Amicus Curiae Brief — Spallone v. United States

OO

Nos. 88-854, 88-856,

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

>

HENRY G. SPALLONE, et al.,

Petitioners,

—-v —

UNITED STATES, et al.,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF

SAVE YONKERS FEDERATION, INC.

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

DANIEL J. POPBO HEN: . ‘MARK HOLZER

PAUL D. KAMENAR Counsel for Amicus Curiae

WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION Old Wagon Road

1705 N Street, N.W. Mt. Kisco, New York 10549

Washington, D.C. 20036 (914) 666-3799

(202) 857-0240

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: PAGE

Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 ........... +

Griffen v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218........

Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning

REE, GRP Ge GO en ccevcccccceccceseceneaines $n.7

Lance v. Plummer, 384 U.S. 929 .......... 6.6 5.. 12

Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267... ... 2... 2.6... cue Ly

Morrison v. Olson, ___. U.S. ___., 108 S.Ct. 2597... 3.0.3

Shiliitani v. U.S., 384 U.S. 366... ... 2... cece nnes Tall

Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446

EE 14

Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367... ............... 9

U.S. v. Board of School Commissioners, 368 F. Supp.

SEED cocccecescoceeuccesseséeecocnneseeenen 9.17

OS. ©. Giieah, G65 UB. SED... ccccccccccecccescoss 1S 2.18

Walton v. House of Representatives, 265 U.S. 487... .

Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger

Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658... .............. >

Wass ©. Graniia, SIGS, BD ccccccccccccccceceses 5

Young v. U.S., ____ U.S. ___., 107 S.Ch. 2124....... 72.10

Yonkers Racing Corp. v. City of Yonkers, 858 F.2d 855

GG, GED ccccccccccccseesceseesanseneneeas 4

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1988

Nos. 88-854, 88-856, 88-870

>

HENRY G. SPALLONE, et al.,

Petitioners,

_V—

UNITED STATES, et al.,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

>

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF

SAVE YONKERS FEDERATION, INC.

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

The Amicus Curiae

Save Yonkers Federation, Inc. (““SYF’’), a not-for-profit

corporation chartered under the laws of the State of New York,

is an “‘umbrella’’ organization representing some forty civic,

neighborhood and taxpayer groups in connection with all hous-

ing and related issues in the City of Yonkers.

Following the district court’s finding that low-income public

housing in the Southwest quadrant of the City of Yonkers had

been racially segregated, and the court’s remedial order requir-

ing that 1,000 units of scattered site low- and ‘‘middle’’-income

| cae

2

public housing be created outside of the Southwest, SYF (on

behalf of its constituent organizations and their individual

members) actively campaigned not against Judge Sand’s liabil-

ity finding, but against his remedy.

SYF’s opposition included the filing of a Petition for a Writ

of Prohibition in the United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit which contended that the district court’s hous-

ing remedy order exceeded his statutory and general equitable

powers, and that it violated the constitutional rights of Yonkers

residents.’

SYF’s opposition to the district court’s housing remedy—

which, instead of desegregating low-income public housing in

Southwest Yonkers, seeks to integrate the rest of Yonkers with

1,000 scattered site units of low- and ‘“‘middle’’-income

housing—continues with this brief amicus curiae supporting the

Yonkers City Councilmen who were forced to enact remedy-

implementing legislation under threat of personal fines and

imprisonment.

1 The Petition for a Writ of Prohibition was denied, as were requests

for rehearing and en banc consideration. A Petition for a Writ of Cer-

tiorari will be filed in this court by mid-May 1989.

eT aa vo LL La ar. LS Tres Se

ARGUMENT

4. It is further ORDERED that, if the necessary legisla-

tion is not passed on or before August 1, each of the

[Yonkers City] Council members who fails to vote in favor

of enactment of such legislation . . . shall be personally

fined $500 per day... .

5. It is further ORDERED that, if the necessary legisla-

tion is not enacted by on or before August 10, 1988 any

[Yonkers City] Council member who then remains in con-

tempt shall be committed on August 11, 1988 to the cus-

tody of the United States Marshall for imprisonment

Leonard B. Sand

United States District Judge’

* > o

That is what this suit is about. Power.

Antonin Scalia

Associate Justice,

Supreme Court of the United States’

Introduction

The facts of this case are set forth at length in the various

submissions of the parties, and thus they will not be repeated

here except as may be necessary to the discussion infra.

Basically, the broad contours of what happened below are

not disputed.

2 Judge Sand’s order of July 26, 1988 is Exhibit “‘A"’ (pages la-Sa) to

Petitioner Peter Chema’s ‘Appendix to Petition for a Writ of Certio-

rari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’’ in

case No. 88-856. That Appendix will be cited infra as “*CA.”’

3 Scalia, J., dissenting in Morrison v. Olson, _._. U.S. ____., 108

S.Ct. 2597, 2623 (1988).

4

After a lengthy bench trial the District Court held that the

City of Yonkers had racially discriminated in its placement of

low-income public housing in the City’s Southwest quadrant.

Instead of desegregating the Southwest, Judge Sand ordered

that housing in the rest of Yonkers be integrated by the creation

of 1,000 scattered site units of low- and ‘‘middle’’-income pub-

lic housing. After the Second Circuit affirmed as to both liabil-

ity and remedy, the City entered into a consent decree.* (In a

related case, the Second Circuit acknowledged that the City’s

“‘consent’’ had been coerced: Yonkers Racing Corp. v. City of

Yonkers, 858 F.2d 855, 865 (2 Cir. 1988)).

It turned out that in order to implement the consent decree

the district court believed that the enactment of certain legisla-

tion was needed in Yonkers (e.g., changes in the zoning law). A

majority of the seven-member City Council balked, and the dis-

trict court began to escalate threats and penalties. In sum, the

district court made it clear that unless the individual City Coun-

cilmen voted in the Yonkers City Council for the consent

decree-implementing legislation, they would be fined and

imprisoned—a level of coercion which Judge Sand himself

characterized as ‘‘extraordinary’’: ‘‘I know,’’ he admitted, ‘‘of

no parallel for a court to say to [an] elected official, ‘you are in

contempt of court and subject to personal fines and may even-

tually be subject to personal imprisonment because of a manner

in which you cast a vote.’ I find that extraordinary.’’* Extraor-

dinary or not, eventually fines were levied and, with one foot

figuratively inside the Metropolitan Correctional Center, two

of the four recalcitrant City Councilmen (Longo and Fagan)

canitulated.° The consent decree-implementing legislation was

enacted.

4 Even though the consent decree purported to bar further proceed-

ings, the City filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. It was denied

(108 S.Ct. 2821, June 13, 1988).

S$ CA 2%.

6 Petitioners Chema and Spallone continued to vote against the con-

semt decree-implementing legislation and the final Council vote was

$-2.

The Councilmen’s Petitions for Certiorari were granted and

their case is now before this Court. Understandably, Petition-

ers’ focus in this Court appears to be on their immunity, qua

municipal legislators, from contempt sanctions related to per-

formance of their official duties.

However, the amicus curiae sees the matter differently, and

believes that Petitioners have misconceived the real issue here.

As the amicus curiae will explain infra, implicit in, and at the

core of, the immunity issue is the more fundamental question of

the scope of the district court’s contempt power vis-a-vis the

legislative processes of a municipality. In other words, the ami-

cus curiae focuses on the “‘cause”’ (i.e., the scope of the district

court’s power), not on the “‘effect’’ (i.e., the impact on the

Councilmen).

Thus, although the amicus curiae supports the Councilmen’s

conclusion in this Court that they were immune from the dis-

trict court’s threats and contempt sanctions, we reach that con-

clusion by another route. We do not get there via the holdings

of Lake Country, supra, and the other 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases

cited therein, because, among other reasons, this is not a 1983

case seeking civil damages but rather a contempt case where the

prime actor is not a private plaintiff but a federal district judge.

Instead, the amicus curiae reaches the conclusion that the

Councilmen were immune because of the basic principle of leg-

islative freedom underlying Lake Country and the cases cited

therein, a principle which acts as a check on the contempt

power of a federal district court, defining its power. As this

court said in a related context nearly three decades ago: ‘*In this

situation the burden is on this Court to define the limitations

upon the contempt power according to the terms of the Federal

Constitution.” (Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962)).

7 The Court, of course, possesses the power to address any issue

‘fairly comprised within the questions presented by the Petition for

Certiorari. . . . (Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Plan-

ning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979).

Ee

raat aa ee a iii

Question Presented

In light of Federalism and Separation of Powers principles,

does the contempt power of a federal district judge extend to

forcing elected municipal legislators, gua individuals, to pass

laws in aid of implementing a reinedy for constitutional viola-

tions?

Disclaimers

At the outset, in addition to its observation supra, concerning

the proper focus for this Court in consideration of this case, the

amicus curiae wishes to state what its argument here does nof

embrace.

First, we do not differentiate (as Justice Marshall did in his

dissent from the grant of a stay [CA 10h-12h]) between a Dis-

trict Court's use of coercion/contempt to enforce such a “‘con-

sent’’ decree as is found in this case, a more freely arrived-at

consent decree, or a non-consent order or judgment. As we

view the issue, the basic question is one of Federalism and/or

Separation of Powers as a limitation on the scope of a district

court's contempt power. What that power seeks to enforce or

implement is irrelevant.

Second, unlike Petitioner Chema, the amicuc curiae eschews

the incremental argument that the district court’s use of

coercion-contempt to get municipal legislation enacted was

““wrong”’ because “‘there exist{ed] less intrusive means for the

district court to achieve its worthy goals’’ and because the force

was used “‘as a first, rather than a last resort." The amicus

curiae argues that a federal district court lacks the power to do

what was done here, no matter what other means did or did not

Third, the amicus curiae views as irrelevant for present pur-

poses that the “‘wrong”’ in this case was of constitutional

dimension, and that the ‘‘remedy”’ itself may have exceeded the

district court's statutory and/or equitable powers.” The amicus

8 Petitioner Chema's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, p. 8.

9 As to the remedy, as stated in footnote | above, SYF will presently

file in this Court a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.

7

curiae argues that no matter what the wrong or the remedy, a

district court lacks the power to force elected municipal legisia-

tors to enact implementing laws.

Fourth, the amicus curiae does not, for present purposes,

challenge the existence of a majority view on this Court that

there exists ‘‘inherent judicial power to punish those violating

court judgments with contempt. . . .”’”” Even if that is true, it

too is irrelevant here because the mere existence of such power

neither defines its scope nor allows it to overcome root princi-

ples of Federalism and Separation of Powers. Indeed, this

Court recognizes that the contempt power has ' mitations."'

Fifth, the amicus curiae does not argue that any of the Peti-

tioners should have been free of the district court’s contempt

power because the terms of the consent decree that two of them

(and three other Council members) voted for were altered in the

municipal ordinances that the court wanted enacted. For one

thing, it is arguable whether or how much the consent decree

was changed. For another, and more important, as we have said

above, the basic question is the scope of the district court's con-

tempt power, not what it was seeking to implement.

agree that there existed an “‘obligation of the City of Yonkers to

comply with the consent decree. . .”"’ On the contrary, a

principal reason that the amicus curiae has submitted this brief

is because of its belief that a single principle unifies the district

court’s coercion of Petitioners to obtain the “‘consent’’ decree

and his coercion of them to obtain the municipal legislation in

aid of implementing that decree and his follow-up housing rem-

edy order. As more fully discussed infra, that principle is that

Federalism and Separation of Powers bar a district court from

using the contempt sanction to achieve the enactment of legisia-

tion, for any reason.

10 Scalia, J., concurring in Young v. US. US...

S.Ct. 2124 (1987).

7 Shillitani v. U_S., 384 U.S. 364 (1966).

12 Petitioner Spelione’s Petition for a Writ of Certioran, p. 4

7

eral observation in Young, supra, that ‘‘{e}xcept, fe for

court’s contempt power fell far short of where Judge Sand

pushed it.

To begin with, the District Court was correct when he himself

ing the language of 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (which does not apply in

this case), there is no statutory authority anywhere, let alone in

_ the Fair Housing Act, which even impliedly authorizes 4 Fed-

eral judge to order individual legislators to enact iaws. Nor has

this Court ever found such authority to be “‘inherent.’’

Indeed, in his dissent from the grant of a stay in this case Justice

Marshall acknowledged that even Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S.

267 (1977) and Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218

(1964) do not so hold.'* Moreover, since in the same place’* Jus-

tice Marshall concedes that the immunity question which the

13 Young, supra, at US. 107 §.Ct. 2143.

14 = See Justice Scalia’s observations in Young, supra.

1S CA Ith.

6 8=6—CA Ith.

arrears ss 2 “i

Councilmen have raised is an open one, it follows that the ques-

tion of the scope of the district court's contempt power articu-

lated by the amicus curiae here must be equally open, for the

Councilmen could not be immune from the contempt power

asserted by Judge Sand, at the same time that power continued

to exist.

In addition, it should be noted that in Washington v. Wash-

ington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Association,

443 U.S. 658, 695 (1979) Justice Stevens observed categorically,

in a statement not challenged by the three justices who dissented

in part, that ‘‘{w)hether [the State Department of] Game and

Fisheries may be ordered actually to promulgate regulations

having effect as a matter of state law may well be doubtful.’’"”

Doubtful indeed! The policy reasons, rooted in the principles

of Federalism and Separation of Powers have consistently and

often been enunciated by this Court.

! In Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943) and

Walton v. House of Representatives, 265 U.S. 487 (1924) this

Court stayed the hand of equity which might otherwise have

interfered with the state governmental operations generally.

More specifically, this Court addressed “‘legislative free-

dom” eloquently and at length in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341

U.S. 367 (1951):

The privilege of legislators to be free from arrest or civil

process for what they do or say in legislative proceedings

has taproots in the Parliamentary struggles of the Six-

teenth and Seventeenth Centuries. As Parliament achieved

increasing independence from the Crown, its statement of

the privilege grew stronger. In 1523, Sir Thomas More

could make only a tentative claim. Roper, Life of Sir

Thomas More, in More’s Utopia (Adams ed.) 10. In 1668,

after a long bitter struggle, Parliament finally laid the

1? See also U.S. v. Board of School Commissioners, 468 F. Supp.

1191, 1227 (S.D. ind.), aff'd 483 F.2d 1406 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. den.

421 U.S. 929 (1975), where the District Court acknowledged that

lacked the power to order a state legislature to pass laws.

re

ghost of Charles 1, who had prosecuted Sir John Elliot and

others for ‘seditious’ speeches in Parliament. Proceedings

against Sir John Elliot, 3 How. St.Tr., 294, 332. In 1689,

the Bill of Rights declared in unequivocal language: ‘That

the Freedom of Speech, and Debates or Proceedings in

Parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in

any Court or Place out of Parliament.’ 1 Wm. & Mary,

Sess. 2, c. Il. See Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & El. 1,

113-114 (1839).

Freedom of speech and action in the legislature was

taken as a matter of course by those who severed the Colo-

nies from the Crown and founded our Naiion. It was

deemed so essential for representatives of the people that it

was written into the Articles of Confederation and later

into the Constitution. Article V of the Articles of Confed-

eration is quite close to the English Bill of Rights: ‘Free-

dom of speech and debate in Congress shall not be

impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Con-

gress * * *.’ Article 1, s 6, of the Constitution provides:

‘* * * for any Speech or Debate in either House, (the Sen-

ators and Representatives) shall not be questioned in any

other Place.’

The reason for the privilege is clear. It was well summa-

rized by James Wilson, an influential member of the Com-

mittee of Detail which was responsible for the provision in

the Federal Constitution. ‘In order tu enable and encour-

age a representative of the public to discharge his public

trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably neces-

sary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and

that he should be protected from the resentment of every

one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that lib-

erty may occasion offense.’ 11 Works of James Wilson

(Andrews ed. 1896) 38. See the statement of the reason for

the privilege in the Report from the select Committee on

_ the Official Secrets Acts (House of Commons, 1939) xiv.

inanimate

The provision in the United States Constitution was a

reflection of political principles already firmly established

in the States. Three State Constitutions adopted before the

Federal Constitution specifically protected the privilege.

The Maryland Declaration of Rights, Nov. 3, 1776, pro-

vided: ‘That freedom of speech, and debates or proceed-

ings in the Legislature, ought not to be impeached in any

other court or judicature.’ Art. VIII]. The Massachusetts

Constitution of 1780 provided ‘The freedom of delibera-

tion, speech and debate, in either house of the legislature,

is so essential to the rights of the people, that it cannot be

the foundation of any accusation or prosecution, action,

or complaint, in any other court of place whatsoever.’

Part I, Art. XXI. Chief Justice Parsons gave the following

gloss to this provision in Coffin v. Coffin, 1808, 4 Mass. |,

27:

These privileges are thus secured, not with the intention

of protecting the members against prosecutions for their

own benefit, but to support the rights of the people, by

enabling their representatives to execute the functions of

their office without fear of prosecutions, civil or criminal.

I therefore think that the article ought not to be construed

strictly, but liberally, that the full design of it may be

answered. | will not confine it to delivering an opinion,

uttering a speech, or haranguing in debate; but will extend

e it to the giving of a vote, to the making of a written report,

and to every other act resulting from the nature, and in the

execution, of the office; and | wordd define the article as

securing to every member exemption from prosecution,

for every thing said or done by him, as a representative, in

the exercise of the functions of that office, without inquir-

ing whether the exercise was regular according to the rules

of the house, or irregular and agains: their rules.

.

:

:

;

lege would be of little value if they could be subjected to

the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon

Cranch 87, 130, 3 L.Bd. 162, that it was not consonant

with our scheme of government for a court to inquire into

the motives of legislators, has remained unquestioned. See

cases cited in State of Arizona v. State of California, 283

U.S. 423, 455, $1 S.Ct. $22, $26, 75 L.Bd. 1154.

Consistent with the principles expressed in Tenny by Justice

Frankfurter was Justice Black's prescient dissent from the

denial of Certiorari in Lance v. Plummer, 384 U.S. 929 (1966):

The significance of this case. . . is the manner in which

the courts below exercised the power to punish for con-

tempt The question of the punishment here is

1s

more

with all the constitutional Bill of Rights’ guarantees but

after a summary contempt proceeding in which a single

judge lays down the law, prosecutes those whom he

believes disobey it, passes judgment on the alleged viola-

tions, and finally imposes punishment as he sees fit. See

Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 198, 78 S.Ct. 632,

650-651, 2 L.Ed.2d 672 (dissenting opinion).

By ordering this state officer to surrender his badge and

resign from his state office, the District Judge below

assumed for the federal judiciary a new, unprecedented,

and, | believe, highly dangerous power. To give federal

judges such authority seems not only completely out of

place in our federal form of government but it at least

i

!

jury. * * * No reason is given by the courts below for not

respecting the authority of a State to conduct its govern-

mental operations by agents responsible to the people of

the State. There is no suggestion that the traditional reme-

dies for contempt are inadequate in this case. And no one

claims that this new federal judge power to remove state

officers is necessary to enforce the salutary provisions of

the 1964 Civil Rights Act. It is clear that the judge's order

here provides complete protection to the plaintiff's rights

a

without that part compelling the State's deputy sheriff to

hold his job at the pleasure of the United States judges.

I regret that the Court refuses to review this case in

order to make it clear to all the people just how far this

new contempt power of federal judges goes. Here it is only

an appointed deputy sheriff that is removed from office.

but if this new contempt enforcement power is legal | can

think of no reason why it cannot be used more

mmportant state officials whether elected or if.

federal pudges can remove sheriffs why not members of the

State legislatures, state judges, and why not even state gov-

ernors. In considering the importance of this power to

remove state officers, it is highly relevant that this ncw

power jeopardizes not merely officers in a few States, but

threatens every state officer in every State from Florida to

Alaska, from Maine to Califorma and Hawai. in order to

protect the rights of citizens to vote im state electsons this

Court recently announced the constitutional principle of

‘one person, one vote.” It seems a little carly to graft onto

that principle a new one giving United States judges the

power to remove state officials chosen by the people in

strict accordance with the ‘one person, one vote’ principle.

Mr. Justice HARLAN: This is one of those rare instances

mm whech | feel justified in noting my dissent to the action

of the Court on a petition for certiorari, not involving an

adjudication on the merits. | fully share my Brother

BL ACK’S view that the issues im this case are important and

that certiorari should be granted.

The Tenney principle of icgislative freedom, rooted in the

principals of federahsm and -eparation of powers canvassed by

Justice Black in Lance, formed the basis of this court's immu-

nity ruling in Lete County Esteres, supre, and later in Supreme

Court of Virginie v. Consumer: Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980).

The latter case ts extremely germane to the question presented

here Justice White's opmmon for the unanimous court in Con-

sumers Union (Justice Powell did not particip.ic) not only

15

noted that in Tenney ‘‘[w]e have also recognized that state legis-

lators enjoy common-law immunity from liability for their leg-

islative acts, an immunity that is similar in origin and rationale

to that accorded Congressman under the Speech or Debate

Clause”’ (446 U.S. at 732), but it went further."

The court observed that

deataadateat tea tt tao Vrciata trates tat

enacted the State Bar Code and if suit had been brought

against the legislature, its committees, or members for

refusing to amend the Code in the wake of our cases indi-

cating that the Code in some respects would be held

invalid, the defendants in that suit could successfully have

sought dismissal on the grounds of absolute legislative

immunity. (446 U.S. at 733-4, emphasis added).

In other words, if a ‘“‘wrong”’ existed (invalidity of the Code),

legislators refusal to ‘‘remedy”’ (amend) it would be unreacha-

ble by civil process. If that is what this Court unanimously

meant in Consumers Union, then the United States District

Judge’s use of his contempt power to force the Councilmen to

enact legislation violated both Federalism and Separation of

Powers. Federalism, because the Tenth Amendment reserves to

the state all legislative power not delegated or prohibited, and

thus the federal government lacks the constitutional authority

to force the enactment of legislation by the states. Separation of

powers because, with all respect to this Court, judges lack the

textual, constitutional power to legislate.

At the risk of presuming, the amicus curiae cannot help but

_wonder what would be the reaction of those who so carefully

18 Since New York has a Speech or Debate Clause (Const., Art. Ill,

§ 11), to the extent that municipal councilmen enjoy derivative protec-

tion it can be said that Judge Sand’s use of contempt violated petition-

er’s State §eech or Debate Clause Rights and thus also violated the

principle of federalism. There are two “‘interrelated rationales”, U.S.

v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 369 (1980), of the Speech and Debate

Clause—445 U.S. 360, 369 (1980) avoiding judicial intrusion into the

legislative branch, and protecting legislative independence—and both

would seem to apply here.

16

erected the three pillars of American Constitutionalism—

Federalism, Separation of Powers, and Judicial Review—were

they to learn that under threat of fines and imprisonment a fed-

eral district judge forced elected municipal legislators to pass a

law.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons the District Court lacked the power

to force the legislation’s enactment.

/s/ HENRY MARK HOLZER

DANIEL J. POPEO Henry Mark Holzer

PAUL D. KAMENAR Counsel for Amicus Curiae

WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION