived. The Vaad

Hatzala which is particularly interested in Orthodox

Rabbis, scholars and their children, has provided a corpo-

rate affidavit for 3,500 persons, will increase this number

whenever it becomes necessary and has sponsored the arri-

val of 2,228 individuals. The /nternational Rescue and

Relief Committee has provided a corporate affidavit for 500

people of which 119 have arrived. The United States Com-

mittee for the Care of European Children has signed a

corporate affidavit for 2,000 children, this being the only

organization authorized to sponsor unaccompanied children

of whom 296 have arrived under its sponsorship. In addition,

963 displaced persons have come to the United States under

3 See “Guarantees of Support of Refugee Children and Displaced Per-

sons”, Monthly Review, Vol. IV, No. 4 (October 1946) pp. 46-49.

34a

individual sponsorship. This brings the total to date to

4.664.

The first displaced persons arrived in the United States

aboard the SS Marine Flasher on May 20, 1946 and there

have been seven subsequent arrivals, all of which have been

at the port of New York. All of the ships are met by a

representative of the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-

vice and by representatives of the interested welfare agen-

cies, the latter for the purpose of directing the persons whom

they sponsor to their destinations.

Considering the limited personnel with which we have

to work, the restricted transportation facilities, the necessity

tor adhering to the quota immigration law and the fact that

the American Occupation Zone contains a relatively small

percentage of the displaced persons in Europe, I believe that

an excellent job is being done. However, it should be

remembered that the entire problem of displaced persons in

Europe amounts to some 2,000,000 individuals. Most of

them are former slave laborers, others are political or racial

refugees and all of them fear unsettled economic conditions

Or persecution in their homelands. They are spread over all

of the countries of central Europe and in addition,

uncounted thousands are to be found in Russia, Palestine

a i the Far East. Nearly a million displaced persons in

Germany, Austria and Italy are being fed by UNRRA or

the Allied armies. The most optimistic estimates indicate

that, at best, between 500,000 and 600,000 of these people

are likely to remain as a long-term problem for the United

Nations’ new International Refugee Organization.

Certain conclusions can be drawn from our experience

thus far in the program which we have operating. The

39,000 quota numbers available on an annual basis to our

present program can never be filled because of the large

number, 25,000, which must be charged to the German

35a

quota and the comparatively small number of Germans,

including the few surviving German Jews, who wish and can

qualify to come to the United States. Transportation facili-

ties will have to improve tremendously before any apprecia-

ble increase in immigration to the United States can be

expected and this statement applies particularly to those

individuals who might wish to come from Europe. And a

change in the present quota laws will have to be made before

they benefit any large number of displaced persons because

the largest groups of displaced persons have the smallest

quotas available to them. The extent to which the United

States may further obligate itself in the matter of displaced

persons is a question which will face the next Congress. We

are now demonstrating what can be done pursuant to

existing legislation. The extent to which the country will

take on further obligations by accepting and caring for

larger numbers of displaced persons depends entirely on

whether legislation to that effect will be forthcoming.

36a

APPENDIX D

DISPLACED PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES,

INS MONTHLY REVIEW, VOL. V. NO. 7,

(JAN. 1948 @ PP. 103-105)

It has been a little over two years since the President of

the United States on December 22, 1945, set forth a policy

regarding the admission of displaced persons. The directive'

of that date outlined a plan for admitting displaced persons

within the framework of the immigration laws. The tables

presented in this report bring to November 30, 1947, availa-

ble statistics concerning displaced persons admitted to the

United States by the officers of the Immigration and Natu-

ralization | Sgrvice.

In a recently published report of a Special Subcommit-

tee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, it was stated that

“displaced persons constitute the remainder of the forced

laborers and concentration-camp victims of the Nazis, and

are those who fled before the occupation armies of a dicta-

torship to which they were violently opposed or who fled in

legitimate fear of political or religious persecution from

their homelands.”

The statistics appearing in this article were furnished by the Office of the

Assistant Commissioner for Research and Education, Immigration and

Naturalization Service.

' See “President Truman's Plan for Refugees,” Monthly Review, Vol. II!

No. 7 (January 1946), pp. 254-255. See also, “Displaced Persons” by Ugo

Carusi, Montly Reveiw, Vol. V1, No. 5 (November 1946), pp.54-56; “Dis-

placed Persons—Location and Activity in the United States” by Hugh

Carter, Monthly Review, Vol. IV, No. 11 (May 1947), pp. 138-144.

2? Displaced Persons and the International Refugee Organization.

Report of a Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

80th Congress, First Session, p. 2, Washington, 1947.

37a

The members of this Committee found in their visits to

approximately 150 displaced persons camps in the United

States, British, and French occupied zones of Germany.

Austria, and Italy, that there were three principal groups of

displaced persons: (1) the liberated forced-labor group who

were brought into Germany from Poland, Yugoslavia, and

the Ukraine: (2) the Baltic group, those who fled from the

Baltic States ahead of the armies in 1944 (the Balts include

Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians); and (3) the Jewish

displaced persons, most of whom have come from the East-

ern European countries. There is an additional group of

displaced persons, the Volksdeutche. This group consists of

members of German-speaking minorities who had settled in

Southern and Eastern Europe. During the war and after.

these minorities moved or were expelled from their homes.

The bulk of the displaced persons in camps therefore was

born in Southeastern Europe.

Of the 28,789 displaced persons admitted to the United

States under the President's directive through Novem-

ber 30, 1947, 56 percent were born in Southern and Eastern

Europe, 43 percent in Northern and Western Europe, princi-

pally Germany, and one percent from all other countries.

(See Table 1.)

Ninety-three percent of those admitted came as quota

immigrants, and five percent as non-quota, chiefly wives of

citizens, while two percent were nonimmigrants who were

resident aliens returning to this country or students.

38a

TABLE NO. 1

Displaced Persons Admitted to the United States Under

The President's Directive of December 22, 1945,

By Class of Admission and Country of Birth:

December 22, 1945 to November 30, 1947*

Country or regioe of birth

—_ — — am on a-

SZirt i iBr rir ~~ 1s (iim Sirs pyyeeens

oo - - ~ <—

BH em a FB EMO Sh | HAr ane 88 am wows

‘

1.18)

107

11.509

gervs's ae" Saas a % sgsen omrse

ga°ae Sgacver sagen" Rsageo "A RA RAZENeRm“oRTE

£8” '43* Rs ever agers gsage*g” ET a" ER LEASART"TRES

| ae.

ga”

i vadltanal 4 bullae ‘it i

*The firs: vessel carrying displaced persons arrived May 20. | 946

39a

The single country with the largest number of admis-

sions is Germany. When it is recalled that the annual quota

for Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans is approxi-

mately 39,000, of which almost 26,000 is for Germany and

13,000 for the remaining countries, it is easy to understand

that there are quota numbers available for persons born in

Germany, whereas other countries having proportionately

greater numbers of displaced persons have fewer quota

numbers available and therefore can have proportionately

fewer admissions to the United States.

The median age of displaced persons rose from 28.7

years in the six months July 1-December 31, 1946, to 33.9 in

the comparable period, July 1-November 30, 1947. The

increase in preference quota of parents being brought to the

United States by citizens is one reason for the increasing

average age. In contrast, during the fiscal year 1947 the

median age of all immigrants was 27.4. The low median age

for all immigrants is accounted for in large part by the

young war brides coming to the United States. For the

cumulative total of displaced persons, the median age is

31.9, as may be observed in Table 2.

The sex distribution for all immigrants in 1947 and for

all displaced persons admitted is shown below:

Displaced

Year ended December 22, 1945-

June 30, 1947 November 30, 1947*

Ce 2 ei ole. 6 ge 6 6 « 147,292 28,789

DPE EE CL Gl lis 5 6 6 6 6 « 53,769 14,359

ee es 6 kw 93,523 14,430

Males per 1.000 females .... 57.5 99.5

*The first vessel carrying displaced persons arrived May 20, 1946.

40a

TABLE NO. 2

Displaced Persons Admitted to the United States Under

The President’s Directive of December 22, 1945,

By Sex, Age, and Marital Status:

December 22, 1945 to November 30, 1947*

Age Group Total Male Female

Tota! ato Ve bs ek eS OP eee 28.789 14.359 14,430

a eee a es 2.521 1,244 1,297

13 to 20 vears . 4.440 2.396 2.044

21 to 30 years 6,967 3,390 3,557

TS. ls ns. 6 he wy ae Weim tere ae 5,390 3,050 2,340

ED ar bis 6 6 o ee & 00 ew 3,883 1,926 1,957

ff eae ee a6 a oon ee 2.552 1.214 1,338

i) ) ae vane ea 1.980 758 1.222

71 to 80 years ene Pe re eye th oe 969 369 600

&. years and over un ie Gil eee are ie hee eal 87 32 $5

ee eee ow ioe teens 31.9 31.6 32.3

Marital Status

RE I PE ee ee ae 28,789

a) Sd ot wn cdS6 oe SS eee 12,324

Dt » 6s 6.66046 deen keene 12,676

Dis ¢ «\¢ 6 66.564 ue 6) e464 ee 3,377

De.) 6 i 6 6 Sa be 64 8S eo 412

*The first vessel carrying displaced persons arrived May 20, 1946

The report of the Special Subcommittee has a table

showing the skills of displaced persons in camps in the

United States Zone of Germany in May 1947. The table

indicates that as many as a seventh of the persons were

professional and semi-professional workers, and more than

a fifth were craftsmen and skilled workers.

While not strictly comparable since the period is not

the same, the occupation distribution for all immigrants

admitted in the fiscal year ended June 30, 1947, and for the

displaced persons admitted between July 1 and Novem-

ber 30, 1947, is shown in Table 3.

4la

TABLE NO. 3

Major Occupation of Immigrants Admitted to the

United States, Year ended June 30, 1947,

And of Displaced Persons Admitted,

July 1-November 30, 1947

Displaced

Immigrants persons

admitted year admitted,

ended July 1, 1947 to

June 30, 1947 Nov. 30, 1947

Occupation No. Percent No. Percent

I tate a md de alah eee 6 4 147,292 100.0 8.3824 100.0

Professional and semi-professiona!

ii SS aie wiles 6:4 9-4 10,891 74 916 10.4

Farmers and farm managers... ... . 3,462 2.4 196 2.2

Proprietors, managers, officials, except

Dts ce ton Mas Ww. 88 « < a 5,886 4.0 587 6.7

Clerical, sales, and kindred workers .. . 13,961 9.5 719 8.1

Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers 8,726 59 817 9.3

Operatives and kindred workers .... . 10,580 7.2 1,002 114

Domestic service workers ........ 4,922 3.3 87 1.0

Protective service workers ........ 292 2 22 2

Service workers, except domestic and

DT Eat eh 66 e-0 cee ces 3,590 2.4 212 2.4

Farm laborers and foremen ....... 442 3 30 3

Laborers, except farm .......... 2,831 1.9 62 7

SE 6 '@ WS ye 0 0-0 e686 81,709 $5.5 4,174 47.3

The Immigration and Naturalization Service cooper-

ates with a number of private agencies to facilitate the entry

into the United States of displaced persons. Toward that

end, the Service accepts applications from social agencies

that desire to execute affidavits guaranteeing that a specified

number of persons whom they wish to sponsor will not

become public charges. These affidavits are called corporate

affidavits. An agency desiring to participate in the program

is requested to furnish information concerning the financial

Status of the organization, the purpose for which it was

incorporated, and other material to show that the organiza-

tioni is able and willing to assume responsibility for the

number of persons specified. If the agency is approved, it

42a

may thereafter submit corporate affidavits to United States

consuls in connection with applications for immigration

visas by displaced persons.

Of the 28,789 displaced persons admitted to the United

States through November 30, 1947, 36 percent were spon-

sored by agencies, while 64 percent were sponsored by indi-

viduals, usually relatives or close friends of the immigrants.

(See Table 4.)

TABLE NO. 4

Agency Participation With Respect to Displaced

Persons Admitted to the United States Under

The President’s Directive of December 22, 1945:

December 22, 1945, to November 30, 1947*

Persons sponsored

Agency Number Percent

Sh aa tetas ha othe Sd i tie 6 “ere & oes 02% > + 3-04! ee 100

Church World Service. Inc. ........... | 97) 3

Catholic Committee for Refugees ........... 1,096 4

Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society... . . 1,823 6

International Rescue and Relief Committee .... . . 301 1

United States Service for New Americans ... . ... . $5,039 18

— U.S. Committee for Care of European Children... . 1,150 4

Vaad Hatzala Rehabilitation Committee... . .. . , 26

Individually sponsored ............... . 18,383 64

*The first vessel carrying displaced persons arrived May 20, 1946.

From time to time as the need arises, supplemental

affidavits to cover additional groups are received and consid-

ered for approval. When affidavits are approved, the Visa

Division of the Department of State is advised and that

division cables the information to the appropriate consuls of

this country, since the question of who are displaced persons

within the meaning of the President’s directive and who of

those are entitled to immigration visas for permanent resi-

dence in the United States are matters determined by the

Department of State through its consuls abroad.

43a

The first corporate affidavits were approved for dis-

placed persons located in the United States, British, and

French zones of Austria and Germany. In April 1947, cor-

porate affidavits were approved for displaced persons

located in Shanghai.

Persons sponsored by agencies are generally of the

same religious faiths as the social agencies sponsoring them.

That is, the Church World Service sponsors the Protestant

group: the Catholic Committee, the Catholic group: and

HIAS, USNA, and Vaad Hatala Emergency Committee,

the Jewish group. The International Rescue and Relief

Committee, the United States Committee for Care of Euro-

pean Children, and the American Federation of Interna-

tional Institutes are non-partisan organizations.

Pursuant to the requirements of the corporation affida-

vit, the agency submits a detailed report for each person

under its sponsorship within the time limit prescribed by the

corporate affidavit, giving the place of residence of the indi-

vidual, how he is being maintained, if employed, the weekly

wage earned, and whether the person has become a public

charge since entering into the United States. If the report

shows that the person is steadily employed, is self-support-

ing, has had no serious illness, and has not become a public

charge, no action is taken on the report and under the terms

of the corporate affidavit the agency is automatically

released from further responsibility sixty days from receipt

of the report by the Service.

44a

APPENDIX E

DEP’T STATE BULL., Vol XV. No. 386,

Nov. 24, 1946, pp. 934-938

U.S. POSITION ON INTERNATIONAL

REFUGEE ORGANIZATION

STATEMENT BY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE US.

DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS!

To begin with. Mr. Chairman, I| should like to state

very briefly the position of the United States on this Interna-

tional Refugee Organization, which will care for and help to

rehabilitate nearly a million people from Europe and the

Far East. As long as they are refugees and displaced persons

they constitute a threat to peace and good relations among

governments.

The maintenance in camps of these persons leads to

deterioration among them as human beings and is an eco-

nomic waste for all the nations of the world. We, in the

United States, feel this most keenly, since from practically

all the countries where they come from we have received

citizens who have built up our nation. Therefore, the United

States supports the principles of the General Assembly reso-

lution of February 12, 1946 namely:

' (a) The problem is international in character.

(b) There shall be no compulsory repatriation.

existing international arrangements for apprehension

of war criminals, Quislings, and traitors. This is being

' Made by the US. representative, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, before Com-

mittee 3 of the General Assembly at Lake Success on Nov. 8 and released to

the press by the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations on the same date.

45a

done by military occupation forces and is not the

responsibility of this new organization.

As a consequence we support the draft constitution of

the IRO which reflects the foregoing principles.

The United States has supported the principles advo-

cated by my colleague from the U.S.S.R. which is proved by

the numbers of people that have been repatriated from the

United States zone. However, it would be foreign to our

conception of democracy to force repatriation on any human

being. Three and one-half million persons have been repatri-

ated from the United States zone, but our people will alwa~:

believe in the right of asylum and complete freedom of

choice.

The Pilgrims, the Huguenots, and the Germans of 1848

came to us in search of political and religious freedom and a

wider economic opportunity. They built the United States.

These people now in displaced-persons camps are kin to

those early settlers of ours, and many of them might have

relatives in the United States.

My Government urges the participation in the IRO as

members by all peace-loving nations. There is no question

but that this participation will entail financial sacrifices by

all participating governments. For a time it will be a heavy

burden, but in the long run it will be an economy and well

worth the cost.

The finances of our organization will be considered in

committee 5, where the financial burden will be allotted to

the participating governments, so that the cost will be equi-

tably shared by all, and each government will pay according

to the standards laid down by committee 5.

In the interest of brevity I shall comment at this time

only on some of the essential points in Mr. Vyshinsky’s

46a

speech of Wednesday, leaving other points for comment

when we discuss the draft constitution article by article.

First of all | should like to say that Mr. Vyshinsky’s

view that no assistance should be given to those who for

valid reasons decide not to return to their countries of origin

is inconsistent with the unanimous decision of the General

Assembly in the resolution on displaced persons of Febru-

ary 12, 1946. That clearly provides that these persons shall

become the concern of the International Refugee Organiza-

tion.

Mr. Vyshinsky says that this problem is very simple. It

can be solved by repatriating all the displaced persons. In

fact, those who do not wish to be repatriated must fall into

this category. I think this point of view fails to take into

consideration the facts of political change in countries of

origin which have created fears in the minds of the million

persons, who remain, of such a nature that they choose

miserable life in camps in preference to the risks of repatria-

tion.

Our colleague from Poland mentioned that since

arrangements had been made to give people food allowances

after their return home the numbers going home had

increased. I think he is quite right that the fear of an eco-

nomic situation has deterred a number of people from tak-

ing the risk of repatriation, but not all of them are actuated

by consideration of the economic situation in their country

of origin.

Seven million people have already been repatriated;

repatriation is still proceeding. One thousand Poles are leav-

ing the U.S. zones of Germany and Austria daily. The mili-

tary administration which accomplished this result can

hardly be held solely responsible for the failure of the last

million to return.

47a

It was a new point, I think, which Mr. Vyshinsky raised

when he presented his position that those who do not choose

to return to their countries of origin shall not be resettled,

shall receive no aid towards settling somewhere else. This

leaves them with the prospect of spending the rest of their

lives in assembly centers as long as the IRO supports them

or else of facing starvation. They obviously cannot be left in

assembly centers to their own devices. They would continue

as an irritant in good relations between friendly govern-

ments and contribute to delay in the restoration of peace and

order which is the concern of all governments. There is no

reason why they should become wanderers if instead they

can be given an opportunity for resettlement in some coun-

try which has a future to offer them.

By another provision of the General Assembly resolu-

tion of February 1946, which, I think, Mr. Vyshinsky must

have forgotten, no action taken shall be of such a character

as to interfere in any way with the surrender and punish-

ment of war criminals, Quislings, and traitors in conformity

with international arrangements or agreements. These

arrangements, however, are the responsibility of other gov-

ernment bodies, including the military authorities.

I can tell you very briefly how arrangements for the

apprehension of Quislings works out under the US. occupa-

tional authorities. U.S. officials are continuously engaged in

screening the refugee personnel to locate Quislings or those

who for other reasons are not entitled to be given asylum.

When special complaints are received from other govern-

ments they are made by the governments’ liaison officers

with the United States Forces, European Theater. USFET

thereupon makes an investigation through Army channels.

If the investigation appears to substantiate the complaint,

the case goes before a board of officers, which makes the

48a

final determination. This method of procedure has in gen-

eral been satisfactory; but it must be emphasized that this

committee here is not, and should not. be the forum for

debate as to its effectiveness. It is not our function here to

discuss the adequacy of these arrangements or the perform-

ance under them. We are concerned with final decisions on

the draft of the constitution of IRO. This draft clearly

excludes from the benefits of the organization war

criminals, Quislings, and traitors. We can hope that such

persons will be entirely eliminated by the time the IRO

begins to function.

Mr. Vyshinsky spoke of members of various military

groups. The military character of different groups and their

members, we think, has been greatly exaggerated. They are

the concern of the military authorities, however, and will be

handled by them. Those who fought with the Germans and

collaborated with them are clearly excluded from assistance

from the IRO in the constitution before us. I have asked that

the U.S. military authorities supply me with a report on

each of the incidents complained of by Mr. Vyshinsky where

the U.S. is concerned, and | shall report these findings in

writing to the committee. if it so desires, as soon as they are

available.

Now we come to the point which Mr. Vyshinsky made

that all propaganda should be suppressed in the camps. He

challenges us on the point that under the guise of freedom of

expression propaganda hostile to the countries of origin is

tolerated. On this point | am afraid we hold very different

ideas. But this does not preclude cooperation between us.

We, in the United States, tolerate opposition provided it

does not extend to the point of advocacy of the overthrow of

government by force. Unless the right of opposition is con-

ceded, it seems to me that there is very little possibility that

countries with differing conceptions of democracy can live

49a

together without friction in the same world. Much progress

has been made to date in dealing with this problem of propa-

ganda within the framework of these divergent views. With

patience and understanding we can achieve still further

progress in this direction.

Mr. Vyshinsky objects to the inclusion of certain cate-

gories of refugees and displaced persons.

One group consists of those who, as a result of events

subsequent to the outbreak of the second World War. are

unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of

the government of their countries of nationality or of former

nationality.

This paragraph covers those who for political reasons,

territorial changes, or changes of sovereignty are unable to

return to their country. That paragraph is in annex |, part |,

section A, paragraph 2. I regret that Mr. Vyshinsky cannot

confirm the agreement reached at the last sensation of the

Economic and Social Council on this point. We consider it

essential that the paragraph be retained. But since he asked

who these people are, I should like out of my own experience

to mention a few. I visited two camps near Frankfurt, where

the majority of people had come from Estonia, Latvia, and

Lithuania. I have received innumerable petitions. My mail

today carried three from people in different countries, who,

because changes had come in the types of government in

their countries, felt that they did not wish to return. That

does not mean that they do not love their country; it simply

means that they prefer the country as it was before they left

it. That country they feel no longer belongs to them. I gather

that Mr. Vyshinsky felt that anyone who did not wish to

return under the present form of government must of neces-

sity be Fascist. I talked to a great many of these people who

do not strike me as Fascist, and the assumption that people

do not wish to return to the country of their origin because

those countries are now under what is called a democratic

50a

form of government does not seem to allow for certain dif-

ferences in the understanding of the word democracy. As

Mr. Vyshinsky uses it, it would seem that democracy is

synonymous with Soviet, or at least a fairly similar concep-

tion of political and economic questions. Under that formula

I am very sure that he would accept some of the other

nations in the world who consider themselves democracies

and who are as willing to die for their beliefs as are the

people of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Vyshinsky also objected to certain exceptions to

the general rule that those who had voluntarily assisted the

enemy are excluded from the concern of the IRO. The intent

of the exemptions is to cover those who were forced to

perform slave labor or who may have rendered humanitar-

ian assistance, such as assistance to wounded civilians. Mr.

Vyshinsky proposes to exclude all those who assisted in any

manner. Under such language those merely present in any

occupied area forced by necessity of survival to perform any

form of work or service within the German economy would

be considered to have assisted the enemy and would thus be

excluded. This would result in cruel hardship on many. We

can, however, discuss the point at greater length later.

I sincerely regret having to speak in opposition to some

of Mr. Vyshinsky’s views. But he will recall that in London

there were some things which because of the fundamental

beliefs I hold, I had to stand on. I felt strongly about them

then and I still do. This does not mean that Mr. Vyshinsky

- cannot hold to his basic beliefs as well and still achieve with

us a solution. This solution can be reached if we are both

willing in these fields to try for a spirit of cooperation and a

realistic approach to our problems. It is essential to the

peace of the world that we wipe out some of our resentments

as well as our fears. I hope that as time goes on our two great

nations may grow to understand each other and to accept

our different viewpoints on certain questions.

APPENDIX F

THE FUTURE OF DISPLACED PERSONS IN

EUROPE

DEP’T STATE BULL. VOL. XVIII, NO. 419,

JULY 13, 1947, PP. 86-88

STATEMENT BY LT. COL. JERRY M. SAGE’

On my return to Europe in 1946, I learned that of the

about 8,000,000 displaced persons that the German armies

had forced into Germany from other countries of Europe

which they had occupied, approximately 7,000,000 had

returned, with the aid of the Western Allied Armies, to the

areas in which they formerly lived. In the zones of the

Western Allies in Germany, Austria, and Italy, there were

at the first of this year slightly over a million displaced

persons in the hands of the Western Allied Armies. Between

80 and 90 percent of these had been forced into German

territory by the Nazi armies before the end of hostilities.

The balance were persecutees, for the most part the Jewish

people who fled into our zones in Austria and Germany,

almost entirely from Poland, in 1946. This movement was

Spey coomerates Uy Gis cameer of 40 Sous ot Kielce on

July 4, 1946.

At this point I should like to clarify a misapprehension

which has arisen in previous discussions of this bill. It has

been erroneously stated that 80 percent of the DP’s entered

the occupied zones after the end of hostilities. As I have

indicated above, the true situation is exactly the reverse. I do

not know how this misapprehension came about. It may

' Excerpts from statement made on July 2, 1947, before the House

Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization, and released to the

press on the same date. Lieutenant Colonel Sage of the United States Army

is attached to Headquarters of European Command, Frankfurt, Germany.

S2a

possibly stem from the fact that millions of Germans and

persons of German ethnic origin (“Volksdeutsch™) have fled

or been transferred into the western zones of Germany from

eastern Germany or from eastern European countries where

they formerly resided. It is not with these people that we are

concerned as they are Germans and have become a part of

the German economy.

Of the million displaced persons remaining, Lithuani-

ans, Latvians, Estonians, Poles, Jews, Yugoslavs, Ukraini-

ans, and stateless persons, of whom we are talking here now,

the United States has control of about 600,000 in Germany,

Austria, and Italy. Of this number I have been vitally con-

cerned with those residing in the U.S. zone of Germany, a

total of over 500,000. When I left Germany a month ago,

there were 354,000 of these displaced persons in assembly

centers in our zone and about | 50,000 living outside centers,

either in labor units working for the U.S. cedars

in the German economy.

The United States Army has been charged with the

responsibility for this group of half a million people. We

have endeavored, with the assistance of UNRRA workers,

to feed, clothe, and rehabilitate these people to the best of

our ability and resources.

But we are continually asked one question and it is one

we continually ask ourselves: “What is to become of these

people—the ones our Army took under its control and still

has under its control?”

The four alternative solutions presented by General

Hilldring are not new. They have been discusse?, consid-

ered, and elaborated on around our conference tables in

Germany for many months. But the United States Army in

Germany, although charged with the responsibility for dis-

53a

decision as to what we are to do with these people in the

future. That decision, we are fully aware, must be made by

the United States Government—by the Congress—the ulti-

mate governmental authority over them.

There are four possible alternatives:

1. Forcible repatriation.

2. Closing the camps and telling the displaced per-

sons to become Germans and fend for themselves as best

they can in Germany.

3. Continuing to maintain them separate from the

political and economic organization in Europe, indefinitely,

in the little communities which they form in the assembly

centers.

4. Endeavoring to secure their resettlement in coun-

tries where they can rebuild their lives and strike new roots.

All I am here for is to give you briefly such of my

observations of these people as you might feel to be useful to

you in reaching your decision as to which of these alterna-

tive courses is to be pursued.

I shall endeavor to answer any questions which occur to

you and to deve'»p more fully any aspect that you may

desire.

Repatriation

The alternative of repatriation must, at this point, be

definitely termed “forcible repatriation”. As has just been

pointed out, a tremendous job has been done in returning

7,000,000 persons to their homelands. Over the past two

years every opportunity has been afforded to those now

remaining in our zones to return. From my observation,

those whom we still have on our hands are essentially a hard

core of nonrepatriables who will not return to their place of

S4a

origin because the map of the area where they formerly lived

has been redrawn and a government alien to them is in

power. They fear a lack of political freedom and have a real

dread of persecution. I can certainly testify as to the pres-

ence of those fears. It is not unusual in the United States

zone of Germany, when a movement of displaced persons is

contemplated from one installation to another for better

accommodations or to meet a military exigency, that rumors

immediately begin to circulate about the camp, and the fear

is developed that transportation is coming to repatriate the

displaced persons against their will. On several occasions it

has been part of my job to visit such installations to quiet the

panic among the people by giving them the true facts about

the movement and reiterating that it has not been and is not

the policy of the United States Government to force dis-

placed persons to return to the area from which they came.

There are still a few people who are accepting our continu-

ing offer to aid those who are willing to go. They receive,

when they reach their destination, a two months’ ration to

insure their subsistence until they get their feet on the

ground and become reestablished. Those who have gone

during the last year and those who may still be willing to go

are mainly Poles who came from that part of Poland which

is still Poland. But the vast majority of displaced persons

now in our hands have convinced me that they will not go

back. I cannot number the occasions on which I have asked

every variety of DP, “Why don’t you go home—to the piece

of ground you know, the members of your family and old

friends, to the place where you can use your native tongue?”

These are the answers I receive, and I receive them

every day from people of nearly every walk of life. The

Baltic peoples—the Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estoni-

ans—have said to me, “I would rather die than return to my

home—it is no longer mine. It is in the hands of the same

people who took away every right I had in 1940 and 1941

55a

and who took away friends and relatives of mine whom I

never saw again.”

Many of the Poles and Ukrainians who formerly lived

in Poland east of the Curzon Line, now Poland no longer,

say, “I will not return to land now held by the U.S. S. R.”

The Jews in our camps tell me: “The Nazi teachings

were far reaching. I am still attacked in eastern Europe, as

well as in Germany. Let me go to Palestine.”

I recall a remark by a Yugoslav DP who was in the

same prison camp with me in 1943. “Should I go home to a

political regime I hate and fear—to be tried by Tito, who

accuses me of being a collaborator during the time I was

spending two years and 50 pounds of flesh in German prison

camps? The only one with whom I could have collaborated

was God!”

Such observations, multiplied hundreds of times, are

heard not only by me, but by every person who works with

displaced persons in our zone. It does not do any good to say

to these people that “7,000,000 displaced persons have gone

back to where they came from: why don’t you?” The answer

is too simple and too clear. Naturally, the millions of French

and other western Europeans went back home. Naturally,

the millions of Russians who believed in the Russian eco-

nomic and governmental system went back. Naturally, also,

anyone who believed in or was indifferent about the new

systems of government in other eastern areas went back.

The ones who have gone were the ones who were willing to

go. Their experience is no guide for those who are now

unwilling to go. Is it reasonable to expect the DP Balts, for

example, who are bitterly hostile to the political and eco-

nomic system which they experienced in 1940 and 1941 and

which now rigidly controls their countries, to feel that it is

safe for them to go back, carrying their hostility with them,

S6a

to work against Communism? The very fact that they go

back unwillingly is enough to endanger them. Or are we to

expect and demand of them that, because their native coun-

tries have changed hands, they must therefore change their

beliefs and accept Communism as their way of life? We

believe that these persons unwilling to go back would have to

be rounded up by the U.S. constabulary or German police

and forced into repatriation trains with gun and bayonet.

Shall We Close the Camps?

The second alternative is to close the camps and tell the

displaced persons that they should become Germans and get

such work or relief as the Germans might provide. From my

contacts with these people I have observed several aspects of

this alternative which you gentlemen may wish to consider

in determining what course to choose. The first is that the

great body of these people would regard it as a return to

imprisonment to be turned back to the Germans whose

armies brought them into Germany for forced labor or into

prisoner-of-war or concentration camps. It has been equally

apparent from my contacts that the Germans do not want

the displaced persons in their midst. The Germans have not

forgotten the Nazi indoctrination which looked on the non-

German as an inferior person to be exploited by the “master

race”. This feeling appears as one of our difficulties in find-

ing employment for displaced persons. Too often the Ger-

man administrator of a labor office discriminates against the

displaced-person applicant, at least by passive if not active

means. These ingrained antagonisms would be a perpetual

source of conflict. They would prolong and make more bur-

densome our task in the occupation of Germany.

In addition to these deep-rooted antagonisms, there are

factors in the economy of the western zone of Germany, as

we over there observe it, which also have a definite bearing

on the practicability of this second alternative. There are

57a

slightly over 500,000 displaced persons in the U.S. zone of

Germany alone. Can we expect the economy of the zone to

absorb this half-million? Before the war, this area contained

about 14 million people. In addition to that population we

have had to accept 1% million expellees (ethnic Germans)

from eastern countries such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary,

and Poland. Another million people have been added to the

German economy in our zone under the classification of

German refugees—Germans displaced from their homes in

either the Russian zone or in the area presently under Polish

administration. Thus, excluding the displaced persons, the

total population of our zone has now been brought to about

16% million. When one considers that at least 30 percent of

the housing in the U.S. zone has been destroyed and its

industries for the most part destroyed or collapsed; that even

before the war, under the extreme food-production efforts of

the Nazis, this area had to import 20 percent of its food

requirements for a normal population of 14 million; that 2’

million Germans have been added to the area; and that it is

also supposed to feed a million persons in the U.S. sector of

Berlin, the reason why American taxpayers have the alter-

native of contributing heavily to the support of this surplus

German population or letting it starve is apparent. Merely

to close the camps and add these half-million non-Germans

to the already surplus Germans in our area would give us

only an apparent but no real relief from the situation we

created when we conquered Germany and took these victims

of Germany into our hands.

58a

APPENDIX G

22 C.F.R. 61.3134ikc) SUPP. 1946

(j) First-priority nonpreference class. The first-prior-

ity nonpreference category of quota immigrants shall con-

sist of the following:

(a) Aliens who have served honorably in the

armed forces of the United States, and the alien wid-

Ows, parents, unmarried minor children, and unmar-

ried minor stepchildren of citizens of the United States

(including deceased citizens) who have so served, and

aliens who have served honorably as seamen for at least

one year on vessels of countries of the United Nations

engaged in sailing from ports in the United States, the

service in either case having occurred during the period

of the war that began on September 1, 1939, such

persons not having voluntarily abandoned such service

or occupation so long as they were not physically inca-

pacitated for such service.

(b) Aliens who have been recommended by the

Joint Chiefs of Staff as persons whose admission is

highly desirable in the national interest, provided that

such cases have been approved by all appropriate gov-

ernmental agencies.

directive of December 22, 1945 and his directive of

October 31, 1946.

Aliens in the first-priority nonpreference class shall

have their applications for nonpreference-quota immigra-

tion visas considered only after consideration shall have

been given to the applications of all first-preference and

second-preference immigrants awaiting visas. Aliens in the

first-priority nonpreference-quota category shall have their

_—_

59a

applications for visas considered in the order in which their

registration forms were properly filled out and received at

the consular office. but consideration need not be given to

the visa application of any alien in this category unless a

quota number is likely to be available for use in issuing a

visa to him. [Subdivision (i) amended by Dept. Reg. 108.34,

Dec. 14, 1946, effective Dec. 24, 1946, 11 F.R. 14611]

APPENDIX H

DEPT STATE BULL. VOL. XVL. NO. 401,

MARCH 9, 1947, PP. 423-429

U.S. Participation in International Refugee Organization

THE PRESIDENT’S RECOMMENDATION

TO THE CONGRESS'

To the Congress of the United States of America:

| recommend that the Congress authorize the United

States to participate as a member of the International Refu-

gee Organization.

As an aftermath of the war, there are more than one

million displaced persons remaining in Germany, Austria,

and Italy. Almost two thirds of these are under United

States care and control. The Allied military victory over the

Axis Powers brought with it a practical and moral responsi-

bility with reference to these victims of the Axis.

The General Assembly of the United Nations has con-

sidered the problem of these displaced persons carefully and

at great length. At the first session in London, certain basic

principles were established. It was agreed that this problem

is international in scope and nature; that every effort should

be made to facilitate the repatriation of displaced persons

who desire to return to their homelands; that displaced per-

sons who have valid objections to return should not be forced

to do so, but should be cared for by an international agency

until new homes can be found for them elesewhere. Between

the January and October sessions of the General Assembly,

the Economic and Social Council made a detailed study of

the entire problem and recommended the establishment of

' Released to the press by the White House Feb. 24, 1947.

6la

an International Refugee Organization which would pro-

‘de an integrated and effective solution. At the meeting of

the General Assembly in New York which ended in Decem-

ber, the draft constitution recommended by the Economic

and Socia! Council was adopted. The United States Repre-

sentative to the United Nations, Senator Warren Austin,

signed the constitution of the International Refugee Organi-

zation subject to subsequent approval by the Congress.

This constitution represents an earnest effort by the

United Nations to solve one of the most poignant and diffi-

cult problems left in the wake of the war. The organization

to be created will have no governmental! powers. It can in no

way alter the statutes of any of its members. It can obtain

funds only by appropriations by the constitutional processes

of its members. It will be solely a service organization to aid

in the solution of a common problem. I am confident that

with the full support of the United States the Internationa!

Refugee Organization will demonstrate the practical effec-

tiveness of cooperation and understanding among nations.

The participation of this Nation in the Organization was

proposed in my budget message for the fiscal year 1948, and

provision was made for the necessary funds within the pro-

posed budget.

With respect to those displaced persons in our own

areas of occupation, the United States Army has an excel-

lent record of performance in a field which is not tradition-

ally the responsibility of soldiers. The Army from the first

recognized the need for making the maximum use of inter-

national civilian agencies, and has done so. With the forth-

coming termination of the supply of civilian personnel from

other organizations now used in the care and supply of

displaced persons, | believe that it is of the utmost impor-

tance that the International Refugee Organization be estab-

lished as soon as possible. It would indeed be serious if it

62a

were not in a position to begin operations on July | of this

year.

It is not unreasonable that many of the other potential

members of the International Refugee Organization should

watch closely the attitude of the United States before mak-

ing their own definite commitments. I feel sure that with the

firm and prompt leadership of the United States, this organ-

ization will be in a position to function as an international

body to perform an essentially international service.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE

February 24, 1947

Congressional Hearings on [RO Constitution

LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO

SENATOR VANDENBERG'

February 24, 1947

DEAR SENATOR VANDERBERG:

I would be grateful if you would bring to the attention

of the Committee on Foreign Relations the following

remarks pertaining to S.J. Res. 77, a bill to authorize U.S.

membership in the International Refugee Organization. |

regret that the intensive preparations required for the forth-

coming meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Mos-

cow make it impossible for me to present these views in

person.

At the climax of the war in Europe, on April 20, 1945,

to be exact, I transmitted to the leaders of the Congress an

' Released to the press Mar. |, 1947. Senator Vandenberg is Chairman

of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

63a

urgent message from the Supreme Commander of the

Allied Expeditionary Force. In that message Genera! Eisen-

hower referred to the “unspeakable conditions” found in the

concentration camps then being liberated by our advancing

armies. He invited the Congressional leaders to make a

flying trip to Germany to see for themselves the “full evi-

dence of the cruelty practiced by the Nazis in such places as

normal procedure.”

With a deep sense of responsibility, a bi-partisan com-

mittee of twelve Senators and Representatives dropped their

current business and departed by air for Germany. They

saw for themselves; and through their eyes, the whole coun-

try saw too. The report of this joint committee, signed by all

twelve members, ranks in my opinion as an historic docu-

ment. It described vividly the tragic plight of those who were

victimized by the Nazis. It recorded firm determination to

do every thing possible to right the appalling wrongs perpe-

trated by the enemy. It was a moral mandate, to soldier and

civilian alike, to exert every effort to help these unfortunate

people.

Almost two years have elapsed since that joint Con-

gressional report. More than 32 million of our soldiers have

been returned from the European battleground. Seven mil-

lion displaced persons have been assisted to return to their

homes from areas under the control of the Western Allied

Armies. Many of the German war criminals responsible for

the suffering and dislocation of these people have been tried

and punished. However, some of the victims of Nazi concen-

tration camps are still in displaced persons centers in our

Occupied Areas. We also have many others who, although

not actually confined in concentration camps, had been

uprooted from their homes by the Nazis and brought to

Germany for forced labor. They are still there. Why?

Because we will not force them back against their will to the

64a

countries from which they were uprooted: and because they

have not yet been resettled elsewhere. We are now faced

with this pressing question: What is to happen to these

people?

My distinguished predecessor, Mr. Byrnes, established

the policy that the future care and disposition of these dis-

placed persons is a collective international responsibility just

as was the military defeat of Germany and the punishment

of Nazi war criminals. This policy was determined and sup-

ported without regard to differences of political affiliation.

With your approval and assistance, | intend to continue that

policy.

In furtherance of this policy the United States has

actively supported in the United Nations the formation of

an International Refugee Organization. As you know, Sena-

tor Austin, acting under authority of full powers issued by

the President, has signed the constitution of the IRO, sub-

ject to final approval by Congress. The purpose of this

Organization is to enable displaced persons to subsist while

it actively effects their repatriation or resettlement. This will

relieve the Army of its part of the present divided and

difficult responsibility and should mean immediate economy

of effort and funds and a speedier solution of the whole

problem.

I have asked the Secretary of War, the Under Secretary

of State and the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied

Areas to describe in more detail the nature of the present

problem and the projected scope of activities of the new

International Refugee Organization. In advance of their

testimony, | would earnestly stress that, with whatever

minor imperfections there may be as the inevitable product

of reconciling many conflicting viewpoints, | believe that the

IRO will advance this problem to its permanent solution. |

therefore urge as an important element of our foreign policy

65a

that the Congress support the efforts we have made thus far

by authorizing the United States to participate in this

Organization. | am confident that the Congress will

approach this situation with the same deep sense of respon-

sibility that it acted upon General Eisenhower's urgent

message almost two years ago.

Faithfully yours,

GeorGce C. MARSHALL

Secretary of State

STATEMENT BY UNDER SECRETARY ACHESON’

Mr. Chairman, | appreciate the opportunity which

your Committee has given to the representatives of the

Department of State to appear before you for the purpose of

supporting Senate Joint Resolution 77, to provide for the

United States membership in the International Refugee

The provisions of this bill can be simply stated. First, it

authorizes the President to accept membership in the Inter-

national Refugee Organization. Second, it provides that the

President shall designate United States representatives and —

alternates to attend sessions of the International Refugee

Organization. Third, it authorizes an appropriation of the

sums necessary for the United States to participate in the

organization. Essentially what this bill asks, therefore, is

congressiona! authorization which will make definitive the

action already taken by Senator Austin in signing provision-

ally the constitution of the International Refugee Organiza-

tion.

' Opening statement made before the Senate Committee on Foreign

Relations at hearings of that committee on the IRO on Mar. |, 1947, and

released to the press on the same date

66a

What is it that this constitution provides” It establishes

an organization to deal on an integrated basis with the

whole problem of refugees and displaced persons. For the

purposes of this organization, a displaced person is someone

who had to leave his own country as a result of the actions of

the Nazi or Fascist authorities. A refugee is, generally

speaking, anyone outside of his own country who was either

a victim of Nazi persecution or who now is unwilling to

return to his own country as a result of events which took

place subsequent to the outbreak of the war. In general, the

organization concerns itself with such people only when

certain conditions are fulfilled, i. e., that such persons desire

to be repatriated and need help in order to be repatriated or

for good reasons refuse to return voluntarily to their own

countries. These are primarily the people whom the occupy-

ing armies found on their hands when they entered Ger-

many, Austria, and Italy. They were people who had been

taken against their will to Germany during the war. largely

for the purpose of slave labor, or were people who, through

fear of persecution or through lack of sympathy with the

regimes which have been established in their own countries,

fled to Germany, Austria, or Italy for protection. The organ-

ization will also be concerned with similar problems in the

Far East. particularly with overseas Chinese displaced by

operations of the Japanese armies.

Toward all these people the organization is intended to

carry out certain functions. In the first place, obviously they

must be cared for until some permanent disposition can be

made of their case. In the second place, then, it is desirable

that as many of these people as possible should be repatri-

ated to their own countries since, always provided they are

willing to go back, this solution represents the most econom-

ical and permanently s2isi ying way of handling the matter.

Finally, those who have valid objections to returning to their

own countries must be resettled in another place. Only to a

67a

limited extent coffid they be absorbed into the German econ-

omy. For example, in our zone in Germany, as a result of the

expulsion of Germans from other countries and areas, there

are three million more people than before the war while

opportunities for work have been narrowed by the destruc-

tion of industrial plants. Nor should these victims of the

Germans be forced against their will to become a part of

them. It is of the highest importance that they should be

brought as speedily as practical to useful living in a commu-

nity where they are needed and wanted.

There are certain additional limitations upon the

classes of people which this organization will serve. A per-

son, for example, who has unreasonably refused to accept

the proposals of the organization for resettlement will cease

to be its concern. Also, the organization will not assist a

person who is making no substantial effort toward earning

his own living if it is possible for him to do so. Lastly, the

organization will naturally not concern itself with war

criminals, quislings, or traitors, or any other persons who

can be shown to have assisted the enemy forces voluntarily

in their operations against the United Nations.

Membership in the International Refugee Organiza-

tion is open to any member of the United Nations and under

certain restrictions to certain non-members. The General

Council is the policy-making body of the organization, in

which each member is represented and in which each mem-

ber has one vote. The Executive Committee is elected by the

General Council and is composed of nine countries elected

for a two-year term. The chief administrative officer of the

International Refugee Organization is the Director Gen-

eral, who will be appointed by the General Council upon the

nomination of the Executive Committee and will himself

appoint the administrative staff of the organization. The

personnel of the organization is calculated in the budget as

68a

running somewhere between 2,000 and 3,000 persons, which

will represent the number of persons required to carry on the

field work and camp administrative functions that are now

being performed by UNRRA and the occupying armies.

The financing of the International Refugee Organiza-

tion will be based upon article 10 of the constitution. In the

first place, there will be an annual administrative- budget

which the General Assembly has set at a figure of

$4,800,000 for the first financial year of the organization.

Second, the main work of the organization is derived from

the funds expended under the operational budget. It was set

by the General Assembly at about $1 51,000,000 for the first

financial year of the organization. The largest part of this is

obviously that devoted to care and maintenance, which is

approximately $100,000,000, or two thirds of the budget.

However, it is clear that the more quickly we can get the

displaced persons repatriated or resettled in other countries,

the more quickly we shall be able to reduce the care and

maintenance items in the budget by removing these people

from assembly centers and camps. It was therefore impor-

tant to make adequate provision for the expenses of repatri-

ation and resettlement.

The two parts of the budget just mentioned constitute

the obligatory portion of the financing of the International

Refugee Organization. In addition to these two parts, there

is also set up a sum of $5,000,000 for what is described as a

fund for large-scale resettlement, to which contributions are

not obligatory upon the members.

The apportionment of the budget among the members

was naturally something to which a great deal of thought

was given. It had been agreed from the start that the admin-

istrative budget should be apportioned on the same scale as

the apportionment of the budget of the United Nations.

According to this, therefore, the United States emerges with

69a

an obligation to pay 39.89 percent of the administrative

budget of the International Refugee Organization. The

operational budget. it was felt, should reflect a little more

closely the interest of the different countries in the problem.

Certain adjustments were also made in favor of countries

which had suffered severe economic and financial damage as

a result of the war. The United States share in the opera-

tional budget on a full membership basis is 45.75 percent.

The United States has substantially 60 percent of the dis-

placed persons actually on its hands and has been actually

making a higher percentage of external contributions to the

cost of their care.

It has of course always been recognized that, so far as

the United States is concerned, the Congress is the appropri-

ating authority and that any obligation undertaken by the

United States to contribute would have to be made annually

subject to the appropriating authority of Congress. As to the

large-scale resettlement expenditures for which no alloca-

tion of percentage is made by the constitution, the Depart-

ment of State suggests that the share of the United States in

this non-obligatory budget could equitably be fixed at the

same percentage as the United States share of the regular

operational budget, 45.75 percent.

The International Refugee Organization is to be a tem-

porary organization. Its work should be brought to a close

within a few years. There is a large job to be done but the

very nature of the problem and the burden of delay both on

the United States taxpayer and on the displaced persons

themselves make it imperative that it be rapidly accom-

plished. Any member may at any time give written notice of

its intention to withdraw. The withdrawal then becomes

effective one year after the notice has been given.

The International Refugee Organization is a service

organization. It is not an organization with governmental~

70a

powers. Nothing in the constitution of this organization

would enable it to alter the statutes of any of its members,

whether in respect of immigration or any other matter.

Furthermore, as | have stated above, the organization can

obtain from the United States only such funds as the Con-

gress may appropriate to the organization.

The constitution which has been described is the result

of many months of earnest deliberation in the United

Nations. Within a few months after the termination of hos-

tilities in August 1945 it became evident that the task to be

faced was one which required the unification of functions

with regard to the care, repatriation, and’ resettlement of

displaced persons that were being carried on at that time by

the American, British, and French military governments as

well as by UNRRA and the [ntergovernmental Committee

on Refugees. The question of refugees and displaced persons

was accordingly placed on the agenda of the General

Assembly which met in London in January 1946. The ques-

tion was recognized by the delegates gathered at London as

one of the substantive problems of great urgency which the

United Nations had to face.

The Assembly itself, faced with the immediate pressure

of organizing the United Nations, could not make any sys-

tematic examination of the matter. It therefore referred the

matter to the Economic and Social Council, which, after a

long series of deliberations and sub-referrals to committees,

reported back to the Assembly in October a proposal for an

International Refugee Organization. After a considerable

debate, the Assembly, on December 15, 1946, adopted the

constitution of the proposed organization, approved a

budget for the first financial year, and approved also an

agreement for a Preparatory Commission to undertake nec-

essary planning functions during the interim period before

the coming into force of the constitution. At every point

Tla

throughout the debate, the urgency and importance of the

question was evident. And to this question, | may add, more

hours have been devoted in the United Nations than to any

other single question exclusive of those concerning security.

The constitution was opened for signature on Decem-

ber 15, 1946. The constitution requires two conditions to

bring it into force: (1) at least 15 states must become parties

to it; (2) the allocated contributions of the participating

States must constitute 75 percent of the total operational

budget.

At the present time, || states are already signatories to

the constitution. They are: Canada, the United States,

France, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Guatemala.

the Philippines, Liberia, the Netherlands, Norway, and the

United Kingdom. The allocated contributions of these states

amount to 69.80 percent of the budget. Of these states, only

the United Kingdom has as yet signed definitively without

reservations similar to that of the United States.

Signature was made on behalf of the United States by

Senator Austin “subject to approval”. In this context,

“approval” is understood to mean approval by the Congress.

The joint resolution now before you will, if enacted, author-

ize the President to accept definitively for the United States

membership in the organization. Favorable action by the

United States will of course affect governments which are

now looking to us to take the lead.

Since the action by the Genera] Assembly, the Prepara-

tory Commission of the IRO has met in Geneva, Switzer-

land, where preliminary plans have been made for the

program of the IRO as and when it is legally established.

The Commission elected as its Executive Secretary Mr.

Arthur J. Altmeyer, who is the Commissioner of the United

States Social Security Administration. Mr. Altmeyer will

72a

thus have the administrative responsibility. as an interna-

tional! civil servant, for the next several months. of initiating

the plans for the effectuation of the IRO.

The origin of the problem of the displaced persons is, |

am sure, familiar to most of you. The great majority of these

people were driven from their homes by the circumstances

of the war. These were nationals of one or another of the

United Nations or were persons who had been persecuted by

the enemy. In very large part, they were people who had

been carried into Germany as slave labor. When the war

ended, they were without the means of repatriating them-

selves or of providing adequately for their own maintenance.

in Germany, Austria, and Italy, the occupying western

armies found some eight millions of homeless people sturdy

enough to have survived, who became the joint concern of

the occupying armies and of UNRRA.

There was then undertaken by the armies and UNRRA

an extraordinarily effective job of identification, care and

repatriation. Seven million people were returned to their

homes within a year. This was a rapid job planned and

instituted as a joint activity by SHAEF. It was also

humaneiy accomplished. It was from all points of view the

most satisfactory method of dealing with the problem. But it

fell short of becoming a complete solution. There remained

more than a million displaced persons on the hands of the

United States, Great Britain, and France in Germany, Aus-

tria and Italy. The process of repatriation, though still con-

tinuing, has slowed up. in)

It is evident that there are, among the displaced per-

sons, hundreds of thousands who will not voluntarily return

to their places of origin. This is due to the changes wrought

by the war in pre-war governmental boundaries and govern-

mental systems within the areas from which they have come;

to the aftermath of the memories of Nazi persecution in

73a

those areas during the war, the destruction of their kindred

and their former homes and former opportunities for liveli-

hood: to differences in political views and fears of persecu-

tion or reprisal because of those differences. We are

unwilling, if we were able, forcibly to send these uprooted

people back to countries with new borders and new political

systems. That has been the cardinal principle in handling

these displaced persons in the past. It was approved by the

General Assembly of the United Nations. It is firmly

embodied“in the constitution of the International Refugee

Organization.

It has also been a firm principle in the administration of

the displaced persons program, and it will continue to be

under the International Refugee Organization, that these

victims of German aggression will not against their will be

forced to stay in Germany and become Germans. As a

matter of fact, there is no place for them in the contracted

German economy and in our already overcrowded zone.

It has always been the view of the military authorities

that the problem of displaced persons was from its very

nature one not for troops but for international civilian agen-

cies. They have increasingly used such agencies. Our Army

is not now staffed to carry on the task of administration of

these hundreds of communities and the negotiation and exe-

cution of international arrangements for repatriation and

resettlement. The International Refugee Organization pro-

vides a unified service for all the present varied services with

the present diffused overheads and responsibilities.

The problem, then, is that of the remaining displaced

persons, about one million people, of whom some 600,000

are in the United States zone.

Of these people, almost all come from the countries of

eastern Europe. Perhaps a third are registered as Poles, a

74a

fifth as Balts, a fourth as Jews, and smaller fractions as

Yugoslavs and citizens of the Soviet Union, stateless, and of

miscellaneous origin. We are thus dealing with a group of

people originating in an area of Europe where political

change has been great and where political tension is high. As

an occupying power, we have these people on our hands; we

are compelled to do something about them in a constructive

and statesmanlike manner.

The program which is envisaged for these people is in

summary as follows: First, the persons who can be repatri-

ated must be temporarily cared for until their return home

can be accomplished. They must receive initial supplies of

food to start them on their way. Second, those who are

unwilling to return need temporary care until they can be

resettled. Third, the task of resettlement requires protracted

negotiation with the potential countries of reception and

then the making of arrangements for sorting out, training,

medica! examination, and transportation. Finally, such dis-

placed persons as are unwilling to work to contribute to their

own support or who are otherwise exploiting the assistance

they are receiving, or have been collaborators with our ene-

mies, or are unwilling to accept opportunities for resettle-

ment, will no longer receive support. This recital of the tasks

before the IRO will indicate, I think, the difficult program

facing the organization. This Government has never

believed that the job would be easy: but it has always been

determined to see it through.

The International Refugee Organization has a substan-

tial contribution to make to the cause of post-war recon-

in it would be a further earnest of our determined effort to

make the United Nations work.

75a

APPENDIX I

UNRRA ORDER NO. 52, _

ELIGIBILITY FOR U.N. ASSISTANCE,

JUNE 24, 1946, U.N. PAG-4/4.2-82

U.N.R.R.A. CENTRAL HEADOU ARTERS

D.P. OPERATIONS, GERMANY

ORDER NO. 52

24th June, 1946.

Subject: Eligibility for U NRRA Assistance

1. Purpose.

a. This order rescinds Administrative Order No. 29.

dated 4th March, 1946 subject: Categories of Displaced

Persons.

b. One of UNRRA’s fundamental responsibilities is

to ensure that only those persons eligible for assistance

under UNRRA Council Resolutions and implementing

administrative decisions receive UNRRA care.

c. The purpose of this order is to re-state the eligibil-

ity requirements for UNRRA assistance, and to define the

various Categories of displaced persons for whom UNRRA

is authorized to give care, as well as those categories of

displaced persons who are ineligible for care.

2. Applicability.

The eligibility requirements set forth herein apply to all

new applicants for UNRRA assistance, as well as to those

displaced persons now receiving UNRRA care.

3. Effective Date.

This order will come into effect forthwith.

4. Policy.

a. The determination of eligibility for UNRRA care

is the responsibility of UNRRA staff and not of the military

76a

in each Zone of Occupation. except for the screening of war

criminals, Collaborators or traitors, which is a military

responsibility.

b. Eligibility for UNRRA care shall be a matter for

continuous review by UNRRA staff at all echelons.

c. Only those new applicants who meet the eligibility

requirements stated herein shall receive UNRRA care.

d. Those persons found to be ineligible after review

shal! be denied U NRRA assistance in accordance with the

procedure as established in this order.

5. Categories of Displaced Persons Eligible for UNRRA

Care.

a. United Nations nationals who have been displaced

as a result of the war from their countries of origin, citizen-

ship, or previous residence.

(1) The date of displacement must have been on or

after | September 1939 and prior to the cessation of hostili-

ties, except for Czech nationals displaced after 14 March

1939, who are eligible.

(2) Examples:

(a) United Nations nationals of the following

countries who meet the requirements of Sections Sa

77a

and 5a(1) above are considered prima facie to be eligi-

ble, except insofar as they are in categories 6a. b, c and

f below:

Albania Byelorussian S.S.R.

Belgium Luxembourg

Czechoslovakia The Netherlands

Denmark Norway

France Poland

Greece USSR.

Yugoslavia Ukrainian S.S.R.

and

Former residents of Estonia, Latvia and

Lithuania.

b Persecutees. Persons persecuted by the enemy

because of their race, religion, or activities in favor of the

United Nations. Persons in this category are eligible for

UNRRA care irrespective of the date they left their coun-

try or place of previous residence, including those normally

resident in Germany, whether or not displaced as a result of

the war.

c. Stateless Persons, who have been driven, as a

result of the war, from their previous places of settled resi-

dence.

(1) This category includes:

(a) Holders of Nansen passports;

(b) Persons who have been deprived of their

nationality by decision of the government of their coun-

try, and who have not acquired a new nationality.

(2) The date of displacement must have been on or

after | September, 1939, and prior to the cessation of hostil-

ities.

d. Miscellaneous Groups.

78a

(1) Italian nationals displaced as a result of the war on

or after | September. 1939, and prior to the cessation of

hostilities. and not normally resident in Germany.

(2) Allied Prisoners of War (RAMPS) who have lost

their POW status, providing the military certifies that they

do not fall within 6a, b and c below.

(3) All displaced persons originally eligible for

UNRRA care who returned to Germany after having been

repatriated.

6. Categories of Displaced Persons Not Eligible for

UNRRA Care.

a. United Nations nationals, stateless persons, and

ltalian nationals who were not displaced as a result of the

war, between | September | 939, and the cessation of hostili-

ties, or who were normally resident in Germany and inter-

nally displaced as a result of the war.

b. War criminals, collaborators, quislings or trai-

tors, of whatever race, nationality or religion.

c. Enemy or ex-enemy nationals, with the exception

of those listed under Sb. Nationals of the following countries

are enemy or ex-enemy nationals:

Austria Japan

Bulgaria Roumania

Germany Siam

Hungary

d. Neutral nations nationals, with the exception of

those listed under paragraph Sb. Neutral nations are:

Afghanistan Portugal

Eire Spain

Finland Sweden

Switzerland

79a

¢. So-called Volksdeutsche and German Balts.

f. Ex-Wehrmacht personnel of whatever nationality

or stateless, are ineligible unless individually certified by the

military authorities as:

(i) Not a collaborator, war criminal, quisling or

traitor:

(ii) Not a Volksdeutsche:

(iti) Having been completely discharged from mil-

itary status;

(iv) Having entered the Wehrmacht involuntarily.

7. Special Category.

Nationals of the United Nations. as set forth below. are

ineligible for UNRRA assistance unless they are per-

secutees or desire repatriation at this ume. If repatriation is

desired. UNRRA assistance wil! be provided.

Argentina India

8la

individuals whom the military authorities determine to be

war criminals, collaborators, quislings or traitors.

b. The Zone Director will notify this Headquarters

promptly of the reply received from the Military Com-

mander.

c. The Zone Director will bring this order to the

attention of all UNRRA staff and will take full responsibil-

ity for its prompt execution, promulgating such additional

implementing instructions as may be necessary.

d. The Zone Director will put into effect a plan for

the controlled review of eligibility for UNRRA assistance of

all persons now receiving care. He will establish the date by

which the review of eligibility will be completed. District

Directors and Field Supervisors will be instructed to make

certain that the teams’ review of eligibility progresses in

accordance with a definite schedule, in order to ensure com-

pletion by the date established.

e. It will be the responsibility of the Zone Director to

make certain that only those persons eligible for assistance

receive UNRRA care.

f. The review of eligibility will include a careful

examination of D.P. registration cards, and interview and

re-interview with the displaced persons as necessary. All

questionable cases of nationality must be referred to offi-

cially accredited liaison officers for determination, subject

to review by the military authorities. This determination by

the liaison officer must be rendered in writing.

g. The Zone Director will be responsible for submit-

ting to appropriate military authorities, in writing, the

names of those displaced persons found to be ineligible for

UNRRA care as soon as their ineligibility is determined,

with the request that they be removed from assembly cen-

ters if resident therein, or with the statement that they are

ineligible for UNRRA assistance if they live outside assem-

bly centers. The Zone Director will keep himself informed

of the numbers of displaced persons found to be ineligible

82a

and reported to the military authorities, the action taken by

the military, and of difficulties arising in this respect.

(1) Volksdeutsche .

(a) The National Liaison Officer of the Government

of which the suspected Volksdeutsche were nationals will be

consulted, and written statements will be obtained from this

Liaison Officer as to whether they are regarded as being

Volksdeutsche.

(b) Should the Liaison Officer confirm that the per-

sons are to be considered as Volksdeutsche, the military

authorities will be approached and requested to declare

whether they likewise consider the persons as being

Volksdeutsche.

authorities concur that they are to be considered as such, the

military authorities will be requested to remove these per-

sons from UNRRA assembly centers.

(d) The decision of the military authorities and of the

Liaison Officer on the national status of persons suspected of

being Volksdeutsche will be obtained in writing. No verbal

Statement is to be accepted.

h. (Reference CHQ Administrative Order 34,

revised 18 May 1946) The Zone Director will include in his

monthly Report to CHQ the progress of the eligibility

review, the number of displaced persons who are found to be

ineligible, and the action taken by the military to remove

them from assembly centers. A separate statement should

be made in the same report with respect to the displaced

persons living outside centers.

F.E. MORGAN

Lieutenant General,

Chief of Operations,

Germany.

83a

APPENDIX J

CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL

REFUGEE ORGANIZATION

PREAMBLE

The Governments accepting this Constitution,

Recognizing:

that genuine refugees and displaced persons constitute

an urgent problem which is international in scope and char-

acter,

that as regards displaced persons, the main task to be

performed is to encourage and assist in every way possible

their early reyagn .0 their country of origin;

that genuine refugees and displaced persons should be

assisted by international action, either to return to their

countries of nationality or former habitual residence, or to

find new homes elsewhere, under the conditions provided for

in this Constitution; or in the case of Spanish Republicans,

to establish themselves temporarily in order to enable them

to return to Spain when the present Falangist regime is

succeeded by a democratic regime;

that re-settlement and re-establishment of refugees and

displaced persons be comtemplated only in cases indicated

clearly in the Constitution;

that genuine refugees and displaced persons, until such

time as their repatriation or re-settlement and re-establish-

ment is effectively completed, should be protected in their

rights and legitimate interests, should receive care and

assistance and, as far as possible, should be put to useful

employment in order to avoid the evil and anti-social conse-

quences of continued idleness; and

84a

that the expenses of repatriation to the extent practica-

ble should be charged to Germany and Japan for persons

displaced by those Powers from countries occupied by them:

Have Agreed:

for the accomplishment of the foregoing purposes in the

shortest possible time, to establish and do hereby establish, a

non-permanent organization to be called the Internationa!

Refugee Organization, a specialized agency to be brought

into relationship with the United Nations, and accordingly

Have Accepted the Following Articles:

ARTICLE 1

MANDATE

The mandate of the Organization shall extend to refu-

gees and displaced persons in accordance with the princi-

ples, defin

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