Opposition Brief — Burke v. Barnes

vo» Supreme Court, U.S. ,

[9 ;

—/ FILED

No. 85-781 JAN 8 1986

— —JOSSPtr& SPANIOL, JR.

CLERK

gn the Supreme Court of the Wnited States

OcTOBER TERM, 1985

FRANK G. BuRKE, ACTING ARCHIVIST OF THE UNITED

STATES, AND

RONALD GEISLER, EXECUTIVE CLERK OF THE WHITE HOUSE,

PETITIONERS

v.

MICHAEL D. BARNES, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE SPEAKER AND BIPAR.ISAN LEADERSHIP GROUP

OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN OPPOSITION

STEVEN R. Ross

(Counsel of Record)

General Counsel to the Clerk

CHARLES TIEFER

Deputy General Counsel to the

Clerk

MICHAEL L. MuRRAY

Assistant Counsel to the Clerk

U.S. House of Representatives

The Capitol, H-105

Washington, D.C. 20515

(202) 225-9700

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Counterstatement of the Case ...................ccccccseesseeeseeeseeeeeeeeees 3

Reasons why the writ should be denied.........................0000085 9

I. The court of appeals reaffirmed a settled and sound

rule regarding the pocket veto ................cc.cccccccseeeeeeees 9

II. This is not an appropriate case to review the stand-

I ieenlipessunnnte 13

ENTS ER DEESIDE GS RES SS a a 18

SSR LEE SE ne 19

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

AFGE uv. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1982)................ 16

Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Civ.

No. 85-1064 (D.N.J. filed Mar. 27, 1985), appeal

pending, Nos. 85-5377 (8d Cir.)............:ccccsseeseesecnseeneees 5

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962)........ 13, 14, 15, 16, 18

Bordallo v. Camacho, 520 F.2d 763, 764 (9th Cir.

att iseeidesiaadinidiadardliidiaalaebiilliacaiadinsidanetcdnhaiabessenniinenpiceepeanes 14

Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939)..... 8, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18

Conyers v. Reagan, 578 F. Supp. 324 (D.D.C. 1984),

appeal dismissed, 765 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985)....... 16

Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983)

(per curiam), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3533 (1984)....... 16

Dellums v. Smith, 573 F. Supp. 1489 (N.D. Cal 1983)... 14

Dennis v. Luis, 741 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1984)...........0....... 14, 16

Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church, 404 U.S. 412

RETESET SET AAS REE 17

Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ill. 1975)............ 13

Eber Bros. Wine & Liquor Corp. v. United ates, 286

a cnntovswpabasionscee 2

Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482.........ccccccccccceesees 2

Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979)..........cccccccceeeeee 8, 16

Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977)........ 16

(1D)

Page

Cases—Continued

In re Benny, 44 Bankr. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1984), appeal

argued, 84-2805, et al. (9th Cir. July 9, 1985)............ 4

In re Moens, Nos. 84-4109, et seg. (C.D. Ill. Feb. 21,

1985), appeal docketed, (7th Cir. Mar. 27, 1986)......... 5

In re Moody, 46 Bankr. 231 (M.D. N.C. 1985), trans-

ferred and notice of appeal filed, No. 85-606 (S.D.

1, 2 SS ae 5

In re Production Steel, Inc., 48 Bankr. 841 (M.D.

\\ 2) SE,

In re Tom Carter Enterprises, Inc., 44 Bankr. €°°

A ——————————EEE, 4 4

In re WHET, Inc., No. 84-2985-7 (D. Mass.), summar-

ily aff'd, No. 85-1119 (1st Cir. May 1, 1985)............... 5

INS v. Ch~ cha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)............cccssssceeeeeeees 15, 17

Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, No. CV 85-1125-KN

(C.D. Cal. Gilod Blew. Bh, BD ceccccscsscsevesssnenissniissssicnnes 5

Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).... 7, 8, 9,

10, 11, 14

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1809)........ 15

McRae v. Mathews, 421 F. Supp. 533 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).. 14

Metcalf v. National Petroleum Council, 553 F.2d 176

101 OM 20) (1) 16

Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946,

cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 779 (1985) .........ccccceceeseeeereeenees 16

National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833

(1976); overruled on other grounds, Garcia v. San

Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 105 S. Ct.

2OBE (RGGI cecercnsccceccessccscnnnntienincuciennctenseeieenaeaaie 15

National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Idaho, 459

UB. GOD (IBID. .waccccecscosecscsscessesvesscsenssnctnnenmsiemsmamimni 17

Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S.

YO) | | 15

Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. United States, No. 85-0832

(D.D.C. filed Mar. 18, 1966)................c.cscccsescossnsessecsesess 5

The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929)............0+++ 7, 10, 11

Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,

43D UD. SOT (RO TED .nccccesenecsesse.--stsrsnssecsestsemstossiinammmesntn 16

Riegle v. Federal Open Market Committee, 656 F.2d

873 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082...........00+ 16

Page

Cases—Continued

Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C.

1983) aff'd, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985)... 16

South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966)...... 15

Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Kelley,

a 16

United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 US. 153

SSS ESA 15

United Presbyterian Church v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375

i scsusouonconocce 16

United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426 (1949) ooo. .cccccccccceeee 15

Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1982),

cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983) ...........ccccccccccsecseseeeeees 16

Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938)............ 7, 10, 11

Constitution, statutes, and rules:

Te 3, 10

H.J. Res. 653, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., Pub. L. No. 98-

nc csceseceennnacs 18

H.J. Res. 656, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., Pub. L. No 98-

a ccssseenenenssaseses 18

H.J. Res. 659, 98th Cong., 2d Sess, Pub. L. No. 98-

SL 18

H.J. Res. 663, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., Pub. L. No. 98-

a ccaseseutecees i8

Pub. L. No. 98-497 § 107(d), 98 Stat. 2291 (1984)........... 4

oc cceheansessncosccnvere 2

a ssupusssounnezsnece 2, 4

EE 2

Miscellaneous:

H.R. 4042, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983) .......ccccccccscsecceeee. 3, 17

H. Doc. No. 277, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 647(b) (1985)... 2, 4

In the Supreme Court of the Wnited States

OcToBER TERM, 1985

No. 85-781

FRANK G. BuRKE, ACTING ARCHIVIST OF THE UNITED

STATES, AND

RONALD GEISLER, EXECUTIVE CLERK OF THE WHITE HOUSE,

PETITIONERS

VU.

MICHAEL D. BARNES, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE SPEAKER AND BIPARTISAN LEADERSHIP GROUP

OF THE U.S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN OPPOSITION

Respondents, the Speaker and Bipartisan Leadership

Group of the House of Representatives (‘House par-

ties’’)', submit this opposition to the petition for certiora-

'The House parties are the Honorable Thomas P. O’Neill, Speaker

of the House of Representatives, and the Bipartisan Leadership Group

of the House of Representatives—the Honorable Jim Wright, Majority

Leader; the Honorable Robert H. Michel, Minority Leader; the Honor-

able Thomas S. Foley, Majority Whip; and the Honorable Trent Lott,

Continued

(1)

2

ri. None of the three questions raised by the Executive

Branch petitioners—the bounds of the pocket veto, stand-

ing, or mootness—merits review by this Court. Regarding

the bounds of the pocket veto, the Pocket Veto Clause

serves a serious purpose: to assure that the President -

guaranteed ten days to decide between signing or vetoing

a bill will not be “destroyed” or “cut down,” ? so that the

President will not be “truly deprived,’ App. 29a (opinion

of the Court of Appeals), of that guaranteed time. Su-

preme Court review of the issue should await an effort by

Congress to deprive the President of that guaranteed

time, which this case most certainly is not.*

Similarly, regarding standing, this Court may find Con-

gressional standing worthy of review in an appropriate

case, but this is not such a case. No party briefed or

argued the issue of Congressional standing in either of

the lower courts. In fact, at oral argument in the court of

appeals, the Executive Branch petitioners supported

standing here, agreeing with all the parties and all the

judges except a lone panel judge who became interested -

sua sponte in his particular view. Executive Petitioners

supported standing for good reason. Unlike the typical

Minority Whip. The participation of the Speaker and Bipartisan Lead-

ership Group is a normal mechanism for the House of Representatives

to present its institutional position in litigation. See note 7, infra.

2 Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482, 486, 493 (1932).

3 Judge McGowan’s able opinion for the court of appeals largely con-

sists of reaffirmation of the settled rule firmly established in the past,

and sensibly followed by this Administration’s predecessors, that the

Clerk of the House can receive veto messages during Congressional ad-

journments much as the Executive Clerk and the Clerk of the Su-

preme Court receive bills and pleadings when the President or the

Court are away. See Eber Bros. Wine & Liquor Corp. v. United States,

337 F.2d 624 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (bill may be presented while the President is

overseas), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 950 (1965); Sup. Ct. R. 44.5 (describing

how a pleading “to the Court is received in vacation’’); compare

F.R.A.P. 45(a) (although a court of appeals may not be in session, it

“shall be deemed always open for the purpose of filing any proper

paper” with its Clerk) with H.R. Rule III(5) (House Clerk receives mes-

sages during adjournments).

3

Congressional standing case, here the Senate and House

parties (““Houses’’) themselves intervened, to present the

institutional interest rather than merely the interests of

individual Members. Moreover, the interest involved does

not concern execution of the law, but the interest of the

Members and Houses of Congress in the lawmaking proc-

ess itself. As discussed below, the petitioners’ mootness

question is just a variant of their standing question.

In sum, this is not a case in which the United States

government presents a sound need for Supreme Court

review. Rather, the Executive Branch of one Administra-

tion proffers an extreme theory regarding pocket vetoes

which is out of line with the settled rule of the courts,

prior Administrations, and Congress, and urges in addi-

tion a question of standing not briefed below which peti-

tioners themselves correctly disavowed in the court of ap-

peals. Certiorari should be denied.

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioners’ statement of the case omits key aspects of

the proceedings which amply demonstrate the inappropri-

ateness of Supreme Court review. Accordingly, the House

parties provide a counterstatement.

1. On November 18, 1983, Congress presented the Presi-

dent with H.R. 4042, 98th Cong., lst Sess., a bill concern-

ing human rights certification for E] Salvador, which had

been passed by majority vote in both Houses, See App. 4a-

5a and App. 14la-145a. Pursuant to the Pocket Veto

Clause of the Constitution, art. I, §7, cl. 2,4 the President

had ten days (Sundays excluded), or until November 30,

1983, to decide between two courses: to return veto the

bill, that is, return the bill to the House of Representa-

_ tives, the originating chamber, with his objections; or, to

*In pertinent part, the clause provides:

If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten

Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to

him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had

signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent

its Return, in which Case it shall nct b= a Law.

4

let the bill become law with or without his signature.

Since Congress had adjourned, the President would have

returned a veto message to the Clerk of the House.® As

discussed below, the settled rule has been that return of a

bill with objections to the Clerk of the House satisfies the

Pocket Veto Clause’s requirements, much as presentation

of a bill to the Executive Clerk satisfies the Clause’s re-

quirements for presentation to the President.

President Reagan chose not to return veto the bill. In-

stead, on November 30, 1983, the White House issued a

statement withholding approval, see App. 5a, based on a

novel belief that the President could simply disapprove

without any return to the Congress, and thus deny Con-

gress any opportunity to consider and override the objec-

tions by a two-thirds majority of each House. In light of

that novel belief, petitioner declined to publish H.R. 4042

as a public law of the United States, see App. 6a.®

2. Plaintiff Members of Congress filed suit against peti-

tioners in the United States District Court for the District

of Columbia to vindicate plaintiffs’ “plain, direct and ade- .

quate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their

votes.”” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962) (quoting

Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939)). The Execu-

tive Branch defended petitioners, and the Houses inter-

vened ‘in support of the plaintiff Members. See App 3a

n.3.7 In district court, the Executive Branch chose con-

5 H.R. Rule III(5), reprinted in H. Doc. No. 277, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.

§ 647b (1985), provides: “The Clerk is authorized to receive messages

from the President and from the Senate at any time that the House is

not in session.”

® The duty of publishing bills that have become law has been inher-

ited by Petitioner Frank G. Burke, Archivist of the United States.

Pub. L. No. 98-497, § 107(d), 98 Stat. 2291 (1984).

7 The Speaker and Bipartisan Leadership Group serve as the regu-

lar mechanism for the House of Representatives to present its institu-

tional position in constitutional litigation. See, e.g., In re Benny, 44

Bankr. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (upholding statute defended by Speaker

and Bipartisan Leadership Group); uppeal argued, 84-2805, et al. (9th

Cir. July 9, 1985); In re Tom Carter Enterprises, Inc., 44 Bankr. 605

Continued

\

5

sciously not to brief or argue any challenge to standing.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District

Court (Jackson, J.) ruled for the Executive defendants on

the merits, the only issue presented, see App. 119a-132a,

and the Members and Houses appealed.

In the court of appeals (Robinson, C.J., and McGowan

and Bork, JJ.), the Executive defendants again chose con-

sciously not to brief or argue a challenge regarding stand-

ing. The Executive maintains in its Petition for Certiorari

that it took that position because of “established circuit

precedent.” Petition for Certiorari at 5 n.2. The reality is

otherwise. Assistant Attorney General Richard Willard

made emphatically clear in his argument to the court of

appeals that “[aJs the Executive Branch itself conceucs,

Congress clearly has standing to litigate the specific con-

stitutional question presented.”’ App. 15a, 17a (citing Tape

Recording of Oral Argument at 204-11).

One judge, Judge Bork, became interested ua sponte in

hiseparticular view of standing, and not satisfied with As-

sistant Attorney General Willard’s concurrence in the

judgment of all the parties and all the other judges, in-

sisted on pressing the issue, but the Executive did not

change its position, yet. Rather, Assistant Attorney Gen-

eral Willard presented the reasons why the Executive

had not contested standing:

(C.D. Cal. 1984) (same); Jn re Moens, No. 84-4109, et seg. (C.D. Ill. Feb.

21, 1985) (same), appeal docketed, No. 85-1499 (7th Cir. Mar. 27, 1985);

In re Moody, 46 Bankr. 231 (M.D.N.C. 1985) (same), transferred and

notice of appeal filed, No. 85-606 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 1985); Jn re Pro-

duction Steel, Inc., 48 Bankr. 841 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (same); Jn re

WHET, Inc., No. 34-2985-T (D. Mass.), summarily aff'd, No. 85-1119

(1st Cir. May 1, 1985) (dismissing challenge to statute, in appeal de-

fended by Speaker and Bipartisan 'adership Group); Ameron, Inc. v.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Civ. No. 85-1064 (D.N.J. filed Mar. 27,

1985) (upholding statute defended by Speaker and Bipartisan Leader-

ship Group), appeal pending, Nos. 85-5226, 85-5377 (3d Cir.); Lear

Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, No. CV 85-1125-KN (C.D. Cal. filed Nov. 21,

1985) (same); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. United States, No. 85-0832 (D.D.C.

filed Mar. 13, 1985) (resolving case without reaching issue of statute

defended by Speaker and Bipartisan Leadership Group).

6

QuEsTION: Why is there Article III standing

here? Does the government take the position that

there is Article III standing?

Mr. WILLARD: The government conceded in Ken-

nedy v. Sampson that the Senate as a body would

have had standing in that case, and since they

have injected the standing in an individual Senator

to raise a challenge, the Senate is alleging injury to

its corporate interests, that is its interests as a

body in being able to consider legislation after... .

My point was simply that this zase is different be-

cause we have the collective body that is the

Senate as a Plaintiff here under statutory author-

ity.

QUESTION: That doesn’t make any difference—are

you saying that doesn’t make any difference under

Article III standing?

Mr. WILLARD: We believe it does make a differ-

ence, that is for Article III purposes because the

character of the injury collectively or separate by

the Senate is different from that suffered by an in- -

dividual... .

QUESTION: Doesn’t the Senate as a body, when it |

intervenes, represent all citizens?

Mr. WIL.Larp: I don’t believe they claim to do so.

QUESTION: What interests does the Senate as a

body have other than the interest of seeing that

constitutional government is properly maintained,

which is really the interests of the citizens?

Mr. WILLARD: Well, it——

QUESTION: They do in their capacity, don’t they?

Mr. Wi.tarp: I don't agree, Judge Bork. I don’t

think they claim to and I don’t think they do. I

think they sue in an institutional capacity as one-

half of one of the three branches of government.

QUESTION: But does the institution have any in-

terest to assert other than the interests of the citi-

zens generally?

Mr. WiLLarp: Yes, Judge Bork, I think it does. I

think its interest is preserving what is an alloca-

tion of powers under the Constitution, just as the

Executive has an interest in preserving its institu-

tional——

QuEsTION: You have a property right in the

Senate as opposed to its representation of citizens,

7

separating the interest of its powers form the inter-

ests of the electorate?

Mr. WiLLarp: That is correct, Judge Bork.

3a. On June 4, 1984, the court of appeals ruled in favor

of respondents, in a scholarly opinion by Judge

McGowan. See App. la-46a. The opinion began with the

facts and the prior proceedings, App. la-8a, and discussed,

on the merits of the pocket veto, the views of the Framers

and the key prior opinions on the pocket veto: The Pocket

Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929); Wright v. United States,

302 U.S. 583 (1938); and Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d

430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See App. 18a-33a. The court summed

up in the two quotations from this Court which it empha-

sized. First, the Pocket Veto Clause’s two fundamental

purposes are to preserve the President’s opportunity ‘‘to

consider the bills presented to him,” and Congress’s op-

portunity “to consider [the President’s] objections to bills

and on such consideration to pass them over his veto pro-

vided there are the requisite votes.’ App. 29a (quoting

Wright v. United States, supra, 302 U.S. at 596). As Judge

McGowan noted, “{t]he [Supreme] Court plainly stated:

‘We should not adopt a construction which would frus-

trate either of these purposes.’ App. 29a (emphasis de-

leted) (quoting Wright, 302 U.S. at 596). Second, “ ‘[t]he

Constitution does not define what shall constitute a

return of a bill or deny the use of appropriate agencies in

effecting the return,’’’ App. 27a (emphasis deleted) (quot-

ing Wright, 302 U.S. at 589).

In rejecting petitioners’ arguments, the court of appeals

discussed how this Administration’s position deviated

from its predecessors:

That intersession adjournments no longer present

any real obstacle to the President’s exercise of his

qualified veto power was recognized by Presidents

Ford and Carter, both of whom assumed the effec-

tiveness of return vetoes made during such an ad-

journment.

8

App. 37a. Furthermore, the court of appeals identified the

extreme nature of petitioners’ claim:

Conceding the absence of any practical difference

between intrassession and intersession adjourn-

ments, [Executive defendants] contend that the

truly correct “bright line’’ must be drawn at the

three-day mark. us, if the tenth day after pre-

sentment falls during an adjournment of over

three days, a bill that has not yet been returne

expires by pocket veto. . . .

App. 42a (emphasis supplied).

3b. Judge Bork dissented at length, but addressed only

the standing issue which he had raised sua sponte and

which, he noted, had been conceded by petitioners. App.

49a n.1 (Bork, J., dissenting) (““The Executive Branch con-

ceded at oral argument that the Senate has standing to

sue in this suit. Similarly, in Kennedy v. Sampson, 511

F.2d 430, 435 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the Executive Branch con-

ceded that either House of Congress would have standing

to sue. . . .”). The panel opinion for the Court of Appeals

responded to that limited dissent by discussing the firm

basis of the standing of the Members and Houses, quoting

Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 483, 438 (1939) (“these sena-

tors have a plain, direct and adequate interest in main-

taining the effectiveness of their votes’’). App. 15a. Judge

McGowan relied heavily on Justice Powell’s trenchant

concurrence in Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979),

regarding the justiciability of a case such as this.® Basi-

cally, the court of appeals accepted Assistant Attorney

General Willard’s position and argument, noting that:

* As the court of appeals noted, Justice Powell distinguished be-

tween the situation in Goldwater, in which “ ‘Congress has taken no

official action. . . . [and] we do not know whether there ever will be

an actual controversy between the Legislative and Executive

Branches,’’’ and other cases such as this one, in which a dispute be-

tween Congress and the President should be resolved because “ ‘the

political branches reach{ed] a constitutional impasse.’”’ App. 14a (quot-

ing Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997-98 (1979) (Powell, J., concur-

ring)).

9

As the Executive Branch itself concedes, Congress

clearly has standing to litigate the specific constitu-

tional question presented. . . . While, as the dis-

sent correctly observes, parties may not create ju-

risdictio:: by mere stipulation, an interpretation of

Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement by

a coordinate branch of the federal government

must not be wholly disregarded.

App. 17a & n.16 (citing Tape Recording of Oral Argument

at 204-11.)

Only then, after petitioners lost on the merits, did they

change position regarding standing. Petitioners say only

that they changed position due to “further consider-

ation,” Petition for Certiorari at 5 n.2. Understandably,

when petitioners argued the standing question for the

first time, together with mootness, in requests for rehear-

ing and rehearing en banc, the court of appeals did not

find the newly-embraced arguments overwhelming.’ In

fact, of the ten judges considering rehearing en banc, only

three even voted to set the matter for argument. See App.

135a-136a.

REASONS WHY THE WRIT SHOULD BE DENIED

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS REAFFIRMED A SETTLED AND SOUND

RULE REGARDING THE POCKET VETO

1. Petitioners seek certiorari to challenge the settled

rule that duly authorized Congressional officers can re-

ceive veto messages during adjournments. At the outset,

this Court should note that there has been no division in

the circuits regarding that rule. Both during and since

Judge Tamm’s opinion in Kennedy v. Sampson, supra, not

one appellate judge—in the D.C. Circuit or elsewhere—

has even questioned that rule. In fact, the Executive de-

® The House parties consistently refer in this opposition to petition-

ers’ not having briefed the standing issue below. This is not to deny

their having addressed it in their rehearing pleadings, but merely to

distinguish pre-decision submissions from post-decision submissions.

10

fendants in Kennedy v. Sampson, acting at that time

through Solicitor General Bork, did not even seek certio-

rari. Rather, Attorney General Levi announced that the

Executive would follow the rule, the Justice Department

settled another suit raising the matter, App. 37an.32, and

the rule took its place among issues of law settled and re-

solved.

2. That rule has been settled for good reason. The

Pocket Veto Clause does not authorize pocket vetoes

during all adjournments, but only when “the Congress,

by their Adjournment, prevent [the bill’s] Return.” U.S.

Constitution, art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (emphasis supplied). In 1929,

this Court commented, in dictum, that “delivery of the

{return vetoed] bill to some individual” would be “‘ficti-

tious,’ The Pocket Veto Case, supra, 279 U.S. at 685, but

that statement was purely hypothetical. Only in Wright

v. United States, supra, was the matter presented con-

cretely, and there the Court upheld return to an author-

ized officer as adequate. The Court overruled its 1929 ex-

pressions, agreeing with counsel for the House of Repre- -

sentatives that “ ‘[t]he Houses of Congress have officers

and agents of great power and responsibility who act in

their stead, and who are constantly in their places when

the Houses ... are not in session.’ 1° There was

“ ‘nothing in the Constitution which denies the right to

the use of these agents in effecting the return of objected-

to bills.’”’ Jd., 302 U.S. at 591.

Kennedy v. Sampson applied the Wright rule in

confirming the adequacy of return to an authorized offi-

cer during adjournments. While that case concerned in-

trasession adjournments, since Kennedy v. Sampson the

pocket veto has been reserved for use only during the

final adjournments at the end of each two-year Congress.

As petitioners conceded in District Court, there is no

1° Jd., 302 U.S. at 591 (quoting the argument that had been present-

ed in The Pocket Veto Case by Representative Hatton W. Sumners, on

behalf of amicus curiae Committee on the Judiciary of the House of

Representatives).

11

practical difference today between intrasession and in-

tersession adjournments, App. 7a, 33a,'! and accordingly,

President Ford accepted return of messages to authorized

officers as adequate during intra- and intersession ad-

journments. President Carter and, at first, even President

Reagan continued to accept such returns during adjourn-

ments. App. 36a-37a nn.31-52.

3. Petitioners propose that during every adjournment of

the Congress more than three days in duration the Presi-

dent should pocket veto rather than return veto.!? Their

1! Petitioners misleadingly comment about adjournments that are

longer in duration than others, and intersession as opposed to intrases-

sion adjournments, Petition for Certiorari at 23-26, when their actual

position is that the President can pocket veto bills during all adjourn-

ments of the Congress, intersession or intrasession, longer than three

days, id. at 27-28. In any event, Judge McGowan’s opinion amply dem-

onstrated the absence of any such distinction that could soundly be

drawn, App. 29a-45a. At the time of The Pocket Veto Case in 1929,

prior to the passage of the Twentieth Amendment in 1933, the in-

tersession adjournment ‘aivided two very different sessions of Con-

gress, a ‘long’ session and a ‘lame duck’ session,” App. 33a n.26. Thus,

the intersession adjournment, a lengthy break between very different

sessions, differed sharply from the mere intrasession adjournment, a

short pause for Christmas and New Year’s that did not separate any-

thing very different. See Kennedy v. Sampson, supra, 511 F. 2d at 442-

44 (listing pre-1933 intrasession adjournments).

In abolishing the regular “lame duck’ session, the Twentieth

Amendment abolished the difference between sessions that had

inarked previous intersession adjournments. Now, the intersession ad-

journment typically serves the function that had been served by the

intrasession adjournment, as the break for Christmas and New Year’s.

The court of appeals recognized and petitioners concede, Petition for

Certiorari at 23, that the duration of intersession adjournments has

correspondingly diminished, as befits its current role.

12 The Executive argued that the constitutional requirement that

the two Houses agree on adjournments longer than three days creates

a “bright line” somehow pertinent to the pocket veto. The court of ap-

peals analyzed this thoroughly, and concluded that “[tlo choose a

three-day line . . . simply because it is a line ignores the [Supreme]

Court’s mandate and the purpose of the pocket veto clause.” App. 45a.

Nevertheless, petitioners proffer that same theory to this Court, argu-

ing for their “well-defined rule that the Pocket Veto Clause appiies

Continued

12

proposal for a “three-day rule,’ App. 42a-43a, not only

swings far out of line with the settled rule, the view of

prior Administrations, and the bicaraeral and bipartisan

position of the Congress, but also carries extreme implica-

tions in practice. For the President to pocket veto bilis

even over a three-day weekend would drastically upset

the system of checks and balances. To illustrate, the

House Calendar regularly collects in one section the

“Bills Through Conference,” which are the bills, number-

ing eighty-two in the 97th Congress, which were reported

back from a conference committee. Typically, these are

the most important and controversial bills presented to

the President.

Pursuant to petitioners’ theory of the three-day rule, of

those eighty-two bills, sixty-one would have been subject

to pocket veto.'* In other words, petitioners would immu-

nize seventy-four percent of the President’s vetoes of such

bills from override. Only twenty-one bills, or twenty-six

percent, were subject to return veto under the proposed

three-day rule.'* As Judge McGowan noted, petitioners’ .

theory of the three-day rule “deprives Congress of the

final word on a significant portion of its legislation and

grants the President an absolute veto,” App. 39a (empha-

sis supplied). When the Framers conferred on the Presi-

when ‘the Congress’ has adjourned,” Petition for Certiorari at 27-28,

meaning any adjournment of both Houses, which includes all adjourn-

ments more than three days in duration.

'3 A table of these bills which was provided as an appendix to the

brief for the House parties in the court of appeals is appended to this

opposition.

'4 A factor not immediately apparent is that typically it takes sever-

al days after a final vote to prepare a bill for presentation to the

President. The necessary preliminary to presentation—“enrollment,”

which makes certain that every word and punctuation mark in the

bill matches what the Houses decided during the processes of floor and

conference consideration—requires meticulous checking of the bill.

Hence, if the pocket veto were available for all adjourr.ments of the

Congress, it would sweep up not only the bills voted on the eve of ad-

journment, but those voted considerably earlier but presented only

within ten days of adjournment.

ee —

13

dent a qualified, but not absolute, veto which could be

overridden by a two-thirds majority of both Houses of

Congress, they made one of their most profound and en-

during commitments regarding the system of checks and

balances. The settled rule regarding the pocket veto pre-

serves that system of checks and balances, which petition-

ers’ extreme theory would disrupt.

As described above, the Pocket Veto Clause serves a se-

rious purpose: to assure that the President’s guaranteed

ten days to decide between signing or vetoing a bill will

not be “destroyed” or “cut down.” Supreme Court review

of the issue should await an instance of deprivation of

that guaranteed time. It should not be granted just to air

again an extreme theory, far out of line with the settled

rule, prior Administrations, and Congress, which was

soundly rejected below.

Il.

THIS IS NOT AN APPROPRIATE CASE TO REVIEW THE STANDING

OR MOOTNESS ISSUES

Regarding respondents’ standing, the court of appeals

followed standards enunciated by this Court with which

even the Executive Branch has hitherto agreed. The pro-

ceedings below show that even if this Court were inclined

to review some Congressional standing case, this is not

the appropriate one.

1. This Court has stated repeatedly that legislators

have standing to protect their “plain, direct and adequate

interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes.”

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962) (quoting Coleman

v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939)); see also Dyer v. Blair,

390 F. Supp. 1291, 1297 n.12 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (three-judge

court) (Stevens, J.). The court of appeals simply followed

those cases, which it discussed thoroughly and which the

Petition for Certiorari omits to mention. Whatever sepa-

rate issues arise when i:.dividual Members of Congress

sue on their own because of the collegial nature of Con-

gressional activity, in this case the Houses themselves in-

14

tervened in support of the Member plaintiffs. Even the

Executive had hitherto agreed, in Kennedy v. Sampson,

supra, that the Houses had staiding in such a case, and

the Executive’s position in this case cont’ nued to concede

that, until petitioners’ late shift in position after the

court of appeals ruled.

Petitioners do not argue that there is any division in

the circuits, but seek review nonetheless by contending

that the “doctrine of congressional standing [is] unique to

the District of Columbia Circuit,” Petition for Certiorari

at 16-17. That contention is incorrect. Since the court of

appeals follows Baker v. Carr, supra, and Coleman uv.

Miller, supra, naturally the other circuits follow the same

rule, praising the D.C. Circuit for taking the Supreme

Court’s commands and “articulat{ing] a comprehensive

jurisprudential theory defining the basis on which the

courts should or should not dismiss suits filed by congres-

sional plaintiffs against the executive branch.” Dennis v.

Luis, 741 F.2d 628, 632 (3d Cir. 1984).15

2. Even assuming arguendo that at some point this .

Court wishes to reconsider its pronouncements in Baker

v. Carr, supra, and Coleman v. Miller, supra, this is not

an appropriate case to review the issue of legislative

standing. Petitioners failed to brief the issue below, and

as described above, Assistant Attorney General Willard

argued in favor of standing when questioned during argu-

ment in the court of appeals. Therefore, what petitioners

proffer for review is an able opinion for the court of ap-

peals which accepted petitioners’ own undisputed argu-

ments. An issue not briefed below, in which the parties

15 For cases in other circuits following Kennedy v. Sampson or the

D.C. Circuit’s test generally, see Dennis v. Luis, supra; Bordallo v. Ca-

macho, 520 F.2d 763, 764 (9th Cir. 1975); Dellums v. Smith, 573 F.

Supp. 1489 (N.D. Cal. 1983); McRae v. Mathews, 421 F. Supp. 533, 540

(E.D.N.Y. 1976). Some cases arise from legislatures and courts in

United States possessions such as the Virgin Islands, rather than from

Congress and mainland district courts, but the courts of appeals deem

this “a distinction without substance concerning the issue of stand-

ing.” Dennis v. Luis, supra, 741 F.2d at 630 n.3.

15

challenging the opinion now are parties whose views were

accepted below, has simply not matured sufficiently for

review by this Court. This Court derives substantial bene-

fits from opinious of courts below rendered on the basis of

adversary presentations, and from receiving briefing and

argument from counsel who have refined their position

through such presentations. The House parties submit,

and the jurisprudential needs of this Court require, that

this Court not be deprived of the benefits of the normal

evolutionary process by which sufficiently defined con-

flicts are presented for review simply because one party

seeks, belatedly, to rely on the view of a lone dissenting

judge.

Moreover, the fact that one lone dissenting judge below

insisted on his particular view, generated sua sponte

without briefing or adversary argument, against the judg-

ment of all the parties and all his colleagues, hardly

served to replace such adversary proceedings, for his view

was so idiosyncratic that even the petitioners who selec-

tively quote from it do not actually embrace it. Judge

Bork’s dissent disputes the validity of any “‘governmen-

tal standing,’”’ that is, any occasion when “states or their

legislators, executives, or judges” could sue “various

branches of the federal government.” App. 54a. As the

court of appeals noted, this view would require overruling

an overwhelming number of this Court’s precedents,'®

and runs directly counter to Justice Powell’s recent sound

instruction that “a dispute between Congress and the

16 App. 10a-1lla (citing JNS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Nixon v.

Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 439 (1977); National

League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 837, & n.7 (1976), overruled on

other grounds, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,

105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985); United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 US.

153, 154-56 (1953); United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426, 430 (1949); and

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)). The list should also

include South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966). In fact,

even though the dissenting judge has had a short tenure, his particu-

lar view required him to disavow some opinions in which he himself

participated already. See App. 54a n.2.

16

" President is ready for judicial review when ‘each branch

has taken action asserting its constitutional authority’—

when, in short, ‘the political branches reach a constitu-

’ tional impasse.’’ App. 14a (emphasis in origina]) (quoting

Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979)). It is not

surprising that the Petition for Certiorari quotes the rhe-

torical devices appearing in the dissent rather than its

basic position, but this only emphasizes that nothing writ-

ten below addressed what petitioners would present in

this Court.

Moreover, this case lacks the characteristics of typical

Congressional standing cases. More often than not, such

cases concern failure to execute the law, not, as here, the

lawmaking process itself. Moreover, Members bring such

cases individually, without intervention by the Houses.'?

In light of those two characteristics, motions to dismiss

such cases on threshhold grounds usually succeed, and in

any event are tested under doctrines not applicable in

this case.'* This case has none of these characteristics,

17 For cases in the D.C. Circuit alone in which individual Members

have sued, without intervention by the Houses to support them, see,

e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Southern Christian Lead-

ership Conference v. Kelley, 747 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1984); United Pres-

byterian Church v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Moore v.

U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 779

(1985); Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam),

cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3533 (1984); Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d

1166 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983); AFGE v. Pierce,

697 F.2d 303, 305 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Riegle v. Federal Open Market Com-

mittee, 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981); Reuss

v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978); Har-

rington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Metcalf v. National Pe-

troleum Council, 553 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Conyers v. Reagan, 578

F. Supp. 324 (D.D.C. 1984), appeal dismissed, 765 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir.

1985); and, Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983),

aff'd, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

‘8 App. 14a (remedial discretion doctrine).

17

and it would provide an inappropriate vehicle for consid-

ering the issue as it arises in the typical cases.!®

3. Finally, petitioners’ mootness question is merely a

variant on their standing question. Petitioners contend

that because H.R. 4042 has “by its own terms expired,”

the “mere publication of the bill would at this point vin-

dicate no interest of respondents,” so that the case is

moot. Petition for Certiorari at 10-11.7° Petitioners cite

Diffenderfer uv. Central Baptist Church, 404 US. 412

(i972), Petition for Certiorari at 12, where a potentially

liable taxpayer sought an injunction against the oper-

ation of a state tax statute, and this Court held that after

the statute was repealed, “[t]his relief is, of course, inap-

propriate now that the statute has been repealed.” 404

US. at 415.

However, the Members and Houses assert the rights

specified for them in the lawmaking process to have peti-

tioner Burke publish H.R. 4042 as a public law, not an in-

junction concerning the operation of the statute. The

relief sought is entirely appropriate for the interest as-

serted. That the petitioner has continued his refusal to

publish the law for several years, even in the face of a

declaratory judgment against him, does not impair re-

spondents’ interest; when petitioner respects respondents’

'§ See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940 (1983) (describing and ap-

proving an appearance by “both Houses of Congress’’ in holding that

“Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a statute ...”). -

~ For the Court to address again, only two years later, one of the very

few cases, like Chadha, in which the Houses have intervened, will not

shed light on the different and more common cases in which individ-

ual legislators appear by themsleves.

2°Petitioners’ analogy to National Organization for Women, Inc.

(NOW) v. Idaho, 459 U.S. 809 (1982), is far-fetched. In that case, the

proposed constitutional amendment failed, with or without the state

ratification recissions under challenge. Here, the proposed H.R. 4042

succeeded. There is no comparison between the mere desire in NOW v.

Idaho to record an unsuccessful effort at enactment, and the interest

here in vindicating the successful lawmaking process.

é

18

interest, he publishes many laws that have expired.”' Pe-

titioners may dispute that the Members and Houses have

standing to pursue their “plain, direct and adequate in-

terest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes,”

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962) (quoting Coleman

v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939)), but that is no more

than a variant of their standing question.** The only dif-

ference is that petitioners seek, on this question, for this

Court to rush into a hasty and unwise summary decision

without receiving briefing or argument—a request ex-

traordinary in the extreme, considering that the courts

below received from petitioners no briefing or adversary

argument prior to decision on any justiciability question.

CONCLUSION

The petition for certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

STEVEN R. Ross

General Counsel to the Clerk

CHARLES ‘TIEFER’

Deputy General Counsel to the

Clerk

MICHAEL L. MURRAY

Assistant Counsel to the Clerk

Counsel for the Speaker and Bipar-

tisan Leadership Group

JANUARY 1986

2! See, e.g., H.J. Res. 653, 656, 659, 663, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (re-

spectively Pub. L. Nos. 98-441, 98-453, 98-455, and 98-461 and 98 Stat.

1699, 1731, 1747, and 1814) (continuing resolutions enacted, respective-

ly, October 3, 5, 6, and 10, each expiring almost immediately).

22Petitioners virtually concede that their mootness question is

simply a variant on standing, repeatedly falling back, in their section

on mootness, on arguments that “respondents lack standing,” and that

“they obviously would lack standing,” Petition for Certiorari at 14, 16.

19

) ‘suotyeudoiddy seisuaty jyuepued

‘1OI-L6 Td peccoooeses 7@¥90g eccccccoses 2 {pe 4au] peccese 1861 ‘II ‘20q -epu] —jueudojasag uvqif) pus Suisnoyy eeccecce PEO WH

‘su0ly

‘OOI-L6 Id seeseccoees 7e420g erecercceces z {pe 4eju] eevecce 1861 ‘Il ‘eq -eudoiddy selouasy perejey pus 40Ua}U] steeeeee SgoP WH

66-L6 Vd pecncceenes 7@490g eoccccesess 2 {pe Jou] peceese LR61 ‘II ‘eq peocscccooseoese uonezu0Yy ny uorjonsysUu0Z Arey Ww pecccoes SSPE WH

‘96-L6 ‘Id peccosecces y@HICg ecocccesoes , {pe 4aquy ececces 1861 ‘Ol ‘eq Wocccccccccceccocccocesooonsocoeesooeoceoes uoneZzu0Yyyny WSVN eoccccccceccs #601 §

‘pene, winjey seeeecccescooseces On ~"" _ga00N eenoy] I eeeees 1861 ‘8Z ‘AON 000 -eeeececeees soyyng ‘Burnunuog ‘suoneudoiddy “18 ‘sey fH

‘I6-L6 Id eevccceccoscccooes ON "" 9g800U aenoy I seeeee 1861 ‘$Z ‘AON PIrrTTirititriiy suonsudoiddy BIqUIN]OZD jo PUywig seeeeeee Z2Sh WH

‘uoKneZUOYNy ABeug

4BajONN JO suoNBoddy Ais pus

ere taro ON |"#ee004 eenoy | I86l ‘ez ‘AON AqLaNdeg peuoneN ARieuy jo quewyedeg eeceeees SPE WH

24 Tare ON | @ee001 esnoy re 1861 v4 ‘AON oeececccecccscccsosccccees Py uonez0yyny — ececcees PSPE WH

‘B8-L6 Td Hee eeeeenereneeees ON "(989007 esnoy I eeeeee 1861 ‘82 “AON -eudoiddy queudojeaeg 1298 M pues pe teeeeeee Prlp WH

eit Tar ON soccescoecese uO1s8e8 uJ seccee 1861 ‘6I ‘AON oseccceses ~Py uonjezoYyyny quewyedeg esuajag eeececeseseoees sg S

‘09-L6 ‘Td Cecccccercesoceses ON eoeresccecoce UuOls8e8 ul eccccce 1861 ‘pI ‘po Ce eeereeeesecesesscesesesseses PV eg B01A1eg peuostuy) Trrerrr rrr t ty Igil Ss 6

'€9-L6 Id Oeeecerevecsceoess ON eeetocecceees UOIs8e8 ul soecccces 1861 ‘g ‘PO COs eeeererererecescesesseeeees PV Ad1]0g wislunoy [suonenN eeeeeeeeeeceees vOE ‘s x

‘IS-L6 ‘Td eccccccce "3@40g seeesees , {pe Biju] eeecccece 1861 | ‘po PTITITITITITETT TTT iT tite suodijeiidoiddy Bumunuop “OZg ‘sey TH L

‘GE-L6 Id seesececese 3@490g eecccccsoes , {pe B1j}U] Ceeece 1861 ‘ZI ‘any ee reeeeeeeereeereseeseeeseees snqiuwigd ‘py UOIBI|INUOVEY seeeeees Z86E WH 9

‘PE-L6 Id seeercecess yeYI0g teeeesecees , {pe Biju] steers 1861 ‘ZI ‘Bny See ee eee eeeeeereeeeeeseeteeeeee PV xB] AldA00eyY dt1u0Ug eeeeeeee vA LA J WH g

‘py “uoNBszZLI0Yy

‘68-L6 Vd sercccceces 38490g erecccosecs , {pe B1}U] eeceeeces 1861 ‘g ‘Bny ny [sjueweddng ‘asuajag jo quewyedeg Oeeeereereseres 69 Ss r

‘SZ-L6 Id seeeeecees 340g eeeeccceces , {pe B13U] seeeere 1861 ‘1g Aine POOR ERE NRO eee eee EEE eHOOEE Eee eEseeeeseeeseees py qunoosiq yeep eeeeeseeeees 1g . H 8

‘SZ-L6 Td PreTrriritiiiritits ON serecesececes U0L8808 uj seeeeeees L861 ‘g Aine seeceee py uoisuayxg eout|dwoy Aaysnpu] [29S eeeeeeee 0ZS8 WH vA

‘PV

ZI-L6 ‘Td se eeecceereceeeees ON eercccccesoes uolsse8 uj eeee oe 1861 ‘g eunr UOLssIDey pue uonjeiadouddy [eyueweddng tteeeees Z1S8 WH I

oyaa yayood | UONS Used s2ye uoljwjueseud

ayy jenoy al —S pe eed eure ON II'G@ =| ON

OLGA NUNLAY YO OLAA LAMOOd ‘SSHUDNOO 436 FHL AO STTIA YOLVW ‘V XIGNAddV

“Ys qe

‘EPZ-L6 Id pcesccecess 7@420g ecccccccces » {pe B13U] eeccce Z861 ‘0Z ‘any ‘say DUBIIOA peuoneN suejeH 4S qunow eevccece 0gs9 WH 88

‘UOTTBZLIOU NY ‘suocTzeLIdOld

‘dy Suseopeoig [euoKeusazu] 10) pavog

‘IWZ-L6 ‘Td 3@490g seeeeeeseee » {pe B13U] seeeee Z861 ‘ZI ‘any pue Anuesy uorBoIUNWIWIOZ ea seeeesceceees S611 § Lg

“6Z2-L6 Td eovccecccccvccoces on secccsccccoce uolsees u] socccees 2861 % ‘any -8N ‘py sseupeiedaig Anueziewy ‘a erecesseccecs ZEEZ s 98

we-m Taro" are uowsses uy fo Z861 ‘gl Ane seeeroecccees quemip ‘suoeLidoiddy [sjueweddng ececcees 6899 ‘Y'H | SE

‘peoj2 A winjyey peccccceees 7@490g scecesecoes . {pe B1}U] eoccee 2861 "PZ eunr sceceseccess ques) ‘jwyuewelddng ‘suotjetidoiddy ecccceee 2269 WH re

‘00Z-L6 Td oeceseeseceseceses ere 98200/ jeug seeeee 2861 ‘SI eunr eeeeceecerseces py u01900}01g 801} 1QUeP] aquest] [equ] seeeeceecesees P WH ee

peoja, winwey eccccccccoccoccccs On ecccccese sse0es Joug eocccees 2861 6 ‘18W eeceeccocccecoees Aqpurig ‘py uoizB0IY wine]0.130g eeercecccores g0sl s 28

IZI-L6 ‘Ta qeyo0g fn" , {pe aayuy fe" 1861 ‘22 ie Pewee suonjeiudoiddy aouByslesy usiel0 4 seeereee 69S WH | Ig

pLI-L6 Td pe ccccccees 7@490g seecccccces 2 {pe 4au] eoccces 1861 ‘2% ‘20q wovece py uonsiudoiddy asuajeg jo quewjyedeg eoseeees G66P WH 0g

“py uorjeiedo

‘SlI-L6 ‘Id seeeeeeenee 740g seeeeeerees , {pe seu] steeeee 1861 ‘22 ‘eq aa) quewdojeaeg pue Ayuunseg [BUucIzBUse}uUy st eeeeeeeeeee 9611 s 62

'86-L6 Id st eeeneeeee 740g seeeeeeeee , {pe 41aqu] seeeeee 1861 ‘Iz ‘eq AAR ene ee eneeeneeeeeeeerenees »py pooy pue aunz[nousy see eeereeeeeees VSR ‘s 82

‘CbI-L6 Id + eeeeeecene 3@490g seeeceeeees z {pe 4au] seeeeee 1861 ‘LI ‘Od seeeeeee py s}uewpUueWYy uolyelysIUIWIpYy yodxg seeeeees L9Sg WH lz

‘6Z1-L6 Td seeeeeesees 3@490g seeeeeeeeee 2 {pe 1au] seeeeee 1861 ‘LI ‘20g teeeeereees uoIsUua}xXy Py joaqu0g eouBzsqng wWKOL seeeeweeeenes LIZI s 92

‘SZI-L6 Id seeeeeeeeee y@490g + eeeeeereee , {pe 4eju] seeeeee 1861 “LI ‘eq Henne eneeeereeeneees s}\jeueg wnwiuly AQUNIeg [Bts90g seeeeeee ger WH SZ

‘LII-L6 Id seer seeeees yey0g seeeeeeeeee , {pe 41a4uU] seeeeee 1861 “LI ‘eq sees sjuewpuseuy py joaquog uoryn{|Od 18M seeeeeee g0SP WH 74

‘SII-L6 Td seeeeeeeeee yeyoodg + eeeeeeeees z (pe i@uy oeeeeee [R61 ‘LI ‘eq Aenean eeeeeeneenee sJUewWpuseuy Py suBduUeuly 42@PiO sn eeeeeereees 9801 Ss &Z

‘OOI-L6 Vd + teeeeereee 3@490g Heeeweneeee S «x 3 4834] oeeeeee [861 ‘LI ‘eq see eeeeeeeees suoijyeiidoiddy uorjoON138U0Z ALB teeeeeee LbZP WH Zz

‘suorjetidoiddy se1suedy pe

‘SOI-L6 Vd teeeceeeees 32490g seeeeeeeee s ‘(pe 4aquU] seeeeee L86I ‘LI ‘20g 48/24 pues juewidojaseg peany ‘aunynousy seeeeeee 6LIP WH 1z

‘euorjetdoid

‘ZOl-l6 Id a eeeeeeenee yeyo0g teeewee ee 2 {pe seu] seeseee 1861 ‘91 ‘eq dy selouesy peyeley pus uoIjepodsuwsy seeeeeee 602P WH 02

yaa yexI0d woxyeyussead ses uolrje) Ueeeud : .

ey penpy 0 yelqng moses) jo neg owen ON II'@ oN

penunuo)—OLAA NYN.LAY YO OLGA LA NDOd ‘SSAUDNOO 4316 AHL AO STTIA YOLVW ‘V XIGNdddV

21

seeeeeneeee

weeeeeeeeee

sete eewnnee

ween eenenee

ee eeeeeenee

seen eeeeeee

Fee eeneeeeeee

Fee eeeeeeeeee

Cone eeeeneeee

ee eeeeeeeee

eoccece ZR61 ‘sl ‘PO me ealpeya eunjydeoey Oarl ‘soxBl,

serene 2861 ‘SI PO noneerneonness UQUUIDUSUTY su0IgnzIWs8U] A10j190deq

seeeeee 2861 ‘Z1 ‘PO ceneeeeses tec. se01nosey seg [e3880R)

ae)

a Z86I “S “PO | -Uj yueulseg [eiepey BIqUINjOD jo PUIG

eeeeeeeee Z861 ‘g ‘PO a ee uoInezZLIOyu Ny VSVN

eeeeccees Z861 ‘g ‘PO ‘ceemnie diysueupeg Sururely, qor

peeeeeees Z861 ‘g ‘PO PTrrririiri titi titi ttt ttt ttt S20LAIeg epely yodxq

eeeeeeeee ZR61 . ‘PO merrenneeeees UOTgBLidolddy uorjon138U0Z Arey

eeeeeeere ZR61 . pO eeeeeeee pV uonszZuOYy Ny uorjons3y8U0_D AreyWw

eeecceee Z861 ‘py ‘PO ‘ARE ueipityD Suse

eeeeccees 2861 % ‘PO meeeeee* OT TUSINT weis0ig soussnsuy uoneuy

eeecceces 2861 % ‘PO eeeeee suotjeudoiddy SutinuyuoD

eeeereees 2861 | ‘PO noeerenness GUQUUIDUGIIY PV saisedg poiesuspuq

eeeeeeeee 2861 ‘I ‘PO ae sUeUIpueuUTy [eoruyse | eBW ales

“‘Burwiok Mm Ul jue

‘ees Z86I ‘1 PO | eSsejugq soA1esey pue weg [ig ofeyng

‘suoneudoiddy seisuesy juepued

YY 2861 ‘0g Weg | -epul—jueuidojeneq] uvqif) pue SulsnoH

“ZR61 ‘9I ydeg ecerececccccccesesecesoses PV uonjezuoyny eouest|[e70]

“ZR61 ‘9I ‘ydag PrTTitiiriti tit PV SB0LAI8g feuleag

eccccccs Z861 ‘g ‘ydeg ee A107 8/nSey eng

“py uonszi0y;

eo. 2861 ‘2 “Weg VY UolssTUIWIOD SsUOTWBI}UNUIWIO [Biepeg

eoeceees 2861 % ydeg aes enueaey sNOeUB]|e081

ZR61 "12 ‘any seeeeeereeeseeees ~Y UOIBITIOUOCOeY ye3png snqiuwg

stews Z861 ‘lz ‘Bny aaa J uotyeZLIOYy Ny esuajag jo quewjzredeg

eeeeee Z861 ‘SZ ‘Bny [verter gang uonsudoiddy [wjueweddng

‘OL Pedsoy 431M “O} poyuIgng see

‘seeuBu) jo Awaqr] 4) UT eoUyO 14yBLAdor

SESSSIBESBS SESS

2 SSSS $3955

"B9P-L6 ‘Id se eeeeeeeee yyI0g seeeeeesees 9 {pe jeuly seeeeeeee S861 ‘s ‘usr See eeeeeeeeseeeeeeee PV uoIjBZUIOYu Ny Ayayeg euljedig oeeeeees OZhE WH 08

“UONSZLIOUINY Gary

“wyusseidey epesl, ‘Sf) “eotsseg suoysnD

‘OSP-L6 Id ee eeeeeeres 490g seeeeeeeeee 9 {pe jeuly eeeeeeees E861 ‘s ‘usr sn “UOLSSTUIUIOZ) epely (euonsuiauy sn seeeeeee 609 WH 6L

GS¥-L6 Id seecceserce ye¥yD0g eeeeceeeees 9 {pe jeuly seeeeeeee S861 ‘s ‘usr se eeeeeeececereesseeseeeees uolIslAey eoxuy spus|s] ula, seseeres 860L WH BL

“queweaoid

‘ESP-L6 Td sovcseccees 740g eoccccecess » {pe jeuly evccceces S861 ‘g ‘usr -w] quewaseuey pue uorBAlesUcZ Asousy | eee 2009 WH LL

‘SPP-L6 “Ta fo” yeyoog fn » {pe peury fe £861 ‘g Cp Potten PY su0Te1I0D feoruysey, |" 9909 “HH | 9L

‘ObP-L6 “Td OO" ye420g o {pe peurg fn eb i 2 ces sjueUuIpUeUTYy sefnpeYysg yuBy fo 999? “HH | SL

‘PRP-L6 Id rerererrr 740g se eeeeeeees 9 {pe jeury a E861 ‘ ‘uer ree errr py Surpery, sounjng seeeeeee LbPS WH PL

‘W2P-L6 “Td lO” yeyo0g fo" 9 {pe yeurg |" £861 ‘g eee py souepissy uonepodsussy eowping | 1129 ‘WH | SL

"u0Hy

‘SIP-L6 "Td f"""" yey0g fn o {pe pouty | sees Z86I ‘SZ 20d | -ezUOYINY UOIssIUIWIOD A107 8 n3ey aeejony fo" 0882 “M'H | ZL

‘PIP-L6 Td seeeeeeeees 72490g seeeeeeenee 9 {pe jeuly seeeeee Z861 ‘$Z ‘eq | Ao eee nee eeeneeeeneenes PV 3nig usydip seeeeeee 8&Z9 WH IL

‘su0ry

"p6g- “4b 'Td seeeeceveee yeyqo0g seeereeeees 9 (pe jeury seeeeee Z861 ‘$Z ‘eq -eudoiddy selouesy pe78|ey pus 401L8}U] seeeeeee 9981 WH OL

‘uoIsUaXY WY eBe]/0OD

‘peoje A 7@¥yI0g eecccvccces qe@y0g ecccccccese o {ps peury coceces 2861 ‘2% ‘20g Ayu nuiwio0g pe[joru0g Ayyequyy, ‘sUBIPU] oee~. seeeeee £292 ‘s 69

"B68- Lb "T d seeeeeeenes yeyd0g errrrrrrrry 9 {pe jeuly seeeeee Z861 Iz ‘20d seeeeeeeeeee py jo13U0Z eu uory BOY IQUeP] osTey seeeenee 969 WH 89

‘SLE- b T *"| ne ye@¥yI0g erecsescecs 9 {pe peuty eecccee Z861 i 4 ‘20d eeecccceseccoces suoneiidoiddy BIqUIN]OD jo puwig eeeccees PPIL WH 19

‘LLS-L6 "Td 0" yeyoog f""" ¢ {pe peurg jo Z861 ‘0Z mae seyyny ‘suotjetidoiddy BuinunUOD “189 ‘sey [' H | 99

‘suotjeudoiddy se1nuesy pe

‘OL8-L6 “I'd (°"""" 3@420g teeeeeeeees o {pe peur jo Z861 ‘LI ‘eq | 4e]ey pus quewdojeseg peany ‘qunynosy seeeeees ZLOL ‘WH | 99

‘suonetidoid

‘696-L6 Td eecccccsces 340g eeceeceeees o {pe jeuly seeeees 2861 ‘LI ‘20g dy selouety pers (eu pus uonepodsussy seeceees 6I0L WH r9

ojea wo}eQUESEd Joys u01j,8) Ueeeid ‘ ,

ave) [enV Or asotteg, | SOP OL esauducc) Soma oureN, ON IG =| ON

penuijuo)—OLAA NUN.Lad XO OLGA LAMOOd ‘SSHUDNOO 4316 GAH.L AO STII HOLVW ‘V XIGNAddV

veseseeeeee] PL. 97-473.

ve} Pocket Vetoed.

H.R. 3963........

H.R. 5470........

81

ait as

i I; : Fy E

Bidet aces

aii ope th |

an se fat

| iia dep

i tH a3} 78

eae

Re Hie

hia eee

nai a:

| PtH HE isind 3 &

HERE |

sitlel Lees t

aie

eel a

AH. re Hi

| aie [ey iH

PH HITE us

ree

HE rrr!