Amicus Curiae Brief — Thompson v. Oklahoma

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IN THE _ MAY 15 y9¢67 }

Supreme Court of the United) States--...... |

Ocroser TERM, 1986 Pee a

WILLIAM WAYNE THOMPSON,

Petitioner,

—e

STATE OF OKLAHOMA,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT

OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

BRIEF OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY

FOR ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY AND

THE AMERICAN ORTHOPSYCHIATRIC

ASSOCIATION AS AMICI CURIAE IN

SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

JosepH T. MCLAUGHLIN

Counsel of Record

Jeremy G. EPSTEIN

Henry WEISBURG

KENNETH A. FREELING

Rosert L. PEABopy

STEVEN M. Pincus

SHEARMAN & STERLING

53 Wall Street

New York, New York 10005

(212) 837-6000

Attorneys fér Amici Curiae —

May 15, 1987

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Question Presented for Review

1. Is the execution of an individual who was under the age

of 18 at the time he or she committed a capital offense cruel and

unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW .........

Memes GP PRUNE «5... ee eee eee ee

gs ss

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE .................

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT................

ok oy os st ees se esse ees.

I. PSYCHIATRISTS, PSYCHOLOGISTS AND

OTHER CHILD DEVELOPMENT

EXPERTS RECOGNIZE THAT

ADOLESCENCE IS A TRANSITIONAL

PERIOD BETWEEN CHILDHOOD AND

ADULTHOOD IN WHICH YOUNG

PEOPLE ARE STILL DEVELOPING THE

COGNITIVE ABILITY, JUDGMENT AND

FULLY FORMED IDENTITY OR

CHARACTER OF ADULTS ..............

Il. ADOLESCENTS WHO COMMIT MURDER

SUFFER FROM SERIOUS

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND FAMILY

DISTURBANCES WHICH EXACERBATE

THE ALREADY EXISTING

VULNERABILITIES OF YOUTH..........

A. A Study of Juveniles on Death Row

Confirms Their Seriously Impaired

ESOT eee

B. Petitioner Was a Subject of the Study and

Exhibited the Same Serious Disabilities .

Page

eee

ill

Page

III. THE EXECUTION OF AN INDIVIDUAL

WHO WAS AN ADOLESCENT AT THE

TIME OF THE CAPITAL OFFENSE IS

EXCESSIVE IN VIOLATION OF THE

EIGHTH AMENDMENT ................. 16

A. Capital Punishment Is Excessive As Applied

to Adolescents Because It Is

ES scone cans ovcecaetees 19

B. Capital Punishment is Excessive As Applied

to Adolescents Because It Serves No

Legitimate Penological Purpose ......... 20

1. The Death Penalty Does Not Deter

Youths From Committing Capital

I oa c ys okie aarechhaa cas <; 20

2. Retribution Is Not a Legitimate

Penological Purpose With Respect to

SE 0 Sls b 0 br Caen deans 22

a. Adolescents Are Less Responsible

Than Adults For Their Offensive

GE tkeu suede canueeianeeuas 23

b. Vengeance Is Antithetical to the

Lawful Treatment of Adolescents . 25

c. Retribution Is Contrary to

Rehabilitation, the Principal

Legitimate Goal of Punishing

ae 27

C. The Execution of Adolescents Is

Unconstitutional in Light of Contemporary

Human Knowledge About Adolescents

Generally and Adolescents Who Commit

Capital Offenses in Particular........... 28

| ree yer ey eee 30

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (i979) .......... 3, 4, 24

California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983) ....... 17

Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 5384 (1977) ......... 17, 19

Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) ..... 3,4, 17

Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) ....... passim

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) .......... 18

Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S.Ct. 2595 (1986)...... 15

Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962)........ 24

Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) ..... 24

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)............. 24

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).......... passim

Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) ............ 29

In the Matter of the Appeal in Maricopa County

Juvenile Action No. J-84536-S, 126 Ariz. 546,

Oe ee NE ins Fe wiles 6S eae deen ed a 27

Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) .......... 29

May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953) .-....... 25, 26

New Jersey v T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) ......

Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979)............

Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).....

Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) .....

Rust v. Alaska, 582 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1978) ......

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)........

Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984)...........

Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984)........

State In Interest of D.B.S., 137 N.J. Super. 371,

ey ae

Tison v. Arizona, 55 U.S.L.W. 4496 (U.S. April

EE as'sinawh Ws 45k wow enue has gees bn kaas 9

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) .............

United States v. Frasquillo-Zomosa, 626 F.2d 99

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 987 (1980)...

United States v. Hill, 538 F.2d 1072 (4th Cir.

CRE So ee ee Ne oc ee

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) ........

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).

Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374

he or Saitoh ee eh ao

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions

U.S. Constitution

le sg Ce vias ce SMe

ba ee pest eee Os

eee ee ee

Fourteenth Amendment................

Twenty-Sixth Amendment...................

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RE re

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es ee Oe. Ck ck ence ees teees

Publications

The Aggressive Adolescent: Clinical Perspectives

OS SI PD oo 5 6's Ses ec Waves ssc.

S. Ambron, Child Development (3d ed. 1981)....

American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed.

pe eens yar ery rr erat eer ee eee

Barron, Suicide Rates of Teenagers: Are Their

Lives Harder to Live?, N.Y. Times, April 15,

en, ee ee ways ees 04

C. Bartollas, Juvenile Delinquency (1985) .......

Bender. Children and Adolescents Who Have

Killed, 116 Am. J. Psychiatry 510 (1959) ......

Brunstetter & Silver, Normal Adolescent

Development, in 2 Comprehensive Textbook of

Psychiatry 1608 (H. Kaplan & B. Sadock 4th

a as oer Pe PS eee eee

Corder, Ball, Haizlip, Rollins & Beaumont,

Adolescent Parricide: A Comparison with Other

Adolescent Murder, 133 Am. J. Psychiatry 957

ack cud ARIST ES VERN S ERROR BRR

uw ©

vil

Cornell, Benedek & Benedek, Characteristics of

Adolescents Charged with Homicide: Review of

72 Cases, Behavioral Sciences & the Law, Vol.

Ss SN f fee ere ere

Cornell, Benedek & Benedek, Juvenile Homicide:

Prior Adjustment and a Proposed Typology

(Paper presented at the American Psychiatric

Association Annual Meeting, Washington,

Te BRP reer eer Ty ea aa

Duncan & Duncan, Murder in the Family: A

Study of Some Homicidal Adolescents, 127 Am.

Dy EY WOE MR nd one b ek oy soe v08s ves

Elkind, Egocentrism in Adolescence, 38 Child

Development 1025 (1967) ...................

E. Erikson, Childhood and Society (1963) .......

E. Erikson, /c'entity: Youth and Crisis (1968) ....

S. Fox, The Juvenile Court: Its Context. Problems

and Opportunities (1967)....................

Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical

Perspective, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 1187 (1970) .....

Ginsberg, Psychiatric History and Mental Status

Examination, in 1 Comprehensive Textbook of

Psychiatry 487 (Kaplan & Sadock 4th ed. 1985)

H. Ginsburg & S. Opper, Piaget’s theory of

intellectual development (1969) ..............

Graham & Rutter, Adolescent disorders, in Child

Psychiatry: Modern Approaches, (M. Rutter &

ree eee

P. Hahn, The Juvenile Offender and the Law (2d

PN oer ue eee reese ee al,

Haizlip, Corder & Ball, The Adolescent

Murderer, in The Aggressive Adolescent:

Clinical Perspectives (C. Keith ed. 1984) ......

Page

vill

Hamburg & Wortman, Adolescent Development

and Psychopathology, in 2 Psychiatry ch. 4 (J.

ies ogre vs eb ow sla dine 5 6

D. Hamparian, R. Schuster, S. Dinitz & J.

Conrad, The Violent Few (1978).............

Handbook of Clinical Child Psychology (C.

Walker & M. Roberts eds. 1983) .............

B. Inhelder & J. Piaget, The Growth of Logical

Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence (1958)

Irwin & Millstein, Biopsychosocial Correlates of

Risk-Taking Behaviors, J. Adolescent Health

Care, Vol. 7, No. 6S, 82S (November 1986

Kohlberg, The Development of Children's

Orientations Toward a Moral Order, 6 Vita

eS ES

Kohlberg, Development of Moral Character and

Moral Ideology, in Review of Child

Development Research (M. Hoffman & L.

rie ois use oe 88

Kohlberg & Gilligan, The Adolescent as a

Philosopher: The Discovery of the Self in a

Postconventional World, Daedalius 1051 (Fall

FERN RR ACCS A rt FS oe er

Lewis, Shanok, Pincus & Glaser, Violent Juvenile

Delinquents: Psychiatric, Neurological,

Psychological, and Abuse Factors, ‘8 J. Am.

Acad. Child Psychiatry 307 (1979)............

Lewis, Moy, Jackson, Aaronson, Restifo, Serra &

Simos, Biopsychosocial Characterististics of

Children Who Later Murder: A Prospective

Study, 142 Am. J. Psychiatry 1161 (1985) .....

Page

10, 11

Lewis, Pincus, Bard, Richardson, Feldman,

Prichep & Yeager, Neuropsychiatric,

Psychoeducational and Family Characteristics

of 14 Juveniles Condemned to Death in the

United States (Paper accepted for presentation

at the 34th Annual Meeting of The American

Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry,

October 1987) (Appendix) ...................

Lewis, Shanok, Grant & Ritvo, Homicidally

Aggressive Young Children: Neuropsychiatric

and Experiential Correlates, 140 Am. J.

Psycitiatry 148 (1083) .....................5.

M. Lewis, Clinical Aspects of Child Development

. 2 Serer he leet

Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 104

SR hen SA in ee a is te fee

P. Mussen, J. Conger, & J. Kagan, Child

Development and Personality (5th ed. 1979) ...

D. Offer & J. Offer, From teenage to young

manhood: a psychological study (1975)........

D. Offer, The Psychological World of the

I CI gos) ocak oc shew de ceuae ces

Paperny & Deisher, Maltreatment of Adolescents:

The Relationship to a Predisposition Toward

Violent Behavior and Delinquency,

Adolescence, Vol. 18, No. 71, at 499 (1983) ...

A. Platt, The Child Savers: The Invention of

Delinquency (2d ed. 1977) ..................

M. Rutter. Changing Youth in a Changing

rr Oe on en a

M. Rutter & H. Giller, Juvenile Delinquency:

Trends and Perspectives (1983)...............

Page

Rutter, Graham, Chadwick & Yule, Adolescent

Turmoil: Fact or Fiction?, 17 J. Child

Psychology & Psychiatry 35 (1976). ...........

Sargent, Children Who Kill—A Family

Conspiracy?, 7 Social Work 35 (1962).........

T. Sellin, The Penalty of Death (1982)..........

Sendi & Blomgren, A Comparative Study of

Predictive Criteria in the Predisposition of

Homicidal Adolescents, 132 Am. J. Psychiatry

eI rer Te eer reree

Sheras, Suicide in Adolescents, in Handbook of

Clinical Child Psychology, 759 (C. Walker &

M. Roberts eds. 1063) .............5002055.,

Silver, Dublin & Lourie, Does Violence Breed

Violence? Contributions from a Study of the

Child Abuse Syndrome, 126 Am. J. Psychiatry

EEE oP cect es sve aoad ns whe rwac rhs

Stedman's Medical Dictionary (5th ed. 1982).....

Steinberg & Silverberg, The Vicissitudes of

Autonomy in Early Adolescence 57 Child

Development 841 (1986) ..................-.

Straus, Domestic Violence and Homicide

Antecedents, Bull. N.Y. Acad. Med., Vol. 62,

i Oh wes 6 a a chanteuse Beak eu 5S)

Straus, Family Training in Crime and Violence,

in Crime and the Family 164 (A. Lincoln & M.

I I ica. bene oe tnee ORES 88

Streib, Death Penalty for Children: The American

Experience with Capital Punishment for Crimes

Committed While Under Age Eighteen, 36

os a AM eee oe ee

Page

Streib, The Eighth Amendment and Capital

Punishment of Juveniles, 34 Cleve. St. L. Rev.

IN rt Se ee bee nay 64

Twentieth Century—Fund Task Force on

Sentencing Policy Toward Young Offenders.

Confronting Youth Crime (1978) .............

Vitiello, Constitutional Safeguards for Juvenile

Transfer Procedure: The Ten Years Since Kent

v. United States, 26 De Paul L. Rev. 23 (1976)

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

DE Chet et candace udedena neu eadeas saws»

D. Wechsler, The Wechsler Adult Intelligence

Scale-Revised Manual (1980).................

D. Wechsler, The Wechsler Intelligence Scale For

Children-Revised (1974).....................

M. Wolfgang & F. Ferracuti, The Subculture of

Violence: Towards an Integrated Theory in

F. Zimring, The Changing Legal World of

Adolescence (1982) ..............cccccecceee

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

The American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry and the

American Orthopsychiatric Association file this brief as amici

curiae in support of petitioner by written consent of all parties,

pursuant to Rule 36.2 of the Rules of this Court. The parties’

letters of consent are on file with the Clerk.

The American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry (“ASAP”)

(Doris S. Soghor, M.D., President) was founded in 1967 and to-

day has approximately 1400 members. ASAP provides a national

forum for adolescent psychiatry and promotes the exchange of

psychiatric knowledge about adolescents. Since its founding,

ASAP has supported research on the normal development, as well

as the psychopathology and treatment, of adolescents, helped

to broaden knowledge and understanding of the various factors

that may influence adolescent development and substantially im-

proved the psychiatric community's ability to recognize and

diagnose psychiatric problems common in adolescents. One half

of ASAP’s members are child psychiatrists, while the remaining

number are general psychiatrists and psychoanalysts who main-

tain an active professional interest in adolescents. Its members

work with adolescents in hospitals, schools and psychiatric clinics

around the country as well as within the nation’s juvenile court

system.

The American Orthopsychiatric Association (“Ortho”) (Bert

Pepper, M.D., President) was established in 1924 and has tradi-

tionally been concerned with the problems, causes, treatment

and prevention of psychiatric disturbances. It is an organization

comprised of more than 10,000 members representing a variety

of mental health-related professions — psychiatry, psychology,

psychiatric nursing, social work, education and the law — in-

cluding experts in adolescent development. With its broad-based

membership, Ortho has consistently helped to shape public policy

in the mental health and human development field from vary-

ing professional perspectives.

Amici sponsor a wide array of educational programs for their

members and other mental health professionals. In addition each

amicus publishes a scientific journal.

Amici are organizations with extensive background and ex-

perience in adolescent development. This brief is intended to

provide the Court with relevant data that will enable it to judge

the critical issue herein effectively, fairly and with greater

knowledge of adolescents’ developmental capabilities. Adolescents

are developmentally different from adults. Accordingly, amici

strongly urge the Court to spare adolescents the imposition of

capital punishment.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The law has historically recognized that adolescents differ in-

tellectually and emotionally from adults, and therefore deserve

to be judged and treated differently. This view is confirmed by

a vast body of clinical research and literature. Psychiatrists and

psychologists have demonstrated that adolescents have not yet

developed many of the psychological, cognitive, and emotional

characteristics of mature adults. Adolescents tend to be less

mature, more impulsive, and less capable of controlling their

conduct and thinking in terms of long-range consequences.

Adolescence is a stage of human development in which one’s

character and moral judgment are incomplete and still undergo-

ing formation. An adolescent's character structure is more flexi-

ble than an adult’s and remains open to major modifications.

(Point I)

Adolescents who commit capital offenses typically suffer from

a variety of serious disturbances which inhibit their natural

development. They come from chaotic families, have been ex-

posed to extreme violence, suffer severe cognitive limitations, and

frequently have long-standing psychiatric problems. These fac-

tors tend to exacerbate the existing vulnerabilities of youth and

place an adolescent at extreme risk for seriously violent behavior.

The findings of a recently completed study of persons on death

row who committed capital offenses in their adolescence are con-

sistent with this general understanding about youthful offenders.

William Wayne Thompson, petitioner herein, who was one of

the subjects of that study, exhibited the characteristics typical

of this distinct subgroup. (Point IT)

The Eighth Amendment forbids the infliction of cruel and

unusual punishment. Punishment is inherently cruel if it is ex-

cessive. It is excessive if it is disproportionate or fails to make

any measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment.

As applied to adolescents, capital punishment is both dispropor-

tionate and makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals

of punishment. It is disproportionate as applied to youthful of-

fenders because youths are less culpable than adults for their of-

fensive acts given their incomplete psychological and emotional

development. The death penalty is also contrary to the only

legitimate aims of punishing the young: rehabilitation and treat-

ment. Finally, in light of contemporary human understanding

about adolescents generally and adolescents who commit capital

offenses in particular, the death penalty as applied to adolescents

is contrary to contemporary standards of decency. Execution of

adolescents is therefore inherently cruel in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. (Point III)

ARGUMENT

‘I

PSYCHIATRISTS, PSYCHOLOGISTS AND OTHER

CHILD DEVELOPMENT EXPERTS RECOGNIZE

THAT ADOLESCENCE IS A TRANSITIONAL

PERIOD BETWEEN CHILDHOOD AND ADULT-

HOOD IN WHICH YOUNG PEOPLE ARE STILL

DEVELOPING THE COGNITIVE ABILITY, JUDG-

MENT AND FULLY FORMED IDENTITY OR

CHARACTER OF ADULTS

The law has always recognized that adolescents differ intellec-

tually and emotionally from adults, and therefore deserve to be

judged and treated differently.' As this Court said:

{Youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time

and condition of life when a person may be most

susceptible to influence and to psychological damage.

Our history is replete with laws and judicial recogni-

tion that minors, especially in their earlier vears.

Examples of this different treatment include limitations on youths’ right to

vote, contract, serve as jurors, purchase liquor, marry, drive motor vehicles.

enlist in the armed services, or accept employment. See generally F. Zimring,

The Changing Legal World of Adolescence (1982).

generally are less mature and responsible than adults.

Particularly ‘during the formative years of childhood

and adolescence, minors often lack the experience,

perspective, and judgment’ expected of adults.

Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982), quoting

Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979). This view is con-

firmed by a vast body of clinical research and literature.’

Psychiatrists, psychologists and other child development ex-

perts have demonstrated that adolescents are at a stage of

development in which they lack the cognitive ability,’ judgment

and fully-formed identity or character of adults. “[A ]dolescence

is the transitional period between childhood and adulthood. It

begins with the biological events of puberty and continues

through a complex series of psychological and sociocultural

events and influences to the establishment of an independently

functioning person.”

An adolescent's intellectual growth is incomplete and his

or her reasoning skills and logic are immature. From a cognitive

perspective, adolescents are in the process of moving from “con-

crete operational thought” to “formal operational thought.” An

See, e.g., Brunstetter & Silver, Normal Adolescent Development, in 2 Com-

prehensive Textbook of Psychiatry 1608 (H. Kaplan & B. Sadock 4th ed. 1985):

Hamburg & Wortman, Adolescent Development and Psychopathology, in 2

Psychiatry ch. 4 (J. Cavenar ed. 1985); Handbook of Clinical Child Psychology

(C. Walker & M. Roberts eds. 1983); M. Lewis, Clinical Aspects of Child

Development (2d ed. 1982); S. Ambron, Child Development (3d ed. 1981);

P. Mussen, J. Conger & J. Kagan, Child Development and Personality (5th

ed. 1979); M. Rutter, Changing Youth in a Changing Society (1979); Graham

& Rutter, Adolescent disorders, in Child Psychiatry: Modern Approaches 407

(M. Rutter & L. Hersov eds. 1977).

Cognition refers to the processes involved in perception. memory, reason-

ing, reflection, and insight. P. Mussen, J. Conger & J. Kagan, supra note

2. at 233-34.

Brunstetter & Silver. supra note 2, at 1608. The period of adolescence en-

compasses approximately ages 11 to 18. See generally Hamburg & Wortman,

supra note 2, at 5-8.

Cognitive capacity develops in a sequence of stages. Jean Piaget is credited

with documenting this growth and providing the terminology for these stages.

(Footnote Continued)

adolescent begins to consider the possible as well as the actual.°

These new cognitive skills develop continuously and “most

adolescents cannot be shown to have reached the stage of for-

mal reasoning by the end of high school.”’ Formal, abstract

reasoning is a complex ability that is influenced by training and

experience.* Therefore, although adolescents begin to acquire a

broader awareness, they lack the judgment necessary to choose

carefully among various possibilities and to appreciate the future

consequences of their actions.

Behaviorally, the effects of an adolescent’s developing cognitive

ability include increased impulsiveness, experimentation, and

risk-taking. An adolescent’s newly forming capacity to reason

abstractly, coupled with his or her “fascination with the possi-

ble,” results in a desire to explore various behaviors.’ However,

because of an adolescent’s limited experience and lack of ability

to assess future consequences, he or she is unable to conceptualize

realistically the potential negative outcomes of certain actions.

This difficulty contributes to a young person's feelings of in-

vulnerability to personal risk.'° Hence adolescents often engage

in alcohol and drug use/abuse, sexual experimentation, reckless

use of motor vehicles, and other potentially destructive

behaviors. "!

See B. Inhelder & J. Piaget, The Growth of Logical Thinking from Childhood

to Adolescence (1958); H. Ginsburg & S. Offer, Piaget's theory of intellectual

development (1969).

* See, e.g., S. Ambron, supra note 2, at 432-33.

Brunstetter & Silver, supra note 2. at 1608.

. we

Irwin & Millstein, Biopsychosocial Correlates of Risk- Taking Behaviors. J.

Adolescent Health Care, Vol. 7, No. 68, 82S. 87S (November 1986 Supplement).

"Id. at 82S.

Furthermore, researchers studying adolescent suicide have

documented that adolescents tend not to appreciate fully the

possibility, and finality, of death.” If they consider death at all,

it is viewed as something that happens to elderly people, not

teenagers. Many adolescents who attempt suicide may not real-

ly believe that death will occur. In fact, they may view a suicide

attempt as nothing more than a form of running away, without

any consideration of their own mortality."

“dolescent cognitive development is also characterized by a high

degree of egocentrism. An adolescent “assumes that other people

are as obsessed with his behavior and appearance as he is himself.

It is this belief that others are preoccupied with his appearance

and behavior that constitutes the egocentrism of the adolescent.”"*

Moreover, adolescents come to regard themselves, and their

own feelings, as particularly special and unique. This belief fur-

ther contributes to an adolescent’s lack of understanding regard-

ing death. An adolescent’s sense of specialness becomes a con-

viction of his or her immortality.'* Adolescent egocentrism thus

results in a general impairment of adolescent judgment.

Adolescence is also a period during which youths struggle to

develop a certain measure of independence and personal identi-

ty or character.’* An adolescent engages in this developmental task

% Sheras, Suicide in Adolescents, in Handbook of Clinical Child Psychology

759, 769-70 (C. Walker & M. Roberts eds. 1983).

Adolescent suicide and suicide pacts among teenagers have become a growing

national concern. See, e.g., Barron, Suicide Rates of Teenagers: Are Their Lives

Harder to Liver, N.Y. Times, April 15, 1987, § C, at 1, col. 5. Suicide is reported

to be the third leading cause of death for teenagers. Sheras, supra at 769.

'S Sheras, supra note 12, at 769.

‘* Elkind, Egocentrism in Adolescence, 38 Child Development 1025, 1029-30

(1967) (emphasis in original deleted).

‘Ss Id. at 1030-31.

‘* See generaily E. Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis (1968); E. Erikson,

Childhood and Society (1963); P. Mussen, J. Conger & J. Kagan, supra note 2.

“I

in a number of ways,” such as trying out various roles, separating

from his or her parents, and seeking affirmation from a peer

group. Throughout this process, adolescents remain emotional-

ly dependent on other people.'* They are vulnerable to influences

from both parents and peers, and are less capable of indepen-

dent, self-directed action than adults. The character structure

of adolescents, though developing, remains in flux and does not

represent the final level of maturity found in adults. Adolescents

are by nature capable of significant and spontaneous change.

Normal adolescence is no longer considered necessarily a time

of extreme emotional turmoil.” Adolescence is, however, general-

ly characterized by emotionality rather than rationality.

"It is understandable that many adolescents must struggle to develop a per-

sonal identity. In addition to the changes adolescents experience in how they

think, they also undergo vast physiological and hormonal changes. Adolescents

are faced with rapid increases in height, changing bodily dimensions, and

physical and psychological changes related to sexual maturation. All of these

changes threaten an adolescent's sense of self. See M. Lewis, supra, note 2,

at 263-66.

'* “[{T]he transition from childhood into adolescence is marked more by a

trading of dependency on parents for dependency on peers rather than

straightforward and unidimensional growth in autonomy.” Steinberg &

Silverberg, The Vicissitudes of Autonomy in Early Adolescence, 57 Child

Development 841, 848 (1986).

'* For example, young people can later overcome features of an antisocial per-

sonality that appear during adolescence. For this reason the diagnosis of An-

tisocial Personality cannot be applied until an individual has reached 18 vears

of age. See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual

of Mental Disorders 319 (3d ed. 1980).

» See, e.g.. M. Rutter, supra note 2, at 235-38; Rutter, Graham, Chadwick

& Yule, Adolescent Turmoil: Fact or Fiction?, 17 J. Child Psychology &

Psychiatry 35 (1976); D. Offer & J. Offer, From teenage to young manhood:

a psychological study (1975). ,

Daniel Offer's work has suggested that adolescents who experience the greatest

inner turmoil are of lower socioeconomic status, and come from families with

overt marital conflicts and a history of mental illness. See D. Offer. The

Psychological World of the Teenager (1969).

Adolescents tend to show a special intensity of feeling and tend

to seek out emotional experience. Moreover, it has been

demonstrated consistently that “adolescents experience a greater

fluctuation of mood than adults.”

Finally, adolescents lack the capacity for mature, principled

moral judgment which is characteristic of normal adult thought.

Moral judgment emerges through the maturation process as a

result of cognitive and emotional growth and an adolescent’s in-

teraction with his or her environment. An adolescent lacks a fully

formed value system against which to evaluate his or her behavior

and decisions. “[L]arge groups of moral concepts and ways of

thought only attain meaning at successively advanced ages and

require the extensive background of social experience and

cognitive growth. .. .”°”

Adolescents must undergo an array of significant changes prior

to adulthood. Before these many developmental tasks are achiev-

ed, adolescents are vulnerable in a variety of ways. They have

difficulty appreciating the future consequences of their acts,

generally lack mature judgment, are easily influenced by fami-

ly members and peers and often engage in experimentation and

risk-taking. Adolescents tend to be guided by emotions rather

than reason. Furthermore, adolescents lack a fully formed iden-

tity or character, and generally do not have the capacity for prin-

cipled moral judgment.

Adolescence is a critical developmental stage through which

young persons must pass prior to entering adulthood. The clinical

literature confirms what we all generally know and what the

law has always recognized — adolescents are not adults.

Adolescents are less capable and less responsible than adults, and

more in need of protection and support.

** Hamburg & Wortman, supra note 2, at 11.

*% Kohlberg, The Development of Children’s Orientations Toward a Moral

Order, 6 Vita humana 11, 30 (1963). See also Kohlberg & Gilligan, The Adoles-

cent as a Philosopher: The Discovery of the Self in a Postconventional World.

Daedalus 1051 (Fall 1971); Kohlberg, Development of Moral Character and

Moral Ideology, in Review of Child Development Research 383, 402 (M. Hoff-

man & L. Hoffman, eds. 1964).

ADOLESCENTS WHO COMMIT MURDER SUFFER

FROM SERIOUS PSYCHOLOGICAL AND FAMILY

DISTURBANCES WHICH EXACERBATE THE

ALREADY EXISTING VULNERABILITIES OF

YOUTH

Adolescents who commit murder typically suffer from a variety

of serious disturbances which inhibit their natural growth and

development. It is well established that these disturbances, ac-

ting in combination, exacerbate the already existing

vulnerabilities of youth and place an adolescent at extreme risk

for seriously violent behavior.”

Psychiatrists and psvchologists have learned that adolescents

who commit murder frequently come from families that are ex-

tremely chaotic and fail to provide the necessary support and

direction for their children.” Under some circumstances, especial-

ly those in which an adolescent kills family members, he or she

may actually be responding to family pressure or implicit

messages to do so.* Furthermore, adolescents who commit

murder almost invariably have a family background that includes

extreme physical abuse and intrafamily violence. Many homicidal

adolescents have also been sexually abused.”

*% See generally Cornell, Benedek & Benedek, Characteristics of Adolescents

Charged with Homicide: Review of 72 Cases, Behavioral Sciences & the Law

Vol. 5, No. 1, at 11 (1987); Cornell, Benedek & Benedek, Juvenile Homicide:

Prior Adjustment and a Proposed Typology (paper presented at the American

Psychiatric Association Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C.) (1986); The Ag-

gressive Adolescent: Clinical Perspectives (C. Keith ed. 1984); M. Rutter &

H. Giller, Juvenile Delinquency: Trends and Perspectives (1983).

* See, e.g., Haizlip, Corder & Ball, The Adolescent Murderer, in The Ag-

gressive Adolescent: Clinical Perspectives 126, 129-34 (C. Keith ed. 1984); M.

Rutter & H. Giller, supra note 23, at 180-91; Corder, Ball, Haizlip, Rollins

& Beaumont, Adolescent Parricide: A Comparison with Other Adolescent

Murder, 133 Am. J. Psychiatry 957 (1976).

* See, e.g., Duncan & Duncan, Murder in the Family: A Study of Some

Homicidal Adolescents, 127 Am. J. Psychiatry 74 (1971); Sargent, Children

Who Kill—A Family Conspiracy?, 7 Social Work 35 (1962).

* See, e.g., Haizlip, Corder & Ball, supra note 24, at 130-34; Straus, Domestic

Violence and Homicide Antecedents, Bull. N.Y. Acad. Med., Vol. 62, No. 5,

(Footnete Continued)

These young people then are often victims of, and witnesses

to, significant violence during their childhood and adolescence.

The violence is often sustained, repetitive, and characterized by

extraordinary brutality and sadism.” Their family environment

is one in which violence is portrayed as the ultimate problem-

solver. The use of physical aggression is considered an acceptable

way of dealing with others.”

This systematic exposure to violence affects a young person

in a number of ways. First, violence becomes a style of behavior

against which a child or adolescent is apt to model his or her

own behavior. Second, the persistent abuse engenders deep-seated

feelings of rage which are often acted upon against other people.”

Finally, a child who is physically battered can suffer significant

trauma to the brain which results in increased impulsivity and

volatility.”

at 446 (1986); Straus, Family Training in Crime and Violence, in Crime and

the Family 164 (A. Lincoln & M. Straus eds. 1985).

* See, e.g., Lewis, Shanok, Pincus & Glaser, Violent Juvenile Deliquents:

Psychiatric, Neurological, Psychological, and Abuse Factors, 18 J. Am. Acad.

Child Psychiatry 307, 315-18 (1979); Sendi & Blomgren, A Comparative Study

of Predictive Criteria in the Predisposition of Homicidal Adolescents, 132 Am.

J. Psychiatry 423 (1975).

* See, e.g., Straus. Family Training in Crime and Violence, supra note 26.

at 182-84: Lewis, Shanok, Grant & Ritvo, Homicidally Aggressive Young

Children: Neuropsychiatric and Experiential Correlates, 140 Am. J. Psychiatry

148 (1983).

* See, e.g., Straus, Family Training in Crime and Violence, supra note 26,

at 182-84: Haizlip, Corder & Ball, supra note 24, at 130: Lewis, Shanok, Grant

& Ritvo, supra note 28, at 152-53; Paperny & Deisher, Maltreatment of

Adolescents: The Relationship to a Predisposition Toward Violent Behavior and

Delinquency, Adolescence, Vol. 18, No. 71, at 499 (Fall 1983); Silver, Dublin

& Lourie, Does Violence Breed Violence? Contributions from a Study of the

Child Abuse Syndrome, 126 Am. J. Psychiatry 404, 409 (1969); see also M.

Wolfgang & F. Ferracuti, The Subculture of Violence: Towards an Integrated

Theory in Criminology 160 (1967) (“[A]ggression is a learned response, social-

lv facilitated and integrated... . ”).

” See, e.g., Lewis, Moy, Jackson, Aaronson, Restifo, Serra & Simos, Biop-

sychosocial Characteristics of Children Who Later Murder: A Prospective Study.

142 Am. J. Psychiatry 1161. 1165-66 (1985); Lewis, Shanok, Grant & Ritvo.

supra note 28, at 152-53: Lewis, Shanok, Pincus & Glaser, supra note 27, at

314; Bender, Children and Adolescents Who Have Killed, 116 Am. J. Psychiatry

510 (1959).

Adolescents who commit murder also frequently have severe

cognitive limitations. They tend to be intellectually immature and

educationally deficient. These adolescents have significant im-

pairments in judgment and are unable to perceive the consequences

of their actions. These cognitive limitations are often linked to learn-

ing disabilities and neurological damage. Homicidal aggression in

adolescents is also strongly associated with psychiatric problems.”!

Together, these factors — exposure to violence, cognitive li-

mitations, and psychiatric problems — exacerbate the already

existing vulnerabilities of normal adolescence. Added to a nor-

mal adolescent's generally limited ability to appreciate the con-

sequences of his or her actions and to take into account societal

values in choosing a course of action, an adolescent who kills

is handicapped further by impairment in cc~nitive ability. Added

to a normal adolescent’s susceptibility to the influence of family

members and peers, an adolescent who kills is surrounded by

an atmosphere of violence, in which the norm not only tolerates

but encourages violence and trivializes its consequences. And

finally, added to the emotionality and egocentrism of adolescence,

an adolescent who kills is often afflicted with neuropsychiatric

disorders which further heighten already intensified emotions and

which can create serious misperceptions concerning the relation-

ship between himself or herself and the external world.

A. A Study of Juveniles on Death Row Confirms Their

Seriously Impaired Development

In the only clinical study of individuals on death row in the

United States who committed capital offenses when they were

under the age of 18, researchers have found that as a group these

persons suffer from the neuropsychiatric, psychoeducational and

family disturbances generally characteristic of adolescents who

commit homicide (the “Study”).”

" See. e.g., Lewis. Shanok, Pincus & Glaser, supra note 27, at 313-18.

2 Lewis, Pincus, Bard, Richardson, Feldman, Prichep & Yeager. Neuro-

psychiatric. Psychoeducational and Family Characteristics of 14 Juveniles Con-

demned to Death in the United States (Paper accepted for presentation at the

34th Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry.

October 1987). (Appendix) (References followed by “A” are to the Appendix).

(Footnote Continued)

The 14 subjects of this interdisciplinary study consisted of all

adolescents sentenced to death in four states. They were selected

for the study solely on the basis of their age at the time of the capital

offense. They are therefore reasonably believed to be representative

of the adolescent offender death row population as a whole. (3A)

The subjects were given comprehensive psychiatric, psycho-

logical, neurological, educational and electroencephalographic

examinations. The psychiatric examination consisted of a tho-

rough interview covering topics such as medical history, history

of neuropsychiatric symptoms, and family and social history, in-

cluding history of physical and sexual abuse. Careful mental

status examinations” were performed. Detailed neurological

histories were obtained by a psychiatrist and a neurologist. These

histories included difficulties surrounding birth, head injury,

illnesses or drug overdoses known to affect the central nervous

system, loss of consciousness, fainting, blackouts or other lapses,

seizures, and symptoms suggestive of psychomotor epilepsy. Ad-

ditionally, any historical evidence of central nervous system

trauma was corroborated through physical examinations, record

reviews, and specialized tests such as the electroencephalogram.

Finally, a standard neurological examination was conducted and

a battery of psychological, neuropsvchological, and educational

tests was administered. (3A-6A)

The Study found serious and wide-ranging disturbances in all

of the subjects. All 14 suffered head injuries during childhood,

The authors of the Study are: Dorothy Otnow Lewis, M.D., Professor of

Psychiatry, New York University School of Medicine, Clinical Professor of

Psychiatry, Yale University Child Study Center: Jonathan H. Pincus, M.D..

Professor and Chairman of the Department of Neurology, Georgetown Univer-

sity; Barbara Bard, Ph.D.. Professor of Special Education, Central Connec-

ticut State Ur ‘versity: Ellis Richardson, Ph.D.. Research Associate Professor

ot Psychiatry, New York University School of Medicine: Marilyn Feldman, M.A.

in Psychology: Leslie Prichep, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Psychiatry, New

York University School of Medicine: and Catherine Yeager, M.A., Research

Assistant. Department of Psychiatry, New York University School of Medicine.

* The mental status examination is a cross-sectional invemory of a patient's

current behavior, symptoms, sensorium. and cognitive faculties. See Ginsberg,

Psychiatric History and Mental Status Examination, in 1 Comprehensive Text-

book of Psychiatry 487 (H. Kaplan & B. Sadock 4th ed. 1985).

nine of which were severe enough to result in hospitalization,

indentation of the cranium, or loss of consciousness. Further-

more, the neurological and electroencephalographic data reveal-

ed that nine had serious neurological abnormalities, including

evidence of localized brain injury, a history of grand mal

seizures, major neurological abnormalities such as abnormal

head circumference, and symptoms or electroencephalographic find-

ings suggestive of a previously undiagnosed seizure disorder. (6A)

The Study also found that seven of the subjects were psychotic

at the time of their evaluations and/or had been so diagnosed

in earlier childhood. An additional four subjects displayed

histories consistent with severe mood disorders. The three remain-

ing subjects suffered from disturbed thinking, characterized by

periodic paranoia. Thus, all 14 exhibited psychiatric disturbances.

Seven suffered from psychiatric disturbances that first appeared in

early or middle childhood. In all cases, psychopathology* antedated

the crimes for which the subjects were sentenced to death. (6A-7A)

The psychoeducational testing done in this Study further in-

dicates that at least nine of the subjects experienced significant

brain impairment and lacked the ability to formulate abstract

concepts. Moreover, 12 subjects had I.Q. scores below 90. The

Study concludes that the majority of these individuals have serious

deficiencies in abstract reasoning and function well below the

expected levels for their ages. (7A)

The Study reveals that these adolescents offenders had been

repeatedly and brutally physically and sexually abused, often by

more than one family member. Furthermore, alcoholism, drug

Grand mal seizures are “characterized by loss of consciousness and tonic

spasm of the musculature, usually followed by repetitive clonic jerking.” Sted-

man's Medical Dictionary 475 (5th ed. 1982).

Psychopathology refers to “disordered psychologic and behavioral function-

ing (as in a mental disease).” Webster's Third New International Dictionary

1833 (1968).

An I.Q. score of 100 is considered average. A person with an I.Q. score

below 90 falls into the bottom twenty-five percent of other individuals of the

same age in the United States. See D. Wechsler. The Wechsler Intelligence

Scale for Children -- Revised 25 (1974); D. Wechsler. The Wechsler Adult In-

telligence Scale — Revised Manual 27 (1980).

abuse, psychiatric treatment and psychiatric hospitalization were

prevalent in the histories of their parents. (8A)

The Study concludes that individuals condemned to death in

the United States for crimes committed in their youth are multi-

handicapped. They generally have suffered serious central

nervous system injuries, have suffered since early childhood from

psychotic symptoms, and have been physically and sexually

abused. These significant disturbances inhibit natural develop-

ment, exacerbate the existing vulnerabilities of youth, and contri-

bute to the violent behavior demonstrated by these adolescents. (8A)

The central nervous system injuries that these adolescents have

experienced may contribute to their emotional instability, im-

pulsivity, and difficulty in controlling aggressive behavior. Also,

this type of brain injury may make these adolescents more

vulnerable to the disorganizing effects of alcohol and drugs. The

Study concludes that the severe-cognitive impairment characteris-

tic of these adolescents further compromises their ability to make

mature judgments and to act in accordance with them. (8A-9A)

Furthermore, the physical and sexual abuse experienced by

these adolescents contributes to their crimes. First, the multiple

batterings suffered by these adolescents sometimes actually caused

brain injury which would result in increased impulsivity. Second,

the severe parental violence that they experienced functions as

a model for their behavior. Third, the extreme, irrational brutali-

ty to which these adolescents are exposed engenders rage which

is displaced onto other individuals in their environment. (9A)

Finally, the Study suggests that the multiple disturbances

which contributed to the violent behavior that these adolescents

displayed also contributed to the harshness of the sentences they

received. According to the Study, these adolescents uniformly

try to hide evidence of their cognitive deficits and psychotic svmp-

tomatology. (9A-10A) Similarly, they try to conceal or minimize

their parents’ brutality towards them, due to feelings of shame.

(LOA) It is ironic that the very factors which could function as

mitigating circumstances instead remain hidden at the time of

the sentencing. It is noteworthy that much of the clinical informa-

tion revealed in this Study had apparently not been previously

uncovered during the course of each individual adolescent's case.

The Study reports that of these 14 subjects “in only 5 cases were

pretrial psychiatric or psychological examinations of any kind

performed.” (8A) “These 5 evaluations tended to be perfunctory

and gave inaccurate and inadequate portrayals of the adolescents’

neuropsychiatric and cognitive status.” (10A) Only once was

significant neuropsychiatric impairment reported. (8A) The Study

states that the data obtained was only revealed in the course of

lengthy, detailed, and comprehensive medical and psychological

evaluations of the kind that simply are unavailable to adolescents

charged with offenses punishable by death. (10A)

B. Petitioner Was a Subject of the Study and

Exhibited the Same Serious Disabilities

Petitioner William Wayne Thompson was one of the subjects

of the Study. He is typical in many ways of other homicidal ado-

lescents, and exemplifies the psychological, educational and fami-

ly disturbances found in the adolescents on death row as a group.

The only psychiatric or psychological evidence presented at

petitioner's trial came from a clinical psychologist, Helen Klein,

who was hired by the prosecution. Dr. Klein met with petitioner

twice and produced a four and one-half page handwritten report.

She then testified at the sentencing phase of petitioner’s trial.

Dr. Klein's testimony was cursory and speculative, and not tied

to the information in her report. The gist of her testimony was

that petitioner is an uncaring person who is incapable of change.

She described petitioner as “an antisocial personality.” (Tr. at

793.)*7 As noted earlier, the standard diagnostic tool for mente]

disorders used by psychiatrists and psychologists requires that

the diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder should not be

made for individuals under the age of 18.*

Even Dr. Klein’s limited report refers to serious disturbances

in petitioner's background and makeup. Her repeated statements

that petitioner “cannot organize his inner experience,” that “[h]e

References preceded by “Tr.” are to the trial transcript. References preceded

by “R.” are to the Record.

* See supra note 19.

Cf. Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 2605 n.3 (1986) (“The adequacy

of the factfinding procedures is further called into question by the cursory nature

of the underlying psychiatric examination itself.”)

has a stereotypical, concrete view of the world and demonstrates

little ability to organize or to conceptualize his experience,” that

“his inner experience is barren and disorganized,” and that his

drawings are “primitive and undifferentiated” are suggestive of

cognitive limitations and other difficulties in thinking. (R. at

490-91, 489.) In addition, Dr. Klein states both in her report

and in testimony that petitioner is educationally well below

average. (R. at 489; Tr. at 789.) She concludes that the results

of the psychological tests “indicate a person with limited

capabilities.” (Tr. at 789.) Furthermore, Dr. Klein’s report pro-

vides a description of petitioner’s general immaturity in its

references to his restlessness, difficulty in controlling his impulses,

and iaeck of social judgment. (R. at 490-91.) Finally, Dr. Klein’s

report briefly mentions that petitioner had abused drugs (“sniffed

paint”) and that he had been beaten by his brother-in-law,

Charles Keene. (R. at 488.) There is no evidence in the record

that Dr. Klein followed up in these critical areas. The record,

however, contains testimony from Vicky Lynn Keene, Charles

Keene’s ex-wife, describing Charles’ extreme brutality toward

her, petitioner, and others. (Tr. at 611-16.) Also, Ms. Keene’s

testimony points out that Charles Keene introduced petitioner

to drug abuse. (Tr. at 612.)

Thus, petitioner has been exposed to a constellation of

psychological and environmental disturbances which have im-

peded his natural growth and development. He suffers from

serious cognitive and intellectual limitations, educational defi-

ciencies, and immature judgment. Furthermore, petitioner has

been a victim of and witness to extreme abuse, which included

his brother-in-law’s brutality. He is thus typical of the subgroup

of adolescents who commit capital offenses.

THE EXECUTION OF AN INDIVIDUAL WHO WAS

AN ADOLESCENT AT THE TIME OF THE

CAPITAL OFFENSE IS EXCESSIVE IN VIOLATION

OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT

The Eighth Amendment, which applies to the states through

the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids the infliction of “cruel and

unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. A punishment

' |

is “cruel and unusual” if it is excessive. It is excessive if it is

disproportionate to the crime or if it makes no measurable con-

tribution to acceptable goals of punishment. Coker v. Georgia,

433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia,

428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976). A punishment is also impermissible

if it offends society's “evolving standards of decency.” Trop v.

Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). Enmund v.

Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).

Although the Court has determined that the death penalty is

not inherently cruel in violation of the Eighth Amendment, Gregg

v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, it has recognized the extraordinary

nature of the punishment:

[E]very Member of this Court has written or joined

at least one opinion endorsing the proposition that

because of its severity and irrevocability, the death

penalty is qualitatively different from any other

punishment, and hence must be accompanied by uni-

que safeguards to ensure that it is a justified response

to a given offense.

Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984) (Stevens, Brennan and

Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (collec-

ting cases); see also California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99

at n.9 (1983) (collecting cases). Indeed,

[djeath, in its finality, differs more from life imprison-

ment than a 100-vear prison term differs from one of

only a year or two. Because of that qualitative dif-

ference, there is a corresponding difference in the need

for reliability in the determination that death is the

appropriate punishment in a specific case.

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurali-

ty opinion) (footnote omitted).

The question raised herein is whether death is ever an ap-

propriate punishment for a youthful offender, an issue that was

raised but left unresolved in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104

(1982). The answer to this question must be no. The fundamen-

tal differences between adolescence and adulthood, distinctions

universally recognized by the medical and social sciences, as well

as the law, make this irrevocable form of punishment both ex-

cessive as applied to youths and offensive to contemporary stan-

dards of decency.

Execution is disproportionate because adolescents tend to lack

that which adults are presumed to possess: the ability to make

sound judgments on their own behalf. Moreover, adolescents who

commit capital offenses typically suffer from a variety of natural

and environmental disabilities which further diminish their

culpability for their acts. The penalty of death is too severe a

punishment for persons who have not yet lived long enough to

learn how to control their impulses, appreciate fully the conse-

quences of their offensive acts, or come to understand how to

contend with a hostile environment.

In addition, the death penalty, as applied to adolescents, makes

no contribution to acceptable goals of punishment. In Gregg v.

Georgia, 428 U.S. at 183, this Court recognized that the death

penalty serves “two principal social purposes: retribution and

deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders.” Whatever

the deterrent effect of capital punishment on adults, the im-

pulsiveness of youth, coupled with an adolescent’s general lack

of appreciation for the finality of death, seriously undermines

whatever deterrent effect the death penalty might have on them.

Retribution is objectionable because adolescent offenders are not

as responsible as adults for their acts. Retribution is also con-

trary to the legitimate purposes of punishing the young. Unlike

adults, for whom punishment is primarily a punitive sanction,

punishment of youthful offenders is intended to be rehabilitative.

In light of all that is known about adolescent development

generally and the abnormal development of homicidal ado-

lescents in particular, inflicting the death penalty on young of-

fenders is also offensive to “contemporary standards of decen-

cy.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429° U.S. 97, 103 (1976). Executing

adolescents — who lack the cognitive ability, judgment and ful-

lv formed character of adults —fails to accord with “the dignity

of man” which is the “basic concept underlying the Eighth

Amendment,” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 100.

aa mall

A. Capital Punishment Is Excessive As Applied to

Adolescents Because It Is Disproportionate

A form of punishment is disproportionate, hence excessive

under the Eighth Amendment, if it is greater than the offender

deserves. Coker ». Geurgia, 433 U.S. at 592. In determining

whether the death penalty is disproportionate as applied to

adolescents, this Court must consider whether adolescents should

be equated with adults with respect to their eligibility for this

ultimate sanction. Because adolescents are not expected to con-

form their behavior to adult standards, it is inappropriate to in-

flict on them a form of punishment intended only for society's

most serious and incorrigible offenders.”

The fact that a separate system of criminal justice has evolved

for adolescents is ample evidence that the death penalty, as ap-

plied to adolescents, is disproportionate.

The very existence of a dual criminal justice system is

evidence of a two-fold societal judgment that children

do not bear the same degree of responsibility for their

antisocial behavior as adults and therefore should not be

subject to the harsh penalties of criminal trial and penal

incarceration; and juvenile delinquents are, by virtue of

their youth, responsive to rehabilitative treatment.”

Inherent in the law are the basic beliefs that (i) youths should

not be punished as severely as adults because they are not as

culpable as adults for their offenses; and (ii) youths by nature

are receptive to treatment and rehabilitation.

The disparate treatment of youth in the law is amply supported

by the clinical evidence about adolescent development. As described

in Point 1, adolescents are still growing socially and psychologically.

* Thus, even though adolescents may be legitimately convicted and punish-

ed for homicidal acts in appropriate circumstances, their incomplete develop-

ment should preclude them from eligibility for punishment by death. See En-

mund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (propriety of death penalty dependent upon

degree of culpability of offender).

” S. Fox, The Juvenile Court: Its Context. Problems and Opportunities 11-13 (1967).

[A]dolescents, particularly in the early and middle teen

years, are more vulnerable, more impulsive, and less

self-disciplined than adults. Crimes committed by

youths may be just as harmful to victims as those com-

mitted by older persons, but they deserve less punishment

because adolescents have less capacity to control their con-

duct and to think in long-range terms than adults.*

Thus, execution must be regarded as a disproportionate form

of punishment as applied to adolescents. Their diminished res-

ponsibility for their acts justifies the added measure of tolerance

that exists in the law. Their ability to adjust and improve as they

mature further demonstrates the inappropriateness of inflicting

on adolescents the ultimate punitive sanction of death.

B. Capital Punishment Is Excessive As Applied to Adolescents

Because It Serves No Legitimate Penological Purpose

The death penalty per se is not constitutionally excessive

because it is thought to make a measurable contribution to two

acceptable goals of punishment: deterrence and retribution.

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 183. Because neither goal can be

achieved by inflicting the death penalty on youthful offenders,

its application to them is excessive. i

1. The Death Penalty Does Not Deter Adolescents

From Committing Capital Offenses

In commenting upon the lack of empirical evidence to sup-

port or rebut the theory that capital punishment has a deter-

rent effect, Justice Stewart observed:

We may nevertheless assume safely that there are

murderers, such as those who act in passion, for whom

the threat of death has little or no deterrent effect. But

‘or many others, the death penalty undoubtedly is a

significant deterrent. There are carefully contemplated

murders, such as murder for hire, where the possible

penalty of death may well enter into the cold calculus

that precedes the decision to act.

“Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward Young

Offenders, Confronting Youth Crime 47 (1978). (“Task Force’).

’

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 185-86 (Stewart, J. plurality opi-

nion). In light of what is known toda¥ about adolescent develop-

ment generally and the development of adolescents who com-

mit homicide in particular, adolescents are unlikely to engage

in a meaningful “cold calculus that precedes the decision” to com-

mit a capital offense in which “the possible penalty of death”

enters into their decision-making process.

As described above, adolescents generally are more impulsive

and less able to appreciate the consequences of their acts than

adults. Adolescents also tend to lack a fully developed apprecia-

tion of death and its finality. Moreover, while adolescents may

be capable of rational decision-making in some areas with the

guidance and support of adults, this capacity is significantly

lessened when they are placed under highly stressful

circumstances.”

Such circumstances are abundant with respect to homicidal

adolescents. These adolescents typically grow up in a chaotic

family environment, are exposed to violence and abuse

throughout their childhood, and tend to be impeded in their

natural development by the adults upon whom they must rely

for protection and support. They also suffer from cognitive limita-

tions which further impair their ability to make sound judgments.

These factors are particularly damaging during adolescence be-

cause it is at this stage of development that human beings are

especially vulnerable and awkward. While adolescents may look

like and possess many of the physical attributes of adults, they do

not vet think or behave like adults. The violent nature of adolescents

‘ In sum, although some youths’ involvement in delinquency may

be related to cost-benefit decisions and to a rational process, other

explanations better explain the delinquent behavior of most youths.

With the vast majority of youngsters, delinquent behavior arises

without much forethought as they interact with their environment.

With still other youths. compulsive behavior, the influence of

alcohol or drugs, or intense emotional reaction to a situation seem

to lead them to bypass any rational process.

C. Bartollas, Juvenile Delinquency 102 (1985); see also P. Hahn. The Juvenile

Offender and the Law 40-57 (2d ed. 1978) (free will and rational choice not

among various behavioral theories explaining the causes of delinquency).

who kill is a predictable consequence of the combination of (i)

their incomplete human development which has been further

hindered by an unstable and violent childhood, and (ii) the rapid

physical changes which they are undergoing.

It is thus demonstrably wrong to conclude that the death penal-

ty deters adolescents who commit capital offenses. Adolescents

generally do not to engage in any “cold calculus” that would fac-

tor in the possibility of a death sentence before they act homicidal-

ly. Emotionality, coupled with a pronounced inability to appreciate

or be affected by the knowledge of the consequences of their ac-

tions, lead adolescents to commit capital offenses. Free will and ra-

tional calculation are generally absent in these circumstances.

2. Retribution Is Not a Legitimate Penological Purpose

With Respect to Adolescents

The penological goal of retribution has two components: (1)

the desire that offenders suffer the punishment they deserve, and

(2) the desire for vengeance. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at

183-184. Whether these concerns are satisfied is contingent upon

the degree of the offender's responsibility for the offense. In En-

mund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, this Court observed:

As for retribution as a justification for executing En-

mund, we think this very much depends on the degree

of Enmund’s culpability — what Enmund’s intentions,

expectations, and actions were. American criminal law

has long considered a defendant's intention — and

therefore his moral guilt — to be critical to “the degree

of [his] criminal culpability.”

Id. at 800 (citations omitted). Thus, “{t]he heart of the retribu-

tion rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related

to the personal culpability of the criminal offender.” Tison v.

Arizona, 55 U.S.L.W. 4496, 4499 (U.S. April 21, 1987).

Adolescents, like aduits, should pay for their crimes. However,

“[t]he juvenile justice system, while holding minors responsible

for their misconduct . . . acknowledges that the level of juvenile

responsibility is lower than for adults.”* It is thus excessive to

inflict the penalty of death on adolescents.

Neither of the concerns of retribution is satisfied by executing

youthful offenders. The punishment of death is too severe because

adolescents are not as responsible as adults. In addition, the

disparate legal treatment of adolescents is ample evidence that

society is less vengeful with respect to youthful offenders.

Retribution is also contrary to the principal legitimate pur-

pose of punishing the young: rehabilitation. Traditional methods

of punishing youthful offenders are based upon a presumption

that young persons are more amenable to positive change than

adults. In fact, this presumption is well-documented. Conse-

quently, the finality and irrevocability of the death penalty makes

such punishment manifestly inappropriate for adolescents.

a. Adoiescents Are Less Responsible Than

Adults For Their Offensive Acts

Adolescents are developmentally different from adults in ways

that diminish their level of responsibility for their actions. Point

I documents the inexperience, impulsiveness and emotionality

of youth. Adolescents have a greater tendency than adults to act

in disregard of the potentially serious and harmful consequences

of their acts. Even when they are aware of such consequences,

adolescents are more prone than adults to act in spite of them.

[T]he American adolescent, struggling with the

biological and psychological pressures of youth, seeks

status and reassurance in the company of his peers.

Rebellion against parental authority and restrictions

is combined with pressure to conform to the expecta-

tions of other adolescents. The teen vears are a period

of experiment, risk taking and bravado. Some criminal

activity is part of the patterns of almost all youth

subcultures.”

* Task Force at 47.

* Id. at 3.

This Court has taken note of these developmental distinctions,

observing that “minors often lack the experience, perspective,

and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detri-

mental to them.” Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. at 635. See Gallegos

v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962). This fundamental concept

of youth forms the basis for state laws which commonly prohibit

minors from possessing alcohol in public, from voting, from sit-

ting on a jury, and from marrying without parental consent.*

[T]he experience of mankind, as well as the long history

of our law, recogniz[es] that there are differences

which must be accommodated in determining the

rights and duties of children as compared with those

of adults. Examples of this distinction abound in our

law: in contracts, in torts, in criminal law and pro-

cedure, in criminal sanctions and rehabilitation, and

in the right to vote and to hold office.

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 590-91 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting)

(emphasis in original). It also justifies disparate treatment for ado-

lescents under the First,“ Fourth,” and Fourteenth* Amendments.

* For example, in Oklahoma, minors — defined as persons under the age

of 18 unless otherwise provided by statute, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 13 (West

1983) — are barred from engaging in any of these activities. See respectively,

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1215 (West 1983) (21 years of age); U.S. Const.

amend. XXVI (18 years of age); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, § 28 (West Supp.

1987) (18 years of age): Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 3 (West 1983) (18 years of age).

“ E.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968) (state law forbid-

ding sale of sexually explicit but non-obscene material to persons under 17 years

of age does not violate First Amendment because “even where there is an inva-

sion of protected freedoms ‘the power of the state to control the conduct of

children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults.) (quoting Prince

v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)).

“ E.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (schoolchild’s Fourth

Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure and his legitimate

expectation of privacy must give way to school’s legitimate need to maintain

appropriate educational environment). -

“ E.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (state law authorizing pre-

- ventative detention of accused juvenile delinquents does not violate their Four-

teenth Amendment rights if serious risk of subsequent crime exists, because.

(Footnote Continued)

This same concept of youth also warrants less severe punishment.

See supra at 19-20.

Furthermore, as shown in Point II, adolescents who commit

capital offenses are even less responsible for their acts than

adolescents generally. Such adolescents tend to lack the support

and protection ordinarily provided youths by parents and other

family members. In addition, their families are frequently violent

and abusive. These factors are further aggravated by psychiatric

problems from which homicidal adolescents frequently suffer.

As a result of these factors, the natural maturation process is

seriously inhibited. The emotional growth and development of

adolescents who are homicidal is, in effect, stunted. The Study

appended hereto confirms this general understanding.

The death penalty is thus too severe a punishment for adoles-

cent offenders. Because an adolescent has not yet fully developed

emotionally and psychologically, and because an adolescent who

commits a capital offense tends to be even more developmentally

limited, the execution of such an individual is by definition a

greater punishment than he deserves.

b. Vengeance Is Antithetical to the Lawful Treatment of

Adolescents

Society's moral obligation to protect its young is indisputable.

As Justice Frankfurter observed in May v. Anderson, 345 U.S.

although juveniles’ liberty interest is strong under Fourteenth Amendment,

juveniles, unlike adults, require some form of custody).

Notably, in Schall the Court observed:

Children, by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take

care of themselves. They are assumed to be subject to the control of their

parents, and if parental control falters, the State must play its part as

parens patriae. In this respect, the juvenile’s liberty interest may, in ap-

propriate circumstances, be subordinated to the State’s “parens patriae

interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child.”

Id., at 265, quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982).

528, 536 (1953) (concurring opinion): “Children have a very

special place in life which law should reflect. Legal

theories . . . lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred

to determination of a State’s duty towards children.” Youth and

its inherent characteristics — immaturity, vulnerability, inex-

perience and dependency — place the concept of revenge at odds

with the lawful treatment of the young. Thus,

[t]he spectacle of our society seeking legal vengeance

through execution of a child raises fundamental ques-

tions about the nature of children’s moral responsibility

for their actions and about society's moral responsibility

to protect and nurture children.”

As described supra at 24, youths are defined as less responsible

for their acts by state legislatures and the courts. In addition to

a host of both legislatively and judicially imposed restraints on

the rights and liberties of adolescents, both state and federal laws

provide distinct rules and procedures for the prosecution of

youths. Under both state and federal law, many acts which con-

stitute crimes if committed by adults instead constitute acts of

“juvenile delinquency” if committed by adolescents. See, e.g..

State In Interest of D.B.S., 137 N.J. Super. 371, 349 A.2d 105

(1975).

Society's responsibility to protect and nurture the young is also

well supported by legal precedent. This obligation is perhaps best

reflected in the Court’s long-standing recognition of the guiding

role parents play in the upbringing of children.” In Wisconsin

v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court held that although a

state’s interest in compulsory education for its children is indeed

“ Streib, Death Penalty for Children: The American Experience with Capital

Punishment for Crimes Committed While Under Age Eighteen, 36 Okla. L.

Rev. 613, 637 (1983).

* Constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents’

claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children

is basic in the structure of our society. “It is cardinal with us that the custody,

care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary func-

tion and freedorn include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply

nor hinder.” Prince v. Massachusetts, supra, at 166.

strong, it must give way to parents’ “traditional interest” in raising

children. Id. at 214. Similarly, when it comes to deciding whether

a child is to be committed to a state mental hospital. the Court

has stated that it is up to the parents to decide, notwithstanding

the child’s clear “liberty interest” not to be confined without due

process.

The law’s concept of the family rests on a presump-

tion that parents possess what a child lacks in maturi-

ty, experience, and capacity for judgment required for

making life’s difficult decisions . . . Mast children,

even in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound

judgments concerning many decisions, including their

need for medical care or treatment. Parents can and

must make those judgments.

Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-603 (1979) (emphasis supplied).

Vengeance cannot therefore serve as a legitimate penological

goal with respect to adolescents — even adolescents who com-

mit capital offenses. The diminished culpability of adolescents,

coupled with society's obligation to protect the young, warrants

a measure of constitutionally imposed tolerance sufficient to bar

their execution.

c. Retribution Is Contrary to Rehabilitation, the Principal

Legitimate Goal of Punishing Adolescents

Retribution is contrary to rehabilitation, which is the primary

goal of punishing the voung. E.g., In the Matter of the Appeal

in Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. J-84536-S, 126 Ariz.

546, 617 P.2d 54, 56 (1979) (“the most deeply rooted concept

in juvenile court philosophy is that the purpose of the system

is to rehabilitate and not to punish”); Rust v. Alaska, 582 P.2d

134 (Alaska 1978) (express purpose of juvenile jurisdiction is

rehabilitation rather than punishment). The reason for this ob-

jective is not hard to discern: “[{I]ncorrigibility is inconsistent with

vouth . . . it is impossible to make a judgment that a fourteen-

year-old youth, no matter how bad, will remain incorrigible for

the rest of his life.” Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d

374, 378 (Ky. 1968).

The existence of a juvenile justice system under both state and

federal law which treats youthful offenders more leniently than

adults demonstrates the importance society places on the goal

of rehabilitation with respect to adolescents.‘! For example, the

purpose of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. §§

5031-5042 (West 1985), “is to be helpful and rehabilitative rather

than punitive . . .” United States v. Hill, 538 F.2d 1072, 1074 (4th

Cir. 1976). Under the Act, “a juvenile is accorded preferential and

protective handling not available to adults accused of committing

crimes.” United States v. Frasquillo-Zomosa, 626 F.2d 99, 101 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 387 (1980).

Greater tolerance respecting youthful offenders is justified by

reason of their heightened capacity for behavior modification. As

described supra at 7, adolescents are generally more receptive and

responsive to rehabilitative treatment. More specifically, “juvenile

murderers tend to be moa! prisoners and exhibit a very low rate

of recidivism when releasea.”* Putting adolescents to death is

therefore without any legitimate penological justification.

C. The Execution of Adolescents Is Unconstitutional in Light

of Contemporary Human Knowledge About Adolescents

Generally and Adolescents Who Commit Capital Offenses

in Particular

Eighth Amendment analysis is dynamic. Whether the inflic-

tion of a particular punishment is inherently cruel is subject to

periodic review, which must give due consideration to “con-

temporary human knowledge.” Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.

660, 666 (1962). Contemporary human knowledge respecting

adolescent development generally and the nature of adolescents

who commit capital offenses in particular indicates that the

ultimate sanction of death is an inappropriate form of punish-

ment for such persons for the reasons described herein.

"See generally A. Platt, The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinqu. cy

(2d ed. 1977); Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 Stan.

L. Rev. 1187 (1970); Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 104 (1909)

*% Streib, The Eighth Amendment and Capital Punishment of Juveniles, 34

Cleve. St. L. Rev. 363, 395 (1987) (citing Vitiello, Constitutional Safeguards

for Juvenile Transfer Procedure: The Ten Years Since Kent v. United States,

26 De Paul L. Rev. 23, 32-34 (1976)); D. Hamparian, R. Schuster, $. Dinitz &

J. Conrad, The Violent Few 52 (1978); T. Sellin, The Penalty of Death 102-20 (1982).

The developmental differences between adolescents and

adults are alone sufficient to justify a constitutional ban on the

execution of youths. It is offensive to “contemporary standards

of decency” to commit to death individuals who, because of their

lack of maturity, exist in the law as persons who are incapable

of making legally binding decisions in certain matters and who

are often accorded disparate treatment for acts which would

be regarded as criminal if they were adults. The reason for these

distinctions is clear: Youths “cannot be judged by the more ex-

acting standards of maturity.” Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596,

599 (1948). These same distinctions justify a degree of leniency in

the manner in which adolescents who commit capital offenses are

punished. The ultimate punitive sanction of death is just too harsh.

However, the analysis need not end there. As shown in Point

II, youths who commit capital offenses typically suffer from

a variety of serious natural and environmental disabilities. In

addition to exhibiting all of the attributes which make youths

vulnerable by nature, adolescents who kill are deficient intel-

lectually, emotionally, psychologically and frequently

neurologically. Their impairment is aggravated by parents or

legal guardians who fail to provide much needed support at a

critical stage in their lives, and indeed, who typically provide

negative influences. The individuals on death row who were minors

when they committed capital offenses exhibit these deficiencies.”

Indeed, petitioner Wayne Thompson is typical of the group.

The execution of persons who commit homicide in their youth

is therefore far more offensive as actually applied than it is in

the abstract as applied to the universe of adolescents. The com-

mission of a homicide by an adolescent is a reflection of a multitude

of serious and complex problems from which the adolescent suf-

fers. Such youths almost invariably have been deprived of a stable,

It is thus no response to these considerations that all these factors are con-

siderations that can be introduced as mitigating evidence at the penalty phase

of a capital trial under Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), and its pro-

geny. Clearly Lockett was an insufficient check inasmuch as these individuals

were sentenced to death despite their substantial impairment.

healthy environment in which to develop. Nor could they rely

upon adults to exercise rational judgment on their behalf. Most

significantly, however, the law has provided them little prac-

tical recourse. Adolescents who commit homicide are legally

subject to the will of and reliant upon adults who typically con-

tribute substantially to the adolescents’ impairment.

The most fundamental concepts of fairness are thus implicated

by the execution of persons who have committed homicide in

their adolescence. They lack not only the maturity necessary

to be accorded the full panoply of civil rights and liberties af-

forded adults, but also the protective support and guidance from

responsible adults who are legally authorized to impose their

will upon them. The death penalty should not therefore be in-

flicted on adolescents because it is both offensive and excessive

as applied to them.

CONCLUSION

The execution of adolescents is inherently cruel and unusual

in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and consequently, peti-

tioner’s death sentence should be vacated.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ JosepH T. McLAuGHLIN

JosepH T. MCLAUGHLIN

Counsel of Record

JEREMY G. EPSTEIN

HENRY WEISBURG

KENNETH A. FREELING

Ropert L. PEABopy

STEVEN M. Pincus

SHEARMAN & STERLING

53 Wall Street

New York, New York 10005

(212) 837-6000

May 15, 1987 Attorneys for Amici Curiae

APPENDIX

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APPENDIX

NEUROPSYCHIATRIC, PSYCHOEDUCATIONAL AND

FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS OF 14 JUVENILES

CONDEMNED TO DEATH IN THE UNITED STATES

Dorothy Otnow Lewis, M.D.

Jonathan H. Pincus, M.D.

Barbara Bard, Ph.D.

Ellis Richardson, Ph. D.

Marilyn Feldman, M.A.

Leslie S. Prichep, Ph. D.

Catherine Yeager, M.A:

Accepted for Presentation at the

34th Annual Meeting of The

American Academy of Child and

Adolescent Psychiatry to be Held

in October 1987

‘

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rr ve a

as 7

The purpose of this paper is twofold: 1) to describe the bio-

psychosocial characteristics of 14 juveniles sentenced to death

in the United States, and 2) to explore the implications of these

findings for imposition of the death penalty on juveniles.

THE LITERATURE

The execution of juveniles in America dates back to the 17th

century when, in 1642, a child was executed for the crime of

bestiality (1). Since then, there have been a total of 272 juveniles

executed in the United States (2). These include 3 executions in

1985-1986 of boys condemned as juveniles but executed after they

reached majority. Thus, the recent tendency has been to execute

young adults for crimes committed as juveniles, thereby avoiding

the actual execution of children. During the time of the evalua-

tions conducted for this study, the number of juveniles awaiting

death rose from 33 to 37.

United States law permitting the execution of juveniles is based

on English common law. Although the death penalty for juveniles

was abolished in England in 1908, histories of English law re-

count numerous cases from 1708 onward of children condemn-

ed to death (3, 4, 5). According to a 19th century account of

the history of the town of Lynn, “In 1708 . . . two children were

hanged here for felony, one eleven, and the other but seven years

of age; which, if true, must indicate very early and shocking

depravity in the sufferers, as well as unusual and excessive rigour

on the parts of the majestrates in the infliction of capita! punish-

ment.” (6) There is evidence to suggest, however, that although

many children were sentenced to death in England in the 19th

century, most of these sentences were commuted (7). Never-

theless, children did hang, and for crimes far less serious than

murder. Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of

England (8), commented on the treatment of juveniles: “If it ap-

pear to the court and jury that he was doli capax, and could

discern between good and evil, he may be convicted and suffer

death.” Blackstone went on to cite cases of boys 9 and 10 vears

old who had killed companions and were hanged because their

behaviors indicated a sense of guilt. In the first instance, the child

hid himself after the murder: in the second instance, the child hid

the body of the victim. Thus, both children were considered to

have been aware of the wrongfulness of their acts and therefore

candidates for execution.

United States law regarding the responsibility of children has

rested heavily on the commentaries of English jurists such as

Blackstone. However, modifications based on case law have oc-

curred. For example, in the case of State v. Doherty (9), where

a child of approximately 13 years of age had killed her father,

the judge instructed the jury to assume that a child under 14

years could not “discern between right and wrong unless it were

proven otherwise.” Similarly, in the case of State v. Aaron (10),

in which an 11 vear old slave was accused of murdering a younger

child, the 11 year old’s conviction and sentence of death were

overturned by the Supreme Court of New Jersey. This decision

was based on the grounds that the conviction was obtained by

means of a pressured confession, and that the presumption of

innocence had not been refuted by “strong and irresistible

evidence that he had sufficient discernment to distinguish good

from evil”.

On the other hand, the outcome was quite different in the

case of Godfrey v. State (11), in which a slave of approximately

11 years hacked a 4 vear old to death, then, covered with blood,

blamed the act on imaginary Indians. The child was sentenced

to death. In spite of clear evidence of infantile reasoning he was

executed. A review of the 14 leading cases of criminal respon-

sibility of children in the United States in the 19th century reveal-

ed that only 2 children, both slaves, were actually executed. (6)

As for the recent past, to quote Streib, “79% (33/42) of the

children executed since 1945 were black.” (7)

Clearly, there is a tradition in this country of holding juveniles

responsible for their acts and meting out punishments as though

the children were adults. Above the age of 7 vears, children have

been assumed to be able to discern between good and evil, the

basic legal criterion for adjudicating culpability. Modern con-

cepts regarding the juvenile’s cognitive development, his capacity

to make mature judgments and his ability to maintain adequate

impulse controls have not been major considerations in the

establishment of United States law regarding the execution of

juveniles.

In fact, to date, little or nothing is known about the mental

condition and cugnitive capacities of juveniles sentenced to death,

except what can be gleaned from popular accounts in newspapers

and trial transcripts. Thus. we do know only from newspaper

accounts that of the 3 juveniles executed in the 1980's one was

retarded and another had spent time in a mental hospital (13,

14). Given the dearth of information regarding the bio-

psychosocial status of juveniles condemned to death, we welcom-

ed the opportunity to conduct comprehensive psychiatric, neuro-

logical, neuropsychological, and educational assessments of ap-

proximately 40% of the juveniles currently awaiting execution

in the United States.

METHOD

SUBJECTS

Our subjects were 14 bovs, each of whom had been sentenced

to death for capital offenses committed before reaching his 18th

birthday. These 14 comprised all the juveniles sentenced to death

in each of 4 different states in which the execution of minors

is permissible by statute. Subjects were chosen because of their

youth and not because of any known psychopathology, and can

be presumed to be representative of the juvenile death row

population. Ages at the time of their offenses ranged from 15

vears 10 months to 17 years 10 months (mean 16 years 6 months).

Their ages at the time of evaluation ranged from 17 vears 10

months to 29 years 2 months (mean 22 years 3 months). There

were 6 Black subjects, 7 White subjects and 1 Hispanic subject.

DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION

The diagnostic evaluation consisted of psychiatric, neuro-

logical, psychological, neuropsychological, educational and elec-

troencephalographic examinations.

The psychiatric examination consisted of a semistructured in-

terview based on an expanded version of the Bellevue Adoles-

cent Interview Schedule (B.A.I.S.). This schedule. consisting of

160 questions, was devised because no existing diagnostic instru-

ment for children or adults dealt adequately with topics such

as medical history, history of neuropsychiatric symptoms (e.g. ,

lapses, headaches, memory impairnient, metamorphopsias, de-

ja vu), characteristics of temper, or history of physical abuse.

A pretesting of this instrument prior to its use in this study reveal-

ed that data obtained was appreciably more comprehensive than

that obtained after a routine 2 week evaluation on an adoles-

cent inpatient teaching service. In this study, the psychiatric

evaluation was conducted by a psychiatrist and required from

4 to 6 hours to administer.

Although a detailed description of B.A.I.S. is beyond the scope

of this report, suffice it to note that in addition to exploring

psychodynamic factors and performing careful mental status

evaluations, the psychiatrist obtained detailed medical, family

and social histories. Detailed neurological histories were obtained

by the psychiatrist and the neurologist including histories of

perinatal difficulties, head injury, illnesses or drug overdoses

known to affect the CNS, loss of consciousness, fainting, blackouts

or other lapses, seizures, and psychomotor epileptic symptoms.

Whenever histories of CNS insults were obtained, attempts were

made to corroborate them through physical examination (e.g.

scars, neurological signs), record reviews, and specialized tests

(e.g., EEC).

Standard neurological examinations were performed on 12 of

the 14 subjects (in 2 cases, scheduling precluded a neurological

examination). The neurological examination consisted of

measurement of head circumference; evaluation of cranial nerves:

and tests of motor, sensory and reflex functions. Tests of coor-

dination included quantification of numbers of alternating palm

strikes in 10 seconds and numbers of finger taps in 10 seconds.

Presence or absence of choreiform movements were determined

by having the subject extend his arms and fingers in front of him

and above his head for 5 secends. All subjects were asked to skip

after the examiner demonstrated the required pattern of move-

ment. The neurologist also performed a mental status examina-

tion which included tests of orientation, and memory for digits

forward and backward. Calculation skills were assessed by four

serial subtractions of 7s starting from 100. Because of its impor-

tance in previous studies (15), and because of the subjectivity

of the assessment of this particular symptom, both clinicians

assessed the presence or absence of paranoid ideation. In only

1 case did their rating differ, and, in that case, the subject was

coded as not having paranoid symptoms.

Certain other issues were covered by both the psychiatrist and

the neurologist independently. For instance, both tried to ascer-

tain whether a child had been the victim of abuse or had been

witness to extreme family violence. A subject was considered to

have been physically abused if he had been punched, beaten with

a stick. board, pipe, or belt buckle; or had been beaten with

a belt or a switch other than on the buttocks. A subject was also

considered to have been physically abused if he had been

deliberately cut, burned, or thrown down stairs or across a room.

A subject was not considered to have been physically abused if

he had been struck only with an open hand or beaten with the

leather part of a belt or with a switch only on the buttocks.

A subject was considered to have been sexually abused if, as

a child, older persons had fondled his genitals or penetrated his

anus. Sexual abuse was also considered to have occurred if the

child had been forced to perform sexual acts on an older person

of either sex.

In addition to the neurological examination, all subjects had

a neurometric quantitative electroencephalogram (QEEG) per-

formed. Unfortunately, in 4 cases interference from metal struc-

tures and electronic equipment within the prisons distorted the

data. However, QEEG data on 10 of the 14 subjects was obtain-

ed. For purposes of this phase of the study, 2 minutes of artifact

free QEEG data were analyzed visually in order to determine

the existence of sharp waves and/or actual seizure activity. More

detailed analysis of the data will be reported subsequently.

Psychological testing consisted of the administration of the

Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (16), the Bender-Gestalt

Test (17), and Rorscnach Test (18), the Draw-A-Person Test (19).

and the Halstead-Reitan Battery of Neuropsvchological Tests (20).

Educational! testing consisted of the administration of the

Woodcock-Johnson Psycho-Educational Battery (21) and the

“Mini-Screen” subtest from the Test of Adolescent Language (22),

the “Story” subtest from the Test of Written Language (23), and

a speech screening test.

FINDINGS

To provide the reader with a sense of the types of crimes com-

mitted by these subjects, Table | presents a list of offenses for

which each subject was convicted.

Table 2 presents evidence of central nervous system trauma.

All of the 14 subjects suffered head injuries during childhood,

9 of which were severe enough to result in hospitalization, in-

dentation of the cranium and/or loss of consciousness. For ex-

ample, one subject was hit by a truck at age 14 years that frac-

tured his skull, and he was hospitalized for 11 months. Another

fell off the roof of a house and lost consciousness at age 10, had

a serious motorcycle accident at age 15, and had palpable scars

bilaterally in the occipital region.

Still another subject was hit by a car at age 6 and hospitalized

for approximately 6 months, and subsequently fell from a roof

onto his chin in later childhood. These head injuries were con-

firmed bv scars in the occipital region and on the chin. Thus,

significant injury to the central nervous system was prevalent

in this group of condemned juveniles.

Table 3 illustrates the neurological and electroenceph-

alographic findings. In 9 cases serious neurological abnormalities

were documented including evidence of focal brain injury (sub-

jects 1, 13), major neurological abnormalities such as abnormal

head circumference or a positive Babinski sign (subjects 5, 10,

12), a history of grand mal seizures (subject 6), and symptoms

or electroencephalographic findings strongly suggestive of a

previously undiagnosed seizure disorder ‘subjects 2, 7, 8).

Table 4 illustrates the severe psychopathology characteristic

of the 14 juveniles. As can be seen, 7 of the subjects were psychotic

at the time of their evaluations and/or had been so diagnosed

in earlier childhood (subjects 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, 12, 14). An additional

4 subjects had histories consistent with diagnoses of severe mood

disorders (subjects 5, 7, 10, 11). The 3 remaining subjects ex-

perienced periodic paranoid ideation at which times they often

assaulted their perceived enemies. It is noteworthy that 7 of the

subjects suffered from psychiatric disturbances that were first

manifested in early or middle childhood. For example, one was

so behaviorally distuibed he required special classes since lst

grade: another had multiple psychiatric evaluations and was

treated with a variety of medications since age 6; and another

attempted suicide at 11 years of age.

Table 5 presents data from selected subtests of the

psychoeducational test batteries. This table illustrates that only

2 subjects had I.Q. scores above 90. One subject scored in the

60's, 5 in the 70’s, and the remaining 6 in the 80's. Of particular

importance was the finding that 9 subjects made more than 50

errors on the categories subtest of the Halstead-Reitan Battery

of Neuropsychological Tests, which is a test of the ability to for-

mulate abstract concepts. A score of more than 50 errors is con-

sidered to be indicative of brain dysfunction. Within this group

of 9, 7 subjects also scored within the impaired range on the tac-

tile performance test, another indicator of significant brain

dysfunction.

Examination of the reading comprehension subtest scores of

the Woodcock-Johnson Psvcho-Educational Battery indicates that

only 3 juveniles were reading at grade level and 9 were reading

4 or more years below their expected grade for their age. In fact.

3 subjects did not learn to read until their incarceration on Death

Row. Another indication of deficits in abstract reasoning was

their scores on the concept formation subtest of the Woodcock-

Johison. Indeed, 7 of the 14 scored below the fifth grade level

on this test, and of these, 4 were functioning at a first or second

grade level. Thus, several measures indicated that the majority

of subjects in this sample had severe deficiencies in abstract

reasoning and were functioning far below the expected levels for

their ages.

As shown in Table 6, 12 of the subjects had been brutally

physically abused, often by more than one family member. In

addition, 5 more of the subjects had been sodomized by older

male relatives, 3 for extended periods of time during childhood.

In fact, 4 of these children had been sodomized by more than

1 individual. Therefore, not only did older family members,

parents in particular, fail to protect these adolescents, but they

also often used the subjects to vent their rages and to satisfy their

sexual appetites. Alcoholism, drug abuse, psychiatric treatment,

and psychiatric hospitalization were prevalent in the histories

of the parents of these subjects.

Of note, in only 5 cases were pretrial psychiatric or psycho-

logical examinations of any kind performed. These tended to be

brief and perfunctory and only once reported the existence of

significant neuropsychiatric impairment. In that case the boy

was diagnosed by one psychiatrist as schizophrenic and by

another as suffering from an organic psychosis.

DISCUSSION

Our data indicate that juveniles condemned to death in the

United States are multiply handicapped. They tend to have suf-

fered serious injuries to the central nervous system, to have suf-

fered since early childhood from a multiplicity of psychotic symp-

toms, and to have been physically and sexually abused. In 6 cases

alcohol or drugs definitely contributed to uncontrolled behaviors

and in 2 other cases alcohol and drugs were probable

contributors.

In what ways do these factors contribute to their violent

behavior? First, the kind of diffuse central nervous system in-

jury that they sustain contributes to their emotional lability, im-

pulsivity, and difficulty in controlling aggressive behaviors. Such

brain injured youngsters are also especially vulnerable to the

disorganizing effects of alcohol and drugs.

The most prevalent psychotic symptom experienced by these

youngsters is episodic paranoid ideation. This symptom is pro-

bably a result of the combination of brain injury, violent parental

behavior, and at times, the genetic vulnerability inherent in be-

ing the child of one or two psychotic parents. Whatever the

causes, these youngsters, as a result of paranoid misperceptions

and a pervasive sense of being endangered, lash out readily at

real and imagined threats. In this way, offenses that start out

as simple robberies or burglaries escalate into homicidal acts.

The severe cognitive impairment characteristic of these

juveniles further compromises their ability to make mature

judgments and act in accordance with them. These juveniles are,

rather, bound by immediate stimuli and tend to act before they

think. They are also easily influenced by those around them and

sometimes take literally statements that are intended simplv as

expressions of exasperation (e.g., “Somebody ought to kill that

guy”). It is not unusual for such children to act out the conscious

or unconscious homicidal wishes of parental figures, older sib-

lings, or older peers (24).

Physical and sexual abuse contribute to these juveniles’ violence

in several ways. First, the abuse itself is frequently characteriz-

ed by multiple batterings to the child’s head. These children are

thrown to the floor, sammed against walls. thrown down stairs,

and even kicked in the head. Thus, the impulsivity secondary

to brain injury may often be the direct result of these batter-

ings. Second, parental violence functions as a model for behavior.

Whether one describes this phenomenon as “identification with

the aggressor” or as modeling is irrelevant. Children imitate what

they see. Finally, the kind of irrational brutality to which they

have been exposed and subjected engenders rage. rage that is

rarely expressed toward the child’s battering parents or caretakers.

More often, it is displaced onto other individuals in the child’s

environment.

It is likelv that some of the verv vulnerabilities that contributed

to the condemned juveniles’ violence also contributed indirectly

to the harshness of the sentences they received. Theoretically.

all of the vulnerabilities described, neurological impairment,

psychiatric illness, cognitive deficits, and parental abusiveness

are mitigating factors that, coupled with the juveniles age. would

argue against the imposition of the death sentence. Unfortunately,

such cognitively handicapped juveniles have no idea of the ex-

istence of these vulnerabilities, much less of their relevance to

LOA

issues of mitigation. In fact, they almost uniformly try to hide

evidence of cognitive deficits and psychotic symptomatology.

They would prefer to be considered bad to being considered sick

or retarded. They frequently tell examiners “I’m not crazy” or

“I’m not a retard.”

Similarly, these juveniles are ashamed of their parents’ brutality

toward them and try to conceal it or minimize it. Only painstak-

ing, lengthy interviews, inquiring in detail about injuries, in-

quiring about the origin of visible scars, and asking about “scars

I can’t see” are likely to reveal the extent to which these juveniles

themselves have been victimized. Even the most harsh abuse is

often interpreted by the juvenile as punishment that was deserved

and therefore to be hidden. Suffice it to say that a history of sexual

abuse is even more likely to be concealed. Thus, these juveniles

systematically conceal those factors in their lives most likely to

mitigate against a sentence of death. It is, therefore, up to the

adults in their families to make sure that factors relevant to the

juveniles’ defense are introduced at sentencing. Unfortunately,

in the case of homicidal children, the very adults who should

be assisting in their children’s defense are not only inadequate

to this task by virtue of their own psychopathology, but also have

a vested interest in concealing the parental misconduct that would

constitute mitigating circumstances. In fact, we have found that

in several capital cases family members have cooperated with

the prosecution, have testified against their own children, or have

urged the judge to impose a death sentence.

Conceivably, the juveniles’ lawyers might be relied upon to

unearth and make use of the kinds of clinical data described in

this paper. Such was not the case. The time and expertise re-

quired to document this quality of clinical information was not

available.

Indeed, of these 14 subjects only 5 received pretrial evalua-

tions of any kind. These 5 evaluations tended to be perfunctory

and gave inaccurate and inadequate portrayals of the adolescents’

neuropsychiatric and cognitive status.

Furthermore, the attorneys’ alliances were often divided bet-

ween the juveniles and their families. In fact, on several occasions,

LIA

our clinical team was requested by attorneys to conceal or

minimize information regarding parental physical and sexual

abuse in order to spare the family any embarrassment. Thus,

some of the very factors that led to the juveniles’ aggression in

the first place also contributed to an inadequate defense during

the sentencing portion of their trials.

In short, factors such as brain damage, paranoid ideation,

physical abuse and sexual abuse, all of which would have been

relevant to issues of mitigation, were overlooked or deliberately

concealed in the cases of these 14 condemned juveniles.

Adolescence is well recognized to be a time of great

physiological and psychological stresses. Normal adolescents are

distinguished from adults by their intensity and volatility of feel-

ings, their poor tolerance of anxiety, their lack of awareness of

the effects of their actions, their failure of self-criticism, and their

difficulty appreciating the feelings of others (25). Our data in-

dicate that, above and bevond these maturational stresses.

homicidal adolescents must cope with brain dysfunctions.

cognitive limitations, and severe psychopathology. Moreover.

they must functiorm in families that are not merely nonsuppor-

tive but also violent and brutally abusive. These findings raise

questions about the American tradition of considering adolescents

to be as responsible as adults for their offenses and of sentencing

them to death.

12A

TABLES

Table 1. Offenses of 14 Juveniles Condemned to Death

Subject Offense

** 1 Raped and murdered young woman.

* 2 Shot and killed subject’s attorney’s sister, then attemp-

ted to rape her.

3 Inthe company of a 14-year old accomplice, shot and

killed man in the course of a burglary.

4 In the course of a robbery of a convenience store, shot

and killed female clerk.

During a robbery with one other person, shot and kill-

ed convenience store clerk.

6 Raped, stabbed, and strangled a 76-year old nun.

“* -7

’ During a spree of six robberies in one week, shot and

killed male grocery store customer.

* 8 Inthe company of others, bludgeoned male victim with

tire jack while stealing car.

* 9 Shot female convenience store clerk in the course of a

robbery. The woman died five weeks later.

10 Abducted, raped, then shot and killed female conve-

nience store clerk.

* 11 Stabbed female victim 60 times. bit her breast. and

pushed his hand into her vagina.

12 Participated with a gang in the robbery and murder

of a business man.

* 13 In the company of others, shot and killed relative.

* 14 Shot and killed mother and stepfather.

Subject was under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the

time of the offense.

** Subject may have been under the influence of alcohol or drugs

at the time of the offense.

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JOOP, “OTOYyoore

Joye “Jeyyour yRaq

soyjyeydays pur J9y ey

ssaupyy aiaqoryorisg

Dp aouajor,A Apap]

ssoutT] ogeryodsg Aye pur ‘aouapor, Apiuey Sosnqy penxeg pure jeosAyg JO aouaplagq “9 eqP

‘DUDSIOPeB

pur pooypyiyo

jnoysnosY) Jayyey-puris pure

rayyey-days Aq paztwopos

‘J9}SIS pasnqge

Aeuxas aarvy Arur sayyeydays

ISNGY JONXIS

‘pray sjoolqns 19a0 ayeyd

ayoig sayVoyy “soyyRydoays

{q SOY IMS puR sjpeq

yew Apoq Joao [pe poddry jy

‘pooypyiyo Ape ul

JOQPOUS S UdappTiyo ul POVeld

‘QOL UO JAAUy

oO} apryy ‘royyRydays Aq

JOUILURY YIM pray Url TY

pur ayyong ypPq WWM Uayrog

‘pray 0} SMOTE

‘PuIpaayq pur syno

BuIsNKD “oa ‘“syaq ‘sp40o9

‘SOUOPIMS UPI ‘jaye ydays

‘sarjour ‘sayyey Aq uayRag

asnqy jorshyd

Wa] 0} pauwapuor sapuaanf FT jo

‘SOINZIAS PUR SUOT]RZ

-1yeqidsoy o1jeryoAsd

ajdyynu, pey say,oyy ‘Apoqg 4J9A0 [[R pol

‘(quaploor “(us JRaq PUP *Y}d9}

Aq pray ut yolqnus JUOI] ayorg pur

WY AUT aUO) JayVO aory Ul Wary payound

yora WWM Aue] ‘parog YIM proy

-O1A WYBNOY susie : ur polqns yy Jaye ,

_SUMOPYPAIG SNOAIAU,, [BIAAIS ‘Sys YM yoo!

pey 1oyjopy “pen ‘JayjoIg pur Joyjour Aq qus payound sayy

< -Jayye pur palqns asnqge [eNxas aTqissog ‘AAO}S FO JAUING

a yum Aouvuseid Sulnp ‘spudlly sty pur pays, uo

JOYy,OU yeaq Jaye rayyeydays Aq paziwopos palqns yes sayyeydays Q

‘SOANPI]AI Peutayed

' auatYydoztyos [B1dAaG ‘rayjyour Aq

‘S19YQO YIM JUBTOIA OsTe syooyynq pur ssay uO UayRog

| seM pur Joyjour pomnfur Jayyey ‘soyyey AQ punose payound C

Dp aougor,a fAprung

(panutuoy) yyRac] 0) poulwapuor) saytuoanf FT Jo

ssaul]] OLQeiyodsg Aptuey par ‘aouajor, Ape ‘asnqy penxag pue [Roisdyd JO 9UePlA “9 PPL

ssauppy d1aporyohsgy ISNGYy JDNXIS asnqy poowhy

‘SOATOU

10} stpid ayry ‘siRaA pF ADR ye

layyey pur JoyVOW UISNOD aRUay JopyoO

‘anjoyodAsd pur Aq pasnge ATpeEnxas

suowaLp UINLayaq, Wy ‘sivad []-G Sane

MpOYOoR Jaye] “ayo (UO1} UISNOD ayRU pue ‘JOyOUIpURID “1OyIP]

ora payNesse spose ajoun Aq paziwopos ‘gayjoul Aq uayRog 1]

QUON aUuON MUON OI

"s}oq

‘yoalqns jo yUsUTyRA1) pure Sp109 UOISUA}Xe

sty soy 19yyeydays yyw Apog J9A0 [Pe

dn yeaq sBuryqis rayyeydays Aq uayRog (3

‘sprr0g

‘aqpoyoore Apqissod soyyr | Fxz pur ‘sdiynypng

‘squgard Udo") ‘sp409 UOISUd}Xe

aq syysy Duyyy WIM Jaye Aq UayRog Q

ssaupyy ouniylisy & Isnqgy JONXIS asngy pooshyd

P AMAIJOLA NPD |

(panutnuor) yea] OF peuweapuory sapuaan( FT Jo

ssouT[] OLyeIypoAsg Apu puke “dUOJOLA Ajtuey ‘asnqy penxasg pur jeorsAyg JO aouaplag “9 AqPL

28A

‘SPATOU JOJ UOTROIPAL Saye)

JOOP ‘Josnge Dnap s9yyey

‘spPultue oO} AypRynag

“URL JayjoUR yno

Jayyeydayg ‘speurtue

0} Ua SuNnUNY,, passayaid

Joyyeydayg ‘aouajo1 UIDIYX]

‘SOQ UWISUI

Ajfurey [esaAas

Aq suodvam Suisn

SOUBOIA BUIA.X'Y

‘uolssaidap

WUO1} SIIFNS 1ayOW

‘o1poyooye

JoyjOW pur Jayyey

SSOUT]T OupoIYdIisg

P auaqor, fips

SSouT[] OLQRIYoAS Ape pur ‘aOUDJOIA Ape

AOyIOM areoAep ayeuray Aq

ASNge [BNXAS aTqISsOg

‘pooypyTtyo Apira ur puany

Ajturey Aq PezIuloposg

'g ade uayM saquiou

Ajtuey Aq PeZIWOpog

“MET-Ul-Jay OIG Aq ynesse

[enxes payduiayyy

‘pooypyiyo

A[iva ut a0u0 uIsnoo

Japlo Aq paziwopos

ISNdY JPNXIS

“oyyeypurss Aq

SOYOUMS YIM uayrag

‘Qo “Syeq “SOUS

‘sadou (PIM Jayjour Aq

uayRog “sayyry Aq

AQUPJUL UT UayRag

“MP]-UT

oyyorg Aq pray ul payory

‘soyjour Aq

SYNS YM paddry jy

‘JOYIOIG Japyo Aq

pedwojs pure uajyrag

OOR ayy ul Ud}RoQ

SOUTQAULOS ‘JayQoU

pur LOY AR] Aq Sp409

UOISUA}XA UQEM UdJPOY]

asngy ppoowshiyg

(panunuor)) (We9C] OF} pauwapuor) sayuaanf Fy jo

‘asuqy [enxeg pur [PoIsAyg Jo aouapivy “9 a) Ln

29A

Bibliography

Seligson, Tom. “Are They Too Young to Die?” Parade

Magazine October 19, 1986. pp. 4-7.

A publication of the National Coalition Against the Death

Penalty, A Call to Abolish the Death Penalty for Juvenile

Offenders, March 20, 1987, Washington D.C.

Koestler, Arthur. Reflections on Hanging. London: Victor

Gollanez, 1955.

Radzinowicz, Leon. A History of English Criminal Law

and Its Administration from 1750: The Movement for

Reform 1750-1833. New York: Macmillan, 1948.

Hibbert, Christopher. The Roots of Evil. New York: Lit-

tle, Brown, 1955.

Platt, A. M. The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquen-

cy. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1969.

Knell, B. E. F., “Capital Punishment: Its Administration

in Relation to Juvenile Offenders in the Nineteenth Cen-

tury and Its Possible Administration in the Eighteenth.”

British Journal of Delinquency 5 (1965): 198-207.

Blackstone, William. Commentaries on the Laws of

England. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1796.

State v. Doherty, 2 Tenn. 79 (1806)

State v. Aaron, 4 N.J.L. 263 (1818)

Godfrey v. State, 31 Ala. 323 (1858)

Streib, V. L.: Death Penalty for Children: The American

Experience with Capital Punishment tor Crimes Commit-

ted Under Age Eighteen: Oklahoma Law Review 1983. V.

36: 613-641.

30A

13. (Anonymous), South Carolina Executes Killer: Age Stirs Pro-

test: The New York Times, Jan. 11, 1986.

14. (Anonymous), Man Executed in Killing Committed as Teen

Ager, The New York Times, Sept. 11, 1985.

15 Lewis, D. O., Shanok, S. S., Pincus, J. H. & Glaser, G.

H.: Violent Juvenile Delinquents: Psychiatric, Neurological,

Psychological, and Abuse Factors. J. Am. Acad. Child

Psychiatry 18: 307-319, 1979.

16 Weschler, D., The Weschler Intelligence Scale for

Children — Revised, The Psychological Corp. Middleburg

Heights, OH, 1974.

17 Bender, L., The Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test, The

American Orthopsychiatric Association, Inc.. New York,

N.Y. 1946.

18 Rorschach, H., Rorschach Test. Hans Huber Publishers:

Switzerland, 1945.

19 Urban, W. H., Draw-A-Person, Western Psychological Ser-

vices, Los Angeles, 1963.

20 Halstead, W. C., Reitan, R. M., The Halstead-Reitan Bat-

tery, University of Arizona, Tucson, 1979.

21 Woodcock, R. W., Johnson, M. B., Woodcock-Johnson

Psycho-Educational Battery, Teaching Resources Corp.,

Hingham, MA, 1977. ;

22 Prother, E., One-Minute Screen (unpublished).

23 Hammill, D. D., Larson, S. C., Test of Written Language.

Pro-Ed, Austin, TX, 1978; 1983.

24 Sargent, D., Children Who Kill—A Family Conspiracy?

Social Work, 7:35-42, 1962.

25 Fountain, G., Adolescent into Adult: An Inquir:’, Journal

of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 9:417-433.

1961.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.