Amicus Curiae Brief — Mendenhall v. United States
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8 Supreme Court, U.S.
es / i ae oe
: JAN 49 1985
- Number 84-718
ALF XANDER L. S S
¥ IN THE co
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1984
Robert L. Mendenhall, Petitioner,
vs.
The United States of America,
The United States Department of the
Interior, and Cecil D. Andrus,
Secretary of the Interior and
Edward F. Spang, State Director of the
Nevada Office of the Bureau
of Land Management, Respondent.
Motion for leave to File Amicus Curiae
Brief Amicus Curiae of Wayne Winters,
editor and publisher
Western Prospector and Miner
William S. Andrews
Counsel for the
Western Prospector and Miner
1432 N. 7th Street
Phoenix, Arizona 85006
(602) 254-5051
No. 84-718
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1984
Robert L. Mendenhall, Petitioner,
Vs.
The United States of America,
The United States Department of the
Interior, and Cecil D. Andrus,
Secretary of the Interior and
Edward F. Spang, State Director of the
Nevada Office of the Bureau
of Land Management, Respondent.
An Appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals
ee -s 9th Circuit ~~
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AS AMICUS CURIAE
COMES NOW, Wayne Winters, by and
through his attorney William S. Andrews,
and moves that the Court grant permission
to file an amicus curiae brief to the
Western Prospector and Miner in support of
the petition for writ of certiorari in
Mendenhall v. U.S..
Nature of Applicant's Interest
The Western Prospector and Miner (WPM)
is a monthly periodical with readership
throughout the United States and abroad.
Its editor, Wayne Winters, has had a long
career editing newspapers primarily
concerned with mining: Tombstone Epitaph
(1964-1974); Bisbee Review (1974-1976) and
Western Prospector and Miner (1975 to
present). As editor of the Western
Prospector and Miner, Winters has become
painfully aware of growing discouragement
among the small mining community with
officers of the Department of Interior and
the U.S. Forest Service.
Petitioner, Robert Mendenhall's, legal
battle to secure title to his mining claims
has been fought by many of the small miners
about whom WPM reports. Despite compliance
with the mining laws, however, few have
ever won a legal tangle with agents of the
U.S. Government and to the best of our
ali-
knowledge, no mining claimant has ever been
heard by the U.S. Supreme Court in a battle
against the Interior Department, except in
those rare cases, when the claimant has
survived Interior's tribunals to win in a
lower court. Interior has invariably
appealed such cases to the U.S. Supreme
Court. Only then has the mining claimant
been heard.
WPM believes that the granting of the
petition for writ of certiorari of Robert
L. Mendenhall would afford the Court the
opportunity to bring about a peaceful
solution to a problem which has been
growing ever since the passing of the
Surface Resources Act of July 23, 1955 and,
with the solution, a renewed respect for
law.
Facts inadequately set forth by Petitioner
Wayne Winters, editor of the WPM, has
chronicled in his newspapers many mining
claims which have been invalidated by
-iii-
Respondent over the years and the vicious
misuse of power by agents of the U.S.
Forest Service practiced against a class of
people who seem to have been forgotten by
the justice system. In an affidavit made a
part of the amicus curiae brief in the
appendix, Winters summarizes the facts of
those stories; and in a second appendix
document, the most recent develcpments in
the unrest in the community of small miners
in northern California are set forth for
the court in a copy of an article from the
front page of the Western Prospector and
Miner for December, 1984.
Also in the appendix to the amicus
curiae brief are excerpts from a Senate
hearing in 1966 which overwhelmingly
substantiate that Respondent has willfully
misadministered the Surface Resources Act
of 1955. The question of the intent of
Congress in passing that Act is fully
answered and documented by these excerpts.
eiye-
Questions of Law
Furthermore, the amicus curiae brief
calls the court's attention to two
important precedent cases not already cited
in the Petition for writ of certiorari:
Andrus v. Shell Oil Company, 446 U.S. 657,
660 (1980) dealing with the "marketability"
test for discovery of a valuable mineral
deposit; and Baker v. United States, 613
F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 932 (1980) which addresses abuse of
discretion by Respondent contrary to
existing mining law in the administration
of the Surface Resources Act.
Respectfully submitted,
William S. Andrews
Attorney for the
Western Prospector and Miner
Table of Contents
Motion for leave to file amicus curiae....i
BODES OF AGTMOP LOG. co ccccovescesesecdcescc csi
Interest of Amicus Curiae... cece enveeed
ENC PORGUCTION. ccccccccccccccccccccecscccceeed
Argument Ee ee ee ee ee
The Common Varieties Act of 1955,
30 U.S.C. § 611, Does Not Apply
to Commercially Valuable Deposits
Argument errr re eT Tr Ter eT Sy Tree ee Te eee
Because the Surface Resources Act
Does Not Apply to Conmercially
Valuable Deposits the Test for
Discovery Must be Made by Looking
At Present Conditions and Not
Those in 1955
APZUMeENt BZonccccceccccccccscvecccsvcecccevsceseed
Even If a /howing of a Valuable
Mineral Deposit in 1955 Was Rele-
vant the Department Erred in Mis-
applying the Supreme Court's Test
for Mineral Validity Determina-
tions
Argument Duke 666 6web66660 66. 6S SRO e*eee#es 14
The Department Has Incorrectly
Applied A "Too Much" or "Excess
Reserves" Test
Summary of Argument......... cevdesvcenessel®
ee ee ee ee eoeeee Tr errr 5 |
Certificate of Mailing... ccccccccscccceelB
-vi-
Table of Authorities
Andrus v. Shell Oil Company, 446 U.S.
657 10 & 1l
Baker v. United States, 613 F.2d 224
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
rs CP k cee ease ce scccees caeek®
Barton v. Morton, 498 F.2nd 288 (9th
Cite: Bie aka he ve Pee a6 b 40.0 0 ee bees see e 13
Boyle v. Morton, 519 F.2d 200 (9th
Cir. 1974) eeevevee eoeeeveevesreeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 8
Brubaker v. Morton, 500 F.2d 200 (9th
Cir. Sa eae eeeeeveeeeeeeeeeeee ee 8
Chrisman v. Miller, 197 U.S. 313
Converse v. Udall, 399 F.2d 616 (9th
ees Desa ree ee eres DPE E BGS GS Goce sc eece 13
McClarty v. Secretary of the Interior,
Ree ee SEM Gets TOGO). wcrc cccccccee 8
Melluzzo v. Morton, 534 F.2d 860 (9th
eee eee Dh eh 6s sso 14
Multiple Use, Ine. v. Morton, 353 F.
Supp. 184 (D. Ariz. 1972), aff'd, 504
EE errr 14
U.S. v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599
CEPT ES Ccceesces [OUP eeheeeeeecekO, Ll & 12
-vii-
No. 84-7.8
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1984
Robert L. Mendenhall, Petitioner,
VS.
The United States of America,
The United States Department of the
Interior, and Cecil D. Andrus,
Secretary of the Interior and
Edward F. Spang, State Director of the
Nevada Office of the Bureau
of Land Management, Respondent.
An Appeal from the U.S. Court of Appeals
9th Circuit
Written consent of the Petitioner to
file this amicus curiae brief was mailed to
the Court on January 8, 1984. Written
request was made on January 4, 1984, to the
Respondent. The written request followed
oral consent to filing the amicus curiae.
Shortly before noon, Arizona time, on
January 9, 1985, Wayne Winters called Allen
Horowitz of the Solicitor General's Office
to inquire whether written consent had been
timely filed with the Clerk of the U.S.
Supreme Court. Horowitz replied: "Go ahead
and file it (the amicus curiae brief).
Assume that permission is granted unless
you hear definitely from me to the
contrary." Wishing to leave nothing to
assumption, a motion for leave to file as
an amicus curiae without written consent of
Respondent has been attached hereto.
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
The Western Prospector and Miner is a
monthly periodical with readership
throughout the United States and abroad.
Its editor, Wayne Winters, has had a long
career editing newspapers primarily
concerned with mining: Tombstone Epitaph
(1964-1974); Bisbee Review (1974-1976) and
=<
Western Prospector and Miner (1975 to
present). As editor of the Western
Prospector and Miner, Winters has become
painfully aware of growing discouragement
among the small mining community with
officers of the Department of Interior and
the U.S. Forest Service.
Petitioner's legal battle to secure
title to his mining claims has been fought
by many of the small miners about whom WPM
reports. Despite compliance with the
mining laws, however, few have ever won a
legal tangle with agents of the U.S.
Government and to the best of our
knowledge, no mining claimant has ever been
heard by the U.S. Supreme Court in a battle
against the Interior Department, except in
those rare cases, when the claimant has
survived Interior's tribunals to win in a
lower court. Interior has invariably
appealed such cases to the U.S. Supreme
Court.
WPM believes that the granting of the
petition for writ of certiorari of Robert
L. Mendenhall would afford the Court the
opportunity to bring about a peaceful
solution to a problem which has been
growing ever since the passing of the
Surface Resources Act of July 23, 1955 and,
with the solution, a renewed respect for
law. Wayne Winters, editor of the WPM has
chronicled in his newspapers many mining
claims which have been invalidated by
Respondent over the years and a vicious
misuse of power by agents of the U.S.
Forest Service practiced against a class of
people who seem to have been forgotten by
the justice system. In an affidavit made a
part hereof in the appendix, Winters
summarizes the facts of those stories.
INTRODUCTION
Prior to the passing of the Surface
Resources Act of 1955, hearings before
offices of the Interior Department with
regard to mining claims were invariably the
result of a dispute between private users.
After the Surface Resources Act of 1955,
the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land
Management became parties at interest in
invalidation proceedings set up under the
provision for Administrative Procedure
(Titie 5, Section 500, et seq.). Despite
safeguards against arbitrary and capricious
use of agency discretion in these quasi-
judicial hearings, Respondent has been
unable to overcome a conflict of interest
in its contests against mining claimants.
Respondent has openly admitted that it
believes the stated intent of Congr’ss - to
encourage mining on the public lands - is
contrary to wise administration.
Respondent advocates leasing the nations
-5-
minerals.! wsing the inherent subjectivity
and the judgmental imperative involved in
the phrase "valuable mineral deposit" from
the law entitling mining claims on the
publie lands, the Respondent has succeeded
in nullifying the mining laws.
1. Testimony of Arthur W. Greeley, Associate Chief,
Forest Service, Department of Agriculture in "Legislative
Purpose of Public Law 167" (30 U.S.C.A. 611). Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Minerals, Materiais, and Fuels
of the Committe on Interior and Insular Affairs, U.S.
Senate, 89th Cong., Second Session on S. 2281 and S. 3485,
Bills to Amend Section 3 of the Act of July 23, 1955 (69
Stat. 367, 368), June 28, 1966.
~¢-
ARGUMENT
I. The Common Varieties Act of 1955,
30 U.S.C. § 611, Does Not Apply
to Commercially Valuable Deposits
By the term of the Common Varieties
Act, "common varieties" which may not be
located do not include materials with a
"distinet and special value." It is clear
that the intent of Congress was to prevent
bad faith mining claimants from obtaining
land for other purposes than mining under
the mining laws and not to prevent the
location by bona fide miners of valuable
mineral deposits. It is important that the
Supreme Court re-affirm this basic
principle of the mining laws as Congress
has in each and every statute that it has
passed effecting public lands open to
mineral entry.
Although the intent of Congress
clearly was to allow the location of
commercially valuable sand, rock, gravel
~
and cinders, ete., the statute has been
repeatedly misconstrued by the Department
of Interior which has disallowed the
location of obviously valuable mineral
deposits.
In addition, the circuit courts have
not been precise in their definition of
common varieties. See, e.g., Brubaker v.
Morton, 500 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1974),
McClarty v. Secretary of the Interior, 408
F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1969), and Boyle v.
Morton, 519 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1975). cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975).
II. Beeause the Surface Resources Act
Does Not Apply to Commercially
Valuable Deposits the Test for
Discovery Must be Made by Looking
At Present Conditions and Not
Those in 1955
When Congress passed the Common
Varieties Act it intended only to prevent
the location of deposits of sand, stone,
gravel, cinders, ete., that were common,
i.e., not conmercially valuable, and
Congress in no way intended to preclude the
future location of commercially valuable,
deposits of these materials. Because the
location of such deposits is permissable
today, any challenge to the validity of a
discovery should look to the present value
of the deposit rather than those conditions
that may have existed in 1955. In the case
of the Mendenhall deposit at issue, it is
clear that because this was an active
producer when the invalidation proceedings
commenced, all of the tests for discovery
clearly have been met.
III. Even If a Showing of a Valuable
Mineral Deposit in 1955 Was Rele-
vant the Department Erred in Mis-
applying the Supreme Court's Test
for Mineral Validity Determinations
In 1905 the United States Supreme
Court approved the Department of Interior's
"pnbrudent-man test" under which discovery of
a “valuable mineral deposit" requires proof
-§-=
of a deposit of such character that a
"person of ordinary prudence would be
justified in the further expenditure of his
labor and means with the reasonable
prospect of success, in developing a
valuable mine." Chrisman v. Miller, 197
U.S. 313 (1905). In United States v.
Coleman, 390 U.S. 599 (1968); the court
approved the department's marketability
test--whether a mineral can be extracted,
removed and marketed at a profit--
determining it to be a logical complement
of the prudent man standard. See also,
Andrus v. Shell Oil Company, 446 U.S. 657,
660 n.4 (1980).
Unfortunately, the department's
application of the marketability test has
been anything but a "complement" of the
prudent man rule. Where the marketability
test, as approved by the Supreme Court, was
intended to be a flexible evidentiary
standard, the department has instead used
=16-
ee
it as a rigid and singular test of validity
in circumstances where that test is neither
appropriate nor logical.
As stated in Coleman, the marketabil-
ity test was designed only to throw light
on a prospector's intent and only to deter-
mine a prudent man could reasonably believe
that a profitable mine could be put in
production and not whether a presently
profitable mine existed. In looking at the
"market" the department has totally ignored
a crucial factor in all market determina-
tions: A market depends not only upon
seqnent conditions, but also upon whether
those conditions can be developed. In
other words, in applying the marketability
test the department has totally ignored the
reasonable ability of mineral operators to
develop a market for a valuable product.
That present marketability is not a
sine qua non of all mineral discoveries was
shown in Andrus v. Shell Oil, 446 U.S. at
alie-
SS
663 n.6, where the court reasoned that
under the Mineral Leasing Act Congress did
not consider "present marketability" a
prerequisite to the patentability of oil
shale.
In any event, the marketability test
as applied in Coleman is not necessarily
the same marketability test that should be
applied in this case. Coleman involved a
patent proceeding. If the elaims in
Coleman had been shown to be valuable then
the government would have forever lost all
fee title to the claims. Such
circumstances warrant a strict test of
mineral value. However, in this case the
claim invalidation proceedings are not in
response to a patent application. Rather
they are based upon a determination by the
department that the department would prefer
the claims to be invalid.
Indeed, in this case, there are no
allegations of any higher or better use of
-12-
the land in question. For this reason the
marketability test, if applied at all,
should be liberally construed in order to
fully comport with the intent of Congress
in the Mining Law of 1872. Specifically,
the mineral claimant should be permitted to
have an opportunity to fully delineate the
nature of his mineral discovery. With the
strict application of the marketability
test to a location, the department
precludes the ability of a claimant to
develop a prospect that may only be
marginally marketable into one that is
highly marketable.
For court decisions that have consid-
ered the flexibility of the construction of
the marketability rule see Converse v.
Udall, 399 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 303 U.S. 1025 (1969); Barton V
Morton, 498 F. 2d 288 (9th Cir.1974) (after
discovery of mineral deposit the claimant
need only show a reasonable prospect that a
-13-
profitable mine will be developed);
Multiple Use Ine. v. Morton, 353 F. Supp.
184 (D. Ariz. 1972), aff'd, 504 F.2d 448
(9th Cir. 1974) (it need not be proved that
the claim can in fact be operated at a
profit); Melluzzo v. Morton, 534 F. 2d 860
(9th Cir. 1976) (lack or insubstantiality
of sales of material from claims in
question if relevant to the question of
marketability. It is not, however,
econelusive proof of lack of value.)
IV. The Department Has Incorrectly
Applied A "Too Much" or "Excess
Reserves" Test
A valuable mineral deposit may not be
declared invalid simply because a great
quantity of mineral reserves cannot be
marketed all at once. Baker v. United
States, 613 F. 2d 224 (9th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 932 (1980). It is
clear from the transcripts of the
department hearings that the presence of
-14-
other valuable reserves of similar, but not
identical, deposits was a conclusive factor
in finding the Mendenhall claims invalid.
It should be noted that the deposits in
this case clearly could be marketed in the
foreseeable future and that the opposition
to the denial of ceriorari in Baker by
Justice Blackmun with Justices Marshall and
Powell is not at issue in this case.
-15-
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Department of the Interior has
gone against the intent of Congress in
administering the Surface Resources Act of
1955, 30 U.S.C. § 611. By applying the Act
to valuable deposits of mineral, the
Interior Department has created a miasma of
irrelevant considerations regarding the
validity of a mining claim--regulations
applied without regard to the good faith of
the claimant; without regard for present
market for the mineral; without regard for
the limits placed on the "marketability
test" by the U. S. Supreme Court in Coleman
and in Andrus v. Shell Oil.
-18-
CONCLUS ION
The need for the U.S. Supreme Court to
consider the issues in Mendenhall v. U.S.
has attained to urgency. The court must
affirm that (1) "eommon varieties," when
claimant is, in good faith, developing a
mineral deposit, are locatable under the
mining laws and (2) the "marketability"
test as used by Respondent is wholly
outside the mining laws and unnecessary to
their administration. The petition for
writ of certiorari must be granted if law
is to govern the public lands.
William S. Andrews
-}7-
ENTRY OF APPEARANCE
and
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I cerify that I am a member of the
Supreme Court of the United States Bar;
that I am appearing on behalf of Wayne
Winters, editor-in-chief of the Western
Prospector and Miner, in this matter and
that forty (40) copies have been mailed to
the Court and three (3) copies of the
foregoing Amicus Curiae Brief have been
served upon all appropriate parties by
depositing the documents in a United States
Post Office, first-class postage prepaid,
this llth day of January, 1985, addressed
to:
Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
and
The Department of the Interior
Land and Natural Resources Division
Appellate Section
Attn: Wendy B. Jacobs, Attorney
18th and C. Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20240
=18-
LV Mai, XL Ie
William S. Andrews
Attorney for Amicus Curiae
1432 N. Seventh St.
Phoenix, Arizona 85006
STATE OF ARIZONA )
) ss.
County of Maricopa )
On this ike day of January, 1985,
personally appeared before me, the
undersigned officer, William S. Andrews,
who acknowledged the above instrument.
: od Notary Public
My Commission Expires:
.*
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