Amicus Curiae Brief — Thornburg v. Gingles

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

LACY H. THORNBURG, et al.,

Appellants,

v.

RALPH GINGLES, et al.,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of North Carolina

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

THE WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION

IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS

DANIEL J. PoPEoO

GEORGE C. SMITH *

WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION

1705 N Street, N. W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 857-0240

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

Washington Legal F oundation

* Counsel of Record

WILeon - Eras Priwrine Co.. Inc. . 769-0096 - Waswincron. D.C. 20001

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Voting Rights Act requires states to

devise election districts and procedures which, wherever

the concentration of minority voters is sufficiently large,

will enable minorities to dictate election outcomes if they

adhere to minority bloc voting.

2. Whether the district court in this case relied ex-

cessively on a Senate Judiciary Committee Report’s pro-

nouncements as to the meaning of Section 2 of the Voting

Rights Act, to the exclusion of the language of the stat-

ute itself.

3. Whether the failure of non-minority citizens to vote

in sufficient numbers for minority candidates in a given

jurisdiction may constitute grounds for holding that ju-

risdiction in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights

Act.

4. Whether the district court erred in holding that

there is a degree of polarized voting sufficient to sustain

a violation of the Act whenever the results of a district’s

elections would differ depending upon the race of the

voters whose votes were counted.

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ..............................-..-.--0.2-0-

e —— —ꝛ—v—ä—

INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE E

STATEMENT OF THE CASE».

I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN INTER-

II.

PRETING THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AS

THOUGH IT GUARANTEES MINORITIES

“SAFE” DISTRICTS ENABLING THEM TO

CONTROL ELECTION OUTCOMES BY RA

e

A. The Court Improperly Discounted a Proven

Record of Minority Political Access and Elec-

r F......

B. The District Court Erroneously Applied the

Act as though It Guarantees Minorities a

Minimum Share of Political Power, as Op-

posed to Equal Opportunity

C. The Court Applied a Clearly Erroneous In-

terpretation of Illegal Vote Dilution

D. The District Court Erred in Interpreting the

Controversial Senate Judiciary Committee

Report as Though It Were the Statute

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS

CRITICAL RELIANCE ON THE FACTOR OF

“POLARIZED VOTING”, WHICH IS TOTAL-

LY INVALID AS AN INDICATOR OF VOT-

ING RIGHTS ACT VIOLATIONS 000...

(iii)

Page

11

13

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Page

A. Polarized Voting is a Prevalent American

Voting Pattern ................. ih RS 19

B. The Court Applied an Unreasonable Stand-

ard in Finding That a “Substantively Sig-

nificant” Degree of Polarized Voting Existed.. 23

S

e

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964) 12, 25

Collins v. City of Norfolk, 605 F.Supp. 377 (E.D.

8 rr 4, 20, 24

Davidson v. Gardner, 370 F.2d 803 (6th Cir. 1967) 16

Dove v. Moore, 539 F.2d 1152 (8th Cir. 1979)... 7-8

In Re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.

denied, 408 U.S. 930 (19717) 16

General Building Contractors Association, Inc. v.

Pennsylvania, 102 S.Ct. 3141 (198277 2

Hardin v. Kentucky Utility Commission, 390 U.S.

r eee 17

Jones v. City of Lubbock, 727 F.2d 364 (5th Cir.

EE 18, 21

Jordan v. City of Greenwood, 534 F.Supp. 1351

I 19

Kirksey v. City of Jackson, 633 F.2d 659 (5th Cir.

, ERS LAR RE 12-13, 19, 25

Memphis Firefighters v. Stotts, 104 S.Ct. 2576

A 2

National Association of Greeting Card Publishers

v. U.S. Postal Service, 103 S.Ct. 2717 (1983) 17

Porter v. Murray, 69 F.Supp. 400 (D. D.C. 1946) 16

Seamon v. Upham, 536 F.Supp. 931 (E. D. Tex.

1982), af d. sub nom Strake v. Seamon, 105 S.Ct.

r . 7, 11

Terrazas v. Clements, 581 F.Supp. 1329 (D. Tex.

rr 7, 11. 24

United States v. Marengo County Commission, 731

P26 16466 (1ith Cir. 1964) .................................... 18

United Steelworkers v. Weber, 444 U.S. 193

. 2

White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973 10

Constitutional and Statutory Authorities

r 13

, passim

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Legislative History Page

I ee na nee 15

S. Rep. No. 97-417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) 14-18

Mivcellaneous Authorities

Levy and Kramer, The Ethnic Factor: How Amer-

ica’s Minorities Decide Elections (Simon &

rr EOS AGS 22

K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise Sec. 3A.31

r ˙——Ü———. seem 16

Election 84 Handbool:, National Journal (Oct. 29,

＋＋dñ„' .. . 5, 22

Cavanagh and Foster, Election 84, Report #2,

Jesse Jackson’s Campaign: The Primaries and

Caucuses, Table 4 (Joint Center for Political

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1985

No. 83-1968

LACY H. THORNBURG, et al.,

Appellants,

V.

RALPH GIN LES, et al.,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of North Carolina

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

THE WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION

IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS

INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE

The Washington Legal Foundation (WLF or Founda-

tion) is a national nonprofit public interest law center

that engages in litigation and the administrative process

in matters affecting the broad public interest. WLF has

more than 80,000 members located throughout the United

States, including in the State of North Carolina, whose

interests the Foundation represents.

This brief is filed with the written consent of all parties.

WLF focuses its litigation efforts on cases of nation-

wide significance affecting the liberties and values of its

members. The Foundation has been especially active in

cases challenging misgu:jed and overbroad applications

of federal civil rights laws. For example, WLF has filed

amicus briefs with this Court in such cases as Memphis

Firefighters v. Stotts, 104 S.Ct. 2576 (1984); General

Building Contractors Association, Inc. v. Pennsylvania,

102 S.Ct. 3141 (1982); and United Steelworkers v.

Weber, 444 U.S. 193 (1979). In these cases, WLF has

consistently pressed the view that the civil rights laws

provide legal protection for all Americans and cannot be

invoked to justify reverse discrimination or exacting rep-

arations from any class of citizens.

In this case, WLF seeks to protect the interests of its

members against a fundamental distortion of the federal

Voting Rights Act. The decision on appeal here—and

numerous other federal decisions of similar thrust—pur-

ports to guarantee preferred minority groups the right

to demand “safe” election districts allowing them to dic-

tate election outcomes through racial bloc voting for

minority candidates. In so holding, the district court

would mandate a form of proportional representation by

race which Congress expressly rejected in the 1982 VRA

Amendments.

Even more disturbingly, the decision elevates the com-

monplace phenomenon of “polarized voting” to a pivotal

role in determining whether state redistricting plans vio-

late Section 2 of the VRA. After defining that concept

in terms broad enough to apply virtually everywhere,

the district court held that the persistence of polarized

voting may condemn a state or locality to perpetual non-

compliance with the VRA.

The court’s interpretation of Section 2 in this case

thus entails an ominous threat to the voting autonomy

of nonminorities in countless jurisdictions; unless they

eliminate polarized voting (i.e. the common situation

where whites tend to vote differently than blacks in rela-

tion to a candidate’s race or his position on racial issues)

by voting compliantly for any minority candidate who

appears on the ballot, their local election systems can be

invalidated and enjoined by federal courts.

WLF's brief will uniquely focus on the foregoing con-

cerns. In the briefs filed prior to the noting of probable

jurisdiction, neither the North Carolina appellants nor

the United States as amicus curiae challenged the very

validity of polarized voting as an indicator of Section 2

violations. This brief does so. Thus, WLF will present

significant arguments which no existing party to this

case is likely to press.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In the interests of brevity, the amicus curiae adopts

the statement of the case set forth in the brief of the

North Carolina appellants.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1. The district court misapplied Section 2 of the Vot-

ing Rights Act (“VRA”) in striking down the North

access to the political process through demonstrated suc-

cess at the polls by black candidates. It erroneously

assumed that the VRA requires that, whenever the

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taxes, literacy tests, and other obstacles to black political

participation and voting have all been dismantled. Blacks

are running for and capturing elective offices in un-

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But some litigious elements are not content with equal

access to the political process and equal opportunity to

vote for the candidate of one’s choice. Encouraged and

of “voting rights”. It holds that election districts must

be endlessly shaped and reshaped until they at last pro-

duce a sufficiently commanding majority of “minority”

voters. Moreover, it places dispositive significance on

the misleading and misunderstood concept of “polarized

voting” in deciding whether a jurisdiction is in viola-

tion of the VRA. Under the district court’s view, only

those jurisdictions where a majority of white voters con-

Neither the VRA nor its 1982 amendments authorized

the courts to dictate the fashioning of “safe” districts for

minorities, or to condemn jurisdictions fcr violating the

tration and turnout among blacks than among whites in Norfolk,

Virginia.) In the 1982 Congressional elections, blacks turned out

to vote at a higher rate than whites in nine states. See National

Journal, Election "84 Handbook, p. 2208 (Oct. 29, 1983).

VRA merely because the majority of white voters in

those jurisdictions have not generally voted for black

car2idates. Yet that is exactly how the court below has

applied the VRA to the North Carolina communities at

issue in this case.

This Court should emphatically reverse the district

court’s decision and thereby prevent the VRA from being

used to perpetuate racial division at the polls for years

to come.

I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN INTERPRET-

ING THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AS THOUGH IT

GUARANTEES MINORITIES “SAFE” DISTRICTS

ENABLING THEM TO CONTROL ELECTION OUT-

COMES BY RACIAL BLOC VOTING

A. The Court Improperly Discounted a Proven Record

of Minority Political Access and Election Success

In holding that the North Carolina redistricting plans

violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”),

the district court completely lost sight of that legisla-

tion’s proper objective.

The VRA does not compel the creation of electoral

districts or systems which will allow minority bloc vot-

ing to dictate the outcome of elections wherever there

are sufficient raw numbers of minorities from which

to fashion such districts. Rather, the Act requires only

that electoral districts must not be designed to prevent

minorities from enjoying equal access to the political

process and an equal opportunity to elect representatives

of their choice. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973(b).

Under that legitimate standard, the challenged North

Carolina districts easily pass muster. The record con-

tains comprehensive evidence proving that minority vot-

ing has had a telling effect on the political power struc-

ture and that black candidates have enjoyed substantial

success in key election races. J. S. App. 34-37a; 47a.

7

But the District Court did not apply the “equal oppor-

tunity” standard as set forth in the statute. Instead, i

applied a standard that can only be satisfied if the re-

districting plan essentially guarantees that minority

candidates will be elected in proportion to the minori

share of the population. Yet Congress explicitly rejected

such a standard in amending Section 2, 42 U.S.C. Sec.

1973(b). And the courts have since made it clear that

“no group is entitled . . . to have its political clout maxi-

mized.” Seamon v. Upham, 536 F.Supp. 931, 945 (E.D.

Tex. 1982), aff'd sub nom Strake v. Seamon, 105 S.Ct.

63 (1984) [emphasis added].

Various decisions have recognized that there can be

no cognizable violation of Section 2 in a district where

minorities have achieved substantial success in gaining

access to key elective offices and political posts. F. g.,

Dove v. Moore, 539 F.2d 1152 (8th Cir. 1979). A find-

ing of consistently adverse electoral results for minority

candidates is a necessary, though not a sufficient, ele-

ment of a Section 2 claim under the results test. See

Seamon v. Upham, supra; Terrazas v. Clements, 581

F.Supp. 1329 (D. Tex. 1984).

Here the distriets in question are all characterized by

records of proven minority access to influential elective

posts. The election of black representatives to these posi-

tions demonstrates that—contrary to the distric court’s

ruling—a “safe” black district in terms of raw popula-

tion alignments is simply not necessary for blacks to par-

ticipate effectively in the political process or to elect

representatives of their choice, Terrazas v. Clements,

supra, 581 F.Supp. at 1354.

*

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’ of

ham County's registered voters are black. J. S. App. 35a.

Black representation has also been substantial, and often

in excess of what proportional representation would

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islative history of the Act's 1982 amendments (see Point

I. D., infra).

More importantly, the district court interpreted Sec-

tion 2 as though it compels states to devise electoral mech-

anisms which will guarantee the election of minority can-

didates by facilitating minority bloc voting. That is, if

it is at all possible to fashion a district with enough

blacks to always guarantee the election of the “black”

candidate by their “raw numbers alone”, then the court

below would compel the state to do so.

That view of the VRA is invalid and unsound. As re-

cently stated by the court in Terrazas v. Clements, su-

pra, 581 F.Supp. at 1359-60:

In the absence of a denial of access, or discrimina-

tory intent, the failure to consolidate the [minority]

population may constitute a less advantageous polit-

ical result, but not an unlawful result. [emphasis

added].

The court beiow invalidated the North Carolina re-

districting plans merely because they failed to provide a

perfect arrangement for preemptive racial voting by mi-

norities. That was reversible error, because the VRA

simply does not require the states to “maximize the politi-

cal clout” of any racial, religious, or ethnic group. Sea-

mon v. Upham, supra, 536 F.Supp. at 945. All that the

Act requires is equal access to the political process—and

the creation of “safe” minority districts is simply not a

prerequisite to equal access. Terrazas v. Clements, supra,

581 F.Supp. at 1354.

C. The Court Applied a Clearly Erroneous Interpreta-

tion of Illegal Vote Dilution

The overinclusive concept of illegal vote dilution relied

on by the district court completely distorts the principle

of equal political access which underlies the Voting Rights

Act. Equal opportunity for minorities to participate in

the elective process does not—cannot—include any re-

12

quirement that non-minorities must subordinate or com-

promise their constitutional right to vote for whomever

they please, and for whatever reason. Kirksey v. City of

Jackson, 633 F.2d 659, 662 (5th Cir. 1981); Anderson

v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964).

Yet the district court tied its holding in this case to

the following extraordinary interpretation of vote dilu-

tion under the VRA:

[T]he demonstrable unwillingness of substantial

numbers of the racial majority to vote for any mi-

nority race candidate or any candidate identified

with minority race interests is the linchpin of vote

dilution by districting. [J.S. App. 14a-15a.]

The court made its position still clearer when, after

acknowledging that blacks have made substantial progress

in gaining access to political power in the North Caro-

lina districts, it emphasized that this progress

. . . has not proceeded to the point of overcoming

still entrenched racial vote polarization, and indeed

has apparently done little to diminish the level of

that single most powerful factor in causing racial

vote dilution. IId. at 47a.]

Thus, the district court repeatedly emphasized its view

that the most critical component of the violations in this

case—and the “single most powerful factor” in finding a

vote dilutior violation—was the failure (or “unwilling-

ness”) of white citizens to vote in essentially the same

way as black citizens. When one reads between the lines

of the foregoing pronouncements, it is evident that the

court is issuing a none-too-subtle warning to North Caro-

lina’s white voters. The warning is that unless they start

to vote for minority candidates (regardless of the candi-

date’s individual merit or qualities) in “substantial num-

bers“, the court will continue to hold that there is “racial

vote dilution” in their districts. And as long as the court

holds that view, it will continue to invalidate and enjoin

the district’s elections.

13

This constitutes a profound distortion of the true goals

and principles of the Voting Rights Act. The district

court blithely dismissed hard evidence that blacks do en-

joy equal access to the political/elective processes (e.g.,

40% representation on House delegation of district com-

posed of only 22% black voters) and focused instead on

the allegedly culpable behavior of white voters in failing

to alter their voting preferences in favor of minority

candidates.

This crabbed and punitive approach to voting rights

law abandons the basic element that Section 2 of the

VRA can only be violated by the discriminatory prac-

tices and policies of governments; Section 2 cannot be

violated by citizens in tke exercise of their absolute First

Amendment right to vote for the candidate they prefer,

for whatever reason. Kirksey, supra, 663 F.2d at 662.

The district court’s opinion erred in failing to grasp this

distinction.

D. The District Court Erred in Interpreting the Con-

troversial Senate Judiciary Committee Report as

Though It Were the Statute

The district court was able to reach its erroneous con-

clusions only by misinterpreting Section 2 of the Act.

Its misinterpretation was hardly surprising, however, be-

cause the court never even attempted to interpret the

actual language of the statute itself. Instead, it relied

almost exclusively upon selected portions of a Senate Com-

The VRA itself, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1971(b), prohibits any form of

intimidation or coercion intended to interfere with any person’s

right “to vote as he may choose.” [emphasis added] But the

court’s admonition that the racial majority’s “entrenched” failure

to vote for minority candic ates may result in a violation of Section 2

is itself a form of coercion or intimidation intended to alter white

voting behavior. It is not farfetched to argue that the court’s

ominous warnings could themselves violate the VRA’s prohibition

of intimidation or coercion, were it not for judicial immunity.

14

mittee Report.“ That report reflected the views of only

a modest majority of the Senate Judiciary Committee,

whereas the enacted statute reflected a complex compro-

mise between a wide variety of factions in the full Sen-

ate and the full House, as well as the views of the

President.

The district court’s slavish adherence to the one-sided

observations of the Senate Committee Report is totally

unjustifiable under black letter rules of statutory inter-

pretation—but it is understandable in one significant

respect.

Only by treating the Committee Report as though it

were the definitive authority on amended Section 2 could

the court possibly justify its rigid application of the Re-

port’s so-called “nine factors” test (including “polarized”

voting) as the definitive standard for determining viola-

tions of Section 2. See S.Rep. at 28-29. And only by

placing such exaggerated reliance on the Committee Re-

port’s “nine factors” could the court find a violation in

the North Carolina districts at issue. For the actual stat-

utory language of Section 2 nowhere mentions such open-

ended factors as “polarized voting”, minority employment

conditions, or political “responsiveness”—and the 1982

amendments would never have passed the full Senate or

been signed by the President had such controversial and

divisive factors been explicitly incorporated in the statute.

The ultimate language of the 1982 amendments to Sec-

tion 2 was indeed a compromise of conflicting viewpoints.

But the Senate Judiciary Committee Report does not even

begin to reflect the diverse elements of that multi-partite

8. Rep. No. 97-417, Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee on

S. 1992, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., ordered to be printed May 25, 1982

(hereafter cited as “S.Rep.”). Senators Thurmond, Hatch, Laxalt,

Dole, Grassley East, and Denton all found it necessary to append

“additional”, “supplemental”, or dissenting views to the Committee

Report.

15

compromise. Instead, it reflects only the one-sided aspira-

tions of a faction of Judiciary Committee Senators who

favored the most expansive interpretation of Section 2

they could mulgate without killing the legislation

altogether.

The earlier House-passed bill (H.R. 3112), which was

subsequently introduced verbatim in the Senate by Ken-

nedy and Mathias, had raised serious concerns that it

might ultimately require proportional representation of

minorities among elected officials. To eliminate these

concerns, Senator Dole introduced the proviso which ex-

plicitly disclaims that the section creates any right to

proportional representation.

At the Senate mark-up of the bill, Senator Dole articu-

lated the essence of the compromise which finally resulted

(S. Rep. at 223):

[TIhat is the thrust of our compromise: equal ac-

cess, whether it is open; equal comma r.

process, not whether they have achieved propertional

election results.

Only when President Reagan signaled that the Dole

substitute was acceptable to him (i.e., that he would not

veto the bill if passed) did the divergent forces and fac-

tions in the House and Senate come togethe: act

the legislation. Since the House simply adopted the Sen-

ate-passed Dole substitute without change, there was no

need for a Conference Committee—and there was no

Conference Committee Report reflecting the understand-

ing and intent of both Houses in passing the bill.

Moreover, there is no plausible basis for viewing the

Senate Judiciary Committee Report—which was intensely

disputed even within that one committee of one House—

as though it reflected the consensus understanding and

intent of both Houses, as well as that of the President.

It simply did not. It reflected only the subjective views

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obscures the original purposes of the Act. Since the va-

lidity of the district court’s decision depends on the con-

trolling legal force of the Committee Report’s “nine fac-

RELIANCE ON THE FACTOR OF “PUL. “ZED

VOTING”, WHICH IS TOTALLY INVALID Abd “N

INDICATOR OF VOTING RIGHTS ACT VIOLA-

States v. Marengo County Commission, 731 F.2d

1546, 1567 (11th Cir. 1984); Jones v. City of Lubbock,

727 F.2d 364, 380-81 (5th Cir. 1984). In the Marengo

County case, for example, the court stated chat

12 is

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1351, 1366 (D. Miss. 1982).

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vote wich discriminatory motives, those motives cannot

be imputed to the State. Kirksey v. City of Jackson,

supra, 663 F.2d at 662; Jordan v. City of Greenwood,

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11

marily because its citizens manifest the same cross-racial

voting discrepancies that characterize voters nationwide.

Polarized voting means only that voters of different

races, as groups, tend to vote differently from one an-

other in relation to the race of the candidates (or in re-

lation to the candidate’s id tification with minority is-

sues). J.S. App. 38a-39a n.29; Collins v. City of Nor-

folk, supra, 605 F.Supp. at 377. In this case, the dis-

trict court adopted the view that there is a “substan-

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their freedom of choice in order to appease the court’s

threats to condemn their election system,, it violates the

First Amendment-based guarantee of absolute freedom

to vote as one chooses. Kirksey v. City of Jackson, supra,

633 F.2d at 662; Anderson v. Martin, supra, 375 US.

at 402.

Under the district court’s approach to polarized voting,

there would be few, if any, districts in the whole United

States which could pass muster under Section 2.

Consistent with the liberal view of the Senate Com-

mittee Report, the district court proceeded as though a

finding of polarized voting plus one other of the “nine

factors” would be enough to sustain a finding that See-

tion 2 had been violated. J.S. App. 14a-15a and n. 13.

Given that the nine factors are hopelessly broad and

amorphous—e.g., “any history of official discrimination”

(Factor I - locale can easily be found guilty of at

least several of them. And few American jurisdictions

would not also be “guilty” of polarized voting under the

district court’s standards. The 1984 Democratic Presi-

dential Primary results (not to mention the 1984 Presi-

dential election itself) conclusively demonstrate that

extreme polarized voting is manifest throughout the

United States. See Appendix A.

Thus, the approach taken by the district court in this

case simply proves too much. Congress cannot have in-

tended to enact a standard for Section 2 compliance

which can only be met with certainty by homogenovs

jurisdictions that do not have to cope with the political

tensions of racial diversity. The district court’s inter-

pretation of the VRA would condemn the election sys-

In fact, the court’s own opinion shows that this phenomenon

ma have already occurred in North Carolina. J.S. App. 37A n.27.

The notable success of black candidates in the 1982 election was

ascri bed to white support which was reputedly based on fear that

the defeat of black candidates would adversely affect the VRA

tems of any jurisdiction where, for instance, conservative

non-minority voters “refuse” to vote for liberal or rad-

ical candidates who happen to be black; and where can-

didates have the audacity to urge reduced welfare spend-

ing or to oppose forced busing (which the court would

undoubtedly condemn as “overt or subtle racial appeals”

under Factor 6 of the Senate Report, J. S. App. 13a).

The approach adopted by the court below does not

advance valid and lawful principles of voting rights for

minorities; instead, it prescribes a form of judicial

tyranny over the political and voting freedoms of mem-

bers of the racial or ethnic majority. This Court should

emphatically and unambiguously reject the district

court’s decision as a profound distortion of the Voting

Rights Act and an affront to the Constitution.

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the decision of the dis-

trict court should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

DANIEL J. POPEO

Grorce C. SMITH *

WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION

1705 N Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 857-0240

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

Washington Legal Foundation

* Counsel of Record

July 5, 1985

|

8888888388338

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re

Whites

8 8888838238

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*

8

*

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Jackson Mondale of sample Glenn Hart Jackson Mondale

N D D f ADAH Ow HN

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Hart

APPENDIX A

Table 4. 1984 Democratic presidential primary voting by race.

Blacks