Opposition Brief — Irene Pernsley v. Martin Harris

Supreme Court brief1985

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

CRRIGINAL

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNI

October Term, 1984

IRENE PERNSLEY, et al.

MARTIN HARRIS, et al.,

RECEIVED

HAND DELIVERED

AUG 16 1985

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

JPREME ela T us

VUUR

Supreme Court, U.S

STATES FILED

AUG 16 1985

JOSEPH F. SPANIOL. JR

; C. ERK

Respondents

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

DAVID RICHMAN

PHILIP H.

Pepper,

THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

LEBOWITZ

iton & Scheetz

2001 The Fidelity Building

123 South Broad Street

Philadelphia,

PA 19109

(215) 893-3000

Attorneys

Respondents

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF QUESTION

___ PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether a conflict with this Court's decisions is

presentea by a decision that a district court may not abstain

from exercising jurisdiction over a proposed class action under

section 1983 for money damages and injunctive relief brought by

inmates of a county prison alleging the unconstitutionality of

conditions of confinement, where defendants in the federal action

are also defendants in a state court class action brought

thirteen years earlier by other inmates and which resulted ina

judgment that conditions in the county jail were in violation of

the state and federal constitutions, where plaintiffs do not seek

to enjoin any state court proceeding nor to restrain local

officials from enforcing any state or local law, and where the

federal complaint alleges that defendants have for ten years

successfully defied state court remedial orders aimed at the same

unconstitutional conditions of confinement.

EVEN IF THE BASIC ELEMENTS WARRANTING

ABSTENTION WERE PRESENT, NO

CONFLICT WITH

THIS COURT'S DECISIONS IS PRESENTED BY THE

LOWER COURTS' REFUSAL TO APPLY YOUNGER

BECAUSE DEFENDANTS' ACTIONS CONSTITUTE BAD

FAITH AND HAVE DELAYED IMPERMISSIBLY THE

CORRECTION OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS

JF CONFINEMENT AT HOLMESBURG...

Cases

Campbell v. Cauthron, 623 F.2d 503 (8th “ir. 1980)

Avenue News, Inc. v. City of Minot, .D.,

1406 (9th Cir. 1984

DeSpain v. Johnston, 731 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1984)

Duran v. Elrod, 713 F.2

cert. denied, 104 S.

Family Division Trial Lawyers v. Moultrie, 725

oa —————————

F.2G 695 (D.C. Cir. 1984)

Gerstein v. Pugn, 420 U.S. 103 (1975)

Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973)

Goldie's Bookstore v. S rio

739 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1984)

Hendrick v. Jackson, No. 1385 C.D. 1976 (Pa.

Commw. Ct. Oct. 1 19

Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 42 }.S. 592 (1975)

Illinois v. General Electri ~, 663 F.2d 206

(7th Cir. 1982), cert ienied, 461 U.S.

913 (1983)

Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 573 F.2d 98

(lst Cir. 1978)

International Prisoners’ Union v. Rizzo, 356

F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa. 1973)

J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981)

Jackson v. Hendrick, No. 71-2437, slip op.

(C.P. Phila. April 7, 1972)

Jackson v. Hendrick, 457 Pa. 405,

321 A.2d 603 (1974)

Jackson v. Hendrick, 72 Pa. Commw. 63,

456 A.2d 229 (1983)

Jackson v. Hendrick, No. 180 E.D. Misc. Docket 1984,

slip op. (Pa., filed October i7, 1984)

Johnson v. Kelly, 583 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1978)

Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997 (Sth Cir. 1979),

aff'd on rehearing, 636 F.2d 1364 (Sth Cir.)

(en banc), cert. dismissed, 453 U.S. 950 (1981)

Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977)

Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117 (1975)

Ledbetter v. Jones, 102 S. Ct. 27 (1981)

McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268 (1910)

Middlesex County Ethics Committee

v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982)

Page

Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972) 12

109)

’

oe)

a®)

r= |

—_

Pos

Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980),

cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) ll

Schneider v. Colegio de Abogados, 546 F. Sup

Un ted States ity ~ + E > ~ b j gh,

589 F. Supp 79 (W.D. Pa 1984 2

Williams v. Red Bank Board f Education, 662

(3d Cir. 1981) 18, 19

“F.2d 1008

Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 1977 20

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) passim

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioners, the City of Philadel. .wia and several of its

officials (hereinafter “the Philadelphia defendants,"

"petitioners," or “defendants"),+ by their Petition for

Certiorari, ask this Court to review the decision of the Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit that abstention under Younger v.

Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), does not require dismissal of an

action attacking conditions in a Philadelphia county jail where

the federal defendants are also defendants in a long-pending

state court action involving the same jail and have stymied for

more than a decade efforts to remedy the jail's unconstitutional

conditions of confinement. This Court has previousiy denied

certiorari review of the issue framed in a case in which the

court of appeals had held, like the court below here, that a

district court may not dismiss a civil rights claim on the basis

1. Petitioners are defendants in Harris, et al. v. Pernsley, et

ai., C.A. No. 82-1847 (E.D. Pa., amended complaint filed, April

19, 1983), and include the Welfare Commissioner of the City of

Philadelphia, members of the Board of Directors of the

Philadelphia prison system, the Superintendent of the

Philadelphia prison system, the Warden of Holmesburg Prison, the

Managing Director and Mayor of the City of Philadelphia, and the

City of Philadelphia itself. The Commissioner of the

Pennsylvania Bureau of Corrections and the General Counsel for

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania are also defendants in the

Harris action, but have not petitioned for writ of certiorari.

(A copy of the Amended Complaint in Harris is provided in the

Appendix to this brief.)

of a state proceeding in which the federal defendants are simply

opposing the implementation of federal constitutional rights and

are not enforcing state law or policy.

Respondents (hereinafter “the Harris plaintiffs”

“plaintiffs") brought this action in 1982 against two state and

several local officials and the City of Philadelphia seeking

monetary and equitable relief from the unconstitutional

overcrowding and other oppressive conditions of confinement at

Holmesburg Prison, one of three Philadelphia county jails.

Respondents’ Amended Complaint averred in essence that conditions

in 1982 remained essentially unchanged from what they were in

1972 when a Pennsylvania state court first declared that

Holmesburg inmates were being subjected to cruel and unusual

punishment and began issuing a series of remedial orders which

defendants disobeyed and which the state court was unwilling or

unable to effectuate. Specifically, the Amended Complaint

alleged that in 1971, inmates at Holmesburg and two other

correctional institutions had commenced an action in state court

challenging the conditions of confinement at the three county

2. The Harris plaintiffs are identified in the caption of the

Amended Complaint. (See Appendix.)

jails.? After extensive testimony, a three-judge state court

determined, based on the “totality of circumstances” test, that

conditions in all three jails, including Holmesburg, subjected

inmates to cruel and unusual punishment. That determination was

affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1974. Jackson v.

Hendrick, 457 Pa. 405, 321 A.2d 603 (1974).

In 1976 -- five years after the state litigation was

begun -- the trial court in Jackson issued its first remedia!

decree which established, inter alia, a maximum inmate capacity

for the Philadelphia prisons, a Provision which, along with the

other contested aspects of the decree, was affirmed by the

Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. Hendrick v. Jackson, No. 1385

C.D. 1976 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 17, 1977) (per curiam). Amended

Complaint #33. In addition, the Jackson parties entered into a

series of consent decrees which are now five in number and are

appended as exhibits to the Amended Complaint. See Amended

Complaint Exhs. A-E. In Stipulation and Agreement I, executed on

February 4, 1977, the defendarts agreed to implement

substantially the maximum capacity figures established by the

3. The relevant facts regarding this prior litigation, entitled

Jackson v. Hendrick, are set forth in the court of appeals

decision at A-20-21. (References to the Opinions of the courts

below are to the Appendix following petitioners’ brief.)

-3-

court in its first remedial decree. In pertinent part, Paragrap

The defendants shall set a maximu 5

for each of the three institutions fc

urpose of maintaining

reater than the rated level. For .

Olmesburg, the capac :

umber of usable cells.

Amended Complaint %4%34-35.

48 If the population exceeds this level, the

Court will consider for release the follow Gg

classes of inmates

(a) persons held for trial on misdemeanor

2sffenses;

(6) persons held in default € $3,0

gc not impose undue dganger toc

Amended Complaint Exh. c.4

Notwithstanding the series of remedial decrees and

stipulations in Jackson aimed at alleviating the conditions

determined to be unconstitutional as long ago as 1972, the

inmates at Holmesburg, according to the averments of the Amended

Complaint, continue to experience those precise conditions.

Although the maximum capacity of Holmesburg under current court

order is approximately 700, the inmate population has

substantially exceeded that number during the time relevant to

this litigation and is currently believed to be approximately

1,300, i.e., almost twice the number that may lawfully be

incarcerated there. Amended Complaint "41.° Despite twelve

4. The problem of overcrowding was a major issue as well at a

hearing before the lower court in Jackson in October 1980.

Following the hearing, the court issued an order which, as

modified, established a maximum capacity of 2,190 at the three

Philadelphia prisons; prohibited triple celling; prohibited

double celling after August 1, 1981; and established procedures

for the release of inmates held on bail until the prison

population was reduced to the rated capacity. The court's

orders, dismissing exceptions by the City of Philadelphia and

other defendants, were affirmed by the Commonwealth Court on

February 14, 1983. Jackson v. Hendrick, 72 Pa. Commw. 63, 456

A.2d 229 (1983).

5. Owing in large measure to the problem of overcrowding,

plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer, inter alia, from

inadequate screening of violent and chronic offenders; unsanitary

preparation and service of food; other hygienic inadequacies such

as insufficient bedding, towels, and toiletries; and inadequate

access to recreational facilities, work assignments, education

programs, library facilities, legal materials, religious

( CONTINUED )

ear c itigat in acxson, the vercrowaing and eprivations

resu > nq fr rT . have e ther per sted * +h it materia hanae

= la)

r worsened Amended Complaint 445.

'n 1982, the Harris plaintiffs commenced the instan

action pro se seeking monetary camages resulting from the

jJeprivation of their constitutional rights, and an injunction

preventing the Philadelphia defendants from continuing ¢t olate

their rights by placing them in conditions of confinement already

jeterminecd t be unconstitutional lefendants moved to dismiss

the Amended Complaint under Fed. R -av. F 12(b)(6 Despite

he fact that the Harris plaintiffs' claims did not arise until

based on res udicata and the variant of the abstention doctrine

ser < rer in Col rad River Water “onservat r D st i > r ted

services, and telephones. Amended Complaint #43. Moreover, as a

direct result of the overcrowding, plaintiffs have been subjected

to physical and psychological injury from violent attacks, sexual

assaults, and of physical violence by other inmates.

Amended Complaint #44.

‘?

)

6. “The present problem results from the fact that past

successive city administrations have avoided the inevitability oc

providing additional facilities through rationalization,

dJilatoriness and procrastination.” Jackson v. Hendrick, No. i80

Misc. Docket, 1984, slip op. at 4 (Pa., Fiied October 17,

States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). The district court specifically

refused to dismiss on the basis of Younger.

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the

district court's decision. The court of appeals determined that

the Harris piaintiffs could not have been parties to the Jackson

proceedings, nor could they have raised in those proceedings the

claims at issue here. (A-25.) Hence, the action was not barred

by res judicata. (A-26.) Moreover, the court of appeals held

that abstention under Colorado River was not warranted because

the test for application of the parallel litigation exception to

this Court's decision in McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268

(1910), was not satisfied:

The (state and federal) cases are not truly

parallel since the federal court plaintiffs

seek money damages while the state court

plaintiffs did not. The liability phase of

the state court case is long concluded, and

thus parallel litigation on liability even for

injunctive relief is not an issue.

(A-33.) On the other hand, the court of appeals agreed with the

district court that other forms of abstention, particularly

Younger abstention, did not apply:

Since the municipal and state officials are

defendants in the state proceeding resisting

the enforcement of federal constitutional

rights, rather than plaintiffs or prosecutors

seeking vindication of state law enforcement

policies, the trial court did not err in

briefed extensively below n Jicusssed at length 1 the ma

2pinion of the court f appea unger formed the basis for

tne opinior £ the dissenting 10dge the rt f appeais,

however, anc petitioners ask that certiorari be granted solely

nsider the applicability f the Younger doctrine

I. THE DECISIONS OF THE COURTS BELOW FINDING JUNGER

C Y

ABSTENTION INAPPLICABLE DO NOT CONFLICT WITH PRIOR

DECISIONS OF THIS COURT BECAUSE THE ELEMENTS NECESSAR

FOR YOUNGER TO APPLY ARE NOT PRESENT HERI

Both the district court and the irt f appeals agree

the fundamental fact whict insels against ertiorari in thi

case: Younger abdstention is inappropriate here because none of

the elements warranting its application is present. Petitioner

Jid not commence a state proceeding against the Harris plainti

435 (1982). The Harris laintiffs do not, and did not, have an

3! i

proceeding. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977). The

Harris plaintiffs are not seeking to enjoin an ongoing state

proceeding brought against them. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S.

434, 444 (1977). Thus, the court of appeals decision presents no

conflict with this Court's decisions and, accordingly, certiorari

should not be granted.

A. No Important State Interest Is Presented By

The Philadelphia Defendants' Thirteen Years

Of Refusing To Remedy The Unconstitutional

Conditions of Confinement In Philadelphia

Prisons

Under Younger abstention, a federal court must defer to

an ongoing state court proceeding only “when important state

interests are involved. Middlesex County Ethics Committee v.

Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. at 432. The importance of the

State's interest is reflected in the nature of the state court

proceeding and the state's role in it. Id.; see also Illinois v.

General Electric Co., 683 F.2d 206, 212 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.

Genied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983) (Younger inapplicable where state had

not initiated “penalty action” against federal plaintiffs);

DeSpain v. Johnston, 731 F.2d 1171, 1177 n.14, 1179 (Sth Cir.

1984) (state's role in litigation significant in determining

state interest). In particular, Younger abstention has been

found to be

best suited to cases where federal plaintiffs

are trying to attack state enforcement

-9-

’

rh &

a —

ts in the state proceeding resisting

~ a t

the en rcement of federal constitutional

rignts, rather than plaintiffs or prosecutors

seeking vindication of state law enforcement

poiicies, the trial court did not err n

inger Harris and its progeny

A-29 footnote omitted Thus, petitioners’ resistance ¢

ect fy ne +he iv ner tut na 4it n< - the wr = the

maintain ime rates no state interest, and the rt cf appea

je m SO ruling was in accord with decisions of this Court

;

,*)

;

Ww)

‘

“

@®

;

ha]

)

“"

a |

La)

Fs)

;

it)

(limiting population in county jail); Inmates of Suffolk County

;

‘

ey)

of population in Charles Street Jail). Thus,

‘

)

an]

)

the Har

a |

is action involv

not warrant federal court abstentior

state lawsuit alone warrants federal abstention is particularly

weak where, as here, the federal interest involved -- vindicatior

§1983 -- is strong. See, e.g., United States v. City of

unjustified where federal interest outweighed state nterest

This Court has long recognized that

“4

)

oa)

)

ne)

)

re)

‘ie

an)

;

> a

i“ @

)

i @

rH +

12 &

( .

‘

leq

Pe)

—

es)

’

)

section 1983 is being invoked by the Harris plaintiffs as

constitutional rights by defendants’ continued operation of an

unconstitutionally-overcrowded prison system. The mere fact that

a municipality, by definition, may have an interest in the

administration of a municipal facility is not sufficient to

Outweigh the powerful concerns underlying section 1983. See

Goldie's Bookstore v. Superior Court, 739 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir.

1984) (abstention “an extraordinary and narrow exception” to

federal court's weighty obligation to exercise jurisdiction when

relief is sought under section 1983); Johnson v. Kelly, 583 F.2d

1242, 1252 (3d Cir. 1978) (state's interest in tax revenues

insufficient to warrant abstention in section 1983 case).

Therefore, the minimal state interest embodied in the

Philadelphia defendants' opposition to state court efforts to

alleviate the conditions of confinement in Philadelphia prison

does not warrant dismissal of an action alleging cruel and

unusual punishment in those prisons.

7. Application of founger abstention on the facts of this case

would also create a conflict with other Opinions of this Court.

Where, as here, there is no pending state proceeding involving

the federal plaintiffs, a decision requiring the federal

plaintiffs to pursue state court remedies would be contrary to

this Court's decision in Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. at

500-16, in which an exhaustion requirement in section 1983

actions was specifically rejected. See also Monroe v. Pape, 365

U.S. 167, 183 (1961).

The Jackson Proceeding Does Not Afford An

a3 4 oP

Ypportunity For Respondents’ Feder

Claims To Be Raised In State Court

Younger abstention is not only inappropriate because

>f the lack of an important state interest being asserted by

petitioners in the state court, Dut also because the Jackson

~ . er 4 ~ tine i € -r

proceeding affords no opportunity for the Harris plaintiffs tc

itutional claims” is a significant element in determining

4°)

)

a |

)

’

}

wn"

proceeding, federal courts must exercise their jurisdiction. Id.

serstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108 n.9 (1975)).

In the Jackson case, commenced in 1971, plaintiffs

alleged that various Philadelphia officials violated their

constitutional rights by subjecting them to particular conditions

Qa.

)

44)

ie)

of confinement which piaintif

The Jackson plaintiffs sought injunctive relief only, and the

trial court rendered a verdict in their favor in 1972, which was

affirmed by the highest court of the state in 1974. All

substantive consideration of the claims against the Jackson

defendants ceased on that date. The only issue considered by the

Jackson court from 1974 to the present is whether the Jackson

defendants are in compliance with that court's series of remedial

orders.

The Harris plaintiffs allege that their constitutional

rights have been violated in a different way. They claim that,

beginning in 1980, the several defendants -- with full knowledge

that the conditions of Philadelphia's prisons had been adjudged

unconstitutional and in violation of court orders to remedy those

conditions -- subjected them to conditions of confinement which

violated the federal constitution. The Harris plaintiffs seek

not only injunctive relief, which potentially could parallel the

state court's orders that the Philadelphia defendants cease their

ongoing violations of the rights of inmates incarcerated in their

prisons, but monetary damages as well to compensate them for the

constitutional injuries they have suffered.®

The Harris plaintiffs’ claims could not have been heard

by the Jackson court initially because their claims did not arise

8. The Harris plaintiffs also seek a declaration that the

particular conduct of petitioners -- i.e., subjecting plaintiffs

to unconstitutional conditions with full knowledge, and in direct

contravention, of the Jackson decrees -- violates the Consti-

tution. Because this issue could not have been adjudicated in

the Jackson lawsuit, abstention is not warranted by the claim for

declaratory relief. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452

(1974).

irmance of t!

Philadelphia pri

incarcerated in -

Harris S$ cannot have

ciass, and the

9. The court of appeals

plaintiffs’ claims were n

judicata and did not warra

P. 12(b)(6). (A-23-26; A-

appeals specifically stated

class even had a cause of ac

conditions in Holmesburg in

subjected to those condit

Ae?) ing

mivea +

challenged this

collaterally attack

plaintiffs’

court.

that h

claims were,

lS,

the Pennsylvania Supreme

Yar

the

a liabilit

Furth

Ons,

miscnaracterizati

have been, par

Drought by the

71-2437, slip op.

perscns incarcerated in

None of the Har

prisons before 1980. Ther

been, and are not, member

ine

vt rh

a F

oOo sucn c

tioners

Cannot n

een, before

ris plain

the

lass member

Aawr

wWwusk &

‘Ss

Jackson court

y phase of

ermore,

the

tie

named

Nh mt

Ww ~ g

ave

the Harri

tne

Jack

There is no identity of persons or parties

between the present class members and the

named P}gintifts in the Common Pleas Court

action. (A-25).

There is simply no rational means by which the Harris

plaintiffs’ constitutional claims may be heard in litigation to

which they are not parties and which has already proceeded to

judgment and completed appellate review. DeSpain v. Johnston,

731 F.2d at 1179 (“the state court proceeding was ‘pending’

within the meaning of Younger ... until the appellate proceedings

were exhausted"); J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1085 (6th Cir.

1981) (federal court did not abstain because juveniles’ challenge

was to state court's post-adjudication use of their compiled

10. Petitioners’ assertion that respondents admitted in their

Amended Complaint that they were members of the Jackson class is

incorrect. First, respondents cannot “admit™ the truth of a fact

which, on the record, is plainly incorrect. Thus, where, as

here, the record demonstrates that the Harris plaintiffs were nct

members of the Jackson class, no “admission” to the contrary can

be controlling or probative. Moreover, the Harris plaintiffs’

assertion, in paragraph 50 of the Amended Complaint, that they

were included among the intended beneficiaries of the injunctive

relief ordered by the Jackson court was not intended as an

admission that they were members of the Jackson class, but rather

as an assertion that they, as persons subject to conditions

adjudged unconstitutional in 1972, were entitled to the benefits

of that adjudication and accompanying injunctive relief. To the

extent that the challenged averment of paragraph 50 may be

pivotal in determining whether respondents were in fact members

of the Jackson class, respondents respectfully note their

intention to seek leave to amend the complaint to clarify that

they were not members of the Jackson class but were entitled to

the benefits of the injunctive relief ordered in that case.

judicial proceedings - jingly, even though the state court

has retained jurisdiction Ower the remedy in Jackson, Younger

abstention is inappropriate because federal court jurisdiction

which have been or could have been heard in state court.”

Ge The Harris Plaintiffs Are ot Seekiv7 7 To

Enjoin Any State Court Lawsuit Or Proceecing

ee ete _ ———— a - — a — — os

In each action in which this Court has required

&oedAera?’ aure teantinn on th . - - +h Yeuneer nrincin a

federal court abstention on the bdDasis or he Younger principles,

”

’

;

cv?

ie}

‘

)

‘

ti)

)

’

application of a state statute alleged to be unconstitutiona:.

challenged constitutionality of Texas child custody iaws, seeking

ll. Even if this Court were to order at Younger abstention

applied to respondents’ claims for injunctive relief, such an

Order would not result in dismissal of the Harris action

Respondents would continue to pursue their ciaims for monetary

damages against the Philadelphia defendants and their claims for

monetary and injunctive relief against defendants Marks and

Waldman. Such a result would place the district court in the

-~ ;

incongruous position of being able to find petitioners 4

violating respondents’ constitutional rights, Dut with

jurisdiction to enjoin the unconstitutional behavior. nis

incongruity further emphasizes th difference between the Harris

plaintiffs’ ciaims and those r: n Jackson. Cf. Williams v.

Red Bank Board of Education, 662 1008, 1024 (3d Cir. 1981

ripen only after

nc?

a ae

(plaintitts’ claims for damages ul

proceedings were completec).

to enjoin Texas officials from proceeding against them under the

challenged statute); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975)

(federal plaintiff sought to prevent, by federal intervention,

enforcement of a state court judgment declaring its theater a

nuisance). In each case, a district court's decision not to

abstain created the spectre that a federal court, if it found for

the plaintiff on the merits, would be placed in the position of

rdering a state court -- or officials seeking to enforce state

law in state court -- to refrain from exercising authority over

the scate defendant/federal plaintiff. Williams v. Red Bank

Board of Education, 662 F.2d 1008, 1017-18 (34 Cir. 1981). In

each such situation, comity justified “the Younger doctrine of

Snintervention” because federal intervention improperly

suggested federal court superiority in the vindication of

constitutional rights and disregard of the state interests

pursued by the challenged statute or proceeding. Juidice v.

Vail, 430 S. at 334; see alsc Huffman v. Pursue, Ltc., 420 U.S.

at 609 ("Federal post-trial intervention, in a fashion designed

to annul the results of a state trial ... deprives the States o

a function which quite legitimately is left to them....")

Here, however, the Harris plaintiffs do not seek to

annul the results of the Jackson trial nor to enjoin the state

courts from enforcing its 1972 order declaring Philadelphia

appropriate in this context, and the decision of the court of

appeais on this issue was consistent with the prior decisions f

D. Where The Essential Elements For Younger

Abstention Are Not Present, This Court Has

Refused To Grant Certiorari To Consider

The Younger Issue

The courts below held that abstention is not proper

here, because the Jackson proceeding does not involve the

enforcement of state law, does not provide an opportunity for the

Harris plaintiffs to raise their federal claims, and will not be

enjoined by the Harris court. This Court has previously

considered whether to grant a petition for writ of certiorari in

@ case invoiving very similar facts. In that case, Ramos

Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980), the court of appeals had

also declined to order abstention, and this Court denied the

defendant state officials’ petition for writ of certiorari. 45

U.S. 1041 (1981).

In Ramos, an inmate at a Colorado State Penitentiary

filed a class action lawsuit in federal court challenging the

conditions of confinement at the prison. The district court had

plaintiff claimed that order of state human rights commission

concerned area preempted by federal law, interference with state

administrative and judicial process represented by possibility of

federal court's enjoining enforcement of order not substantial

enough to justify abstention).

1@ aosta 5 Aamos raw.iey

iar t ty mmiss ers 44 F.2 28 (6th r 1964), ar

4 wr mates a 4 nty ja br gr @ section i983

4- allenging the 3 ns of confinement in the jail,

€ f appea eversec the distr tc r S Cismissa ‘

ea he 4 c 3¢e efendants i Crawiey hac

argue a the district irt should abstain from deciding the

mates Rims nm the ground that a state court decision,

Dseque afftirmec by a4 State appellate court, had rderec

Sure of the facility until a new jail was completed.

efenda ; laimecd t be attempting t compiy with tne state

t's jer The irt f appeais refused to apply Younger,

sespite the existence of the parallel state proceeding:

wever, Younger and its progeny all have a

procedural posture which is very different

from our case. in the typical Younger case,

he federal plaintiff is a defendant in

nmgoing or threatened state court proceedings

seeking to enjoin continuation of those state

proceedings. Moreover, the basis for the

federal relief claimed is generally available

to the would-be federal plaintiff as a defense

mn the state proceedings.... In our case, the

federal plaintiff's are also plaintiffs in the

state court action. In addition, the

13 international Prisoners’ Union v. Rizzo, 356 F. Supp. 806

E.D. Pa. 1973) is not to the contrary. There, the complaint was

filed less than one year after the trial court's decision in

Jackson and

adjudicated

aised precisely the same claims that had just been

in Jackson.

guire the

iladelphi

wai

the ack

4efendant

a4 ver °|

3 Complai

mecying s&s

nave c

nn ah

Berrvyvt

— a

t appropr

ma the

“om

if a

ed th

temr

rders

sec Ct

ie e

er ve

a rer

blems

, 411

e, de

trati

ecr

AeA

s 4

Aered

was

indicate prejudgment of issue making Younger abstention

inapplicable) .+4

Moreover, in Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407 (1965) a

reapportionment case, this Court held that where state-

adjudicated constitutional violations are left uncorrected

considerations of comity do not bar federal equitable relief. In

Scott, this Court required only that the district court give the

state authority a reasonable period of time to remedy its

unconstitutional procedures before the district court could order

relief. 381 U.S. at 409. Here, the local authorities have been

14. Moreover, much of petitioners’ argument is based on matters

de hors the Amended Complaint, viz., fragments of the record in

Jackson v. Hendrick which are supposed to demonstrate the

positive strides taken by state officials since the inception of

this federal suit toward the elimination of overcrowding and

other oppressive conditions of confinement in Holmesburg. See

Petitioners’ Brief at ll.

The Harris plaintiffs have had no opportunity to counter the

representations made by defendants regarding their recent efforts

and changes. If post-complaint occurrences are to be considered,

both Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and prin-

ciples of fairness dictate that notice should be provided to

plaintiffs in order that they may produce counter-affidavits. In

short, the Court cannot base its decision solely on the city's

representations regarding the current state of the record.

Petitioners’ casual references to matters outside the Amended

Complaint misled Judge Garth, dissenting in the court of appeals,

into believing that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has directed

compliance with court orders concerning, inter alia, population

caps and multiple-celling. In fact, the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court, by staying the Jackson court's order of June 22, 1984, has

relieved petitioners of any immediate duty to limit population or

avoid the multiple celling of inmates in Holmesburg prison.

-27-

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.