Opinion — Irene Pernsley v. Martin Harris

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

IRENE PERNSLEY et aL. v. MARTIN HARRIS ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 84-1955. Decided November 4, 1985

The motion of respondents for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis is granted. The petition for writ of certiorari is

denied.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE, dissenting.

For the past nine years, the prison system in Philadelphia

has been operating under the supervision of the Court of

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, following that court's

finding in 1972 that prison conditions violated both the Penn-

sylvania Constitution and the Eighth Amendment of the United

States Constitution. Since 1976, a full-time, court-appointed

Special Master has been in place and numerous remedial or-

ders have been issued, including orders requiring the build-

ing of new prison facilities and contempt orders imposing

over $500,000 in fines for failure to comply with prior orders.

In addition, the parties have entered into consent decrees

aimed at controlling the population in the prison system.

Beginning in 1984, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court assumed

plenary jurisdiction over the entire State proceeding.

The State suit commenced by the filing of a class action in

1971 on behalf of all inmates in the Philadelphia prisons, seek-

ing equitable relief from alleged unconstitutional prison con-

ditions; defendants are officials of Philadelphia. In the case

now before us Respondent, an inmate who admits he is a

member of the same class represented in the State action,

brought a separate class action in the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania on behalf of all persons confined in the Philadel-

phia prisons; defendants include City and State officials.

The federal complaint similarly makes claims like those in the

2 PERNSLEY v. HARRIS

State suit, and asserts that the Philadeiphia prisons are over-

crowded, thereby violating the Eighth Amendment of the

United States Constitution; it seeks extensive injunctive

relief and monetary damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1983.

The District Court dismissed the equitable relief claims

sought in this second class action on the alternative grounds

of res judicata, or abstention under the doctrine of Colorado

River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424

U. S. 800 (1976); it dismissed the damage claim on grounds of

sovereign and qualified official immunity. A divided Court

of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, rejecting each of

the District Court’s holdings. 755 F.2d 338. In his dissent-

ing opinion, Judge Garth agreed that while Colorado River

did not support abstention, Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37

(1971), mandated it:

I do not believe that Supreme Court teachings, comity,

or reason support a federal court’s intrusion into a state’s

administration of its prison system when the state courts

have been, and presently are, exercising supervision

over these institutions and are doing so in accordance

with both state and federal constitutional requirements.

755 F. 2d, at 347.

Rehearing was denied over two dissents. 758 F. 2d 83.

Respondents essentially ask the federal courts to duplicate

the on-going State court regulation of the Philadelphia prison

system. The District Court recognized that the substantial

and ongoing State court proceedings involve an important

State interest, namely, the administration of a prison system.

The Court of Appeals nevertheless found Younger abstention

restricted to pending State criminal or quasi-criminal pro-

ceedings initiated by the State. Our cases, however, recog-

nize that “(tjhe policies underlying Younger are fully appli-

cable to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important

state interests are involved.” Middlesex County Ethics

Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U. S. 423,

432 (1982). See also Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423

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PERNSLEY wv. HARRIS }

1979) (the Younger doctrine is “fully applicable to civil pro-

ceedings in which important state interests are involved”)

The Younger doctrine is rooted in the concept of comity,

because

interference with a state judicial proceeding prevents

the state not only from effectnating its substantive poli-

cies, but also from continuing to perform the separate

function of providing a forum competent to vindicate any

constitutional objections interposed against those poli-

cies. Huffman v. Pursue, Lid., 420 U. S. 592, 604(1975)

There is no question that the State is a party to the ongo-

ing State proceedings and that important State policies are

implicated in the management of the county prison system.

The State courts continue to exercise comprehensive jurisdic-

tion over the prison system’s administration through use of a

Special Master, by holding hearings, and by issuing remedial

orders and ordering fines. Should the District Court exer-

cise its equitable powers as sought in this second suit, the

Philadelphia prisons may thus become subject to potentially

conflicting and contrary determinations as to the appropri-

ate remedy for the alleged unconstitutional conditions. Al-

though plaintiffs here additionally seek damages, there is no

bar to the assertion of that claim in the State proceedings.

So long as plaintiffs have an opportunity to raise their federal

claims in.the State action, “[njo more is required to invoke

Younger abstention.” Jwidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337

1977).

I would grant the writ of certiorari and reverse the Court

of Appeals judgment

JUSTICE REHNQUIST and JUSTICE O’CONNOR would grant

certiorar!.