Reply Brief — City of Irvine v. County of Orange
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Supreme Court, U.S,
i" FILED
fact 4
No. 86-1305 «MAR RE 96F
SOSKRH ESPANOL,
CLERK =
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1986
THE CITY OF IRVINE,
Petitioner,
vs.
COUNTY OF ORANGE, et al.,
Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF
AND SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX
McDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY
JOHN E. McDERMOTT’
ERICH R. LUSCHEI
Suite 600
2049 Century Park East
Los Angeles, CA 90067
(213) 2774110
Attorneys for Petitioner
*(Counsel of Record)
Lawyers Brief Service / Legal Publishers / (213) 383-4457 / (714) 720-1510
pe
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Fe I Re I He birsickceis de ctdarsitenccnsastuscessnasiviencs ii
I. RESPONDENTS’ RELIANCE ON NAACP
Wf get) i se” ig BS @ 4 0 SE l
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA,
PRR cenet PRUNE Bly BUD snssivassisnsnscacsndsassnestionseses A-1
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Legal Aid Society of Alameda County v. Dunlop
GIS FAG SB CO Cee Pee iitsteeetiereeacsasi 3
NAACP v. New York
SiS WB. BRS: CE ae siicrciassnatdesrnencneten: i 2
United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald
4352 US. SF COR ee coi attatsirenttacnenaia eects 3
Federal Statutes
28 UB. & GBF acc ccinciscceatenoaecnneanemaeeanaumeaind ante 3
Rules
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 24 .......0..........00.. io
supreme Conant Tae DAG sicseissiencctsnssadscsboniacincsnnssmermcnnacs 3
peng Chaart Te SIRF ssiicactiscasn secon dernansnescsevdsaaisesors 3
——_ ™
No. 86-1305
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term 1986
THE CITY OF IRVINE,
Petitioner,
VS.
COUNTY OF ORANGE, et al.,
Respondents.
PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF
AND SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX
I. RESPONDENTS’ RELIANCE ON NAACP
V. NEW YORK IS MISPLACED
On the timeliness of Irvine’s motion to intervene,
respondents contend that the lower court rulings in this
case fall squarely within the parameters of NAACP v. New
York, 413 U.S. 345 (1973). Nothing could be furtner from
the truth. This case presents distinct facts from NAACP
which have not been addressed definitively by this or any
other court and warrant review by this Court to clarify the
construction and application of Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 24.
When this litigation began, it was only about the
expansion of John Wayne Airport. El Toro MCAS was not
in any way the subject of the lawsuit, nor was the County’s
resilution opposing commercial use of El Toro MCAS.
Irvine, relying on that resolution, felt comfortable that its
sister city Newport Beach would adequately protect its
interests in the John Wayne Airport litigation.
Under respondents’ reading of NAACP, Irvine should
have known that this litigation might be settled and should
have taken affirmative steps to protect its interests. But
settled in what manner? Irvine may have had reason to
expect that litigation affecting the expansion of John
Wayne Airport, which is all that the County’s suit was
about, could be settled. Yet it never imagined, nor had any
reason to suppose, that the litigation might be settled on the
condition that the County of Orange repeal a resolution
Opposing commercial development of El Toro MCAS, an
entirely separate airport which never was the subject of the
County’s suit. Expecting Irvine to anticipate such an
outcome is not only unreasonable but would turn NAACP
on its ear and produce a harsh and unfair result never
intended by this Court in NAACP.
Denial of Irvine’s motion to intervene for lack of
timeliness also punishes the wrong party. It rewards the
County for its failure, either in its complaint or prior to the
Settlement Agreement, to notify the one party most
affected by the repeal of its resolution opposing commercial
use of El Toro — The City of Irvine, in whose sphere of
interest El Toro is located. It punishes Irvine for its reliance
on the County’s complaint and the County’s resolution
opposing commercial use of El Toro MCAS.
NAACP is simply not applicable because the terms of the
consent decree there did not exceed the issues raised by the
complaint. The only equitable solution to the application of
the timeliness standard to motions to intervene is that the
complaint should govern the scope of the issues Irvine
should have known might be settled. As to any other issues,
timeliness should be judged according to “when the
intervenor became aware that its interest would no longer
be protected by the parties.” Legal Aid Society of Alameda
County v. Dunlop, 618 F.2d 48, 50 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing
United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 394
(1977)).
In this case, the complaint makes no mention of El Toro
MCAS; it concerns itself solely with the proposed expansion
of John Wayne Airport. See Petitioner’s Reply Brief,
Second Supplemental Appendix. The record is clear that,
notwithstanding publicity about the possibility of
settlement, Irvine did not learn of the repeal of the
County’s resolution opposing commercial use of El Toro
until the settlement was announced, at which point it acted
expeditiously to intervene. The Court should accept this
case for hearing because of the lack of clarity about the
scope of NAACP, the need to harmonize its decisions in
NAACP and McDonald and to resolve an important dispute
over the correct construction and interpretation of Fed. R.
Civ. P., Rule 24.!
| For these same reasons, respondents’ request for sanctions pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and Supreme Court Rules 49.2 and 50.7 is wholly
inappropriate. Those provisions only apply to frivolous appeals.
Respondents’ characterization of Irvine’s inferences regarding the
County’s intentions toward El Toro MCAS is intemperate (Respondent's
Brief at 7 n.3), has nothing to do with the issue of timeliness which is the
subject of this petition and thus is not a basis for an award of sanctions.
Irvine made no “misrepresentations,” only its own inferences and
opinions which counsel made clear to the Court were inferences in a
letter following the petition. Respondents’ Brief, Supplemental Appendix
at 26a. Irvine continues to believe those inferences are fair to make in
view of the County’s failure even to notify or consult with Irvine before
rescindng its resolution opposing commercial use of El Toro.
NAACP is distinguishable in another respect. Had
intervention been permitted in NAACP, a city election
would have been affected. 413 U.S. at 368-69. No such
palpable prejudice is present here. Irvine merely wishes to
be placed in the same position it would have been in had the
County been straightforward from the outset about its
intention regarding El Toro, or advised Irvine before the
Settlement Agreement that it was considering the repeal of
its resolution Opposing commercial use of El Toro.
Dated: March 12, 1987
Respectfully Submitted,
McDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY
JOHN E. McDERMOTT
(Counsel of Record)
ERICH R. LUSCHEI
APPENDIX A
a et ee
Gatzke, Lodge & Mispagel
Michael Scott Gatzke*
Mark J. Dillon
2890 Pio Pi.» Drive, Ste. E
P.O. Box 1636
Carlsbad, CA 92088
(619)-729-2304
*A Professional Corporation
Adrian Kuyper, County Counsel
Daniel J. Didier, Deputy County Counsel
Office of the County Counsel
10 Civic Center Plaza
P. O. Box 1379
Santa Ana, California 92702
(714) 834-3300
Attorneys for Plaintiff, the County of Orange
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
No. CV 85-1542 TJH (MCx)
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
FILED
March 15, 1985
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
BY DEPUTY
a o.oo
COUNTY OF ORANGE,
Plaintiff,
v.
AIR CALIFORNIA, AMERICAN AIRLINES,
AMERICA WEST AIRLINES, CONTINENTAL AIR
LINES, INC., FRONTIER AIRLINES, INC., JET
AMERICA, PACIFIC SOUTHWEST AIRLINES,
REPUBLIC AIRLINES, INC., WESTERN AIR
LINES, INC., ALASKA AIRLINES, INC., MUSE
AIR CORPORATION, TRANS WORLD AIRLINES,
INC., UNITED AIRLINES, INC., FEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, McDONNELL
DOUGLAS CORPORATION, CITY OF NEWPORT
BEACH, STOP POLLUTING OUR NEWPORT
CORPORATION, AIRPORT WORKING GROUP
OF ORANGE COUNTY, INC., DOES 1 THROUGH
1,000, INCLUSIVE,
Defendants
Amending its Complaint as a matter of right, Plaintiff,
the County of Orange, a political subdivision of the State of
California, for its First Amended Complaint (“Complaint”),
alleges:
NATURE OF THE CASE,
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1. This is an action for declaratory relief in respect of
controversies arising under the United States Constitution
(the Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, cl. 2; and the Commerce
Clause, Art. I, §8, cl. 3); the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
as amended, 49 U.S.C. §1301 et seq. (including amend-
ments made by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978); the
Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, former 49
on
U.S.C. §1701 et seq.; the Aviation Safety and Noise
Abatement Act of 1979, 49 U.S.C. §2101 et seq.; the
Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, 49 U.S.C.
§2201 et seqg.; the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (“NEPA”), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §4321 et seq.; and
regulations and orders of the Federal Aviation administra-
tion in implementation and enforcement of those acts.
Plaintiff is the proprietor of John Wayne Airport, Orange
County (“JWA”), a commercial air carrier airport located
in Orange county. As alleged below, plaintiff has recently
taken a series of discretionary legislative actions in respect
of use and regulation of john Wayne Airport. These actions
have created substantial interrelated controversies between
and among the parties. A prompt judicial resolution of all
of these controversies is necessary to allow the plaintiff to
discharge promptly and efficiently its public responsibilities
as the proprietor of JWA. These inevitably interrelated
controversies are complex, and this action is brought to
afford all interested and affected parties an opportunity to
litigate their respective and related claims in a single forum.
2. Jurisdiction of this Court is proper by virtue of 28
U.S.C. §1331, because this is a civil action arising under the
Constitution and the laws of the United States; and under
28 U.S.C. §1337 because this action arises under Acts of
Congress regulating commerce.
3. Plaintiff additionally invokes the pendent (and
ancillary) jurisdiction of this Court in respect of related
state law claims under the California Environmental
Quality Act (Public Resources Code §21000 ef seq.
(“CEQA”), and the implementing regulations, the State
CEQA Guidelines (14 Cal.Admin.Code §15000 ef seq.
(“the Guidelines”}). These State law claims are inevitably
related to, and affected by the federal issues rasied in this
complaint. The exercise of pendent jurisdiction by this
Court is necessary to afford complete relief among the
parties and to avoid a multiplicity of actions which would
otherwise threaten plaintiff with potentially inconsistent
adjudications of related issues, and the possible imposition
of inconsistent obligations on plaintiff.
4. Venue is proper in this District by virtue of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b), in that the cause of action arose in this District.
5S. The relief sought in this action is a declaratory
judgment under 28 U.S.C. §§2201 and 2202, declaring the
rights, obligations and legal relations of the parties which
are in controversy; and such preliminary and permanent
injunctive relief and orders as may be necessary to permit a
meaningful and complete adjudication of the issues, and the
enforcement of the decisions of this Court.
THE PARTIES
The Plaintiff.
6. Plaintiff, the County of Orange (‘the County”), is a
political subdivision of the State of California. Under the
authority of California law, the County is the proprietor
and landlord of John Wayne Airport, Orange County
(“IJWA”’).
The Airline Defendants.
The ‘‘Authorized Air Carriers”
7. The County is informed and believes, and on that
ground alleges that defendant Air California (“AirCal”) is a
a
corporation, and a federally certificated air carrier
authorized to do business in the State of California.
8. The County is informed and believes, and on that
ground alleges that defendant American Airlines, Inc.
(“‘American’’) is a corporation, and a federally certificated
air carrier authorized to do business in the State of
California.
9. The County is informed and believes, and on that
ground alleges that defendant America West Airlines,
(‘America West”) is a corporation, and a federally
certificated air carrier authorized to do business in the State
of California.
10. The County is informed and believes, and on that
ground alleges that defendant Continental Air Lines, Inc.
(“Continental”) is a corporation, and a federally certificated
air carrier authorized to do business in the State of
California.
11. The County is informed and believes, and on that
ground alleges that defendant Frontier Airlines, Inc.
(‘‘Frontier’’) is a corporation, and a federally certificated air
carrier authorized to do business in the State of California.
12. The County is informed and believes, and on that
ground alleges that defendant Jet America (“Jet America’’)
is a corporation, and a federally certificated air carrier
authorized to do business in the State of California.
13. The County is informed and believes, and on that
ground alleges that defendant Pacific Southwest Airlines
(‘‘PSA”’) is a corporation, and a federally certificated air
carrier authorized to do business in the State of California.
14. The County is informed and believes, and on that
ground alleges that defendant Republic Airlines, Inc.
(“Republic”) is a corporation, and a federally certificated
air carrier authorized to do business in the State of
California.
15. The County is informed and believes, and on that
ground alleges that defendant Western Air Lines, Inc.
(‘‘Western”’) is a corporation, and a federally certificated air
carrier authorized to do business in the State of California.
16. AirCal, American, Frontier, PSA, Republic and
Western are currently regulated commercial operators
authorized by the County to do business at JWA. By action
on February 26, 1985, the County Board of Supervisors
authorized its staff to negotiate operating agreements,
leases, or any other necessary documents with America
West, Continental and Jet America for regulated commer-
cial service at JWA. None of these defendants have
consented to be named in this action. In the remainder of
this complaint, these nine defendants are _ occasion-
ally referred to collectively as ‘the Authorized Air
Carriers.” America West, Continental and Jet America are
occasionally referred to collectively as “the New Entrant
Air Carriers.”
The “Waiting List Air Carriers”
17. The County is informed and believes, and on that
ground alleges that defendant Alaska Airlines, Inc.
(“‘Alaska”’) is a corporation, and a federally certificated air
carrier authorized to do business in the State of California.
18. The County is informed and believes, and on that
ground alleges that defendant Muse Air Corporation
(“‘Muse”) is a corporation, and a federally certificated air
carrier authorized to do business in the State of California.
19. The County is informed and believes, and on that
ground alleges that defendant Trans World Airlines, Inc.
(“TWA”) is a corporation, and a federally certificated air
carrier authorized to do business in the State of California.
anne fio § mute
20. The County is informed and believes, and on that
ground alleges that defendant United Airlines, Inc.
(“United”) is a corporation, and a federally certificated air
carrier authorized to do business in the State of California.
21. Alaska, Muse, TWA and United are potential
regulated commercial operators which have requested
permission to commence operations at JWA. Pursuant to
County policy and regulation, these carriers have been
placed on a waiting list from which new air carriers may be
selected to commence operations at JWA under certain
circumstances and conditions. They are not currently
authorized to engage in scheduled operations at JWA. In
the remainder of this complaint, these four defendants are
occasionally referred to collectively as “the Waiting List
Air Carriers.”
Other Defendants.
22. The Federal Aviation Administration (““FAA”’) is an
agency of the United States Department of Transportation
(“DOT”). Pursuant to direct statutory authority and
regulatory delegation by DOT, FAA has extensive
regulatory authority over various civil aviation matters in
the United States by virtue of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §1301 et seq. (“the 1958 Act”),
and Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations. FAA has
not consented to be named as a party to this action.
23. The County is informed and believes, and on that
ground alleges that defendant McDonnell Douglas Corpo-
ration (“MDC”) is a corporation which, among other
things, engages in the manufacture and sale of commercial
aircraft, including the McDonnell Douglas MD-80 and
related versions of the MD-80 aircraft.
24. The City of Newport Beach (‘“‘Newport Beach” or
“the City’’) is a municipal corporation under the laws of the
State of California, and is located within the County of
Orange, California in an area generally to the south of
IWA.
25. Stop Polluting Our Newport Corporation (“SPON”)
is a California corporation. The Plainti‘f is informed and
believes, and on that ground alleges that SPON purports to
represent persons residing in Newport Beach in expressing
their views concerning various local environmental matters,
including environmental issues relating to JWA.
26. The County is informed and believes, and on that
ground alleges that Airport Working Group of Orange
County, Inc. (“AWG”) is a California corporation; that
AWG is a coalition of various organizations generally
opposed to any increase in operations at JWA or other
expansion of the airport; and that these groups and
organizations represent various residents in Newport Beach
and other areas to the south of JWA through AWG in their
opposition to JWA operations.
27. Doe Defendants 1 through 1000, inclusive, are
persons interested in the subject matter of this action, in
whole or in part, and who take positions in respect of one or
more of the controversies alleged in this complaint contrary
and adverse to the positions of the plaintiff. Plaintiff is
presently unaware of the actual identities of such persons,
and therefore names them in this action by their respective
fictitious names.
Background
John Wayne Airport
28. John Wayne Airport, Orange County is an airport
serving commercial air carriers offering regularly sched-
uled passenger service to and from other airports in the
United States. JWA is an element of the National Air
Transportation System, and has been certificated by FAA
under the provisions of 14 C.F.R. Part 139. JWA is also
certificated as a commercial airport by the State of
California.
29. JWA is the only commercial air carrier airport in
Orange County. Because of substantial existing facility
limitations and constraints, and because of regulations
adopted by the County for environmental and other
purposes, JWA presently serves only a portion of the
existing demand for air transportation services in Orange
County. That portion of the demand not served in Orange
County must be served by other commercial air carrier
airports in Southern California.
30. The County has received grants of federal funds for
the development and improvement of airport facilities at
JWA under the Airport and Airway Development Act of
1970 (“the 1970 Act”). In accepting such funds, the County
entered into written contracts with the FAA (acting on
behalf of the United States), as provided and required by
the 1970 Act.
31. Since at least 1972, the County has regulated the
scope and nature of certain uses of JWA by the public aiid
by commercial air carriers. This regulation has been
undertaken in the sound exercise of the County’s legislative
discretion to control noise and other environmental effects
—A-10—
of aircraft operations at JWA, and for other purposes. In
engaging in such regulation, the County has been exercising
its federally authorized proprietor rights to regulate JWA
for the purpose of controlling its potential litigation
exposure to persons who might claim that the operation of
JWA has taken or damaged their property, or caused them
bodily injury. The County is currently a defendant in such
damage actions now pending in the Orange County
Superior Court and has been a defendant in other similar
actions in the past.
In adopting such regulations, the County has also been
acting within its authority as the proprietor of JWA to
regulate airport use in a manner which strikes an
appropriate balance between local needs for air transporta-
tion services and the potential environmental consequences
of air transportation activities at JWA.
32. Among other regulations, since 1972, the County has
limited the permissible number of average daily departures
(“ADDs”) by regularly scheduled commercial operators
operating relatively noisier types of aircraft. Although the
form of this regulation has been expressed in various terms
since 1972, the substance of the regulation remained
essentially the same between 1972 and 1982. Since 1972 the
maximum permitted level of ADDs at JWA has been 41
ADD.
33. On March 17, 1982, the County adopted its
commercial airline access plan for JWA (“the March, 1982
Plan.”) The March, 1982 plan regulated ADDs essentially
as follows:
(a) “Class B” ADDs were defined by noise and weight
limitations. The types of commercial jet aircraft which had
historically used JWA, such as the B737-200 and DC-9-
10/ 30, were Class B aircraft;
eieceeceeaemenaeeacnaanaeniaaanitiiiiaiiaianiaiiaiaee enamel
—A-li—
(b) “Class A” ADDs were aircraft defined by noise and
weight limitations. The permissible levels of noise for ““Class
A” aircraft were lower than for “Class B” aircraft. The
MD-80 is one aircraft which qualified as “Class A”
aircraft; and
(c) ADDs were to be reallocated during the two year
period of the plan (June 1, 1982 to May 31, 1984) on a
quarterly basis to afford additional operational opportun-
ities for various air carriers, with preference in reallocation
given to Class A ADDs.
34. On July 18, 1983, the Airport Manager of JWA
presented to the Board of Supervisors the report and results
of a study authorized by the Board regarding the capacity
and limitations on the use of existing facilities at JWA by
commercial air carriers. (John Wayne Airport Facilities
Capacity Study [“the Facilities Capacity Study”]). This
study was prepared by an independent consultant, and
concluded that the existing facilities at JWA were not
reasonably capable of accommodating more than five
commercial air carriers. Six commercial carriers were then
serving JWA.
35. Because of the matters disclosed and confirmed by
the Facilities Capacity Study, the Board of Supervisors, by
their Resolution No. 83-1556 (October 19, 1983), limited the
permitted number of commercial carriers at JWA to six.
This action was confirmed and extended on May 30, 1984
by Board Resolution No. 84-846. In Resolution No. 83-
1556, and as confirmed by subsequent action of the Board
of Supervisors, the Airport Manager of JWA was directed
to maintain a “waiting list” of persons desiring to
commence regularly scheduled commercial air carrier
service at JWA, with the anticipation that if new entry
opportunities became available at JWA for such operators,
—A-12—
they would be selected from (and in the order of) the
waiting list during the period of the Interim Plan alleged in
the following paragraph.
36. On May 30, 1984, the County, by Board Resolution
No. 84-846, also adopted an interim access plan and
regulation (“the Interim Plan”) which, by subsequent
actions, has been extended to March 31, 1985. The Interim
Plan precludes operations at JWA by regularly scheduled
commercial air carriers using aircraft noisier than the
County’s definition of Class A aircraft.
37. Historically, the County has regulated operations
(ADDs) by regularly scheduled commercial operators using
aircraft which generated more than 89.5 dB SENEL at any
of the monitoring stations of the County’s noise monitoring
system located to the south of the airport, the direction of
operation for the vast majority of aircraft departures at
JWA. In Resolution No. 84-579, and by subsequent actions
extending the limitation to March 31, 1985, the County
temporarily lowered this regulatory threshold to 86.0 dB
SENEL because of its desire to ensure continuing
regulatory control over commercial air carrier operations
while the County completed EIR 508 and the CEQA
process on the proposed project alleged and described
below.
The Airport Project
38. On February 26, 1985, the County took final action
to approve and adopt a project for JWA which, among
other things: (1) increased the permitted number of ADDs;
(2) created two classes of regulated commercial aircraft
(“Class A” and “Class AA”) with certain regulatory
preferences given to the quieter Class AA aircraft; (3)
—A-13—
authorized the entry of three additional regulated
commercial air carriers into service at JWA, selected in
order from the Airport Manager’s waiting list; and (4)
provided for facilities improvements at JWA (including a
new passenger terminal) and various land use actions in
connection with the project approval of an increase in the
authorized number of ADDs at JWA. These actions are
sometimes referred to in this complaint for convenience as
“the Airport project.” For purposes of this action (and for
purposes of CEQA), the project approved by the Board of
Supervisors is described more precisely and in greater detail
in Board Resolution Nos. 85-255 to 85-260 (all adopted on
February 26, 1985) and the documents referred to in those
resolutions.
39. The adoption of the Airport project was the
culmination of a 15 month effort by the County to address
both the future of the use of JWA through the year 2005,
and the critical and controversial issues relating to the
regulation of the airport. These issues affect both federal
and local interests. Because of the requirements of CEQA,
this planning effort and evaluation occurred in the context
of the CEQA environmental process. The evaluation of
possible airport regulations and restrictions was an element
of EIR 508, prepared for the Airport project, and was
undertaken in the context of possible mitigation measures
which the County might adopt in connection with the EIR
508 project.
40. The Airport project began in December, 1982. At
that time, the County’s Environmental Management
Agency (“EMA”) and the Airport Manager’s Office
prepared a report for the Orange County Board of
Supervisors which described a coordinated approach for the
—
preparation of documentation to critically evaluate future
operations and development at JWA.
41. On December 15, 1982, the Board of Supervisors
considered and approved the coordinated approach
developed by the EMA and the JWA staff. By Board
Minute Order, the Board directed staff to begin a study
concerning the land use and environmental impacts
associated with possible increases in authorized levels of
regulated operations, associated development of JWA, and
possible actions which might be taken in surrounding
residential areas to enhance their compatibility with airport
activities. County staff was instructed to report back to the
Board within 90 days with recommendations for the Board’s
selection of a proposed project for planning and for CEQA
evaluation.
42. At its meeting on April 13, 1983, the Board passed
Resolution No. 83-547 formally adopting a proposed project
for JWA. This project was defined as a two-phased increase
in Class A ADDs and a master plan for related airport
facilities improvements, together with a land use compatibil-
ity plan (““LUCP”’). The phasing of the ADD increases was
defined as an immediate increase from 41 ADD to 55 Class
ADD (“Phase I”), with a further increase to 73 Class A
ADD upon completion of the associated airport facilities
improvements (“‘Phase II’’). The Board also directed that
staff prepare (with the assistance of consultants later
approved by the Board) a project EIR. This EIR became
County EIR 508.
43. The County also coordinated with FAA in order to
allow EIR 508 to also be circulated and considered by FAA
as an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) prepared
under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).
FAA is currently considering EIR/EIS 508 in connection
—A-15—
with various regulatory responsibilities which it has in
respect of JWA and the Airport Project.
44. During the preparation of EIR/EIS 508, the County
consulted with FAA to discuss issues relating to airport
regulation and airline access at JWA. FAA and the County
(together with various other parties) had been engaged in
litigation in this Court on such issues in the past (e.g. PSA et
al., etc. v. County of Orange, et al., C.D. Cal Civ. No. 81-
3248-TJH (Gx) and American Airlines, Inc. v. County of
Orange, et al., C.D. Cal. Civ. No. 83-294-TJH (JRx)). Both
FAA and the County desired to avoid future litigation
between them and to reach an understanding accommo-
dating both legitimate federal and local interests. To that
end, the County advised FAA of the environmental and
planning processes it was undertaking, and sought input
from FAA regarding its views on how the County might
regulate JWA (if the airport project were adopted) in a
manner consistent with any statutory or contractual
obligations the County might have to FAA or to the United
States. FAA, recognizing the serious existing facilities
constraints at JWA, and the legitimate concerns of the
community and of existing airport users, provided its
opinions, which were reflected in EIR/EIS 508. The views
of FAA were evaluated in EIR 508 and incorporated into
possible regulatory actions by the County which were
considered by the County as a possible mitigation measure
which might be adopted in connection with the Airport
project.
45. On July 13, 1984, “Draft Environmental Impact
Report 508 and Draft Environmental Impact Statement
508 for the John Wayne Airport Master Plan and the Santa
Ana Heights Land Use Compatibility Program” (“DEIR
508’”) was completed and submitted to the County and to
—
FAA. On that same date, the County’s EMA prepared and
filed a Notice of Completion of DEIR 508 and circulated
DEIR 508 for public review and comment.
46. The public review and comment period for DEIR
508 began on July 13, 1984, and was scheduled to end on
August 27, 1984. On August 14, 1984, the City of Newport
Beach requested in writing that the public review and
comment period for DEIR 508 be extended from August
27, 1984 until September 11, 1984. On August 22, 1984, the
Board of Supervisors authorized the extension of time in
which to provide comments to DEIR 508 requested by the
City.
47. In considering a project increase to 55 Class A ADDs
(Phase I), and in light of the need to adopt a new
commercial airline access plan, DEIR 508 discussed at
length various alternative access plans which might be
adopted as mitigation measures for the proposed project.
The subject of airline access and airport regulation at JWA,
as considered in DEIR 508, received extensive written
comments by the City, SPON, AWG, MCD and various of
the Airline Defendants. The City, SPON and AWG, in
particular, contended in their comments that the County
could not legitimately define the proposed project as an
increase in authorized ADDs because, among other reasons,
the County might lack authority to regulate airport
operations at JWA. These defendants therefore contended
that the DEIR was inadequate and incomplete under
CEQA and that the County was unable to legally approve
an increase in regulated operations at JWA.
At the same time, these defendants contended that DEIR
508 failed to adequately evaluate additional airport
regulations which might be adopted by the County in
mitigation of the proposed project.
a ae
48. Following public review and comment, the County
reveiwed the written comments to DEIR 508 and prepared
written responses to those comments. The County also
made significant revisions and additions to DEIR 508 in
response to the public comments, including the
identification of additional access plan alternatives which
might be adopted as mitigation measures for the project.
Revised Draft EIR/EIS 508 (“RDEIR 508”), which
consisted of DEIR 508, as amended (Volumes 1 and 2) and
the public comments and staff responses (Volume 3), was
then recirculated for public review and comment from
November 13, 1984 to December 27, 1984.
49. Following public review and comment on RDEIR
508, the County evaluated the comments received from
interested persons on the revised draft EIR and prepared
written responses to those comments (Final EIR 508,
Volume 4). ;
50. Between November 20, 1984 and January 23, 1985,
the Orange County Planning Commission and the Orange
County Airport Commission held approximately nine
public hearings, and accepted written and oral comments
from the public on the RDEIR and the proposed project.
After receiving this additional input, and having considered
RDEIR 508 and the comments and responses to the
RDEIR, both commissions made their recommendations to
the Board of Supervisors that the EIR be certified as
adequate and complete, and made their respective
recommendations regarding the proposed project.
51. On January 30, 1985, the Orange County Board of
Supervisors considered the proposed project and EIR S08.
At that time, the Board tentatively approved and certified
the EIR, subject to preparation of final findings and their
adoption by the Board, and selected a project authorizing a
—A-18—
phased increase in regulated ADDs, mitigated by various
regulatory and other measures. The Board also tentatively
approved construction of various specified airport improve-
ments in connection with the authorized increase in
regulated flights. The Board then continued the matter to
February 13, 1985 to further consider the land use elements
of the project, and to allow preparation of proposed
findings for their consideration and approval.
52. On February 13, 1985, the Board held a public
meeting at which they decided to seek further input on the
land use (LUCP) elements of the project from the Planning
Commission, and continued their deliberation on the project
to February 26, 1985.
53. On February 26, 1985, the Board took final action by
various resolutions to approve and implement the Airport
project. Specifically:
(a) Resolution No. 85-255 certified EIR 508 as adequate
and complete under applicable provisions of CEQA;
(b) Resolution No. 85-256 approved a master plan for
facilities improvements at JWA and authorized various
other implementing actions by County staff;
(c) Resolution No. 85-257 approved a land use plan
(“LUCP”) for areas generally south of JWA designed to
enhance their compatibility with JWA;
(d) Resolution No. 85-258 approved a land use element
action in connection with the LUCP;
(e) Resolution No. 85-259 adopted a Commercial Airline
Access Plan and Regulation for JWA for the period April 1,
1985 to March 31, 1990 (“‘the 1985 Access Plan”’); and
(f) Resolution No. 85-260 made related findings
overriding determinations of the Airport Land Use
Commission as provided for by California law.
—A-19—
54. The 1985 Access Plan was adopted by the County to
serve a number of important purposes. The Plan
implemented the project decision approved by the Board of
Supervisors in the certification of EIR 508, including an
increase from 41 ADD to 55 ADD on April 1, 1985 and the
authorization of three additional carriers to commence
service at JWA on that date. It also represented the next
step in the County’s longstanding policy of attempting to
provide a reasonable level of air transportation service to
the Orange County community, while achieving even
further gains, in addition to those already realized by past
County policies, in reducing aircraft noise in areas
surrounding JWA. The plan also was effectively a
compromise with the FAA in recognition of federal
interests and concerns regarding airport access, while
simultaneously reflecting recognition of realistic and
practical limitations on the use of JWA during Phase I of
the Airport project, and the legitimate interests and
concerns of the local community.
55. Pursuant to Public Resources Code §21152(a), a
Notice of Determination was filed by the County with the
County Clerk on March 5, 1985. The filing and posting of
the Notice of Determination had the effect of starting a 30-
day statute of limitations on court challenges to the
approval of the project under CEQA (Public Resources
Code §21167(c); Guidelines § 15094(d)).
56. The County is informed and believes, and on that
ground alleges that in adopting the 1985 Access Plan, it met
the concerns and objectives of FAA in respect of airport
access, and struck a reasonable balance between the
multitude of competing interests.
57. During the CEQA process, and in public comments
made shortly thereafter, various parties to this action
—A-20—
indicated or stated their intent to initiate various legal
actions against the County in various courts in respect of
actions which the County took in approving the Airport
project. The County is informed and believes, and on that
ground alleges, that:
(a) SPON and the AWG intend to initiate an action
actions in the Orange County Superior Court challenging
the Airport project decisions of the County on CEQA
grounds, and in such action or actions, they do not intend to
bring before the Court all of the parties and related issues
raised by this Complaint;
_ (b) Newport Beach is considering initiating an action or
actions in the Orange County Superior Court challenging
the Airport project decisions of the County on CEQA
grounds and that if such actions are initiated, the City
would not intend to bring before the Court all of the parties
and related issues raised by this Complaint;
(c) McDonnell Douglas intends to initiate action in this
federal court challenging certain of the County’s Airport
project decisions on federal statutory and constitutional
grounds, and that if such actions are initiated, MCD would
not intend to bring before the Court all of the parties and
related issues raised by this Complaint;
(d) The Waiting List Air Carriers intend to initiate an
action or actions in this federal court challenging certain of
the County’s Airport project decisions on federal statutory
and constitutional grounds, and that if such actions are
initiated, the Waiting List Air Carriers would not intend to
bring before the Court all of the parties and related issues
raised by this Complaint; and
(e) That each of the parties to this action is interested in,
and would to some degree be affected by the decision of a
court on each and every issue and controversy alleged in
—A-21—
this Complaint, or any other issues which any of the parties
might raise regarding the County’s Airport project
decisions by way of response to this Complaint.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Declaratory Relief)
58. Plaintiff incorporates by this reference the allega-
tions of paragraphs 1 through 57 of this complaint.
59. An actual controversy has arisen between and among
the parties to this action regarding their respective rights,
and obligations, and a declaration of such rights, duties and
obligations by this Court is necessary to resolve this
controversy. Specifically, the County is informed and
believes that MCD, American, and Republic contend that
provisions of the 1985 Access Plan which give certain
regulatory preferences at JWA to commercial aircraft
quieter than the McDonnell Douglas MD-80 are illegal and
unconstitutional in that:
(a) Such provisions are unjustly discriminatory in
violation of obligations of the County under its grant
agreements with FAA and related provisions of the Airport
and Airway Development Act of 1970;
(b) Such provisions are preempted and in violation of the
Supremacy Clause because they have been preempted by
regulatory action of FAA under the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958 in regulations adopted by FAA under 14 C.F.R.
Parts 36 and 91; and
(c) Such provisions violate Section 105 (a)(1) of the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (amending the 1958 Act),
49 U.S.C. §1305 (a)(1).
60. The County contends that its actions in adopting the
1985 Access Plan are legal and constitutional. The County
von
further contends that the defendants named in paragraph
59 have no standing or right of action under federal law to
challenge the County’s actions. The County further
coniends that its actions as alleged are reasonable and
legitimate exercises of authority by an airport proprietor
and that, under all of the circumstances, they constitute a
reasonable accommodation between legitimate federal and
local interests. The County further contends that its actions
significantly reduce its potential exposure to noise related
damage suits which might otherwise arise out of the
operation of JWA and the implementation of the Airport
project.
61. The County is informed and believes, and on that
ground alleges that FAA would contend that the position of
the County alleged in paragraph 60, is correct.
62. The County is further informed and believes that
Newport Beach, SPON, AWG, PSA, Air Cal, Western and
America West also contend that the provisions of the 1985
Access Plan at issue in this cause of action are legitimate
and lawful exercises of proprietor authority.
63. A declaration of the rights and obligations of the
parties is necessary in order to allow a meaningful
implementation of the 1985 Access plan and realization of
the environmentally mitigating effects of the regulations at
issue in this cause of action.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Declaratory Relief)
64. Plaintiff incorporates by this reference the allega-
tions of paragraphs 1 through 57 of this complaint.
65. An actual controversy has arisen between and
among the parties to this action regarding their respective
—A-23—
rights, duties and obligations, and a declaration of such
rights, duties and obligations by this Court is necessary to
resolve this controversy. Specificaliy, the County is
informed and believes that the Waiting List Air Carrier
defendants contend that the decision of the County in
connection with its certification of EIR 508 and adoption of
the Airport Project, and its adoption of the 1985 Access
Plan provisions allowing entry into service at JWA project
by three additional air carriers during Phase I of the
Airport project selected by the order in which their names
appeared on the Airport Manager’s waiting list was
unlawful and unconstitutional in that:
(a) Such provisions are unjustly discriminatory in
violation of obligations of the County under its grant
agreements with FAA and related provisions of the Airport
and Airway Development Act of 1970;
(b) Such provisions are preempted and in violation of the
Supremacy Clause because they have been preempted by
provisions of Section 308(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 (49 U.S.C §1349(a)); and
(c) Such provisions violate Section 105(a)(1) of the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (amending the 1958 Act,
49 U.S.C. §1305(a)(1)
66. The County contends that its actions in adopting the
1985 Access Plan are legal and constitutional. The County
further contends that the defendants named in paragraph
65 have no standing or right of action under federal law to
challenge the County’s actions. The County further
contends that its actions as alleged are reasonable and
legitimate exercises of authority by an airport proprietor
and that, under all of the circumstances, they constitute a
reasonable accommodation between legitimate federal and
local interests. The County further contends that its actions
— ipon
significantly reduce its potential exposure to noise related
damage suits which might otherwise arise out of the
operation of JWA and the implementation of the Airport
project.
67. The County is informed and believes that FAA,
America West, Continental and Jet America contend that
the County’s actions as alleged in this cause of action are
lawful and constitutional and constitute a reasonable
exercise of authority by an airport proprietor.
68. A declaration of the rights and obligations of the
parties is necessary in order to allow a meaningful
implementation of the 1985 Access Plan and realization of
the environmentally mitigating effects of the regulations at
issue in this cause of action.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Declaratory Relief)
69. The plaintiff incorporates by this reference the
allegations of paragraphs 1 through 57 of this complaint.
70. An actual controversy has arisen between and
among the parties to this action regarding their respective
rights, duties and obligations, and a declaration of such
rights, duties and obligations by this Court is necessary to
resolve this controversy. Specifically, the County is
informed and believes that the Waiting List Air Carrier
defendants contend that the allocation provisions of the
1985 Access Plan, and the term of the Plan are unlawful
and unconstitutional in that:
(a) Such provisions are unjustly discriminatory in
violation of obligations of the County under its grant
agreements with FAA and related provisions of the Airport
and Airway Development Act of 1970;
—A-25—
(b) Such provisions are preempted and in violation of the
Supremacy Clause because they have been preempted by
provisions of Section 308(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 (49 U.S.C. §134%a)); and
(c) Such provisions violate Section 105 (a)(1) of the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (amending the 1958 Act),
49 U.S.C. §1305 (a)(1).
71. The County contends thai its actions in adopting the
1985 Access Plan are legal and constitutional. The County
further contends that the defendants named in paragraph
70 have no standing or right of action under federal law to
challenge the County’s actions. The County further
contends that its actions as alleged are reasonable and
legitimate exercises of authority by an airport proprietor
and that, under all of the circumstances, they constitute a
reasonable accommodation between legitimate federal and
local interests. The County further contends that its actions
significantly reduce its potential exposure to noise related
damage suits which might otherwise arise out of the
operation of JWA and the implementation of the Airport
project.
72. The County is informed and believes, and on that
ground alleges that FAA and the Authorized Air Carrier
defendants agree with the contentions of the County alleged
in paragraph 71.
73. A declaration of the rights and obligations of the
parties is necessary in order to allow a meaningful
implementation of the 1985 Access Plan and realization of
the environmentally mitigating effects of the regulations at
issue in this cause of action.
—A-26—
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Declaratory Relief - Compliance with CEQA)
(Federal Law Claims)
74. The plaintiff incorporates by this reference the
allegations of paragraphs | through 73 of this complaint.
75. An actual controversy involving federal laws and
regulations has arisen between and among the parties to this
action regarding their respective rights, duties and
obligations, and a declaration of such rights, duties and
obligations by this Court is necessary to resolve this
controversy. Specifically, the County is informed and
believes that Newport Beach, SPON and AWG (“the
CEQA defendants”) contend that in certifying EIR 508 as
adequate and complete under CEQA in connection with the
approval and implementation of the Airport project, the
County violated CEQA in that:
(a) The County failed to prepare EIR 508 in a manner
required by FAA Order 5050.2B, and in a manner required
by FAA advisory circulars and regulations prepared with
respect to public input and participation in the preparation
and development of the Airport project;
(b) The County in part defined “the project” for EIR
508 in terms of an increase in the authorized number of
regulated ADDs at JWA. The CEQA defendants contend
that such definition of the EIR project is impermissible
under CEQA because the County is now preempted by
federal law, or may be preempted by federal law during the
projected life of the project from regulating the permissible
number of ADDs, rendering the EIR’s project description
inaccurate and thereby tainting the entirety of the
environmental analysis in EIR 508;
—_
(c) That the County has a duty under CEQA to adopt all
feasible mitigation measures for the Airport project which
would reduce the environmental effects of the project,
including any and all possible regulations and restrictions
on the use of JWA by aircraft operators regardless of the
effects on airport operations and service, and that CEQA,
to that extent, acts affirmatively to limit the discretion of an
airport proprietor in the regulation of airport use,
specifically the use of JWA: and
(d) That the County failed to comply with Public
Resources Code §21168.9 which, the CEQA defendants
contend, would require the County to seek the approval of
the state courts of its project, and of its airport restrictions
adopted or continued in mitigation of the project, before
implementation of the project, including the project
increase in authorized ADDs.
76. The County is further informed and believes, and on
that ground alleges that, in the absence of this action, the
CEQA defendants intend to initiate an action or actions
against the County in state court under the provisions of
CEQA, and that they intend to seek preliminary and
permanent relief which would enjoin the implementation of
the Airport project, and which would control or otherwise
regulate by state court order the permissible level and
nature of airport operations at JWA. Any such relief would
inevitably prejudice federal privileges and rights of the
County and the other defendants in respect of the
implementation of the Airport project.
77. The County contends that it has complied with all
applicable provisions of CEQA in the preparation and
certification of EIR 508 and approval of the Airport
project; that it has complied with any applicable federal
orders or regulations in the development and adoption of
—A-28—
the project; that it now has under federal law, and that there
is no reasonable basis to anticipate a change in federal law,
the authority to regulate and restrict the permissible
number of authorized ADDs at JWA; that no state law,
including CEQA, may operate to limit the regulatory
discretion of an airport proprietor, and that any and all
such provisions in CEQA are preempted and unconstitu-
tional under the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution; and that no state court may issue its orders
inequity under authority of CEQA or any other state law
which would operate in such a manner as to restrict the
discretion of an airport proprietor in the regulation of
airport use.
78. The County is informed and believes that all
defendants to this action, other than the CEQA defendants,
contend that the position of the County, as alleged in
paragraph 77, is correct.
79. A declaration of the respective rights and obligations
of the parties is necessary in order to avoid prejudice to
their respective positions and their federally authorized and
delegated rights and privileges, the unnecessary and
unconstitutional imposition of inappropriate constraints on
the air travelling public, and prejudice to those citizens of
Orange County which will benefit from implementation of
the Airport project.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Declaratory Relief - CEQA)
(Federal and Pendant State Law Claims)
80. The plaintiff incorporates by this reference the
allegations of paragraphs 1 through 79 of this complaint.
—A-29—
81. An actual controversy involving both federal law and
laws of the State of California has arisen between and
among the parties to this action regarding their respective
rights, duties and obligations, and a declaration of such
rights, duties and obligations by this Court is necessary to
resolve this controversy. Specifically, the County is
informed and believes that Newport Beach, SPON and
AWG contend that in certifying EIR 508 as adequate and
complete under CEQA in connection with the approval and
implementation of the Airport project, the County violated
CEQA in that:
(a) The County in part defined “the project” for EIR
508 in terms of an increase in the authorized number of
regulated ADDs at JWA. The CEQA defendants contend
that such definition of the EIR project is impermissible
under CEQA because the County is now preempted by
federal law, or may be preempted by federal law during the
projected life of the project from regulating the permissible
number of ADDs, rendering the EIR’s project description
inaccurate and thereby tainting the entirety of the
environmental analysis in EIR 508;
(b) The County in part defined the project of EIR 508 in
terms of an increase in the number of authorized ADDs.
The CEQA defendants contend that such definition of the
EIR project is impermissible under CEQA because there is
a possibility that the County may, at some future date,
authorize further increases in ADD levels at JWA, and that
the project must therefore be described in terms of the full,
unlimited and unregulated “capacity” of any facility
improvements at JWA undertaken pursuant to and in
connection with the Airport project;
(c) The failure of the County to properly define the
project for purposes of EIR 508 renders the EIR
= we
description and analysis of the environmental consequences
of the project misleading, inaccurate and incomplete; and
(d) That even if the project description is adequate and
accurate, the EIR fails to adequately disclose the
environmental consequences of the project in respect of its
significant adverse environmental impacts including, but
not limited to, traffic, air quality, growth inducing impacts
and noise.
82. The County is further informed and believes, and on
that ground alleges that, in the absence of this action, the
CEQA defendants intend to initiate an action or actions
against the County in state court under the provisions of
CEQA, and that they intend to seek preliminary and
permanent relief which would enjoin the implementation of
the Airport project and control or otherwise regulate by
state court order the permissible level and nature of airport
operations at JWA. Any such relief would inevitably
prejudice federal privileges and rights of the County and
the other defendants in respect of the implementation of the
Airport project.
83. The County contends that it has complied with all
applicable provisions of CEQA in the preparation and
certification of EIR S08 and approval of the Airport
project; that it has not abused its discretion in adopting the
project and certifying EIR 508 as adequate and complete;
that it has proceeded in the manner required by law; and
that its decisions in respect of the Airport project and EIR
508 are supported by substantial evidence.
84. The County has alleged that to the extent CEQA
would purport to affect or limit in any way the discretion of
the County as an airport proprietor in the regulation of
airport use at JWA, it is preempted and unconstitutional
under the Supremacy Clause of the United States
—
Constitution. The County does not contend that CEQA is
preempted to the extent that it merely requires that a
decision making body prepare and consider a report
describing the environmental consequences of proposed
discretionary actions or projects (‘the informational
purposes of CEQA”). The County contends that Final EIR
508 complies with the informational purposes and
requirements of CEQA.
85. The County is informed and believes that all
defendants to this action, other than the CEQA defendants,
contend that the position of the County, as alleged in this
cause of action, is correct.
86. A declaration of the respective rights and obligations
of the parties is necessary in order to avoid prejudice to
their respective positions and their federaily authorized and
delegated rights and privileges and the privileges authorized
by the adoption of the Airport project by the County, the
unnecessary imposition of inappropriate constraints on the
air traveling public, and prejudice to those citizens of
Orange County which will benefit from implementation of
the Airport project.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Injunctive Relief)
87. The plaintiff incorporates by this reference the
allegations of paragraphs 1 through 86 of this complaint.
88. If Newport Beach, SPON or AWG initiate separate
CEQA state court actions in respect of EIR 508, they may
effectively deprive this Court of the ability to enjoin such
actions or stay the state court proceedings. The simulta-
neous prosecution of this action and separate state court
CEQA actions would inevitably involve similar issues which
—A-32—
could be considered and adjudicated only imperfectly and
incompletely because the issues are inevitably interrelated.
In certifying EIR 508 and approving the Airport project,
the County was required not only to consider relevant
environmental considerations as disclosed by EIR 508, but
also relevant legal, social, political and economic considera-
tions inevitably involved in implementation of the Airport
project. The lawfulness of the County’s actions cannot
meaningfully be adjudicated in any action of lesser scope
that the scope of controversial issues which were before the
County when it made its decisions.
89. If not enjoined, the County is informed and believes
that Newport Beach, SPON and AWG will seek to prevent
a complete adjudication of all of these related issues, and
the issuance by this Court of such temporary and
permanent injunctive relief as may be necessary against
such defendants is essential to preserve the integrity of this
action, the jurisdiction of the Court over the entire
controversy, and the rights of all of the parties to a
complete adjudication of their disputes. Such action would
require a significant duplication of litigation effort and the
expenditure of public funds by the County and other
parties. No defendant would be harmed by any such orders.
WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF PRAYS:
1. For a declaration of its rights and the lawfulness of its
actions as alleged in the First, Second, Third and Fourth
and Fifth Causes of Action;
2. For such injunctive relief as may be necessary as
alleged in the Sixth Cause of Action;
3. For its costs of suit; and
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4. For such other and further relief as may be deemed
necessary or appropriate by the Court.
March 15, 1985
Michael Scott Gatzke
Mark J. Dillon
Gatzke, Lodge & Mispagel
Attorneys For The
County of Orange
By: Michael Scott Gatzke
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.