Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Pattern Makers v. NLRB

Supreme Court brief1985

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

PATTERN MAKERS’ LEAGUE OF NORTH America, AFL-CIO,

AND ITs ROCKFORD AND BELOIT ASSOCIATIONS,

* Petitioners,

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

and

ROCKFORD-BELOIT PATTERN JOBBERS ASSOCIATION,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM B. PEER

1899 L Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

MarsHaA S. BERZON

MICHAEL RUBIN

177 Post Street, Suite 600

San Francisco, Ca. 94108

Of Counsel: LAURENCE GOLD

Gporce KAUFMANN (Counsel of Record)

2101 L Street, N.W. 815 16th Street, N.W.

(202) 637-5390

Wiso . Eres Printine Co.. Inc. . 769-0096 - WaswincTon. D.C. 20001

QUESTION PRESENTED

Is the National Labor Relations Board granted the au-

thority by the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,

to invalidate provisions in union constitutions and bylaws

requiring union members to retain their membership

during a strike or lockout or at a time when a strike or

lockout appears imminent?

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

EE. 1

ee 2

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED DB — 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 3

.. 3

B. The Proceedings in the LKR 4

C. The Court of Appeals Proceedings 8 7

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .................. 8

I. THE DECISION BELOW IS IN SQUARE CON-

FLICT WITH THE DECISION OF THE

NINTH CIRCUIT IN MACHINISTS LOCAL

1327 v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1212 (1984) 8

Il. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IS IN-

CONSISTENT WITH THE LANGUAGE AND

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF bans 8(b) (1) (A)

OF THE NLRA . ~ 15

OO ee 19

(iii)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page

Associated Press v. Emmett, 45 F.Supp. 907 (S.D.

r A eee sn tae eee 17

Booster Lodge No. 405 v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84

% 7, 12. 14

Ewald v. Medical Society, 70 Misc. 615, 128 N. V. S.

SD Gaels GO, GD —..—— 17

Labor Board v. Drivers Local Union, 262 U.S. 274

eee 18

Leon v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 350 F.Supp. 877

C—O ⁊ 17

Machinists Local v. Labor Board, 362 US. 411

(1960) . 18, 19

Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor), 231 NLRB

EE . Snes 5

Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor), 263 NLRB

ee one owe 4, 5, 6

Machinists Local 1327 v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1212

.. 8, 9, 10

NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175

— 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16

NLRB v. Granite State Joint Board, 409 U.S. 213

——A= 7, 9, 12, 13, 14. 15

NLRB v. Machinists Local 1327, 608 F.2d 1219

(9th Cir., 1979) eels 5

Scofield v. NLRB, 394 US. 423 (1969) 1 „5 )

Troy Iron & Nail Factory v. Corning, 44 Barb. 231

(N.Y. 1864) 1 1 17

STATUTES

National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29

U.S.C. § 141 et seq. :

§ 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 ——— passim

§ 8(b) (1) (A), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (1) (A) _. passim

MISCELLANEOUS

National Labor Relations Board, Legislative His-

tory of the Labor Management Relations Act of

SS ee eee 17

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1983

No. 83-

PATTERN MAKERS’ LEAGUE OF NorTH AMERICA, AFL-CIO,

AND ITS ROCKFORD AND BELOIT ASSOCIATIONS,

4 Petitioners,

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

and

ROCKFORD-BELOIT PATTERN JOBBERS ASSOCIATION,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

Pattern Makers’ League of North America, AFL-CIO,

and its Rockford and Beloit Associations hereby petition

this Court to issue a writ of certiorari to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to review

the judgment in Pattern Makers’ League et al. v. Na-

tional Labor Relations Board, 724 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. No.

83-1045; Dec. 21, 1983).

OPINIONS BELOW

The National Labor Relations Board’s decision and or-

der in this case is reported at 265 NLRB No. 170, and

is reprinted at pp. 9a-44a of the appendix (hereafter

“App.”) to this petition. The Seventh Circuit’s opinion

and judgment is reported at 724 F.2d 57 and is reprinted

at App. la-8a.

JURISDICTION *

The opinion and judgment of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Seventh Cireuit were issued on De-

cember 21, 1983. On April 10, 1984, Justice Stevens

signed an order extending the time for filing a petition

for writ of certiorari to and including May 18, 1984.

This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act

(“NLRA”), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157, provides:

Employees shall have the right to self-organization,

to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bar-

gain collectively through representatives of their own

choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities

for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mu-

tual aid or protection, and shall also have the right

to refrain from any or all of such activities except

to the extent — L t may be .

agreement requi mem p in a r organi-

zation as a condition of employment as authorized in

section § 8 (a) (3) of this Act.

Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158

(b) (1) (A), provides:

It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor

organization or its agents—

(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the

exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 of this

Act: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair

the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own

rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of

membership therein

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. The Facts

All members of petitioner Pattern Makers’ League

(hereafter “the League” or “the Union”) take an Oath

of Membership obligating them to adhere to the Union’s

“Constitution, Laws, Rules and Decisions.” App. 30a.

And, League Law 13 provides:

(N]o resignation or withdrawal- from an Associa

tion, or from the League, shall be accepted during

a strike or lockout, or at a time when a strike or

lockout appears imminent. [App. 28a, n.3.]

This amendment to the Union’s governing laws was rati-

fied in August 1976 by a membership vote after “ap-

propriate notice procedures” (App. 30a), and became ef-

fective in October 1976 (id.).

The following year, on May 5, 1977, petitioners Rock-

ford and Beloit Associations (hereafter “the Local

Unions”) commenced a strike against the Rockford-Beloit

Pattern Jobbers Association, a multiemployer association.

All members of the Local Unions received notice of, and

all but one participated in, the secret ballot vote author-

izing the strike. App. 30a. All striking members re-

ceived between $125 and $150 a week in strike benefits.

Id. Nonetheless, and notwithstanding the restriction on

resignation contained in League Law 13,’ some eleven

union members attempted to resign their membership dur-

ing the strike aiid then returned to work while the strike

was still in effect. App. 27a-28a, 29a-30a. The direct

result of their actions, according to unrebutted testimony,

was that the strike was prolonged, and that it became

necessary for the Local Unions to accept a contract

embodying substandard wages and benefits. App. 31a.

There is no contention . . that the members who tendered

their resignations were unaware of the restrictions on resignation

imposed [by League Law 13.“ App. 38a-34a.

B. The Proceedings in the NLRB

After a decision by an Administrative Law Judge, the

NLRB, “having determined that this and another case

involving the right of a labor organization to impose

restrictions on a member’s right to resign presented is-

sues of importance in the administration of the National

Labor Relations Act” (App. 9a), set both cases for oral

argument in tandem on January 16, 1980 before the

After rearly three years of consideration, the compan-

ion case, Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor), 263

NLRB 984 (1982), was decided by the Board on Sep-

tember 10, 1982, with the decision in the instant case

14 days preceding the commencement of a strike is un-

enforceable.”

Members Fanning and Zimmerman found that “a union

tion conduct, and found an unfair labor practice on that theory.

231 NLRB 115 (1977). On review the Ninth Circuit rejected the

Board’s construction of the clause as “hypertechnical,” concluding

that the provision “is a restriction on a members right to resign.”

NLRB v. Machinists Local 1327, 608 F.2d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir.

1979). Because the Board majority had not reached the question

whether a union constitutional provision restricting resignation

would be valid, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the Board.

Pursuant to the remand, the Board accepted as the law of the case

the Ninth Circuit's construction of the Machinists’ provision (263

NLRB, at 984 n.4), and proceeded to decide “whether a union can.

pursuant to an internal rule prohibiting resignations during «a

strike or within 14 days preceding its commencement. lawfully im-

pose a fine on members who tendered resignations and returned t»

work during the course of a strike (id. at 984).

bership, a subject expressly excluded from

of Section 8(b)(1)(A) by the proviso

within the ambit of a union’s control over its

Member Jenkins filed a dissenting opinion in Pattern

Makers, as he did in Dalmo Victor. He stated:

I would find that League Law 13, as applied

herein, is a reasonable and narrow restriction on the

employees’ right to resign their union membership,

and is within the ambit of the Union’s control over

its internal affairs. Accordingly, I also would find

that the fines imposed pursuant to League Law 13

on the 10 employees who crossed the Union’s picket

lines were lawful and not in violation of the proserip-

tions of Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act. [App. 22a.)

C. The Proceedings in the Court of Appeals

The Unions sought review of the Board’s decision inso-

far as that decision invalidated League Law 13 in the

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. That court

upheld the Board’s ruling.

The Seventh Circuit began from the premise that the

instant case is one present ling] an apparent conflict be-

tween two fundamental policies underlying the NLRA”

which the court identified as the right of employees to

refrain from collective bargaining activities and the right

of unions to regulate their internal affairs without con-

gressional or court interference (App. 3a-4a). The court

below acknowledged that this Court has twice explicitly

left open the question whether union constitutional pro-

visions restricting resignations during a strike period are

enforceable under the NLRA. See App. la and Booster

Lodge No. 405 v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84, 88-90 (1973);

NLRB v. Granite State Joint Board, 409 U.S. 213, 217

(1972). Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit viewed the very

eases which had declined to decide the question, as well

as an earlier case, Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423

(1969), as establishing that “[a]n employee’s right to

resign cannot be overridden by union interests in ‘group

solidarity and mutual reliance’” (App. 6a). Further,

while the court below acknowledged that “(t]he Union

plainly has power to control its internal matters by en-

‘

to resign [as] personal [and not] . . merely an inter-

nal matter’” (App. 7a).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. THE DECISION BELOW IS IN SQUARE CONFLICT

WITH THE DECISION OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

IN MACHINISTS n 1327 v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1212.

A. The decisions of the Seventh Circuit and the Ninth

Cireuit are in square conflict as to whether the NLRA

grants the NLRB the authority to rule—as the Board did

in Dalmo Victor and then in this case (see pp. 4-7 supra)

—that union restrictions on resignations during a strike

are invalid. Dalmo Victor itself was reversed by the

Ninth Circuit in Machinists Local 1327 v. NLRB, 725

F.2d 1212 (Feb. 14, 1984). The Ninth Circuit ex-

pressly noted that the Seventh Circuit had, in this case,

approved the Board’s rule (id. at 1217, n.5), and ex-

pressly disagreed with the Seventh Circuit’s holding and

its reasoning.

Unlike the court below, the Ninth Circuit viewed the

new Board rule against union restrictions on resignations

during a strike as one which “frustrates federal labor

policy in important respects.” 725 F.2d, at 1215. Rely-

ing on NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175

(1967), the Ninth Circuit stressed that:

[Nleither Congress nor the [Supreme] Court gave

individual members license to avoid union rules de-

signed to protect the welfare of the bargaining unit.

[This is why] Congress . . enacted the proviso to

$8(b) (1) (A), which reserves to unions the power

The NLRB’s petition for rehearing in Machinists Local 1327,

filed March 26, 1984, is presently pending.

to make reasonable rules regarding the retention and

acquisition of membership. [725 F.2d, at 1216.)

Further, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the view of the

Board, echoed by the Seventh Circuit in this case (App.

3a-4a), that this Court has, subsequent to Allis-Chalmers,

established “a balancing test” allowing “either the Board

or the courts to conduct an ad hoc weighing of the al-

legedly competing interests described in the main text

of §8(b)(1)(A) on the one hand, and the proviso to

§ 8(b) (1) (A) on the other.” 725 F.2d at 1216-17. And

the Ninth Circuit explicitly, and emphatically rejected as

“false” the basic premise of the Board and of the court

below—that there is a “conflict between the employee's

right to resign union membership and the union’s inter-

est in making rules regarding the acquisition and reten-

tion of membership.” 725 F.2d at 1217; see also id., at

n.5 (noting that the Seventh Circuit in this case assumed

the same conflict as did the Board): —

These rights are preserved in § 7 and § 8(b) (1)

(A) of the Act, respectively. Because both the em-

ployee’s right and the union’s interest are policies

that have been “embedded” in the labor laws for

over 35 years, neither can “impair” or “override” the

other within the of Scofield. They must

and ‘o—coexist. 725 F.2d at 1217 (emphasis in

origi: 94 —

Finally, unlike the Board and the court below, the Ninth

Circuit, while recognizing that “ ‘the power of the union

over the member is certainly no greater than the union-

member contract’” (725 F.2d at 1218, quoting Granite

State Board, supra, 409 U.S., at 217), maintained that,

under the § 8(b) (1) (A) proviso, the member’s obligation

is, under the present circumstances, also no less than the

obligation the union constitution and laws establish:

[T]he terms of the contract before us condition the

member’s t to resign on his promise not to break

the strike. the member can escape his obligations

by pleading, when the union attempts to collect the

fine, that he is no longer part of the union, then the

terms of this contract mean little. [725 F.2d at

1218. }

B. The conflict between the Seventh Circuit and the

Ninth Circuit concerns an important and recurring ques-

tion central to the national labor policy. Indeed, this

Court has three times addressed issues concerning union

fines imposed upon employees who, in violation of union

rules, work during a strike, expressly leaving for later

decision the precise question presented in this case.

In Allis-Chalmers, supra, the question was whether a

union that fines members who cross a union’s picket line

and return to work during an authorized strike violates

§ 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act. This Court held that, even

though $7 does otherwise protect the right of employees

to refrain from joining in strike activity (388 U.S., at

178), such union discipline of strikebreaking mem

does not constitute the “restraint or coercion” made un-

lawful by § 8(b) (1) (A).

First, the Allis-Chalmers Court ruled unanimously

(see 388 U.S., at 199 (White, J., concurring)) that the

refraining from work..g for the struck employer—is in

no way at odds with national labor policy, but, rather, is

one the union has every right to impose:

Integral to . federal labor policy has been the

＋

upon its terms, and Itlbe power to fine or expel

strikebreakers is essential if the union is to be an

effective bargaining agent. ” Provisions in union

constitutions and bylaws for fines and expulsion of

the Taft-Hartley amendments. [388 U.S., at 181.]

Similarly, it was common ground that “the proviso to

§ 8(b) (1) (A) preserves to the union the power to expel

the offending member.” 388 U.S., at 183; emphasis sup-

plied; id., at 190; id., at 199 (White, J., concurring) ; id.,

at 199-200 (Black, J., dissenting). In that case, however,

the proviso to § 8(b) (1) (A) did not in terms apply, be-

cause the anti-strikebreaking rule was not enforced by

a sanction directly affecting membership but, instead,

majority in that case, after surveying the background

of the main body of § 8(b)(1)(A), determined that the

1947 Congress did not intend in that section to inter-

fere with “the relationship of a union member to his own

union” (id., at 191):

Union membership allows the member a part in

choosing the very course of action to which he re-

155

211

7111

;

[

;

tions in which attempted to discipline employees

for violating the union’s rule against strikebreaking after

1 l

after engages in conduet which the rule pro-

scribes, the union commits an unfair labor practice

when it seeks enforcement of fines for that conduct.

in Grenite State Board, the penalty for working during the strike

was imposed after the strike began, by a vote at a membership meet-

ing (409 U.S., at 214), while in Booster Lodge, the union's constitu-

tion expressly prohibited members from strikebreaking (412 U.S.,

at 84).

* Aside from the quotation in the text, these instances are as

and the same number of times in the five-page Booster

(1) Under §7 of the Act the employees have “the right to re-

frain from any or all” concerted activities relating to collective

bargaining or mutual aid and protection, as well as the right

to join a union and participate in those com erted activities.

We have here no problem of construing a union's constitution

or bylaws defining or limiting the circumstances under which

a member may resign from the union. We have, therefore, only

to apply the law which normally is reflected in our free institu-

tions—the right of the individual to join or to resign from

association, as he sees fit. 409 U.S., at 216 (emphasis

supplied)

(The court of appeals’ reference to this passage as supporting an

absolute right under the NLRA to resign from labor unions (App.

5a) ignores the underlined sentence, and thereby grievously dis-

torts this Court’s evident meaning—viz., that as a contractual mat-

ter union members, like other members of voluntary associations,

may resign their membership absent a valid restriction on resigna-

tion.)

(2) [T)he power of the union over the member is certainly no

greater than the union member contract. When there is

a lawful dissolution of a union-member relation, the union has

no more control over the former member than it has over the

man in the street. [409 U.S., at 217 (emphasis supplied)

(3) [When a member lawfully resigns from the union, its

power over him ends. [409 U.S., at 215 (emphasis supplied

(4) We do not now decide to what extent the contractual rela-

tionship between union and member may curtail the freedom

to resign. But where, as here, there are no restraints on the

resignation of members, we conclude that the vitality of §7

requires that the member be free to refrain in November from

the action he endorsed in May.... [409 U.S., at 217-18 (em-

phasis supplied).

(Again, the court below distorted the Court’s meaning in this pas-

sage by relying on the immediately succeeding phrase—that a union

members “§ 7 rights are not lost by a union’s pleas for solidarity

or by its pressures for conformity and submission o its regime”

(409 U.S., at 218, quoted App. A——-)—while ignoring the Court’s

explicit limitation of this observation to circumstances other than

those here present.)

Lodge opinion.’

In sum this Court has explicitly left for another day

the question whether the NLRA limits the right of

unions to limit resignations through properly promul-

gated provisions in their constitutions and bylaws. Gran-

ite State Board, supra, 409 U.S., at 217; Booster Lodge,

supra, 412 U.S., at 88. Now that the NLRB has decided

that question and the Board’s rule has precipitated a

square conflict in the circuits, the appropriate day for de-

termining the question twice left open by this Court has

arrived.

Those instances are:

(1) Neither [the union's] constitution nor its bylaws contained

any provision expressly permitting or forbidding such resigna-

tions. 412 U.S., at 86.

(2) Since in [Granite State Board] there was no provision in

the Union’s constitution or bylaws limiting the circumstances

in which a member could resign, we concluded that the mem-

bers were free to resign at will and that §7 of the Act, 29

U.S.C. § 157, protected their right to return to work during a

strike commenced while they were union members. [412 U.S.,

at 87-88.

(3) Here, as in [Granite State Board,] the Union's constitution

and bylaws are silent on the subject of voluntary resignation

from the Union. And here, as there, we leave open the question

of the extent to which contractual restriction on a member’s

right to resign may be limited by the Act. [412 U.S., at 88.

(4) Since there is no evidence that the employees here either

knew of or had consented to any limitation on their right to

resign, we need “only to apply the law which is normally re-

flected in our free institutions—the right of an individual to

join or to resign from associations, as he sees fit.” [412 U.S.,

at 88.

(5) The Union contends, however, that a result different from

[Granite State Board] is warranted in this case, even though

its constitution does not expressly restrict the right to resign

during a strike. [412 U.S., at 88-89 (emphasis supplied).

II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IS INCON-

SISTENT WITH THE LANGUAGE AND LEGISLA-

TIVE HISTORY OF § 8(b)(1)(A) OF THE NLRA.

Allis-Chalmers, supra, makes clear that the substantive

rule of conduct enforced in this case—that union mem-

bers who work for the struck employer during a duly

authorized strike are subject to union discipline—is con-

sistent with national labor policy.* If the Union’s rule

against resignations during a strike is equally valid,

it follows that the Union was simply exercising its au-

thority to fine an individual who was a member at the

relevant time for violating the Union rule against strike-

breaking, and was therefore, under Allis-Chalmers, acting

lawfully.

As Aliis-Chalmers also recognized, a union does not vio-

late § 8(b) (1) (A) simply by interfering in some manner

with “the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [§ 7],”

including the right to refrain from concerted activity.

Employees have, as the Court in Allis-Chalmers noted

(388 U.S., at 178), a right protected under §7 of the

Because Allis-Chalmers has already decided this question, the

heavy reliance of the court below on Scofield, supra, is misplaced.

The question in Scofield (394 U.S. at 424-426) was whether a par-

ticular union substantive rule of conduct rule is so inconsistent

with national labor policy that the rule may not be enforced in any

manner, whether by fine, expulsion, or otherwise, and the purpose

of the mode of analysis set out therein was to determine whether

the work rule in question there met that standard. Here, that ques-

tion has already been resolved, in favor of the union rule of con-

duct, by Allis-Chalmers. The open question is whether that other-

wise valid rule may be applied against individuals who resign in

violation of a union restriction on resignation.

Contrary to the suggestions of the court below (App. 4a), Scofield

in no way addressed this issue. The Scofield court did observe that,

in the case before it, the union member was free to leave the union

at any time. 394 U.S., at 430. But, as this Court later recognized

in Granite State Board, supra, 409 U.S., at 217, this observation in

Scofield simply “indicates that the power of the union over the

member is certainly no greater than the union-member contract.”

Act to refuse to join in a strike. But the existence of a

§ 7 right was only the beginning of the analysis in Allis-

Chalmers, not, as in the opinion below, its end point.

As Allis-Chalmers recognized, for there to be a violation

of § 8(b) (1) (A) there must be, in addition to some im-

pedence of a right otherwise protected under §7: (1)

“restraint or coercion”; and (2) a kind of union action

not within the proviso to § 8(b) (1) (A), which protects

“the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own

rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of mem-

bership therein.“

Although the Seventh Circuit failed to so acknowledge,

there is no escaping the point that in this case, unlike

Allis-Chalmers, the plain words of the § 8(b) (1) (A) pro-

viso encompass rules of the kind at issue here. A rule re-

quiring a member to retain his or her membership dur-

ing a strike period is surely a rule regarding “retention

of membership.” Indeed, it is more clearly such a rule

than an expulsion provision, which all agree is encom-

passed in the proviso: An expulsion provision ccncerns not

“retention of membership” but the inverse—loss of mem-

bership.““

* As we have seen (pp. 10-11, supra), Allis-Chalmers recognizes

that enforcement of a rule against strikebreaking would indubitably

be valid, because the ability of unions to expel members is protected

by the proviso to § 8(b) (1) (A); only because a fine rather than ex-

pulsion was involved did the Court proceed to decide whether there

was “restraint or coercion” and conclude that there was not.

10 It is also significant that the language of the proviso speaks

in terms of “impair[ing| the right of a labor organization to pre-

scribe its own rules.” Thus, Congress did not simply say that

§ 8(b) (1) (A) shall not prevent unions from prescribing rules of

certain types. Instead the proviso is couched in terms of preserving

intact of preexisting right. This language suggests a realization

that there was a preexisting body of law regarding that “right,”

and that the intent was simply to leave that body of law intact.

And, indeed, there is a body of common law which enforces non-

arbitrary resignation restrictions in voluntary associations in cir-

The evident meaning of the plain language of the § 8

(b) (1) (A) proviso is reinforced by the history of the

Taft-Hartley Act which shows a conscious decision by

Congress to excise from the House bill any provision that

could be read as forbidding unions from limiting resig-

nations by members. As it passed the House, the bill

that became the Taft-Hartley Act contained “right to

refrain” language identical for present purposes to that

contained in the final Act (H.R. 3020, Soth Cong., Ist

Sess., § 7(a), I National Labor Relations Board, Legisla-

tive History of the Labor Management Relations Act of

1947 (“Leg. Hist.”), at 176), and also contained two

provisions dealing specifically with the obligation to con-

tinue union membership: First, the House bill would

have made it an unfair labor practice for employers and

labor organizations, “by intimidating practices, to inter-

fere with the exercise by employees of rights guaranteed

in section [7] or to compel or seek to compel any indi-

vidual to become or remain a member of any labor or-

ganization” (H.R. 3020, supra, § 8(b) (1), I Leg. Hist.

178-79 (emphasis added) ); second, that bill would have

made it an unfair labor practice for a union “to deny to

any member the right to resign from the organization at

any time” (H.R. 3020, supra, § 8(c) (4), I Leg. Hist. 180).

cumstances very similar to the present ones. See, e.g., Troy Iron &

Nail Factory v. Corning, 44 Barb. 231 (N.Y. 1864) (enforcing rule

of a landowners’ association that no member may resign as long as

he continues to own or occupy certain land); Leon v. Chrysler

Motors Corp., 350 F.Supp. 877 (D.N.J. 1973) (enforcing a rule of a

mutual advertising association that no auto dealer may resign from

membership except with the consent of a majority of the associa-

tion’s members); Ewald v. Medical Society, 70 Misc. 615, 128 N. V. S.

886, 888 (N.Y. App. 1911) (enforcing rule of a county medical

society that no member charged with ethical violations may resign

while such charges are pending); Associated Press v. Emmett, 45

F.Supp. 907, 921, 923 (S.D. Cal. 1942) (upholding a ruling requir-

ing two years notice or consent of the Board of Directors for a

resignation to be valid).

No equivalent to the § 8(b) (1 (A) proviso was contained

in the House bill.

In putting together the final version of the statute, the

Conference Committee left out both the foregoing at-

tempts in the House bill to regulate union rules limiting

resignations from membership, and, at the same time,

included the § 8(b) (1) (A) proviso, which in its ordinary

meaning validates such union rules. Thus, as in Labor

Board v. Drivers Local Union, 362 U.S. 274 (1960)

(which involved, like this case, an NLRB attempt to read

into the general language of 88 0b) (10 (A) a restriction

on certain union activity) :

Plainly, the [union’s] conduct in the instant case

would have been prohibited if the House bill had be-

come law. But the House conferees abandoned the

House bill in conference and accepted the Senate

proposal. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 510 on H.R. 3020,

Soth Cong. Ist Sess., 42... . “It is relevant to recall

that the Taft-Hartley Act was, to a marked degree,

the result of conflict and compromise between strong

contending forces. This is relevant in that it

counsels wariness in finding by construction a broad

policy . . . as such when .. it is clear that those

interested in just a condemnation were unabie to se-

cure its embodiment in enacted law.” IId., at 289-

90.

This is a case, then, in which there is no room for the

ad hoc balancing approach adopted by the Board and ap-

proved by the Seventh Circuit. Rather, Congress struck

the balance in 1947, and determined that whatever the

reach otherwise of 87 and of 58 0b) (10 (A) of the

NLRA, unions retain the common-law right of voluntary

associations to require, as a condition of membership, a

commitment to remain a member during the periods crit-

ical to the success of the collective effort. Since “the

commodation between [the] competing factors has

ready been made by Congress” (Machinists v. Labor

Board, 362 U.S. 411, 428 (1960)), the Court should

grant the petition for a writ of certiorari in order to

resolve the conflict between the circuits and to restore the

accommodation Congress struck.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, this petition for a writ

of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM B. PEER

1899 L Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

MARSHA S. BERZON

MICHAEL RUBIN

177 Post Street, Suite 600

San Francisco, Ca. 94108

Of Counsel: LAURENCE GOLD

GEORGE KAUFMANN (Counsel of Record )

2101 L Street, N.W. 815 16th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20087 Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 637-5390

APPENDIX

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 83-1045

PATTERN MAKERS’ LEAGUE OF NORTH AMERICA,

AFL-CIO, and Its RocKForD AND BELOIT ASSOCIATIONS,

* Petitioners,

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, ¥

end Respondent,

ROCKFORD-BELOIT PATTERN JOBBERS ASSOCIATION,

Intervening Respondents.

Argued Sept. 27, 1983

Decided Dec. 21, 1983

Before BAUER, ESCHBACH and COFYEY, Circuit

Judges.

34 L.Ed.2d 422 (1972). We find such

In May 1976, Petitioner Pattern Makers’ League of

North America (the Union) amended its constitution by

adding the following provision: “13. No resignation or

withdrawal from an Association, or from the League,

shall be accepted during a strike or lockout, or at a

time when a strike or lockout appears imminent.” This

provision, dubbed League Law 13, was ratified in Au-

gust 1976 by the membership of the various member as-

sociations of the Union.

On May 5, 1977, the Union stuck members of In-

tervenor Rockford-Beloit Pattern Jobbers Association

(the Employer), a multi-employer bargaining unit con-

sisting of eleven companies engaged in the manufacture

and sale of patterns for casting. The trike ended Decem-

ber 19, 1977, when the parties agreed on a new collective

bargaining agreement.

Eleven employees, ten from the Beloit Association and

one from the Rockford Association, tendered their resig-

nations to the Union during the strike. The first employee

resigned on September 11. He returned to work for the

Employer on September 12 and on that day the Union

expelled him. After the strike ended, the Union sent letters

The National Labor Relations Board ruled that the

Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National

Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1974),

;

in Machinists Local 1327, International Asso-

ciation ~f Machinists, District Lodge 115 (Dalmo Vic-

tor), 268 N.L.R.B. 141 (1982), petition for review filed,

Nos. 82-7580 & 82-7701 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 1982). In Dalmo

Victor, the Board determined that a union's constitu-

tional provision prohibiting members from resigning

during a strike or within fourteen days preceding its

was invalid and thus unenforceable. The

afl

gif

parent between two fundamental policies under-

picket lines, and violated Sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) by

imposing a fine and excessive fees and dues on an employee as a

I HKAT LILIU

submitting his and by attempting to cause an em-

ployee’s discharge from employment for failing to comply with

the provisions of the union-security agreement. The Union has

not challenged these rulings before this court, and, accordingly

they are summarily enforced.

The Board in Dalmo Victor recognized the competing interest

of the union in reflecting the will of the majority of its members and

fashioned a rule allowing the union to impose a 30-day notice of

resignation requirement on its members. Two members of the

Board in the majority of the case before us—Chairman Van de

Water and Hunter—concurred in Dalmo Victor, agreeing that the

union rule impermissibly restricted the members’ right to resign,

but arguing that the 30-day rule announced by the majority was

arbitrary and inconsistent with the NLRA and interpretive Su-

preme Court rulings. The issue of the validity of a Board—

fashioned 30-day notice provision is uot presented in this case.

felt

veil

510

5215

;

ial

11 0

˖ Ein

BESS 9 b

10 0

tire

Supreme Court, in considering the parameters of a

union’s authority, has developed an analysis that dis-

tinguishes between union rules that touch wholly “in-

ternal” affairs and rules that affect “external” activities.

Scofield, 394 US. at 429-30, 89 S.Ct. at 1157-58. The

Scofield Court stated that “it has become clear that if

the rule invades or frustrates an overriding policy of

the labor laws the rule may not be enforced, even by fine

or expulsion, without violating §8(b)(1).” Id. at 429,

fundamental policies of the NLRA. For example, in

Granite State many union members resigned during a

strike and returned to work. The union levied fines

against those workers for violating a membership resolu-

tion that any member aiding or abetting the employer

during the strike would be subject to a fine. The Supreme

Court ruled that the union’s fines frustrated the over-

—

riding right of the individual to join or to resign from

associations, as he sees fit ... .” Granite State, 409

U.S. at 216, 93 S.Ct. at 387. Similarly, in Booster

Lodge the union sought court enforcement of fines it im-

posed on employees who had resigned from the union.

The employees had returned to work despite a union con-

stitutional provision prohibiting strikebreaking by union

members. The union argued that the obligation to refrain

from strikebreaking bound union members notwithstand-

ing their resignations. Booster Lodge, 412 U.S. at 89, 93

S.Ct. at 1964. The Supreme Court stated :

In order to sustain the Union's position, we would

first have to find, contrary to the determination of

the Board and of the Court of Appeals, that the

Union constitution by implicetion extended its sanc-

tions to nonmembers, and then further conclude that

such sanctions were consistent with the Act. But we

are no more disposed to find an implied post-resig-

nation commitment from the strikebreaking pro-

scription in the Union’s constitution here than we

were to find it from the employees’ participation in

the strike vote and ratification of penalties in

[Granite State].

Id. at 89-90, 93 S.Ct. at 1964-1965 (footnote omitted).

Although the unions in Granite State and Booster

Lodge did not restrict resignations, the Court’s rea-

soning applies equally here. The Section 7 right to re-

frain from union activities encompasses the right of

members to resign from the union. See, e.g., Granite

State, 409 U.S. at 216, 93 S.Ct. at 387; NLRB v. Ma-

chinists Local 1327, International Association of Ma-

chinists, 608 F.2d 1219, 1221 (9th Cir. 1979); NLRB v.

Martin A. Gleason, Inc., 53' F.2d 466, 476 (2d Cir.

1976). We think that because League Law 13 completely

suspends an employee’s right to choose not to be a union

member and thus no longer subject to union discipline,

it frustrates the overriding policy of labor law that em-

ployees be free to choose whether to engage in concerted

activities. An employee’s right to resign cannot be over-

ridden by union interests in “group solidarity and mutual

reliance in situations in which a collective effort is

necessary to achieve a particular result” upon which the

Union so heavily relies. Petitioners’ br. at 9-10. Although

a union has a powerful interest in maintaining its

strength during a strike, see N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers

Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 175 at 181, 87 S.Ct. 2001

at 2007, 18 L.Ed.2d 1123, an employee’s Section 7 rights

“are not lost by a union’s plea for solidarity or by its

pressures for conformity and submission to its regime.”

Granite State, 409 U.S. at 218, 93 S.Ct. at 387. See id.

(Burger, C.J., concurring) ([The institutional needs of

the Union, important though they are, do not outweigh

the rights and needs of the individual.“

An employee’s right to resign not only is guaranteed

by Section 7, but also is supported by an employee’s own

strong interests. Among those interests are an employee’s

freedom to change his or her mind about the useful-

ness or effectiveness of a strike, such as when an em-

ployer has been able to replace the strikers, or an em-

ployee’s desire to return to work for completely per-

sonal reasons, such as family hardship. A union rule

compelling membership fully subject to union authority

improperly infringes upon these interests. Moreover,

forced continued membership distorts the balance be-

tween encouraging collective activities among workers

and protecting individuals from coercion.

The Union plainly has power to control its internal

matters by enforcing rules reflecting the will of the ma-

jority of its members. See Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 181,

87 S.Ct. at 2007. When an employee is a full union mem-

ber he or she is subject to those rules; when that em-

ployee resigns, the union’s power ends. J as the

Union’s power may not extend to an employge’s post-

resignation activities, it also may not extend to forbid

an employee from resigning. An employee’s decision to

resign is personal; a union rule requiring retention of

membership cannot be considered merely an “internal

matter.” Accordingly, a union cannot compel membership

during a strike under the proviso to Section 8(b) (1) (A)

in derogation of an employee's right to choose whether

to be a part of such concerted activity.

The Union’s second argument in support of League

Law 13 is its theory of “mutual reliance”: because the

Union members relied on each other when voting to

strike, they waived their Seetion 7 right to abandon the

strike by resigning from the Union. The Union stresses

that each member joined the Union or retained Union

membership with the knowledge that resignations were

prohibited during strikes or lockouts. The Union claims

the union-employee relationship is thus voluntary antl

enforceable.

The Supreme Court, however, gave this mutual reli

ance theory “little weight” in Granite State, 409 U.S.

217, 93 S.Ct. at 387, and determined that, in the absence

of a union rule restraining resignations, Section 7 re-

quires that Union members remain free to change their

minds and resign during a strike. In that case union

members voted to strike and, soon after the strike began,

voted unanimously to fine strikebreakers. The First Cir- g

cuit concluded that union members who voted had

waived their right to resign without penalty in the in-

terest of allowing the union to maintain strike dis-

cipline. 446 F.2d 369, 372-74 (lst Cir. 1972), rev'd,

409 U.S. 213, 93 S.Ct. 385, 34 L.Ed.2d 422 (1972). The

Supreme Court decided that the employees’ interests took

precedence.

We can discern no qualitative difference between em-

ployees agreeing not to aid or abet a company during a

the

their minds about remaining members of the union.

III

The Supreme Court held in Scofield that a union rule

setting a ceiling on the production for which union members

could accept immediate pay did not contravene any policy

of the NLRA. The concept that union members were free

to leave the union and escape the rule vas central to the

Court's analysis. Scofield, 394 U.S. at 430, 89 S.Ct. at

certed activity and is unable to prevail on the other mem-

bers to change the rule, then he may leave the union and

obtain whatever benefits in job advancement and extra

pay may result. Id. at 435 at .

fundamental principle is the embodiment of individuals’

Section 7 rights and safeguards the balance between in-

dividual rights and the collective power of the union. The

principle applies to the circumstances presented in this

case.

The petition for review is denied.

ENFORCEMENT GRANTED.

It is the same thing to say that a rule prohibiting resignations

during strikes is designed to strengthen the union's power through

strike solidarity.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BEFORE THE \

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

Case 33-CB-1132

PATTERN MAKERS’ LEAGUE OF NORTH AMERICA,

AFL-CIO, and Its RocKFoRD AND BELOIT ASSOCIATIONS

and

ROCKFORD-BELOIT PATTERN JOBBERS ASSOCIATION

DECISION AND ORDER

On November 21, 1978, Administrative Law Judge

Gerald A. Wacknov issued the attached Decision in this

proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondents, Pattern Makers’

League of North America, AFL-CIO, Rockford Associa-

tion, and Beloit Association, filed exceptions and a sup-

porting brief and the General Counsel filed limited

exceptions and a brief in support thereof, as well as a

brief otherwise in support of the Administrative Law

Judge’s Decision.

On December 12, 1979, the Board, having determined

that this and another case, involving the right of a

labor organization to impose restrictions on a member’s

right to resign, presented issues of importance in the

administration of the National Labor Relations Act, as

amended, scheduled oral argument for January 16, 1980.

Thereafter, on January 16, 1980, Respondents, the Gen-

eral Counsel, the Charging Party, and the American

1 Machinists Local 1827, International Association of Machinists

and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, District Lodge 115 (Dalmo

Victor), 268 NLRB No. 141 (1982).

10a

Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organi-

zations,” presented their oral arguments before the Board.

tached Decision in light of the exceptions,

arguments, and, for the reasons stated

cided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions

the Administrative Law Judge,’ as modified herein.

The principal issue in this case involves the question

of whether Respondents violated Section 8(b) (1) (A) of

the Act by imposing fines on members who tendered

resignations and returned to work during the course of

a strike in apparent contravention of Respondents’ rule

prohibiting resignations during a strike or lockout or

when one appeared imminent.

The pertinent facts reveal that, in May 1976, Respond-

ents, in an attempt to end what they viewed as “a

regular pattern of strikebreaking by employers,” adopted

and ratified an amendment to their constitution, known

as League Law 13, which provided that “no resignation

or withdrawal from an Association, or from the League,

shall be accepted during a strike or lockout, or at a

2 The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial

Organization appeared as amicus curiae and argued orally on be-

half of Respondents’ position.

The Administrative Law Judge, inter alia, found that Respond-

ents had violated Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by threatening em-

ployees with physical harm and loss of accrued pension benefits if

they crossed the picket line, and had violated Secs. 8 (b) (2) and

8(b) (1) (A) by imposing a fine and excessive fees and dues on

employee William Kohl after expelling him from membership ‘or

having submitted his resignation. No exceptions were taken to

that

27 K

these findings.

The Administrative Law Judge, however, also found Re-

spondent Beloit Association had not sought to have employee John

Nelson discharged for failing to comply with the terms of a union-

security agreement, as alleged by the General Counsel. The General

Counsel has excepted to this finding. For the reasons more fully

discussed, infra, we find merit to the General Counsel's exception.

time when a strike or lockout appears imminent.” There-

about

a strike against Rockford-Beloit Pattern Jobbers Asso-

ciation, a multiemployer association, and its individual

members which culminated on December 19, 1977, with

lawfully intrudes into the rights guaranteed to employees

by Section 7 of the Act and that, consequently, the fines

imposed thereunder are unlawful and in violation of

Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Respondents, on the

other hand, assert that League Law 13 constitutes a

valid exercise of their right to enact internal union

rules governing the acquisition and retention of member-

ship, as set forth in the proviso to Section 8(b) (1) (A)

They therefore argue that the fines imposed on those in-

dividuals who resigned returned to work during the

Ad-

;

fn. 3, supra, employee Kohl also tendered his re-ignation during

the strike, was expelled from the Union, and was subsequently fined.

As stated, however, no exceptions were taken to the Administrative

Law Judge's findings concerning Kohl.

13a

115

iii

38 1133

— —4 — 8

and violative of Section 8 (b) (10 (A of the

135

tity

11510

e n 111

ti 11117 ti i

peal

d., al. op., pp. 10-11. In Dalmo V

that, while a member has a Sec.

2 —

1122

i I 11

12 3. 111“ 15 ee ET

te fie aig: e 1115 i

27 sities 5

i i fi |

111 11 14747 l it i +

; : 1 ff if f

11 g Tr 1 2 1113 a

E 33 1221 Hiri 5

rE sf is e 111121 :

14a

We also find, contrary to the Administrative Law

Judge, that Respondent Beloit Association unlawfully

sought to have employee John Nelson discharged from his

position with Atlas Pattern Works (hereinafter Atlas)

for failing to comply with the provisions of the union-sec-

urity agreement. The record in this regard reveals that

Nelson began working for Atlas in March 1977, and

never became a member of Respondent Beloit, which rep-

resented Atlas’ employees. On or about January 14, 1978,

Nelson tendered to Respondent Beloit a check represent-

ing dues for the month of January 1978.“ However, on

January 17, 1978, Respondent Beloit returned the check

to Nelson with a letter stating that, since he was not a

union member, it could not accept dues from him which

he did not owe. That same day, Respondent Beloit sent

Atlas a letter informing it that Nelson had failed to com-

ply with the terms of the union-security agreement that

went into effect on December 19, 1977, and requested that

Atlas “take appropriate action to rectify this situation.“

The General Counsel alleges that Respondent Beloit’s

letter to Atlas concerning Nelson constituted a request

for his discharge for failing to meet his obligations under

the union-security agreement and that Respondent had

breached its fiduciary duty to inform employees of their

obligations under such agreements. The Administrative

Law Judge disagreed with the General Counsel noting

that the letter to Atlas was sent 3 days before Nelson’s

discharge could actually have been requested under the

agreement and further noting that no attempt to dis-

charge Nelson or interfere with his job tenure was made

* Under the terms of the union-security agreement executed on

December 19, 1977, employees were required to become members

within 30 days of employment.

An identical letter concerning Kohl's failure to comply with the

union-security agreement was sent by Respondent Beloit to Atlas

just 3 days before th Nelson letter. The Administrative Law Judge

found that that letter amounted to an implied request for Kohl’s

discharge and violated Secs. 8(b) (2) and 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.

As noted in fn. 3, supra, no exceptions were taken to this finding.

15a

upon the expiration of the required period. He also

found that Respondent Beloit had not breached any fidu-

ciary duty owed to Nelson and concluded that it had not

violated Section 8(b) (2) or 8 0b (1 (A of the Act, as

alleged. As noted, we disagree with that finding.

It is well settled that a union seeking to enforce a

union-security provision against an employee has a fidu-

ciary duty to inform that employee of his obligations so

that the employee may take the steps necessary to pro-

tect his job.“ That duty, the Board has held, requires

that a union provide the employee with “a statement of

the precise amount and months for which dues [are]

owed, as well as an explanation of the methods used in

computing the amount,” plus “an opportunity to make

payment.“ As evident from the above facts, Nelson, al-

though apparently unaware or uncertain of what his

obligations were under the union-security agreement,

nevertheless made a good-faith effort to comply with

those obligations by tendering his dues to Respondent

Beloit on January 14. However, instead of advising Nel-

son of the extent of his obligations under the new con-

tract when it rejected his tender of dues, Respondent

Beloit chose merely to inform him that he was not a

union member and that consequently he did not owe any

dues. Under these circumstances, we find that Respond-

1% Chauffeurs, Salesdrivers & Helpers Union, Local 572, Inter-

national Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen &

Helpers of America (Ralphs Grocery Company), 247 NLRB 934

(1980).

d. at 935.

It is apparent from Respondent Beloit's letter to Atlas, when

viewed in light of the former's refusal to accept Nelson's tender

of dues, that Respondent Beloit equated Nelson's continued employ-

ment with Atlas, under the terms of the union-security clause, with

his becoming a full member of its Association. However, the Board

in this respect has long held that “while contracts requiring mem-

bership as a condition of employment are lawful within the meaning

of the proviso to Section 8(a) (3), a union cannot lawfully compel

l6a

ent Beloit has not fulfilled its fiduciary duty of inform-

ing Nelson of his obligations under the union-security

agreement executed on December 19, 1977."

stated, that an identical letter concerning

Kois s failure similarly to comply with the terms of

union-security agreement amounted to an implied

for his discharge. We see no reason why the Nelson

Ee ee ee ere

especially when viewed in light of Respondent Beloi

breach of its fiduciary duty owed to Nelson. For

above-stated reasons, we find that Respondent Beloit

the discharge of an employee except for his failure to pay

quired dues and initiation fees.” Hershey Foods Corporation,

NLRB 897 (1973).

$3 57

ent’s part to notify Nelson of his obligations under the new con-

tract since “an employee is not presumed to be on notice as to the

extent of his obligations to the union during successive terms.”

See Conductron Corporation, a subsidiary of McDonnell Douglas

Corporation, 183 NLRB 419, 425 (1970), citing N.L.R.B. v. Inter-

national Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers, AFL-

CIO (General Motors Corporation), 307 F.2d 679 (D.C. Cir. 1962).

Moreover, in light of Respondent Beloit’s rejection of Nelson's

tender of dues on the ground that he had no dues obligations, we

17a

lawfully sought to have Nelson discharged and in so

doing violated Sections 8 (b) (2) and 8 0b 1A) of the

Act. |

ORDER

Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Re-

lations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations

Board hereby orders that the Respondents, Pattern

Makers’ League of North America, AFL-CIO, Wash-

ington, D.C., Rockford Association, Rockford, Illinois,

and Beloit Association, Beloit, Wisconsin, their officers,

agents, and representatives, shall:

1. Cease and desist from:

(a) Giving force or effect to League Law 13.

(b) Restraining or coercing employees who have re-

signed from Respondents by imposing fines on such em-

ployees for working during a sanctioned strike.

(ec) Causing or attempting to cause Atlas Pattern

Works or any other employer to discharge or otherwise

discriminate against any of its employees for failure to

comply with the terms of a union-security clause without

adequately advising them of their obligations, in viola-

tion of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act.

d Imposing fines and other penalties upon former

members for conduct in which they engaged after their

effective resignation from Respondents, as conditions of

regaining union membership under the provisions of a

union-security clause, and attempting to cause an em-

ployer to seek an employee’s compliance therewith.

(e Threatening employees with physical harm, prop-

erty damage, a loss of pension benefits, or any other re-

prisals for working during the course of a sanctioned

strike.

AN ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.”

19a

Respondents immediately upon receipt thereof, and be

maintained by them for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in

conspicuous places, including all places where notices to

members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall

be taken by Respondents to insure that said notices are

not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.

(f) Mail to the Regional Director for Region 33 suf-

ficient signed copies of said notice for posting by

employer-members of the Rockford-Beloit Pattern Job-

bers Association, if the employers are willing, in places

where notices to employees are customarily posted. Said

copies, after being duly signed by Respondents’ author-

ized representatives, shall be returned forthwith to the

Regional Director.

(g) Notify the Regional Director for Region 33, in

writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what

steps Respondents have taken to comply herewith.

Date, Washington, D.C. December 16, 1982

JOHN R. VAN DE WATER, Chairman

Don A. ZIMMERMAN, Member

RoBERT P. HUNTER, Member

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

[SEAL]

20a

MEMBER FANNING, concurring and dissenting in part:

I agree with the majority in all respects save that I

do not find that Respondents violated the Act by “giving

force or effect to League Law 13,” which simply pro-

hibits resignations from the League during a strike or

when one is imminent. As I explained in Dalmo Victor,”

a labor organization’s restrictions on resignation are rele-

vant in cases involving union discipline of employees only

to the extent that the labor organization defends that the

employee is a union member and had consented to be

bound to union rules. Where the restriction is not a

valid one—and I agree that League Law 13 is not—it

may not be relied upon as a bar to resignation; in that

case, the labor organization cannot defend its action as

one taken against a member.

The League Law does not, however, have any impact

on the employment relationship and, therefore, does not

violate any law or policy this Agency is charged with

enforcing. It is a procedural rule purporting only to

regulate the release of a member from the Union’s rolls.

Neither Section 8(b)(1)(A) nor the Act in general

regulates the purely internal affairs of labor organiza-

tions.“ The proviso to Section 8 (b) (1) (A) stakes out

the limit of Federal restriction in this area and leaves

15 Machinists Local 1327, International Association of Machinists

and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, District Lodge 115 (Dalmo

Victor), 268 NLRB No. 141 (1982), sl. op., p. 8, fn. 13.

16 Before the 1959 Landrum-Griffin amendments, which come

under the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor, the Supreme

Court observed that “the protection of union members in their

rights as members from arbitrary conduct by unions and union

officers has not been undertaken by federal law, and indeed the

assertion of ny such power has been expressly denied.” Interna-

tional Association of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 620

(1958).

ployer’s involvement in commerce even in cases where a

labor organization is the respondent.

There is no basis for concluding that a union rule,

which on its face only regulates union membership rolls,

may not be maintained without violating the Act. League

Law 13 has no effect on the employment relationship, and

its maintenance should not be unlawful simply because

the League sought to rely upon it to show a binding

union-member compact which had, in law, been vitiated.

Dated, Washington, D.C. December 16, 1982

JOHN H.FANNING, Member

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

17 Local 283, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Imple-

ment Workers of America, UAW-AFL-CIO (Wisconsin Motor Cor-

poration), 145 NLRB 1097, 1133 (1964).

18 Scofield, et al. v. N.L.R.B., 394 U.S. 423 (1969).

MEMBER JENKINS, dissenting in part:

I join in all my colleagues’ findings except their affirm-

ance of the Administrative Law Judge’s finding that the

. fines imposed on the 10 employees who resigned from Re-

spondents during the strike and crossed Respondents’

picket lines to return to work violated Section 8 (b) (1)

(A) of the Act.

For the reasons set forth in my separate dissenting

opinions in Machinists Local 1327, International Associa-

tion of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO,

District Lodge 115 (Dalmo Victor), 263 NLRB No. 141

(1982), and 231 NLRB 719 (1977), I would find that

League Law 13, as applied herein, is a reasonable and

narrow restriction on the employees’ right to resign their

union membership, and is within the ambit of the Union’s

control over its internal affairs. Accordingly, I also would

find that the fines imposed pursuant to League Law 13

on the 10 employees who crossed the Unions’ picket lines

were lawful and not in violation of the proscriptions of

Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act.

Dated, Washington, D.C. December 16, 1982

HOWARD JENKINS, JR., Member

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

—

23a

APPENDIX

NOTICE TO MEMBERS

Posted by Order of the

National Labor Relations Board

An Agency of the United States Government

WE WILL NOT give force or effect to League Law 13.

WE WILL NOT impose fines and other penalties upon

former members for conduct in which they engaged after

resigning their membership from the League or its As-

sociations.

WE WILL NOT impose such fines and other penalties

upon former members for conduct in which they engaged

after resigning their membership, as conditions of re-

gaining union membership under the provisions of a valid

union-security clause, and WE WILL NOT attempt to

cause employers to seek employees’ compliance therewith.

WE WILL NOT cause or attempt to cause employers

to discharge o otherwise discriminate against employees

who have not complied with the terms of a union-security

agreement without first adequately informing employees

of their obligations under said agreement.

WE WILL NOT threaten employees with physical

harm, property damage, a loss af pension benefits, or any

other reprisals for working during the course of a sanc-

tioned strike.

WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain

or coerce employees in the exercise of their Section 7

rights, except to the extent that such rights may be

affected by an agreement requiring membership in a

labor organization as a condition of employment as au-

thorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.

WE WILL rescind the fines and/or other similar

penalties levied against employees who effectively resigned

PATTERN MAKERS’ LEAGUE OF

NortH America, AFL-CIO, and Irs

ROCKFORD AND BELOIT ASSOCIATIONS

(Labor Organization )

Dated By

(For Pattern Makers’ League of

North America, AFL-CIO)

Dated By

(For Beloit Association )

Dated

(For Rockford Association

This is an official notice and must not be defaced by

anyone.

This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days

be directed to the Board’s Office, Savings Center Tower,

16th Floor, 411 Hamilton Avenue, Peoria Illinois 61602,

Telephone 309-671-7081.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BEFORE THE

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

DIVISION OF JULGES

BRANCH OFFICE

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

Case No. 33-CB-1132

PATTERN MAKERS’ LEAGUE OF NORTH AMERICA, AFL-CIO,

AND ITS ROCKFORD AND BELOIT ASSOCIATIONS

and

ROCKFORD-BELOIT PATTERN JOBBERS ASSOCIATION

Lynne E. Gilfillan, Atty., Peoria, III., for the General

Counsel.

William B. Peer, Atty., Washington, D.C., for the Re-

spondents.

DECISION

Statement of the Case

GERALD A. WACKNOV, Administrative Law Judge:

Pursuant to notice, a hearing with respect to this matter

was held before me in Rockford, Illinois, on August 16,

1978. The charge was filed on January 23, 1978 by

Rockford-Beloit Pattern Jobbers Association (herein called

the Pattern Jobbers Association), and thereafter on

March 7, 1978 a complaint and notice of hearing was

issued alleging a violation by Pattern Makers’ League of

North America, AFL-CIO, and its Rockford and Beloit

Associations (herein called the Respondent Unions) of

Section 8(b) (1) (A) and 8 (b) (2) of the National Labor

Relations Act, as amended (herein called the Act). On

Respondent Beloit Association are and have been at all

times material herein labor organizations within the

meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.

III. The Unfair Labor Practices

A. The Issues

The principal issues raised by the pleadings are (1)

whether Respondent Unions violated Section 8 (b) (1) (A)

of the Act by fining employees for returning to work dur-

ing the course of a strike, after said employees had been

expelled from or had tendered resignations to their re-

spective Respondent Unions; (2) whether Respondent

Beloit Association violated Section 8 (b) (1) (A) and Sec-

tion 8(b) (2) of the Act by attempting to cause an em-

ployer to discharge employees for their failure to join the

Union; and (3) whether Respondent Unions threatened

members in violation of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act.

B. The Facts

On or about May 5, 1977 the Respondent Rockford and

Beloit Associations commenced a strike against the Pat-

tern Jobbers Association and its individual members. The

strike ended on or about December 19, 1977 when nego-

tiations culminated in a new collective-bargaining agree-

ment. Between September 11 and December 2, 1977 ap-

proximately 11 employees individually tendered written

resignations to their respective Respondent Unions, and

thereafter returned to work for their employers.

On September 11, 1977 William Kohl became the first

member to tender his resignation. On September 12,

1977, apparently the date Kohl urned to work, he was

expelled from membership by Respondent Beloit Associ-

ation. On September 26, 1977 four additional employees

tendered their written resignations, and thereafter the

Respondent Unions received letters of resignation from ap-

proximately six additional individuals.“ Apparently, only

Kohl was expelled from membership.“ Pursuant to League

Law 13 of the Respondent Pattern Makers’ League of

North America the remaining resignations were not

accepted by the Respondent Unions, and each individual

was thereafter notified of this action in writing by letter

dated January 26, 1978, which letter also advised that

at a special meeting held on January 23, 1978, a sub-

stantial fine, approximately commensurate with his earn-

ings, had been levied against him for returning to work

during a strike.“

‘Al’ ‘at two of the letters of resignation are perfunctory in

nature, . erely advising Respondent Unions of the member’s resig-

nation. One letter contains expressions of dissatisfaction with

union officers and negotiators, and in another letter the member

expresses his continued belief in unions but regretfully states “it

has come down to my family and a hardship.”

2 The record umwer whether employee Lannie McDonald was

also expelled.

League LA 13 proves:

No resignati. or withdrawal from an Association, or from

the League, shall be accepted during a strike or lockout, or ata

time when a strike or lockout appears imminent.

The record does not contain Respondent Beloit Association's

rationale for responding to Kohl’s resignation letter with immediate

explusion, rather than invoking League Law 13 against Kohl, thus

prohibiting his resignation.

tion.” by letter dated February 1, 1978, apparently

pursuant to Kohl’s request, Respondent Beloit Association

furnished Kohl with application forms and advised him

„ FEREPIRE

ain

5 tH

a5 lt

fist

1 1 rf

;

collective-bargaining agreement, requesting that the em-

ployer take appropriate action to reetify this situation.“

On the same date, Respondent Beloit Association returned

to Nelson a check for union dues which he had previously

submitted, stating, “Since you are not a member of this

Association [the Union] can not accept any payment from

you for dues you don’t owe.” Donald L. Hansen, business

agent of Respondent Beloit Association, testified that

neither he nor any union steward or official notified Nel-

80a

his obligation to join the Union under the terms

col

lective-bargaining agreement or that his dis-

would be requested absent compliance therewith.

ship was approved in early February, 1978 after the pay-

ment of the appropriate admittance fee and dues require-

ments for new members.

League Law 13 became embodied in the laws of Re-

the various associations, including the members of Re-

defections from membership which, during the of

numerous prior strikes, caused substantial harm to the

League and its members. Thus, the return to work of

former members during the course of strikes resulted in

the inability to negotiate successor contracts, de-

functness of associations, and the acceptance of substand-

ard terms in collective-bargaining agreements.

week in benefits.“ Hansen further testified that all mem-

bers are required to take an Oath of Membership obligat-

ing them to adhere to the “Constitution, Laws, Rules and

Decisions” of the League and its associations; all mem-

bers, including those who later tendered their resigna-

tions, received due notice and all but one attended the

strike vote which was conducted by secret ballot; and,

5 However, Pattern Makers League Law 35, clause 3, states that

the monetary assistance benefit for strikers shall be only $40 per

week. There is no record evidence clarifying this apparent dis-

as a direct result of the defection of approximately 25

percent of the initial strikers, the strike not only was

prolonged but it became necessary to accept a contract

Unions

tember 1977“ and was attended by about 50-60

11.

assessed a fine of $15,000, and that until such a fine

paid his pension would decrease year by year until noth-

ing was left of it.“

The precise date of the meeting is unclear.

Gabelhausen admitted stating that crossing a picket line and

“possibly creating a non-union shop” could ultimately effect em-

ployees pensions.

% N. L. K. B. v. Granite State Joint Board, Textile Workers Union

of America, Local 1029, AFL-CIO (International Paper Bor Ma-

chine Co.), 409 U.S. 213 (19738).

29 V. L. R. B. v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S.

175 (1967).

The Board majority in Ex-Cell-O found it unnecessary

under the circumstances therein to “rule on the question

of what, if any, provision in a union’s constitution or by-

laws limiting the time or manner of resignation would

pass muster under the Act,” but enunciated certain stand-

ards which must be met in order to provide the manda-

tory “reasonable accomodation” between the often con-

flicting interests of the union and its members during a

strike. Thus, the Board majority in interpreting and

applying Supreme Court decisions states that any rule

imposing restraints on members’ rights to resign during

a strike must be precisely tailored to the union’s needs

and therefore no broader than necessary to serve the

union’s legitimate interests, and must accord “weight to

the competing considerations which may necessitate resig-

nation during a strike,” such as economic hardship.”

{Emphasis supplied. ]

There is no contention by the General Counsel that

League Law 13 was improperly enacted or that the mem-

1! See Granite State Joint Board, supra; Scofield v. N.L.R.B., 394

U.S. 423. See also, Local Lodge No. 1994, International Association

of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO (O.K. Tool Com-

pany, Inc.) 2215 NLRB 651; General Teamsters Local 439, Inter-

national Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen &

Helpers of America (Loomis Courier Service, Inc.), 237 NLRB

No. 84.

34a

bers who tendered their resignations were unaware of the

restrictions on resignation imposed therein. While there

are various infirmities inherent in League Law 13 or in

the failure of the Respondent Unions to uniformly apply

it to all members who tendered their resignations,” it is

clear that this Law fails to comply with the Board’s

standard enunciated in Ex-Cell-O that such a provision

12 Thus, it appears the Law would prohibit resignation or with-

drawals during strikes by members who are leaving the industry

or who may have secured jobs with other non-struck employers,

and would further prohibit resignation even if the strike were

unprotected. See Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO,

Local 1127 (New York Telephone Company), 208 NLRB 258. Fur-

ther, the language precluding resignations when a strike “appears

imminent” is so vague and susceptible to such varying interpreta-

tion as to severely limit the statutory right of members to resign

even prior to a strike vote and possibly even prior to the commence-

ment of negotiations. Such indefinite limitations placed upon an

employee’s statutory right to resign may run afoul of the Board’s

requirement that in order for such limitation to be binding a mem-

ber must have actual knowledge of or have indicated his consent

to be bound by his contractual commitment vis-avis the Union.

See Ex-Cell-O Corporation, supra; Loomis Courier Service, Inc.,

supra. It would appear that such a requirement presupposes some

particularity regarding these commitments so that a member may

timely and effectively resign. Compare the constitutional prohibi-

tion in Machinists Local 1327, International Association of Ma-

chinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, District Lodge 115

(Dalmo Victor), 231 NLRB No. 115. Moreover, by couching the

member’s obligation in such uncertain terms, the Union may have

breached a fiduciary duty to “deal fairly” with employees whom the

Union represents. See Loomis Courier Service, Inc., supra, slip

opinion p. 7. Finally, the Respondent Unions did not consistently

invoke and perhaps waived their “right” to invoke League Law 13.

Thus, as noted above, William Kohl was the first member to tender

his resignation. He was expelled from membership immediately

thereafter, prior to the other individuals involved herein having

tendered their resignations. Under such circumstances the remain-

ing employees would quite reasonably believe that, similarly, League

Law 13 would not be invoked to prohibit their resignations. Indeed,

the record shows no notification to them that their resignations

were unacceptable until January 26, 1978, well after the conclusion

of the strike and months after the tenders of resignation.

35a

must accord weight to circumstances necessitati -

nation during a strike. The blanket prohibition of —

nations or withdrawals during strikes embodied in

League Law 13 permits of no exceptions or qualifications,

obviously according no weight whatsoever to the compet-

ing considerations often confronting striking employees.

Thus, I find that League 13 is an impermissible encroach-

ment on employees’ statutory right to resign union mem-

bership and that the fines imposed thereunder are in

violation of the Act. Local 1384 United Automobile, Aero-

space, Agriculture Implement Workers (Ex-Cell-O Corpo-

ration), supra. But cf. Machinists Local 1327, Interna-

— Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers

FL-CIO, District Lodge 115 (Dalmo Victor), supra,

and the dissenting opinions therein.

During the course of discussing ble methods

dealing with anticipated —— dt ae — a

President Romelfanger voiced his agreement and elabor-

ated upon the statement of one member, who remarked

that some of the men on the picket line could get pretty

hostile, adding that it had sometimes happened that

strikebreakers end up with broken arms or broken legs.

Similar statements were made, in similar coniexts, by

Vice President Gabelhausen and Business Manager Bunk

at various union meetings. Further, it was, at the least,

—— suggested by Gabelhausen that employees would

ose a day of pension benefits to which they were entitled

for each day they worked during the strike.

I find that the statements attributed to Romelfanger

Gabelhausen and Bunk, were made substantially as wit-

American Lumber Sales, 229 NLRB 414, 416.

86a

no effort was made by any union official to dispel such

reasonable beliefs. Moreover, when Bunk was asked

whether his remarks concerning broken windows and

damage to cars of employees constituted a threat, Bunk

replied, “Take it for what it is worth,” clearly indicating

that indeed such was the case. I find that the aforemen-

tioned statements constitute conduct violative of Section

8(b) (1) (A) of the Act as alleged. See Service Em-

International Union Local 254, AFL-CIO, 218

NLRB 1399; Progressive Mine Workers of America, Dis-

trict No. 1, 188 NLRB 489.

The Genera! Counsel submits that the letters from

Respondent Beloit Association to Atlas, the employer of

Kohl and Nelson, were requests for the discharge of these

employees for failure to comply with the union security

provisions of the new contract. Further, the General

Counsel maintains that by making such a request to the

employees’ employer Respondent Beloit Association

breached a fiduciary duty to deal fairly with the em-

ployees affected, which duty, at a minimum, requires

that a union inform the employee of his obligations under

a union security provision in order that he may protect

his job tenure.

Hansen testified that the letters to Atlas regarding

Kohl and Nelson were designed to prompt Atlas to, in

turn, cause Kohl and Nelson to comply with the con-

tract’s union security provisions.“ The letter regarding

Nelson was sent to Atlas 3 days prior to the time that

Respondent Beloit Association could have requested his

immediate discharge, and was not inconsistent with Han-

sen’s testimony regarding the purposes of the letter. Upon

14 See Liberty Nursing Homes, Inc., 286 NLRB No. 55, slip

opinion pp. 5-6.

15 The record does not contain the wording of the union security

provisions.

87a

the expiration of the appropriate period, the record shows

no attempt to cause the discharge of Nelson. Further, the

record strongly indicates that Nelson was aware of his

obligations; indeed Nelson had previously tendered a

check for dues prior to his becoming a member. Most

importantly, the job tenure of Nelson was not disrupted

in any fashion, and he continued in the employ of Atlas

and thereafter became a member of the Respondent Be-

loit Association. Eased upon the foregoing, I find the

record evidence insufficient to support the complaint al-

legation that Respondent Beloit Association unlawfully

attempted to cause Atlas to discharge Nelson. Nor does

it appear that Respondent Beliot Association breached a

fiduciary duty to Nelson.

However, the facts regarding Kohl are quite different.

It is not in dispute that Respondent Beloit Association ex-

pelled Kohl from membership immediately upon receiv-

ing his letter of resignation. Thereafter, Respondent Be-

loit Association sent a letter to Atlas urging that Kohl

comply with the union security provisions of the centract

by becoming a member of said Union. However, unlike

the treatment of Nelson, Respondent Peloit Association

thereupon erected a barrier to Kohl’s compliance with the

contract requirements by conditioning his membership in

the Union upon the payment of substantial sums for

back dues obviously imposed for periods during which

Kohl had no dues obligation,“ a readmission fee of $500,

and an additional amount of $4,200 for damages. It is clear

that all such amounts were imposed as a penalty for con-

duct in which Kohl was engaged after having effectively

resigned his Union membership. Therefore, having con-

ditioned membership, mandatory under a valid union

security clause, upon the payment of such apparently un

precedented and excessive amounts and by attempting to

cause the employer to seek Kohl’s compliance therewith

% According to the Laws of the Pattern Makers’ League, 8 months

advance dues are customarily required of new members.

38a

upon the implicit threat of discharge, Respondent Beloit

Association has violated Section 8 (1)(A) and 8(b)

(2) of the Act.“ International Association of Machinists

and Aerospace Workers, District No. 71 (Whitaker Cable

Corporation), 224 NLRB 580; Local 1936, Brotherhood

of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, (NCR Corpor-

ation), 229 NLRB 243; Business Machine Technicians

and Engineers Section, Brotherhood of Airline and

Steamship Clerks, AFL-CIO (NCR Corporation), 235

NLRB No. 86.

Conclusions of Law

1. The Pattern Jobbers Association is an employer en-

gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)

and(7) of the Act.

2. Respondents Pattern Makers’ League of North

America, AFL-CIO, Rockford Association, and Beloit As-

sociation are labor organizations within the meaning of

Section 2(5) of the Act.

3. By maintaining as an obligation of membership and

by invoking League Law 13 against members, which law

unreasonably precludes members’ effective resignation

during a strike or when a strike appears imminent, Re

spondents have violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.

4. By imposing fines against former members who had

duly resigned prior to returning to work during the

course of a strike, Respondents have violated Section 8

(b (1) (A) of the Act.

17 While the complaint alleges only the unlawfulness of the fine,

I find that the back dues and excessive readmission fee required of

Kohl as a condition of becoming a member of the Union are likewise

tantamount to unlawfully imposed fines. Whether Respordent Beloit

Association could lawfully impose a reasonable readmission fee

based on nondiscriminatory considerations is a matter properly

left for the compliance stage of this proceeding. See Metal Workers’

Alliance, Incorporated, (TRW Metals Division, TRV, Inc.), 172

NLRB 815.

39a

5. By conditioning admission in the union, under the

loit Association has violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and

8(b) (2) of the Act.

6. By threatening employees with reprisals in the form

of physical harm or loss of accrued pension benefits, Re-

spondents have violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.

7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor

affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-

tion 2(6) of the Act.

The Remedy

Having found that the Respondents engaged in certain

unfair labor practices, I recommend that they be required

t to

conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuan

Section 10 (e) of the Act, I hereby issue the following

recommend d:

pattern Makers’ League of North Amer-

ica, AFL-CIO, Rockford Association and Beloit Associa-

tion, shall:

1. Cease and desist from:

(a) Giving force or effect to League Law 13.

(b) Restraining or coercing employees who have

resigned from Respondents, by imposing fines on such

employees for working during a sanctioned strike.

Threatening employees with physical harm,

property damage, a loss of pension benefits, or any other

reprisals for working during the course of a sanctioned

strike.

(d) Im fines and other penalties upon former

mentee ta amish to es Gar caged ces lt

effective resignation from Respondent, as conditions of

regaining union membership under the provisions of a

union security clause, and attempting to cause an em-

ployer to seek an employee’s compliance therewith.

2. Take the following affirmative action designed to

effectuate the purposes of the Act:

Mak-

(a) Expunge from the Laws of the Pattern

ers’ League of North America, AFL-CIO any reference

to League Law 13

1 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section

adopted the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and

—— — —— — E for all

purposes.

sion fee imposed upon William Kohl as a condition of his

regaining membership in the Beloit Association, and

so notify Kohl of such action.

(d) Expunge from the records of said employees

any reference to fines levied against them for post-resig-

nation conduct.

(e Post at their business offices and meeting halls

copies of the attached notice marked Appendix.“

Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional

Director for Region 33, after being duly signed by auth-

orized representatives of Respondents, shall be posted

by Respondents immediately upon receipt thereof, and

shall be maintained by them for 60 consecutive days

thereafter in conspicuous places including all places

where notices to members are customarily posted. Reason-

able steps shall be taken by the Respondents to insure

that said notices are not altered, defaced or covered by

any other material.

(f) Mail to the Regional Director for Region 33

sufficient signed copies of said notice for posting by em-

ployer members of the Rockford-Beloit Pattern Jobbers

Association, if the employers are willing, in places where

notices to employees are customarily posted. Copies of said

notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director, after

In the event that the Board’s Order is ( forred by a Judgment

of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading

“POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELA-

TIONS BOARD” shall be changed to read “POSTED PURSUANT

TO 4A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF AP-

PEALS ENFORCING AN ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS BOARD.”

tives, returned forthwith to the Regional

ie) Notify the Regional Director for Region 33 in

writing within 20 days from the date of this Order, what

steps the Respondents have taken to comply herewith.

Dated: NOVEMBER 21, 1978

% Gerald A. Wacknov

GERALD A. WACKNOV

Administrative Law Judge

43a

APPENDIX

JD-(SF) -276-78

NOTICE TO

MEMBERS

[SEAL] [SEAL]

PosTEeD By ORDER OF THE

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

An Agency of the United States Government

WE HEARBY NOTIFY YOU that League Law 13 of

the Pattern Makers’ League of Nerth America, AFL-

CIO, has been found to unlawfully prohibit employees

from resigning their membership from the League or

its Associations during the course of a strike or when a

strike appears imminent.

WE WILL NOT give force or effect to League Law 13

and it will be expunged from the League’s body of laws.

WE WILL NOT impose fines and other penalties upon

upon former members for conduct in which they en-

gaged after resigning their membership, as conditions of

regaining union membership under the provisions of a

valid union security clause and WE WILL NOT attempt

to cause employers to seek employees’ complaince there-

with.

WE WILL rescind the fines and other similar penalties

levied against employees for their post-resignation activ-

ity of working during the course of a strike, and notify

said employees that such fines and penalties have been

rescinded.

WE WILL expunge from the records of said employees

any reference to fines levied against them for post-resig-

nation conduct.

property damage, loss of pension benefits, or

PATTERN MAKERS’ LEAGUE OF

NortH AMeRicA, AFL-CIO, and Its

ROCKFORD AND Be Sr ASSOCIATIONS

(Unions)

Dated By

(For Pattern Makers’ League of

North America, AFL-CIO)

;

Dated

By ‘

(For Beloit Association )

Dated By

(For Rockford Association

This is an Official Notice and Must not be

Defaced by Anyone

may be directed to the Board’s Office, Savings Center

Tower—16th Floor, 411 Hamilton Avenue, Peoria, IL

61602. Telephone Number— (309) 671-7091.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.