Amicus Curiae Brief — Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.

Supreme Court. US.

(a) FILED"

AUG 24 J9a7

CLERK

i —

In Tue

Supreme Court of the United States

Octoser TreRM, 1987

ALLIED TUBE & CONDUIT CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

Vs.

INDIAN HEAD, INC.,

Respondent.

BRIEF OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS AS

AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR

A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

NEIL F. HARTIGAN

Attorney General, State of Euinois

100 West Randolph Street, 12th Floor

Chicago, Illinois 60601

(312) 917-2503

Rosert E. Davy, Jr.*

Assistant Attorney General

100 West Randolph Street, Suite 13-313

Chicago, Illinois 60601

(312) 917-2582 * Counsel of Record

Printed by Authority of the State of Illinois (P.O. 33786—70—8-24-87)

ee a a

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the petitioner’s lobbying a model code organ-

ization can be held an actionable restraint of trade lead-

ing to treble damages under the Sherman Act, consistent-

ly with Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr

Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) and its progeny.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

QUESTION PRESENTED ................... i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................. iii

EE Saestbcscesseseccesecccce 1

IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF THE AMICUS . 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............... 3

5

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ....

1. The States Rely On Model Codes Such As

ee ee ae chun etecesses 6

2. The Decision Below Wili Stifle The Unin-

hibited Debate The Model Code Process

EE rrr 7

3. The Second Circuit Took An Erroneous

View Of The Protection Noerr Accords To

Those Participating In The Legislative

Process Through Model Code-Making .... i)

4. The Four District Courts To Have Con-

sidered These Issues Recognized The

Reality Of State Government Reliance On

EC RSE 13

PURE USEGEEAES EN e6545688 c000000s 15

—

ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: PAGE

California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Un-

limited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972) ............... 5, 10

Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley,

cis nti eeeene oKeen ean 11

Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr

Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) ... passim

Indian Head, Inc. v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp.,

No. 81 CV 6250 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 1986) ... 14

Rush-Hampton Industries v. Home Ventilating In-

stitute, 419 F. Supp. 19 (M.D. Fla. 1976) .. 14

Sessions Tank Lines, Inc. v. Joor Manufacturing,

Inc., 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 4 66,989 (C.D.

RE CGLEGEb dads cde bdaed¥ecrdeeseeces 13

United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington,

SE SE ED 66 cee cscvecescnsencesss 5

Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Allied Tube &

Conduit Corp., 573 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. IIL.

Ps aN etek on den bab ee bee edeeeensseens esses 14

OTHER AUTHORITIES:

Cal. Admin. Code Tit. 24.R.3 ................. 7

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-23-104(a) ................ 7

41 Ill. Admin. Code Part 100 ................ 5,7

Md. Ann. Code art. 38a, §60 ................ 7

527 Code of Mass. Regs. 12.00 ............... 7

iv

pe. EE. GS es Gs ED “bc be esecdccccss 7

ee GE RTT eee

Wash. Admin. Code R. 296-46, R. 296-401 .....

House Select Comm. on Small Business, The Ef-

fect Upon Small Business of Voluntary Indus-

trial Standards, H.R. Rep. No. 1981, 90th

CI tee is Oe ED Sion doc deccccniess.

29 C.F.R. § 1910.66(cX22Xi) (1986) .............

33 C.F.R. § 183.435(aX1) (1986) ..............6. 7

Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards

in the Development of Mandatory Federal Stan-

dards Affecting Safety or Health, 56 Tex. L.

Gs TP EE 6 NSN db vce asevadedacdieeues 6, 7

No. 87-157

In THe

Supreme Court of the Anited States

Ocroser Term, 1987

ALLIED TUBE & CONDUIT CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

Vs.

INDIAN HEAD, INC.,

Respondent.

BRIEF OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS AS

AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR

A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

As Amicus Curiae, the State of Illinois respectfully

prays this Court grant the petition for a writ of certiorari

submitted by the petitioner in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reporu.. at 817

F.2d 938 (1987). The oral opinion of the District Court

is not reported. Both opinions are found in the Petition

for a Writ of Certiorari, Appendices A and B.

-

IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF THE AMICUS

The State of Illinois respectfully submits this brief, as

amicus curiae, in support of granting the writ of certiorari

in this case. The Attorney General of Illinois is the chief

law enforcement officer of the state. He is charged with

the duty to enforce the state’s antitrust laws, as well as

the federal antitrust laws. Illinois has a significant interest

in the correct interpretation and application by the lower

federal courts of this Court’s antitrust doctrine.

The Second Circuit’s opinion below threatens to under-

mine the system by which states such as Illinois promul-

gate legislation in the areas of product safety and build-

ing construction. The opinion will make it more difficult

for the states to fulfill their responsibilities to protect their

citizens from unsafe products and from hazardous con-

struction. As the question presented is of such practical

significance to state government and its citizens, and as

the decision’s adverse impact on state regulatory interests

is of such magnitude, Illinois respectfully requests this

Court grant the petition for certiorari.

~~

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case arises from the petitioner’s efforts to block

the respondent’s proposal to include a new type of elec-

trical conduit, known as PVC conduit, as a permissible

type of electrical conduit in the 1981 edition of the Na-

tional Electrical Code (NEC).

The NEC is a model code promulgated by the National

Fire Protection Association (NFPA), which establishes

products and performance requirements for electrical

systems. The NEC is the most widely disseminated and

adopted model code in the world. Forty-five states, includ-

ing the District of Columbia, rely on the NEC-in promul-

gating their electrical codes.

The NFPA is a private, voluntary organization com-

posed of over 31,500 individual and group members repre-

senting industry, labor, academia, insurance, organized

medicine, firefighters, and government. It revises the

NEC every three years through a multi-step, several year

long process. The NFPA submits proposed amendments

to the NEC to a code-making panel made up of profes-

sionals with technical expertise in the area. If approved

by this panel, the proposal then goes to the full member-

ship, together with the comments and voting position of

each panel member. After an opportunity for comment,

the panel considers the amendment a second time along

with the membership’s comments. If again approved, the

NFPA publishes the proposed amendment to the full

membership. The entire membership then votes.

On September 18, 1978, the respondent began the process

of obtaining NEC approval for its product, PVC conduit,

by submitting its proposal to the NFPA.

~

The petitioner recognized that inclusion of PVC conduit

in the NEC might adversely affect its sales of a competing

type of steel conduit. It therefore met with a number of

different groups, including other members of the steel] in-

dustry, to gather votes in opposition to the respondent’s

proposal. The petitioner’s lobbying tactics were aggres-

sive, and included an NFPA membership and registra-

tion drive of its supporters, in an effort to ‘“‘stack” the

NFPA vote. When a vote was ultimately taken on the

respondent’s proposal, the proposal was rejected. There-

after, various state legislatures enacted the NEC, and

PVC conduit was not listed as a permissible construction

material.

With its PVC product effectively excluded from the

market, the respondent sued the petitioners for a viola-

tion of the Sherman Act in connection with its conduct

before the NFPA. The jury found for the respondent and

awarded it $3.8 million, to be trebled, plus attorneys’ fees.

The District Court granted the petitioner’s motion to set

aside the verdict primarily on the ground that its con-

duct in connection with the 1981 NEC was protected from

antitrust liability under this Court’s decision in Eastern

Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,

Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and its progeny. The Court of

Appeals reversed and reinstated the jury verdict.

=§-

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The states have a responsibility to adopt laws, rules and

regulations protecting the safety and welfare of their citi-

zens. In exercising their regulatory and police power func-

tions, states depend upon model codes such as the Na-

tional Electric Code (“NEC”) at issue in this case. Illi-

nois requires compliance with the NEC in all cities, towns

and communities except those which by ordinance have

adopted comparable provisions. See, 41 Ill. Admin. Code,

Part 100, Secs. 100.10, 100.210. Illinois has specifically

delegated the power to establish building codes to local

governmental units. See, Ill. Rev. Stats., ch. 24, par.

11-30-4 and ch. 34, par. 422. It is estimated that over fifty

percent of all Illincis municipalities have adopted the

NEC.

The decision below threatens to undermine the system

of government reliance on model codes by denying con-

cerned parties, which raise significant public safety issues

before model code-making bodies, protection from treble

damage liability under the Sherman Act as required by

this Court’s decision in Eastern Railroad Presidents Con-

ference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).

In Noerr and in United Mine Workers of America v.

Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) and California Motor

Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972),

this Court developed the principle that the First Amend-

ment right to petition the legislature outweighs antitrust

concerns which arise when commercial competitors seek

anticompetitive legislation. The opinion below disregards

this principle. It will effectively chill the debate and hence

will diminish the quality of the model codes considered

by state and local government.

=

In addition to frustrating the states’ ability to promul-

gate health and safety codes, and being inconsistent with

this Court’s decision in Noerr, the decision is in conflict

with every other decision squarely treating the same

issues.

1. The States Rely On Model Codes Such As The NEC.

In highly technical and complex areas, for example, safe-

ty codes and building regulations, state and local govern-

ments rely heavily upon a variety of model codes and

other standards developed by voluntary organizations like

the National Fire Protection Association (““NFPA’’). See

Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the

Development of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting

Safety or Health, 56 Tex. L. Rev. 1329 (1978). State gov-

ernments themselves lack the governmental resources to

initiate, develop through public proceedings, adopt and de-

fend comprehensive codes.

Development of such complex codes requires public hear-

ings, which usually involve technical, scientific data and

issues. Hearings are frequently time consuming, particu-

larly when controversial matters may result in judicial

challenges to adopted regulations. Furthermore, airing of

the technical issues requires expert staff to conduct the

hearings, analyze the evidence, weigh the sometimes con-

flicting data, prepare the appropriate code language and

disseminate adequate information to those affected by the

regulations in order to secure compliance.

As a practical matter most state and local governments

lack the necessary resources to conduct their own investi-

gations. For that reason and because the NFPA and other

groups do a professional job in their own right, state

legislatures depend on the NFPA and like code-making

=

associations to become, in effect, their committees and

scientific laboratories. See Hamilton, supra, at 1377-78.

From the state’s perspective, code-making at the volun-

tary organization level is an integral part of its own legis-

lative process. The model codes are the product of consid-

ered analysis and debate.

The NEC serves to illustrate how important model

codes are to the states. Forty-five states, including the

District of Columbia, rely on the NEC in promulgating

their electrical codes. Aff. of John Lison, May 16, 1985,

Joint Appendix, 137, 145 as submitted in the case below.

Twenty-six states adopt the NEC in its entirety by refer-

ence. Id See, e.g., 41 Ill. Admin. Code Part 100, Sec.

100.210; 1981 N.Y Laws Chap. 707; Md. Ann. Code art.

38a, § 60; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-23-104(a). Another nine-

teen adopt it with amendments, usually modest ones. Jd.

See, e.g., Cal. Admin. Code Tit. 24, R.3; 527 Code of

Mass. Regs. 12.00; N.J. Admin. Code, Tit. 5, § 23; Wash.

Admin. Code R. 296-46, R. 296-401. See also 29 C.F.R.

§ 1910.66(cX22Xi) (1986); 33 C.F.R. § 183.435(a(1) (1986)

(federal regulations incorporating: model codes by refer-

ence). Voluntary organizations perform an invaluable public

service and save state and local governments precious

legislative resources in developing model codes for govern-

ment consideration. See House Select Comm. on Small

Business, The Effect Upon Small Business of Voluntary

Industrial Standards, H.R. Rep. No. 1981, 90th Cong. 2d

Sess. 3, 75 (1968).

2. The Decision Below Will Stifle The Uninhibited Debate

The Model Code Process Requires.

It is in the best interest of state and local governments

that organizations such as the NFPA have access to a

free flow of information, and conduct robust and vigor-

=

ous debate when creating model codes. The exchange of

ideas—even “wrong” ones—is the crucible which shapes

the final legislative product as it emerges from the model

code-making group’s processes. Often, a party in the best

position to raise concerns about the safety of a product

is a competitor. See, e.g., Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136-187. Chal-

lenges, such as those made by Allied against Carlon’s

PVC conduit on safety grounds, are precisely the sort of

catalyst for investigation upon which the code-making

process, and in turn the states, depend.

The imposition of antitrust liability in the circumstances

of this case will inhibit free and open debate within model

code organizations by those parties most capable and moti-

vated to bring all the facts to the fore. Allied raised the

issue of the safety of PVC conduit before the NFPA.

While clearly. Allied was motivated in part by commer-

cial interest, the jury found as a matter of fact that Allied

was also motivated by a genuine concern for safety. Fur-

thermore, the objective validity of the safety issue raised

by Allied was conceded at the trial by Carlon. If Allied’s

conduct is not protected, few will ever be safe. Parties

simply will not risk antitrust litigation to oppose a com-

petitor’s product, even with strong arguments based upon

bona fide, scientific evidence that a particular product is

unsafe or otherwise hazardous.

The decision below thus goes to the very heart of model

code-making and threatens to destroy the model code

process. It will become a sham, with critics of a product

afraid to speak up for fear of exposure to antitrust claims.

Nor is it an answer that participants may move to the

legislatures directly with their challenges. The legislatures

are ill-equipped to assume the task of initiating and de-

veloping complex codes from scratch in technical areas

without the assistance of model codes. See pages 3-4,

aii.

supra. Taking over these functions would require staff in-

creases at a time when most budgets are under consider-

able pressure. That simply will not happen.

Besides the practical difficulty of state governments con-

ducting hearings or revising technical codes, the Second

Circuit’s opinion may bring other more far-reaching prob-

lems. As code-making breaks down, the relative uniform-

ity of product safety legislation in the building area will

tend to diminish. The result is likely to be unseemly and

dangerous competition for building activity based upon

how lax a code a local area is willing to accept in order

to induce the work.

On the other hand, the additional burden of having to

develop complex legislation without the benefit of prior

code-making will tend to cause local governmental units

to be more reticent about changing and updating codes

to accommodate new products or necessary changes. Para-

doxically, a Court of Appeals decision that ostensibly is

intended to enhance competition may well do the exact

opposite, in the long run perpetuating and entrenching

existing products.

3. The Second Circuit Took An Erroneous View Of The

Protection Noerr Accords To Those Participating In The

Legislative Process Through Model Code-Making.

In Noerr, the Supreme Court recognized the critical im-

portance of excluding from Sherman Act liability the activ-

ities of competitors seeking to influence the legislature.

The right of petition is so precious and the benefits to

the legislature of having input from all sources is so great,

that parties seeking to participate in the process must

not be shackled with treble-damage liability. As the Su-

preme Court stated:

ailtiin

In a representative democracy such as this, these

branches of government act on behalf of the people

and, to a very large extent, the whole concept of

representation depends upon the ability of the peo-

ple to make their wishes known to their representa-

tives. To hold that the government retains the power

to act in this representative capacity and yet hold,

at the same time, that the people cannot freely in-

form the government of their wishes would impute

to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not busi-

ness activity, but political activity, a purpose which

would have no basis whatever in the legislative his-

tory of that Act.

365 U.S. at 1387.

Even more fundamentally, the Supreme Court based its

exemption from Sherman Act liability of those seeking

legislative change upon the First Amendment rights of

petition and association:

The right of petition is one of the freedoms protected

by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course, light-

Vy impute to Congress an intent to invade these free-

oms.

Id. at 138. See also California Motor Transport Co. v.

Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1971) (application

of the Sherman Act to petitioners of agencies and courts

destructive of rights of association and petition). The Su-

preme Court has often recognized the exceeding impor-

tance of the First Amendment values of petition and asso-

ciation, and has frequently emphasized the exacting level

of judicial review required of any legislation or lower court

action which would impinge upon these rights, particularly

as they relate to our democratic system.

[The practice of persons sharing common views band-

ing together to achieve a common end is deeply em-

bedded in the American political process.

te al ee et

i

= =

Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454

U.S. 290, 294 (1981). The Sherman Act must not be turned

into a weapon to inhibit groups or individuals from pre-

senting the legislature with information relevant to its

making a decision.

The Second Circuit in the decision below paid verbal

obeisance to these principles, but went on to eviscerate

them. The Court ruled that competitors bringing infor-

mation before model code-making bodies exert only an “‘in-

direct” influence on the legislature, and therefore are not

protected by the Noerr doctrine. Virtually ignoring the

reality of the relationship between the states and model

code-making bodies, the court found that Allied’s conduct

did not constitute petitioning of the government, and that

there are effective methods for influencing state govern-

ments directly, rather than through the model code-mak-

ing bodies.

From the state perspective of model codes as an integra!

part of the legislative process, the Second Circuit’s distinc-

tion between “direct”? and “indirect” pressure on the

legislature is misconceived. Concerned parties attempting

to influence model codes are participating directly in the

legislative process. This is precisely the sort of political

activity, implicating fundamental First Amendment con-

cerns, which the Supreme Court ruled is entitled to pro-

tection from the application of the antitrust laws. As the

Supreme Court stated in Noerr:

The Sherman Act does not prohibit two or more per-

sons from associating together in an attempt to per-

suade the legislature or the executive to take particu-

lar action with respect to a law that would produce

a restraint or a monopoly.

365 U.S. at 136.

=~

Indeed, the Court in Noerr extended protection to far

more “indirect” lobbying activity than exists in this case.

There, the defendant railroad associations engaged in a

deceptive publicity campaign designed to destroy com-

petitor truckers’ good-will and to promote support for

legislation inhibiting the truckers’ ability to compete. Jd.

at 129-30. This activity was only indirectly aimed at the

Congress. But the activities of concerned parties petition-

ing for change in model codes are, in every practical

sense, aimed at the state and local legislatures which may

adopt them.

Besides being unrealistic, the Second Circuit’s opinion

does violence to the First Amendment principles underly-

ing Noerr. The opinion below insists that competitors may

effectively lobby the state legislature directly. But as has

been stated above, the states simply lack the resources

adequately to consider all the various issues raised in the

area of technical code-making. While states obviously can

adopt, amend or reject the model codes promulgated by

the code-making associations, as a practical matter they

rely heavily upon the expertise of the code-making bodies

themselves, and on a free flow of information being pre-

sented to them.

By inhibiting the free flow of information at the model

code-making level, the Second Circuit’s opinion effective-

ly limits the information which will be received by the

legislatures directly. The decision will effect the very evils

that Noerr was intended to protect against: denying

legislative access and the right of association to those with

the most to say, and denying the legislature the benefit

of the information and ideas that flow from the model-

code process.

a eC GET

-~ =

4. The Four District Courts To Have Considered These Is-

sues Recognized The Reality Of State Government Reli-

ance On Model Codes.

All four district courts to have considered these issues

have concluded that petitioning model code associations

is protected by the Noerr doctrine. In Sessions Tank

Lines, Inc. v. Joor Manufacturing, Inc., 1986-1 Trade Cas.

(CCH) 466,989 (C.D. Cal. 1986), a company manufactur-

ing fuel tank liners sued a company making fuel tanks,

arguing that defendant Joor Manufacturing had under-

taken a false information campaign to convince model

code-making bodies to disallow tank liners. The associa-

tion in this case was the Western Fire Chiefs Associa-

tion, WFCA, which passes a uniform fire code, just as

the NFPA passes the NEC. Also at issue was the defen-

dant’s influence in persuading Underwriters Laboratories

(“U.L.”), another model code organization, not to certify

the safety of tank liners. The Court found that the chal-

lenged activity was protected under the Noerr doctrine

because,

[sjuch reliance upon the WFCA and UL by these

governmental euthorities in practical effect has re-

sulted in a delegation of governmental authority to

these otherwise private entities.

. . . [AJs a practical matter, it would be virtually im-

possible for Joor to lobby the individual governmental

entities regarding the adoption of particular specifica-

tions or requirements in the UFC. These governmen-

tal bodies rely on the WFCA and UL and in order

to have any effective influence on the government

—. Joor was required to lobby the WFCA and

Id. at 62,066.

=

Similarly, in Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Allied

Tube & Conduit Corp., 573 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. Ill. 1983),

Allied Tube, the appellant in this case, sued Wheeling-

Pittsburgh over Wheeling-Pittsburgh’s attempt to lobby

the NFPA to disapprove in the NEC a new type of con-

duit produced by Allied. The Court correctly recognized

two key points. First, it noted the delegation of authority

from state governments to model code groups:

Such wholehearted reliance upon the NFPA and UL

by these governmental entities has resulted in a near

complete delegation of governmental authority to

these otherwise private entities. While the govern-

mental bodies of course have retained the power to

modify or reject the NFPA and UL recommenda-

a in practice they have relied completely on

them.

Id. at 838.

Second, the Court recognized the consequent difficulty

of petitioning state government directly:

as a practical matter it would be virtually impossi-

ble for WP to lobby the individual municipalities and

states regarding the adoption of — specifica-

tions or requirements for IMC. These governmental

bodies have placed total trust and reliance on NFPA

and UL. In order to influence effectively the govern-

mental entities, WP had no option but to lobby

NFPA and UL.

Id. at 838. See also Indian Head, Inc. v. Allied Tube &

Conduit Corp., No. 81 Civ. 6250 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 1986)

(Dist Ct. Opinion below); Rush-Hampton Indus. v. Home

Ventilating Inst., 419 F. Supp. 19 (M.D. Fla. 1976).

The State of Illinois wishes to reiterate the point that

is made clear in each of these district court cases, and

a point which was disregarded by the Court of Appeals

ts en nS NE rR

~i§-

in the case below. As a practical matter, those wishing

to affect legislation in technical areas such as building

codes, have no choice but to petition at the model code-

making level. Such is the system of mutual dependence

that has evolved between state and !ocal governments and

the model code-making associations. Without this system,

these governments would not be able fully to consider the

merits of technical legislation.

CONCLUSION

The potential elimination of strong advocates with both

the resources and capability to pursue safety issues within

the model code development process, is contrary to the

public interest. The very reason state and local govern-

ments rely so heavily upon such mode] codes, namely to

facilitate the states’ exercise of their sovereign authority

to exclude unsafe products from the market, will be un-

dermined. The decision below may, therefore, result in

the public’s serving as the unwitting and unwilling testing

laboratory for unsafe products.

In its decision, The Second Circuit Court of Appeals

placed major burdens upon the states, in regulating com-

plicated scientific and technical areas, such as that regu-

lated by the NEC. As this decision is contrary to the deci-

sions of four previous District Courts, and as the question

presented is of great practical significance to state and

~~

local governments, the State of Illinois respectfully re-

quests this Court to grant the petition for certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

NEIL F. HARTIGAN

. Attorney General, State of Illinois

100 West Randolph Street, 12th Floor

Chicago, Mlinois 60601

(312) 917-2503

RoBerTt E. Davy, JR.*

Assistant Attorney General

100 West Randolph Street, Suite 13-313

Chicago, Illinois 60601

(312) 917-2582 * Counsel of Record

August, 1987

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