Amicus Curiae Brief — California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians

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In the Supreme Court

linited States

BRIEF OF THE SAN MANI

INDIANS AS AME

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Interest Of Amicus Curiae

[]

Introduction And Summary Of Argume

Argument

iT]

Appellants Are Incorrect In Their Assertion T]

Without State Control. Bingo On Indian Reserva

tions Would Create A Gap In Law Enforcement

The Cabazon Court Followed A Traditicna] Analy

sis, Consistent With This Court’s Holdings Ir

Bryan v. Itasea County and Rice v. Rehner. ];

Ruling That California’s Bingo Statutes Cannot

Be Applied To Tribal Bingo Conducted For Char.

itable Purposes On Indian Reservations Under

Kither The Criminal Or Civil Provisions Of Pub

he Law 280

A. The Criminal Provisions of Public Law 280

‘

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases

Page

A.K. Management Company v. San Manuel Band of

Mission Indians, 789 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1986) .. 13

Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band, etc. v. Duffy,

694 F.2d 1185 (9th Cir. 1982) ........

errs occccccceecece sd be By a a ae

Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976)

.5, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, «

—“~

—'

Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. County of River

side. 783 F.2d 900 (9th Cir. 1986)

.3, 5, 15, 16, 17, 18, 26, 29, 31, 32

Carroll v. State, 361 So.2d 144 (Fla. 1978) 20

lowa Tribe of Indians of Kansas and Nebraska v.

Kansas, 787 F.2d 1434 (10th Cir. 1986)........10, 22

Joh nson Vv. Vé llow Cab Transit Company, 32] U.S.

383 (1944) ee - a ... 18, 19, 2]

Vashentucket Pequot Tribe v. McGuigan, 13 ILR

3031 (D. Conn. 1986) .. a eae > 29

UcClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n., 411 U.S

164 (1973) 24, 30

V OTe 7 li nate ad State ,. 160 | s VA ste. ' 1895 } ] ]

Oklahoma eT Te / Ma yt seneca (Cayuga Tribe OT

Oklahoma, 711 P.2d 77 (1985). 23

(Jneé ida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin » State of

Wisconsin. 71% F.Supp 712 (W.D Wise. 1981)

21, 24, 25, 29, 3]

) ‘ 1 wy a ¢) , ‘)

Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

CASES

Page

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d

310 (Sth Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020

NO , . 22, od, 20, 29, 3]

Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma. 13

ILR 3103 (N.D. Okla. 1986) ............ 23

United States v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d 897 (8th Cir

United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir

1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111 (1981) .

PPCM EM EWE Ge baseebeececes 21, 22, 25, 26, 29

United States v. Levenson, 524 F.Supp. 781]

WS ED co cc cece cc ccccccccey

United States v. Marcyes, 557 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir

i a 14, 20, 21, 22, 29,

Wisconsin Winnebago Business Committee v. Kober

stein & Ho-Chunk Management Corporation, 762

F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1985)..........

Woxberg v. United States, 329 F.2d 284 (4th Cir

Constitution

California Constitution, art. IV, § 19 +.

Miscellaneous

Bakal, Charity U.S.A., An Investigation Into The

Hidden World Of Multi-Billion Dollar Charity

Industry (Times Books, 1979) pp. 333, 334, 335 7.8

Black's Law Dictionary (4th Ed., Rev.) p. 1112 22

Eneyclopaedia Britannica, p. 824 8,9

In the Supreme Court

Hi k

United States

. 8, " ; ’ . 1

. BAND OF MISSION INDIA

Appe Llee ‘.

On Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF OF THE SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION

INDIANS AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF

APPELLEES

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

Amicus Curiae San Manuel Band of Mission Indians

(“Tribe”) is a federally recognized Indian tribe whose

reservation 1s near the County of San Bernardino. State

f California. The reservation is comprised of approxi

mately six hundred fifty acres, of which only approxi

mately eight acres lie on flat, commercially usable land.

The remainder of the reservation consists of steep moun-

tain terrain. Until recently, the Tribe has had no method

Its

generating income or providing employment for

families, many of whom are on welfare

In July, 1986, the Band commenced playing bingo on

its reservation pursuant to a tribal ordinance authorizing

the Tribe to engage in bingo for tribal charitable purposes

only. The revenue the Tribe hopes to generate from that

activity will be used to fund programs for the general

health, welfare and education of the tribal community.

Nearly eighty percent of the Tribe members, many of

whom were on unemployment rolls for years before the

bingo project began, immediately became employed and

are receiving their first vocational training of any kind.

The Tribe, like other tribes throughout the country

engaging in charitable bingo to raise funds and provide

jobs for the general welfare of their members, faces suits

seeking to bring such fund-raising activity under State

and local governmental control. This despite the fact that

the cases frequently cited by appellants, including Rice v.

Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983), and its predecessors, compe!

an opposite result. Since this case focuses upon Califor-

nia’s attempt to now obtain jurisdiction over a matter

which will directly affect the ability of the Tribe to

generate resources without State or federal aid for eduea.

tional, employment and other Tribal purposes, the Tribe’s

interest in its outcome is acute.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This brief will argue that every case relied on by

Appellants and amici who join with them, and the dec:

City of San Bernardino v. San Manuel Tribe of Mission Ind

Central District of California, Case No. CV 85-6899 WJR (Bx): City

f San Bernardino v. Area Director, Sacramento Area Office. Bure

Indian Affairs, Docket No. IBIA 86-22-A

sion below,” demonstrate a consistent approach in deter-

mining when and under what circumstances State law will

be applied to activities on Indian reservations under

Public Law 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (“Pub.L.”).°

Perhaps even more importantly, however, is the need to

establish first that there is nothing in the result below

which leaves any gap in the State’s concerns regarding

gambling* or the ability of law enforcement to protect

against organized crime on Indian reservations. Indeed.

it is in the tribe’s best interest that adequate protection

against such conduct is available, and ample State and

federal law exists to assure that it is.

Bingo has traditionally been separated in the minds of

the public from “gambling” as that term is generally

used, e.g., casino-type gaming (blackjack, roulette, craps

and the like), even though the inclusion of bingo within

the technical definition of gambling cannot be denied.

Bingo is played for fund-raising purposes under a variety

of rules and regulations in virtually every state by relig-

lous organizations, fraternal groups, senior citizens

groups, and by many of the states themselves, as well as

at most American, British and other armed forces bases

throughout the world. An Air Force Base located just a

few miles from appellant City of Riverside’s borders

“Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riversid: a3

900, 902-903 (9th Cir. 1986)

18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360

‘Appellants repeatedly refer to the subject of California’s

‘gam

bling’ laws (Brief of the Appellants, pp. 8, 22), whereas the issues

2rein concern only the legally and historically distinguishable games

of bingo and a limited form of State-sanctioned card games which are

played on the Cabazon reservation. Since Amicus and most tribes

interested in these issues from a fund-raising viewpoint are only

nvolved in bingo this brief will address that game only

regularly ewards bingo prizes which are substantially

greater than those permitted under California law. It is

therefore more than happenstance that California’s voters

adopted bingo as an acceptable way to raise funds for

charitable purposes without specifying any particular

guidelines. (Calif. Const.. art. IV, $ 19.)

Charitable bingo is not insignificant economically. Last

year alone the estimated proceeds from charitable bingo

in the United States. excluding bingo played on military

and Indian reservations, exceeded a billion dollars.*

Therefore, if bingo, in particular, attracts organized

crime at all, which we dispute, the States should be as

concerned about State-sanctioned bingo as with Indian

bingo, sinee both generate large sums of cash revenue.

Yet the measures taken by California to protect against

criminal involvement in its own bingo games are far less

than those imposed on tribes by the federal government.

particularly when bingo is played on Indian reservations

with the managerial assistance of non-Indians. Additional]

guidelines are also pending in Congress.

)

It is in the foregoing context, which could be readily

examined by the lower courts. that it was correctly deter-

mined the conduct of bingo games by Indian tribes on

their reservation for tribal] fund-raising purposes is not

against California’s public policy. Utilizing long-standing

principles of statutory construction, as this Court did in

deciding Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) and

Rice v. Rehner, supra, the court properly found that

California’s statutes regulating bingo do not fal] within

the scope of the criminal provisions of Pub.L. 280 (18

U.S.C. § 1162), which control State Jurisdiction over Tri-

“Gaming x“ Wage ring Busine Ss Vol i. No i July, 1986 ns

H.R. 1920, S. 902

bal activities,” since that statute was directed at truly

criminal conduct in the common law sense and not at laws

which are merely a part of a State’s regulatory scheme.’

Similarly, California’s bingo laws are not the kind of laws

Congress intended would be applied under Pub.L. 280’s

civil provisions (28 U.S.C. § 1360), since they are merely

regulatory in nature. Bryan v. Itasca County, supra. Since

Pub.L. 280 controls State criminal and civil jurisdiction

over tribal activities in states which are subject to its

provisions, California’s bingo regulations cannot be im-

posed upon tribal bingo conducted on Indian reservations

within its borders.

ARGUMENT

[if

APPELLANTS ARE INCORRECT IN THEIR ASSER-

TION THAT WITHOUT STATE CONTROL.

BINGO ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS WOULD

CREATE A GAP IN LAW ENFORCEMENT

Appellants and their supporting amici argue that with-

out the application of State regulation. bingo games

"We disagree with the State’s contention that if Pub.L. 280 does

not apply, principles of “federal common law” nevertheless confer

such Jurisdiction. Were that the case, then there simply would be no

need for Pub.L. 280, nor would this Court's limitations on Pub.L

280's importation of a State’s civil laws which are regulatory in

nature have any meaning. Bryan v. Itasca County, supra. The analysis

of Pub.L. 280’s preemptive effect has been briefed extensively

appellees and other amici and will not be repeated here

‘Similar reasoning was applied by the court below concerning the

exclusion of California bingo statutes from the meaning of the phrase

‘gambling business which Is a violation of the law of a State.

inder the Organized Crime Control Act (18 USC § 1955 1976

“OCCA”"), Cabazon, supra, 783 F.2d at 903

conducted for charitable purposes on [Indian reservations

would be unusually vulnerable to organized crime infiltra-

“lon and other criminal conduct. Brief of the Appellants

at 5, 26 and 29. The apparent concern is that the amount

of cash revenue which might be generated by these games

would create an atmosphere in which embezzlement.

skimming, and fraud could flourish and that absent State

intervention, there would be no way to deter such eon-

duct. Jd., at 8, 25. Because of the importance placed on

this premise by Appellants as a rationale for resolving

any doubt in their favor. we feel it necessary to address

the realities of Appellants’ concern before disputing their

assertion that they have a legal right to contro] charitable

bingo on Indian reservations under Pub.L. 280.

The State’s fear of Indian bingo-related crime is placed

in 1ts proper perspective when one examines the degree to

which State-sanctioned bingo is now permitted to exist

and flourish. In 1976. California voters approved Proposi-

tion 9 by more than a 2-to-] margin, which amended the

State Constitution to allow the Legislature to authorize

citles and counties to permit the playing of bingo for

charitable purposes. Calif Const., art. IV, § 19. No other

limits were placed in the Constitution. Jd. Thus. al]

regulation was left to State and local control. Jd. State

legislation was enacted which set some limitations but

additional regulation was left to Cities and Counties

California Penal Code, § 326.5. The regulations adopted

by the Legislature include a limitation on the size of the

prizes and restraints on those authorized to Operate the

Yames.

A DINZO game Snail De o7 erated and Staffed nhiy OV members

the authorized Organization whien Organized

T) > Tor i Ws ie a rmzea > ra a» WT y¥ tne any ; of + ,

Lit ( ai Value Or prizes awardes a ATiINng me COTQaCU ) i

ngo games shal! not exceed two n inadrea nft lOllars ($25( S

The selection of bingo as a fund-raising tool was not

surprising. Bingo holds a unique position historically and

has often been treated separately from true gambling.

Because it is usually associated with charitable. publie or

social organizations, it has been generally thought of as

more of a fund-raising and social activity than as a

traditional form of gambling such as that found in Las

Vegas casinos.” See, Gambling In America, Final Report

Of The Commission On The Review Of The National Policy

Towards Gambling, Washington, 1976. Indeed, such activ-

ities have been an important and publicly accepted part of

our culture. See, Charity U.S.A., An Investigation Into The

Hidden World Of Multi-Billion Dollar Charity Industry,

Bakal (Times Books, 1979), p. 333. Lotteries. which are

similar to bingo, helped to build Harvard, Yale,

Princeton, Brown, Dartmouth and Columbia. Id. Many

early churches, bridges, canals and roads were similarly

financed. Jd. Some of the funding for the American War

of Independence came directly from such activities, and

had among its proponents George Washington, Benjamin

Franklin, and Thomas Jefferson. Id.. at 334.

Catholic churches employed bingo in the United States

as far back as the early 1800’s. The Church made it so

popular that by the 1920’s it had come to be identified as a

“Catholie” game. Id., at 335. Bingo achieved its height of

popularity during the American Depression, when many

people were unable to participate in higher-priced forms

of recreation. They turned to bingo as an inexpensive and

popularly accepted alternative. See. Encyclopaedia

Britannica, p. 824.

r kind, or both, for each separate game which is held.” ¢

Pe nal Code. \ 326.5 { 198] }

| . . , . y ‘ | : .

In fact, ¢ allfornia Constitution, art. [V. § 19 specineally pronibits

Qe ng co

From these beginnings, bingo has become associated

with fund-raising for society's most respected institu-

tions, including schools, churches. Synagogues, hospitals,

fraternal orders, civie clubs, veterans groups and volun-

teer firemen. Charity U.S.A. supra, at 334. Signs indicat-

ing “Bingo Tonight’ have become commonplace

throughout the United States, even in States where gam-

bling (except horse- racing and lotteries) is strictly ou

lawed. For example, it was reported that in one such

State which had no regulations directed at bingo in

particular, many groups nevertheless openly advertise, on

billboards and in phone directories. bingo games with

cash prizes of thousands of dollars per night. Law en-

foreement apparently does not regard this as prohibited

“gambling” or particularly worrisome because, as one

police official put it, “publie sympathy is with the charita-

bie organizations.” Jd. at 334.

Bingo for prizes is also seen as an acceptable way to

provide a source of social satisfaction for many people.

Senior citizens, for example, are often attracte d because

of the opportunity it provides to meet and eonverse with

one another. Senate And Assembly Committees On Gov-

ernmental Organization, Transcript of Proceedings, In

lerrm Hearing on Bingo Regulations, November 2, 1983

pp. 132, 170 (hereinafter “Calif. Legis. Proceedings” )

California’s legislative scheme even added “senior citi-

zens’ associations” to the otherwise tax-exempt groups

hich are authorized to conduct bingo games. California

Penal Code, § 326.5(b)

Bingo games have been conducted by the United States

government on military reservations in California since at

least 1951. See, Calif. Legis. Proceedings, Test timony of

John Hawley, President of Western Gift Dist ributors, p

1O8. In fact. bingo fames Can pde found on Ameriéal

military s worldwide. Jd., at p. 109."” At Norton Air

Force Base, which borders San Bernardino, California.

members and guests of its NCO Club are invited to play

bingo games in which prizes far exceed those permitted

under California law, including prizes of a $2,500 Savings

bond or a percentage, or sometimes all. of the monies

collected for playing that game. See Appendix A.

Closely related to bingo, of course, are lotteries that

have been used for raising funds for public purposes for

hundreds of years. See, Charity U.S.A.., supra. Such lotter-

les currently involve revenues and prizes in astronomical]

sums.

The foregoing demonstrates that the act of engaging in

these special forms of gaming is far from being “so

fundamentally evil” that the State has soughi to prohibit

them within its borders as contravening publie policy

lowa Tribe of Indians of Kansas and Nebraska v. Kansas.

787 F.2d 1434, 1436, n. 1 (10th Cir. 1986). Bingo and

lotteries for fund-raising purposes are thus not only

sanctioned by the State of California itself, but also by a

substantial number of its organizations within its bounda-

ries that are dedicated to preserving the moral. ethical

and religious values of its members. It is in this context.

then, that charitable bingo is conducted in California on a

large-scale basis.

In 1983, more than $30 million in gross revenues were

collected at bingo games conducted in the Citv of Los

Moreover. bingo Ss the only Vaming activity sanet

permitted by the British Armed Services on their militar

Encyclopaedia Britannica, p. 824

A recent winner in the California lottery won a $10,000.00

ghner r S are yy ¢ K v i Va

Angeles alone. See, Calif. Legis. Proceedings, p. 8 (testi-

mony of Robert D. Burns, General Manager, Los Angeles

City Department of Social Services). Some charities have

been known to run as many as fifty games in one session.

Id., at 138. A single game run at a school in Sacramento.

California, grossed more than $2.2 million in one year

Id., at 144.

Bingo “centers” have begun to emerge in different

parts of California. For instance, in Sacramento various

church groups and charities rent space in a bingo center

capable of running nine different games during the same

evening. In Los Angeles, a particular charity draws ap-

proximately 600 people per session and runs four or five

times weekly. Jd., at 18. Jack Scheidegger, legislative

liaison for the State Attorney General, testified in 1983

that under the current law large-scale bingo operations

are emerging. Some charitable organizations pay up to

$62,000 per year to lease space in bingo centers for

approximately ten hours per week. Zd., at 25

Notwithstanding the large amount of eash involved in

these games, the State does little to control them in a wa}

that would have any meaningful impact on organized

erime control or criminal activity in general, if that were

really a concern. While the size of the prizes per game is

limited, the number of games played per evening, admis-

sion prices charged, and the number of persons who may

play each game is virtually unrestricted. As seen by the

Statistics above, this results in substantial sums of cash

changing hands, which is alleged to be the attraction to

organized crime because f its supposed potential for

skimming and embs ement But in California there is

\ Xan ‘ / i ri

no commission, board or other State body which supervises

the operation of bingo games in any way. Nor do Califor-

nia’s statutes address the identity, backgrounds or quali-

fications of those who operate the games, other than that

they be members of the organization for whose benefit the

game is being played. California Penal Code, § 326.5(h).

While one would hope that all members of any religious,

eivie or other organization purporting to use the proceeds

from its bingo games for charitable purposes were free

from criminal ties or intent, common sense would tell us

otherwise. Although the statutory scheme requires that

the proceeds from the game be retained in a special fund

and not commingled with the organization's other funds

(California Penal Code, § 365.5(j)), there are no restric-

tions on the way in which the funds are to be collected,

handled, counted, and the like. In California, only four-

teen percent of bingo-playing cities contacted by the

State legislature in 1983 had any mechanism for auditing

the games within their particular jurisdictions. Only five

counties within the State require any audits at all, mean

ing that sixty-five percent of the counties state-wide have

no auditing requirements of any kind. See, Calif. Legis

Proceedings, supra, comments of Co-Chairman Richard

Alatorre, page 120.

Finaliy, the sale of “pull tabs’’, which are ecards having

numbers or symbols concealed and preprinted in a man

ner providing for distribution of prizes (presumably up to

$250 each), is expressly permitted at bingo games. Cali

F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1985) and involve the removal of cash proceeds

prior to counting or reporting. This results in a wilful evasio

federal tax laws, 26 U.S. § 7201 et seq. Embezzlement is

fraudulent appropriation of property by a person to whom suc!

property has been entrusted, or into whose hands it has lawi

ome 7 Voore ? United States, 160 U.S ZO. ZoY 27 1 SOF Vi

nited States, 329 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1964

bho

fornia Penal Code, § 326.5(0). There is no limit on the

number of such cards which may be handled or sold

during any given bingo session.

In sum, the State’s interest in preventing the entry of

organized crime, which traditionally is linked with skim-

ming and other crimes relating to cash, is not prevented

by the present regulatory scheme, since no safeguards

against such practices are addressed.

On the other hand, the basie concern that bingo, be-

cause of its involvement with cash, will attract organized

erime to any greater degree than any other type of cash

intensive enterprise (e.g. movie theaters, fast food stores,

and the like) is unfounded. Unlike ecasino-type gambling

where every bet is a quick, unreceipted cash exchange,

bingo players must purchase bingo ecards or tabs in

advance to play. Thus all revenues can be documented,

thereby minimizing the opportunities for skimming and

embezziement if reasonable management safeguards re-

quired of any business are employed. And where the fear

is that organized crime will nevertheless have a special

opportunity to infiltrate reservations when tribes require

non-tribal managerial assistance (although the States

never explain why the same opportunity is not feared

where non-Indians are involved in other tribal activities),

the federal government already does far more than Cali-

fornia has ever considered doing in protecting the inter-

ests of both indian tribes and the general public against

possible eriminal conduct. 25 U.S.C. $81 requires that

contracts between Indian tribes and non-Indians relative

to Indian lands or properties be approved by the Seere-

tary of the Interior, and invalidates contracts that do not

bear that approval. Jn re Sanborn, 148 U.S. 222, (1893)

Several recent appellate court decisions have specifically

Yr) tT aT ‘ s , i ’ ‘ } , } i }

lied that management contracts Detween trides and non-

Indians hired to assist the tribe in managing and operat-

ing bingo games are, pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 81, null and

void absent the required approval. A. K. Management

Company v. San Manuel Band of Mission Indians, 789

F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1986); Wiscensin Winnebago Business

Committee v. Koberstein & Ho-Chunk Management Corpora

tion, 762 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1985).

The federal approval process involves thorough back-

ground investigations of management personnel, includ-

ing a Department of Justice inquiry to check for possible

criminal associations. See, Appellee’s Motion to Dismiss

Appeal or Affirm Judgment, Appendix, p. 66a. The man-

agement agreements must also fix a limited time to run,

specify the amount of the contractor's fee, include a list of

all parties in interest to the contract plus their respective

residence and business addresses, require the tmbe to

receive monthly statements showing revenue and ex-

penses, provide for an independent audit by a certified

publie accountant, set forth accounting procedures, allow

the tribe aecess to all books and records, establish a cash

management system adequate to safeguard the funds of

the operation, and provide the tribe the mght to oversee

such a system. /d., at 64a-68a. This process therefore

involves far more scrutiny than would be provided under

California law, while at the same time recognizing that

many tribes may lack the expertise to engage in fund-

raising activities without such outside assistance. That

need would be frustrated totally if Tribes were subjected

to California’s limitations on the operation of charitable

bingo games, which in no way take into account the

unique factors that distinguish Tribes from other organ-

zations and governing bodies. Indeed, Congress has

moved to formalize such regulations in its introduction

and present consideration of H.R. 1920 and 8.902

a Le

Moreover. the absence of State control over Indian

bingo would in no way leave a law enforcement gap should

problems arise. Skimming is obviously a federal erime

inder the Internal Revenue Code and other federal and

State laws. and no one has seriously contended that there

is inadequate criminal jurisdiction to scrutinize and pros

ecute such activity. See, eg., 26 U.S.C. § 7201. More

ommon erimes, such as fraud and embezzlement, are, of

course, subject to State jurisdiction under Pub.L. 280

These are not, therefore, issues which are truly involved

n this ease, although Appellants and amici have tried to

make it seem that the tribes, if successful, will create

havens of immunity from criminal sanctions. The fact the

record is devoid of any evidence of uncontrolled criminal

eonduct associated with bingo, either off the reservation

or on, despite the fact that bingo has been piayed on

Indian reservations in California and other States for

several years and by other organizations off the reserva

tions for much longer, simply underscores that reality

The court below correctly aetermined nat tne fear oO

THE CABAZON COURT FOLLOWED A _ TRADI-

TIONAL ANALYSIS, CONSISTENT WITH THIS

COURT’S HOLDINGS IN BRYAN V. ITASCA

COUNTY AND RICE V. REHNER, IN RULING

THAT CALIFORNIA'S BINGO STATUTES CAN-

NOT BE APPLIED TO TRIBAL BINGO CON-

DUCTED FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES ON

INDIAN RESERVATIONS UNDER EITHER THE

CRIMINAL OR CIVIL PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC

LAW 280

In Cabazon, appellants argued that California’s bingo

statutes were applicable to the reservation under the

criminal and eivil provisions of Pub. L. 280. The court

rejected appellants’ claim. In reaching its result, the

eourt followed its earlier decision in Barona Group of

Capitan Grande Band, etc. v. Duffy, 694 F.2d 1185 (9th

Cir. 1982), which held California’s bingo laws could not

be applied to tribal activities on a reservation. The analy-

sis employed by the court was the same utilized by

virtually every court which has had to determine if a State

law could be imposed on a reservation.

With respect to Pub.L. 280, the court in Cabazon and

Barona first determined that California's bingo statutes

did not fall within the kind of “crime” intended to be

included within that statute. The court then concluded

that as a law which was civil and primarily regulatory in

nature, application of the bingo statutes on Indian reser-

vations under Pub.L. 280 would also be contrary to and

outside the scope of that law when civil provisions of Pub

L. 280 are viewed against long-established principles of

tribal sovereignty and self-government.

A The Criminal Provisions of Public Law 280

Public Law 280 is divided into two sections, one per

taining to eriminal matters (eodified at 18 U.S.C.

§ 1162(a)), and the other to civil laws (28 U.S.C. 1360).

Taken together, these sections represent an express dele-

gation by Congress of State criminal and eivil jurisdiction

over reservations in states such as California which are

subject to its terms. Although there has been much debate

over whether laws coming under its mane are criml-

nal/prohibitory” or ‘“civil/regulatory’ in nature, an anal-

ysis of the cases in the area, including those eited by

Appellants which are claimed to be in eonflict with, or

rejecting of, that distinction, reveal a complete consis

tency in approach by all courts which have examined Pub

L. 280 and other federal statutes purporting to app!)

State law to reservations, regardless of the outcome of the

particular eases. The only difference among these dec!

sions would appear to be factual in nature.

Indeed. we see no reason to go beyond analyzing thes«

eases on the basis of 1) whether the State statute in

question falls within the federal statute’s meaning of a

erime and. if not, 2) whether as a civil law it is regulator)

‘n nature so as to conflict with the principles enunciated

‘n Bruan v. Itasca County. Thus, we submit that such an

analysis represents the only meaningful distinction

between the terms ‘“criminal/prohibitory” an

‘“eivil/regulatory.”’ In making these determinations, this

Court has clearly announced that any analysis of Cor

rressional intent in enacting those statutes must De un

dertaken against a backdrop of tribal sovereignty} Ri

Rehner, supra, 463 U.S. at 719

‘‘a) Each of the States... listed in the following

table shall have jurisdiction over offenses committed

by or against Indians in the areas of Indian country

listed...to the same extent that such State... has

jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within

the State... and the criminal laws of such State

shall have the same force and effect within such

Indian country as they have elsewhere within the

State...: California...all Indian country within

the State.”’ [Emphasis added. |

The first question in analyzing the applicability of

Pub.L. 280 in the instant ease is therefore whether or not

California’s bingo regulatory scheme encompasses the

kinds of “offenses” and “eriminal laws” intended by

Congress in enacting that statute. In determining that it

does not, the Ninth Cireuit in Cabazon followed its earlier

decision, in Barona Group of Camtan Grande Band, etc

Duffy, supra, 694 F.2d at 1187, which had this exact issue

before it. Barona held that California’s bingo statutes

were not the kind of laws intended by Congress to be

swevt under the criminal provisions of Pub.L. 280 (1%

U.S.C. § 1162). Finding they were not, and were therefore

civil in nature, the court further held they also were not

the kind of civil laws intended by Congress to be included

within the civil seope of Pub.L. 280, since they simply

] : e

regulated the licensing and playing of bingo and thus fell

within the proseription of Bryan. Barona Group

» J

Capitan Band, etc. v. Duffy, supra, 694 F.2d at 1184

The need for the kind of analyses empioyea in oOryda?

und earried forward through Barona and Cabazon was

explained in this Court’s opinion in Johnson v. Yellow

Transit Company, 321 U.S. 383, (1944). That case focused

tT?

various Oklahoma statutes prohibiting

DOSSeCSSI

d transportation of liquor and whether

could be applied under the assimilative crimes statute (18

U.S.C. § 468) to deliveries of liquor which were clearly

intended for a federal military reservation within the

State, which Oklahoma had intercepted. The carrier sued,

alleging the seizure constituted an unlawful interference

with its authorized interstate transportation. Oklahoma

contended that the assimilative crime statute applied.

That federal statute stated that anyone who committed an

act within a federal enclave, which act, if occurring within

the state in which the enclave is located, “would be

penal,” would “be deemed guilty of a like offense and be

subject to a like punishment.” Jd., at 388-389. Oklahoma

argued that all of its statutes relating to liquor were

enforceable under those provisions, including penalties

mposed for violating its import reguiations, and that

herefore the shipment of liquor to the military reserva

}

tion located within the State of Oklahoma was subjee

‘

UKianoma criminal jurisdiction

+) } . 22) ol! arty} artian elxr 4

inally determined because all parties, particularly

. , ; ;

I'nitea States. were not before the Court, there was

serious doubt avout whether the mere fact that the

Oklahoma liquor statutes were criminal on their fa

‘ — th. + | iran ++ ; ‘ ‘

necessarily required their adoption under the language Oo!

e Teaera Statute ynien reTrerrea 0 ne state s Dé

iWwsS

4h! () YY ye 4 ‘ ‘ _" y no

j nid a UU! Sta iLcs vt | Lilie } i

. . ; +4) ;

nports proviae One iiustration Ol ne qimeu es

> ] 7

nnere t In nis aquestlo! | nese pe ali Statutes

. ? °° t ) Tk. ’

1~signeda ) ‘ nioTree a SVS em pi ice nS I y Ss Lit

orts D specia permits issued D 1 State ive]

; ‘ 1 17 r » 7 } | “t

UKia. Sta L¥4 ( »/ + | +s mporvarlv!l

ors Wit! Spt a ern ~ 1a4e pena

SY i , ? ~ “

crimes statute adopts Oklahoma's penal liquor laws

the Court might further have to hold that that statute

compels federal officials on the Fort Sill Reservation

to apply for and obtain state permits before they can

lawfully import any liquors for any purpose. And

strong argument might be made that had Congress

intended such a drastic result, it would have consid

ered the problem and used more express languag

[d., at 389, n.8. (Emphasis added.

Aes

In determining whether a federal law purporting

ipply a State s criminal laws to federal f¢ LOry 1S app

“able to a specific State statute, Yellow Cab therefore

makes the logical suggestion that the full ramification of

adopting the State statute in question must De considered

if the relevant federa

" . "

n light of the purpose and history «

} 6 T ’ 9) ‘ )

iaw ld.. 32 ] | . al 389-390: She (iso. pbryvdan } Ttase

County, supra, 426 U.S. at 381; Rice v. Rehner, supra, 46

| with m7 ¢ ry} 4

S. at 723-726. This becomes particularly importan

where adoption of a State law under the inclusion prov

sions of a general and somewhat ambiguous federal law

‘5 Cl is Pub Ly Z3U Could inaermine LI pa SOVven»nre sa

i ( ss ¢ I *48 "Til ‘ | B sul { ( Lit / ‘ t

~ »~

en "4

S gress

~ ~ 1 | oe a 4

ss A ‘> 1

ist scus

+4 - a

The willingness of courts to consider Congressional

intent when deciding if a particular State statute is to be

included within a federal law which purports to adopt

State eriminal law was addressed in United States v.

Marcyes, supra. In that case two members of the Puyallup

Indian reservation were accused of operating fireworks

stands on a reservation which was open to the public

Some of the fireworks being sold were illegal under State

law. The sellers were arrested and charged in district

court under the Assimilative Crimes Act. 18 U.S.C. § 13

Defendants argued that the act only incorporated the

general criminal code, or “prohibitory laws”, of State and

could not be used to enforce Washington's fireworks laws.

which defendants argued were not truly criminal in na-

ture but were merely civil laws regulating the sale and

possession of fireworks. Jd., at 1364. Referring to Bryan.

defendants additionally argued that the concept was even

stronger because an Indian reservation and the attendant

principles of tribal sovereignty were involved. Jd. The

Ninth Cireuit rejected the argument, but not on its

analytical basis. The court acknowledged that:

“{A] strong argument exists that Congress did not

intend to include the penal provisions of a state

regulatory system within the ACA. The rationale for

this argument is obvious; a state could thereby en

force its regulatory system on the federal jurisdic

tion by making criminal any failure to comply with

those regulations (i.e.. licenses, permit , ete.). Jd

7 « » 17

at 1364

i | ia | *

a iw 1S r sing ses

Nevertheless, the court found that the Washington firs

works statutory scheme was in fact the kind of “pena!

law’ envisioned under the Assimilative Crimes Act, since

‘its intent is to prohibit the general possession and/or

sale of dangerous fireworks and is not primarily a licens

ng law.’ Id.. at 1364

The importance of Marcyes not that the cour

rectly or incorrectly determined that the fireworks stat

ites were the kind of penal laws referred to in th

Assimilative Crimes Act; rather, Marcyes (as well as Ri

Bryan and Yellow Cab) demonstrates that federal courts

must determine the contextual meaning of words such as

‘eriminal”’ or “penal” in federal legislation in order

void the potentially anomalous results deseribed in Y:

w Cab. See, also, Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin

(LL é oft Wisconsin. supra, 518 i Supp. al 714 This

particularly true where [Indian nterestS are concerne

~ , ar ; 4 Wint Fr rr B94 }" yA Of} +} f

sé C.Gee LiLe¢ ISLULES ] -» yA. Za I

. . ‘7797 ‘ ‘

elt, ert. denied. 449 - ) 2 Dnited Ntat:

Varcyes, SuUPTa

maucted a Sl

ambling on an Indian reservation was 1n violation of

Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 937.1%

S.C. § 1955 (““OCCA’). That statute makes it aer

rage n al llega ‘vambling bDusiness whiel

( 1L10 of the aw ol 1 State or po L1¢a SuDGd S

which it is conducted. The court econeluded under

" " ¢ . ’

»+ ; a + iro *¢ _ ’ , t+atrasit } “ + 4

cts tnat lke the Nreworks Statute in wmarcyes, tne \

7 . ‘ " ? > ‘ ‘

oTOn law agalnst proresslonai gamobDilng Was

des -

within the meaning of the UCCA. despite the St

law's exceptions. Jd., at 897. The lower court recognized

the specific environment for organized crime which ex-

isted in casino type gambling’” and found that the nature

of the particular activity involved was against the public

policy of the State of Washington and therefore consti-

tuted the kind of gambling business which was squarely

within the meaning of the federal statute. Jd.. at 897.

Consistent with the foregoing cases is Seminole Tribe of

Florida v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981). cert.

denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982), which examined whether a

set of Florida statutes permitting bingo games to be

played by certain qualified organizations were “criminal”

under Pub.L. 280, or, if civil, were regulatory so as to

infringe on tribal rights. In order to first determine if the

statutory scheme constituted a criminal prohibition under

Pub.L. 280, the court examined “whether the operation of

bingo games is prohibited as against the public policy of

the state or merely regulated by the state.” Jd., at 313. lh

doing so, the court examined various state court decisions

which discussed the constitutionality of the bingo statute,

observing that in Carroll v. State, 361 So. 2d 144 (Fla

1978), “exercising this power to regulate, the legislature.

in its wisdom, has seen fit to permit bingo as a form of

recreation, a at the same time, has allowed worthy

n itself, an act or case involving illegality from the very nature

transaction, upon principles of natural, moral and public law

those which were merely “malum pronibditum ' (“a wrong prohibits

i thing wnhien 18 wrong decause prohibited; an act wniecn S

inherently immoral, but becomes so because its commission is

pressi5 forbidder DY positive aw ( ontrastea with malum nl

Black’s Lau Dy mary +t! Eid Re ] » lou ]

Indian f Kan ind Nebrask Kansas, 787 F.2d 1434

Pele’ al T oO 4 S

organizations to receive the benefits. (Citations omit-

ted)”. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth, supra, 658

F.2d at 314. The Fifth Cireuit determined that the

underlying act of bingo was not against Florida’s public

policy and that therefore the bingo law was not criminal

in nature within the meaning of Pub.L. 280. /d., at 316

The court then analyzed the regulatory effect of the bingo

laws and determined that if they were applied to reserva-

tions in Florida under the civil provision of Pub.L. 280,

they would interfere with statutory policies of tribal self

government, which was beyond the seope of Congress

intent in enacting those provisions of Pub.L. 280. /d.,

7 ITE

514-5105.

Again, the particular result reached by the court

Butte rworth lS significant for tne process empioyea: iower

courts, with an opportunity to examine all of the facts

surrounding the nature of the particular activity in ques

tion, the proposed form of regulation, and the potential

interference with tribal sovereignty (not unlike the type

of test suggested by amicus, State of Minnesota, at pages

-23 of their brief) are in a proper position to determine

whether or not, against a backdrop of strong policies

favor of tribal sovereignty and self-government, the State

statutory scheme in question comes within the meaning

the federal statute Delng considered

The same approach was lilustrated in Oneida lribe

inadians OT Wisconsin } State OT Wis: OVS Tit, Supra

striet eourt expressly eonsidered tne Trollowing ques

ons in determining whether Wiseconsins Dingo lav

, } } D> | ‘

nferred State jurisdiction under rub. lL. 2d5U

wnetner Wiseonsin S pingo AWS

passed Public Law 280 and conferred jurisdiction on

the State of Wisconsin to enforce its criminal laws in

Indian country.” Jd., at 714.

After considering the nature of the State regulations

themselves and the factual context in which they were

being applied, the court concluded that Wisconsin’s bingo

laws were civil rather than criminal under Pub.L. 280.

and as such could not be imposed upon the reservation

because they were merely regulatory in nature. Jd., at 719.

The court found that the Wisconsin legislature had deter-

mined the act of bingo-playing to be generally beneficial

and had “chosen to regulate rather than prohibit” such

activity, thus removing the State statutory scheme from

being considered “criminal” within the meaning of Pub.L.

280. Id., at 719. The court admitted to a “certain uneasi-

ness’ in reaching this decision because it seemed a rather

“mechanical approach,” but when coupled with its review

of the background against which the federal law had to be

read, (see, McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n., 411

U.S. 164) (1973), pronounced itself ‘“satisfir

conclusion reached on [the motion pending

court] is based on sound principles of constry

laws pertaining to Indian tribes and of

regarding tribal independence.” Oneida, ipra, 51%

F.Supp. at 719.

In 1982, the Ninth Cireuit addressed the question of

whether California’s bingo laws fell within the criminal]

ambit of Public Law 280. Barona Group of Capitan

Grande Band v. Duffy, supra. In contrast to the facts in

Farris, in which the particular State gambling statutes

involved were directed at conduct (casino-type gambling)

which had been found to be contrary to State publie

policy and therefore fell squarely within the OCCA defini-

tion of a “gambling business” in “violation of the law of

. ‘ ‘ ; ‘ . ;

S SLaALt ie ‘ iT ; Ti 1aea nat ( aliliornila Se iT M4

— ; i. + i «+

aws were not directed al

criminal conduct as intende

inder Pub.L. 280, but were, for

ature. Again, the court

4 . les

statutes themselves,

those purposes, Civili il

looked at the nature of tl!

noting that bingo was avaliabie

tax-exempt organizations of diverse kinds (1.e

.] _ fraterna

societies, recreational clubs, senior citizen organizations

real estate boards and labor and agricultural groups

hat there was no general prohibition against the genera

opulation’s engaging in the act of playing bingo, a1

that Dingo was permitted to De played as a money making

enture. Jd., at 1189. The court also noted that

nougon tne statutory seneme was not Strictly a ceensing

r revenue-raising program Butterworth was correct 1!

pservation that [rjemn ion may appear in [forms Ol

han licensing, and the fact that a form of gambling

self-reguiated as opposed to state-reguiated throug!

ensing does not require a ruling

, , Tad lA 7 } 4 ’ ,

1. Id., a

B. The Civil Provisions of Public Law 280

ng established that Californias g

re not eriminal within the meaning P “

) na and Cabva mn courts next turne { n ana 5

vyhether the bingo statutes, as civil laws, w nfores

oer rine or \ SlQTiS 7 p { | Ae) ZO 7

ot AS in tne rimina aw Onves Xa!

e { ngeress na ntent tf the federal statut 10

KC) | } ~ y i

In Bryan, this Court found no authority under which a

State governed by Pub.L. 280 eould impose its regulatory

aws upon an Indian reservation Expliecating the lan-

guage, intent and history of Pub.]

ated the

4. 280, this Court reiter-

“policy of leaving Indians free from State

Jurisdiction and control [which] is deeply rooted in the

Nation’s history....” Jd. at 376 n. 2. The

question

addressed was whether the

State of Minnesota had the

iuthority to levy a personal property tax on the mobile

me of an enrolled member of the Minnesota Chippewa

trioe residing on land held in trust by the United States

tor the benefit of the tribe. This Court unanimously held

that neither the defendant County nor State had the

1uthority to levy such a tax in the absenee of speeifie

igressional consent, and that references to a State's

vil laws in Pub.L. 280 were not a Congressional grant of

¥ . ‘ > : ‘ Ss > a , > 7 ”

ower enadiing the State to exercise its general regula

ry powers, including taxation, over reser ins

~ ’

} on Fala.

, . reo , -) y *? " r " r ,

i lg tnat result. e Dal lia Vuave

. _S £ D..} 920 u —_ zz me en .

POrLUODS OF Fud.l. 2 Was eXamined, pay ny speeclai

ention to Section 4. subsect a ine primary inten

iS Provision was round to be to ‘ rearess the laek Oo!

. > . ’ ’ ;

equate indian forums ror resoiving private lefal dis-

es between reservation Indians. and between Indians

“irat it? . " sto, ; ’ , + ; .

ind otner private « IZenS, DV Derm) ing’ the courts of the

t t ; | . ; yf ms at 2 nd 2 TT +...

> LC } A4eUClLUGe SuUCcn GiSDu cs * al ) ) 11S COU!

’ > ; < + 4 + }

St rved A a . guing Ui nis Sta i ory ianguare

roreactsc

‘ ne “aN y ’ ied iws ‘) rvé 17

— ‘ ‘ ; 1, ‘ ‘ ; “at

array OF State none riminal laws, du ratne

{ wor, ~ ar ; ‘ ‘ aw Tn mes r) mara

4 » uct iaws ut (mean ij

vS VW vitn private mgnts and status

~ vey] ippDlleat I

private persons or private property would include

the laws of contract, tort, marriage, divorce, insanity,

descent, ete., but would not include laws declaring or

implementing the states’ sovereign powers, such as

the power to tax, grant franchises, ete. These are not

within the fair meaning of ‘private’ laws.” /d., at 384,

fn. 10, quoting from Israel and Smithson, /ndian

Taxation, Tribal Sovereignty and Economic Deve

ment, 94 N.D.L. Rev. 267, 296 (1973).

'é,

In analyzing the language of Pub.L. 280, this ¢

observed “the absence of anything remotely resembling

an intention to confer general civil regulatory control

Indian reservations’. Jd., at 384.

Examining other considerations, including present

Congressional policy toward reservation India.is,

Court found that Pub.L. 280 “was plainly not meant

effect total assimilation.” /d., at 387. The danger

imposing State regulation on a reservation was

deseribed:

“And nothing in its legislative history remotely sug

gests that Congess meant the Act's extension of

jurisdiction to the States should result in the und:

mining or destruction of such tribal governments

did exist and a conversion of the affected tribes

little more than ‘private, voluntary organizations

United States v. Mazurie, 419 U S 544, 557, 42 L FE

29d 706. 95 S Ct 710 (1975) —a possible resu

tribal governments and reservation Indians we!

subordinated to the full panoply of eivil regu

powers, including taxation, of state and al g

ments.’ Jd., at 388

The Bryan Court examined other A

yre that rie . > , | ms

nvress lat Vasseu At). hu : .

‘ mstr

‘Tu :

S Snow

naa inten<

the Appellants,

ng established

_ +o x y

i act aw il

y rro ? ,

\ —_ ? t

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) r° ‘ ry?

+? yr - + J

‘ 1¢

a. yon ¢ .

}

4 "

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is Nie

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PU tu I A ( i}

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,ULT SS

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quest

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rst) ? T r* . Sa . ; ‘

\ : Va [lé CTla v¥

Ore C y eT) »f no r) } |

— » lial isi i j

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1pon ne States genera

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Au iy axa LOT). Vel at

’

72 2 r\r . S29 ]

i c ex Tess SzLidi Si j

r° T re ? ’ _

ir¢ ¢ cre } ‘

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Yr) ¢ } , we .

AitiX® O , OU DTYUa

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OT i state O exerelsée ven

r° »r"t T y yr

test YALIUVUIIS y

4 ,

T of tT} -¢

nN Lat nis ¢ OUT Was Oi

’ in} tne .

eXamining tne ‘ Oongresslo

r° If OT Ty ’ y Tr r f » *

re ae ifi {7 la ne

qa now. nave Dee! ntende

‘ . », | )

li ¢] li@r Frud.L. Zou 8 er

CUuladal W rt spect

xTend } >“ iTe Ss reo

‘ I i 1 1 uu

> j

Linug¢ iT! nis

i > y ’ ¥ :

LvV as eet ] 3

. tt ror nr Ty ne

ad ‘ y ; y ; “2 ’ .

f i ~ f ‘

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a P

statutes, the cases have uniformly held that such regula-

tion would conflict with Bryan. Seminole Tribe of Florida

v. Butterworth, supra; Barona Group of Capitan Grande

Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy, supra; Oneida, supra;

Mashentucket Pequot Tribe v. McGuigan, 13 ILR 3031 (D.

Conn. 1986); and Cabazon, supra. To have found other-

wise would have been to impose on tribes the requirement

that they comply with various State regulations which

this Court has held would merely relegate the tribe to

being little more than a “private, voluntary organization.”

Bryan v. Itasca County, supra, 426 U.S. at 388.

Appellants have argued, however, that this Court’s

decision subsequent to Bryan, in Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S.

713 (1983), now compels a different result. We disagree.

Rice is entirely consistent with the analysis which has

been applied to every case cited, including Cabazon and

Rarona. In Rice, which did not involve a State subject to

Pub.L. 280, the issue was whether a federally licensed

Indian trader who was selling liquor on a reservation was

subject to State liquor licensing laws. The trader, Rehner,

had sought a declaration that under 18 U.S.C. $1161, a

federal statute permitting sales of liquor on reservations

provided such sales comply with tribal ordinances and

“State law’, that term did not include “regulatory” liquor

laws of the State such as those compelling the licensing of

sellers.

This Court employed the same approach in interpreting

§ 1161 as courts have traditionally utilized in determining

the meaning of other federal laws relating to the possible

importation of State jurisdiction over Indian affairs, 1.e.,

to examine the congressional intent involved, utilizing

tribal sovereignty as an essential “backdrop against

which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be

read” (McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission, supra,

e180

74 + 7". . + iy, ’ , '

411 U.S. at 1/72 After econaucting sucn an anaiysis,

Court concluded that. unlike Pub L. 280. the regulat

i ¢

ntende

were ]

provisions of a States laws

iquor

" "

iciuaedad within

basis for construing $1161 as intending to distinguis!

between or exclude those State liquor laws whieh ar

reguiatory and those which are not (1.e., those wnicnh a!

substantive” in nature). Rice v. Rehner, supra, 463 U.S

at 734. n. 18. There is nothing in Rice to suggest, however

that the basic determination of whether or not a statute

or i not reguiat \ Q NISSsed ITI Bryar nas move

I | Liv t ice Lialory, as 1ISCUS! A if a fit, Lid il

beyond the reach of the court. Rice simply held that th

distinction was not pertinent to its analysis of § llf

That ease therefore neither extends the law nor co! fliets

: Witn aecis1ions wnien preceaea it in analyZing the wordall!

and nistory of federal statutes which apply to Indians

Moreover, Rice in particular has no special significanes

an analysis of Pub.L. 280, since having found that 8 LI'

ipplied and therefore invoked the States jurisaict

~ ourt ye per renised ; ne Fes, ‘ ye? ‘

. > 8, — 17 7 7 ‘

ag \

CONCLUSION

( [ 5 i B { f a, V j

(}) l ef ana SIS emi f Vas | i

I wed i! sryan ind Ri he Ourts Wel! pe f

ietermine whether or not a federal statuts n Ca

4 is Wt iS { r traditionai considerations of Cong!

~ nA ntent VAS IT t int ) OVeT Ding Stat | es ~ t

; VT (Ti A r*¢ ? et } my na ma ‘ ‘

Y nsteaqd arnt r)7 t ary? ( neoress

S 1161: 2.¢e.. that there was no historica

n question and tne findings DY ali federal courts whicli

have considered the impact on, and interference wit!

legitimate tribal activities and self-government which im

position of these State regulatory schemes were found

have, these courts correctly determined, consistent wit!

Bruan and Rice. that the State bingo laws in issue wer‘

not the kinds of statutes intended to be included withi

the meaning of either the civil or eriminal provisions

Pub.L. 280. That conclusion in no way removes or eve!

iffects those law enforcement tools which may be neces

sary to prevent the commission of the kinds of erin

feared by appellants. We respectfully submit it 1s to thos:

potential erimes, not the playing of bingo, to whieh the

ention should be directed. We respectfully requ

ie Cahazon decision be athrmed

Aiid

| ) i ‘ Qe )*) ) be §

1 ;

MAN B \

, esslonali ‘ I

4 ait, j , 17 j

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MORTON AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA 92409

BINGO RULES

BINGO CARDS WILL GO ON SALE AT 1730 HOURS

PAPER CARDS WILL SELL FOR THE PRICE STATED FOR THAT PARTICULAR GAME

YOU MUST HAVE THE LAST MWUMBER CALLED WITHIN THE GAME PLAYED TO WIN

4. NO WINNER RECOGNIZED AFTER A GAME [S CLOSED.

SPECIAL CARDS MAY NOT BE TORN APART. USE INK MARKERS ONLY

6 IN THE EVENT OF TIES, THE AMOUNT WILL BE EQUALLY DIVIDED AMONG ALL WINNERS

PARTICIPANTS MUST BE BONAFIED MEMBERS IN GOOD STANDING. YOUR CLUB CARD MUST

BE STAMPED CURRENT. YOU MAY NOT HAVE YOUR CARD UPDATED AFTER WINNING IN ORDER T

SOLLECT PRIZE.

= ALL GUESTS MUST BE SIGNED IN. PERSONS ELIGIBLE FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE CLUB MAY

NOT BE SIGNED IN AS GUESTS.

} WINNERS OF GAMES WITH PRIZES OF MORE THAN $150.00 MAY COLLECT THEIR CHECKS Al

THE NCO CLUB OFFICE ON FRIDAY AFTER 1500 HOURS.

MINIMUM PURCHASE OF 3 HARD BOARDS @ $2.50 IS REQUIRED TO PLAY ANY BINGO GAMES,

TICKETS MUST BE PRESENT ON THE TABLE WITH YOUR CARDS, OTHERWISE YOUR BINGO ANNOT

8E HONORED

"ARD PRICES HARD BOARDS, MINIMUM PURCHASE OF 3 @ $2

CIAL PACKAGES: 8 HARD BOARDS, 7 SPECIAL & 1 SET SPEEDY $10

1S HARD BOARDS, 7 SPECIALS & 1 SET SPEEDY. $11

AFTER PURCHASE OF 15 HARD CARDS, CARDS AR R$

MUST BE 18 YEARS OF AGE TO PLAY BINGO

BINGO CALLER RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE

w ORDER TO HOLD A SEAT. IT MUST BE PURCHASED WITH MINIMUM

; NO EXCEPTIONS

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PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAII

| am a citizen of the United States and a resident

City and County of Los Angeles: | am over the age

eighteen years and not a party to the within actio!

business address is: 1706 Maple Avenue, Los Ang

California.

On September 22, 1986, I served the within Briet

San Manuel Band of Mission Indians as Amicus Cunriat

Support of Appellees in re: “State of Califor

Cabazon Band of Mission Indians” in the United St

Supreme Court, October Term 1985, No. 5o-1/08

. > . : | y ’ rTrmry

on the Parties in said action, by placing thre

thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postagt

prepaid, in the United States post office ma

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Angeles, Cailfornia, addressed as [01LlOWS

JOHN K. VAN DE KAM! GERA J. GI

Attorney trenera 4

California Ly

STEVE WHITE ipa

ef Assistar Attorns ENN R. Sa

RODERICK E. WALS1

FREDERICK R. M LR, « Tenth S

Supervising Deputy A

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Attor 1

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regoling 1S true ana correct

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MmXeCCULea n septemdDe! Ghd, 0 4 LOS Ange it

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Gili LLich 4 yA P

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.