Petition — Ostric v. Corporation of St. Mary's College

Supreme Court brief1983

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

oe sig | Pees

eee oe

-~—we

. i meas t 3 |

;

: a ‘

Si oie a oe A AToer aA =o reer

-* bes ot ve le) be ~ - = “

~—-! ~+— ee et et Sw wee ~- ~—+ ~ sie ee

-7-vy

As trRmt raat mrmRee ~ . .

‘ 7 ‘PAS et

Sei) wees’ o ee ee ae ~ Som oem Shem

ee ae)

T=<DRCr ~

a7 a. ss> ~ _ 7- Sane

me § ¥v °C 'e yl @

wD mm © IMfeei nw © So doo ST

Arr “I DFM AD fFromennds -

f ‘ 4

ws? Pi ae ow ~e- S be bi ae we Vi tei em

al ats dh ideo he tials shoe aAmamete APT a- ammomie A

i = . 4 2S ™ 4 DU w= ~

o '~ oars) wit 4 ee ee ee ww wee <- is Pe , STL)

ras ee

EAD

a Wat Wetiwl s+

Sooteonlaninaitantn alla hain! athe! ae

=" ‘a Van) ~ ~

yey Op a ae a ee Se « wi ba - ~s ~

ANvy nermore

aaceeer

bt moe Vita We eet w

-4aty -—poee Cte

« id £2 =) - ~

-——_-— ~— we om eee ae

=. a ee ee s+: j ar

SOUTH BEN N 46417

oe ~ mse eee | ~-' ~--

—-

~~~

nnn me

)

s of ®” a rab)

“ ' 1oO isda sea

”) ' a Pp 3) $i

0) me | UE pois Wert « cS

UW) Wc OwrPrrehd @©@Hv4O

pot . aAehavgrs~. Ss O

fw w {1-4 O PO ct “rd

mw of OMe aN a P

wt Sap OFA OB NHN NAW OH NGO

ym > Gt e t+ 4 @ - oA Wed Perl

ajg%e & OPEN, « mcs ~ + Gin O FE: hh

“1 6 TR cal, ice HH > eu Ps wo aPrPpPruNnooY

Ee ¢ O ghee lhO SCN feet ELD SCM SO.

1? fu a O rt UW wit © w abe 2G HW OOOH O ~ CU

$y ® APE wh = OO. oow tie t Ooo -

= foroo Uh ciet th osc OAH @ OD) > Pt O Sf >

Oo Ppodcohnwn wu ovidare og oP wad

La) $a fa U(r ley @ - fl ow YO ¢ Aged OL KP

oop HOt oped FOO ciel Get O c

> ZThunadr “A Weed Moy AM PAdtherigdg bh oO

vel pom FFAOG Hert ~~ Ube w sh eet

a Gaede a | O + ha YO 0G P

Oo Or ¢ i a a EK VPOHH EEL, W

$i a “Wd @ @ Pw ® @ Ur ff oa aw Sy

ond Cuca wo One Ww a bi Pued Or p - - YO

0) oO By 10 OR Hw OW OW Pert ) Ww ouoUuUN

“A fr O aU) ret > Bev) UAidoPH Bee

Bow yon s -s“ -( Wf, CH HH OOp ete

ie uo Pu - sane gu «duende doo

= w ® $4 w gs oO 4 & O a 4? aa OM ed fh GW

a) Ss. 3S 01) Ord = POGda hts Pe ODP CA OY,

— os Pp Oo kiert F/O GpPpap Si gt Met Ont

@ ol OM HO OO Coed WO Sieh tO Orel Gterd

7) Ow ss PO thy evel OP 6 OD ow co woo Ww Pu

Cerlp@t, of tf ue fi: ‘ay Petuss Oo @

a - Ge O,423 O & O Oi e GA Cher WM ODP, i ci Pp, S; Y)

iia "US Ei deed W Sal Set G4 O GD Ped wm @ 53 —& @ ug

> Q) Ont 44 DO-A OAC ARABS SHH BE OOK O OA oO

7 OF pPoanpyjoyp pd popvro Ad OOH OWHRet

- aw

@ re |

W) oO

ran) a)

ro) ts

Whether, within the meaning of Rule 17.1

(a) of the Supreme Court of the United States,

this Court of Appeals "has so far departed

from the accepted and usual course of judicial

proceedings, .. . /as well as/ so far sanc-

tioned such departure by... /the trial/

court, as to call for an exercise of this

/Supreme/ Court's power of supervision” in the

instant case.

-As Whether, in sanctioning the Trial

Court's decisions, particularly by affirn-

ing the dismissal of this case."due to

plaintiff's failure to amend the com-

plaint pursuant to the court's crder”,

the Court of Appeals rendered a decision

"in conflict with applicable decisions of

» « « /the Supreme/ Court” of the United

States, within the meaning of Rule 17(c)

of the latter.

B. Whether this Court of Appeals gross-

ly misapprenended and/or mispresented

the facts relevant to the issues pre-

sented for review, based its decisions

on such misapprehension cf the facts, and

failed to adhere to proper procedure in

reaching a decision in dealing with the

fundamental issues that follow.

“”

fe)

1. Whether the Petition

plaint gave the Defendants (Respon-

dents) “fair notige of what...

/nis/ claim is and the grounds upon

which it rests .. ."3*

2. Whether there existed (a) a

continuing and civil conspiracy a-

gainst the Petitioner under 42

U.S.C. 88 1983, 1985, and 1986 (>)

engaged in by all Defendants and (c)

the Petitioner's other closely inter-

related claims stemming from the

same conspiracy;

3. Whether the Defendants’ (Res-

pondants') Motions to Dismiss are

valid and, assuming as the Court bde-

low held, that they are, whether the

Trial Court resolved all matter of

doubt in favor of the Plaintiff

(Petitioner);

* Conley v. Gibson, .78 S.Ct. at 103, 355 U.S.

at 48 - cited by Wright, Charles Alan -

' oo

a a (Third

197 9% D. 323.

iii

is . . .

(Petitioner) in <¢he

instan* case in which Defendants

in the instant case, to conduct hear-

ings on Defendants’ Cispositive pre-

“otions to Dismiss and to sub-

t to the Trial Court's judge pro-

posed findings of the facts and

conclusions and recommendations wm-

der 26 U.S.C. §8 636(b) and (c)

without consent of the parties;

6. Whether the proper course (1)

for Defendants in the instant case

in which they failed to answer, or

defore the pleadings were closed,

was to seek a judgment on the plead-

ings “pursuant to Rule 12(c) and (hn)

P.R.C.P.", (2) for the Trial Court

to grant such a judgement, and (3)

_—

ive

TT . Tmiat ; ' A:

II. Whether the Trial Court's proceecings

gether with the decisions dDelow taken as

whole, including deprivation of

constitutional rights, particularly these of

freedom of speech, due process of law, and

"right to jury determination",* represent “a

gross miscarriage of justice”. **

A. Whether the management of the judi-

| id

”

—-

cial administrati:

Courts below in a way as to seek truth

"to secure the

sive determination of ... /retitioner

action", within the meaning of Rule l o

* Rogers v. Missouri Pacific 2. Co., 352 VU.

500, 510 = cited dy Stern, 2ober+ Le and

Eugene Gressman, Supreme Court Fractice,

Fifth Ed. (1 978), p.293.

** E.G. Thomoson v. City of Louisville,

19>; Washingzon v. Unitec States, 357 U.S

348 - cited by Stermm and Gressman, id

Pe 299.

the latter, or were they involved in

systematic distortion of the truth and

obstruction of justice = through the

Trial Court's action and the Court of

Appeals' sanction -

1. in granting Defendants' Motions

to Dismiss;

2. In not entering default judg-

ment scught by the Petitioner against

Defencants;

3. In ordering that the Petitioner

file an amended ccemplaint;

4, In denying the Petitidier's

"Motion for Determination of the

aintiff's Entire Case... ."3

5. In failing to rule upon the

Petitioner's "Motion for Reversal or

Amendment of the Court's Order of

6. In considering the Defendants’

"Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

for Failure to State a Claim Upon

Which Relief Can Be Made” as a bona

fide motion and granting it;

7. In entering, on December 7,

1981, a final order of dismissal

court's order"; and

January 6, 1982 the Petitioner's

List of other parties to this case besides

those included in the caption on the cover

is as follows: the Congregation of the Holy

Cross, Notre Came; William A. Hickey, Vice-

President and Dean of Faculty of St. Mary's

College, Notre Dame; Rita Mary Cassidy, Pro-

fessor of this college; Donald M. Hornine,

Professor of this college; John M. Duggan,

President of this college; Jason D. Lindower,

Controller of this college;. Michael R. McKee,

Professor of this college; Sr. Rose Bernard

Tarleton, Professor of this college; Thornburg,

McGill, Deahl, Harman, Carey and Murray, legal

firm; Frederick F. Thornburg, associate of this

legal firm; Thomas C. Murray, associate of this

legal firm; Indiana Civil Rights Commission

(nereinafter ICRC); Mary W. Shafer, Commission-

er of the ICRC; J.L. Maymnard,Director of the

ICRC; John C. Carvey, Chairperson of the ICRC;

Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General of In-

Giana; and Jabm W. Montgomery, Judge of

t. Joseph Circuit Court cf South end,

Indiana.

TASLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS FRESENTED FCR REVIEW

TABLE OF CONTENTS se eeeee @ ee © @ © e © tHe

ARPT . “~~ Ay

OPINIONS Bein cece ee eh 64.8868 06 65 6 KOS

lan] Louk -~ - -*? > ~\r rR - Aa?

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTI re

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,

~~ —_

wrear Jab Aare ih -) al ieied marae

ORDINANCE ANY Ass’ oo Wit ee ee ee ee

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .cccscvocsvecs

1. /General Nature of the Case

and of Complaint/ coccceoes

2. /Claims for Relief/ wceccces

2,<4, /Events (Proceedings) of

September-November, 1979/ .

5. /Events (Proceedings) after

November, 1979/ cecccoveces

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ..

CONCLIGTGN. 1000.06 60s eect eens keene

AFFIDAVIT wcccoccccscesevcecsesevecers

PROOF OF SERVICE “ee @*# #@ @ @ @ # © @ ee @ ee HO ee

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Reshear v. Weinzappel

1 F.2d 127 (7th Cir, 1973) eecveeedy, 50

Conley v. Gibdson

S.ct. at 103, 355 U.S. at bs cckiie. ©

§ U.S. 41, at Ri

SEC eUiuaevnavcccecvecscces ob, 43, Us

idge

19 MW lococecdvcccecccccsccet®

(1972) occrcee 46

lip. Op. Fh Cir.

’

Dec. 2, cae prevevs cen sse chs 52

Madison Vv. Purdy

10 F.2d 99 (5t Cir. 1969 )ecvvvecveeed7

i Chemical Co.

303 U.S. recess oc cee@ore cee oll

Pavilonis v.43

26 Feed 1075 (lst Cir. 19BC)e ervey 50

Roger Misso' Sfic R, CO.

TH U.S. 500, opera D 42

Swa vs

212 F. e. 32 (E.D. Pa 1962) seevere 57

3 2 U.S. L9G sevens erareneaeevy 4, 42, 62

Washington v. J.S:

357 U.S. 3 TETEERERERE EEE 4, 42

Page

5 : 7th Cire L980) eeeeceee 0049

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

S. Const., lst Amendscreesscvresseseseseved

U.S. Conste, Sth Amendeceecccveccevesceeds 36

U.S. Const. , 7th Am@Mdececesecccccccseseeds 30

S. Const., l4th Amend secccesevvseccseveveds

Art. 1, SOC. 10 Cle Lesecccvcveresevecesveerd

Ge 3p BOCe Zevcvcccvvccccsecvvevevevsessveees

STATUTES AND RULES

Federal Magistrate Act of 1979 (Supp. 1980)

(28 U.S.C. $8 631-639);

OOO i ic ea dn a05006 00000005 s08eres 3, 30, 59

636(bd b)(1 )(3) cee ecdererceecescecesecesetes 58

696 (O)eccccccceceseceseeds 3, 26, 27, 30, 59

Civil Rights Act of 1966, as amended

42 U.S.C. 2000d-et seq.

Sec. FOB(A)(L)(2)ececesvecessvsecevverevsveed

Sec. 7OU(a)ecccccnvcccsccevececcecsccceceeses

BS PPP RETET TP EET ToT Tey rr ee

DB BOG Ge H soo igh o0-v 0s decdicndeeukeaigauccanee

Bt Pereer Perr Tere Ter fe er

Be.) ee eee errr rrr re re

DRE) sonnei 2985 Se ee ee eee

3 Seeks eds eses 6O000.0.0606RamD 3» 9, 16, 5

3 LOBB(D)evevnvvvereeveseveseseessesesseres

5 L9BS ccccccvcccvevcseseveedsasy 8, 9, 49, 59

“H

E-T-510-PhG-DETEEEREEERE REE EEE on

5GOGi. pecccvecesceeetesance 8, oy 16, 4g, 59

wm uu

BED) vs cba b eet o0e b000 60 €6 06 0800408 be hae

§ 1984 4

TeVerr er er To TeeeT ET ee ee.

Age Discrimination Act of 1967

Bcc 6 coe 6:00 68 5000566060 4000 008 bRe ORS

Sec. S623 (D)ccvevccvvcvccvevecsesevesvvesvesed

25 U.S.Ceo}

gtr et erreevrrryrrrcrrrr rier eer ry

D 2208. vow eet. 0.00 00 060.00 600606 6 000-6 0 000000 cone

$1292(D) a vevcccccvvvvvveveceversesessereen ese

BD LBBLivvccccvecevvvsevvvevsevesesecseveseay LO

BS 16S5l(a)icrcccccvccvcsssecvccssesevesvvevsees

Indiana Civil Rights Law of 1971

IC 1971, 22-FaL et. SOQereeevvsvesvvesevsy 47

Administrative Adjudication Act of the

State of Indiana IC 1971, 4e22—-leve vere evene3

Rules of the Supreme Court of the

United States

Rule 17 (a) ici ae adhd eeee ene Raa 46, 61

Page

Rule 17 cde (Gd see eveevr ewe weee ee eee so 6eeseueene ee

Rule SC isk 6 bow ho 400 6066608 0 Chee Oke & OERS 42

a pedtaa he

ederal Rules of Civil

Law's 00.2 +0008 66 aed

Slaleccccccccccces

BCE Reason nese 6teae

S SCA (Zbeccccsceces

StL) ccavwendesee ee

lOve sec vscvevvvece

Lecce cnveccececene

L2(Aa)eveveveveeees

L2(D)(E)aeeeveeens

L2(C)evesveveveves

L2(L)eccccecevcece

L2(N)evvevecccsees

3S(a)(O)ecevecveee

29 (a)esecveceroees

UO. rccccccescccces

it) 6) ee ee

S2(D)(C)eveveveees

54(b

ELS )ococvacesceese

i} eee

pbINDUEREEERERETEE ET

TETTTULICRT CLT

ooeel3, 14, 155 33, 50

eee eee ell, 19, 40, 41

TERT URELTIOR ES ST Ly, 57

ebeceteeee eee ve encun

coe cecccecececeenty 47

seeaevoesceuseseenseneau

TEPER ELIEE? OL 56, 5?

pocsl®y 365 SP, 60,-61

ee@eeetetee ee @@ © £08 esveel

svecd, Si 37, 862 62

cover eccceccccecccee d/

ccoccecccecccenescce Sf

cece ren eceneeereety 37

rere eeteeeveee @©@e @e tee E

Cece ec erereseeveseee te

ecocncccnscvedeccceces te

TYERTIRELELIL EES Or eu

see eeeceeeeuseseceent

‘

Pace

Rule LLIC PEREUREEERIEERIDEEEEE EEE RETR TE

Rule SS(a)(D)(L)esevereressevevesevvesvany SH

Rule S5(a)(O)(d)erecvevevevrevevevvvevevevvege

Rule S5(O)(Ljccvecvescveveevveresvevevemey oo

Rule 60(B)(B)eccccccercceccccccevcceve eda, 40

Rule 60(D)(S)eeroveveseveveeevveveveveesay HO

Rule 60(b)(b)eresvvvsevesevevveversvvseday 40

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure

PUL] Zlosevccrereveeesrsverersvevereveresverevae

PUL] 21 (a)iverevrvvevvvevrevevevereverevever da

RUL@ Z1L(D)evevvsvereveservvvevrevesvevev verve

Rule 21(C)esseveveverveeeveervesevvady avy 52

Rules of the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Indiana,

South Bend Division:

Rule -IRUUUEEEUERERERTLERERTIE EEL eee

PUL] Prsvocvecvereseeverereseveresevrereverac

RULE 7(B)ecccccceccccccvcveccveserececcesveeds

RUL@ L2ccrervvvecvceveveseeevevvevveservaey af

Magistrate Rules of the District Court

Me2(B)(D)eccccccccreccccceverevvererevevees ad

MeZ(Aerevcvvcrcccvecevereververeverevers vee

Member er creer erer ee eee eeeeeeeres ‘* ooevcees ae

xiii

Page

MISCELLANEOUS

ABA Commission on Standard of Judicial

Administration, Tentative Drafts of

Hh a 4 i] la . -

FOUrth ec cecercserecsvorsvesveeseessersOay 62

dv y = & ce Book (1980)

ection/ 3, 2+

"Standard of Peview,”

by Fichard OE CNT eT ee Te

Articles of Incorporation of the

Corporation of St. Mary's College,

Notre i eek a eosin ee yoke. 4 be CARON

Black's, Law Dictionary (1979 Ed.)

DePSlevevvevevesevvvverevsss oe seeesevevevvr dss

Code of Judicial Conduct

Car.on VWA)(U)recccerevevevreevevveverersere da

Canon VA) (S)eccccvccreeevevcccvvveversseer je

Contractual Agreements Between

St. Mary's College, Notre Dame,

and DEL GCL OAM 2s 5565500000 0.00 50608000 0060009

Stern, Robert L. and Eugene Gressman,

Cour ice, Fifth Ed. (1978)

GGeerareeererereeeereverreeerereeevy ’ 42

Id., PrAI Fever veerewerreerveereeere vy uy 42

Wedst, Federal, Forms (1977) 8 2510000c0cees 36

Weight, Charles Alan, Han¢ :

of Federal Courts (1976) re LPR! i, 6

Wright, Charles Alan and Arthur R. Miller,

wilV a G9), Ode WETTILEIEL EEE TP Ys

xiv

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals (App.

A, pp. itae2ia) is not reported. The opinion

of the District Court (App. BeF, pp. 22a-3Sa)

is not reported. The opinion of St. Joseph

Circuit Court, South Bend, Indiana (App. H,

pp. 27a-38a) is not reported. The opinion of

Indiana Civil Rights Commission (App. I-K,

pp. 39a-446a) Ls not reported.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals (App.

L, pp. 47a-48a) was entered on March 1, 1983,

A petition for rehearing was denied on March

28, 1983 (App. My, pp.» 49a-50a). On May 23,

1923, Honorable John Paul Stevens, Associate

Justice of the Supreme Court of the United

States extenced the time within which to file

a writ of certiorari to and including July 29,

1983, and on May 31, 1923, the same Associate

Justice further extended the time for filing

a petition for writ of certiorari to and ine

cluding August 25, 1983. A motion for extene-

sion of time to file petition for rehearing

was denied on March 23, 1983

S2a). Judgment for the district court (App. C,

pp. S3a-54a) was entered on December 7, 1981.

The judgment of St. Joseph Circuit Court,

South Bend, Indiana (App. F, p. 57a) was en-

tered January 29, 1979. A motion for relief

from order was “overruled” by St. Joseph Cir-

ult Court (App. 2, p. 62a) on April 26, 1979.

appeal was dismissed by a commissioner of

the ICRC "who at the same time... affirmed

‘/its/ Director's findings)" on October 1%,

1978 (App. I, p. 42a). The jurisdiction of

this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 8 1254

(1), of the Court of Appeals under § 1291 and

that of the Cistrict Court under 8 1331,

Supra - Federal question.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,

ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

The pertinent parts of the text of the fol-

lowing Constitutional Provisions, Statutes,

Ordinances involved in the instant case are

set forth in Appendices, II. .

1. U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 10. cl. 1,

Art. III, sec. 2, Amend. I, Amend. VY, Amend.

VII, Amend. XIV, sec. 1 (App. A*, pp. 1€1la-

182a).

2. “Civil Rights": Civil Rights Act of

1964, sec. 703(a)(1)(2), sec. 704(a); 42 U.S.

C. B 2000e-2.(a), 8 2000e-3.(a) (App. 2B*,

pp. 183a-184a); 42 U.S.C. 6B 1983, 1985(d)(c),

1986 and 1988 (App. C*, pp. 185a-189a);

Age Discrimination Act of 1967, sec. 623(a),

sec. 623(0) (App. D*, p. 190a); Indiana Civil

Rights law IC 1971, 22-921 (App. E*, pp. 19ia-

197a).

3. Federal Magistrates Act of 1979 (Supp.

1980), 28 U.S.C. 8 636(b) and 8 636(c) (App.

F*, pp. 19&a-202a); Magistrates Rules of the

U.S. District Court for the Northern District

of Indiana (App. G*, pp. 203a=-205a).

4, Administrative Adjudication Act of the

State of Indiana - IC 1971, 4=22-1 (App. H*,

Pp» 206a- 217a).

5. Articles of Incorporation of the Corpo-

ration of St. Mary's College, Notre Dame (App.

L?, pd. 14a-2272a).

«t

6. Contractual Agreement between St. Mary's

Notre Dame, IN and the Petitioner

hony Ostric, a former

full professor of Anthropology and Sociology

at St. Mary's College, Notre Dame, Indiana,

is certain that, in the instant case, the dee

that his case presents questions of great

importance and that, under the circumstances,

only this most Honorable Court can decide

these questions.

E.G. Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362

J.-S. 199; Washington v. United States, 357.

U.S 248 as Cited b St - d I d

U.S. 348 civec Oy sterm, Robert L. an

rugene Gressman, Supreme Court Practice,

Ti¢+ny TA (1098 90

a a ne Oe ee Lear (VC/» De > Pe

1. The Petitioner - a lay in matters of

law yet unable to find a lawyer to represent

him*: © brought, on his own behalf, this civil

case (to be tried by jury) before the United

States District Court for the Northern Dis-

trict of Indiana, South Bend Division, Honor-

able Allen Sharp, Judge. He commenced his

action (File No, S79=-256) by filing, on

August 31, 1979, his Complaint agains<+ St.

Mary's College, Notre D

fendants previously named (pvii ); he did so

only after he became certain that his plead-

*- The Equal Employment Cpportunity Commis-

Sion (hereinafter EEOC) in its NOTICE oF

RIGHT TO SUE, issued to the Petitioner,

August 8, 1979, notified the latter that

oi eee Or annot afford or... /was/

unable to ttetn a lawyer to represent

Jens yo + « the: Civil Rights Act o u

as amended, 42 U.S.C. /8/ 2000e-5(2)(1) per

mits the U.S. District Court having jurisdic

tion in + «+ /nis/ case tc appoint 2 lawyer

to represent. . /nim/": subsequently, on

August 31, 1979, the Petitioner filed nis

Motion For Appointment Of Courisel with the

Trial Court, whose Judge, Honorable Allen

ed «

‘Oo

On:

SarP s denied it on September 25, 1979.

hen, on October 1, 1979, this Jucge reversed

himself sua sponte and officially informed

the Petitioner, through his legal Clerk,

Marty Kus, that the Trial Court decided to

appoint counsel for the Petitioner. This

Judge's decision was not carried out.

ing is “so construed as to do substantial

justice";* and that "the claim/s/... /are/

ourt nhac emphasized that rules require the

Complaint to give the. Defendant/s/ ‘fair no-

are and the grounds upon which... .. /they/

rest/-/'",*#* That the Petitioner's Complaint

‘App. Y%, 2-2/4, 2/6, pp. 73a-i5ia, 165a=-180a)

and from the presentation that follows.

2. In his Complaint (NR. 1 § 1, pe 1) the

8(f), Federal Rules of Civil Proce-

ht, Charles Alan, Handbook of th

w of Federal Courts (1976), p. 321

(footnote omitted).

### Conley v. Gidson, 78 S.Ct. at 103, 355

at SE,

bso

S. cited by Wright, id., pe 323.

deriving from it... . were denied, abridged,

violated... ty the Corporation of St.

Mary's College, Notre Dame /IN/ (hereinafter

"St. Mary’s College’) and Defendants the Con-

gregation of the Sisters of the Holy Cross

(hereinafter ‘the Sisters of the Holy Cross'),

Rita Mary Cassidy/; they/ engaged in numer-

ous and various improper, wifair.. . and

unlawful (concerted) conspiratorial actions

(by commission and/or omission) against...

Petitioner/ to accomplish an unlawful pur-

poses deprivation and/or denial of ... /Fee

titioner's/ equal rights (privileges) and

opportunities, and his dismissal or forced

resignation, and most recently (June 1978)

forced retirement” (App. Y, pp. 74a-75a).

Defendants John Duggan, Jason D. Lindower,

Michael R. McKee and Sister Rose Bernard

Tarleton later fafter July 1975) joined this

conspiratorial group (hereinafter the above

named group of nine (9) Defendants will be

referred to as "Administration and Faculty")

by engaging themselves also in the above de-

scribed concerted actions against the Peti-

t+ioner, constituting the same continuing con-

spiracy under 42 U.S.C. 88 1985 and 1986 for

the same described purpose (App. Y, p- 75a).

After July 1975, the Defendants Adminis-

tration and Faculty were joined by another

group of Defendants including two attormeys,

Frederick F. Thornburg and Thomas C. Murray

and the law firm of which they are a part

Thornburg, McGill, Deahl, Harman, Carey and

Murray (hereinafter this law firm and these

Defendants Attormmeys will be referred to as

"the Lawyers") to become in their turn an

integral part of the above described civil

conspiracy against the Petitioner by engaging

themselves in similar concerted actions

against the latter and for the same conspir-

atorial purpese (ib.).

After February 1978, the remaining group

of Defendants consisting cf Mary W. Shafer,

Commissioner of the ICRC; J.L. Maynard, Dis

rector of the ICRC; John C. Carey, Chairper-

son of the ICRC; Theodore L. Sendak, Attomey

General of Indiana; Carol Ann Bowman, Deputy

Attorney General; and John W. Montgomery,

Judge of St. Joseph County Circuit Court,

South Bend, Indiana (hereinafter referred to

as "Public Officials") willfully joined the

two other groups of Defendants named above in

their continuing civil conspiracy uncer 42

U.S.C. 88 1985 and 1986 as well as under

§ 1983. In doing so, they frustrated all Fe-

titioner's efforts in seeking justice and

relief in this matter (App. Y¥, pp. 76a-77a).

Mul +3 a of $ are presented

in the Petitioner's Complaint (88 7.<-12.,

pp. 2-3) as is an ample set of facts (88 13.-

152., pp» 3-70), throughly documented, in

support of his claim showing that the Peti-

tioner "is entitled to relief" (Rule &(a)(2),

supra) as a victim of the Defendants' fol-

lowing actions:

1) a gontinuinge civil conspiracy under

42 U.S.C. 8B 1985 (bd) and (c) ane 8 1986

(App. C*, pp. 185a-189a) as well as under

6 1983 (id., pe 185a) including clear in-

stances of misconduct, false presentation,

libel and perjury (App. Y, pp. 74a=75a)1

(2) Discrimination because of the Peti-

tioner's personal and culturel world view,

including his religion (beliefs) and person-

al and cultural values deriving from his na-

tio ori ° : y (id., ppe 77a=78a).

(3) +aliation because on several occa-

sions the Petitioner made charges, filed

complaints and acted as witness against St.

Mary's College and some (powerful) members

of its community (ib.,)s

(4) breach of contract, contractual and

other agreements between the Petitioner and

St. Mary's College accompanied with arbitary

illegal actions against the Petitioner, such

as deprivation of his regular salary, denial

of his sabbatical leave, denial of exemption

from retirement at age 65 and not responding

to his application for a new opening (ids,

79a).

In his Complaint, jurisdiction of the

Trial Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1331

(App. Y, p 74a) and the constitutional provi-

sions, statutes, ordinances, laws and regula-

tions which - according to the Petitioner's

claims - have been violated by the Defendants

various unlawful actions constituting several

causes of action described above (pp. 9-10)

are specifically stated (id., pp. 76a=77a);

however, the Petitioner asserts that - based

on his case as a whole and particularly on

the ample set of facts contained in his Com-

plaint (88 13.-152.; see App. 2, pp. 80a-131a

and App. Z/1, pp. 132a=-135a) = his claim of

conspiracy is the pivotal one and all other

claims made by the Petitioner against all

Defendants are ) + d a stem

In the Conclusion of his Complaint (pp.

71-72), and, in accordance with Rule 2(a),

Pederal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Peti-

tioner clearly made "a demand for judgment

for the relief to which he deems himself

entitled” with his “claim against... /each

of/ defendant/s/ .. . for a sum certain,"

within the meaning of Rule 55(>)(1), Supra:

in addition, the Petitioner's claim of total

pecuniary, compensatory and punitive damages

against all Defendants is for a sum of

$8,931, 600.00.

By his Affidavit in support (dated August

31, 1979), attached to his Complaint, the Pe-

titioner did "certify (under oath) that... .

+ tatemen (in the foregoing and attached

Complaint ) e +rue and correct and th -

ig made... upon... (his) personal mowl-

edge of said facts" (emphasis added).

3. On September 22, 1979, on behalf of Dee

fendants Administration and Faculty, Vincent

P, Campiti, one of their attorneys,* filed

untimely a Motion To Dismiss tegether with a

* Their second attomey being Arthur A. May.

Contrary to the provisions of Rule 5(a),

and Rule 5 of the Trial Court, <shis

attorney never served his formal written

appearance upon the Petitioner. Attorney

Vincent P. Campiti never properly, nor bow wid

served his formal appearance upon the Fet

tioner.

“emorandum in Support; stated in this Motion,

the Defendants “move that... /the Peti-

sioner's/ complaint be dismissed uncer rules

8, 10 and 12 on the ground that “he complaint

is basically an jncomprehensibse, «+ + une

clear, . . . pleading consisting of ...- ge

On October 12, 1979, on behalf of Lefen-

dants Public Officials, Theodore L. Sendak,

Attorney General, by Robert F. Colxer, Assis-

sant Attorney General, filed a Motion To Dis-

miss (together with a Memorandum) in which 4

was stated that they "move the Court to dis-

miss... /the Petitioner's/ action under

Federal Rule of Civil procedure 12(>)(4),

for the reason that the... /Petitioner/

has failed to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted.”

On October 17, 1979, the Petitioner filed

timely and under Rules 54(c) and 55(a) and

(>)(1), /supra/ ... his “Demand for Judg-

ment By Default", together with a Memorandum

in Support, against Defendants Adm: inistration

and Faculty in which the Fetitioner claimed

their said Motion +o Dismiss, together with

a Memorandum, was filed untimely, in LY »

and for fraudulent ard dilatory purposes,

being therefore invalig. The Fetitioner re-

quested that the Clerk of Trial Court enter

a default against these verte alter-

fee

tO)

ap |

natively that the latter be requested to file,

within 10 days, an answer to the Petitioner's

Complaint in form of a properly prepared re-

sponsive pleading (App. 2/3 and 2/4, pp. 139a=

151a).

On November 7, 1979, on dehalf of Defen-

dants Lawyers, attormey R. Kent Rowe filed

untinely a Motion to Dismiss (together with

a Memorandum in Support) in which it was

stated that these Cefendants “move that... .«

/the Petitioner's/ claim for relief be

stricken and dismissed as to these moving

Defendants in accordance with Rules & and

12(f), /gupra/ .. . because said pleading is

replete with scurriious, offensive and obdiec=

tionable allegations and should not be per-

i+ 4 + A ~~ + + | ;

mitted to remain of record; the form of clain

+ 9 + + 9 - ‘ - 9 4

Zor relief fails *o comply with Rule 8 require

his "Response To The Attorney General's Moe

court. in this pleading (NR. &, p. 4), the

Petitioner claimed that these "Defendants -

by filing said Motion to Dismiss in...

/said/ Court... = did + 3 .

with £t3 d iv

: -s '; fand that/ they

g ; i ¥v o

a, responsibilities, nor duties toward the

/Petitioner/, a citizen of the United States.”

As stated above (p. 11), contrary to these

Defendants' allegations in their Motion to

Dismiss, the Petitioner claimed that there

are abundant facts in the Petitioner's Com-

and Administration and Faculty) in continuing

civil conspiracy (a) under 42 U.S.C. S88 195

facts indeed amply shew - without even consid-

ering the question of eventual liability of

Public Officials under § 1983 - Defen-

s ointly engaged with

Defendants Public /State/ Officials in various

prohibited actions against Petitioner; they

acted “under color of ... /law and/ sub-

sect/ed/, or cause/d/ to be subjected... .

/the Petitioner/ to the deprivation of...

rights, /and/ privileges .. . secured by

the Constitution and laws" of the United

tates (App. C*, p. 185a)s among others,

those secured by its Amendments I, V, VII,

These prohibited actions were made "under

trative Adjudication Act /of Indiana/ -- I¢

1971, 4e22-1 (App. H*, pp. 206a-217a). In

this pleading, the Petitioner prayed the

rial Court that these Defendants' "said dila-

tory claim without merits contained in said

» « « ‘Motion to Dismiss' and 'Memorandum'

de rejected and their ‘Motion to Dismiss’

lied..." or alternatively, that said De-

Zendants be required to file, within 10 days,

their answer to the Petitioner's Complaint in

form of a properly prepared pleading (NR. 2,

pp. 2-9).

Cn November 20, 1979, the Petitioner filed

his "Notice About Defendants’ Contempt For

The Federal Rules And Of Petitioner's Obiec-

tions To Defendants' Motion To Dismiss" (NR.

9), namely against Defendants Lawyers; th

Petitioner claimed Defendants Lawyers showed

. +~omnr:

con Temps

$7 FV e¢ -~-

/illustrative

wee

1979. . «. »" (emphasis added). Yet, without

expressing any excuse or reason, they left

the time to expire without filing their re-

ponsive pleading! Instead of the responsive

pleading, they filed untimely, - 3 days after

tion to Dismiss.” The

s invalid

it was not filed

their invalid "Moe

Petitioner claimed that

for the following rea-

+-—

melyv; not served

= 8)

offensive matter which does not £0 *0 merit

(NR. 9, pe 3).* Therefore, the Fet

prayed that the Trial Court declare said "Mo-

tion To Dismiss" null and order these DLefen-

dants to file their responsive pleading with

in 10 days (id., pp. 6=7).

4, In the three months following the

filing (August 31, 1979) of the Fetitioner's

Complaint, no oper step hac ceen taken

ither by the Trial Court or by the Defen-

=. * 4 = 2 *

dants; no ruling had deen made either upon

the Defendants' aforementioned “Motions to

Dismiss” or upon the Petitioner's three afore-

said pleadings - succeeding his Complaint -

even though each of the Fetitioner's pleac-

ings contained "two or more statements of

a claim /requests/ made in the altermmative”

(Rule 8(a), supra). None of the Defendants

* These reasons are similar to those for

which the Petitioner Claimed (on po. 13-14)

that the aforesaid ‘Motion te Di

by Defendants Adminis tion and Faculty was

invalid.

ever filed a responsive pleading despite

le 12(a), supra, which in its relevant

part provides: ". . . The service of a motion

permitted under this rule /including Motions

to Dismiss/ alters this period /in the afore-

said Defendants' matter, 20 days/ to time as

notice of the court's action.” (Emphasis ad-

ded.) AcCordingly, the Petitioner concluded

that - by its nonruling upon the Defendants’

said "Motions to Dismiss" and by its Order

of December 3, 1979 (App. S, p. 65a) = the

Trial Court indeed, de facto, "postpone/d/

its disposition /of these Motions" //intil

the crial* on the merits.” (Rule 12(a), supra.)

* In the sense of "/a/ judicial examination

and determination of issues between parties

to actions... (citation omitted)" (Black's

Law Dictionary (1979 ed.), p.» 1348) = in the

present case - by the judge, sua sponte with-

out trial by jury even though the petitioner

demanded a tri

It should be pointed out here that not

nly has the Trial Court failed to rule upon

Fretitioner's requests in all three above de-

used to comply with Feder

[nd

“”

”

i ed

Procedure. He made the following serious error

prejudicial toward the

of a statement made in the folio of the docke-

et of the adove entitled cause: "Clerk's

judgment (by default) not entered because re-

pleading is on file in the instant case. This

Clerk, as well as the Trial Court, continously

refused to correct this serious error despite

the Petitioner's persistent requests made

in several of his pleadings filed with said

District Court. (Sees App. 2/5, pp. i61a=

163a.)

5. On December 3, 1979, "/t/he within case

/of the Petitioner's suit/ .. . /was/ submite

ted to the Honorable G.5. Lee, United States

Nagistrate, for all necessary pretrial proce-

dure... « within authority of his office."

On January 15, 1980, because 43 days had

elapsed after the Trial Court's foregoing

order with no action whatsoever in the ine

Stant case, the Petitioner filed his "Motion

Local Rules and 12. The Court failed to

rule upon this ‘Motion.

On January 21, 1980, after having received

"Notice" (App. T, pp. 66a-67a) from the Trial

Court Clerks's Office regarding the Petition-

ers "right to consent to have... /said

Magistrate conduct any or all proceedings in

a jury or nonjury civil matter, and order

the entry of judgment... .," the Petitioner

declared himself “unwilling to consent,"

Signed his “REFUSAL TO CONSENT” and filed it

with the Court. (App. U, p. 68a.)

Furthermore, since during the more than

with said Order, and ocecause said Magistrate

rule upon this Motion.

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure request-=

ing said Court of Appeals to issue an extra-

ordinary writ requiring that the Trial Court

Gionorable Allen Sharp, Judge) “promptly do

wnat should be done in accordance with the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, laws and

Constitution of the United States” (NR. 13,

p. 4).

On May 3, 1980, Robert

for Defendants Fublic Officials filed with

said Court of Apneals "Response to Applica-

tion For Writ" and "move/d/ the Court to De

ny and Dismiss the /Fetitioner's/ Applica-

tion for Writ... /stating/ that...

/the entire instant/ action should be dis-

missed and all costs be assessed against

the... /Petitioner/ and... /that he/

be ordered to pay the fees of defendants’

attormey and all other expenses occasioned

dy this action." Yet, this "Response", pre-

pared and filed by said Assistant Attorney

General of Indiana, is in direct violation

of Rule 21, supra, to which he referred,

particularly Rule 21(b6) which deals with

Order Directing Answer" and provides that,

"the answer to the petition /application/

be filed by the respondents and all other

parties /only/ in the time fixed by the

/Circuit Court's/ Order." There was no such

Order. In addition, said "Response" was

written in language offensive to the Peti-

tioner using words which are defamatory ver

se. Despite that, this Court of Appeals cor-

Siderec this "Response" as a bona fide plead-

On August 5, 1980 - eight months after

the Trial Court's Order involving the afore-

App. S, p. 65a) and only once several inqui-

ies were mace by members of the Appellate

court's legal staff - the Petitioner received

"Notice of Hearing" (App. vs De 69a) from

said Magistrate calling "/t/he hearing

defendants' separate and several

ing Of The Hearings on Defendants’ Separate

and Several Motions to Dismiss", together

with a "Erief Of Objections To Magistrate's

Calling Of Hearings..." and Affidavit in

Support (NR. i416). The Petitioner took

ticular § £26(>) (App. F*, pp. 198a-199a; anc

a . , ‘ye 4 . dy .

Rules Me2(a)(bd), Me3(a) and Me4% of the Mag-

20 3a-20+a); in accordance with these Rules,

the Petitioner respectfully requested “that

Th» 3 Ses D3 : Ray) ;

Inited States District Court, set aside th

call ef said hearings under the aforemen-

+ioned Rules for the reasons that (1) it is

not_in compliance with said Rules; (2) there

- =

are no valid ‘Defendants’ Motions to Dis-

; $3) wi +) : a :

miss’ filed with this Court of the above

siderec during said hearings: (3) /even

if there were/ such pending valid 'Defen-

¢ants' separate and several Motions to Dis-

miss' . . . properly filed, said United

States Magistrate could not conduct any such

hearings on such /dispositive/ Motions to

Dismiss without the consent cof all varties

under the Federal Magistrates Act of 1979;

serve 'the best interest of

Cn August 19, 1980 - despite the Fetition-

er's said written "Obdjections To Magistrate's

Calling of the ‘Hearings ...'" = said Mage

istrate held these "hearings" on this date

and proceeded, as he put it, “in confermity

with 8 636(c) /sic/ ef said act /i.e. the

objection dy the Trial Court. Said Magistrate

(together with the Trial Court) was aware

that, as stated above, the Fetitioner simed

and filed (January 22, 1980) his “Refusal to

Consent", and that = according to § 636(c) -

* The cover sheet of the a belonging to

the instant case bears th e following indica-

tions "“Dispositive consent Refused"; this

statement was added ter the ee

filing of said “Ref fusal to Consent

jury civil matter and order. . » when spe-

jally desimmed to exercise such jurisdiction

by district court..." (App. F*. pp. 199a=

200a; App. G*, pp. 204a-205a). (Emphasis

The magistrate conducted and termi-

improperly and without

Determination of Petitioner's Applicae-

tion for Writ" (NR. 17) with the Seventh

ak - CArs A 1 ; 7

Cireuit Court of Appeals; this was followed

: Siting + mimi} 4 ;

by the filing cf two similar pleadings, at

the interval of a month, for the same pur-

12]

(vo

). Nevertheless, on December

16, 1980, the Court of Appeals entered its

ruling as follows: "It is ORDERED that the

Petition for writ of mancanus §s DENIED.

Examina

owledgec,

‘al se!

~~ ome

una

former

wae

the

fA TA:

~~ ——~

mace

was

9 '

sattver

“as

.ne

mecessa

all

fA,

-~-

to -

a i oF

“A O-dl Ww -«

> aA w

rps ;

Ply eed ty

Su Pp @

oz; AW

, od ow

P m4: Po

~ ow

Pha &&

Wom perl

44erl i

- PHY

ome) Sent

Poo © B

3S -rt LD

ov ® + @

oe oe | | oa ot

PPR AN

5: Oa ow

“A Py, oN

Oo aie 7

Pr, oS | Oo

SS Pp

Oo Oo =

PmOo Po

a) se

Pet @ @ =

os en oi

Oo1y-~-1 ow

1 I vpn

Ak OM be

1 @ ae)

Su > - §%

@oqm: gg, )

A650” Oe

‘ ~ ea =

OS FO +?

“+4 @ al ~ i 3

so OH

+ O 5 a +

ie | N* Oo

x pE~-*€

ve.

stra

i to Honore

ressec

adda

epared in

Report was pr

and

Trial Court

the

That

titioner prayed:

Invalid for

'Repor

decléere

-roe

wee

That

cated above; and

; ;

ind:

a~ee =

reasons

vie

Carne

~OUTT

Trial

+ho

wees

with

-~*

i a)

~ss

made

ose

~n"

Owing addi-

fal/

pao)

-_--

the

“

court ace

ee Ue ge

v UCLcCialt

P+)

(Code o

g to law’

neard according

t+,

tion

20U

icial

S prejudi

instant

in the

oner

case)"

ne heed

5). Instead of taki:

nz/

spos/

"ad

nsibdilities and

ve respo

aness

y of the dusi

rompt

. . ‘ /(- . ~ -. . é

+he instant case (code of Judicial Conduct,

(a “ 4 4 -* fan 24 Pawns 5 nh “+!

~ mon J\A) J ’ Le azoresaiad jig ag + 84 ~ Aw Vv s

"..A = _ Aa, PB

* a a ~

wenee& Once more

pleadings; he saiied to rule upon this Motson.

Cn March 3, 1381, the Trial Court entered

its Order together with Memorandum and Order,

in a joint document (App. F, pp. 29a-35a),

/> SA ' / S

that the... /Petitioner's/ motion. for

- - - - - aa

entry of default and default judgment” oe

aaron “4 , sd aay

DENIED and /all three of the Defendants

miss be GRANTED, except with regard to the

. . fand/ that... /ne/ file an amended

complaint limited to those claims in confor-

* As stated above

(Z/3, pe i41a) the

that “the c k

agairst /a group o befem ants,

Administration and Faculty .. .."

"Notion for Relief from Judgement” (NR. 32

pursuant to Rules 60(bd)(2)(4) and (6) and re-

quested that the Trial Court grant him relief

from judgment contained in its Crder of

farch 3, 1981 by setting aside the latter

(id., Dp» 1) for the reasons thoroughly pre-

sented in said motion.

On April 14, 1981, the Trial Court denied

the Petitioner's said "Motion for Relie=l fron

Judgment" without givine any reason for this

“Motion for Determination of . .. /his/

Fntire Case..." (NR. 39); in it he moved

that the Trial Court "examine the whole re-

cord of the above en*itled cause and make

determination of the /Petitioner's/ entire

case, correct errors and overrule ail the

Court's decisions-denials-orders stated in

its Order of March 3, and April 14, 1981 (see

App, FP, pp. 34a=-35a and App.E, p. 28a) and

. J .

srover relief requested since /commencing

“osurt's decisionsedenials and orders, stated

: . eg SLY si i

above, in particular the Court's order that

said Motion, the Petitioner declared: “For

the purpose of clarity, . . . /he/ considers

it relevant to state here as follows: As... .

in several of his pleadings (filed since

Jof the Petitioner's/ .. .' as ordered by

the Court's aforesaid Order entered March 3,

\App. 7, pp. j4a-35a); such an amendment

would strike a vital blow to the... /Peti«=

tioner's/ whole action of which all claims

* The Petitioner so informed the Trial Court

as early as Cctober 1, 1979 through its

legal Clerk, Marty Kus (see above p. 5).

are closely interr@lated and stem from the

same civil conspiracy engaged in by all Defen-

(see above, p.ll); the latter's said decision

law does not permit or require the doing of an

act which will result only in loss." (See

Black's Law Dictionary (1979 ed.), p.951) It

is pertinent to also state here that those

claims to which the P

i id

| a

sp |

“

cs |

plaint would be limited, according to the

Trial Court's said Order (of March 3, 1951) are

already amply presented in the Petitioner's

Complaint.

On November 24, 1981, the Trial Court en-

tered its Order (App. D, p.26a) denying the

Petitioner's aforesaid "Motion for Determina-

tion of the... /Petitioner's/ Mmtire Case

+ « "3s this Motion was denied not after con-

sidering the Petitioner's “entire case", as

the latter requested, but only, as said Court

stated, "/u/pon careful review of the /Peti-

/for which/ .. . this Court finds insuffi-

cient grounds therein to reverse this Court's

prior ruling (emphasis added)." (App. D, vp. 26a)

it seems pertinent to point out that the Peti-e

tioner's said Motion was denied with no follow

ip = at that time, or ever - notifying the Fe-

ioner that, "if he fails so to do /i.e. to

amend his Complaint according to said Court's

Order of March 3, 1981/, the /Petitioner's/

action shall stand dismissed with prejudice as

-~-y

t day". (Wedst's Federal Forms (1877),

On November 25, 1981, Vincent Campiti, at-

nz Defendants Administration

and Faculty, filed with the Trial Court "Moe

or Judgment On The Pleadings For Fail-

ure To State A Claim Upon Which Relief Can fe

Granted” /NR. 44); in it these Defendants “pur-

quest the court to enter Judgment on the

Pleadings for the moving defendants on the

ground that... /the Petitioner/ has failed

* Furthermore, there were several instances

in the instant case in which the Trial Vourt,

Honorable Allen Sharp, Judge, did not carry

out its decision (see above footnote, p-.5)

nor follow up on its Order (App. X, p.72a;

see above, pp. 32-34)

upon

e acla

o stat

." These Defen

“

_ , fF

perciy

ot pro

”

“*

arty ma

ead

’

;

ings..

a”

e pl

fal, any

tT on tN

one

}

r Reversa

Le)

fr,

morandu

d fil

*For more detail

i ines

“1

Seventh amendments to the Constitution f th

sees aa oes > ACen

nited States /id., p.2/. In this Motion, the

P 3+; . (4 7m Tas a} Cary

retitioner prayed: "(1) That the /Trial/ Court

reverse or amend its prior ruling contained in

its Order of November 24, 1981 /App. D., pp.26a

-27a/ after examining the... /Petitioner's/

entire case... .; (2) That - if... /the

Trial/ Court decides to make an Order of de-

nial of the... /Petitioner's/ ‘Motion For

Reversal . ..' = the /Trial/ Court state in

such Order that the latter is

‘of the opinion that such order /of

denial/ involves a controlling question

of law as to which there is substantial

ground for difference of opinion and

that an immediate appeal from the order

may materially advance the ultimate

termination of the litigation ....'

as prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) /NR. 45,

The Trial Court refused to mile on this Moe

tion and to consider any of the alternative

recuests made by the Petitioner.

Cn December 7, 1981, the Trial Court entered

its final Judement as follows:

"This action came on for (hearing) bee

fore the Court, Honorable Allen Sharp,

United States District Judge, presiding,

and the issues having been duly (heard)

and a decision having been duly rendered,

it is Ordered and Adjudged that...

/the Petitioner/ take nothing by his come

plaint and this case is dismissed.”

/App. 0, pp. S3a-54a/

It is pertinent to state here that = contrary

to the Trial Court's allegations in its afore-

said Judgment - the Fetitioner's case was dise

missec without "this action... (coming) on

for (hearing) before the Court /during which/

Honorable Allen Sharp, United States District

Judge /would be/ presiding and /during which/

the issues /would/ have been duly (heard)...

/and, therefore the Trial Court's said/ deci-

sion by which (this case is dismissed)...

/nas not/ been duly rendered ...."

Besides, in its Order, entered also Decem-

ber 7, 1961, the Trial Court declared that, "in

Ae /cthe Petitioner's/ failure to

amend (complaint), the Court hereby enters a

final order of /its/ dismissal." /App. C,

pp. 24a-25a/

It is equally pertinent to point out that

the Trial Court entered its aforesaid Order of

ant/s/"

& defen

g which

5 ao F's $98

unlawful filin

am fhe

lance

compl

es of sa

AUL

the

with

cedure, nor

Order,

judgment and

f From

Felie

t to

tT pursuan

idavi

Aff

the Petitioner filed aforesaid "Motion For Ree

lief Prom Judgement And Order..." /App. 2/6/

timely and properly in accordance with "Genere-

al Rules of Pleading” contained in Rule @(a),

supra - the Trial Court simply declared in its

final Order that,

"This Court having carefully considered

the record in this case, now DEVIE

said Motion. SO ORDERED /App. 53, pp.22a=

23a/ . ‘ ‘

without giving any reason for its denial.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

"has so far departed from the accepted and u-

cial proceedings... /as

| oe

sual course in jud

well as/ so far sanctioned such a departure by

. « « s/the/ lower court that, as to call from

exercise of this /Supreme/ Court's power of

supervision."* The Court of Appeals did so in

sanctioning the Trial Court's decisions (es-

pecially those contained in its Orders entered

*Rule 17(a), Rules of the Supreme Court of the

United States.

March 3, 1981 (App. F, pp.34a=-35a) and Decem-

plicable decisions of this /Most Honorable/

°?

ourt,"* notably Conley v. Gidson, 355 U.S.

Furthermore, the Trial Court's and the

curt of Appeals’ proceedings and the decisions

of both in sum - having resulted in the depri-

vation of the Petitioners'’s constitutional

rights including those of freedom of exercise

of religion, freedom of speech, the right to

patition Government for a redress of grievances,

right to property without due process of law,

right of equal protection of laws, and es-

pecially "right to jury determination,”** rep-

resent "a gross miscarriage of justice." *#*

*Rule 17(c), supra.

**Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S.

500, 510 - citec by Stern, Robert L. and

Eugene Gressman, Supreme Court Practice

(1978), Pe 293.

362 U.S. 1993

357 U.S. 348 -

Indeed the record shows that the management of

the judicial administration in the instant

case was performed by the Courts below not in

away as to seek truth and justice in accor-

dance with the provisions of Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure "to secure the just, speedy

and inexpensive determination of . .. /the

Petitioner's/ action,” within the meaning of

Rule 1 of the latter, but to the contrary, the

Trial Court's action and the Court of Appeals’

action and sanction constituted involvement in

systematic distortion of the truth and obstruc-

tion of justice.

In addition, there is a substantially large

amount of money involved (38,931,600) as the

Petitioner's claim of total pecuniary, com-

pensatory and punitive, damages against all De-

fendants.

I. A. and 8.

wi dec} of

the Supreme Court of the United States.

(1957), the Court held that

In appraising the sufficiency Of the

complaint we follow of course, the as-

cepted rule that a_complaint should not

be dismissed for failure to state a

claim unless it appears beyond a doubt

the Plaintiff can prove no set of facts

in support of his claim which would en-

title him to relief... « o-

Jt/ne Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

do not require a claimant to set out in

detail the facts upon which he bases his

claim. To the contrary, all the fules

require is "a_ short and Dees statement

of the claim* that will give the defen-

dant fair notice of what the plaintiff's

claim is and the grounds upon which it

rests... ... The Federal Rules reject

the approach that pleading is a game of

skill in which one misstep by counsel

may be decisive to the outcome and ac-

Cc th inciple at u 4

e adj j o facilitate a proper

decision on the merits. Cf. Maty v.

Grasselli Chemical Co., 303 U.S. 197."

emphasis added.

The sufficiency of the Petitioner's Com-

plaint is clearly shown dy the Statement of

the Case and several extended excerpts from

it or the Petitioner's other pleadings’ (see

Appendices Y, Z, Z/l, 2/2, pp. 73a-138a). Both

courts below recognize explicitly that in his

complaint, the Petitioner did definitely prove

a “set of facts in support of his claim which

*Rule 8(a)(2)

would entitle him to relief... /and that he

did/ give the defendant/s/ fair notice of what

» « « Snis/ claim/s/ ... /are/ and the

grounds upon which... /they/ (rest)." Conley

v. Gidson, supra; the Court of Appeals recog-

nized it by declaring:

The district court... held that the

plaintiff had fulfilled the requirements

for filing suit under Title VII. Broadly

construed, the complaint successfully

i m4 VT 17

pleaded a pendant state claim for feanch

of contract (emphasis added). (See. App.

A, Del7a, and App. F, p. 34a)

Therefore, both Courts below, based on their

recognition that the Petitioner's "Complaint

successfully pleaded... claim/s/" and this

Court's decision in Conley v. Gibdson alone,

must have been aware - because of this conflict

- that the latter could not be dismissed and

that the Trial Court’s decision to dismiss the

Petitioner's Complaint represents an abuse of

discretion and disregard for law, and the Court

of Appeals' affirmation of the Trial Court's

said decision “so far departed from the accept-

ed and usual course of judicial proceedings

» . « fand/ so far sanctioned such departure

by . . « /said/ lower court, as to call for an

exercise of this Court's power of supervision."

(Rule 17(a), sguvra.) This abuse of discretion

and disregard for law by both Courts below is

519, at 520-521 (1972) in which it held that

"The District Court erred in dismissin

oy Oe (Petitioner's) pro se complaint

without oP (eh him to present evidence

on Ais claim

es . /a/Viegations such as those

asserted dy petitioner, however inart-

fully pleaded, are sufficient to call

for opportunity to offer supporting

evidence... « «.

» « « /W/e conclude that he is en-

titled to an opportunity to offer proof.

Gross misapprehension of the fact

What follows will show that the Court of

Appeals grossly misapprehended the facts rele-

vent to the issues presented for review, based

its decisions on such misapprehension of the

facts and failed to adhere to proper procedure

particularly in reaching its decision of

March 1, 1983,

"that the judgement of the said District

Court in this cause... is hereby,

AFFIRMED, with costs, in accordance

with the opinion of this Court entered

this date /App. L, pp. 4+7a-42a/."

What is presented in the Statemen* az the Case

and that which follows below clearly show that

this Court of Appeals' said opinion consists

mostly of manifestly erroneous allegations

contrary to the facts and inconsistent with

themselves and the Court's other allegations.

The Court of Appeals' opinion contains the

following allegations:

vriefs, the court notified the parties

that it had tentavively concluded that

oral argument would not be helpful to

the court in this case.. ». «. /See App.

A, footnote, pp. ia-2a) .

o e . .

Plaintiff applied for a writ of manda-

mus in. an attempt to speed up the trial

court's determination of this case in

appeal No. 90-1541. That application was

denied in an order dated December 16,

1980.. . ee Fite: PD. Sa-6a/

"After a preliminary examination of the

A. Validity of Defendant's Motions to

Dismiss

Plaintiff claims that he was entitled

to a default judgment against all of the

defendants for failing to file an answer

Within twenty days, Plaintiff filed a mo-

tion for default judgment on October 17,

1979 after the defendants had filed Rule

12 motions to dismiss on seprember co,

and on vuctoocer -<, . The judge

refused to grant a default judgment be-

cause the entry of a default would heve

been a mere formality due to the exise-

tence of good cause to set it aside. The

gooc cause to set a cefault aside was

the fact that Ostric’s complaint failed

to state a ciain upon which relief could

be granted except as to a few aims};

therefore the nlaintiff was : entitled

to _jucement. In addition, the judge re-

Zusec to grant a default judgement be-

the defendants had already #

thesr motions to dismiss when plaintirf

asxec the court to enter a default.

* J o ,

E. Submission of the Case to a Magis-

trate

Plaintiff contends that the district

court erred in r ri h 2 oa

United States te without h

consen®. The district court properly fol-

lowed the procedure provided in 28 U.S.C.

s 636(b) (1) (8). » « /See App. Ay pp.

7a-Ga/,

. . o .

ra)

Ce Dismissal of the Complaint with

Leave to File an Amended Complaint

(1) Immunity of the State Defendants

The district court did not err when it

dismissed Cstric's suit against the

Indiana defendants because they w

dDsolutely imm f it. (id., pp.

Ja-10a

(3) Dismissal of the 8 1983 Claim

e = a ~ a aim nde - *)9 198 a

plaintis? mus allece he ons

tional righ was violated under colo

of state law. 4

C ees Vv oe Kress &

KO, Tots op F 14 * 150 a Vje he da} =

Ourt dismissed Os ‘s claim wm-

de : jon 198 ° Lling 0 cemon-

strate or allege sufficient

im of his rigt

ugh Ostric al

tence of a conspiracy,

eges the exis-

fail to support that allegation. .. .

2 plai ~ fai 3 to al ere =a

inf a

The district court properly held that

the plaintizts failed to state a claim un-

der Section 1953 because the remaining de-

fendants, St. Mary's College, the Congre-

gation of the Holy Cross, the named fac-

ulty-members and other college personnel

and the law firm and lawyers representing

the college were not acting under color

of state law.

(4) Dismissal of the 8 1985 Claim

An action under Section 1985 does

not require that a defendant act under

color of state law; therefore, conspira-

cies dy private parties are actionable

under Section 1955. omer eee

Breckenridge, +03 U.S. 1971) ‘eee

St. Mary's is not a state institution

nor did any of the alleged conspirators

attempt to deprive Ostric of his right

of recourse to any state agency or

COUrT.e. «

(5) Dismissal of 88 1986 and 1988

Claims

To state a claim under Section 1986,

a claim must be established under Section

1985. William v. St. Joseph Hospital,

supra. 0 Lied un-

——e 1985, eee

im must fa;

(7) Dismissal of Complaint with

Leave to File an Amended Com-

plaint

Pro se plaintiff Anthony Ostric filed

a 74 page. . . complaint, which...

contains irrelevant comments and claims,

and is so confusing that r onsiv

pleading would be impossidie. The Cimas

dants filed a motion to dismiss on that

pasiSes « oc WE cannot conclude that the

district gree rred order} th

laintitf amend h} omplaint to

th Bor Rul of Civil Pro-

D. Dismissal of the Case for Failure

to Amend

Th estio fw dism

a mplaint fo ilu amend

ict cour The dist 7 a” not

d Vv d adsent a show} ot abu

discretion. See Carl Locasio v. t;

Corporation, No 82-1354, slip op. \7th Cir.

Dec. 2, 1962), Besh v. W f

474 F.2d 127 (7th Cir. 1973 Nine

months after the court ordered the “plain-

tiff to _amend the complaint, t dq t

ou ted the ad d otio

dismiss. for failure to amend the come

; - as

the Basil's case. caveeones v. King

626 Fezd 1075 (ist Cir. 1980).

If!

For the above reasons the district

court order dismissing plaintiff's case

for failure to amend is affirmed.

(Emphasis added. )

The above quoted allegations taken from the

Court of Appeals' aforesaid opinion (See App.

A, pp. la-21a) are erroneous and contrary to

the facts contained above in the Statement of

the Case, aside from the Court's initially

cited allegations in its footnote

A, pp. 1a-2a) regarding oral argument. This

allegation is also false decause the fact

ramains that the Court h

Bis.

“

'—

nt)

‘

the parties tha

cluded that oral argument would not de helpful

to the court in this case." The Court's

dated March 31, 1982 (See App. 7, pp. 63a-

64a) does not contain any such conclusion by

the Court.

As for the Court's allegation regarding

“writ of mandamus” (See App. A, footnote, Dp.

Sa-6a), the truth is that the Petitioner did

e ly for such 2 inary writ under

Rule 21(a), Federal Rules of Appellate Pro-

cedure, but for a writ under Rule 21(c),

supra, as presented above (pp. 22a-25a).

The Court's above cited allegations under

the title: "A. Validity of Defendant's /sic/

Motions to Dismiss," contain nothing about the

“validity” of the latter. What is written un-

der this title indeed mispresents the facts

which are very relevant to the issues present-

ed for review. As shown above, (pp.13-14),

contrary to what the Court's allegations in-

etitioner did not file his "Demand

For Judgment By Default” against all the De-

fendants, but only against Defendants Admini-

stration and Faculty. These Defendants' Mo-

tions to Dismiss as well as the second group

of Defendants, Lawyers, alleged the Petition-

er's Complaint to be "“incomrrehensidle" or

“unintelligible” and accordingly they, these

Defendants, could move only to dismiss the

latter “under Rule @" and they did so even

though they kmew that their allegations were

false and their Motions to Dismiss jnvalid;

the reason these Motions to Dismiss were in-

valid is specifically presented above (pp. i4-

21 and by App. 2/3 and 2/4, pp. 139a-151a).

Based upon all this, or merely upon that which

is directly preceding, (pp. 43-46), or even

only upon the Court of Appeals' recognition

that "the /Petitioner's/ Complaint successful-

ly pleaded... /two claim/s/ ..." (See

above, p. 45; see also App. A, p. 17a), one

is compelled to recognize the Court of Appeals’

allegations under A. (and C.(7) as well) as

2 2 _ 90 +)

completely false and inconsistent with otner

allegations made in the same Court's opinion.

foab?

Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred and

contradicts itself in alleging under A. that

"The /Trial Court's/ judge refused to

grant a default judgment because the

entry of a default would have been a

mere formality due to the existence of

good cause to set it aside. The good

cause to set a default aside was the

fact that Ostric's complaint failed

to state a claim upon which relief

could be granted except as to a few

/sic/ claims. In addition, the Judge

refused to grant a default judgment

because the defendants had already

filed their motions to dismiss when

plaintiff asked the court to enter a

default. /App. A, pp. 7a-8a/

CF 2 eta

. . « Anthony Ostric filed a 74 page. .

» complaint,* which is so confusing

that responsive pleading would be im-

possible. The defendant filed a motion

to dismiss on that basis (under Rule 8,

/and not under Rule 12 as the Court al-

leged before/).. . .. We cannot con-

clude that the district court erred in

ordering the plaintiff to amend his

* The truth is that the Petitioner's

Complaint amounted to 71 and a half

pages in all.

Complaint to comply with Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure." (App. A, pp. 12a-

Furthermore, it should be pointed out that

ust queted, allegation (under A.)

regarding the second reason why "the judge re-

fused to grant a default judgment” represents

additional evidence of the Court of Appeails'

distortion of the cruth. As asserted above

(pp. 13-14) the Fetitioner, under Rules 54(c)

and 55(a) and (bd)(1), supra, requested that

the Clerk of the Trial Court enter a default

“—_

see also App. 2/3 and 2/4, pp. 139a-151a)

and, as stated above (p. 21), the Clerk re-

fuged to comply with Rule 55(a) and (b)(1)3

as the reason for his refusal to enter said

default it was specifically stated on the

folio of the docket: "Clerk's judgment (by

default) not entered because responsive plead-

ing /oy Defendants Administration and Faculty/

already on file" even though no responsive

pleading is on file in the instant case. The

Clers (A. Pope), as well as the Trial Court,

continuously refused to correct this serious

error despite the Petitioner's persistent

requests in several of his pleadings filed

with said District Court. (See 2/5, pp. i61a

-163a).

The Court of Appeals not only proceeded

improperly in not resolving all matter of

doubt in favor of the Petitioner and accepting

the Defendants’ allegations as truth (facts),

but instead they proceeded in a bdiased manner

as advocates in favor of the Defendants, as

demonstrated in several already presented

instances. Additional evidence in this regard

is said Court's acceptance of the Defendants’

allegations as its own and presenting them

after modifying them so as to appear less

absurd, as shown by the following. While the

Defendants Administration and Faculty - as

shown above (p. 13) = alleged the Petitioner's

Complaint to be "an jncomprehensible, .. .

unclear, . .. pleading consisting of ...

immaterial, .. . and scandalous matter...

in_violation of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and beneath the dignity of this

Honorable Court .. . /emphasis added/” (De-

fendant Lawyers alleged similarly (see above

pp. 14-15) ), the Court of Appeals, in its

above cited (pp. 53-54) allegations, mod-

ified the Defendants’ allegations in declaring

the Petitioner's Complaint as “contain/ing/

rrel ¢ comment d ims, and is so

confusing that r v ac would »b

impossible. The defendants filed a motion to

dismiss on that basis." (Emphasis added. )

In addition, it should be pointed out that

for certain the Court of Appeals was aware

that - contrary to their above cited allega-

tions (pp. 47-48) = Rule 12(b)(6) of the Fed-

eral Rules of Civil Procedure cannot logical-

ly be applied unless the basic assumption of

the truth of the complaint is made. A Motion

to Dismiss is a preliminary matter, made in

the case prior to the filing of an answer

which would have clearly put the same case in

issue. In effect, what the Defendants' Mo-

tions to Dismiss seek is to have the Pe-

titioner denied access to the Court with-

out even an opportunity to present his evi-

dence to the trier of fact. All such motions

to dismiss for failure to state a claim (un-

der F.D.R.C. 12(b)(6) are viewed with dis-

favor by the Court and should only be granted

in the most clear cases. Madison v. Furdy,

410 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1969); Swartz v. Eberly,

212 F.Supp. 32 (E.D. Pa. 1962). The only re-

quirement for a complaint is a "short, plain

statement of the claim showing the pleader is

entitled to relief" as stated in the Rule of

Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). this rule only cal-

led for

"pleadings in a federal court action

to indicate that if the allegations in

the complaint are established, the

pleader is entitled to relief under

the substantive law of jurisdiction.

5 Wright & Miller, Eeders. fraguice

and Procedure, Civil 8 1204 (1969)".

Regarding the Court of Appeals' above

cited (on p. 48) allegations under title "B.

Submission of the case to a Magistrate", the

Court of Appeals distorted the truth in de-

claring that

"/i/ Plaintiff contends that the dis-

trict court erred in referring the case

} Nagi with-

out his consent. The district court

ee followed the procedure proce-

In confronting the above allegation (num-

ber /2/) with the pertinent facts pre-

sented above (pp. 22, 25-31) and in his plead-

ings (see App. A/5, pp. 153a-164a), one is

bound to conclude that this allegation re-

presents an instance of irresponsible and

offensive calumny which could be understood

to have been made with malicious desig to

present the Fetitioner as completely irration-

al. It appears even more offensive when one

becomes aware that the improper involvement

ad Magistrate in the instant case has

been shown to the Court of Appeals in the

Petitioner's aforementioned “Brief For Plain-

tiff Appellant" (pp.34-36, 38). Contrary to

the Court of Appeals' false and calumnious

allegations just cited, the Petitioner suf-

ficiently demonstrated above (pp.22, 25-31)

that said Magistrate was not authorized, un-

der the circumstances in the instant case,

to conduct hearings on the Defendants’ dis-

positive pretrial Motions to Dismiss and to

propose “findings of the facts and conclusions

and recommendations under 28 U.S.C. $8 636(»d)

and (c) without consent of the parties.

Contrary to the Court of Appeals' above cit-

ed (pp.48-49) allegations under the title "Cc",

subtitles (3), (4) and (5), the Petitioner

sufficiently demonstrated in his Complaint the

existence of a continuing civil conspiracy di-

rected against him under U.S.C. §8§ 1983, 1985

and 1986 engaged in by all Defendants, and

that the Petitioner’s other claims against all

Defendants are closely interrelated and stem

from this same conspiracy; in other words (as

indicated above pp.9-1l1), among the multiple

causes of action presmted in the Petitioner's

complaint, a continui vil _con acy is

the pivotal one. Therefore, as stated above

(pp. 34-35), to file an amended complaint with-

out claim of conspiracy as ordered by the

Trial Court's order of March 3, 1981 (see App.

PF, pp. 34a-35a) would result in an enormous

loss for the Petitioner because such an amend-

ment of his complaint would strike a vital

blow to the Petitioner's whole action. To ren-

der it possible that this Most Honorable Court

directiy determine the validity of the Peti-

tioner's claim regarding the existence of the

above described conspiracy in the instant case,

the Petitioner made a great effort and sacri-

fice in appending some very relevant extended

excerpts from the Petitioner's complaint (see

App. Y, pp.73a-79a; App. Z, ppo.80a-l13la, Anp.

2/1, pp.132a-135).

The above cited (p.50) allegations, regard-

ing "the district court/'s/ grant/ing of/ the

defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to

amend the complaint (nine months after the

Court's order to amend the complaint)” is er-

roneous; there was no such motion, in the ine

stant case, filed by any of the Defendants.

As shawn above (pp. 36-37), on November 25,

1981, Defendant Administration and Faculty

filed their “Motion For Judgment On The Plead-

ings For Failure To State A Claim Upon Which

Relief Cam Be Granted"; in it those Defendants,

pursuant to Rule 12(c) and (h) F.R.C.P. . « .

requested the Court to enter Judgment on the

Pleadings on the ground that... /the Peti-

tioner/ (had) failed to state a claim... .."

These Defendants were aware, as was the Trial

Court, that - at that state of pleadings in

the instant case - Rule 12(c) and (h), supra,

could not serve as proper grounds for filing

the Defendants' such Motion. Rule 12(c), supra

provides in its relevant part:

“After the pleadings are closed...

any party may move for judgement on

the pleadings." (Emphasis added. )

The instant case was not closed at that tine.

(See App. 2/6, pp.166a-168a, 177a-180a. )

What has already been presented in the in-

stant Petition is sufficient to show convin-

cingly that, taken as a whole, in their pro-

ceedings, the Trial Court of Appeals manifest-

ed "a serious departure from established pro-

cedure,"* within the meaning of Rule 17(a) of

*ABA Commission on Standards of Judicial Ad-

ministration, T ve D +t of Stand

R Appella > 3-11, pe2l

1976), cited by Richard Y. Holcomb, "Stan-

dards of Review," in sac. B.2, Appellate Ad-

vocacy = Source Book, American far Association,

Paul Mare Sandler, Editor, 1980, p.7.

this Court, and that their proceedings and de-

cisions, or lack of them, definitely resulted

in a "gross miscarriage of justice"* and, for

the Petitioner, "a denial of substantial jus-

tice. "**

At this point in this Petition, it becomes

obvious that the management of the judicial

administration was not performed by both of

said Courts below in a way as to seek truth

and justice in accordance with the provisions

of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "to secure

the just, speedy and inexpensive determination

of the... /Petitiorer'’s/ action, “within

the meaning of Rule 1 of the latter, but ine

stead they were involved in persistent distor-

tion of the truth and obstruction of justice;

it becomes so - particularly through the Trial

Court's action and the Court of Appeals' ac-

tion and sanction in -

l. Granting Defendants' invalid Mo-

*Thompson v. City of Louisville, supra,

Pe ’

**#ABA Commissior on Standard Judicial Admini-

stration, op. cite, De7-.

tions to Dismiss (see above, pp.l4-21,

51-52, 54-57; also App. 2/3 and 2/4, pp.

139a-15la).

2. In not entering default judgment

sought (October 17, 1979) by the Peti-

tioner against Defendants Administration

and Faculty (see above pp.13-14, 21, 51-

52, S4=553 see also App. 2/3, 2/4, 2/5,

pp.139a-l5la, 16la-163a);

3. In ordering (March 3, 1981, see App.

F, pp. 34a-35a) that the Petitioner file

an amended complaint (see above, pp. 34-

36, 59-60; see also App. 2/6, p.166);

4, In denying the Petitioner's "Mo-

tion for Determination of the Plaintiff's

Entire Case ...", filed November 24,

1981 (see above pp. 35-36);

5. In failing to rule upon the Peti-

tioner's "Motion for Reversal of Amend-

ment of the Court's Order of December 4,

1981" (see above, pp.37=-38; see also App.

2/6, pp.167a-168a);

6. In considering the Defendants' "Mo-

tion for Judgment on the Pleadings for

‘

| i

12)

| i

i?)

{

‘

» wo

)

333 [Pueiald teas #6 |

piaint), .. .a /Trial Court's/ final order

: s se 7 - = 4 ¢

ismissal" (see App. C, pp. 24a=-25a) and

in declaring in its judgement (App. 0, pp.

rh =

Ord

ary oy

D h-

)

llen Sharp,

e presiding

en duly (heard)

en duly rendered,

dged that...

rg f[hIOlwlo

~- AlWIOletlo O

." Cemphasis

® OO|rRia

this cas

even though - contrary to this declaration -

this action was dismissed without

"(coming) on for (hearing) before the

vlal/ Court /during whicn/:-: :

/said/ Judge /would be/ presiding and

/during which/ the issues would have

been duly (heard) .. . /and therefore

said/ decision /has not/ been duly ren-

dered.”

(8) In declaring, by the Court of Appeals,

its dise-

abuse

oresal

nals a

. .

”_

eat

< A.

we et ee me wet

Amarett

6§

ad) De fre

Anthony

August 22, 1983

-—s. res 9779235 2>°°*= ~ eee ee a> eah* oy — ee all anil Gealeu

IN THE SVPRE-E COURT CF THE UNITED STATES

Poe biedl ak eae laa! 7A = -_i +

ANTH CNY CSTRIC, Fetitioner, )

rus A Sra .jtere a> em

THE CORPORATIC Us Sa

ef al om eee .’"%AnSt

TARY:'S COLLEGE, NULARS

~. _ bowl an - - P|

wAw.G, ~- AL. ’ mesnoncent.

a — > : 5 3 _ 5 ss <

Anthony Cstric, being duly sworn under

ath, does hereby state that he is the Peti-

CERTIORARI and the affirmations therein ar

true and correc* and the presentation of the

statement of facts is made uvon the Petition-

er's personal kmowlecge of said facts.

Ae (36 fn al

anthony Osdric, Petitioner, pro

Subscribed and sworn to before me thi

“y commission expires:

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ANTHONY OSTRIC, Petitioner,

THE CORPORATION OF ST.

MARY'S COLLEGE, NOTRE

)

) i E

) SERVICE

)

DAME, ET AL., Respondent. )

Anthony Ostric, being duly sworn upon his

oath, states:

1. That he is the Petitioner,

2. That on the 2+th day of August, 1983, he

delivered personally three copies of the fore-

going PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI, with

the Affidavit attached to it to:

R. Kent Rowe

900 St. Joseph Bank Bldg.

South Bend, IN 46601

Vincent Campiti

222 West Jefferson Blvd.

South Bend, IN 46601

and forwarded by First Class Mail, postage

prepaid to:

George 5. Huff, Jr.

Deputy Attorney General

State of Indiana

219 State House

Ind 1 46204 : Y gsr

ndianapolis, IN mR

ci 1 — CB b- C.

/ j

Anthony Ostric, Petitioner

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.