Respondents Brief — Pattern Makers v. NLRB

FILED

oc 1

No. 83-1894 1

——

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1984

O0

PATTERN MAKERS’ LEAGUE OF NORTH AMERICA,

AFL-CIO, AND ITS ROCKFORD AND

BELOIT ASSOCIATIONS,

Petitioners,

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

and

ROCKFORD-BELOIT PATTERN JOBBERS

ASSOCIATION,

Respondents.

—¼

—

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

—-- —-o

BRIEF FOR ROCKFORD.BELOIT PATTERN

JOBBERS ASSOCIATION--A RESPONDENT

— —l(

Se

Epwarp J. Fany

Suite 202

303 North Main Street

Rockford, Illinois 61101

(Counsel of Record for Respondent,

Rockford-Beloit Pattern Jobbers

Association)

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 835-7427 Ext 333

> |

QUESTION PRESENTED

Are employees unlawfully restrained in the exercise

of their statutory right to refrain from conceried activity

by a union constitutional provision which denies the em-

ployees the freedom to resign from union membership dur-

ing a strike or when a strike is imminent and thus escape

the unicou rule, enforceable by court collectible fines, which

prohibits the return of members to work during a strike?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pages

! ͤ 6A-fLl

Summary of Argument 0 2

BERET eee

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

— 8 No. 405, 1. AM. vs. NLRB, 412 US.

84 (1973) —— ů — ů —«—

International Association of Machimsts Local Lodge

No. 1414 (Neufeld Porsche-Audi), 270 NLRB

No. 209 (June 22, 1984) (Slip Op.) 5, 16

Mosher Steel Co. vs. NLRB, 568 F2d 436, 442 (5th

Cir. 1978) 2,6

NLRB vs. Allis-Chalmers 1 om 388 U.S. 175

(1967) . 4,5, 14

NLRB ws. Textile Workers Local 1029, Granite

State Joint Board, 409 U.S. 213 (1972) 4. 5. 7, 13,

14, 15, 16

Pattern Makers’ League et al vs. NLRB, 724 F2d

57 (7th Cir. 1983) (Pet. for Cert. App. la)... 16

Scofield vs. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969) 4. 5. 14

Sraru rwe

Labor Management Relations Act of 1947

29 USC 141 et seq.

29 USC 141(b) 2,6

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Pages

National Labor Relations Act, as amended,

29 USC 151 et seq.

See. 7 (29 USC 157) 2 3, 7, 10, 13, 17

Sec. 8(a) (3) (29 USC 158(a) (3) — 2,7,9,14

Sec. 8(b) (1) (A) (29 USC 158(b) (1) (A)) — passim

Sec. 8(b) (2) (29 USC 158(b) (2) 914

H. R. Bill No. 3020, Soth Congress, Ist Session

Legislative History 49-50, 176

EEE ..... —

Sec. 8(c) (4) 3 11

MISCELLANEOUS:

National Labor Relations Board Legislative History

of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947

(G.P.0. 1948)

Leg. Hist. pp. 226, 239 — — a

Leg. Hist. pp. 669, 733

93 Cong. Ree. pp. 3572, 3612 (19477 11

Leg. Hist. pp. 1129, 1139

93 Cong. Rec. pp. 4387, 4398 (1947) 12

Leg. Hist. p. 1207 :

93 Cong. Ree. p. 4436 10

Leg. Hist. pp. 1622-1623

93 Cong. Rec. pp. 7000, 7001 lf * 12

Leg. Hist. p. 1623

93 Cong. Rec. p. 6859 10

H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Congress Ist Session

(1947) pp. 1, 7, 42-44, Leg. Hist. 505, 511, 546-548... 12

No. 83-1894

fy

*

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1984

1

—

PATTERN MAKERS’ LEAGUE OF NORTH AMERICA,

AFL-CIO, AND ITS ROCKFORD AND

BELOIT ASSOCIATIONS,

Petitioners,

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

and

ROCKFORD-BELOIT PATTERN JOBBERS

ASSOCIATION,

Respondents.

oO

-

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

r=

AF

BRIEF FOR ROCKFORD-BELOIT PATTERN

JOBBERS ASSOCIATION—A RESPONDENT

1

9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The union argues that the proviso of Section 8(b) (1)

(A) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) author-

izes the union to invalidate an employee’s resignation from

membership and therefore prevent his escape from fines

1

2

imposed to restrain the employee from crossing a picket

line. The union position is not supportable.

1. The NLRA, as amended by the Labor-Management

Relations Act, was enacted to protect the right of individ-

ual employees in their relations with both unions and em-

ployers. This is clearly stated in the Congressional Decla-

ration of Purpose and Policy, 29 USC 141(b), and recog-

nized by the courts. Mosher Steel Co. vs. NLRB, 568 F2d

436, 442 (5th Cir. 1978).

2. Congress has firmly imbedded into the NLRA, as a

national policy, the right of the individual employee to re-

sign from union membership. Section 7 NLRA, 29 USC

157 clearly states that employees have the right to refrain

from any or all union activities. This right is recognized

by the courts. Congress made only one exception: by

union-management agreement an employee can be required

to pay dues and an initiation fee. Section 7, Section 8(a)

(3) NLRA. There are no other exceptions. There are no

limitations.

The union’s reliance on the proviso of Section 8(b) (1)

(A) is not well placed. The proviso permits the union to

fix standards for admission to the union and fix require-

ments which must be met (payment of dues, attendance at

meetings, ete.) to retain membership. Failure to meet

such requirements can result in expulsion. Nowhere does

the Act empower a union to force an employee to continue

membership by refusing to honor a resignation at any time.

The use of the words “acquisition or retention” in

Section 8(b) (1) (A) and the words ‘‘acquiring or retain-

ing membership” in Sections 7 and 8(a) (3) demonstrate

that Section 8(b) (1) (A) does not authorize the union to

3

force an employee into involuntary membership subject to

the union’s discipline.

The accepted meaning of the word “retain” does not

support the union’s position.

Neither is there any support for the union’s position

to be found in the Legislative History. Senator Taft ex-

plained that “the right to refrain from any or all such ac-

tivities” was added to Section 7 to make Section 8(b) (1)

apply to the coercive act of unions against employees who

did not wish to join or did not wish to participate in a

strike or picket line. Later Senator Taft explained ‘‘all

it would do would be to outlaw such restraint and coercion

as would prevent people from going to work if they wished

to go to work.” Congressman Hoffman stated that Section

7(a) of the House Bill meant that employees would have

the right to join or not join, to be bound by or not be

bound by, union rules.

Although the House Bill in 1947 was more detailed,

the House Conferees accepted the Senate Bill because it

was “broader in its scope” of outlawing union unfair labor

practices. The Conferees’ Report explained that while

they accepted the broader language in Section 8(b) (1),

they insisted upon the explicit langyage of Section 7 guar-

anteeing the right to refrain from any and all union ac-

tivity.

Nowhere in the Legislative History is there support

for the union position.

3. The union’s common law theory must give way to

the provisions of the governing statute.

The union’s “solidarity” theory has already been dis-

posed of by this Court.

4+ The decision of the Seventh Circuit in this case is

consistent with the decisions of this Court. In Allis-Chal-

mers, 388 U.S. 175 (1967), this Court held that a union

could discipline a full member and pointed out the distine-

tion between a full member” and a “financial core” mem-

ber. In Scofield, 397 U.S. 423 (1969), this Court held that

a union rule could be enforced only if it “* * * impairs no

policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws and is rea-

sonably enforced against members who are free to leave

the union and escape the rule.” In Granite State, 409 US.

213 (1972), this Court stated [When there is a lawful

dissolution of a union-member relation, the union has no

more control over the former member than it has over the

man in the street”. In Booster Lodge, 412 U.S. 84 (1973),

this Court said: [Wie are no more disposed to find an

implied post-resignation commitment from the strike-

breaking proscription in the union’s constitution here than

we were to find it from the employees’ participation in the

strike vote and the ratification of penalties in Granite

State.”

The Court left open the question of the extent to

which contractual restriction on a member's right to re-

sign may be limited by the Act. Booster Lodge, Id.

The Seventh Cireuit faced that issue in this case and

reasoning from this Court’s decisions held that any union

rule which denies its members the opportunity to resign

during a strike, or when one is imminent, is invalid.

More recently the National Labor Relations Board,

after reviewing the above decisions, concluded that any

restriction placed by a union on its members’ right to re-

5

sign are unlawful. Neufeld Porsche-Audi, 270 NLRB No.

209, June 22, 1984, 116 LRRM 1257.

— *

~~

It is well established that a union may impose a court

collectible fine upon a full member who violates a valid in-

ternal rule of the organization. NLRB vs. All s-Chaimers

Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967); Scofield vs. NLRB, 394 US.

423 (1969). It is equally well established that a union may

not impose a court co'lectible fine upon an employee who

is not a member of the organization including an employee

who has resigned from that membership to escape the con-

sequences of the internal union rule. NLRB vs. Textile

Workers Local 1029, Granite State, 409 U.S. 213 (1972);

Booster Lodge No. 405, M. vs. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84

(1973).

The union now argues that the proviso of Section 8

(b) (1) (A) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),

29 USC 158(b) (1) (A) authorizes the union to prohibit the

resignation of an employee from membership during, or

immediately before, a strike so that the employee is not

free to escape the union rule prohibiting the crossing of a

picket line but must remain subject to the restraint and

coercion of a court enforceable fine for violating the union

rule. The union argument would lead to the conclusion

that under the proviso of Section 8(b) (1) (A) NLRA, a

union may by rule require a member to remain a member

for life. Indeed the union appears to so argue at pages

35-38 of the Brief for Petitioners. (‘‘ Pet. Br.“)

The union’s position is not supportable.

1. The protection of the rights of individual employees

is an express purpose of Congress.

The NLRA was designed by Congress, in 1935, to pro-

tect the individual employee from the then unequal power

of employers. In 1947 Congress adopted the Labor-Man-

agement Relations Act to amend the NLRA to protect in-

dividual employees from the growing excesses of labor

unions. Congress clearly expressed its policy in its decla-

ration of purpose and policy of the Labor-Management Re-

lations Act. 29 USC 141(b) second paragraph:

It is the purpose and policy of this Chapter, in order

to promote the full flow of commerce, to prescribe the

legitimate rights of both employees and employers in

their relations affecting commerce, * * * to protect the

rights of individual employees in their relations with

labor orgamzations whose activities affect commerce,

to define and proscribe practices on the part of labor

and management which affect commerce and are in-

imical to the general welfare, * * *. (Emphasis added)

Nowhere did Congress state a purpose for the benefit

of labor unions. This case, therefore, must be judged in

the light of the Congressional purpose “to protect the

rights of individual employees in their relations with labor

organizations”. Labor Management Relations Act, 29

USC 141(b).

In Mosher Steel Co. vs. NLRB, 568 F2d 436, 442 (5th

Cir. 1978) the Court expressed the will of Congress:

(5) It is indisputable that the thrust of the NLRA is

not the protection of the union, not the protection of

the employer, but rather the protection of the em-

ployee. Thus, a decision that would operate to the dis-

— i to be avoid-

— =

7

2. The right to resign from union membership is a Con-

gressional policy firmly imbedded in the NLRA.

Section 7 of NLRA, 29 USC 157 provides:

Employees shall have the right to self-organization,

to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain

cellectively through representatives of their own

choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities

for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mu-

tual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to

refrain from any or all of such activities except to the

extent that such right may be affected by an agree-

ment requiring membership in a labor organization

as a condition of employment as authorized in Section

158(a) (3) of this Title. (Emphasis added)

Section 7 of NLRA is the heart of the Act. Standing

alone it clearly fixes the right of each individual employee

to be a union member or to refrain from being a union

member. This Court has recognized this right to resign

from membership. NLRB vs. Textile Workers Local 1029,

Granite State, 409 U.S. 213 (1972); Booster Lodge No. 405,

LAM. vs. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84 (1973).

The only exception is that union membership may be

required as a condition of employment by agreement be-

tween employer and union—and this exception does not

require “full membership” but only the payment of uni-

formly levied initiation fees and dues during the term of

the union-employer agreement. Section 8(a) (3) NLRA,

29 USC 158(a) (3). If Congress had intended to give the

union authority to require continued union membership it

would have stated such an additiona exception in Section

7. There is no exception. There is no limitation as to

time.

The union, however, argues that the Section 8(b) (1)

(A) proviso grants to the union the authority to require

continued membership so that once an individual employee

becomes a member, he may not resign that membership

and thus free himself from the discipline of the union. The

words of the proviso clearly do not support the union’s

position.

Section 8(b) (1) (A) NLRB, 29 USC 158(b) (1) (A)

provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a

labor organization or its agents:

(1) To restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exer-

cise of the rights guaranteed in Section 157 of this

title: provided That this paragraph shall not impair

the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own

rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of

membership therein; * * *.

The proviso obviously permits a union to establish

rules stating the conditions which must be met by an em-

ployee to acquire membership in the union. Typical of

such conditions may be: payment of initiation fee; sign-

ing an application; progressing to journeyman status

through an apprenticeship; passing a skill test (in certain

skill trades); being eighteen (18) years of age or older;

being licensed in a certain trade such as barber, truck

driver, electrician, plumber, ete.

The proviso also obviously permits a union to estab-

lish rules which the member must meet if he wishes to re-

tain his membership. Typical of such conditions may be:

prompt payment of dues; attend regular membership

meetings; display a union membership identification dur-

ing working hours; maintain licenses required by law;

honor a picket line; ete. In other words the member must

continue to meet the requirements of the internal rules

— —

—

if he wishes to retain his membership. If he fails to meet

the union requirements, he may be unable to retain his

membership—he may be expelled.

The proviso certainly does not authorize a union to

establish a rule which forces a member to remain a mem-

ber forever subject to the discipline of the union. Neither

may it require him to remain a member during a particu-

lar period of time so that he will be subject to the dis-

cipline of the union.

Congress used the identical words in two (2) other

subsections of Section 8 of the Act. Section 8(a) (3) per-

mits the employer and the union to make an agreement

which requires union membership as a condition of em-

ployment Provide further, That no employer shall jus-

tify any discrimina against an employee for non-mem-

bership in a labor organization * * * (B) if he has rea-

sonable grounds for believing that membership was denied

or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the

employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation

fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or re-

taining membership.” (Emphasis added) Section 8(b)

(2), 29 USC 158(b) (2) makes it an unfair labor practice

for a union ‘‘to cause or attempt to cause an employer to

discriminate against an employee in violation of subsee-

tion (a) (3) of this Section or to discriminate against an

employee with respect to whom membership in such an or-

ganization has been denied or terminated on some ground

other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and in-

itiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquir-

ing or retaining membership.” (Emphasis added) Con-

gress used the word “retained” and ‘‘retaining” to mean

10

“to keep” in each of the three (3) paragraphs. There is

no room to give any other meaning to the word.

The universally accepted meaning of the word “re-

tain” is “to keep; to hold in possession”. Clearly Con-

gress used the word in its usual meaning. The union can

establish rules which the member must meet in order to

acquire and to retain—keep—his membership, not rules

which require him to remain a member against his wishes

and consequently subject to the discipline of the union.

Legislative History does not support the union’s posi-

tion. As a matter of fact, there is very little reference to

the language here under consideration, but it does not sup-

port the union’s position. The legislative history of See-

tion 7 of the Act (29 USC 157) supports the contention of

this Respondent. According to Senator Taft the phrase

„the right to refrain from any or all such activities” was

added to Section 7 of the Senate Bill to make the prohibi-

tion contained in Section 8(b) (1), 29 USC 158(b) (1)

apply to coercive acts of unions »gainst employees who did

not wish to join or did not wish to participate in a strike

or picket line. 93 Congressional Record 6859, II Legisla-

tive History 1623. After the proviso had been added to

8(b) (1) (A), Senator Taft also said that it ‘‘would not

outlaw anybody striking who wanted to strike. * * * All it

would do would be to outlaw such restraint and coercion

as would prevent people from going to work if they wished

to go to work”. 93 Congressional Record 4436, II Legis-

lative History 1207.

Obviously a union member wishing to return to work

would be subject to the restraint and coercion of a union

disciplinary rule prohibiting his return to work if at the

11

same time he was not free to resign that membership to

escape the restraint and coercion of the disciplinary rule.

The union’s attempt to place some significance to the

fact that Section 8(b) (1) and (e) (4) of the House Bill

was omitted from the Conference Bill is not supportive of

the union’s position. When HR 3020 came to the floor of

the House, Congressman Hoffman said that the clear mean-

ing of Section 7(a) language: “employees * * * shall also

have the right to refrain from any or all such activities”

meant that the employee would “have the right to join

or not join, to be bound by or not be bound by, union

rules”. 93 Congressional Record 3572, 3612 (1947). Leg-

islative History 669, 733. When HR 3020 passed the

House, it also contained Section 8(b) (1) and Ste) (4).

Section 8(b) (1) made it an unfair labor practice “* * * to

compel or seek to compel any individual to become or re-

main a member of any labor organization”. Section 8(c)

(4) made it an unfair labor practice for a union “(4) to

deny to any member the right to resign from the organi-

zation at any time”. Legislative History 51-53, 178-180.

The Senate Bill, Section 8(b) (1) used broader terms mak-

ing it an unfair labor practice ‘‘to restrain or coerce (A)

employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in

Section 7”. Legislative History 226, 239. The conferees

adopted the Senate Bill almost entirely. The House Con-

forces, however, considered their more detailed gun ante

of the right to resign from membership to be contained

in the broader Senate language, and therefore afforded

even greater protection. ‘‘From the above description of

the House Bill and the Senate amendment dealing with

unfair labor practices on the part of labor organizations

and their agents, it is apparent that the Senate amend-

12

ment was broader in its scope than the corresponding

provisions of the House Bill”. Hu Conference Report No.

510, 80th Congress, First Section, 1, 7, 42-44 (1947). Leg-

islative History 505, 511, 546-548. (Emphasis added). But

the House did not just rely on this Conference Report.

While it accepted the broader language of 8(b) (I), it in-

sisted upon explicit language in Section 7 guaranteeing

the right to refrain from any or all union activity. Sena-

tor Taft explained that the reason for the right to refrain

coercive acts of unions against employees

who did not wish to join or did not care to participate

in a strike or a picket line. (Emphasis added) 93 Con-

gressional Record 7000-7001 (June 12, 1947) Legisla-

tive History 1622-1623.

Senator Holland, in proposing the proviso language,

described it as having to do with the “admission or the

expulsion of members”. (Emphasis added) 93 Congres-

sional Record 4387, 4398, Apri! 30, 1947, Legislative His-

tory 1129, 1139. In other words the union could adopt in-

ternal rules which a member must meet for retention of

his membership and if he failed to comply with those rules

he could be expelled from membership. It has nothing

whatsoever to do with the right to refrain from or resign

from ution membership.

13

Nowhere in the Legislative History is there any state-

ment to support the union position that under the proviso

of Section 8(b) (1) (A) it can prohibit an individual em-

ployee from resigning from full membership at any time.

3. The union’s common law and solidarity theories are

not supportable.

The union’s brief, pages 36-38, appears to abandon its

reliance on the proviso of Section 8(b) (1) (A) and to

theorize that the union has a common law right to adopt

and enforce “League Law 13” prohibiting the resignation

or withdrawal of a member during a strike or when one is

imminent. The union overlooks or ignores the fact that

the matter is governed by statute: the National Labor Re-

lations Act, as amended. Section 7 of the Act (Section 29

Sc 157) clearly provides: “Employees shall have the

right to * * * join, or assist labor organizations, * * *, and

shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such

activities except to the extent that such right may be af-

fected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor

organization as a condition of employment as authorized

in Section 8(a) (3)”. Section 7 clearly governs the right

to join and to resign from membership.

The bottom line of the union’s Brief (page 38) and

the ente argument of the Amicus Curiae Brief of Team-

sters For a Democratic Union is based upon the theories

of mutual reliance and solidarity. Both theories have been

disposed of by this Court.

This Court gave “little weight” to the mutual reliance

theory in NLRB vs. Textile Workers, Granite State, 409

U.S. at 217.

14

In Granite State, Id. at 218, this Court stated that em-

ployees Section 7 rights are not lost by a union’s plea

for solidarity or by its pressures for conformity and sub-

mission to its regime”. Burger, C.J. concurring, adds:

‘‘T }he institutional needs of the union, important though

they are, do not outweigh the rights and the needs of the

individual”.

4. The decision of the Seventh Circuit is consistent with

and supported by the decisions of this Court.

In NLRB vs. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175

(1967) this Court held that the union did not violate See-

tion 8(b) (1) (A) of NLRA when it levied and collected

by court action fines against full members of the union who

returned to work during a strike. In so doing the court

pointed out that a union shop agreement under Section 8

(a) (3) and 8(b) (2) could require not full membership but

only the tender of uniformly required initiation fees and

dues. See also note 37. The court left open the question

of whether or not the union could have imposed fines upon

“financial core” employees.

In Scofield vs. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969) this Court

held that a union rule imposing a ceiling on production

for which its members would accept piece work pay is

valid and that enforcement by fines did not violate Sec-

tion 8(b) (1) (A). In Scofield, Id. at 430, the Court held

that Section 8(b) (1) “leaves a union free to enforce a

properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union

interest, impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the

labor laws, and is reasonably enforced against members

who are free to leave the'union and escape the rule.” (Em-

phasis added) To this the Court added, at 435: “If a

15

member chooses not to engage in this concerted activity

and is unable to prevail on the members to change the

rule, then he may leave the union and obtain whatever

benefits in job advancement and extra pay may result from

the extra work * * *”. (Emphasis added)

In NLRB vs. Textile Workers Local 1029, Granite State

Joint Board, 409 U.S. 213 (1972) this Court held that the

union had violated Section 8(b) (1) (A) when it fined

thirty-one (31) employees who, after participating in the

strike vote and the resolution that fines be levied against

anyone crossing the picket line, resigned their member-

ship and returned to work. The Court stated: “|[Wlhen

there is a lawful dissolution of a union-member relation,

the union has no more control over the former member

than it has over the man n the street”. Granite State, Id.

(Emphasis added) The concurring opinion of Chief Jus-

tice Burger added: ‘‘I join the Court’s opinion because

for me the institutional needs of the union, important

though they are, do not outweigh the rights and the needs

of the individual. * * * Where the individua! employee

has freely chosen to exercise his legal right to abandon

the privileges of union membership, it is not for us to im-

pose the obligations of continued membership. Granite

State, Id. 218. (Emphasis added)

The Court outlined some events which may influence

a member’s decision and observed that the union had no

rule specifically permitting or denying resignations from

membership. Granite State, Id. 217-218.

In Booster Lodge No. 405, I. A. M. vs. NLRB, 412 US.

84 (1973) this Court found that the union violated See-

tion 8(b) (1) (A) when it fined employees who resigned

16

from membership and returned to work during a strike,

even though the union’s constitution expressly prohibited

members from returning to work during a strike. There

was no constitutional provision permitting or forbidding

such resignation. But the Court said ‘‘|WJe are no more

disposed to find an implied post-resignation commitment

from the strike breaking proscription in the union’s con-

stitution here than we were to find it from the employ-

ees’ participation in the strike vote and ratification of

penalties in Granite State”. Booster Lodge, Id. 89. “And

here, as there (Granite State) we leave open the question

of the extent to which contractual restriction on a mem-

ber’s right to resign may be limited by the Act. Booster

Lodge, Id. 88.

The Court below was confronted with that question,

and the opening paragraph of its decision reads:

The issue squarely confronting us is whether a union

in its constitution may deny its members the opportu-

nity to resign from the union during a strike or when

a strike is imminent. The United States Supreme

Court twice has acknowledged, but has not been re-

quired to decide, this issue. Booster Lodge No. 405

vs. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84, 88-90 (1973); NLRB vs. Gran-

ite State Joint Board, Textile Workers Union, Lodge

1029, 409 U.S. 213, 217 (1972). We find such a rule

invalid.

In a recent decision the National Labor Relations

Board reviewed the above decisions at length and con-

cluded that any restrictions placed by a union on its mem-

bers’ right to resign are unlawful. Machinists, Local Lodge

1414, Neufeld Porsche-Audi, 270 NLRB No. 209, June 22,

1984, 116 LRRM 1257.

17

CONCLUSION

We submit that the union’s League Law 13 (which

prohibits the resignation of a member during a strike or

when a strike appears imminent) impairs fundamental pol-

icies imbedded in the National Labor Relations Act by

Congress; is contrary to the express language and con-

sistent interpretation of Section 7, NLRA;; illegally denies

its members the freedom to leave the union and escape its

discipline; and violates Section 8(b) (1) (A).

For the foregoing reasons we respectfully urge that

the judgment below be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

Epwarp J. Fan

Suite 202

303 North Main Street

Rockford, Illinois 61101

(815) 962-5534

Counsel of Record for Rockford-

Beloit Pattern Jobbers Associa-

tion, a Respondent