Supplemental Appendix — Teamsters Freight Local Union No. 480 v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc.

ee ar ae as

riL BD

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Bnited States

OcTOBER TERM, 1984

TEAMSTERS FREIGHT LocAL UNION No. 480

Petitioner,

VS.

RYDER TRUCK LINES, INC.

Respondent.

SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

CeciL D. BRANSTETTER

R. JAN JENNINGS

Branstetter, Kilgore & Stranch

200 Church Street, 4th Floor

P. O. Box 3079

Nashville, TN 37219-0079

Attorneys for Petitioners

St. Louis Law Printing Co., Inc., 411 No. Tenth Street 63101 314-231-4477

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 77-3243-NA-CV

Ryder Truck Lines, Inc.

Plaintiff

VS.

Teamsters Freight Local

Union No. 480, et al.

Defendants

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is an action for an injunction and for damages for

breach of collective bargaining agreements brought pursuant to

the terms of Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations

Act of 1947, as amended, 29 USC Section 185. The jurisdiction

of the Court is not disputed.

This action was instituted by a verified complaint on May 17,

1977, seeking an injunction against Defendant Teamsters

Freight Local Union No. 480 and individual Defendants Luther

Watson, Frank Hopkins, Turner Brim and Clyde Powers. A

Temporary Restraining Order issued upon the Court’s finding

that the Defendants and each of them had committed and were

committing a wrongful breach of the collective bargaining

agreements, and restraining the Defendants, inter alia from

engaging in any strike, work stoppage, or work interference at

Plaintiff’s Nashville terminal. That Temporary Restraining

Order was filed with the Clerk where it was received at 1:30 p.m.

on May 17, 1977.

On May 23, 1978, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint

against Defendant, Teamsters Local Freight Union No. 480, for

$50,000.00 compensatory damages and $150,000.00 punitive

damages.

a ee

This matter came on for trial without a jury on Momday,

January 12, 1981.

Upon the testimony of the witnesses, the evidence produced

at the trial, stipulated and undisputed facts, the entire record in

this action, and the written submissions of counsel for the par-

ties, the Court has reached the following findings of fact and

conclusions of law.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The Plaintiff is an interstate motor common carrier and

maintains a terminal facility with one (1) office and shop in

Metropolitan Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee.

2. The Defendant, Teamsters Freight Employees Local Union

No. 480, is an unincorporated labor association which acts as

collective bargaining agent for employees.

3. The Plaintiff and Defendant, Teamsters Freight Employees

Local Union No. 480, (hereinafter Local 480) are signators to

collective bargaining agreements, known as the NATIONAL

MASTER FREIGHT AGREEMENT and SOUTHERN CON-

FERENCE AREA OVER-THE-ROAD, LOCAL CARTAGE,

OFFICE CLERICAL and GARAGE SUPPLEMENTAL

AGREEMENTS. The applicable National and Supplemental

Agreements at the time of the matters which gave rise to this

litigation are a part of the record in this action and were marked

as Exhibit 2 at the trial.

THE CONTRACTUAL BACKGROUND

4. Title 29, Section 141(b), USC, provides:

**(b) Industrial strife which interferes with the normal flow

of commerce and with the full production of articles and

commodities for commerce, can be avoided or substantial-

ly minimized if employers, employees, and labor organiza-

tions each recognize under law one another’s legitimate

ek ieee.

rights in their relations with each other, and above all

recognize under law that neither party has any right in its

relations with any other to engage in acts or practices

which jeopardize the public health, safety, or interest.

It is the purpose and policy of this chapter, in order to pro-

mote the full flow of commerce, to prescribe the legitimate

rights of both employees and employers in their relations

affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful pro-

cedures for preventing the interference by either with the

legitimate rights of the other, to protect the rights of in-

dividual employees in their relations with labor organiza-

tions whose activities affect commerce, to define and pro-

scribe practices on the part of labor and management

which affect commerce and are inimical to the general

welfare, and to protect the rights of the public in connec-

tion with labor disputes affecting commerce.”’

5. In the legislative history of Section 301(a) of the Labor

Management Relations Act, 29 USC Section 1985, the following

appears:

‘*If unions can break agreements with relative impunity,

then such agreements do not tend to stabilize industrial

relations... The chief advantage which an employer can

reasonably expect from a collective labor agreement is

assurance of uninterrupted operation during the term of

the agreement. Without some effective method of assuring

freedom from economic warfare for the term of the agree-

ment there is little reason why an employer would desire to

sign such a contract.’’ H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th

Congress, Ist Session 42 (1947). S. Rep. No. 105, 80th

Congress, Ist Session, at p. 16 (1947).

6. Article 8, Section 2, of the NATIONAL MASTER

FREIGHT AGREEMENT, in pertinent part, reads as follows:

— -

**(a) The parties agree that all grievances and questions of

interpretation arising from the provisions of this Agree-

ment shall be submitted to the grievance procedure to

determination. Accordingly, except as specifically provid-

ed in other Articles of the National Master Freight Agree-

ment, no work stoppage, slowdown, walkout or lock out

shall be deemed to be permitted or authorized by this

Agreement except:

(1) failure to comply with a duly adopted majority deci-

sion of a grievance committee established by the Na-

tional Master Freight Agreement or Supplemental

Agreement;

(2) a National Grievance Committee deadlock of a

grievance rendered pursuant to the procedures pro-

vided herein; and

(3) failure to make health and welfare and pension

payments in the manner required by the applicable

Supplemental Agreement...

ese eee ek EE *

The Local Union shall give the Employer a twenty-four

(24) hour prior written notice of the Local Union’s

authorization of strike action which notice shall specify the

majority grievance committee decision or deadlocked Na-

tional Grievance Committee decision providing the basis

for such authorization....’’

7. Article 44 of the SOUTHERN CONFERENCE AREA,

OVER-THE-ROAD SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT, Sec-

tion | in pertinent part reads as follows:

‘*The Unions and the employers agree that there shall be

no strikes, lockouts, tieups, or legal proceedings without

first using all possible means of settlement as provided for

in this Agreement and in the National Agreement, if ap-

plicable, of any controversy which might arise. . . .”’ (Em-

phasis supplied)

—

8. In the trucking industry, in furtherance of the policy of

facilitating the flow of commerce and maintaining industrial

peace, the parties through the collective bargaining process

negotiate the specific terms of wages, benefits, working condi-

tions, and other benefits for union members in exchange for

guarantees of continued work without stoppage or interference.

Article 8, Section 2(a) of the NATIONAL MASTER FREIGHT

AGREEMENT, as quoted above, sets forth the precise condi-

tions, negotiated at arms length between the parties, under

which a union may legally call or authorize a strike.

9. In order to facilitate the orderly resolution of controversies

arising between unions and their members, on the one hand,

and trucking companies, on the other, a detailed and specific

grievance procedure is set forth in the collective bargaining

agreements.

10. In the event of a failure or refusal by management to com-

ply ‘vith the final decision reached in the grievance process, the

remedy provided to the union and its members is the economic

sanction of strike, in addition to other remedies provided by

law.

11. In the event of a failure or refusal by the union or its

members to abide by the ‘‘no strike’’ language of the collective

bargaining agreements, Title 29, USC Section 185 provides a

remedy to management in the nature of a suit for money

damages, in addition to injunctive relief and other remedies pro-

vided by law.

THE ‘‘MOLE HILL”’

12. Plaintiff did not have a maintenance shop at its St. Louis

Terminal on May 16, 1977 or previously. It had only a ‘‘fuel

lane’’ where trucks could be fueled, and where windshields

could be washed, as appropriate.

13. Pursuant to a local contract with Teamsters Local 618,

Plaintiff had one employee at its St. Louis Terminal who acted

a

—

as a “‘fuel man’’, and who also washed windshields as ap-

propriate, when he was on duty. There was no formal policy or

procedure regarding the washing of windshields when he was

not on duty.

14. For an unspecified time prior to the first of May, 1977,

some of the supervisory personnel of Plaintiff from time to time

left the terminal office to wash windshields.

15. When it became known to John Geldbach, the new ter-

minal manager at Plaintiff’s St. Louis terminal, that some

supervisory personnel were leaving the terminal office to wash

windshields, he, with the concurrence of his supervisors, in-

stituted a policy that supervisory personnel would not be involv-

ed in the washing of windshields, and that drivers would be ex-

pected to wash their own windshields as appropriate, when the

‘‘fuel man’’ was not on duty, effective on or shortly after the

first of May, 1977.

16. There was no testimony at the trial suggesting that any

breach of this newly instituted policy had occurred—or in fact

that any driver had asked to have his windshield washed by

anyone other than himself when the ‘‘fuel man’’ was not on

duty—prior to the events occurring on May 16, 1977, involving

drivers Boyd and Thomas.

17. Although the direct testimony of the drivers Boyd and

Thomas would suggest clearly that their windshields routinely

had been washed by others than themselves, Mr. Thomas had

also testified by deposition, which testimony was put into the

trial record on his cross-examination, to the effect that: ‘‘... on

other occasions, we called him (Frank Hopkins, the local 480

business agent in Nashville) and told him that our windshields

were dirty and we needed the windshields clean and they

wouldn’t clean them...’’

18. On May 16, 1977, following their mandated rest, drivers

Boyd and Thomas, employees of Plaintiff and members of

~—

Defendant Local 480, were called by the dispatcher and advised

to be at the St. Louis terminal within the normal two hour

period to accept their dispatches.

19. The drivers Boyd and Thomas asked to be advised of their

destinations. When they were not advised as to where they were

being sent, and were told that that information would be given

to them at the terminal, they called Mr. Hopkins, their

Nashville business agent, to be advised as to whether they

should accept the two-hour call and proceed with their dispatch.

Mr. Hopkins did not testify in this action. The drivers,

however, testified that Mr. Hopkins advised them to go ahead

and accept the call and proceed to the terminal within the two

hour period.

20. When the drivers Boyd and Thomas arrived at the St.

Louis Terminal of Plaintiff, they clocked in and conducted

walk-around inspection of their units. They then reported to

the dispatcher that their windshields were dirty, and requested

that the windshields be cleaned by the company.

21. There was no testimony that the windshields were dirty to

the point of being any safety hazard. In fact, the driver Boyd

testified the tractors were equipped with windshield washers and

that, as to any accumulated dirt or debris on the windshield, he

routinely simply adjusted to it in his driving.

22. After consulting with his superior, the dispatcher advised

the drivers Boyd and Thomas that the ‘‘fuel man’’ was not on

duty, that the company would not wash their windshields, and

that they would need to wash their own windshields and go

ahead on their dispatch.

23. The drivers Boyd and Thomas then called their Nashville

business agent, Frank Hopkins, a second time from St. Louis.

Mr. Hopkins consulted with Local 480 President, Luther Wat-

son, during this call. After their telephone conversation with

Mr. Hopkins, the drivers refused to wash their own windshields

or to proceed with their dispatch unless the company would

wash the windshields.

ont

24. When confronted with this position by the drivers Boyd

and Thomas, Plaintiff’s St. Louis dispatcher again consulted his

superior. He then advised the drivers Boyd and Thomas that,

unless they proceeded as previously directed, they would be con-

sidered to have ‘‘voluntarily quit’’ their jobs for refusal to obey

instructions of their employer. After having been apprised of

the company’s position, the two drivers continued to refuse to

proceed as directed. The drivers were then instructed by the

dispatcher that it was the position of Plaintiff that the drivers

had ‘‘voluntarily quit’’ and that they should leave the premises.

25. After being advised of the position of Plaintiff that they

had voluntarily quit, and after being requested to leave the

premises, both drivers refused to leave the terminal at St. Louis.

26. The police were called to remove the drivers from the

premises, if necessary. When the police arrived at the Plaintiff’s

St. Louis terminal, Patrolman Richard Skidmore requested the

drivers Boyd and Thomas to leave the premises peacefully in

order that he would not have to arrest them, and so that they

would not have to submit to booking and other normal police

procedures. He also advised the dispatcher that the only way he

could remove the drivers from the premises would be upon the

swearing out of a warrant for trespassing. The dispatcher

agreed io sign the warrant.

27. At this point, drivers Boyd and Thomas called Frank

Hopkins, their Nashville business agent, a third time. After con-

sulting with him by telephone, they advised the dispatcher that

the company could fire them and have them arrested, but that

they would not voluntarily leave the premises, and that they did

not voluntarily quit their jobs.

28. After staying at the Ryder Terminal approximately thirty

(30) minutes, and after repeated attempts to have the drivers

Boyd and Thomas leave the premises peacefully to avoid arrest,

Patrolman Richard Skidmore of the St. Louis Police Depart-

ment arrested them and took them to jail.

on ies

29. Both of these drivers are black. There was an allegation

that the failure to clean their windshields was somehow racially

motivated. This a'legation is totally unsupported by the proof.

THE ‘“‘MOUNTAIN”’

30. Shortly after the third telephone conversation between

drivers Boyd and Thomas and their Nashville business agent,

Frank Hopkins, Local 480 president Luther Watson and Local

480 business agent Turner Brim set up a meeting with Plaintiff's

representative James D. (Buck) Barton and Frank Hopkins at

the Nashville Ryder Terminal.

31. At approximately 6:00 p.m. on May 16, 1977, Local 480

set up a picket line at the Nashville Ryder Terminal, and a strike

and work stoppage began.

32. There is disputed testimony in the record regarding

whether Defendant called the strike in the first instance, or

whether Defendant simply authorized and ‘‘took over’’ the

strike after it had already begun. The Court finds as a fact that

Defendant, through Luther Watson, Frank Hopkins, and

Turner Brim, instituted a strike or work stoppage at the

Nashville terminal of Plaintiff at or about 6:00 p.m. on May 16,

1977.

33. Luther Watson, president of Teamsters Local 480,

testified that he ‘‘calls the shots’’ for that local union. He

testified that never before, since he had been president of the

union, had the members either started a strike, or ended a

strike, other than at his specific direction.

34. Defendant offered no explanation as to how the members

of Local 480 could have known of what had occurred at St.

Louis other than through Luther Watson, Frank Hopkins, or

Turner Brim.

35. Defendant did not present testimony from Frank Hopkins

or Turner Brim.

— ve

36. Defendant did not present testimony from any other

member of Local 480 suggesting how the Employer could have

learned of any difficulty in St. Louis, or how there could have

been a ‘‘spontaneous’’ picket line.

37. There was direct testimony from witnesses presented by

Plaintiff that there was no trouble at the Nashville terminal of

the Plaintiff until representatives of Local 480, one of whom

was specifically identifyed as Turner Brim, came to various

parts of the Nashville terminal facility and talked to employees

after which the employees immediately left their work stations

and went on strike. One of Plaintiff’s witnesses, Carey Fussell,

testified that he watched the employees leaving and going to the

gate, and that there was no picket line at the gate as he watched

the employees who had just been called out go toward the gate.

Mr. Fussell testified that Mr. Brim told him specifically that the

Union was going on strike.

38. Luther Watson, president of Local 480, testified that,

after being consulted by Frank Hopkins regarding the wind-

shield question, he left the matter up to Frank Hopkins to

resolve. N» explanation was offered by Defendant as to why

Mr. Watson and Brim, as well as Hopkins, thereafter should

have gone to the Nashville terminal of Plaintiff to consult with

Mr. Barton, if something less serious than strike action was coni-

templated by the Union.

39. In a telegram dated several days later, and sent by Local

480 president Luther Watson, Defendant acknowledged and

declared that it authorized the strike. (Exhibit 3)

40. The strike was terminated, and Plaintiff’s employees who

were members of Local 480 went back to work at approximately

2:00 p.m. on May i7, 1977, after the Court had entered a tem-

porary restraining order enjoining the continuation of the strike

or work stoppage.

ee ta A A

—'

41. Although there was defense proof suggesting that Defen-

dant’s members ended the picket line, and the strike was over,

in the late morning of May 17, the driver Thomas testified that

he and the driver Boyd went to the Ryder Terminal at approx-

imately 1:00 p.m. on that day after they returned to Nashville

and made a visit to the union hall. He testified that the strike

was still in progress when they arrived, and that the picket line

was still up when they left.

42. This Court entered a Temporary Restraining Order on

May 17, 1977, which was received for entry by the Clerk at 1:30

p.m.

SUBSEQUENT GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE OF THE

“MOLE HILL”’

43. Plaintiff experiences approximately thirty-six hundred

(3600) grievances which are docketed per year, that is, which are

not settled at the local level prior to being docketed for con-

sideration by a grievance committee. This volume of grievances

is illustrative of the extremely broad ‘‘any controversy”’

character of the grievance process.

44. The drivers Boyd and Thomas grieved the termination of

their employment as contemplated by the grievance procedure

established under the collective bargaining agreements.

45 The grievance committee decision was in favor of the

drivers Boyd and Thomas, as to their claim of wrongful

discharge, and provided that they be returned to work, with

back pay, and that they be compensated for the air fare from St.

Louis to Nashville.

46. Thus, the rights of the union and its members, sought to be

protected by the national labor policy regarding industrial peace

and commercial productivity, were protected.

— on

GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE OF THE ‘‘MOUNTAIN”’

AND THE “‘CONDITION PRECEDENT’’ DEFENSE

47. After obtaining a Temporary Restraining Order from this

Court, in which the Court found Defendant to have engaged in

an illegal strike or work stoppage, Plaintiff filed a grievance,

utilizing the grievance procedure under the collective bargaining

agreement, as to the illegality of the strike.

48. Plaintiff's grievance asserting the illegality of the strike

was taken up by the National Grievance Committee on

September 8, 1977. The National Grievance Committee at that

time did not reach any decision as to the grievance and instead

‘**postponed’’ action on the grievance.

49. The National Grievance Committee was again convened

to consider this grievance on March 8, 1978. Again, the Na-

tional Grievance Committee failed to make a decision regarding

the grievance. This time the National Grievance Committee sent

the matter back to the parties for settlement.

50. Article 8, Section 2(a) of the NATIONAL MASTER

FREIGHT AGREEMENT establishes a deadlock of the Na-

tional Grievance Committee as a condition precedent to the in-

stitution of any damage suit action in circumstances such as are

before the Court. That same provision, however, contains the

following unambiguous language:

‘*if a decision is not rendered within thirty (30) days after

the co-chairman has convened the National Grievance

Committee, the matter shall be considered deadlocked.”’

51. Plaintiff instituted this as an action for damages, by filing

an Amended Complaint on May 23, 1978.

52. The National Grievance Committee had twice ‘‘deadlock-

ed’’ under the contract language prior to the time Plaintiff in-

itiated its Amended Complaint for money damages.

53. Plaintiff therefore has met any conditions precedent to

the institution of an action for damages in this matter.

—-

54. The May 16, 1977 strike at Plaintiff’s Nashville terminal

was not authorized by any of the exceptions to the no-strike

clause in the collective bargaining agreement as set forth in Arti-

cle 8, Section 2(a) of the NATIONAL MASTER FREIGHT

AGREEMENT.

55. It is undisputed that the 24-hour notice requirement as a

condition precedent to any strike, was not complied with by

Defendant prior to the strike.

56. Defendant’s strike at Plaintiff’s Nashville terminal on

May 16, 1977, was, therefore, an illegal strike, in violation of

the specific terms of the collective bargaining agreements.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND HOLDING

As indicated by the headings employed above, it is this

Court’s opinion that the parties in this case have classicly made

a mountain out of a mole hill. The two drivers could have wash-

ed their own windshields. One of them testified that the trucks

contain automatic washers, which he customarily used. If they

thought this work was not their responsiblity and a dispute ex-

isted in relation to it, they could have filed a grievance over it

upon their return to Nashville. The company used monumental

bad judgment in causing the arrest of the two drivers. The union

officials in Nashville, in frequent telephone conversation with

the drivers, had the opportunity to give better advice to them

than was given. The Company had the opportunity to defuse

the situation when the matter was discussed between the union

officials and Mr. Barton. In general, most of the actors in this

drama performed with less than common sense

The mutual errors leading up to the work stoppage cannot ex-

cuse the fact that there was an illegal strike in breach of the con-

tract. When a union sanctions, approves, or incites an illegal

strike, as the Court finds defendant has done in this case, it is

liable in damages to the employer. Penn. Packing Co. v.

Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local 195, 497 F2d 880 (3rd Cir.

1974).

Pe

Compensatory damage proof was offered by plaintiff in the

amount of $35,442.50 (Exhibit 11). This proof was undisputed

by defendants. However, the Court has examined the proof

and finds that of that amount, $26,238.50 was in ‘‘fixed

overhead’’ for the period of time the men were on strike and

$9,204.00 was in ‘‘lost revenue’’. The undisputed testimony

was that the Nashville terminal was an unprofitable one. Proof

of damages would ordinarily entail lost profits, i.e., the dif-

ference between ‘‘revenue’”’ and ‘‘overhead’’ or costs. Since that

is impossible in a losing operation, a different measure of

damages is appropriate. However, to add the ‘“‘lost revenue’ to

the ‘‘fixed overhead’’ is to compound the damages. Revenue

received would offset the overhead and be credited against it.

Since it was not received, it is simply not considered. By no

logic can its loss be used to amplify the overhead. The Court

therefore finds and fixes compensatory damages at $26,238.50.

Plaintiff sues also for punitive damages. In a 5-4 opinion of

1979, the Supreme Court established a per se bar to the award of

punitive damages against a union in a suit for breach of the duty

of fair representation. /.B.E.W. v. Foust, 442 US 12, 60 L. Ed.

2d 698, 99 S. Ct. 2121 (1979). This per se rule has not been ex-

panded to all suits against a union under 29 USC 185 by the

Supreme Court, a split of authority exists among the circuits,

(see Ironton Coke Corporation v. Oil Chemical & Atomic

Workers International Union, 491 F. Supp. 70, 72-74 (S. D.

Ohio 1980)) and no controlling authority is extant in this circuit.

A ruling by the Court on the question is unnecessary to decision

in the instant case. Upon the facts here presented, the conduct

of the union was not so egregious as to justify the award of

punitive damages, and such an award would be in appropriate if

permissible.

—_

Plaintiff will make application for attorney’s fees with ap-

propriate affidavits of time expended and usual and customary

charges. Defendant will be given the opportunity to respond. A

hearing thereon will be sceduled if deemed necessary.

An appropriate order will enter.

/s/ Thomas A. Wiseman Jr.

United States District Judge

=o

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 77-3243-NA-CV

Ryder Truck Lines, Inc.

Plaintiff

VS.

Teamsters Freight Local

Union No. 480, et al

Defendants

ORDER

In accordance with the Memorandum Opinion filed contem-

poraneously herewith, judgment is awarded to plaintiff in the

amount of $26,238.50 and costs.

/s/ Thomas A. Wiseman Jr.

United States District Judge