Petition — Lemire v. United States

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JosePH C. LEMIRE, JON T. STEPHENS,

LIONEL W. ACHUCK and INTERCONEX, INC.,

; Petitioners,

a v.

: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

i, Respondent.

3 PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

i UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

a FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

g Roszrt Gotp Joun W. VaRDAMAN, Jn.

* Jon T. Brown Counsel of Record

a Brown, RoaDy, BONVILLIAN pape

x & Gow ttorneys for

E 1800 Nineteenth St., N.W. Petitioner Stephens

ei ——— Davp E. KENDALL

(202) Attorney for

Jamus T. Re.y Petitioner Intercones, Ine.

ie Wr4.4aMs & CONNOLLY

Lemire an wr ang

INTERDONATO, LOMBARD, 20006

_ Remar & Comsrocx (202) 831-6000

Ave., N.W.

*p4823%

“gesdilt

iz BH

“ TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

OPINION BELOW

JURISDICTION 2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED __.

STATUTES INVOLVED

STATEM?Y'NT

AND CREATES A CONFLICT IN THE CIR-

Wo sce Gi ea eee

: ne iv

ae TABLE OF AUTHORITIES __

Cases Page

Alexander V, United States, 418 F.2d 1208 (D.C.

Cir, 1969) 14

Beck V. United States, 298 F.2d 622 (9th Cir.),

cert, denied, 370 U.S. 919 (1962) 18

Bollenbach Vv. United States, 826 U.S. 607 (1946).. 14 =

Cameron V. Hauck, 383 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1967), ox

cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1089 (1968) 18

Chiarella V. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) .... sare é

Cramer v. Fahner, 683 F.2d 1876 (7th Cir.), . ill

cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 8376 (1982) 00... = 18 é

Baton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697 (1974) 0... 12 ¢

Government of the Virgin Islands vy. Richards,

618 F.2d 242 (8d Cir. 1980)

Haupt v. United States, $330 U.S. 681 (1947) _........

North Carolina vy. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) —.....:

Phillips Vv. United States, 679 F.2d 192 (9th Cir.

1982) dive

Raytheon Company V. Carver, et al., Supreme Court

of Bermuda, No. 82-68

Samuel V. United States, 169 F.2d 787 (9th Cir.

1948)

Street v. New York, 894 U.S. 676 (1969) ohg cle.

Somber ¥. Caer, 88 US. 969981) -30 1

Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 887 U.S. 1 (1949).

United States v. Adamson, 700 F.2d 958 (6th Cir.

og Burt Karina iY

id oad

athe SE até

See

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued a

Page z

United States v. Coz, 482 F.2d 1826 (D.C. Cir. Be

1970) ie

United States v. Dansker, 687 F.2d 40 (84 Cir. :

1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1088 (1977) a

United States v. Franks, Nos. 81-2809 and 81-2310 :

(10th Cir. December 27, 1983) 2

United States v. Gering, T16 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. :

1988) :

United States v. Head, 641 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. t

United States v. Herbert, 698 F.2d 981 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, 104 8. Ct. 87 (1988)

United States V. Hoffman, 415 F.2d 14 (7th Cir.),

cert. denied, 8396 U.S. 958 (1969)

United States v. Irwin, 664 F.2d 671 (10th Cir.

1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1016 (1982)...

United States vV. Johnson, 700 F.2d 699 (11th Cir..

1983) ....

United States v. pest 518 F.2d 306 “(6th Cir.

1976)

af ¢

4 ove aes f +4 : "4

Rie SRO aT Ty ne RNOL See

United Stats ¥. Lanch, 099 F.24 689 (Tih Gi. ag

16, ny

United States v. Moynagh, 566 F.2d 799 (1st Cir. = 4

1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 917 (1978) —. : a

ne ces ¥, Pine, 609 F.2d 106° (8a. Gir. a

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Williams, 464 F.24 927 (8th Cir.

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

ted States v.

No. 88——

T. STEPHENS,

W. AcHUCK and INTERCONEX, INC.,

JosEPH C. LEMIRE, JON

LIONEL

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

en bane, was denied January 11, 1988 (Appendix C,

infra, pp. 52a-58a). ‘a

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitu-

tion provides in pertinent part:

No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty,

or property, without due process of law... .

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitu- :

tion provides in pertinent part:

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also “have

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theories uf guilt, one of which may not

our interpretation of the law, can lay a sound basis for

conviction” (App. 82a) (emphasis in original). Notwith-

standing its conclusion that the indictment, as well as the

instructions, set forth an invalid legal theory, creating the

was evidence that the jury had acted on the erroneous

theory. The court concluded that the record did “not sup-

port an inference that the jury acted pursuant to [the]

impermissibly broad interpretation of the statute” (App.

9a).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

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F.2d 174, 178-79 (4th Cir. 1981) ; Cameron v. H

F.2d 966, 978 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.

(1968) ; Cramer v. Fahner, 683 F.2d 1876, -1

Cir.), cert. denied, 108 8. Ct. 876 (1982); U’

v. Williams, 464 F.2d 927, 981 (8th Cir. 1972) ;

United States, 298 F.2d 622, 681 (9th Cir.), cert.

870 U.S. 919 (1962) ; Samuel v. United States, 169 F.

787, 796-98 (9th Cir. 1948) ; United States v. Irwin,

F.2d 671, 680 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.

1016 (1982). —

obese

The wisdom of the Stromberg rule is nowhere better

demonstrated than in the court of appeals’ unpersuasive

attempt to explain how it could determine that it was

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secutive five-year sentence. Achuck was placed on proba-

tion on condition that he make restitution to Raytheon in

the amount of $750,000. The court imposed the restitu-

tion orders under 18 U.S.C. § 3651 which provides that

a condition of probation, a defendant may “be required

make restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties

actual damages or loss caused by the offense for

conviction was had ....” (emphasis supplied).

As discussed above, it was impossible to determine

the jury’s general verdict how it resolved the close

hotly contested factual question of economic harm to

theon. See supra, pp. 13-15. Of course, the amount

any damages was not an issue at trial and, obviously,

the jury’s verdict provided no guidance on that question.

of $1.75 million, the trial court conducted no hearings on

the question whether, or to what extent, Raytheon suf-

fered economic damage. As the court of appeals observed,

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criminal conduct. Accordingly, procedural safeguards

must govern such awards to insure that they do not

exceed compensation for actual economic loss suffered.

The decision below expands enormously the power of

trial courts to impose economic judgments upon defend-

ants in the form of restitution awards without the con-

ingly popular part of the sentencing process. This has

resulted in new legislation both at the state and federal

levels. See, ¢.g., Victim and Witness Protection Act of

1982, § 5, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 8579-80 (West Supp. 1982) (ap-

plicable to crimes committed after January 1, 19838) ; Ga.

Code Ann. § 17-14-1 to 14-16 (1982). Despite the new

to avoid “infringing on the constitutional rights of the

Supp. 1982).

Cir.

In United States v. Tiler, 602 F.2d 80 (2d

defendants were required to deposit $100,000 in escrow to

Circuit said in Tiler, “generally restitution payments

have been ordered only after actual damages have either

been finally determined or formally conceded. See, ¢.g.,

United States v. Boswell, supra; United States v. Hoff-

man, 415 F.2d 14, 22-23 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396

U.S. 958, 90 S. Ct. 481, 42 L. Ed.2d 428 (1969).” 602

F.2d at 34. -

tile

Interconex bid offered the lowest rate. Not a single one

sent MAI thet Uae thas ie ae Ge

court below.

Moreover, at no time in the

either th» measure, or extent of, damages even

4 uit

trial on the issue of damages, but they were afforded no

right to a hearing on damages.

Review of the court of appeals’ decision is warranted

not only because of the effect on Stephens and Achuck, but

more importantly, because of the precedent it establishes

in creating almost limitless power in trial courts to impose

huge restitution orders as a condition of probation with-

out the procedural safeguards that due process demands.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, petitioners respectfully

mit that the petition for a writ of certiorari should be

granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Rosert Gotp JoHN W. VARDAMAN, Jn.

Jon T. Brown Counsel of Record

re, dehiucl Sazan HeLene Duce

Brown, RoaDY, BONVILLIAN pages

& Gow ttorneys for

1800 Nineteenth St., N.W. Petitioner Stephens

Washington, D.C. 20086 Davi E. KENDALL

James T. Reniy Petitioner Interconesz, Ine.

Attorney WriiaMs & ConNOLLY ’

| Pena © tail Wesbington’ D.O, 20008

Remy & Comsrocx (202) 881-5000

4801 Massachusetts Ave., N.W. ,

APPENDIX

A—U.S.C.A. Opinion

B—U.S.C.A. Judgment ..

C—U.S.C.A. Rehearing Orders

D—District Court Judgments

E—Statutes

F—Transcript of Jury Reinstruction

. < Ns oh Fe ae CE Ke BOD ee oy og’ he mY

eK . ee eae Say ee een

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No, 82-2492 :

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3

No. 82-2528

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Vv.

INTERCONEX, INC., 4

Appellant ad

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(D.C. Criminal Nos. 81-00842-02, 81-003842-04,

81-00342-08 and 81-00842-05)

Argued September 9, 1983

Decided November 4, 1983

John W. Vardaman, Jr., and Robert Gold with whom

4 David E. Kendall, Jon T. Brown and James T. Reilly

i were on the brief for appellants. | “a

; William C. Bryson, Attorney, Department of Justice, 8

3 with whom Stanley S. Harris, United States Attorney, .

a was on the brief for appellee.

‘ Before: Wricht, WALD and Epwanrns, Cirouit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Cirewit Judge WaLp.

’

prison terms and a suspended consecutive five year term,

the suspension being conditioned on payment of $1 million

restitution to Raytheon Company. It sentenced defendant

Achuck to six suspended concurrent five year prison terms,

suspension being conditioned on payment of $750,000

restitution to Raytheon. Defendant Lemire received six

concurrent five year sentences. The three individual de-

fendants were also fined $19,000 each, and defendant

Interconex, Inc., was fined $24,000.

All four defendants challenge their convictions on the

following grounds: (1) the district court misinstructed

the jury on the requisite elements of wire fraud; (2) the

instructions allowed the jury to convict on a theory of

fraud different from that which the government pre-

sented at trial; (3) the district court erred in permitting

the government’s use of a non-expert summary witness;

and (4) the district court erred in not admitting three

defense exhibits into evidence. In addition, Achuck chal-

of probation in this case. For the following reasons, we

affirm the convictions and restitution conditions.

I. BACKGROUND

The evidence in this case is both complex and contro-

yes

project, and Raytheon’s senior official in Saudi Arabia.

Carver was involved in the alleged fraud and conspiracy

but is not an appellant in. this case. Defendant Joseph

Lemire was the manager of several supporting subsidi-

aries of Raytheon and was responsible for procuring and

shipping this housing to Saudi Arabia.

Prior to Raytheon entering the 1976 contract, Lemire

and Carver became acquainted with defendants Jon

or Ts ss e

Pies Re ee ee

he eis aN . f

‘ > = 7 a4

ree x

sentatives of IMS to discuss their provision of houses to

Saudi Arabia and, as a result of the meeting, Interconex

and IMS signed an agreement that they would work

together to get the Raytheon contract and to develop

other business. That agreement provided that IMS would

bid on the Raytheon contract, and, if successful, IMS

would manufacture and deliver the prefabricated con-

struction to port, and Interconex would ship and deliver

the construction to the site in Saudi Arabia. On June 9,

Lemire spoke to IMS on the telephone and discussed

modular housing for Saudi Arabia. On June 21, Mr.

Waxman notified modular house manufacturers, includ-

ing IMS, of the contract specifications; he told them that

the bids were to include shipping and that the bids were

due by June 23. Raytheon received four bids, of which

the IMS bid was lowest. The bids differed greatly in

their shipping charges, with IMS charging the least

amount—in this case, $91.11 per ton.* Lemire awarded

the contract to IMS.

When the housing contract was let, Lemire informed

_ the Raytheon official responsible for approving procure-

ment contracts that he had solicited bids C&F (cost and

freight), that is, for both the housing and transportation.

When questioned about his decision to have the manufac-

turers provide shipping, Lemire responded that the com-

petitive bid for shipping would save Raytheon money.

Raytheon’s management then approved the contract.

pany in which each had @ one-half interest. On June 10,

2 The shipping rates in the other bids were $115.07 per ton by

A Pe

Fuh: 3 P

»*

they travelled to Geneva where Achuck obtained special

power of attorney over a Liberian company, Generation

Holding (GH), and Stephens obtained a similar power

over Coralda Trust, Ltd., a company based in Lichten-

stein. When IMS was awarded the Raytheon contract, it

entered into a subcontract agreement with Interconex.

Rather than have IMS pay “nterconex the full $20.50

per square foot that the companies had agreed upon, IMS

consented to pay $12.65 per square foot to Interconex

and the remaining $7.85 per square foot to GH. When

IMS was later awarded a second contract by Raytheon, it

In the fall of 1976, Raytheon began an investigation of

the IMS contracts, and in particular the shipping rates.

In the course of this investigation, a company official

and Lemire responded that he did not know. Raytheon

also asked IMS and Interconex for cost information about

the shipping, and both refused to supply the information.*

Later in the fall, Raytheon got Interconex to cancel the

fourth and final voyage upon which houses were being

shipped. Raytheon itself chartered a boat to ship the

houses, thereby achieving about $700,000 savings on the

last trip. Tr. at 1148. Except for obtaining Interconex’s

release from the shipping contract for the fourth voyage

and arranging shipping for the houses itself, Raytheon

took no further action. The government investigation

leading to the indictment was prompted by surveillance

of Mrs. Carver by a member of the Saudi Royal family.

Fie

lif

The grand jury indicted the defendants and Mr, Carver

on September 11, 1981.*

B. The Parties’ Theories of the Case

At trial, the government focused its proof primarily on

its allegation that Interconex overcharged Raytheon for

shipping. The government’s theory was that Interconex

was able to submit a lower bid than its competitors be-

cause of contract specification information that Lemire

provided it well in advance of the bidding* This in-

formation enabled Interconex to calculate its rate based

on knowledge that it could charter an entire vessel to ship

the housing, rather than booking shipments with a com-

mon carrier. The government contended that this knowl-

edge allowed Interconex to achieve inflated profits while

still submitting the lowest bid. These express profits were

then divided among Carver, Lemire, Stephens and Achuck.

contract and in awarding the contract to IMS. Moreover,

the defense argued that Lemire did not deny Raytheon

the opportunity to charter its own boat. Lemire testified

that he would never have considered chartering a vessel

because he was not free to make such arrangements, be-

lieving he had to use Waterman. He pointed out that

Raytheon had never before chartered its own boat.

The defense explained the transfer of funds from GH

to Carver and Lemire as independent of the award of the

IMS contract. Lemire testified that he did not know that

GH was the source of the funds, and in fact that he did

not know of GH’s existence until the government investi-

gation preceding the indictment. The defense contended

that the funds were Stephen’s and Achuck’s capital in-

vestment for an independent joint venture by Carver,

Lemire, Stephens and Achuck to build a modular housing

factory in Saudi Arabia. Thus, Lemire denies having

gotten a kickback from Interconex for aiding them in

getting the shipping contract.

II. INSTRUCTIONS ON WiRE FRAUD

The defendants contend on appeal that the instructions

to the jury incorrectly stated the law on the essential ele-

ments of wire fraud. They assert that the instructions

erroneously allowed the jury to convict based on a theory

that Lemire’s and Carver’s failures to disclose their con-

flicts of interest due to their alleged joint venture with

Stephens and Achuck, without more, constituted a ma-

terial non-disclosure evidencing a specific intent to de-

fraud Raytheon. The government responds that the in-

structions were entirely correct, i¢., that a failure to

a conflict of interest, when accompanied by a

Sve ee

loyal and honest services of its employees Lemire and

Carver. Although we agree with the defendants that the

government’s interpretation of the wire fraud statute

encompasses too much, we find that a fair reading of the

instructions in light of the evidence and arguments the

jury heard, does not support an inference that the jury

acted pursuant to such an impermissibly broad interpre-

tation of the statute.

A. The Scope of Criminal Fraud

The elements of wire fraud are (1) formation of a

“scheme to defraud,”* and (2) use of interstate wire

communication to further that scheme.” See Uhiited

States v. Pollack, 584 F.2d 964, 971 (D.C. Cir.), cert.

denied, 429 U.S. 924 (1976) ; cf. Pereira v. United States,

347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954) (elements of mail fraud) ; United

States v. Diggs, 618 F.2d 988, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1979)

(same) ; United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 511 (7th

Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1978). Con-

gress did not define “scheme or artifice to defraud” when

it first coined that phrase, nor has it since. See United

* The requisite elements of “scheme to defraud” under the wire

fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1848 and the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C.

§ 1841, are identical. Thus, cases construing mail fraud apply to the

wire fraud statute as well. See United States v. Feldman, 711 F.2d

768, 768 n.1 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Computer Sciences

Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1188 n.14 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, ——

U.S. ——, 108 S.Ct. 729 (1988); United States v. Giovengo, 637

F.2d 941, 944 (8d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1082 (1981).

718 U.S.C. § 1848 provides:

Bee

kant

PEt

nats

10a

States v. Reid, 583 F.2d 1255, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1976);

United States v. Von Barta, 685 F.2d 999, 1005 (2d Cir.

1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981).* Instead that

expression has taken on its present meaning from 111

years of case law.* See Von Barta, 635 F.2d at 1006 (leg-

islative history helpful), United States v. McNeive, 536

F.2d 1245, 1247 n.3 (8th Cir. 1976) (same).

At the core of the judicially defined “scheme to defraud”

is the notion of a trust owed to another and a subsequent

breach of that trust. But “[n]ot every breach of a fidu-

ciary duty works a criminal fraud.” George, 477 F.2d at

508. In their attempts to delineate which breaches of duty

rise to the level of criminal fraud, courts have used var-

ious limiting doctrines. Some, including this court, have

required that the fraud be “active’—that the fiduciary

utilize his trusted position to obtain a benefit for himself

at the expense of the person whose trust he breaches. See

Post v. United States, 407 F.2d 319, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1968),

cert. denied, 398 U.S. 1092, 1969); United States v.

Epstein, 174 F.2d 754, 766 (6th Cir. 1949). Other courts

have required that the breach be accompanied by some

material non-disclosure or misrepresentation to the party

owed the duty. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 663

F.2d 534 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981), modified in part and

reh’g denied, 680 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982);

Von Barta, 635 F.2d at 1006. The crux of these require-

®In Reid, we quoted with approval the Fifth Circuit’s comment

\ Poe Bs:

‘““

lla

ments is that the wire fraud statute makes criminal only

breaches of duty that are accompanied by a misrepre-

sentation or non-disclosure that is intended or is contem-

plated to deprive the person to whom the duty is owed

of some legally significant benefit. See Diggs, 618 F.2d

at 997 (“proof of fraudulent intent is critical’) ; Ballard,

663 F.2d at 541 n.17 (relating materiality to active

fraud).

Although critical ambiguities about the scope of the

wire fraud statute remain, there is judicial consensus

about certain requisite elements of a scheme to defraud.

The duty breached need not arise from state or federal

law; in particular, it may stem from an employment re-

lationship of the sort that imposes discretion and conse-

quently obligations of loyalty and fidelity on the employee.

See, ¢.g., Ballard, 663 F.2d at 541; Von Barta, 685 F.2d

at 999; United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167, 1172

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 928 (1980); United

States v. Reece, 614 F.2d 1259, 1261 (10th Cir. 1980);

United States v. Bryza, 522 F.2d 414, 422 (7th Cir.

1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 912 (1976). And although

the scheme to defraud must threaten some cognizable

tangibles as well. See, ¢.g., United States v. Condolon,

600 F.2d 7, 8 (7th Cir. 1979) (scheme to obtain sexual

favors by false promises of modelling or acting job) ;

United States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d 1888, 1887-88 (9th

Cir.) (scheme to invade privacy by obtaining confidential

information from telephone company), cert. denied, 489

U.S. 896 (1978). With the broadening of the scope of

a certain amount of confusion and controversy over the

Se REN ta ence ey. :

sees 2 eo Roe Ab

12a

employee breakdowns, better handled in the civil courts.”

Carried to its logical extreme, such a theory would crimi-

nalize any intentional undisclosed breach of duty to an

employer. The government appears to be arguing just

such a theory here, but we are not inclined to accept it

for the following reasons.

An employer values the loyalty of his employees and

prohibits conflicts of interest primarily because such con-

flicts create an incentive for the employee to act in a

manner detrimental to the employer’s tangible monetary

interests. Employee loyalty is not an end in itself, it is

a means to obtain and preserve pecuniary benefits for the

10 See, e.g., Coffee, The Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Continu-

ing Story of txe “Evolution” of a White Collar Crime, 21 Am. Crim.

L. Rev. 1 (1988) ; Coffee, From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on

L. Rev. 428 (1988); Comment, supra note 9.

In corporate law, the notion of what constitutes fraud on a com-

pany by a senior official as opposed to a mere conflict of interest,

which may be approved in advance or even ratified in retrospect by

the company’s governing board, has changed considerably over the

voidable if fair or if material facts of transaction revealed at time it

is ratified); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §7138 (McKinney Supp. 1982)

(same), and the Model Business Corporation Act § 41 (1979). In

disclose

13a

employer. An employee’s undisclosed conflict of interest

does not by itself necessarily pose the threat of economic

harm to the employer. Therefore it does not alone con-

stitute a sufficient indicium that the employee intended

any criminally cognizable harm to the employer.“ Other

surrounding circumstances may of course provide the nec-

essary proof that the employee intended such harm.” We

hold today, however, that an intentional failure to dis-

close a conflict of interest, without more, is not sufficient

evidence of the intent to defraud an employer necessary

under the wire fraud statute.” See United States v.

Feldman, 711 F.2d 758, 763 (7th Cir. 1983). There

11“[(T]f merely depriving the victim of the loyalty and faithful

service of his fiduciary constitutes criminal fraud, the ends/means

distinction is lost. Once the ends/means distinction is abolished and

trust;

l4a

must be a failure to disclose something which in the

knowledge or contemplation of the employee poses an

independent business risk to the employer. Other courts

have so held. Von Barta, 625 F.2d at 1005 n.14; United

States v. Dizon, 586 F.2d 1888, 1400-01 (2d Cir. 1976).

At the same time, we are not unaware that undisclosed

conflicts of interest create fertile ground for subsequent

misuse of the employee’s position. “The vice against

which [courts] seek to guard... is that the adverse

interest of the individuals may overcome [their] duty

[as] officials, and induce agreements and transactions

detrimental to the [employer] and unduly beneficial to

the individuals.” Epstein, 174 F.2d at 764, (quoting Wy-

man V. Bowman, 127 F, 257, 273 (8th Cir. 1904)). Ac-

loss of his employee’s loyalty and fidelity. So long as the

‘ba

rial non-disclosure” ie Ballard, 663 F.2d 534, which in-

volved a scheme to channel oil through a chain of oil com-

panies in order to generate commissions. The scheme’s

mastermind, Mr. Granlund, was hired by the Florida

Power Company to obtain oil during the 1973 oil short-

age. The Florida Power Company paid him for this and

also allowed him to receive commissions from the oil com-

panies. By channelling the purchases through five com-

. panies, Granlund received five commissions on each sale;

channelling in turn was arranged by giving kickbacks

to employees of the intermediary companies responsible

for purchases and sales of oil. The intermediaries were

subject to price controls which limited the profit they

could make on sales of oil. The Ballard court held that

in light of these price controls the employees of the in-

termediaries did not intend to defraud their employers

because the employers already received the maximum

profits on each sale. The court reasoned that the failure

of the employees to disclose the scheme to the intermedi-

ary employers would therefore not have altered their

business conduct, so the non-disclosure was not material.”

it obtain a city contract at the same time his firm was working to

get the contract for a competitor) , cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982) ;

United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981) (reversal of

16a

In Ballard, the Fifth Circuit stated that a non-disclosure

is material only if the employee “has reason to believe

that the information would lead a reasonable employer

to change its business conduct.” 683 F.2d at 541; see

also Feldman, 711 F.2d at 768 (simple concealment of

conflict of interest in customer’s accounts immaterial be-

cause it would not itself have enabled defendant to trade

without advancing sufficient collateral); United States

v. Bethea, 672 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (pro-

curement officer’s ordering storage for servicemen who

did not request it, thereby giving business to cosigner

of defendant’s loan, not fraud unless activities were not

in furtherance of servicemen’s best interest). Since an

employer presumably would “change its business conduct”

only if, upon disclosure of the conflict and any other rele-

vant information, it saw new opportunities for profit or

savings, or dangers of economic harm, the notion of ma-

opportunity or economic benefit. If the jury believed the

government’s evidence that the defendants schemed to

}

{

wrt

iva

cerely believe Raytheon could not charter a boat itself

because of its Waterman commitment. Or, if the jury

found that Lemire had solicited bids for modular housing

C&F or had otherwise altered the standard procedure

for letting the contract in order to enable Interconex

to get the shipping contract to the detriment of Ray-

theon’s best interests, then it might justifiably convict

the defendants of wire fraud. If the jury, however,

found only an undisclosed breath of fiduciary duty on

Lemire’s and Carver’s part due to their interest in a

joint venture with Interconex’s principals, then it could

not properly convict because there was nothing inherent

in that failure to disclose that spelled business loss or

harm to Raytheon.

We turn then to the trial judge’s instructions to see

if they could reasonably be interpreted by the jury to

allow a conviction of wire fraud upon a mere finding

of failure to disclose Lemire’s and Carver’s conflict of

interest stemming from the joint venture. If in light of

all the circumstances—the language of the instructions,

the arguments of counsel, and the evidence itself—we

find that the jury may have convicted the defendants

solely upon that undisclosed conflict, those convictions

must be reversed. See, ¢.g., Ballard, 668 F.2d at 544

(reversing and remanding because “the jury was au-

thorized to find [defendant] guilty if the government

out facts supporting any of the criminal theories

in the [district] court’s charge to them,” in-

cluding those rejected by the court of appeals). Alter-

natively, if these factors cumulatively indicate that it is

highly improbable that the jury found the defendants

guilty under an improper legal theory, technical errors in

the instructions are deemed harmless, and we will affirm.

See Alezander Vv. United States, 418 F.2d 1208 (D.C. Cir.

pened at trial

—.: —

188

dence, no reasonable possibility that error had materially

affected verdict); United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d

1208 (2d Cir. 1982) (insufficient evidence of extortion

meant that charge dealing with extortion on RICO count

was erroneous, but error “harmless beyond reasonable

doubt” since prosecutor told jury that defendants were

not involved in the extortion and not to consider extor-

tion in assessing guilt or innocence under RICO), cert.

denied, —— U.S. ——, 108 S. Ct. 729 (1983); United

States v. Pine, 609 F.2d 106, 108 (3d Cir. 1979) (proper

test is to determine improper instructions’ effect on jury’s

understanding of the law) .”

The defendants mainly challenge the portions of the

charge that address the legal requirements of a “scheme

or artifice to defraud.” In stating those requirements,

the judge instructed:

the first alleged object was to defraud Raytheon

Company of its right to the honest, conscientious,

faithful, loyal, disinterested and unbiased services,

16 The standard for determining when an error in a jury instruc-

tion requires reversal is the general standard for determining harm-

less error after objection by the defense. See Hamling v. United

States, 418 U.S. 87, 108 (1978); Alexander, 418 F.2d at 1207;

United States v. Valle-Valdez, 664 F.2d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 1977).

Under that standard, “[i)}t is our responsibility . . . to reverse ap-

B ~~ vee , Aye wy er bh

Carver and Lemire, free from bribery, corruption,

Now the object of the scheme need not be money

or any form of tangible property. The government

need not prove any actual loss of money by the Ray-

theon Company.

A scheme to defraud an employer of the honest,

faithful and unbiased services of its employees can

also come within the meaning of scheme or artifice

to defraud as set forth in the wire fraud statute.

Tr. at 8175-76. By themselves, these words are am-

biguous; conceivably they could be interpreted to allow

a conviction solely on the basis of a knowing failure to

disclose a conflict of interest, such as Lemire’s interest

in the joint venture with the principals of Interconex.

The remainder of the instructions, however, lead us to

ing whether they constituted prejudicial error. United

States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 674-75 (1975); United

“ 2

; ee.

SEY Pe

ls Ess tae es

20a

ately following the troublesome language confirmed the

admonition that both a breach of fiduciary duty and

material non-disclosure were required by the statute.”

of specific intent and willfulness, was necessary to support a convic-

tion.” Id. at 978.

‘8 The full charge relating to the meaning of “scheme or artifice

to defraud” read:

Now, the essential elements of the offense of wire fraud,

each of which the government must prove beyond a reasonable

doubt, are as follows:

The first essential element: The government must prove that

Number one, the first alleged object was to defraud the

Raytheon Company of its right to honest, conscientious, faith-

ful, loyal, disinterested and unbiased services,

and

g Fz

;

show that someone was defrauded since success of scheme

was not required); United States v. Reid, 583 F.2d at

1261-62 (not necessary to show victim actually incurred

loss), the emphasis on “actual harm” (emphasis supplied)’

projects to the layman a requirement that there be a

threat of monetary loss.

Later instructions on specific intent also helped to cure

any defect in the instructions on “scheme to defraud.”

financial loss to another or bringing about some

financial gain to one’s self.

Tr. at 3209-10 (emphasis supplied). Although the em-

show they intended to take a financial or business ad-

vantage of Raytheon.”

Moreover, although the central instruction on “scheme

to defraud” failed to define a legally significant term

like “material non-disclosure,” and the curing instruc-

disclose Lemire’s and Carver’s conflicts of intercat with-

out any other action on their part against Raytheon’s

business interests was sufficient to constitute wire fraud.

As the defense itself noted, “[tjhe evidence introduced

32 We reached a similar conclusion in Post, 407 F.2d at 329, where

we found that the phrases “intentionally converted” and “know-

ingly use[d)” in the charge sufficiently apprised the jury of the

need to find specific intent to defraud. In Post, the district court

had stated in a prior instruction thet the jury was to acquit if it

found that a golf club’s directors used the club’s funds for the club's

benefit. Jd. at 828; see also Feldman, 711 F.2d at 765 (“intent to

defraud” not in statement of elements of mail fraud, but definition

elsewhere made clear that jury could only convict if it found that

defendant committed acts with purpose of defrauding employer)

24a

have had to shift from consideration of the major thrust

of the government’s evidence and arguments and dwell

sand from the Raytheon Company by fraud in an agreement

That’s what it all really boils down to.

Tr. at 2904. Conversely, we find unpersuasive defendants’ sugges-

tion that the government’s closing argument “played upon the

theme” of mere failure to disclose Lemire’s and Carver's conflict of

interest. Brief for Appellant at 31. The prosecutor himself focused

on the need to show the defendants’ specific intent to defraud Ray-

theon of money when he argued :

I would like to say also that while I will make these remarks,

eae Aen

25a

on a few ambiguous lines in an eighty-six page charge

in order to convict on an improper theory.

The verdict itself also suggests that the jury did not

was payment would not have been consummated but for

the fraud. This conclusion would not follow from a find-

ing of a mere failure to disclose a theoretical conflict of

conviction on count two thus carries a necessary impli-

mind when he did something, and it is important

that—the totality of what we have shown.

fit

toad -

.S Pry ro.

26a

defrauded Raytheon of at least $775,008. Hence it is

reasonable to assume that the conviction on the mail

fraud counts was based on the same finding that a scheme

existed to defraud Raytheon of that money.

Even were we less certain that the offending language

of the instructions did not control the verdict, we would

still hesitate to reverse. To the extent the instructions

were confusing and even misleading, the defense had

ample opportunity to make clarifying suggestions. Rule

80 of the Federal Rules of Criminal] Procedure states:

No party may assign as error any portion of the

charge or omission herefrom unless he objects

thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict,

stating distinctly the matter to which he objects

and the grounds for the objection.

(Emphasis supplied.) “The rule requires that illegal

their immediate correction.” United States v. Campbell,

684 F.2d 141, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v.

Williams, 521 F.2d 950, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975). At the

of :

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the

; Mangieri, 694 F.2d at 1277; Gaither, 418 F.2d at

here the indictment gave warning that the

government might argue for a verdict based on depriva-

tion of employee loyalty. In addition, its proposed in-

structions before the trial repeated that theory.

proof of inflated shipping charges.”

; The defense cites Smolar, 557 F.2d 18, and United ;

States v. San Juan, 645 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1976) as q

F- “(t]he applicable cases” holding “that the government ¥

: may not change the theory of the case after the evidence i

has been closed.” Reply Brief for Appellants at 10. M

Smolar, however, involved a change of the theory of the

case from “outright fraud as charged in the indictment,

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proper limiting instructions.” Scales, 594 F.2d at 568;

see, ¢.g., United States v. Esser, 520 F.2d 218, 218 (7th

Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 947 (1976); Gordon V.

United States, 488 F.2d 858 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 424

U.S. 828 (1971). Thus, we conclude that the Federal

testimony such as is presented in this case.

The contention that Kasper’s testimony unfairly preju-

diced the defendants raises more troubling concerns,

heightened by the fact acknowledged by Judge Johnson

that the non-expert summary evidence was cumulative,

and hence subject to challenge under Rule 403. See Tr.

at 1930; S. Saltzburg & K. Reddon, supra, at 751 (“sum-

maries of documents introduced in evidence ... are bet-

ter handled under Rule 403” than under Rule 1006) ; ef.

Zenith Radio Corp v. Matsushita Electrical Industrial

Co,, 505 F. Supp. 1813, 1884 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (as

amended 1981) (expert opinions that merely rehash evi-

dence inadmissible because unhelpful). Since the sum-

outweigh its probative value.

evidence, a non-expert summary witness can help the jury

ee oe ee te ee ee ee

fragmentally revealed a multitude

of witnesses throughout the trial See Seales, 504 F.2d

se ;

eet 1 -

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% a :

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« meet o

7 <7

Pte ae ri hm

pees Soy ts.

F.2d 89 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, —— US. ——, 108

8.Ct. 58 (1982). Although we usually defer to the dis-

trict court’s assessment of whether the probative value of

evidence outweighs the possibility of prejudice, see United

States v. Wright, 489 F.2d 1181, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

(standard of review is abuse of discretion) ; United States

One danger is that a jury will treat the summary as

additional evidence or as corroborative of the truth of the

testimony. “This danger has led to the re-

of ‘guarding instructions’ to the effect that the

{summary} is not itself evidence but is only an aid in

evidence. Even with such instructions, a sum-

mary may be considered too conclusory, or as emphasizing

too much certain portions of the Government’s case, or as

presenting incompetent facts.” Scales, 594 F.2d at 564.

In this case, however, we think the dangers are shadow,

allowed the defense to object to any portions of the sum-

mary testimony before the jury heard them. This

594 F.2d at 568-64; Gordon, 488 F.2d at 877; see

Esser, 520 F.2d at 218 (“[s]ummary testimony does

allow witness to invade the province of the jury”).

The defendants also had full opportunity to cross-

in-

Vv.

King, 616 F.2d 1084, 1041 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 446

U.S. 969 (1980); Gordon, 488 F.2d at 876-77. They

argue nonetheless that by restricting his summary to

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anything other than what was already in evidence.”

Hence, the defendants’ contentions that Kasper intro-

duced otherwise inadmissible evidence are unfounded.

A third danger posed by summaries of evidence is that

they provide an extra summation for the government that

comes from the witness stand rather than the counsel’s

lecturn. The distinction between valid summary testi-

the word “argument” connotes a taking of sides in a con-

are best left to the closing argument of counsel. Here,

however, the summary involved only routine computations

and culling through of documents to eliminate confusing

and extraneous evidence. Consequently we find no force

to the argument that Kasper’s testimony provided an

unwarranted second closing for the government.

4la

* Thus, allowing Kasper to testify was no abuse of discre-

be: tion by the district court.

a B. Ewcluded Defense Exhibits

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paid He |

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2. Exhibit DX155

DX155 (dealing with pre-contract proposed Waterman

freight rates) was excluded on the grounds that it was

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Upon entering a judgment of conviction of any of-

fense not punishable by death or life

United States v. Consuelo-Gonealez, 521 F.2d 267, 264

9th Cir. 1975) ).

= The defendants, however, premise their appeal against

4 the condition of restitution on other, more specific, lan-

| guage later in the Probation Act:

May be required to make restitution or reparation

to aggrieved parties for actual damages or loss

the offense for which conviction was had

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THE

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

September Term, 1983

Criminal Action No. 81-00342-02

No. 82-2492

UNTTED STATES OF AMERICA

Joseru C. LEMIRE

Appellant

And Consolidated Cases No. 82-2493,

82-2526 and 82-2528

Before: WriGHT, WALD and EDWARDS, Circuit Judges

(Filed Jan. 11, 1984]

ORDER

On consideration of the Petition for Rehearing of Ap-

pellants, filed December 19, 19838, it is

ORDERED by the Court that the aforesaid Petition is

denied.

For The Court:

Guonce A. Fisher

Mow s .

;

BOL he Tee Peat

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

September Term, 1982

Criminal Action No. 81-00342-02

No. 82-2492

UNtrTep STATES OF AMERICA

JoserH C. LEMIRE

Appellant

And Consolidated Cases No. 82-2493,

82-2526 and 82-2528

Before: Ropinson, Chief Judge; Wricut, TaMM, Wi-

54a

APPENDIX D

| DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

3 Docket No. 81-842

: DEFENDANT

e: Joseph C. Lemire

% JUDGMENT AND

a PROBATION/COMMITMENT ORDER

a COUNSEL

C) GUILTY, and the court being satisfied that there

is a factual basis for the plea,

( NOLO CONTENDERE, @ Nor Gum

[Filed Dee. 8, 1982)

LEN SEMIN CL EE ET GT ee Pg I ORE

FINDING & JUDGMENT

There being a finding/verdict of

& GUILTY.

Defendant has been convicted as charged of the of-

fense(s) of

Wire Fraud, 18 USC 1343, woth gi 8, 4,

and 5; Interstate Transportation of

Taken by Fraud, 18 USC 2814, 2, Count 2;

Conspiracy, 18 USC 871, Count 7.

SENTENCE OR PROBATION ORDER

The court asked whether defendant had anything to

say why judgment should not be pronounced. Because

no sufficient cause to the contrary was shown, or ap-

peared to the court, the court adjudged the defendant

a. guilty as charged and convicted and ordered that:

Ee The defendant hereby committed to the custody of

8 the Attorney General or his authorized representative

SS for imprisonment for a period of .

Five _— wii sala eek a Ons anal

Dollars ($1,000.00) on Count 1;

Five (5) yous sed & Fine of Five, Thonsane.

7 4 "e2

~~ sae

ee an!

P -?

| Se ee es

Ce Rae Not eet

. =e otis of 4.24

nr * 4 as :

Ph, ae ap as foe. We rane be" . sa ee ee ee

Pe ERS fee Se OT ee, be SR Ww yt UG eR PT toe

; and s Speen Thousand 7

0. ‘Counts 8,4 and

‘ Te be 24 “Wie, ee hae f x,

It is ordered that the Clerk deliver a certi-

fied copy of this judgment ‘and commitment

to the U.S. Marshal or other qualified officer.

‘ SIGNED BY

e & US. District Judge

0) US. Magistrate :

4 fe Norma HoLLoway JOHNSON a

57a

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Docket No. 81-842

DEFENDANT

Jon T. Stephens

JUDGMENT AND

PROBATION/COMMITMENT ORDER

&} WITH COUNSEL

“ John W. Vardaman, Jr., Esquire

: (Name of counsel)

oh)

MN ee thre

re Pa oe ee

is a factual basis for the plea,

CO) NOLO CONTENDERE, & NOT GUILTY

[Filed Dec. 7, 1982]

FINDING & JUDGMENT

There being a finding/verdict of

&) GUILTY.

Defendant has been convicted as charged of the of-

fense(s) of

Wire Fraud, 18 USC 1848, 2, Counts 1, 8, 4,

and 5; Interstate Transportation of Property

Taken by Fraud, 18 USC 2314, 2, Count 2;

Conspiracy, 18 USC 871, Count 7.

SENTENCE OR PROBATION ORDER

The court asked whether defendant had anything to

say why judgment should not be pronounced. Because

no sufficient cause to the contrary was shewn, or ap-

peared to the court, the court adjudged the defendant

guilty as charged and convicted and ordered that:

The defendant hereby committed to the custody of

the Attorney Genera! or his authorized representative

for imprisonment for a period of

Five (6) years & a Fine of One Thousand

Dollars ($1,000.00) on Ct. 1;

Five (6) pool pee (ak Hips Be a. ow

Dollars ($5,000.00) on Count 2; Five (5) years

coco Guns 8 86 Five (8) yt nd

on and

| 59a

3 charge of the Probation Officer of the Court for

a period of Five (5) years consecutive to the

“ prison term on Cts. 1, 8, 4, 5, & 7 on condition

‘ ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS OF PROBATION

directed by the Probation Officer of the Court.

It is ordered that the Clerk deliver a certi-

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Docket No. 81-842

DEFENDANT

Lionel W. Achuck

JUDGMENT AND

PROBATION/COMMITMENT ORDER

COUNSEL

In the presence of the attorney for the government

the defendant appeared in person on this date De-

cember 16, 1982.

However the court advised defendant of right to

counsel and asked whether defendant desired to

have counsel appointed by the court and the de-

fendant thereupon waived assistance of counsel.

& WITH COUNSEL

Robert Gold, Esquire and Jon T. Brown, Esquire

(Name of counsel)

PLEA

CO GUILTY, and the court being satisfied that there

is a factual basis for the plea,

0 NOLO CONTENDERE, &® NOT GUILTY ia

(Filed Dee. 22, 1982) : “ ey A

7 re] , 4 a . :*

S's 2" Pars

* se ’ ° eee

. * 4

. ‘ed

' i ‘Whe ‘

‘ | .

« é e

2 . ;

4 .

FINDING & JUDGMENT

There being a finding/verdict of

C) NOT GUILTY. Defendant is discharged

bg GUILTY.

Defendant has been convicted as charged of the of-

fense(s) of

Wire Fraud, 18 USC 1843, 2, Counts 1, 8, 4,

and 56; Interstate Transportation of Property

Taken by Fraud, 18 USC 2814, 2, Count 2;

Conspiracy, 18 USC 871, Count 7.

SENTENCE OR PROBATION ORDER

SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF PROBATION

The court asked whether defendant had anything to

_ Bay why judgment should not be pronounced. Because

* no sufficient cause to the contrary was shown, or ap-

peared to the court, the court adjudged the defendant

guilty as charged and convicted and ordered ‘that:

The defendant hereby committed to the custody of

the Attorney General or his authorized representative

for imprisonment for a period of

One (1) year to Three (8) years and a Fine

of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) on each of

Counts 1, 8, 4 and 6; ;

One (1) year to Three (3) years and a Fine of

Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) on Count 2;

One (1) year to Three (8) and a Fine

Dollars

(Teal

. are <

. or Si ae on So wt '

xy ~ er me eo'd uF

It is ordered that the Clerk deliver a certi-

fied copy of this judgment and commitment

to the U.S. Marshal or other qualified officer.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Docket No. 81-842

DEFENDANT

Interconex, Inc.

JUDGMENT AND |

PROBATION/COMMITMENT ORDER :

FINDING & JUDGMENT

There being a finding/verdict of

&) GUILTY.

Defendant has been convicted as charged of the of-

fense(s) of

Wire Fraud, 18 USC 1848, 2; Counts 1, 3, 4,

and 5; Interstate Transportation of Property

Taken by Fraud, 18 USC 2314, 2, Count 2;

Conspiracy, 18 USC 371, Count 7.

SENTENCE OR PROBATION ORDER q

a It is ordered that the Clerk deliver a certi-

he fied copy of this judgment and commitment

to the U.S. Marshal or other qualified officer.

“i /8/ Norma Holloway Johnson

ae Norma HoLLoway JOHNSON

Date 12-16-82

APPENDIX E

(STATUTES)

18 U.S.C. § 371. Conspiracy to Commit Offense or to

Defraud United States

If two or more persons conspire either to commit any

offense against the United States, or to defraud the

sentations, or

change, alter, give away,

procure for unlawful use any counterfeit

obligation, security, or other article,

sented to be or intimated or held

feit or spurious article, for the

7a Postal 8 - or ts , | Or xe

Tor.

“r De ties

« -

67a

18 U.S.C. $1848. Fraud by Wire, Radio, or Television

having devised or intending to devise any

scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or

Whoever,

dis

$95

18 U.S.C. § 2814.

+ oe

Hi: i

spurious

of an obligation or other security of the United States, or

of an obligation, bond, certificate, security, treasury note,

bill, promise to pay or bank note issued by any foreign

government or by a bank or corporation of any foreign

country.

18 U.S.C. § 3651. Suspension of Sentence and Probation

Upon entering a judgment of conviction of any offense

not punishable by death or life imprisonment, any court

ti erty He j i

oH i it | | |

E o 4ditat |G

4 g i ii lt 5 :

a i. iq if 3

an i i 4! i a fils

ee igpuen: Una

Se A

x aed)

ages gid gEty2 it ae

rete

FTA ah

| ns :

| APPENDIX F z

[TRANSCRIPT OF REINSTRUCTION OF JURY]

- . . . . .

| [8237] (Whereupon, the jury entered the courtroom at 4

approximately 3:57 P.M., and the following proceedings e

were had within the presence and hearing of the jury:)

THE COURT: Please be seated, ladies and gentle :

men.

The microphone is acting up a little, ladies and gentle 2

Dan ae ae ee, ope ee

Me eek, Dai, eek

34 oe

Feo<i>

tf 12 Ran Hil

aad I Hi

HHH

‘

78a

money from the Raytheon Company by means of false

pretenses and representations which defendants knew

would be and were false when made.

signs, signals or sounds over the wires in interstate

or foreign commerce. Counts one, three, four and five

allege such transmittions to have occurred on or about

September 21, 1976, January 7, 1977, January 24, 1977,

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.