Opposition Brief — Absher v. United States
Supreme Court brief1987
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
rerwerewwrrs were eek
(y) yay: Gupreme Court, Us.
By L EILLED
No. 86-1312 :
r — APR 9-967
“JOSEPH F. SPANTOL, JR.
K
E
Inu the Supreme Court of the
OCTOBER TERM, 1986
CHARLES ROGER ABSHER, ET AL., PETITIONERS
Vv.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
IN OPPOSITION
CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor General
RICHARD K. WILLARD
Assistant Attorney General
GREGORY C. SISK
Attorney
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 633-2217
Ais Ft
”
’
°
a
e
\
\ :
: t
Z :
\
. s
—s ~e
7
’ :
A 2 © = z
Z
1
| "
‘
: : |
Kin :
\ 2 |
;
2
“
‘
as : :
é.
\
3 {
.
;
‘ :
/
aa G
° |
se |
4 ¢ be ie 3 | :
g
, : ?
. |
A | |
| .
| ‘
a
. ! 3
“ : i |
re 3
2
\
x :
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether disabled veterans who have retired from the
uniformed services are denied equal protection because
they are not permitted to receive both full retirement pay
and full veterans disability benefits, whereas retirees under
the civil service system are not required to waive a portion
of their civil service annuity in order to receive veterans
disability benefits.
(I)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
SE noc as pcweassebeecae va eei et evee+s l
ES SE a a a a Cee a near I
Statutory provisions involved .................20.- l
eee Baka bd Ck 6 kN 5 6 6p A668 6 oe ROS BREE S 2
cca cc ed sha s AO00 S05 ic 61 RN OOS Cowwes 4
i ee eae keene eu bans hes oh ae 6S 0s 9
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Bowen v. Owens, No. 84-1905 ,
a eer eee eee eT eee ee 4
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc., No. 84-468 (July 1, 1985) ............. 4,7
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603
ee aos he bbe heads bowee ee 4,5
Mathews v. DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181
ea eg kk os 0d ek abe bbawe 4
McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210
ETE EES TE: EE a a a 7
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 .
RUT USE Te a eae: ore oe 4
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78
eee cee waa eat coencenes 4
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Se 6 re 7
United States Railroad Retirement Board v.
Preis, S09 U.S. TGS (ISSR) owns cece sccae 4,5,7,9
(111)
IV
Page
Cases—Continued:
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93
FUSPOR c0b 0sssbsbscusewunaeeaT riers es 4-5, 7
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749
SR nr er oy Pr a te 4
Constitution, statutes and regulations: Ps
U.S. Const. :
P,P Pee re rae ee Tre 3
Amend. XIV (Equal Protection
= ee a eee Pr eee 4,7
Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 548, § 1,
SE Ee ee ee eee 2
Act of May 27, 1944, ch. 209, 58 Stat.
RE rT eee CT eT EET TTEe 2
Federal Employees’ Retirement System Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-335, 100 Stat. 514
et seq. :
§ 101(a):
100 Stat. 523 (to be codified at |
PF eae I iii e tons 4s cdeeaeee 6
100 Stat. 523, 536-537 (to be
codified at 5 U.S.C. 8411(c)(1)(B),
2) |) ) ee eee 6
Fa EEE acs taencastndedaewance as 6
Pa EE hie 65-0 0-0 bd Nn d bed Mo dEE OSS OO 6
2 ee ED 6-5b 20 o5 ew ceed ncwehanaces 6
pk oe ee eeeerrrorry reer rer rer 5
Page
Constitution, statutes and regulations—Continued:
> Uae GE Be. BEEP SRM) sic ciccckdawecses 6
$US:C-8336(a) ...... 6
I ooo so rs vnc ceeud nein 6
SAN es ei siovcncke essa deeae 6
ee ee ae Pre a ree 2, 5-6
es i a ay als wands 5-6
10 U.S.C. (& Supp. Ill) 6321 et seg. .........05- 2
OO oe aa a ous 6
Re Ab as Serer i eisnies 6
gts we OF errr rere err er ry ere 2,6
re ie ia ands is) aces vinden 6
14 U.S.C. (& Supp. III) 288-294 ............... 2
MUAE Se ci i as 6
rubles © 5... Serpe enna 2
66 01 I oi ik sb cvciceniviccis 6
ik foe | ee ere 2
TEP tae Se er ety 2
14 UB ls TO a Bocce cee 2
SE id hs ves crea deeees 2
es ee hice 2
Se a aso eo bales ae 2
ie ee ae ae me
USC Ge. TS od koe 2
Vi
Page
Constitution, statutes and regulations—Continued:
38 U.S.C. (& Supp. IIT) 301 ef seg. ..........5-. 2
38 U.S.C. (@ Supp. UT) S14 ow cc cccccccccccces 2
SB US Sir rere ccccchsnstasosecssesssece 2
Fe UES. BIRO cesccccevccccesssccvcetape 2, 3,9
TE UBL. SIGE) cc cccvccccccsccesssccsess l
BS UBS SOD che cccececicccicectecnens 1,2,3,9
BB UB. FRR co ccccccccnccavccsceseecse l
42 U.S.C. (@& Supp. TH) 212 2... cccccccscdccees 2
42 U.S.C. (& Supp. IIT) 212(a) ............4-4-. 6
Pat ee errr er rr rrr TT rr 6
Army Reg. :
Reg. 30-19, App. B (July 1,
SN en.6decedad nes dees ktnocnenesedues 6
Reg. 215-2, ch. 2 (Mar. 6,
Pn dc ibisitaades ins es 0keese be eenes 6
Reg. 60-20, YF 2-9 (Aug. 1,
8 SCPE E PCT TT LEN TELE OTe Tee 6
Reg. 40-3, FF 4-11 (Feb. 15
SED a as vane bkes detacschsaupneecepen’ 6
Miscellaneous:
21 Cong. Rec. (1890):
Ol TPE ce cccccccccasnnesseniesenece 8
SE EY. 60.06 6s.00ccsccesavceucouned’ 8
22 Cong. Rec. (1891):
i BO isa. choosecsscececcsumaaeeaneens 8
Vil
Page
Miscellaneous— Continued:
H.R. 722, 95th Cong., Ist Sess.
PE pac GdaeabOCPENEEES R64 e Sceccecaeues 9
H.R. 823, 96th Cong., Ist Sess.
2 RPE re pg ag SOU OTTTTT TT 9
H.R. 2141, 97th Cong., Ist Sess.
CRED ccdeddvedto neue subs he's 00000 bcbekeees 9
H.R. 517, 97th Cong., Ist Sess.
EARS eo er ey pone
H.R. 325, 98th Cong., Ist Sess.
SRE CRaGACAD EU OEPEN eR bos ceccbedeeeaseus 9
H.R. 468, 98th Cong., Ist Sess.
dice eek Eee cabins thet ones s6s460% 9
H.R. 867, 99th Cong., Ist Sess.
EE Had Kone SawESUASURS Occ cévcccccoseses 9
H.R. 1366, 99th Cong., Ist Sess.
CRUSE scastivcné S REN neaeeneees haasee 9
Office of the Actuary, Defense Manpower
Data Center, FY 1983 Defense Statistical
Report on the Military Retirement
GG Soc desc cccceseciccdcccctccese ©
S. 1907, 96th Cong., Ist Sess.
CR buck dined se ewkGedbesscccccenvcesncasus 9
In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1986
e No. 86-1312
CHARLES ROGER ABSHER, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-5Sa) is
reported at 805 F.2d 1025. The opinion of the Claims Court
(Pet. App. 6a-15a) is reported at 9 Cl. Ct. 223.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
November 14, 1986. The petition for a writ of certiorari was
filed on February 10, 1987. The jurisdiction of this Court is
invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
38 U.S.C. 3104(a)(1) (misidentified as 38 U.S.C.
3704(a)(1)) and 38 U.S.C. 3105 are reprinted at Pet. 2.
(1)
2
STATEMENT
1. Veterans who have served in the uniformed services
for a period of twenty years or more are generally entitled to
retirement pay from their respective services. See 10 U.S.C.
3911 et seq. (Army); 10 U.S.C. (& Supp. III) 6321 et seq.
(Navy and Marines); 10 U.S.C. 8911 et seq. (Air Force); 14
U.S.C. (& Supp. II]) 288-294, 14 U.S.C. (Supp. IID) 353-
355, 362, 421, 423-424 (Coast Guard); 33 U.S.C. (Supp. IIT)
853g, 33 U.S.C. 853k, 853/, 33 U.S.C. (& Supp. III) 8530
(National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion); 42 U.S.C. (& Supp. III) 212 (Public Health Service).
Retirement pay is taxed as ordinary income. Veterans with
a service-related disability may also qualify for disability
compensation and pensions administered by the Veterans
Administration (VA). 38 U.S.C. (& Supp. III) 301 et seq.
These VA benefits vary according to the degree of the
disability, without regard to rank or length of service (38
U.S.C. (& Supp. III) 314). They are exempt from taxation
(38 U.S.C. 3101; 26 U.S.C. 104(a)(4)).
Retired veterans may not, however, receive both full
retirement pay-and disability benefits (38 U.S.C. 3104).
Such dual payments have been expressly prohibited since
1891, originally by a flat ban on retirees receiving any
disability benefits at all (Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 548, § 1, 26
Stat. 1082). Starting in 1944, however, Congress permitted
retirees to waive an amount of retirement pay equal to the
amount they are eligible to receive in disability benefits, Act
of May 27, 1944, ch. 209, 58 Stat. 230 et seq. (currently
codified at 38 U.S.C. 3105), so that retirees may receive the
full benefit of the tax-exempt status of their disability
benefits.
2. Petitioners are 2,048 disabled military retirees. They
challenged the constitutionality of 38 U.S.C. 3104 and 3105
in the Claims Court, contending that the ban on dual com-
pensation and its accompanying waiver requirement violate
3
the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment
because civil service retirees who also qualify for VA dis-
ability benefits are not required to waive a portion of their
civil service annuities in order to receive the VA benefits.
Petitioners sought the amount of back retirement pay they
had waived during the six years preceding the filing of their
complaint.
The Claims Court (Pet. App. 6a-15a) granted summary
judgment for the United States. The court held that the
prohibition on dual compensation in 38 U.S.C. 3104 and
the waiver provision of 38 U.S.C. 3105 together serve the
legitimate objectives of limiting public spending and plac-
ing a ceiling on the amount of compensation received as a
result of uniformed service (Pet. App. 12a-13a). Moreover,
the court held, Congress has pursued these objectives in a
rational manner. The court rejected petitioners’ contention
that there is no rational distinction between military retirees
and other federal employees who are not required to waive
their annuities in order to receive VA disability benefits (id.
at 13a-14a). Pointing to the “preferential treatment deserved-
ly provided retirees of the uniformed services”—including
the young age at which military personnel can retire and
numerous “commissary, recreational, travel and health
benefits in addition to their retired pay”—the court con-
cluded that these special benefits provided “a rational basis
for limiting the amount of compensation [petitioners]
receive” (ibid.). Putting the point another way, the court
held that “(t]he special benefits accorded retirees of the
uniformed services are such that this class of individuals is
not situated similarly to other groups that are not required
to waive retirement pay to receive tax-free VA benefits” (id.
at 14a).
The court of appeals affirmed (Pet. App. la-Sa). It agreed
with the Claims Court that the legislative decision to limit
the compensation received by uniformed services retirees,
4
while permitting them to take full advantage of the tax-
exempt VA disability benefits, is “the type of balance Con-
gress is entitled to strike” (id. at 4a). And the court found
the differences between civil service retirement and military
retirement more than sufficient to explain the disparate
treatment of the two groups of retirees. The court con-
cluded that “[t]he balance [Congress] has thus struck is not
only rational, it also bears a demonstrably fair and substan-
tial relation to legitimate legislative objectives” (id. at Sa).
ARGUMENT
The decision of the court of appeals is correct. It does not
conflict with any decision of this Court or of any other court
of appeals. To the contrary, it is consistent with a long line
of decisions rejecting attempts to use the Equal Protection
Clause to obtain greater benefits than Congress has chosen
to provide under a particular program. E.g., Bowen v.
Owens, No. 84-1905 (May 19, 1986); United States Rail-
road Retirement Board vy. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980):
Mathews v. DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976); Weinberger v.
Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S.
78 (1971); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960). No
further review is warranted.
1. To establish a denial of equal protection, a plaintiff
group must make a two-part showing. First, it must show
disparate treatment: it must identify a similarly situated
group and show that it is being treated less favorably than
that group. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc., No. 84-468 (July 1, 1985), slip op. 6; Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 216 (1982). Second, it must show that there is no
justification for the disparity; where, as here, no “suspect
classification” or “fundamental interest” is involved, the
test is whether the difference in treatment “is so unrelated to
the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes
that [the Court] can only conclude that the legislature’s
actions were irrational.” Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97
ee ce
2
(1979). See also United States Railroad Retirement Board
v. Fritz, 449 U.S. at 174-176; Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S.
at 611.
2. Petitioner’s showing here falls far short. The bundle of
retirement benefits for uniformed service personnel evolved
separately, and differs in many respects, from the bundle of
benefits for civil service personnel. Military retirement
benefits are tailored to Congress’s perception of what is
needed to attract qualified personnel, to ensure dedicated
service and an orderly pattern of promotion, and to provide
suitably for retirement. Cf. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. at
109 (“The Foreign Service retirement system and the Civil
Service retirement system are packages of benefits, require-
ments, and restrictions serving many different purposes.”).
Petitioners offer no reason whatever to conclude that mil-
itary and civil service personnel must be treated identically,
or that each group is constitutionally entitled to the benefit
of any provision enjoyed by the other. Cf. id. at 98-102
(rejecting equal protection challenge to mandatory retire-
ment age in Foreign Service).
a. The dual benefits provision cannot be viewed in isola-
tion. The military retirement system differs in numerous
respects from the civil service retirement system, offering
substantial advantages to military personnel that are not
enjoyed by their counterparts in the civil service. Three
examples will illustrate. First, uniformed services personnel
make no contribution to any retirement fund. Civil service
personnel, by contrast, must make regular contributions to
their retirement fund of up to 7% of their salaries. 5 U.S.C.
8334(a)(1).! Second, uniformed services personnel gener-
ally may retire after 20 years of servite, regardless of age. 10
1A disabled veteran who enters the civil service does not evade the
employee-contribution requirement. If he wishes civil service retire-
ment credit for his years of military service he usually must (a) forfeit
any uniformed services retired pay to which he would otherwise be
6
U.S.C. 3911, 3914 (Army); 10 U.S.C. 6323, 6327 (Navy and
Marines); 10 U.S.C. 8911, 8914 (Air Force); 14 U.S.C. 291,
14 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 355 (Coast Guard); 33 U.S.C. 853/
(National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion); 42 U.S.C. (& Supp. III) 212(a) (Public Health Ser-
vice). The average age of enlisted personnel at retirement is
42, and officers on average retire at 46 (Pet. App. 14a; Office
of the Actuary, Defense Manpower Data Center, FY 1983
Defense Statistical Report on the Military Retirement Sys-
tem 91 (1984)). Civil service personnel, by contrast, must
generally wait until age 62 to retire and receive benefits. 5
U.S.C. 8338(a).2 Third, in addition to retired pay, uni-
formed service retirees also receive commissary, recrea-
tional, travel, and health benefits not available to civil
service retirees. See, e.g., Army Reg. 40-3, 4 4-11 (Feb. 15,
1985) (medical services); id. at 60-20, JY 2-9 (Aug. 1, 1984) |
(exchange privileges); id. at 30-19, App. B (July 1, 1980)
(commissary privileges); id. at 215-2, ch. 2 (Mar. 6, 1984)
(recreational privileges).
b. Congress, weighing the needs of the military services,
established a package of retirement benefits to meet those
needs. Differences between that package and the benefits
afforded to other government personnel do not violate the
entitled, 5 U.S.C. 8332(c)(2); Pub. L. No. 99-335, § 101(a), 100 Stat. 523
(to be codified at 5 U.S.C. 8411(c)(2)), and (b) make a contribution to
the civil service retirement fund of either 7% or 3% for each year of
military service performed after December 31, 1956, depending upon
whether he is subject to the Civil Service Retirement System (5 U.S.C.
8332(c)(1)(B) and (j)(2}(A); 5 U.S.C. (& Supp. II]) 8334(j); 5 C.F.R.
831.301(b)), or the new Federal Employees’ Retirement System (Pub.
L. No. 99-335, $ 101(a), 100 Stat. 523, 536-537 (to be codified at 5
U.S.C. 8411(c)(1)(B), 8422(e))).
?There are, however, special provisions that permit a civil service
employee with 30 years of service to retire at age 55 (5 U.S.C. 8336(a)),
or with 20 years of service at age 60 (5 U.S.C. 8336(b)).
7
Equal Protection Clause unless “natently arbitrary or irra-
tional.” United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz,
449 U.S. at 177; see Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. at 96-97;
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 40 (1973); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc., slip op. 6.
For example, in Vance v. Bradley, supra, a group of
Foreign Service employees challenged a requirement that
they retire at age 60 as a violation of equal protection
because civil service employees are not subject to the same
requirement. This Court noted that the age limit could not
be struck down on this ground unless the cap was shown not
to be rationally related “to the achievement of any combina-
tion of legitimate purposes.” 440 U.S. at 97. The Court
found that the objectives of stimulating superior perfor-
mance in the Foreign Service by assuring that opportunities
for promotion are available, and ensuring that Foreign
Service personnel are up to the rigors of overseas duty,
provide ample justification for having a mandatory retire-
ment age in the Foreign Service.
Similarly, a retirement system for the uniformed services
that requires no employee contributions and permits early
retirement but does not allow dual payments clearly bears a
rational relationship to the needs of the uniformed services.
As this Court explained in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S.
210, 212-213 (1981) (footnotes and citations omitted):
The impetus for [the enactment of a military retire-
ment system during the Civil War] was the need to
encourage or force the retirement of officers who were
not fit for wartime duty. Thus, from its inception, the
military nondisability retirement system has been “as
much a personnel management tool as an income
maintenance method,” the system was and is designed
not only to provide for retired officers, but also to
ensure a “young and vigorous” military force, to create
8
an orderly pattern of promotion, and to serve as a
recruiting and re-enlistment inducement.
In keeping with these purposes, Congress has crafted a
retirement program for members of the uniformed services
that imposes no burden on current income and that encour-
ages both enlistment and early retirement by permitting
retirement after 20 years of service with a lifetime annuity
and substantial post-retirement in-kind benefits. In this
way, the needs for “a ‘young and vigorous’ military force
[and] an orderly pattern of promotion” are served. Having
crafted such a package of retirement benefits for uniformed
service employees, Congress obviously could decide to save
money and keep benefits at what it thought an appropriate
level by denying a pro tanto portion of retirement pay to
uniformed service retirees who are also receiving VA dis-
ability benefits, without at the same time denying dual
benefits to civil service retirees, whose retirement fund
comes in part from their own mandatory contributions and
who will generally have been required to serve to a greater
age. To hold otherwise would expose virtually every provi-
sion for compensation or benefits to any class of govern-
ment employees—and much else besides—to judicial scru-
tiny for comparability to some other provision affecting
some other class.
The debates on the ban on dual compensation evinced a
concern with the rising cost of military pensions and a belief
that dual compensation was excessive and improper. 21
Cong. Rec. 8507-8508, 8509-8522 (1890); 22 Cong. Rec.
134, 2191-2192 (1891). These were legitimate concerns then
and they are legitimate concerns now, especially when
viewed in light of the various special advantages of military
retirement.
Congress could, of course, have provided more gener-
ously for uniformed service retirees. In just the past ten
years, in fact, more than twenty bills have been introduced
9
to amend 38 U.S.C. 3104 and 3105, but none has been
enacted. See, e.g., H.R. 867, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985);
H.R. 1366, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985); H.R. 325, 98th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1983); H.R. 468, 98th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1983); S. 783, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981); H.R. 517, 97th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1981); H.R. 2141, 97th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1981); S. 1907, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979); H.R. 823, 96th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1979); H.R. 722, 95th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1977). See also Pet. App. 14a-15a. As this Court said in
rejecting a similar attempt to win in this Court what a group
of retirees had failed to win in Congress, “[t]o be sure, [the
retiree] lost a political battle in which he had a strong
interest, but this is neither the first nor the last time that
such a result will occur in the legislative forum.” United
States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz,449 U.S. at 179.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
CHARLES FRIED
Solicitor General
RICHARD K. WILLARD
Assistant Attorney General
GrReEGorY C. SISK
Attorney
APRIL 1987
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.