Amicus Curiae Brief — Colorado v. Spring
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Supreme Court, U.S.
FILE D
ws
No. 85-1517
JUL 18 1988
>PANIOL, JR.
Iu the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1986
STATE OF COLORADO, PETITIONER
Vv.
JOHN LEROY SPRING
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONER
CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor General
STEPHEN S. TROTT
Assistant Attorney General
WILLIAM C. BRYSON
Deputy Solicitor General
ANDREW J. PINCUS
Assistant to the Solicitor Genera!
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 205380
202) 633-2217
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QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether respondent’s voluntary statements should
be suppressed under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
1386 (1966), on the ground that the law enforcement
officers’ failure to identify in advance the crimes that
would be the subjects of the interrogation rendered
respondent’s waiver of his Miranda rights ineffective.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Interest of the United States
Statement Z
Summary of argument
Argument:
aco y Vig , arty ‘ ,OY 7)
Respondent’s voluntary statements should not |
suppressed
A. The law enforcement officers’ administration of
the Miranda warnings supplied respondent
with all the information he needed to make
a
knowing Miranda waiver
B. Respondent’s waiver of his Miranda rights v
voluntary
~ y e
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
B , mer \ M el ror j 16% T ~ 4c)
Carter V. Garris 656 F.2d 65 =
U.S. 952 t
f ling Vv. Brie y] /. 19? 2 Id 735. cert de} ed 119
U.S. 877 ib, 25
Commonwealth v. Forde, 466 N.E.2d 510 6
Fare v. Michael C.. 442 U.S. 707 12? 12 97
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731
Harris Vv. Riddle, 551 F.2d 936, cert. denied, 434
U.S. 849
Michigan V. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96
Michigan V. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 L4
Miranda Vv. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
Miller v. Fenton, No. 84-5786 (Dec. 3, 1985
Miller v. Fenton, No. 83-5530 (3d Cir. J
LORG )
IV
Cases—Continued: Page
Moran Vv. Burbine, No. 84-1485 (Mar. 10, 1986) passim
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 2)
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369
Oregon V. Elstad, No. 83-773 (Mar. 4, 1985) passin
—"
~
Schenk vy. Ellsworth, 293 F. Supp. 26 16
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 20
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 35 27
State Vy. Woods, l 17 Wis. 2d 701. S45 N W 2d 157
(1984) 26
United States v. Anderson. 533 F.2d 1210 L7
United States v. Burger, 728 F.2d 140 17
United States v. Campbell, 431 F.2d 97 17
United States v. Contreras, 667 F.2d 976, cert. dé
nied, 459 U.S. 849 17
United States v. Hall, 396 F.2ce 841. cert. denied.
393 U.S. 918
lynited States v. Met ‘rary, 648 F.2d 3283 16
United States ex rel. Placek v. Illinois, 546 F.2d
1298 17
United States v. Wash naton, 431 U.S. 18] 15, 19, 20,
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49
Constitution:
U.S. Const
Amend. V 15
Amend. XIV (Due Process Clause) 26, 27, 28
Miscellaneous:
1 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure
(1984) 26
White, Police Trickery In Inducing Confessions,
Iu the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1986
~ —
No. 85-15] i
STATE OF COLORADO, PETITIONER
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ON WRI
SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONER
INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES
The issue in this case is whether respondent’s
waiver of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 486 (1966). was invalid because the law en-
forcement officers did not inform respondent of the
crimes that would be the subjects of the proposed
interrogation. The Court’s analysis and resolution of
the question whether police must provide this in-
formation in addition to the warnings prescribed in
Viranda is likely to have an effect upon the conduct
| t off
. , , 7 : >
. . . vey +1 ‘Y ; wre -*% ; ale, . > .
Interrogations DY Tederal iaw enrtorcement omcers
V ae CA |
and the admission of voluntary statements in federal
criminal prosecutions.
STATEMENT
l. In February 1979, Harold N. Wachtor, III, a
law enforcement officer employed by the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms of the United States
Department of the Treasury, learned that respondent
and several other persons were involved in a scheme
to steal firearms and resell them in another state.
Agent Wachtor recruited George Dennison, one of
the members of the group, as a government inform-
ant. In addition to revealing the details of the fire-
arms scheme, Dennison told Wachtor that respondent
once admitted killing a man during a hunting trip in
Colorado. Pet. App. 2A, 7C; Supp. Tr. 7-10, 31, 40.
Dennison subsequently szported to Wachtor that
respondent had obtained some firearms and was look-
ing for a buyer. Pursuant to Wachtor’s instructions,
Dennison arranged a meeting between respondent and
undercover ATF agents that was held on March 30,
1979." The agents reached an agreement with re-
spondent for the purchase of the firearms; respond-
ent and one of his confederates were arrested as they
transferred the firearms to the uslijreover agents’
automobile. Respondent was found to be in possession
of a .22 caliber pistol at the time »f his arrest. Pet.
App. 1A-2A, 7C; Supp. Tr. 9-11, 18.
'“Supp. Tr.” refers to the transcript of the suppression
hearing conducted on March 17, 1980; “Tr.” refers to the
trial transcript.
*In the course of a telephone conversation with Dennison
concerning the sale of the firearms, respondent implicated
himself in the hunting trip murder. That conversation was
tape-recorded by ATF agents. Pet. App. 8C.
One of the ATF agents read the Miranda warnings
to respondent just after respondent was placed under
arrest. Later that day, at the ATF office, respondent
again was advised of his Miranda rights by ATF
Agents Patterson and Sadowski. He agreed to answer
the agents’ questions and executed a written form
acknowledging and waiving his rights. Pet. App. 3A,
8C; Supp. Tr. 14-16, 20, 66-67. The agents first in-
terrogated respondent about the firearms transac-
tions. They then inquired whether respondent had a
criminal record; respondent stated that he had a
juvenile record involving the shooting of his aunt.
Agent Patterson asked respondent whether he had
ever shot anyone else. Pet. App. 3A, 8C-9C; Supp.
Tr. 69, 74-77. Respondent “kind of ducked his head
and mumbled ‘I shot another guy once.’” Supp. Tr.
69; see also Pet. App. 3A, 9C. Respondent stated
response to subsequent questions that he had never
been to Colorado and that he had not killed Donald
Walker—the victim of the hunting trip shooting. Pet.
3A, 9C; Supp. Tr. 69.
On May 26, 1979, while he was in custody on
charges growing out of the firearm sales scheme, re-
spondent was interviewed by Colorado law enforce-
ment officers concerning the murder of Donald
Walker. Prior to the commencement of the question-
ing, respondent was advised of his Miranda rights,
ind he executed a written acknowledgment and
aiver of those rights. Respondent admitted that he
had accompanied Walker and Donald Wagner on a
deer hunt, that he held the flashlight while Wagner
hot Walker, that either respondent or Wagner emp-
tied Walker’s pockets, that respondent aided Walker
in disposing of the body, and that respondent later
lied about Walker’s whereabouts Respondent subse-
4
quently signed a written statement prepared by one
of the officers, which summarized the interview. Pet.
App. 4A-5A, 17C-18C; Supp. Tr. 80-90, 98-103.°
5’ Approximately six weeks later, after respondent entered
his guilty plea to the federal firearms offenses and an informa-
tion charging him with murder had been issued in Colorado,
respondent again was interviewed by the ATF agents. At that
interview, on July 13, 1979, the agents administered the
Miranda warnings and respondent indicated that he under-
stood his rights. Respondent stated that he would not sign
any forms without the advice of his lawyer, but he agreed to
answer the agents’ questions. Respondent answered a number
of inquiries concerning the location of a variety of firearms
and explosives. The questioning then turned to the Walker
murder. In response to several questions, respondent said,
“I’d rather not talk about that,” but he then admitted that he
had been in Colorado with Waiker at the time of the murder
and that the gun in his possession at the time of his arrest
previously had belonged to Walker. Respondent agreed that
“The], Wagner and Walker went out together and that only
[he] and Wagner came back alive.” Pet. App. 5A-6A, 19C-
20C; Supp. Tr. 22-28, 32-35, 70-73.
The trial court found that these statements were admissible
(Pet. App. 6A-7A), but the Colorado intermediate appellate
court disagreed, holding that respondent had “invoke|d]j his
right to silence as to the homicide” when he at first declined
to answer questions relating to that subject (id. at 4B). The
Colorado Supreme Court unanimously concluded that the
statements should be suppressed because the agents did not
make “any effort to reaffirm [respondent’s] decision to waive
his constitutional rights after he declined to answer particular
questions” and failed to ascertain whether respondent in-
tended to exercise his privilege against compelled self-
incrimination with respect to all questions relating to the
Walker murder. /d. at 23C-24C; see also id. at 35C. This
Court limited its grant of certiorari to the first question pre-
sented in the petition, and thereby expressly declined to re-
view the state court’s determination with respect to this issue
Accordingly, no question regarding the admissibility of the
July 13 statements is presented in this case.
2. Respondent was charged with first degree mur-
ler in connection with the death of Donaid
Prior to trial, respondent moved to suppress the state-
ments he made in the interviews on the ground that
he had not effectively walved his Miranda rights.
The trial court denied respondent’s motion (Pet. App
1A-9A). With respect to the March 30 interview. th
irt found (id. at 3A) that
IS questioning was conducted while | respona-
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awful Cc IStOQY, pursuant to a Vail
ent] was in .
arrest; that [respondent] had been properly ad
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sed of his rights and was aware of his rignt to
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errogation, to stop tne interrogation at al
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ne; and that his responses to the interrogatior
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e made tIreely, voluntar! and inte lige!
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nere Was no eiemel ort duress or coer I
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to Indu respondent’s!| statements
ne court noted that respondent was not specifica
ia ty} } Oo | toe} 17 ? }
io ‘ al it UuUcs min? \ VU VUCTI UP
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Colorado murder, but it found tha the questior
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emseives suggested Lne OnNICc OT} ingqull
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ng to a sudye tnat wa not readlly e]
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parent to | respondent|’’ (id. at 4A)
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The trial court also concluded that respondent
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Di¢ rhe court ODS rved that r'¢ spond nt was
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ed of his rights, executed a waiver forn |
at TO ans er an ( lé L1oO? and ~ ries a TT ?
itement Summarizing tne intervis Ihe rt
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6
Respondent was found guilty of first degree mur-
der, and he appealed to the Colorado intermediate
appellate court. That court reversed respondent’s con-
viction by a tivided vote, holding that respondent’s
statements had been admitted into evidence in viola-
tion of this Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona,
supra (Pet. App. 1B-7B). The court stated that
‘“fajn advisement of the privilege against self-
incrimination and of [the] right to counsel is sufficient
if the accused fully knows the general nature of the
crime involved. If knowledge of the crime is with-
held, a suspect cannot intelligently make the decision
as to whether he wants counsel” (id. at 3B (citation
omitted) ). Since the agents did not advise respond-
ent that the questioning in the March 30 interview
would relate to the Colorado murder, the court con-
cluded that “any waiver of rights ir regard to ques-
tions designed to elicit information about [the mur-
der] was not given knowingly or intelligently”
(ibid.). None of respondent’s March 30 statements
had been introduced at trial, but the appellate court
did not note that fact.* It concluded that the reversal
of respondent’s conviction was required because re
spondent’s March 30 Miranda waiver was invalid
(Pet. App. 3B).
The court stated that th
ie May 26 statement was
not admissible because it was a “fruit” of respond-
ent’s March 30 statements. The May 26 statement
had to be suppressed, the court concluded, because
the State had failed to show that “the [May 26]
lt ! qa ! d that responds Ss stateme
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ithe W Ker murder!
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statement was not the product of [respondent’s] prior
incriminating statements” (Pet. App. 4B).
One judge dissented. He concluded that at the time
of the March 30 interview respondent was “full)
aware that his activities surrounding the possession
and sale of stolen firearms were the basis for his
arrest and the agents’ investigation” (Pet. App. 6B).
Because the .22 pistol found on respondent was the
weapon that had been taken from Walker at the time
of his death, the dissenting judge concluded that ques-
tions regarding the source and the use of the pistol
were foreseeable, and that respondent’s Miranda
waiver on March 30 was therefore valid and proper.
The dissenting Judge further concluded that respond-
ent’s May 26 Miranda waiver was valid as well ( Pet.
App. 6B-7B).
3. The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed by a
divided vote (Pet. App. 1C-35C). Observing tha
“Ti]t seems likely that a suspect’s decision whether
to consult with an attorney will often be infiuenced
by the seriousness of the matter underlying the inter-
rogation” (id. at 12C), the majority stated that
‘“lo|ne factor often considered crucial to a court’s
determination as to the validity of a waiver * * * is
the extent of the suspect’s knowledge concerning the
?
.
likely subjects and scope of the prospective question-
ing’ (id. at 13C). The court concluded that “‘an ex-
amination of the totality of the circumstances is
proper and necessary to determine, among other
things, the extent of the suspect’s awareness of the
subject matter of the investigation and the impact of
this awareness, or lack of awareness, on the suspect’s
decision to waive his constitutional rights” (ibid.).
The court found that, in the present case, “the ab-
ence of an advisement to [respondent] that he would
be questioned about the Colorado homicide, and the
lack of any basis to conclude that at the time of the
execution of the waiver, he reasonably could have ex-
pected that the interrogation would extend to that
subject, are determinative factors in undermining the
validity of the waiver” (Pet. App. 15C (emphasis in
original) ). The court therefore concluded that re-
spondent did not make a “voluntary, knowing and in-
telligent waiver of [his] rights” in connection with
the March 30 interview (id. at 17C).
The court considered the admissibility of the March
30 statements to be relevant because the court be-
lieved that its finding of a violation of Miranda o1
March 30 might require the suppression of responc
ent’s May 26 statement. Pet. App. 10C-11C. The
court held that the May 26 statement would be in
admissible if it was “the direct fruit of the March 30
statement” (id. at 19C), and it directed the trial
court to resolve that issue on remand.’
Two justices dissented. They noted that respondent
had been advised of his rights as required by Miranda
and had indicated that he understood those rights.
The dissenting justices stated that “fa waiver of
Miranda rights should never be held invalid simply
because the suspect is not informed or does not know
in advance of all matters that are under investigation
and will be the subject of interrogation” (Pet. App
33C).
The | rado Supreme Coun so | e]
on remand the State’s argument th he May 26 statem
was admissible under © Vv. Histad, No. 83-773 (Mar
1985), regardless of the admissibi! of the Marcl em<*
{ Se¢ r ‘ 1S tt nh)
9
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In Miranda vy. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966), this
Court prescribed a set of “procedural safeguards” de-
signed to protect persons suspected of criminal wrong-
doing from what the Court viewed as the inherent
compulsion of custodial interrogation, and thereb)
enable such persons freely ‘o exercise their pri\
against compelled self-incrimination. Mira)
not prohibit all custodial interrogation; on thi
trary, it established a specific procedure by wi!
suspect could waive his privilege 2nd agree to at
questions posed by the police.
The law enforcement officers in the present
followed with precision the procedures set forth b»
this Court in Miranda. They recited the Miranda
warnings, ensured that respondent understood his
rights, and obtained from respondent a written waiver
of those rights. The court below, however, treated the
officers’ compliance with Miranda as the beginning
rather than the end of its inquiry. The court con
cluded that respondent’s waiver was invalid because
he had not been supplied with a supplement to the
Miranda warnings
a description of the criminal ac-
tivity that was to be the subject of the proposed in-
terrogation. This Court’s ~ecent decisions in Moran
v. Burbine, No. 84-1485 (Mar. 10, 1986). and Ore gon
v. Elstad, No. 88-7338 (Mar. 4, 1985). conclusively
demonstrate that the Colorado Supreme Court erred
by requiring the police to provide respondent with in-
formation other than that contained in the Miranda
warnings.
The first inquiry in evaluating the validity of a
a ° 7 } " ,
Miranda Wal > | wnetner the suspect ed WI1LN
full aware) both of the nature of the right being
abandoned ara tl OFlSeCUuences OT «tne GecIslol
o
10
abandon it” (Moran, slip op. 7). This test plainiy is
satisfied as long as the suspect is supplied with the
information contained in the Miranda warnings. The
warnings inform the suspect of his right to remain
silent and caution him that any statement he makes
can be used against him; a suge@fet who is aware of
the information contained in the warnings thus pos-
sesses all the information necessary for an effective
walver.
The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that a sus-
pect also should be told of the subject matter of the
interrogation because that information might influ-
ence the suspect’s decision whether to waive his right
to remain silent. But this Court repeatedly has held
that Miranda’s sole purpose is to ensure the volun-
tariness of a suspect’s decision to speak or remain
silent; it is not a guarantee that the suspect’s decision
will comport with his informed self-interest. Law
enforcement officers therefore are not required to pro-
vide a suspect with any and all information that he
might find helpful in deciding whether to speak or
remain silent.
Such a novel rule would upset the balance that this
Court has struck between the competing interests im-
plicated in custodial interrogation. The rule would
not further the Fifth Amendment interests protected
by Miranda, because the additional information
not necessary to enable a suspect to exercise his priv
lege against compelled self-incrimination. Yet
rule would discourage voluntary confessions and
thereby undermine society’s compelling interest in ap
prehending and convicting persons who have engaged
in criminal activity. Moreover, the principle applied
by the court below would greatly reduce the clarity of
Miranda’s waiver procedures and, as a result, in-
erease the difficulties facing police officers charged
with administering the Miranda rule.
1]
Respondent’s waiver also satisfied the second re-
quirement for an effective Miranda waiver because it
was “voluntary in the sense that it was the product of
a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation,
coercion or deception” (Moran, slip op. 7). No physi-
cal or psychological pressure was applied to obtain the
waiver. In addition, because the law enforcement offi-
cers did not deceive respondent with respect to the
information conveyed in the Miranda warnings, but
simply withheld information that Miranda did not
require them to provide, the waiver was not the prod-
uct of impermissible police deception. For these rea-
sons, respondent’s waiver of his Miranda rights
should be upheld.
ARGUMENT
RESPONDENT’S VOLUNTARY STATEMENTS SHOULD
NOT BE SUPPRESSED
in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966). this
Court concluded that custodial interrogation by law
enforcement officers generates “pressures which work
to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to
compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do
SO freely” (384 U.S. at 467). “To combat this in-
herent compulsion, and thereby protect the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self incrimination,
]
Miranda imposed on the police an obligation to Iol-
low certain procedures in their dealings with the
accused” (Moran v. Burbine. No. 85-1485 (Mar. 10
198%), slip op. 6). The Court held that, prior to any
quesuloning of a suspect, a law enforcement officer
must inform the suspect “that he has a right to re
main silent, that any statement he does make may be
used as evidence against him, and that he has a right
» the presence of an attorney, either retained
ointed” (Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444).
i
vd
Viranda further provided that a sus}
his right to remain silent and agree
questioning by law enforcement officers “
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly
gently.” 384 U.S. at 444; see also id. at
waiver is valid if it is the product of
deliberate choice,” and if it is made “
awareness both of the nature of tl
doned and the consequences of the decision
LO
\
it.” Moran v. Burbine, slip op. 7; see also
Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979); Ne
lod +t]
ntel
-A70
ree al
1a iu
ie right being aban
’
abdanhd'
Walve
with the March 30 interview conducted |
agents In our view, respondent’s Mira
nlainlvy was valid. The agents administered the wa
nos required by Miranda, respondent in
Although none of the statements made by r
y r the March a() nterview vere adn ed at tr
of the waiver is relevant because the Colorado §
. ‘
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indicated that respondent’s May 26 statement 1
pressed on the ground that it was a “fruit” of the
statement The Colorado Supreme Court dh ed
court 3 qaeterm ne the rel; at snij etTweel TNhé T
ments on remand. Pet. App. 18C-19' Since the
qT ement w d y + he sijhiect ¢ su] pres ; the
tatements were ot obtained in violation of Mira
ng that respondent’s March 30 waiver was valida v
nate any ques n regarding tne aamis ot ti!
Statement
Even if the March 30 statements wer ned
oO! V f T the M i\ © Sstateme YY ~
1 4 ‘ lor th f ?
} j \ Q9 77 (M . 4 19R5) Th, ,
( ' } e 1 e } y
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March
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e understi od the Intormation conveyed 1n ne Warn
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ngs, and respondent voluntarily agreed to waive his
right to remain sil
ions. Miranda an
]
simple procedure is all
-
nt and to answer the agents’ ques
1 its progeny make clear that this
that is required to obtain a1
ffective waiver.
\. The Law Enforcement Officers’ Administration Of
The Miranda Warnings Supplied Respondent With
All The Information He Needed To Make A Knowing
Miranda Waiver
] ] . 4 +
eC Was 1Nn rmed by law enforce! ent officers
e had a right to remain silent. that anv statems
) ) , , ,
e made could be used against him. and that he
right to request a lawyer (Pet. App. 5A, 8C). T
Colorado Supreme Court concluded that respond
aiver nonetheless was ineffective because he
nformed in advance of all the subjects that
covered in the proposed interrogation. It is well s
ed, however, that a police officer may obtai1
alver simply by conveying tO a suspect the infon
contained in the Miranda warnings themselves;
» additional information is required. The officers’
recise compliance with Miranda in this ease thers
. ——- , +7 *7 vn ley AG - +h,
re was sufficient to supply respondent with the in-
rmation necessary for an effective waiver.’
inhis Cour stated ! M hat a pect mu (
' é Ot nis } h in order | execute a valid walivel
¢ 7) r} iS, a M rd la Wa rv i not pve € er Vé I
pect ia to comprehend the informatio: ntained lt
ne warnings This question must be evaluated by cor deri!
he [suspect’s] age, experience, education, background, and
telligence” (Fare Vv. Michael C., 442 U.S. at 725). Nothin:
he record in this case indicates that respondent failed
ne rmat n conveyed by the wart ny
l4
1. This Court steadfastly has adhered to the view
that the warnings prescribed by Miranda provide a
suspect with all the information that he needs to de-
cide whether to waive his rights. The Miranda Court
itself noted that advising a suspect that his state-
ments can be used against him will ‘make [the sus-
pect] aware not only of the privilege, but also of the
consequences of forgoing it” (384 U.S. at 469). No-
where in the Court’s comprehensive discussion of the
warnings (id. at 467-474) is there even a hint that
the police would be required to append ad hoc supple-
ments to the warnings depending on the facts of each
particular case.
Only last Term, this Court expressly reaffirmed
that the warnings convey to a suspect all the informa-
tion necessary for an effective Miranda waiver, stai-
ing that “fo]nce it is determined that a suspect's
lecision not to rely on his rights was uncoerced, that
.e at all times knew he could stand mute and request
a lawyer, and that he was aware of the state’s inten-
ion to use his statements to secure a conviction, the
(
]
'
|
analysis is complete and the waiver is valid as a mat-
ter of law.”’ Moran, slip op. 8; see also Fare v. Mi-
chael C., 442 U.S. at 718; Michigan v. Mosley, 423
U.S. 96, 99-100 (1975) ; Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
133, 443-444 (1974); ef. Oregon v. Elstad, No. 83-
773 (Mar. 4, 1985), slip op. 12 (“[t]he warning con-
veys the relevant information and thereafter the sus-
pect’s choice whether to exercise his privilege to re-
main silent should ordinarily be viewed as an ‘act of
free will’ ”’).
The conclusion that the warnings supply a suspect
with all the information that is relevant under M?-
nda is a direct corollary of the principle upon which
Viranda is based. The sole purpose of the warnings
procedures mandated by Miranda is to
15
counteract the compulsion to speak that a suspect
might feel as a result of custodial interrogation,
thereby protecting the suspect’s privilege against com-
pelled self-inerim ination. Moran, slip op. 6, 10-11;
Miranda, 384 U.S. at « wa ag reminding the suspect
that he is: « ..'ed to refrain from speaking, and that
if he chooses to answer questions he may provide in-
formation that can be used against him, the warnings
fully counteract any such compulsion to speak. As
this Court has recognized, at Is inconceivable that
1e Miranda] warning wouid fail to alert La defend-
nt} to his right to refuse t er any question
which might narininal * * Indeed, it seems
self-evident that one w! sf free to refuse
to answer questions is i! ture to later
complain that his answi United
States v. Washington , 4 ION; 7): see
also Moran, slip op. 13 | VM full com-
prehension of the rignts to re nt and request
an attorney are sufficient to dis; el whatever coercion
is inherent in the interrogati n } rocess”’ ).
Respondent’s waiver plainly satisfies this standard.
The officers’ recitation of the ivende warnings ex-
pressly reminded respondent that he had a right to
‘emain silent and that his statements could be used
against him. The warnings thus fully informed re-
spondent of the existence of his Fifth Amendment
privilege and the consequence of abandoning that
privilege.* Accordingly, the officers were not re-
The requirement that a suspect be made “aware[] * * * of
* the consequences of the decision to abandon [the privi-
ege|”’ in order effectively to waive his right to remain silent
(Mora a op. 7) does not justify a rule requiring the police
a Iv is e suspect of the particular criminal activity that
are investigating. It could be argued that informing the
| |
?
quirea to provide respondent with information apout
}
the subject matter of the proposed interrogation in
order to accomplish that goal
)
suspect of the topics of the interrogation would in some general
sense provide the suspect with information about the conse-
quences of waiving his rights—he would learn the particular
criminal activity in w .ich he might implicate himself. How-
ever, the sole consequence of which a suspect must be informed
for purposes of Miranda is that his statements can be used
against him. Once he is aware of that fact, he understands
“the consequences of forgoing [the privilege].’ Miranda,
384 U.S. at 469; see also Moran, slip op. at 8, 9-10.
'The lower courts that have concluded that a suspect
knowledge of the subjects of the interrogation is relevant in
assessing the validity of his Miranda waiver nave formulated
essentially two different standards. Some courts impose an
obligation upon the police to provide this information, holding
that the police must inform the suspect of the subject of the
interrogation in every case. See, e.g., Schenk v. Ellsworth
293 F. Supp. 26, 29 (D. Mont. 1968). Other courts, including
the court below (see Pet. App. 13C-17C), have cast the re-
quirement in terms of the suspect’s knowledge, holding that
the suspect’s awareness of the subject matter of the proposed
interrogation must be considered in assessing the validity of
the suspect’s waiver. On this view, the police are not obligated
to supplement the Miranda warnings as long as the suspect
could have ascertained the subjects of the interrogation from
his knowledge of the surrounding circumstances. See, e.g..
Carter v. Garrison, 656 F.2d_68, 70 (4th Cir. 1981), cert
denied, 455 U.S. 952 (1982): United States v. McCrary, 643
F.2d 328. 328-329 (5th Cir. 1981): see also Collins v. Brierly.
192 F.2d 735, 739 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S
877 (1974). Although the rules applied by these courts differ
in their particulars, they rest upon the same basic legal co1
clusion—that the suspect’s awareness of the subject of the
interrogation is in some way relevant in assessing the validity
of his Miranda waiver. For the reasons discussed in the text
this conclusion is incorrect.
Other courts have held that the validity of a suspect’s waiver
. ‘tv " - : +? le 7 : } . 4
is unaffected by the suspect’s lack of knowledge about the
"he only pessible reason for requiring the police
—~
provide a suspect with this additional informatio
is the justification advanced by the Colorado Supreme
Court—that ‘“‘a suspect’s decision whether to consult
it] orney before answering questions will
uenced by the seriousness of the matter
inderlying the interrogation” (Pet. App. 12C). How-
ever, just as this Court has made clear that the M/-
randa warnings convey to a suspect all the informa-
mn needed for a valid waiver, the Court consistently
nas refused to require supplementation of the warn-
ys on the ground that the additional informatio
ight be considered useful by a suspect in calculat-
g whether it is in his self-interest to waive his
rights. Miranda requires only that the suspect be
ade aware that he is free to choose between speak
ng and remaining silent; it is not concerned wit
wisdom of that choice. Accordingly, the suspect
ust be supplied with information only when that
ormation is necessary to make the suspect aware
his right to choose to remain silent.
In Oregon v. Elstad, supra, for example, the Co
+] laf , va 7~ sn. = ae
ejected the defendant’s claim tnat nls ME tTaANG
pjects of the proposea interros atior See. e.g.. / ited Stat
B 28 F.2d 140, 141 (2d Cir. 1984): United Stat \
i p30 F.2d 1210, 1212 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1976): 7 ted
States V. Campbell, 431 F.2d 97, 99 n.1 (9th Cir. 1970)
irts also have rejected arguments that the Miranda want
ngs should be supplementé d with other categories of inforn
tion. See, e.g., United States v. Contreras, 667 F.2d 976, 979
(llth Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 849 (1982): Harris \
R e, 551 F.2d 936, 938-939 (4th Cir.). cert. denied. 434
S. &4Y9 (1977): United State p yp] Place] 7 Illinaze 546
F.2d 1298, 1300 (7th Cir 1976): ted States Hall. 296
1 A] $45-846 (Ath (‘iy . 1, , 7s 012
GR
-
et CO LL LL LLL LLL LL CL LL LE EE
18
waiver was not fully informed because he had not
received an additional warning telling him that his
previous confession was inadmissible. The defendant
asserted that the additional information might have
affected his decision whether to assert his right to
remain silent. The Court stated that an additional
warning was “neither practicable nor constitution-
ally necessary,” and noted that it had “never em-
braced the theory that a defendant’s ignorance of thi
full consequences of his decisions vitiates their volun
tariness” (Oregon v. Elstad, slip op. 17).
The Court reached the same result in Moran v.
Burbine, supra, holding that a suspect need not be
inform ed of the fact that an attorney had telephoned
the police station to inquire about his case. It stated:
“No doubt the additional information would have
been useful to [the defendant] ; perhaps even it might
have affected his decision to confess. But we have
never read the Constitution to require that the police
supply a suspect with a flow of information to help
him calibrate his self interest in deciding whether to
=peak or stand by his rights” (slip op. 8).
This Court’s decisions in Elstad and Moran com-
pel the rejection of the Colorado Supreme Court’s
conclusion that a suspect must be aware of the sub-
jects of the proposed interrogation in order efiec
tively to waive his Miranda rights. An additional!
warning cannot be mandated on the ground that the
information would be useful to the suspect becausée
as this Court has made clear, “Miranda [does not}
require[] the police to inform a suspect of any and
all information that would be useful to a decision
whether to remain silent or speak with the police”
(Moran, slip op. 18 n.4). Whether a suspect pos
sesses such information accordingly is irrelevant i
assessing the validity of his Miranda waiver.
he Court’s decision in United States v. Was}
SUPTa, Provides additional Support for tnis ¢c
- a ; , ‘ane
sion. The defendant in Washington received t]
Miranda warnings prior to testifying before a grand
ry, but he argued that he also should have been tol4
at he was a potential defendant. The Court rejecte:
e claim that the Miranda warnings were inadequate
,
rotect tne ae fendant
s Fifth Amendment privilege
pserved that “‘[|e]ven in the presumed psycholo:
ercive atmosphere of police custodial inte
tion, J es not require that any ad
Cn Simply vecause tne sSuspe
(431 U.S. at t88). Since
f V1tn wfhlS informa I
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> Cast ere not required to supply re
I el li dal aqdaitiona nrtorma I f I
in 2 9110 Viranda Walvel
’ . . } . }
4 Expanding the scope or the Viranda
117 that « 968 - % _ j
requl. nat a Suspect be Iniormed in advance
e possible subiects of the interrogation is ut
anted for the additional reason that such a require
would dramatically alter the balance struck by
Court in Miranda with respect to the constit
nai constraints upon custodial interrogation. ‘
rt has recognized that “[e]ustodial interrogatio1
‘ate two competing concerns” (Moran, slip
| pat sé ‘th . an f : a. —_ 4: P
we lie needa To? police questioning as a
y . . °
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TILE © enrorcement of criminal iaWS Cannot mM
‘ . . ‘
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( ions 7 OUlit are } ore nan mere
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( e\ ire essentia! U Soc1levtV Ss ¢ I? f
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ea
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nas conciudaed tnat tne nterroga ! rocess 1S
h nt] , nda 7 t ,
erentiv coercive and al aS a cons lf f f
exists a substantial risk that the p ice Will inadve
tantlx + o« roy } . fy . lin | +x y ] or 4 ' + i>
tently traverse tne fine line petween iecitimate ¢
T slinit ‘ mwiI¢ Tat, na mn" titiyitinnall +? , y)
LO @11C1L AGMISSIONS and Constitutional! Im pe Ss f
compulsion” (Moran, slip op. 12).
rT 1, ‘ + a4 . 2 | ] } —— + :
rhe Court reconciled these interests in M
sé 7° Ao a : : :
ing that “[pl]olice questioning , | con-
in j form, * * * b nly if the
. ] . , ) _ ] 4+] 4 4 . ’
suspect clearly unaerstood tnat,. at an\ me, me
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bring the proceeding to a halt or, short of that, ca
an attorney to give advice and monitor the conduct of
his interrogators” (Moran. slip op. 12). By requiri
police officers to inform a suspect al
iatter of the interrogation solely because that infor-
mation is relevant to a suspect’s calculation of
own self-interest in waiving or standi: n his
vilege, the rule adopted by the court bel
“upset this [Court’s] carefully draw
manner that is both unnecessary for the
the Fifth Amendment privilege and
legitimate law enforcement” (Moran. slip on. 12-1
Moreover, the rationale underlvine such a rm
would be virtually limitless—extending to anv infor-
mation possessed by police officers that might b
relevant to the suspect’s calculation of his self-inte?
est. For example, the suspect’s decision to waive
his rights and consent to interrogation probabil
would be affected by the quality and quantity of in-
formation already possessed by the police concerning
the suspect’s involvement in the offense under investi-
if
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: ‘
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= . “
; " + " + _ . ; 448)
qisser ng i! i! [ ev. Michael ( , 442
4 ei ‘V , ’ ~
~*~ a (1 ; iy 4 . r y nas rne YT lf
lorming police and prosecutors tn specificity as
+ + | "
0 what they may do in conductine « istodial interro-
nts ) f . Lf
VaALION, ANG OT intorminge <« irts Ge] nat circum-
Stance State ) I ht 1? ) ’ y ry? OT} )
LA TICES SLALEMeENUS ODtalned s inverrogatiol
are not admissible’’).
The adoption by this Court of th Colorado Supreme
Court’s decision “would ha tne ine itahle ConSe-
quence of muddying Miranda’s otherwise relatively
clear waters” (Moran, slip op. 11). For example,
would the police be required to inform a suspect of
the conduct that is under investigation (@.g., “a kill-
ing’) or would they be required to list for the suspect
each of the actual charges that might possibly be
brought? A police officer’s suspicion with regard to
a particular offense could change in the course of an
interrogation as the suspect reYaled new information.
Would the officer be required to interrupt his ques-
tioning to advise the suspect that he now was under
suspicion for an additional offense? In addition, as
the dissenting justices on the Colorado Supreme Court
observed (Pet. App. 34C), “[p]Jrior to questioning a
suspect, the police may have insufficient information
to determine what charges will ultimately be filed
against him. The nature of the offense may depend
upon circumstances unknown to the police, such as
whether the suspect has a criminal record. It may
also turn upon an event yet to occur, such as whether
the victim of the crime dies.”
The uncertainty generated by the Colorado court’s
rule would not necessarily be confined to advising a
suspect of the criminal activity that would be the
subject of the interrogation. As we have discussed
(see pages 20-21, supra), the principle embraced by
the Colorado Supreme Court could be applied to re-
quire police officers to provide suspects with a range
of other information that might be viewed as relevant
to a suspect’s calculation of his self-interest in decid-
ing whether to waive his rights. A careful police of-
ficer therefore could no longer be sure that adminis-
tration of the Miranda warnings would provide the
predicate for a valid waiver. Instead, he would have
to examine the facts of each case to determine whether
23
a court might later conclude that some piece of in-
formation woula have been relevant to the suspect’s
decision. And a miscalculation in either direction
could prove costly: if he erred in failing to supply
the information, any confession he obtained would
have to be suppressed; if he erred on the side of cau-
tion, his action could needlessly discourage the mak-
ing of a statement and thwart successful investiga-
tion of a serious crime.
B. Respondent’s Waiver Of His Miranda Rights Was
Voluntary
The second aspect of the Miranda waiver inquiry
is whether “the relinquishment of the right [was]
voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a
free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation.
coercion or deception” (Moran, slip op. 7). The ques-
tion is whether the waiver was the product of an
“uncoerced choice” by the suspect (ibid.).
Nothing in the record in this case indicates that
respondent’s waiver was the result of physical or psy-
chological pressure. The trial court found that “there
was no element of duress or coercion used to induce
[respondent’s] statements on March 30, 1979” (Pet.
App. 3A), and neither of the two state appellate
courts questioned that determination. Respondent’s
waiver therefore was clearly voluntary. Cf. Moran,
slip op. 7."
'© Some courts have suggested that a waiver may not be
“voluntary” if the suspect is not aware of the subjects of the
proposed interrogation. See, e.g., Collins v. Brierly, 492 F.2d
at 739. However, the limitations upon a police officer’s obliga-
tion to provide information to a Suspect cannot be circum-
vented by the use of the “voluntariness” label; a waiver is
not rendered involuntary by a police officer’s failure to provide
24
Respondent intimates (Br. in Opp. 6) that his
waiver was the product of a “deliberate intent to mis-
lead [respondent] about the subject matter of the in-
terrogation.” In our view, nothing in the record sup-
ports the conclusion that the agents withheld informa-
tion about the topics of the proposed interrogation as
part of a deliberate effort to mislead respondent into
waiving his Fifth Amendment privilege. Even if re-
spondent were correct, however, that fact would not
vitiate his Miranda waiver.
Miranda provides that “any evidence that the ac-
cused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a
waiver wiil, of course, show that the defendant did
not voluntarily waive his privilege” (384 U.S. at
476). The Court similarly observed in Moran that a
waiver that is “the product of * * * intimidation,
coercion or deception” is involuntary (slip op. 7).
The context of each of these references to deception
and trickery indicates that deception can render a
Miranda waiver involuntary only when the deception
amounts to the equivalent of coercion, precluding the
suspect from making a free choice between waiving
and standing on his rights. As we have discussed,
that plainly was not the case here.
Police deception also would invalidate a waiver if
it “deprive[d] a defendant of knowledge essential to
his ability to understand the nature of his rights and
the consequences of abandoning them” (Moran, slip
op. 9). Thus, when the deception relates to the nature
of the rights discussed in the warnings—if, for ex-
ample, an officer tells a suspect that the suspect’s
a suspect with information that Miranda does not require the
officer to convey. See page 25, infra. The voluntariness
inquiry looks not to the extent of the suspect’s knowledge, but
to whether his choice was the product of coercion.
25
statement actually cannot be used against him
resulting waiver would be invalid.
However, when the deception concerns facts ex-
traneous to the information conveyed in the warn-
ings—and does not amount to the equivalent of coer-
cion—the deception cannot invalidate the suspect’s
waiver. In Moran, for example, the Court concluded
that even if the police officers deliberately withheld
from the defendant the fact that the defendant’s at-
torney had telephoned the police station, their conduct
did not constitute “the kind of ‘trick[ery]’ that can
vitiate the validity of a waiver’ (Moran. slip op. 9
(citation omitted) ). That is because the officers’ con-
duct did not affect the defendant’s awareness of the
information necessary to understand his rights—the
information conveyed in the Miranda warnings. See
ibid. (“‘ ‘deliberate or reckless’ withholding of infor-
mation * * * is only relevant to the constitutional
validity of a waiver if it deprives a defendant of
knowledge essential to his ability to understand his
rights and the consequences of abandoning them’’).
In the present case, the agents failed to supply
respondent with information—the topics of the pro-
posed interrogation—that Miranda did not require
them to provide. The limits upon a police officer’s
obligation to provide information to a suspect would
be meaningless if the failure to supply extraneous in-
formation could constitute deception that vitiates a
suspect’s waiver. Instead, because “respondent’s
voluntary decision to speak was made with full aware-
ness and comprehension of all the information
Miranda requires the police to convey, the waiverT]
[was] valid” (Moran, slip op. 9-10) .™
any
" Although this case concerns a situation in which the
claim of deception is based upon law enforcement officers’
26
For the foregoing reasons, it is clear that responc-
ent acted with an awareness of both the nature of his
privilege against compelled self-incrimination and the
consequences of waiving that privilege when he volun-
tarily waived his Miranda rights prior to the March
30 interview. Respondent’s waiver therefore was
valid and the Colorado Supreme Court erred in con-
cluding that Miranda required the suppression of
respondent’s voluntary statements.
Finally, to the extent that the lower court’s ruling
is based on due process considerations, the agents’
failure to provide information to a suspect, the same test
should apply in determining whether an affirmative misrepre-
sentation by a law enforcement officer undermined the validity
of a suspect’s waiver. For example, an affirmative misrepresen-
tation concerning the subjects of the proposed interrogation
would not vitiate a suspect’s waiver because it would affect
only the suspect’s calculation of his self-interest, and could
not affect his comprehension of his right to remain silent.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Forde, 466 N.E.2d 510, 511-
512 (Mass. 1984) (police officer’s false statement that the de-
fendant’s fingerprints had been found on dead body did not
vitiate Miranda waiver); State v. Woods, 117 Wis. 2d 701,
723-729, 345 N.W.2d 457, 468-471 (1984) (waiver not in-
validated by police officer’s misrepresentation of evidence
against defendant) ; 1 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Proce-
dure §6.9(c), at 528-529 (1984); but see White, Police
Trickery In Inducing Confessions, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 581,
611-614 (1979) (arguing that misrepresentation of the
charges under investigation should invalidate a Miranda
waiver). The basic constitutional standard governing police
interrogation techniques—the Due Process Clause—already
regulates the use of deception by police officers (see pages 27-
28, infra). Miranda should not be read to impose additional
restrictions upon the use of this interrogation technique by
police officers as long as the deception does not affect the
suspect’s ability to understand and act upon his right to de-
cline to answer a police officer’s questions.
pds ae a
failure to inform respondent of the crimes that would
be the subject of the interrogation plainly did not
deprive respondent of the fundamental fairness guar-
anteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The agents simply failed to provide re-
spondent with information that might have affected
his calculation of whether his self-interest weighed
in favor of making a voluntary statement. That con-
duct “falls short of the kind of misbehavior that so
shocks the sensibilities of civilized society as to war-
rant a federal intrusion into the criminal processes of
the States” (Moran, slip op. 19). In United States v.
Washington, supra, the defendant—in addition to
claiming a violation of Miranda—argued that it
would be “fundamentally unfair to elicit incriminat-
ing testimony from a potential defendant without
first informing him of his target status” because this
additional information would “alert the witness more
pointedly” and assist him in deciding whether to in-
voke his privilege against compelled self-incrimination
(431 U.S. at 190 n.6). The Court held that “Tt)his
line of argument simply restates respondent’s claims
under the Self-Incrimination Clause and is rejected
for the same reasons,” noting that there had been no
showing of “any governmental misconduct which
undermined the fairness of the proceedings” (ibid.).
The same conclusion is appropriate here.
Even if the police withheld information as part of
a plan to deceive respondent, their conduct would not
amount to a violation of due process. The Due Proc-
ess Clause does not prohibit all uses of deception in
connection with police interrogation. Frazier vy. Cupp,
394 U.S. 731, 737, 739 (1969); Miller v. Fenton, No.
83-5530 (3d Cir. June 26, 1986). slip op. 19-20; 1 W.
LaFave & J. Israel, supra, §6.2(c), at 446-447: see
2R
a
also Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 35 (1959) (potice
deception combined with other factors found to con-
stitute interrogation technique violative of due proc-
ess). The inquiry is whether the statements were ob-
tained by “ ‘techniques and methods offensive to’”’
fundamental fairness, under “circumstances in which
the suspect clearly had no opportunity to exercise ‘a
free and unconstrained will.’ ”’ Oregon v. Elstad, slip
op. 5 (citation omitted); see also Miller v. Fenton,
No. 84-5786 (Dec. 3, 1985), slip op. 5, 12. The trial
court in this case specifically found that respondent’s
statements were voluntary and not the product of 1m-
proper coercion (Pet. App. 3A), and there is no evi-
dence to the contrary. Therefore, the admission of
the statements into evidence is not barred by the Due
Process Clause.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Colorado
should be reversed with respect to the issue on which
this Court granted certiorari.
Respectfully submitted.
CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor General
STEPHEN 8S. TROTT
Assistant Attorney General
WILLIAM C. BRYSON
Deputy Solicitor General
ANDREW J. PINCUS
Assistant to the Solicitor General
JULY 1986
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