Petitioners Reply Brief — Holloway v. Valley
Supreme Court brief1983
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oMtice Supreme Court, U.S, |
FILED
| OCT AL Igg3
In the Supreme Court of the an States
OcToBER TERM, 1983 AULMANDIER L STEVAS,
CLERK
Nos, 83-129
83-289
CLypDE HOLLoway, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
VirGie LEE VALLEY, ET AL.
RAPIDES PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL., PETITIONERS
vu.
VirGiE LEE VALLEY, ET AL.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
REPLY TO BRIEFS IN OPPOSITION
PAuL R. BAIER
Paul M. Hebert Law Center
Louisiana State University
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70803
CHRISTOPHER J. Roy
711 Washington Street
Alexandria, Louisiana 71309
Counsel for Petitioners
Clyde Holloway, et al.
JOHN F. WARD, JR.
RoBert L. HAMMONDS
1111 South Foster Drive, Suite C
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70896
Counsel for Petitioners
Rapides Parish School Board, et al.
ARGUMENT .
CONCLUSION
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ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: Page
Carr v. Montgomery County Board of Education,
377 F.Supp. 1123 (M.D. Ala. 1974) .........4.. 4n.2
Carr v. Montgomery County Board of Education,
511 F.2d 1874 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 423
is HOEY duwabevocwaset inti dbvenceses 4n.2
Firefighters Local Union v. Stotts, Oct. Term 1983,
FO GG hv cabowvsvvnenensaveadanbencaces 5n.3
Flax v. Potts, 464 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied 409 U.S. 1007 (1972) ...... ccc eee eee 1
Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 616 F.2d
GOS GU GI BI ov de kde sv unecteedscecses 2,4n.2
Memphis Fire Department v. Stotts, Oct. Term
SOUR, Fes Be eae ccevbesetevniessavecdess 5n.3
South Park Independent School District v. United
States, Oct. Term 1983, No. 82-2014, cert.
denied, October 3, 1983 ........ceeeeeeeeeees 4
Stout v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 537
P28 GOO GA CE TAG sh oisivcecvecccsucevcces 4n.2
Swann v. Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1(1971).... 1,4n.2
Tasby v. Wright, 520 F.Supp. 683 (N.D. Tex. 1981) .. 4
Tasby v. Wright, No. 82-1121 (5th Cir. 1983) ........ 4
Thompson v. Newport News School Board, 363
F.Supp. 458 (E.D. Va. 1973) «0... 6. cece ee eens 3
Thompson v. Newport News School Board, 498 F.2d
195 (4th Cir. 1974) (en banc) ....... eee eens 3
1
In the Supreme Court of the United States
OcTOBER TERM, 1983
Nos. 83-129
83-289
C: + © HoLioway, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
ViRGIE LEE VALLEY, ET AL.
RAPIDES PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
VirRGIE LEE VALLEY, ET AL.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
REPLY TO BRIEFS IN OPPOSITION
Pursuant to Rule 22.5, petitioners CLYDE HOLLOWAY, et
al. (No. 83-129), and RAPIDES PARISH SCHOOL BOARD,
et al. (No. 83-289), file this joint reply to respondent Valley's
and the United States Government's Briefs in Opposition.
First. Respondent Valley's Brief in Opposition materially
misstates the law. Nothing in Flax v. Potts (Br. Op. 11)
approves the busing of five-year-olds two hours a day. And this
Court's opinion in Swann makes it clear that remedial power in
desegregation cases is not wholly boundless. As Chief Justice
Burger declared for a unanimous Court in Swann, 402 U.S. at
28, “it must be recognized that there are limits.”
2
Second. Two material misstatements of fact taint the Gov-
ernment’ Brief in Opposition.
A. The Government contends (Br. Op. &) that the district
court did not err in rejecting the other desegregation plans
that were submitted on remand as alternatives to closing Lin-
coln Williams and Forest Hill Schools. The Solicitor General
says (Br. Op. 8): “the [district] court considered each of those
plans carefully.”
The record shows precisely the opposite.
When this case was remanded to the district court, the
private plantiffs proposed that Lincoln Williams and Forest
Hill remain open as K-3 schools, a proposal that was supported
by petitioners herein.! But the district court rejected this
proposal peremptorily, not carefully, saying only “We cannot
allow K-3 schools ....” On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the
United States conceded that the district court had misstated
the law of the Fifth Circuit in this regard. U.S. Brief [Fifth
Circuit], pp. 28-29 n.33. See Lee v. Macon County Board of
Education, 616 F.2d 805, 812 (5th Cir. 1980). The decision of the
panel majority below not only departs from prior Fifth Circuit
case law, but is squarely at odds with the law of the Fourth
Circuit:
“If certain proper circumstances may justify an entire
! Transcript of hearing of June 30, 1981, at 7-8:
{Counsel for plaintiffs): “We would submit that Lincoln Williams and
Forest Hill be K through 3 schools... . The only reason why we pro-
pose that is because somewhere in the Fifth Circuit's order, I believe
mention was made of the fact that the schools in the urban area were
given the privilege of keeping their small children close to home;
whereas this privilege was not extended to the children in the rural
areas. For that reason we said if the court feels that there must be
another plan, then that is the proposal.
THE COURT: “Well, the court did make that statement, that is right.”
3
school remaining of one race then, a fortiori, the same
circumstances will justify the two lowest grades and kin-
dergarten remaining predominantly of one race,
especially considering the time of travel and age of the
children.”
Thompson v. Newport News School Board, 363 F.Supp. 458,
463-64 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd 489 F.2d (4th Cir. 1974)(en banc).
B. The Solicitor General says (Br. Op. 7 n.6) that there is no
record evidence showing that the district court's order requires
five-year-olds “to take a 40-mile, two hour bus trip.”
To the contrary, the bus driver route sheets introduced into
evidence as Forest Hill Exhibit 14 show that 181 former Forest
Hill School students must be bused past Forest Hill School en
route to Lecompte. These students are picked up as early as
6:45 a.m. and they are on buses nearly an hour en route to
Lecompte. With respect to kindergarteners through third-
graders, the uncontradicted testimony of Parks Sansing (Tr.
June 30, 1981 Proceedings, p. 57) establishes that these pupils
are bused an additional 2.2 miles and twenty to twenty-five
minutes within the city limits of Lecompte as buses move from
Lecompte Elementary to Carter C. Raymond and thence to
Rapides High School before beginning the trip back to Forest
Hill and beyond. Mary Miles, a black seamstress and mother of
a five-year-old, testified (Tr. Sept. 17, 1980 Proceedings, pp.
30-31) that her son must be bused 30 miles round-trip under the
district court's plan. And the School Board objected to busing
“in some instances, busing kids forty miles, not just right next
door.” Tr. August 27, 1980 Proceedings, p. 27.
Chief Judge Clark in his dissent categorically states (Pet.
App. 17a-18a):
“These children, ranging in age from kindergarten
through early elementary grades, must rise early, board
4
buses, drive past their community school houses and go to
a distant town and then reverse the journey in the even-
ings. Some will spend two hours a day on the school bus.”
With all respect to the Government, Chief Judge Clark did not
pull his two-hour figure out of the air.
Third. In opposing certiorari in this Court in South Park
Independent School District v. United States, No. 82-2014,
cert. denied October 3, 1983, the Government emphasized (Br.
Op. 5, 7-8) that the district court excluded grades K-3 from its
desegregation plan because (Br. Op. 7a):
“It is constitutionally permissible for the Court to allow
children in grades K through three to remain in neighbor-
hood schools.”*
And as recently as August 11, 1983, the Fifth Circuit affirmed
a desegregation plan for Dallas that exempted children in
grades K-3 from bus rides longer than 30 minutes. See Tasby v.
Wright, 520 F.Supp. 683, 714-733 (N.D. Tex. 1981), affd No.
82-1121 (5th Cir. 1983). Yet the panel majority in the instant
case says (Pet. App. 12a):
“This constitutionally erected barrier to the operation of
segregated schools applies to all children within the school
system, including those in elementary grades.”
Plainly the law is being unequally applied in these cases, and
lower courts are sorely in need of guidance from this Court
2 Citing Stout v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 537 F. 2d 800 (5th
Cir. 1976); Carr v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 377 F.Supp. 1123
(M.D, Ala. 1974), aff'd 511 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 423 U.S. 986
(1975); Swann v. Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 26, 31 (1971); Lee v. Macon
County Board of Education, 616 F.2d 805, 812 (5th Cir. 1980). These are the
very same cases we rely on in urging this Court to grant certiorari in the
instant case. See especially No. 83-129 Pet. 28-30.
5
regarding the proper interpretation of Swann, particularly as
it affects children of tender years.
Fourth. The Solicitor General says (Br. Op. 7) this case
“presents no novel legal issues.” We disagree. No federal court
has ever closed a perfectly good school, much less a rural
community's only school, as a remedy in a desegregation case.
And the district court acted alone in this case, wholly outside
the submissions of the parties. There is in this case, we
respectfully submit, a question of remedial authority worthy of
a hearing in the Nation’s last resort of equal justice under law.*
’ This Court has already agreed to hear Memphis Fire Department v.
Stotts, No. 82-229, and its companion Firefighters Local Union v. Stotts, No.
82-209, which also raise troubling questions regarding the scope of federal
judicial authority in an analogous context. See Brief of Petitioners, Memphis
Fire Department, et al., v. Stotts, No. 82-229, especially at 36-38.
6
CONCLUSION
For the above additional reasons, it is respectfully submitted
that the petitions for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
PauL R. BAIER
Paul M. Hebert Law Center
Louisiana State University
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70803
CHRISTOPHER J. Roy
711 Washington Street
Alexandria, Louisiana 71309
Counsel for Petitioners
Clyde Holloway, et al.
JOHN F. Warp, JR.
RoBert L. HAMMONDS
1111 South Foster Drive, Suite C
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70896
Counsel for Petitioners
Rapides Parish School Board, et al.
OcTOBER 4, 1983
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