Amicus Curiae Brief — ICC v. Locomotive Engineers
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Supreme Court, U.S,
FILED
JUN @ Ge
Nos. 85-792 and 85-793 JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR,
—_—~om
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1985
JNTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION and
MISSOURI-KANSAS-TEXAS RAILROAD COMPANY,
Peti iovers,
V.
BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINE =RS and
UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
BRIEF OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS AND
NATIONAL RAILWAY LABOR CONFERENCE
AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITIONERS
KENN -TH P. KOLSON RICHARD T. CONWAY
ASSOCIATION OF (Counsel of Record)
AMERICAN RAILROADS WILLIAM F,. SHEEHAN
50 F Street, N.W. SHEA & GARDNER
Washington, D.C. 20001 1800 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
(202) 689-2100 Washington, D.C. 2305¢
Dav P. LEE (202) 828-2900
General] Counsel
NATIONAL RAILWAY
LABOR CONFERENCE
1901 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 862-7218
Counsel for Amici Curiae
June 7, 198
WILSON - EPES PRINTING Co.. INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
STATEMENT
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGU-
ARGUMENT
I. THE COMMISSION ADEQUATELY EX-
PLAINED ITSELF
II. THE COMMISSION’S CONCLUSIONS WERE
CORRECT
A. The Interstate Commerce Act Provides A
Comprehensive Scheme Encouraging Rail
Consolidation And Protecting the Interests
. The Railway Labor Act, If It Applied, Would
Interfere With and Could Defeat the Goals
of the Interstate Commerce Act
. The ICC, Following BLE v. CNW, Rightly
Ruled That the Railway Labor Act Is Super-
I ii
D. Override of the Railway Labor Act Is Re-
quired in This Case
Ill. SECTION 11341(a) IS SELF-EXECUTING...
IV. THE 4-R ACT DID NOT AMEND THE LAW
TO ALLOW THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT TO
INTERFERE WITH TRANSACTIONS AP-
PROVED BY THE COMMISSION
CONCLUSION
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: Page
American Airlines v. CAB, 445 F.2d 891 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1015 (1972) ........ 7
Andzrson Vv. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 773 F.2d
880 (7th Cir. 1985) ...........-...------.---0---csseone-eosenneenns 30
Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight
Systems, Inc., 419 U.S. 281 (1974) -......-----.------ 9
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Boston
and Maine Corp., 122 LRRM 202v (ist Cir.,
April 9, 1986) ........-.-.---.....---2c--e---ereseocesnosennnssnnoenes 18, 23
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Chicago
and North Western Ry., 314 F.2d 424 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 819 (1963) -........---- passim
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes V.
United States, 366 U.S. 169 (1961) ~................... 11,17
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville
Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 269 (1969) .................-.-. 14
Bundy v. Penn Central Co., 455 F.2d 277 (6th Cir.
|, | ean See. ea eee 18
Burlington Northern, Inc. v. American Railway
Supervisors Ass’n, 503 F.2d 58 (‘th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 975 (1975)......--.---..------------ 18
Burlington Northern R.R. v. UTU, No. 86-5013-
2 2.0) = pee 16
Chicago & E.I. R. Co. Trackage Rights, 254 1.C.C.
> eee 3
Colorado Interstate Gas Co. V. FPC, 324 U.S. 581
(| aa a ee 7,10
Congress of Railway Unions v. Hodgson, 326 F.
|. £: OS SS |) ase 25, 28
Detroit and Toledo Shore Line R.R. v. UTU, 396
FR Re ee Se ENN 14
Division 1287, Amalgamated Transit Union Vv.
Kansas City Area Transp. Authority, 582 F.2d
444 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090
CED eccecsnatscntecseniacninsatepsicnindtiabieninapedieimiamaandals 28
Division No. 14, Order of R.R. Tel. v. Leighty,
298 F.2d 17 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
SF a ee ee ee 12
Dixie Cotton Oil Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry.,
el & ¥, See
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatl., 443
REE ee SS eC
Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S.
gE SEIS AES SEE See a
Employees Protective Ass’n v. Norfolk & Western
Ry., 511 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1975) 20000.
Engineers Vv. Burlington Northern, Inc., 92 LRRM
ey ee IONS ca
Guilford Transp., Ind., Inc.—Control—Boston and
Maine Corp., 366 I.C.C. 292 (1982), affirmed in
relevant part, Lamoille Valley R.R. v. ICC, 711
A | nr
Guilford Transp. Ind., Inc.—Control—Delaware
and Hudson Ry., 366 1.C.C. 396 (1982), af-
firmed in relevant part, Central Vermont Ry. v.
ICC, 711 F.2d 331 (D.C. Cir. 1983) .............
Gulf, M. & N. R. Co. Abandonment of Operations,
ET a
Hayfield Northern R.R. v. Chicago and North
Western Transp. Co., 467 U.S. 622 (1984)...
International Aas'n of Machinists v. Boston and
Maine Corp., No. 84-3703-T (D. Mass.) _..........
International Ass’n of Machinists v. Northeast
Airlines, 400 F. Supp. 372 (D. Mass. 1975),
aff'd, 536 F.2d 975 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429
i
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Northeast
Airlines, 536 F.2d 975 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 961 (1976)
International Ass’n of Machinists v. Northeast
Airlines, 473 F.2d 549 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
Ne decent.
ICC v. Columbus & Greenville Ry., 319 U.S. 551
EEE as ee ee
ICC v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass’n, 315 U.S. 378
NS ee te
Jackson Transit Authority v. Local Division 1285,
Amalgamated Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15
(1982)
Page
26
14
30
29
15
19
lV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Kent v. CAB, 204 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 346 U.S. 826 (1958) .............................---.-...
Locomotive Engineers v. New York Dock Rail
Road, 94 Labor Cases { 13,704 (E.D.N.Y. 1981),
subsequent opinion, 97 Labor Cases { 10,007
RS he Re eee eee
Missouri Pac. R.R. v. UTU, 782 F.2d 107 (8th
Cir. 1986), pdg. on pet. for a writ of cert.,
Bis I~ cnnsobiaheatcieinectibehpesetitetenuiininbtientnitiiabsnnss
Missouri Pac. R.R. v. UTU, 580 F. Supp. 1490
(E.D. Mo. 1984), aff’d, 782 F.2d 107 (8th Cir.
1986), pdg. on pet. for a writ of cert., No. 85-
| Rec Core aes Peet. © eo ere sil
Nemitz v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 436 F.2d 841
(6th Cir.), aff'd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 37
b, | EEE ES GRE AEE OSS SNS
New York Dock Ry.—Control—Brooklyn Eastern
District, 360 I.C.C. 60, aff'd, New York Dock
Ry. v. United States, 609 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.
Page
7,19
29
18
19
DOD iciedetiectitinenthntnninscntatiicie piiicecnltbiliilednteiasell 6, 13, 26, 29
Norfolk and Western Ry. v. Nemitz, 404 U.S. 37
Op a Se Se ee eee eee
Norfolk and Western Ry.—Trackage Right—BN,
354 I.C.C. 605 (1978), as modified by, Mendo-
cino Coast Ry.—Lease and Operate—California
Western R.R., 360 1.C.C. 653 (1980), aff'd, Rail-
way Labor Exec. Ass’n vy. United States, 675
pA Be te Bannon ES eee
Oregon Short Line R.R. Co.—Abandonment-—-
Goshen, 354 1.C.C. 76 (1977) .................................
Oregon Short Line R.R. Co.—Abandonment—
Goshen, 360 1.C.C. 91 (1979) .................................
Railway Clerks v. Florida East Coust Ry., 384
i TD MI alin eonernideilihinstinishiuialiaidaidasinditinssedbbeanbeke
Railway Labor Exec. Ass’n v. Butte, Anaconda
and Pac. R.R., No. 85-3875 (9th Cir.) —..............
Railway Labor Exec. Ass’n v. ICC, 784 F.2d 959
(9th Cir. 1986)
18
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Railway Labor Exec. Ass’n v. Staten Island R.R..,
— F.2d (2d Cir., No. 85-7483, May 22,
RD i Bi iil bie a ose, 7,15
Railway Labor Exec. Ass’n v. United States, 339
U.S. 142 (1950) a a FL Se CLI 12,17
Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U.S. 182
SING ik ait nidindictacahdibtdagspsshideeaeistaielinbtigttderceégsanee 22
Shepard v. NLRB, 459 U.S. 344 (1983) -............... 10
Simmons v. ICC, 760 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1985)... 6
Simmons v. ICC, 766 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 791 (1986) ...........000..... 6
Southern Ry. Co.—Control—Control of Georgia
Bae Geg BHR BAAs: BBR CGD ncecncccectcernnserdiccc+se- 28
Texas & New Orleans R.R. v. Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen, 307 F.2d 151 (5th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 952 (1963)........ 19, 20
Texas and New Orleans R.R. Vv. Brotherhood of
Railway and Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548
SEI cicesisrenersetitineianisisilbibdiabancahdatbicielaidbsapidipptimpihipanbideree 14
Thompson Vv. Texas Mexican R. Co., 328 U.S. 134
TESTES SEE ree alae 2
Transit Comm’n vy. United States, 289 U.S. 121
AR SSP PRAT SES ATR 2
Union Pacific-Control-Missouri Pacific, 366 I.C.C.
462 (1982), aff'd, Southern Pacific Transp. Co.
v. ICC, 736 F.2d 708 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 105 S.Ct. 1171, 1172 (1985) db
United States v. Lowden, 308 U.S. 225 (1939) ....5, 11, 20
United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, Inc.,
ee peeenlbidnbnnes 10
UTU v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 332 F. Supp.
1170 (N.D. Ohio 1971) ................. est neni elt Cee 18, 19
Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259 (1981) .........-2000. 26
STATUTES:
Civil Aeronautics Act, as amended:
49 U.S.C. app. § 1378 (1982 ed.) -......-...--..002... 7,19
Interstate Commerce Act, as amended:
49 U.S.C. § 10505 5, 7,18
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
CR BOD aiccnnn nena nncsceccncoseccencenceverccnsionentonneess 4, 5, 6,7, 15
| A S| EEA nO © SOY Sea a
re I iciiccstctscttecsvtncusinenonbitidicinsassbaninnts 4,5
Ts Fh OD cenctecttertccsccccccsswceeesnsisencnstintiscces 4,6
CT aia ince atcntnsesiersenesmnctnincnnaentngsciinnnns passim
ee Or I errnerticcnceqresenceneneccemenenesqnnnmentansa passim
gs passim
LE ET TR 8, 12, 22, 23
4 Ee eee passim
National Labor Relations Act, as tieniadied:
Section 8(e), 73 Stat. 543, 29 U.S.C.
FERRE Es eae eae ae eee 10
Norris-LaGuardia Act
ft ESE Tee Ces PES 19
Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (“Amtrak
Act”), Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1327
(1970) :
Section 405, 84 Stat. 1387 .................................. 25, 27
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31
CPCI cticsdsanpsicharedeeipirtnnielninepenpaeniuithanintadbiniantcgyiningens passim
Section 101, 90 Stat. 33, 45 U.S.C. § 801 _.......... 11
Section 401, 90 Stat. 61-62 -...................... indie 12
EE A 24, 26
Railway Labor Act, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151
68 I. cegrtnicitinttronntininnpebpenteinae passim
Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448,
Sh ts: EY SUID ccgietsensihetiids thibnestigialisaedttacindscipilaeste 6
Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 456 (1920)... 1]
Transportation Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 898 (1940).. 2, 5, 11,
12,17
Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, § 13(c),
Oe I ID oss cesemeetnntsvnimentacishtiobetn 27
MISCELLANEOUS:
BE GS Bs MD CED occecscc ccc ccncccecsecceseconsesees 27
H.R. 10979, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975) ..........-.-... 26
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
H.R. Rep. No. 94-725, 94th Cong., Ist Sess.
EIR ES SEA ee
S. 2718, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975) ......................
S. Rep. No. 94-499, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975),
reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
RT A Te ie otha a Seiad Mi SNE NID OR
i L.L. Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Com-
OR a he
Supplemental Hearings on H.R. 17849 and S.3706
before the Subcommittee on Transportation and
Aeronautics of the House Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d
REE SY tere eles a el ee
Page
26
26
11
11
27
BRIEF OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS AND
NATIONAL RAILWAY LABOR CONFERENCE
AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITIONERS
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
The Association of American Railroads is the trade
association for the nation’s railroads. Its members em-
ploy approximately 94% of the workers, operate approx-
imately 92% of the trackage, and account for approxi-
mately 97% of the freight revenues of all railroads in
the United States. The Association represents its mem-
ber railroads before courts, agencies, and the Congress
when matters 0. common concern are at issue.
Almost all of the nation’s Class I railroads are mem-
bers of the National Railway Labor Conference. The
Conference represents member railrcads both in national
collective bargaining pursuant to the Railway Labor Act
with unions representing their employees and in regard
to other labor-management relations problems that are
of concern to the railroads generally. In addition, the
Conference serves as a clearing house of information re-
garding, and renders assistance and advice to member
railroads concerning, employee protection issues that arise
out of mergers and other railroad transactions governed
by the Interstate Commerce Act.
This case raises the question whether labor-manage-
ment disagreements arising out of rail carrier efforts to
implement transactions approved by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission are to be resolved according to the
procedures prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Act,
or the procedures prescribed by the Railway Labor Act.
This question is critical. Under the Interstate Commerce
Act such disputes are resolved promptly by mandatory,
binding arbitration; under the Railway Labor Act they
may lead to strikes and other forms of self-help, inter-
fering with interstate commerce and possibly blocking
altogether the realization of transactions held to be in
the public interest.
2
The decision of the court of appeals in this case mis-
construes the relationship between the two statutes and
misunderstands the <ffect of an approval by the Commis-
3ion under the Interstate Commerce Act. It threatens
serions interference with and delay to the ability of rail-
roads to implement not only Commission-approved track-
age rights transactions by operation with their own
crews as traditionally has been done—which is the sub-
ject of this case—but also other kinds of transactions
approved by the Commission. The AAR and the NRLC
accordingly file this brief in support of the petitioners
herein.’
STATEMENT
This case has its beginning in the approval by the
Interstate Commerce Commission of the merger of the
Union Pacific (“UP”) and Missouri Pacifie (“MP”)
railroads. To ameliorate the anticompetitive effect of
that merger, the Commission simultaneously granted two
competing carriers—the Missouri-Kansas-Texas (“MKT”)
and the Denver Rio Grande Western (“DRGW”)—rights
to operate their trains over tracks owned by MP.? And
to protect the interests of any employees who -night he
adversely affected by the exercise of those rights, the
Commission imposed on the carriers certain “employee
1 Written consents from all parties to the filing of this brief have
been filed with the Clerk of the Court.
2It has long been “a well-recognized practice among carriers to
agree as to trackage rights aad privileges between one another for
the common use of a part of the line of or? in such a mainer as
to make the tracks subject to the agreemen. a part of both roads.”
Dixie Cotton Oil Co. v. St. Lowis, 1. M. & S. Ry., 27 L.C C. 295, 297
(1918). The acquisition of trackage rights by a carrier “consti-
tute[s] an ‘extension’ of its own railroad” and “serves the same
purpose as would the acquisition of such lines by purchase or the
construction by it of a like extension * * *” Tre iit Comm'n V.
Un‘ted States, 289 U.S. 121, 128-129 (1933). The Transportation
Act of 1940 gave the Commission “explicit powers over trackage
rights,” including “fixing terms and conditions * * * for any track-
age agreements entered into * * *.” Thompson v. fexas Mexican
R. Co., 8328 U.S. 184, 146 (1946).
es
3
protection” obligations, more fully described below. Un-
ion Pacific-Control-Missouri Pacific, 366 I.C.C. 462
(1982), aff'd, Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. ICC, 736
F.2d 708 (D.C. Ci». 1984).
The trackage rights applications submitted to and ap-
proved by the Commission stated that the MKT would
use its own employees to man its trains, and that the
DRGW would have the option of doing so. (Pet. App.
62a.)* When the tenant carriers exercised their track-
age rights the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers
(“BLE”) and the United Transportation Union (“UTU”)
protested to the Commission on behalf of the MP em-
ployees. They argued that the tenants’ operation of their
own trains with their own crews over MP tracks
amounted to a change in the collective bargaining agree-
ments relating to the working conditions of MP employ-
ees; that such a change could be lawfully effected only
through collective bargaining pursuant to the major dis-
pute procedures of the Railway Labor Act; and that the
Commission has no power under the Interstate Com-
merce Act, to authorize a transaction effecting such a
change without resort to the procedures of the Railway
Labor Act. (Pet. App. 57a-59a. )*
* “Pet. App.” references are to the Appendix to the petition of the
Interstate Commerce Commission. Operation by the tenant carrier
“with its own engines and crews * * * is the usual method by which
one carrier uses tracks of another.” Gulf, M. & N. R. Co. Abandon-
ment of Operations, 233 1.C.C. 294, 297 (1939). Indeed, it has been
held that an agreement under which the owner carrier “would fur-
nish all necessary locomotives and crews” is not a true trackage-
rights agreement, which “necessarily include[s] an operating right”
‘a. the tenant carrier. Chicago & E.]. R. Co. Trackage Rights, 254
1.C.C. 608, 604, 605 (1943).
* Both the BLE and the UTU participated in the initial ICC pro-
ceeding and opposed the trackage rights applications generally.
Neither, however, opposed the applications insofar as they would
allow the tenants to use their own crews and neither raised that
issue on appeal to the D.C. Circuit from the approval of the applica-
tions. Moreover, those unions also represent employees of the tenant
carriers. The record shews that the unions, on behalf of those
4
In addition, the UTU threatened to strike the MP
unless the MP refused to permit MKT crews to operate
MKT trains on MP tracks. That threatened strike was
enjoined. Missouri Pac. R.R. V. UTU, 580 F. Supp. 1490
(E.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd, 782 F.2d 107 (8th Cir. 1986),
pdg. on pet. for a writ of cert., No. 85-1054.
The Commission rejected the unions’ arguments. It
concluded, among other things, that the tenants were
free to use theix own crews, even if that did amount to
a change in the working conditions of MP employees, be-
cause the Kailway Labor Act did not apply but had been
superseded for the reasons stated at length in Brother-
hood of Locomotive Engineers V. Chicago and North
Western Ry., 314 F.2d 424, 430-31 (8th Cir. 1963).
(Pet. App. S0a. )
A divided court of appeals found the Corimission’s ex-
planation inadequate. It sought to distinguish the case
on which the Commission relied, and it vacated the Com-
mission’s orders on the asserted ground that the agency
“did not give a shred of reasoning to support its view
that completion of the transactions required shielding
crew selection from the Railway Labor Act.” (Pet. App.
19a, footnote omitted. )
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. Introduction. The Interstate Commerce Act con-
tains, in Chapters 109 and 113 of Title 49 of the U.S.
Code, a comprehensive and meticulous scheme for the
regulation of changes in rail earrier control or operation.
Chapter 109 (“Licensing”) governs the extension or con-
struction of a line of railroad (§ 10901), the sale of a
line of railroad from a carrier to a noncarrier (id.),
the abandonment of a line or the discontinuance of op-
erations over a line (§ 10903), and the purchase of a line
noticed and approved for abandonment (§ 10905). Chap-
employees, nave entered into agreements with the MKT—pursu-
ant to the procedures pres«ribed by the Interstate Commerce Act—
regarding the crewing of MKT’s trains used in trackage-rights
operations.
5
ter 113 (“Combinations”) governs the consolidation a4
merger of carriers, purchases or leases or contracts to
operate the properties of vther carriers, acquisitions of
control, and acquisitions of trackage rights over arother
earrier’s lines (§ 11343). Before any of these actions
may be taken the approval of the Interstate Commerce
Commission is required.®
Under that statutory scheme the Commission for nearly
50 years has had power to impose employee protections
as a condition of its approval of most of the actions just
described. Thus, before 1940 the Commission in its dis-
cretion and without specific authority imposed protec-
tions as a condition of its approval of transactions now
falling under Chapter 113. United States v. Lowden,
308 U.S. 225 (1939). Such protections were required
after the Transportation Act of 1940, which “made man-
datcry with respect to unifications the protections for
workers that had previousiy been discretionary.” JCC
v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass’n, 315 U.S. 373, 379 (1942)
(footnote omitted). Similarly, before 1976 the Commis-
sion had and exercised discretionary power to impose con-
ditions under the predecessors to Chapter 109 provisions.
See id. In that year the Railroad Revitalization and Reg-
ulatory Reform Act amended those provisions to require
protections in the case of abandonments (§ 10903) and
to codify the Commission’s discretion in the case of ac-
quisitions and extensions or constructions of rail lines
(§ 10901). See Railway Labor Exec. Ass’n v. ICC. 784
F.2d 959, 945 (9th Cir. 1986).
5 Under § 10505, the “ mmission may exempt “a person, class of
persons, or a transaction Ur service” from requirements of the Act,
including those contained in Chapters 109 and 113, but such an
yxemption does not “reli.ve a carrier of its obligations to pro-
tect the interests of employees as required” in those chapters
($ 19505(g)). Hence, the preemptiv: effect upon the Railway Labor
Act is the same regardless of whether the Commission approves a
transaction under applicable provisions of Chapter 109 or 113 or
exempts the transaction from those provisions.
6 The one exception to the foregoing is that the Commission has
no power to impose protectiors in connection with the purchase of a
6
Chapters 109 and 113 share more than a common his-
tory of the Commission’s power to impose protections.
Both chapters have the goal of an efficient and economic
rail transportation system, see ICC V. Railway Labor
Exec. Ass'n, supra, 315 U.S. at 376; the justifications
for protections as recognized y this Court apply equally
to both chapters, see id., 315 U.S. at 377; the prctections
that the Commission imposes under both chapters are
virtually identical;* and tae Railway Labor Act, if it
applied, would frustrate and possibly block altogether
transactions under both chapters approved by the Com-
mission as being in the public interest. For these reasons
the cmici Association of American Railroads and Na-
tional Railway Labor Conference beiieve that the Rail-
way Labor Act is overridden by the Interstate Commerce
Act with respect to all transactions subject to Commis-
sion approval, whether falling under Chapter 109 or 113.
This case involves a trackage rights transaction, cov-
ered by Chapter 113. As we show below, there is an
additional reason for concluding that the Railway Labor
Act is superseded with respect to Chapter 113 transac-
tions—namely, the provision in § 11341(a) that carriers
participating therein are “exempt * * * from all other
laws * * * as necessary to * * * carry out the transac-
tion.” But neither the presence of that provision in
Chapter 113, nor our reliance on it in this case, detracts
from the force of the arguments that the Railway Labor
—
line approved for abandonment under § 10905 (added by the 1976
Act but significantly amended by the Staggers Rail Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-448, § 402(c), 94 Stat. 1895, 1942-45). Simmons
v. ICC, 766 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1985) ; Simmons V. ICC, 760 F.2d
126 (7ih Cir. 1985).
7Compare New York Dock Ry.—Control—Brooklyn Tastern Dis.
trict, 360 1.C.C. 60, affirmed, New York Dock Ry. v. United States,
609 F.2d 83 (2a Cir. 1979) (merger protections under Chapter 113),
with Oregon Short Line R.R.—Abandonment—Goehen, 360 1.C.C. 91
(1979) (abandonment protections under Chapter 109).
7
Act is superseded by Chapter 109 as well. The amici
make this point out of a concern that a decision by this
Court favorable to petitioners in this case that relied on
the presence of § 11341(a) in Chapter 1138 could con-
ceivably be construed by lower courts to prejudice the
position of carriers in cases arising under Chapter 109.’
2. Summary. We show in Part I below that the court
of appeals erred in ruling that the Commission’s explana-
tion for its conclusion was inadequate. The Commis-
sion’s decision set forth the union’s claims, and then the
reasons for rejecting them. It relied heavily on, and
adopted as its own, the reasoning behind Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers v. Chicago and North Western Ry.,
314 F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1963), which held that the Rail-
way Labor Act is superseded by the Interstate Commerce
Act in cases such as this one. In short, “(t]he path which
it followed can be discerned.” Colorado Interstate Gas
Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581, 595 (1945).
In Part II we address the merits of the Commission’s
conclusions. We show that the procedures for resolving
disputes under that Act, which at their end contemplate
the union’s right to strike if its demands are not met,
must yield to the mandatory arbitration provisions pre-
scribed by the Commission as the means for resolving
8 We are supported in our view of the preemptive effect of
Chapter 109 by the experience under the Civil Aeronautics Act.
Labor protections imposed on air carriers under that Act have been
held to supersede inconsistent agreements under, or provisions of,
the Railway Tabor Act without reference to pny express statutory
exemption. E.g., Kent v. CAB, 204 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1953) ; .ccord,
International Ass’n of Machinists y Northeast Airlines, 473 F.2d
549 (1st Cir. 1972); International A..'n of Machinists v. Northeast
Airlines, 586 F.2d 975 (1st Cir. 1976) ; American Airlines v. CAB,
445 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1971).
® Pending cases involving the relationship between Chapter 109
(either directly or iadirectly by reason of a § 10505 exemption) and
the Railway Labor Act include Railway Labor Ezec. Ass'n Vv. Butte,
Anaconda and Pac. R.R., No. 85-3875 (9th Cir.) and Railway Labor
Exec. Ass'n Vv. Staten Island R.R., —— F.2d
74838, May 22, 1986).
(2d Cir., No. 85-
8
disputes stemming from carrier efforts to implement
transactions the Commission has approved as being in
the public interest. A contrary result would mean that
labor, already entitled in many instances under the In-
terstate Commerce Act to federally imposed protections
unparalleled elsewhere in American industry, would have
a veto power over the implementation by carriers of ap-
proved transactions. As a host of lower court decisions
supporting our view demonstrates, Congress meant to
encourage rail consolidations under the Interstate Com-
merce Act, and could not have meant to frustrate that
goal by giving rail labor, in addition to the statutorily
mandated protections, the right to delay or block those
transactions altogether.
3. In Part III we support the Commission’s construc-
tion of § 11341(a) as self-executing. That section of the
Interstate Commerce Act requires no action by the Com-
mission whatever. The factors required to be considered
by the Commission appear in $§ 11343 and 11344. Once
the Commission after considering those factors approves
a transaction, a question may subsequently arise as to
whether or not it is “necessary” under § 11341(a) for
the carrier participants to be relieved of the operation of
some other law, but the answer will ordinarily not de-
pend on whether the Commission has made any “neces-
sity” determination as part of its decision approving the
transaction in the first place.
4. Finally we show that the unions err in contending
that the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform
Act of 1976 amended the Interstate Commerce Act to
somehow revivify the role of the Railway Labor Act in
the implementation of ICC-approved transactions. The
provision in the 4-R Act on which the unions rely was
added without a shred of debate and it is inconceivable
that Congress was effecting so major a change in the
law. and introducing so large a hurdle to the accom-
plishment of the goals of the Interstate Commerce Act,
without a word being said about the matter by any mem-
ber of Congress or any representative of rail labor or
management.
9
ARGUMENT
I. THE COMMISSION ADEQUATEiY EXPLAINED
ITSEL:*
The Commission’s reasoning in its Octcber 19, 1983
decision “may reasonably be discerned.” Bowman Transp.,
Inc. V. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 281,
285-86 (1974). It set out the issues for decision by stat-
ing the unions’ claims: “that this Commission has no
jurisdiction over crew assignment disputes and that they
must be settled under the procedures of the Railway
Labor Act” and that the Commission’s approval of the
trackage rights transaction could not “immunize [that]
transaction ‘from the requirements of . RLA” or au-
thorize the carriers to make “unilateral changes of col-
lective bazgaining agreements.” (Pet. App. 57a.) The
Commission than went on to reject those arguments, rul-
ing that its approval of a transaction covered by § 11343—
“exempts such a transaction from the requirements
of all laws as necessary to permit the transaction
to be carried out, and includes an exemption from
the requirements of the RLA. See Brotherhood of
Loc. Eng. Vv. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co., 314
F.2d 424, 432 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. denied 375 U.S.
819 (1963).” (Pet. App. 59a.)
It also ruled (id. 60a) :
“To the extent that existing working conditions and
collective bargaining agreements conflict with a
transaction which we have approved, those conditions
and agreements must give way to the implementa-
tion of the transaction.”
And then the Commission explained why (id.) :
“If our approval of a transaction did not include
authority for the railroads to make necessary
changes in working conditions, subject to payment
of specified benefits, our jurisdiction to approve
transactions requiring changes of the working con-
ditions of any employees would be substantially nul-
lified. Such a result would be clearly contrary to
10
congressional intent. The discussion of this point
in Brotherhood of Loc. Eng. [v. Chicago and North
Western Ry. Co., 314 F.2d 424, 4380-31 (8th Cir.
1963) ] is persuasive and we conclude that this rea-
soning is unaffected by the enactment of the 4-R
Act.”
The Commission’s two citations to the Eighth Circuit’s
decision in the Chicago and North Western case (herein-
after “BLE v. CNW”), and its adoption of the reasoning
there as its own, make clear the basis for its finding that
the crew selection provisions of the approved trackage
rights agreements were exempt from the provisions of
the RLA.° In short, while the organization of the deci-
sion of the Commission may not be flawless, “[t]he path
which it followed can be discerned.” Colorado Interstate
Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581, 595 (1945). See also
United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, Inc., 327
U.S. 515, 532-33 (1946) ; ICC v. Columbus & Greenville
Railway, 319 U.S. 551, 555 (1943).
Il. THE COMMISSION’S CONCLUSIONS WERE
CORRECT
A. The Interstate Commerce Act Provides A Compre-
hensive Scheme Encouraging Rail Consolidations
And Protecting the Interests of Labor.
The Interstate Commerce Act favors rail mergers and
other types of rail consolidations. That has been true for
over 60 years. The post-World War I period was a time
of great uncertainty and financial crisis for the nation’s
10 See Shepard v. NLRB, 459 U.S. 344, 348-52 (1983), in which
this Court upheld the Board’s decision to forgo a requirement of
reimbursement as a remedy for violation of § 8(e) of the Nation]
Labor Relations Act. The Board’s reasoning on that issue was
confined to a footnote and was “something less than a model of
precise expository prose,” but the Court was able to glean “the
sense of the Board’s explanation,” in part by a reading of a decision
that the Board had merely cited in the explanatory footnote.
Id. 350.
11
railroads, largely because of waste and inefficiency caused
by extensive duplication of facilities and services. C 1-
gress responded with the Transportation Act of 1920, 41
Stat. 456, where “consolidation of the railroads of the
country, in the interest of economy cnd efficiency, became
an established national policy * * *.” United States v.
Lowden, 308 U.S. 225, 232 (1939). That Act, however,
left consolidation largely to the Commission’s efforts, and
proved insufficient to its end. Congress accordingly re-
affirmed and reinforced the national policy by giving rail
carriers principal authority to initiate unifications in the
Transportation Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 898, the chief goal
of which was “ ‘to facilitate merger and consolidation in
the national transportation system.’” Brotherhood of
Maintenance of Way Employes v. United States, 366
U.S. 169, 173 (1961).
The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform
Act cf 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31, continued
pursuit of the national policy. It “was an attempt to
restructure the railroad industry in the face of chronic
financial losses and line closures.” Railway Labor Exec.
Ass’n V. ICC, 784 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 1986). It
sought to promote an efficient rail transportation system
through (among other things) “the encouragement of
efforts to restructure the system on a more economically
justified basis, including planning authority [for mer-
gers} in the Secretary of Transportation, an expedited
procedure for determining whether merger and consolida-
tion applications are in the public interest, and continu-
ing reorganization authority * * *.” §101(a)(2), 90
Stat. 33, 45 U.S.C. § 801(a) (2).
11See 1 I. L. Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission
172-178 (19381).
12 See Senate Rep. No. 94-499, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 20-21 (1975),
reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 14, 34 (“Title IV
of this bill is intended to encourage mergers, consolidations and
joint use of facilities that tend to rationalize and improve the
12
Throughout this entire period the Commission’s ap-
proval has been required for mergers, consolidations and
other transactions falling within what is now § 11343. The
Commission’s jurisdiction over these transactions is “ex-
clusive,” and carriers participating in approved transac-
tions are “exempt * * * from all other law * * 7 an
necessary to let that person carry out the transaction
***” § 11341 (a).
A more efficient and hence viable rail transportation
system will ultimately benefit the public at large and pre-
serve jobs for rail labor. Yet Congress has long recog-
nized that the economies it sought to encourage through
rail mergers are often achieved by the abolishment of
duplicative facilities, resulting in the dismissal of em-
ployees or their displacement to lower paying jobs.** Its
response, since the Transportation Act of 1940, has been
to require the Commission in determining whether to
grant an application subject to § 11343 to consider
(among other things) “the interest of carrier employees
affected by the proposed transaction,” § 11344(b) (1) (D),
and if it approves the application the Commission “shall
require the carrier to provide a fair arrangement” to
protect employees adversely affected by the transaction.
§ 11347. The Commission accordingly has established a
comprehensive set of “protections” to be afforded em-
Nation’s rail system, and requires the Commission * * * to reach a
[prompt] decision * * *.” Section 401 “empowers the Secretary to
develop plans, proposals and recommendations for mergers, con-
solidations and other coordination projects * * *.”).
18 See Railway Labor Exec. Ass’n V. United Staves, 339 U.S. 142,
147-148 (1950), noting “a widespread awareness in the railroad
industry that many of the economies to be gained from consolida-
tions * * * could be rea‘ized only at the expense of displaced railroad
labor” and that “[t}he legislative history of §5(2)(f) [now
§ 11347] shows that one of its principal purposes was to provide
mandatory protection for the interests of employees affected by
railroad consolidations.”; Division No. 14, Order of R.R. Tel. V.
Leighty, 298 F.2d 17, 17-18 (4th Cir. 1962).
13
ployees adversely affected as a result of approved rail
mergers, consolidations and common control transac-
tions,"* and lease and trackage rights transactions.”
Under these protective conditions, an employee who is
dismissed from a job or displaced to a lower paying posi-
tion as a result of the approved transaction will continue
to receive, generally for six years, the equivalent of the
wage he or she was earning at the time of the adverse
effect, indexed in accordance with subsequent general
wage increases; moving expenses are provided if reloca-
tion is necessary; and transfers of work are subject to
“implementing agreement” provisions regarding the al-
locaticn of seniority or other contract rights of affected
employees. In addition, if the carrier and the union rep-
resenting its affected employees are unable to come to
terms over an implementing agreement, the parties must
submit their dispute to expedited, binding arbitration.
See New York Dock Ry. v. United States, supra, 609 F.2d
at 94.
B. The Railway Labor Act, If It Applied, Would Inter-
fere With and Could Defeat the Goals of the Inter-
state Commerce Act.
The carefully constructed statutory scheme we have
just described would be set at naught if unions could
insist that carriers, in addition to securing the approval
of the Commission to engage in the transactions listed
in § 11343, and complying with the employee protective
14 New York Dock Ry.—Control—Brooklyn Eastern District, 360
1.C.C. 60, 84-90 (1979), affirmed, New York Dock Ry. v. United
States, 609 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1979). The Second Circuit’s decision in
this case contains an extensive history of the conditions imposed
over the years by the Commission.
15 Norfolk and Western Ry.—Trackage Rights—BN, 354 I.C.C.
605 (1978), as modified by Mendocino Covet Ry.—Lease and Oper-
ate—-California Western R.R., 360 I. 653 (1980), affirmed,
Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n Vv. United States, 675 F.2d 1248 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
14
conditions imposed by the Commission under § 11347,
must also follow the “major dispute” procedures of the
Railway Labor Act (“RLA”) before consummating a
transaction that the Commission has approved as being
in the public interest.
“Major” disputes arise under that Act when labor or
management seeks to change the rates of pay, rules, or
working conditions established in existing collective bar-
gaining agreements. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. V. Bur-
ley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945). Because the “major pur-
pose of Congress in passing the Railway Labor Act was
‘to provide a machinery to prevent strikes,” Texas and
New Orleans R.R. v. Brotherhood of Railway and Steam-
ship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 565 (1930), the Act requires
the parties to such a dispute to follow certain prescribed
procedures designed to maximize the possibility ef reach-
ing agreement. Those procedures are “purposely long
and drawn out,” Railway Clerks v. Florida East Coast Ry.,
384 U.S. 238, 246 (1966), and their exhaustion is “almost
an interminable process.” Detroit and Toledo Shore Line
R.R. v. UTU, 396 U.S. 142, 149 (1969).° It is not .-
16 In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen V. Jacksonville Terminal
Co., 394 U.S. 369, 378 (1969), this Court described the Act’s “de-
tailed framework to facilitate the voluntary settlement of major
disputes” ;
“A party desiring to effect a change of rates of pay, rules, or
working conditions must give advance written notice. §6. The
parties must confer, §2 Second, and if conference fails to
resolve the dispute, either or both may invoke the services of
the National Mediation Board, which may also proffer its
services sua sponte if it finds a labor emergency to exist. §5
First. If mediation fails, the Board must endeavor to induce
the parties to submit the controversy to binding arbitration,
which can take place, however, only if beth consent. §§ 5 First,
7. If arbitration is rejected and the dispute threatens ‘sub-
stantially to interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as
to deprive any section of the country of essential transportation
service, the Mediation Board shall notify the President,’ who
may create an emergency board to investigate and report on
the dispute. § 10.”
15
common for the procedures to drag on for two years or
more. At their ultimate conclusion, however, the parties
may resort to self-help, including a strike by a union if
its demands have not been met. E.g., Railway Clerks v.
Florida East Coast Ry., supra, 384 U.S. at 243-44.
Those demands may be inconsistent with the carrier’s
ability to implement the transaction approved by the
Commission, as an example may illustrate. Recently the
Commission approved the common control of three rail-
roads in the Northeast.’* It did so because common own-
ership would produce “substantial” public benefits in
several areas, including operating efficiencies to be
“achieved through consolidation of maintenance and re-
pair facilities.” ** Yet when the carriers sought to con-
solidate their facilities the International Association of
Machinists sued to prevent them from doing so, arguing
that the carriers were obliged to bargain under the RLA
over demands by the union that each of three carriers
add to its collective bargaining agreement a provision
effectively barring the transfer of repair work from one
carrier to another. Those demands, if agreed to by the
carriers, would have forbidden the consolidatiun.”®
17 Guilford Transp. Ind., Inc.—Control—Boston and Maine Corp.,
366 I1.C.C. 292, 3388 (1982), aff'd in relevant part, Lamoille Valley
R.R. v. ICC, 711 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ; Guilford Transp. Ind.,
Inc.—Control—Delaware and Hudson Ry. Co., 366 I.C.C. 396 (1982),
aff'd in relevant part, Central Vermont Ry. v. ICC, 711 F.2d 331
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
18 366 I.C.C. at 338; see also id. at 402.
19 Complaint in /nternational Assoc. of Machinists v. Boston and
Maine Corp., No. 84-3703-T (D. Mass.). A Stipulated Order of
Dismissal ended the case on February 24, 1986.
Another recent example (though arising under Chapter 109) can
be found in Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n v. Staten Island R.R.,
F.2d (2d Cir., No. 85-7483, May 22, 1986). In December 1984
the carrier applied for ICC approval of a proposed transaction.
Four unions later served bargaining demands that the carrier pro-
16
In other cases, a union may strike if a carrier imple-
ments an approved transaction without first seeking to
change the existing collective bargaining agreement
through the RLA major dispute procedures, as would
have occurred in connection with the approved transac-
tion involved in this case but for the strike injunction
recently affirmed by the Eighth Circuit. See p. 4 supra.
If the carrier should be required to utilize the RLA pro-
cedures, the result at a minimum will be delay in its
ability to implement the approved transaction. And if
at the end of those procedures the union has not agreed
to change the collective bargaining agreement, then the
carrier will face the choice either of foregoing what the
Commission has approved as being in the public interest,
or taking a strike.
C. The ICC, Following BLE v. CNW, Rightly Ruled
That the Railway Labor Act Is Superseded.
Because the application of the RLA could defeat the
Interstate Commerce Act scheme for approving mergers,
ete. subject to employee protections, the Eighth Circuit,
in the BLE v. CNW decision relied on by the Commis-
sion, ruled that te RLA was among the laws from
which carrier par.icipants in ICC-approved transactions
are exempt. It relied in turn on the legislative history
vide them 6 months’ advance notice of such proposed transactions.
The ICC issued an order of approval on April 24, 1985 and the next
day the unions sued to enjoin the transaction, arguing that the
carrier in implementing the approved transaction had violated the
RLA by changing the status quo during the pendency of bargaining
demands. The complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.
On many rail properties unions recently have served bargaining
demands that if agreed to by the carriers would block or impede
ICC-approved transactions. The carriers generally view the de-
mands as nonmandatory subjects of bargaining. Some litigation on
that score has commenced (e.g., Burlington Northern R.R. v. UTU,
No. 86-5013-CV-SW-C (D.Mo.)) and more is inevitable.
17
of the Transportation Act of 1940, which as noted above
amended the Interstate Commerce Act to make employee
protective conditions mandatory in Chapter 113 trans-
actions. In passing that Act Congress rejected a proposed
amendment—the “Harrington”? amendment—that would
have forbidden carriers from abolishing jobs or impair-
ing existing employment rights as a result of a merger or
other transaction needing the Commission’s approval un-
der § 11343. That amendment, the Eighth Circuit noted,
“ ‘threatened to prevent all consolidations to which it
related.’” Id. at 430 (quoting Railway Labor Execu-
tives’ Ass’n Vv. United States, supra, 339 U.S. at 151).
Its defeat fortified the conclusion that Congress intended
the ICC-nrescribed protective conditions rather than the
RLA to govern the adjustments caused by merger imple-
mentations, for if the RLA were to govern it would
allow the nullification of Commission-approved trans-
actions:
“'T}he ICC power to authorize mergers would be
completely ineffective if authority to adjust work
realignments through fair compensation did not
exist. * * * Under the Railway Labor Act in a major
dispute employees cannot be compelled to accept or
arbitrate as to new working rules or conditions.
* * * Thus under the Railway Labor Act provisions,
it is possible for either party to completely block any
change in working conditions by refusing to agree
to a change and by refusing to arbitrate. Like the
Harrington amendment, the Railway Labor Act, if
it applied, would threaten to prevent many consoli-
dations.” Id. at 430-431.
20 This Court, in Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes
v. United States, supra, 366 U.S. at 173-77, relied heavily upon the
legislative history growing out of the Harrington amendment in
rejecting a union contention that the predecessor of § 11347 re-
quired a “job freeze,” and holding that compensatory employee pro-
tections are adequate.
18
The Eighth Circuit accordingly concluded that the RLA
was one of the laws from which carrier participants in
ICC-approved transactions are exempt under § 11341 (a)
in implementing those transactions. Jd. at 431-32.”
That decision does not stand alone. Others to the same
effect include Brotherhood of Loc. Eng. v. Boston & Maine
Corp., 122 L. RRM 2020, 2025 (1st Cir., April 9, 1986)
(ICC exemption of lease transaction and imposition of
employee protections under § 10505 “exempted B&M from
the conditions of the RLA with respect to major dis-
putes.”) ; Missouri Pac. R.R. v. UTU, 782 F.2d 107, 111
(Sth Cir. 1986) (affirming district court holding “that
MOPAC is exempted under § 11841(a) * * * from the
requirements of the Railway Labor Act”) ; Burlington
Northern, Inc. v. American Railway Supervisors Ass’n,
503 F.2d 58, 62-63 (7th Cir. 1974) (employee protec-
tions ordered by ICC pursuant to merger are controlling
in case of conflict with RLA procedures) ; Bundy v. Penn
Central Co., 455 F.2d 277, 279-80 (6th Cir. 1872) (minor
dispute procedures of RLA are overridden by ICC-im-
posed order under § 5(2) (f) [now § 11347]); UTU Vv.
21In BLE v. CNW the employee protective conditions imposed by
the ICC were agreed to by the carrier and the union before the
merger. The statute permits the parties to make such pre-merger
agreements and to submit them to the Commission for approval.
49 U.S.C. § 11347. If it approves, the agreement has the force of and
becomes a Commission order. Norfolk and Western Ry. v. Nemitz,
404 U.S. 87 (1971).
Respondents may seek to distinguish BLE V. CNW by suggesting
that the result there reflected a determination by the court that the
union having agreed to the protective conditions thereby waived its
ability to invoke RLA procedures. But no such analysis appears in
the decision and in any event would be incorrect if it led to the
conclusion that unions which do not enter into pre-merger agree-
ments are free to invoke the RLA. As the Eighth Circuit ruled,
the transaction is exempted from the restraints of the RLA to the
extent necessary to carry out the transaction (314 F.2d at 432), not
on a theory of union waiver but because otherwise unions could
stymie Commission-approved transactions.
19
Norfolk & Western Ry., 382 F. Supp. 1170, 1174 (N.D.
Ohio 1971) (“plain language” of Interstate Commerce Act
conferred “exclusive and plenary jurisdiction upon the
ICC to approve mergers and relieve carriers from all other
restraints of federal law, without carving a specific ex-
ceptiun with regard to the Railway Labor Act”). And
the Sixth Circuit ruled in Nemitz v. Norfolk & Western
Ry., 486 F.2d 841, 845 (6th Cir.), aff'd on other grounds,
404 U.S. 37 (1971), in language echoing the Eighth Cir-
cuit’s quoted above:
“The authority vested in the I.C.C. to effectuate pro-
posed mergers would be rendered ineffective if au-
thority to adjust work realignments through fair
compensation did not exist. Since, under the Rail-
Way Labor Act, employees cannot be compelled to
accept or arbitrate new working rules or conditions,
the application of the Railway Labor Act to situa-
tions such as that presented here, like the Harring-
ton Amendment, would threaten to prevent many
consolidations, and, therefore, should not be applied.”
See Kent v. CAB, supra, 204 F.2d at 266, which held
that a collective bargaining contract under the RLA
“must yield to the paramount power of the [Civil Aero-
nautics] Board to perform its duties under the” Civil
Aeronautics Act to approve mergers “upon such terms
as it determines to be just and reasonable in the public
interest.”” Accord, IAM v. Northeast Airlines. 400 F.
Supp. 372, 373-74 (D. Mass. 1975), aff'd, 536 F.2d 975
(1st Cir. 1976) (RLA “is not applicable where the dis-
pute arises out of a merger” because “Congress has pro-
vided a special mechanism for resolving the numerous
problems attendant on such a merger’); see also cases
cited note 8, p. 7, supra.”
22 Texas & New Orleans R.R. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men, 307 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1962), conflicts in certain respects with
the authorities cited in the text. There the court ruled that the
Norris-LaGuardia Act barred it from enjoining a threatened strike
20
D. Override of the Railway Labor Act Is Required in
This Case.
The result reached in the many cases just mentioned
has special—and we might add obvious—force in this
case. The rights of the MKT and the DRGW to use their
own crews were expressly recognized by the Commission
to be material terms of each of the trackage rights appli-
cations it approved as being in the public interest. (Pet.
App. 67a.) If the RLA were to apply to the crew selec-
tion process, the transaction approved by the Commis-
sion could be postponed while the “almost interminable”
major dispute procedures of that Act were exhausted, or
indeed frustrated altogether by threat of or resort to
strike. Indeed, as we have noteu, the MP’s employees
have already threatened and been enjoined from striking
over this very matter.
The possibility that MP crews could resort to self help
against the tenants has, if anything, even graver conse-
quences. The very purpose of the grant of trackage
rights was to protect and foster a competitive relation-
ship between the tenants and the MP. It is inconceivable
in the first instance that the MKT (for example) should
have to bargain with and rely on MP employees in seek-
ing to wrest new or protect existing traffic from the MP.
And it would be astonishing if, as a result of a trans-
action approved by the Commission to maintain competi-
tion between the MP and the MKT, Congress intended
to permit MP employees to interfere with and possibly
over the carrier’s effort to implement an ICC-approved transaction.
We believe that the court erred in holding that § 11347 [then
§ 5(2)(f)] of the Interstate Commerce Act is not part of the
pattern of the national labor legislation to which the Norris-
LaGuardia Act must be accommodated. See United States v.
Lowden, 308 U.S. 225, 236-88 (1939). In any event, even in that
case the court acknowledged that union resorts to the RLA that
were “contrary to the public interest” in the context of ICC-
approved transactions would be unenforceable. 307 F.2d at 161-62.
21
shut down the MKT’s entire operations. Moreover, if
the MP employees demand, upon pain of strike, that MP
ban MKT trains with MKT crews, and the MKT’s em-
ployees demand, upon pain of strike, that MKT not hire
MP crews, a stalemate will result. Commerce will be
interrupted and the Commission’s approval of the track-
age rights applications wil! be nullified. And finally, use
of MP crews to operate MKT trains obviously would re-
quire the approval of the MP, which would thus be em-
powered to frustrate the competition that the Commis-
sion intended to protect and preserve.
In the case at bar the court of appeals sought to dis-
tinguish BLE v. CNW on the ground that the Eighth
Circuit in that case “recognized that immunity attached
only to obstacles that would frustrate fruition of the”
ICC-approved transaction. (Pet. App. 18a.) But as we
have shown above, and as the Commission ruled below,
the RLA major dispute procedures, if applicable to the
crew selection process, would be an obstacle to fruition
of the approved trackage rights transactions. Thus the
court’s distinction is one without a difference. The ra-
tionale of that case is fully applicable to this one and
the Commission adopted it in concluding that the car-
riers herein are exempt from the major dispute proce-
dures of the RLA in implementing the approved trackage
rights transactions.
III. SECTION 11341(a) IS SELF-EXECUTING
Section 11341(a) provides in pertinent part:
“A carrier * * * participating in * * * a transaction
approved by * * * the Commission under this sub-
chapter may carry out the transaction * * * without
the approval of a State authority. A carrier * * *
participating in that approved * * * transaction is
exempt from the antitrust laws and from all other
law, including State and municipal law, as necessary
to let that person carry out the transaction * * *.”
(Emphasis added. )
22
As that plain language makes clear, the Commission
is not called upon to do anything under § 11341(a). The
types of transactions (including trackage rights transac-
tions) that require Commission approval are set out in
§ 11343, and the criteria according to which the Commis-
sion is directed by Congress to grant or deny approval
are set forth in § 11344. In particular, § 11344(c) pro-
vides that the Commission shall grant approval if “it
finds the transaction is consistent with the public inter-
est.” Section 11341(a) then provides, without requiring
further Commission interposition, that a carrier partici-
pant “is exempt from the antitrust laws and from all
other law * * * as necessary to let that person carry out”
the transaction that the Commission has approved. The
Commission itself, in determining under § 11344 whether
the public interest warrants approval of a proposed trans-
action, is not required to determine, or to make any find-
ings, whether it would be “necessary” to override some
particular law to effectuate the transaction if approved.
See Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U.S. 182 (1948).”
That is the point the Commission was making when, in
answer to the contention of the unions that its initial or-
ders approving the trackage rights applications did not
expressly state that the carriers were exempt from the
RLA, it said (Pet. App. 60a) :
23 In Schwabacher, the Court explained that Commission approval
of a proposed railroad merger “is dependent upon three, and upon
only three considerations,” those then set forth in the predecessor
to § 11344. Following Commission approval, the “approved transac-
tion goes into effect without need for invoking any approval under
state authority, and the parties are relieved of ‘restraints, limita-
tions, and prohibitions of law, Federal, State, or municipal, insofar
as may be necessary to enable them to carry into effect the transac-
tion so approved * * *.’” 334 U.S. at 194-195. BLE v. CNW and
other such decisions by the lower courts in cases involving the RLA
are consistent with that decision; the decision below is not.
23
“The terms of section 11341 immunizing an ap-
proved transaction from any other laws are self-
executing and there is no need for us expressly to
order or to declare that a carrier is specifically re-
lieved from certain restraints.”
And that is precisely what the Eighth Circuit ruled in
rejecting a similar contention by the union in BLE Vv.
CNW that the Commission had failed to make an express
finding of exemption. The court held that the Commis-
sion’s approval of a transaction, and its imposition of
the required employee protections, “carried with it any
exemption from the restraints of other laws as contem-
plated by §5(11) [mow § 11341(a)] to the extent neces-
sary to carry out the merger.” 314 F.2d at 432. See
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Boston and
Maine Corp., supra, 122 LRRM at 2025 (“We also
note that the exemption provision, § 11341(a), is self-
executing.” ).
It is true that the Commission’s approval of a transac-
tion immunizes the carrier participants from the RLA
only to the extent necessary to implement the transaction.
Thus it may be that, subsequent to the Commission’s or-
der of approval, a union will argue that the carriers are
seeking more immunity from the major dispute proce-
dures of the RLA than is necessary to implement the
approved transaction. In such a case the issue for deci-
sion will be whether application of the RLA would frus-
trate or impede an action intended to implement the
approved transaction; if so, then the carriers are exempt
from the RLA under § 11341(a); if not, the RLA may
apply. The issue will not turn on whether the Commis-
sion, in its order of approval, made any findings of the
need for an exemption under § 11341(a) from some other
statute for, as shown above, that section requires no ac-
tion whatever by the Commission in passing on an ap-
plication subject to § 11343. Rather, the function of the
Commission under § 11344 is to determine whether a
24
grant of the application is in the public interest and
otherwise comports with the standards specified therein.”
The court of appeals’ misunderstanding of § 11341 (a)
led it to the erroneous ‘onclusion that the Commission
“rejected the notion that it had to provide some basis for
concluding that waiver of the Railway Labor Act was
necessary” to the transaction it had approved. (Pet. App.
10a.) As we have shown, the Commission correctly con-
strued § 11341(a) as not requiring findings with respect
to exemption in the initial order of approval. When the
issue of exemption subsequently arose, the Commission
adequately explained why the crew selection process nec-
essarily was exempt from the RLA. On both counts the
Commission’s decision is squarely in keeping with the
statute and with.BLE v. CNW and the other decisions
cited above.
IV. THE 4-R ACT DID NOT AMEND THE LAW TO
ALLOW THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT TO INTER-
FERE WITH TRANSACTIONS APPROVED BY THE
COMMISSION
In the court below the respondents urged that the re
sult in BLE v. CNW was overturned by the Railroad
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (the
“4-R Act”). Section 402(a) of that Act (90 Stat. 62)
added a sentence to § 11347 (then § 5(2)(f)) requiring
that henceforth the employee protective conditions to be
imposed—by the Commission shall be “no less protective
* * * than those heretofore imposed pursuant to this sub-
division and those established pursuant to section 405 of
the Rail Passenger Service Act (45 U.S.C. 565).” (Em-
24 This is not to say that an opponent of an application could not
contend in the initial agency proceeding that the grant of the appli-
cation would be contrary to the public interest in a particular case
if the result would be to override rights under another statute such
as the RLA. The Commission might well have a duty to consider
such a contention, although no such contention was made in the
initial agency proceeding below regarding the terms of the trackage
right applications relative to crew selection.
25
phasis added.) The latter act created Amtrak and per-
mitted railroads providing intercity passenger service to
transfer that service to Amtrak by contract. Section 405
required such contracts to contain employee protective
conditions certified as “fair and equitable” by the Secre-
tary of Labor, and it directed the inclusion of such pro-
tective conditions as may be
“necessary for (1) the preservation of rights, priv-
ileges, and benefits (including continuation of pen-
sion rights and benefits) to such employees under
existing collective-bargaining agreements or other-
wise; (2) the continuation of collective-bargaining
rights; (3) the protection of such individual employ-
ees against a worsening of their positions with re-
spect to their employment; [etc.].”
On April 17, 1971, the Secretary approved and certified
certain conditions which came to be known as the “Ap-
pendix C-1” conditions, so called because they were an
appendix to the standard contract between Amtrak and
the contracting railroads. In keeping with § 405’s di-
rection, Article I, §2 of those conditions included the
following:
“The rates of pay, rules, working conditions and
all collective bargaining and other rights, privileges
and benefits * *~* of railroad’s employees under ap-
plicable laws and/or existing collective bargaining
agreements or otherwise shall be preserved unless
changed by future collective bargaining agreements
or applicable statutes.” **
Since that is one of the conditions “established pursuant
to Section 405 of the’ Amtrak Act, the Commission after
25 In Congress of Railway Unions v. Hodgson, 326 F. Supp. 68, 76
(D.D.C. 1971) the court upheld the Appendix C-1 conditions against
a challenge from labor that they were insufficiently protective of
employees.
26 The Amtrak Appendix C-1 conditions are reproduced as an
appendix to Oregon Short Line R. Co.—Abandonment—Goshen, 354
1.C.C. 76, 90-96 (1977).
26
passage of the 4-R Act has included it (with minor
changes) in those imposed under § 11347 of the Inter-
state Commerce Act. See, e.g., Article I, § 2 of the New
York Dock conditions, 360 I.C.C. at 84; see generally
New York Dock Ry. v. United States, 609 F.2d 83 (2d
Cir. 1979). Respondents asserted below that that condi-
tion imported the RLA into the implementation of trans-
actions approved under Chapter 113.
We have shown above that the RLA, if it applied, would
gravely threaten the success of the long-standing congres-
sional goal of encouraging rail mergers and consolida-
tions. A similar threat, in the form of the Harrington
amendment forbidding changes in existing employment
rights as a result of a merger, was turned back by Con-
gress in 1940. Page 17, supra. It stands to reason that
if by passage of the 4-R Act Congress meant to thrust
the major dispute procedures of the RLA in the way of
carrier efforts to implement ICC-approved mergers, and
permit unions to delay and indeed strike over such ef-
forts, some notice would have been taken. Yet the legis-
lative history of the 4-R Act on this point is silent. See
New York Dock Ry. v. United States, supra, 609 F.2d
at 93.27 “This silence is most eloquent, for such reticence
while contemplating an important and - controversial
change in existing law is unlikely.” Edmonds v. Com-
pagnie Generale Transatl., 443 U.S. 256, 266-67 (1979) ;
see Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 270-271 (1981).
27The provision which became §402(a) of the 4-R Act first
appeared in H.R. 10979, the House version of the Act, in identical
form in all relevant respects to its final enactment. The House
Report of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
accompanying the bill paraphrases but otherwise does not discuss
the amendment. The Senate bill, S. 2718, contained no provision
comparable to what became § 402(2). The Conference Report does
not mention why the House-proposed amendment to § 5(2) (f) was
agreed upon. ers,
Floor debate concerning the meaning of employee protection pro-
vision in the 4-R Act was similarly limited. Only one Congressman,
Representative Skubitz, commented on the extent of such protection
and that comment came in the context of a provision mandating
27
The Commission’s construction of the statute as pre-
serving existing collective bargaining rights only to the
extent that they do not conflict with the implementation
of an approved transaction (Pet. App. 59a-60a), furthers
rather than frustrates the goals of the Act and accord-
ingly warrants respect here. Hayfield Northern R.R. V.
Chicago and North Western Transp. Co., 467 U.S. 622,
634 (1984) (“The Commission’s position, of course, is
entitled to considerable deference since it represents the
construction of a regulatory statute by the agency charged
with the statute’s enforcement.”’).
The history of the Amtrak Act § 405 conditions fur-
ther supports the Commission’s construction. Section 405
was copied almost verbatim—and almost without discus-
sion—from §13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation
Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1609(c).* That Act pro-
vided federal aid to state and local governments for the
provision of mass transportation facilities and equipment.
The purpose of § 13(c) was to preserve the collective bar-
gaining rights of affected employes when federal funds
were utilized to purchase a private transit company, since
many state and local governments denied such rights to
employee protection arrangements in abandonments. That section,
Congressman Skubitz stated, only provided “a restatement of what
the Commission already does * * *.” 121 Cong. Rec. 41340 (1975).
28 Representatives of labor said that “[t]he protective provisions
in this section are drawn literally from the comparable provisions
of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 * * * and are de-
signed to serve the identical policy expressed in these laws.” Sup-
plemental Hearings on H.R. 17849 and S. 3706 before the Subcom-
mittee on Transportation and Aeronautics of the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 122
(1970) (Statement of Al H. Chesser, National Legislative Director,
United Transportation Union, also representing the Congress of
Railway Unions). Secretary of Labor Shultz noted: “I assume that
the coverage under the protective arrangement provision * * * is
substantially of the same scope as the protective arrangements pro-
vision * * * of the Urban Mass Transportation Act.” Id. at 65
(letter from George P. Shultz).
28
their employees. See Jackson Transit Authority V. Local
Division 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15,
17 (1982); Division 1287, Amalgamated Transit Union
v. Kansas City Area Transp. Authority, 582 F.2d 444
(8th Cir. 1978).
It was not the intention of the Amtrak conditions,
however, to allow collective bargaining rights and agree-
ments to prevent implementation of an approved transac-
tion. Rather, Article I, § 4, of Appendix C-1 (reproduced
at 354 I.C.C. 90-91) provided for the negotiation of im-
plementing agreements with respect to a transaction
“which will result in a dismissal or displacement of em-
ployees or rearrangement of forces” (354 I.C.C. at 91)
and, in default of such an agreement, for binding arbi-
tration. Except for allowing greater expedition, which
was justified by, among other things, “the time element
written into the [Amtrak] statute,” that provision in
Appendix C-1 was patterned after Sections 4 and 5 of
the Washington Job Protection Agreement as incorporated
by the I.C.C. in prior employee protection conditions.
Congress of Railway Unions v. Hodgson, supra, 326 F.
Supp. at 75-76.%° Sections 4 and 5 provided a means
whereby prohibitions in collective agreements that would
impede implementation of a transaction, such as a “pro-
hibition against transferring work from one railroad to
another,” could be overcome without resort to the pro-
cedures of the Railway Labor Act. Southern Ry. Co.—
Control—Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 331 I.C.C. 151, 165
(1967). “[Wlithout something comparable to it, section
6 of the Railway Labor Act * * * would seriously impede
mergers.” Id. at 171. Thus, for example, an arbitration
award under Art. I, § 4, of Appendix C-1 provided for
29 The Act required Amtrak to commence passenger service within
six months of its enactment. See 326 F. Supp. at 76. In the Hodgson
case, the unions contended (unsuccessfully) that Sections 4 and 5
of the Washington Agreement should have been “incorporate[d ]
verbatim” into Appendix C-1, rather than that a provision for such
implementing agreements and arbitration was inappropriate alto-
gether. 326 F. Supp. at 75.
29
the use of Milwaukee engineers—rather than Burlington
Northern engineers—in operating Amtrak trains over
some 11 miles oi BN track so as to eliminate an other-
wise unnecessary stop to change crews east of Minneapo-
lis. See Engineers v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 92
LRRM 3436 (D. Minn. 1976).
As we have noted, the conditions imposed under § 11347
include a similar provision for implementing agreements
and for arbitration in default of an agreement.*° Indeed,
in connection with the New York Dock transaction itself,
an arbitration awerd arising out of that provision pro-
vided for consolidation of the employees and seniority
rosters of the merged railroads as New York Dock em-
ployees subject to a common seniority roster under New
York Dock’s collective agreements, thus displacing the
seniority roster and collective agreements of the carrier
acquired by New York Dock insofar as its employees were
concerned. See Locomotive Engineers v. New York Dock
Rail Road, 94 Labor Cases § 13,704 (E.D.N.Y. 1981),
subsequent opinion, 97 Labor Cases { 10,007 (E.D.N.Y.
1982) .**
3° Article I, § 4, of New York Dock (see 360 I.C.C. at 85) more
closely followed Sections 4 and 5 of the Washington Agreement as
incorporated in prior ICC protective conditions in that it did not
include the greater expedition authorized by the cognate provision
in Appendix C-1, while Article I, § 4, of the Norfolk and Western
and Mendocino Coast conditions (see 354 I.C.C. at 610-611) did pro-
vide for such expedition. The unions supported the New York Dock
conditions in New York Dock Ry. v. United States, supra, 609 F.2d
83, and objected (unsuccessfully) to the expediting aspects of
the latter conditions in Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n v. United
States, supra, 675 F.2d at 1248, but did not object then—as they
did not object in regard to Appendix C-1—to provision for imple-
menting agreements and arbitrations under which work and forces
could be rearranged in a manner inconsistent with provisions in
collective bargaining agreements. That tactic of so objecting was
not adopted until after the terms of the employee protective condi-
tions had been fixed.
$1 Such consolidation of seniority rights—which necessarily in-
volves departures from collective agreement provisions—is among
30
In sum, virtually without discussion a provision con-
ditioning federal grants on the willingness of local gov-
ernment to permit their mass transit employees to engage
in collective bargaining has made its way into the em-
ployee protections provided under the Interstate Com-
merce Act. However, both the provenance of that provi-
sion and its application demonstrate that the Commission
correctly concluded that the 4-R Act was not intended to
amend existing law in a manner that would allow the
RLA to interfere with transactions approved under Chap-
ter 113 of the Interstate Commerce Act.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be
reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
KENNETH P. KOLSON RICHARD T. CONWAY
ASSOCIATION OF (Counsel of Record)
AMERICAN RAILROADS WILLIAM F. SHEEHAN
50 F Street, N.W. SHEA & GARDNER
Washington, D.C. 20001 1800 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
(202) 639-2100 Washington, D.C. 20036
DAvip P. LEE (202) 828-2000
General Counsel
NATIONAL RAILWAY
LABOR CONFERENCE
1901 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 862-7218
Counsel for Amici Curiae
June 7, 1986
the more common functions of implementing agreements and arbi-
tration under ICC protective conditions. See, e.g., Anderson v. Nor-
folk & Western Ry. Co., 773 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1985); Employees
Protective Ass’n V. Norfolk & Western Ry., 511 F.2d 1040, 1043
(4th Cir. 1975).
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.