Respondents Brief — Begg v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners

Office - Supreme Court US.

i wre ep

JUN 2S 1994

No. 83-1675 :

IN THI

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM 1983

RICHARD BEGG,

Petitioner,

v.

BOARD OF FIRE AND POLICE COMMISSIONERS OF

THE CITY OF PARK RIDGE and the CITY OF PARK

RIDGE, ILLINOIS, a municipal corporation,

Respondents.

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

PAUL N. KELLER

$05 Park Place

Park Ridge, Illinois 60068

(312) 399-5207

Attorney for Respondents

Pandick Midwest. Inc. Chicago ¢ 454-7600

ee ee ee

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ARGUMENT

I.

II.

Il.

THE PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO

SHOW THAT A FEDERAL QUESTION

WAS PRESENTED TO OR DECIDED BY

THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT..............

THE DECISION OF THE ILLINOIS SU-

PREME COURT RESTS ON AN ADE-

CQQUATE SEALE GROUND cic. ccscsecsessicscsasiccess

PETITIONER HAS NO STANDING TO

RAISE THE QUESTION PRESENTED

PI ONT NEE ON cinsensincticscesncscacsarebinnstgnnaiinianbiantsa

TNs ca tehipinnicnnspccnssnpectertioessenmmecnancciguieeiniencsaanes

APPENDIX

A.

Findings and decision of the Board of Fire

and Police Commissioners of the City of Park

10

la

li

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Crowell v. Randell, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 368 (1836)...

Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437 (1969).......... 4

Street v. State of New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969)... 4

Fuller v. State of Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974) ......... 4

Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Com-

manta, ABS UR. SEE ( BDBT) ncncnesnsniansisassnnasaniontnnsoass 6

Wilson v. Loew’s, Inc., 355 U.S. 597 (1958) .......2+- 6

People v. Patterson, (1980) 88 Ill. App. 3d 144,

BOG OB BaP ccccissctntncistisdilinss nnaiitiapiiaananinnsiiaimeinne 7

Bodenschatz v. State Personnel Board, (1971) 15

Cal. App. 36 775, 93 Cab, TRO. BIT evctisenisvccnessss. 7

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) .....:cceccee0 8

Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945) ..... eee 8

Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)

DI CCI vais sccsictcnsstnssssnsnintniniianeniiaaanamniees 8

McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) .......... 9

Marbury v. Madison, | Cranch 137 ( 1803).............. 9

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) ......... 9

Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) .........eeeeseseeeeeees 9

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) «0... 9

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM 1983

RICHARD BEGG,

Petitioner,

Vs

BOARD OF FIRE AND POLICE COMMISSIONERS OF

THE CITY OF PARK RIDGE and the CITY OF PARK

RIDGE, ILLINOIS, a municipal corporation,

Respondents.

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In 1977, the Park Ridge Police Department issued an

Order, No. 77-014, establishing “Traffic Enforcement Stan-

dards” for all patrol officers. The Order cites the high number

of motor vehicle accidents in the City of Park Ridge, the

resulting financial loss and human suffering and finds that a

strong police traffic enforcement program is necessary to control

accidents and injuries. In order to implement such an enforce-

ment program, the Order establishes standards for patrol

officers. Based on an expectation that an officer will observe at

least one traffic violation during each tour of duty, the officer is

expected to issue an average of 0.8 traffic tickets per day over a

90-day period. An Officer’s activity as measured against this

standard is one factor considered in his overall performance

evaluation.

Richard Begg was a veteran police officer of the City of

Park Ridge, having I8 years on the job at the time this action

arose. He has since retired from the Department. For some

time prior to the present charges being placed against Begg, he

had been warned by his superiors that his job performance on

all measures was below acceptable levels. In April 1980, he

was given a written order from the Director of Public Safety to

bring his activity up to specified levels during the succeeding

quarter or disciplinary measures would be taken. He failed to

comply and was suspended for three days by the Director of

Public Safety. Pursuant to state statute, he demanded and

received a hearing before the Board of Fire and Police Com-

missioners of the City of Park Ridge.

At the hearing, the Department supervisors testified to the

basis for, and operation of, the traffic enforcement standards

and performance appraisal system. Evidence was presented

that Begg had failed to meet the required standards. Begg’s

witnesses, all his fellow officers, testified that in their opinion

the Department’s traffic enforcement standards constituted a

“‘quota system.” No evidence was offered by Begg contradicting

his failure to meet the enforcement standards. Rather, Begg

testified that he preferred to handle traffic violations by way of

verbal warnings and that he engaged in other activities which

were not reflected in the Department’s per:>rmance appraisal

process. The Board of Fire and Police Commissioners found

that the manifest weight of the evidence supported the dis-

ciplinary action. The Board’s Order appears in the Appendix

hereto.

3

Pursuant to state statute, Begg filed a Complaint to review

the Board’s action in the Circuit Court of Cook County. A copy

of the Complaint and Brief in support thereof appear in the

Appendix hereto. The Circuit Court, without explanation, held

that Begg “‘was suspended on the base of a traffic quota system

which is against public policy,” and reversed the decision of the

Board of Fire and Police Commissioners.

The City appealed to the Appellate Court of Illinois, which

reversed the Circuit Court and affirmed the decision of the

Board of Fire and Police Commissioners. Contrary to the

assertion in the Petitioner’s Statement Of The Case in the

Petition For Writ Of Certiorari, neither the majority nor the

concurring opinion of the Appellate Court held that traffic

quotas violate the 14th Amendment. Begg sought and was

granted Leave To Appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court of Illinois unanimously affirmed the

judgment of the Court of Appeals and the Board of Fire and

Police Commissioners. Begg now seeks to have this ruling

reviewed by this Court. The City believes that review by this

Court should not be granted.

4

ARGUMENT

I.

THE PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT A

FEDERAL QUESTION WAS PRESENTED TO OR DE-

CIDED BY THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT.

The Question Presented For Review in this case is the

product of Petitioner’s imagination. It is not the issue which

was presented to or decided by the Illinois Supreme Court.

Moreover, Petitioner has failed to show that the state court

decision is based any federal question.

The decision of the Illinois Supreme Court dealt only with

the sufficiency of Petitioner’s evidence at the administrative

hearing. The Court held that Petitioner failed to rebut the

City’s evidence that the administrative regulation is reasonable.

This Court has repeatedly held that it does not have jurisdiction

to review the determination of a federal question unless it was

presented to and relied upon the Court below. Crowell v.

Randell, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 368 (1836). This Court has

“consistently refused to decide federal constitutional issues

raised here for the first time on review of state court decisions.”

Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437 (1969).

The party seeking review by this Court has the burden of

proving that the federal question was presented to the state

court. Where, as in this case, the highest state court has failed

to pass upon the federal question and gives no indication that it

was ever asked to consider any federal question, it will be

assumed that the omission results from a failure to present the

question properly in the state court, unless the Petitioner

affirmatively shows that the question was presented. Streer v.

State of New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); Fuller v. State of

Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974).

In his Petition For Writ Of Certiorari, the Petitioner

blithely asserts that the federal question was raised in the

administrative hearing, in the Complaint For Administrative

Review before the Cook County Circuit Court, in the Appellate

Court of Illinois, and the Illinois Supreme Court. (Petition,

p.5). This assertion fails to comply with the requirements of

Supreme Court Rule 21.1(h), that Petitioner set forth “specific

reference to the places in the recora where the matter appears.”

In fact, “the matter” does not appear in the record. Respond-

ents invite this Court’s attention to the Order of the Board, to

Petitioner’s Complaint in the Circuit Court, and to the opinions

of the three state courts which have considered this case.

Nowhere in any of these documents is the issue raised or

decided which is now stated by Petitioner as the Question

Presented For Review. Only in the concurring opinion of the

Illinois Appellate Court is passing, and hypothetical, reference

made to “innocent people” in the context of an argument for a

different standard of review than the one applied by the

majority. Not even in the decision of the Circuit Court, in

which Petitioner prevailed, was any mention made of “due

process,” “‘innocent motorists,” or “probable cause,” which

Petitioner now presents as the federal question to be reviewed

by this Court. In his pleadings in the state courts, Petitioner has

always based his challenge to the regulation on “public policy”

grounds. Now he seeks to reformulate that challenge, to base it

on due process grounds. Clearly, while due process issues may

enter into public policy considerations, the two doctrines are not

synonymous, co-extensive, nor interchangeable.

The Petition For Writ Of Certiorari is insufficient because it

contains no showing whatsoever that the question it seeks to

have reviewed was in fact ever presented to or decided by the

Illinois Supreme Court. Since the federal question presented to

this Court mas not been ruied upon by the highest state court

which considered the case, this Court has no jurisdiction to

review the question.

Il.

THE DECISION OF THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT

RESTS ON AN ADEQUATE STATE GROUND.

This Court will decline to review a state court decision on a

Petition For Wnit Of Certiorari where an adequate state ground

exists for that decision. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad-

casting Company, 433 U.S. 562 (1967); Wilson v. Loew’s, Inc.,

355 U.S. 597 (1958). In this case, the only basis for the

decision of the Illinois Supreme Court was a state ground.

Specifically, the Illinois Supreme Court held that as a matter of

Illinois law, Petitioner “had the burden of showing that the

administrative regulation was arbitrary and unreasonable. He

failed to meet that burden.” 459 N.E. 2d 925, 929. The

Supreme Court found that:

Appellant did not present any evidence to demonstrate

that the traffic index standard was unreasonable. Neither

Appellant nor any other officer testified that he was forced

to issue more tickets that were justified in order to meet the

traffic index standard. None of them testified that the 0.8

standard was an unreasonable or arbitrary standard. ...

{[T]here was no conclusive evidence presented to show

that the traffic index standard had not reduced the number

of accidents. ... The Appellant failed to show that reliance

upon these standards, in evaluating officers, was unreason-

able or arbitrary. 459 N.E. 2d 925, 929.

Clearly, the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court was based

on its review of the evidentiary record of this case and not on

any question of federal law. The Court never had to reach any

question of due process or public policy concerning the admin-

istrative regulation since it found that Petitioner had failed to

allege or prove any facts which would raise those issues.

The Petition For Writ Of Certiorari seeks to introduce new

evidence into these proceedings when it discusses at length

what purports to be a statute of the State of Pennsylvania.

(Petition, p. 10-11). This discussion is completely dehors the

record of this case and has no relevancy to the issues here

presented.

The Petition For Wnt Of Certiorari also asserts that:

... not only are traffic quotas inherently wrong from the

standpoint that innocent motorists are subjected to traffic

citations without probable cause, but that a police officer

[sic] is deprived of the discretion to issue a traffic citation,

which discretion is recognized as being vital under illinois

law.) (Citations omitted). (Petition, p. 11).

The opinion of the Illinois Court of Appeals responds to this

argument clearly and succinctly.

Plaintiffs central challenge to the regulations at issue

appears to be that they establish an absolute quota to be

met by the police officers and that such quota systems are

per se against public policy. For that proposition, plaintiff

cites People v. Patterson (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 144, 410

N.E.2d 223, and Bodenschaiz v. State Personnel Board

(1971) 15 Cal. App. 3d 775, 93 Cal. Rptr. 471. But

neither of those cases even involved quota systems. In

Patterson, ... [t]he court noted that an officer may always

issue a warning or reprimand without citing a motorist.

We find nothing in that statement of the discretion invested

in a police officer to support the proposition that the

regulation at issue here is against public policy. Nothing in

the record indicates that plaintiff was not free to exercise

his discretion in a similar matter in any individual case. In

Bodenschatz, a police officer was dismissed because his

enforcement activity was well below the average for his

fellow officers. The officer challenged his dismissal in part

because he contended that his level of activity was low

only because the police department had a policy of requir-

ing its officers to engage in more enforcement activity that

circumstances warranted. The appellate court agreed that

such a policy would be improper as contrary to the public

interest but noted that the officer had failed to meet his

burden of proving that such a policy was in existence. Jn

this cause there was no evidence to suggest that plaintiff was

8

being asked to meet standards which were unreasonably

high. Nor was there any testimony that other police officers

or the plaintiff would have had to issue unjustified citations

to meet the standards. 443 N.E.2d 222, 224. (Emphasis

added).

The decision of the state court is expressly based on its

determination that Petitioner introduced no evidence to support

his theory of the effect of the administrative regulation. Since

Petitioner failed to prove that the regulation has the factual

effect he claims, he cannot ask this Court to decide whether that

effect violates due process considerations.

The question of the standard of review in determining the

validity of administrative regulations being one of state law,

there was in this case an adequate and independent state

ground for the decision irrespective of the constitutional issue

that this Court is now urged to review. When a state decision

rests on adequate foundation of state substantive law, it Is

immune from review in the Federal courts. Wainwright v.

Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117

(1945); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590

(1874).

THE PETITIONER HAS NO STANDING TO RAISE THE

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.

The federal question raised in the Petition For Writ Of

Certiorari asserts a violation of due process rights of “innocent

motorists (subjected to) the issuance of traffic citations without

probable cause.” As shown above, Petitioner has failed to

establish that any such motorists received any such citations.

However, assuming arguendo that the administrative regulation

did have the effect alleged, Petiuoner has no standing to assert

the constitutional rights of such motorists in challenging his

three day suspension for failing to issue sufficient citations. The

motorists whose rights are alleged to be violated, if they exist at

all, are not parties to this action.

This Court has repeatedly held that “constitutional rights

are personal and may not be asserted vicariously.” McGowan v.

Manland, 366 U.S. 420, 429-430 (1961). Constitutional

judgments are justified only out of the necessity of adjudicating

rights in the particular cases between litigants before the court.

Marbury v. Madison, | Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).

Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional

adjudication is the principal that a person to whom a

statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to

challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceiv-

ably be applied unconstitutionally to others in other situ-

ations not before the court. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413

U.S. 601 (1973); Cf. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).

Only limited exceptions to these principals have been

recognized by this Court, such as where individuals not party to

a particular suit stand to lose by its outcome and yet have no

effective avenue of preserving their rights themselves. Broad-

rick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611 (1973); Eisenstadt v.

Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). Clearly, this exception is not

applicable to the present case, as an innocent motorist who is

issued a traffic citation without probable cause could avail

himself of the established judicial avenues of contesting that

citation.

Since the question presented for review by Petitioner in this

case assumes facts not in evidence and asserts constitutional

rights of persons not party to this litigation, the petition should

be denied.

10

CONCLUSION

Petitioner has failed to carry his burden of showing that he

has properly reserved for review the constitutional question he

preseats. The decision that he asks this Court to review is

purely a ruling on the sufficiency of evidence produced at the

administrative hearing, which rests entirely on state grounds.

Moreover, the federal due process question raised by the

Petition For Writ Of Certiorari asserts constitutional rights of

third persons not party to this action and is grounded on

hypothetical facts not supported by any evidence in the record

of this case. Accordingly, Respondents respectfully pray that

this Court deny the Petition For Writ Of Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

PauL N. KELLER

505 Park Place

Park Ridge, Illinois 60068

(312) 399-5207

Attorney for Respondents

APPENDIX

la

STATE OF ILLINOIS ;

$3.:

COUNTY OF COOK

BEFORE THE BOARD OF FIRE AND POLICE

COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF

PARK RIDGE, ILLINOIS

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPEAL OF

RICHARD R. BEGG, A POLICE OFFI-

CER OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT

OF THE CITY OF PARK RIDGE, IL-

LINOIS.

FINDINGS AND DECISION

This matter comes on to be heard by the undersigned

Board of Fire and Police Commissioners of the City of Park

Ridge, Illinois upon the appeal of Police Officer RICHARD R.

BEGG (hereinafter referred to as “Appellant”), from a

Suspension Order dated August 15, 1980 by Director of Public

Safety, G. JOE MOFFITT (hereinafter referred to as Ap-

pellee), wherein said Appellant was suspended for three (3)

days without pay for the alleged violation of certain perform-

ance standards applicable to patrol officers of the Park Ridge

Police Department. A copy of said Suspension Order is

incorporated herein by reference. This Board held a public

hearing on said appeal on December 8, 1980 pursuant to notice

as required by law, and, having heard and reviewed the

testimony and other evidence presented at said hearing, and

after due deliberation and being fully advised in the premises,

FINDS:

1. Appellant was at all times mentioned herein and per-

taining hereto a police officer of the Police Department of the

City of Park Ridge, Illinois, assigned to duties as a patrol

Officer.

2a

2. By Suspension Order dated August 15, 1980 Appellant

was suspended by Appellee for a period of three (3) days

without pay for the alleged violation of Part I of said perform-

ance standard relative to traffic arrests (“traffic index”) and

Part II relative to non-traffic arrests, for the period of April 1,

1980 through June 30, 1980.

3. Within the time permitted by law and in the manner

required, Appellant filed an appeal of said suspension with this

Board.

4. This Board has jurisdiction of the subject matter of said

appeal and the persons of the parties hereto.

5. All notices and other things required to be done prior io

delivery and after said hearing have been done.

6. Throughout the hearing, both Appellant and Appellee

appeared in person and were represented by legal counsel of

their own selection. All witnesses were sworn on, testified

under oath, and were subject to cross examination.

7. The manifest weight of the evidence shows by a pre-

ponderance that:

A. Contrary to Part I of said Performance Standard,

Appellant’s “traffic index” for the period April 1, 1980

through June 30, 1980 was .59 traffic arrests per day,

whereas Appellee had informed Appellant in writing by

instrument dated April 24, 1980 that the minimum accept-

able level for such traffic index was .80 traffic arrests per

day.

B. Contrary to Part II of said Performance Standard,

Appellant’s non-traffic performance for the period April 1,

1980 through June 30, 1980 was .97 non-traffic arrests per

day, whereas Appellee had informed Appellant in writing

by instrument dated April 24, 1980 that the minimum

acceptable level for such non-traffic performance was 1.50

non-traffic arrests per day.

3a

C. There was no demonstration by Appellant of any

mitigating circumstance sufficient to excuse his perform-

ance below said required standards.

8. The aforesaid conduct by Appellant was a violation

sufficient to warrant the three (3) day suspension given.

NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND

DETERMINED that the aforesaid suspension of Police Officer

RICHARD R. BEGG for three (3) days without pay for the

violations set forth above be and the same is hereby affirmed.

December 29, 1980

/s/ EDWARD A. CRUSE

/s/ RICHARD P. HEFFERAN

/s/ ROBERT E. BERGMANN

being all of the member of the Fire &

Police Commissioners of the City of

Park Ridge, III.

SP ee EF

4a

STATE OF ILLINOIS |

SS.:

COUNTY OF COOK i

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS

COUNTY DEPARTMENT—LAW DIVISION

RICHARD R. BEGG, }

Plaintiff |

-VS-

BOARD OF FIRE AND POLICE COM- |

MISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF PARK |.

RIDGE, EDWARD A. CRUSE, RIC- + NO. 81 L 2184

HARD P. HEFFERAN, ROBERT E.

BERGMANN, and G. JOE MOFFITT.

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SAFETY FOR

THE CITY OF PARK RIDGE, IL-

LINOIS,

Defendants

COMPLAINT FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW

NOW COMES RICHARD R. BEGG, plaintutf by

STANLEY H. JAKALA, his attorney, complaining of the

defendants, BOARD OF FIRE AND PCLICE COMMISSION-

EPS OF THE CITY OF PARK RIDGE, EDWARD A.

CRUSE, RICHARD P. HEFFERAN, ROBERT E. BERG-

MANN, and G. JOE MOFFITT, DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC

SAFETY FOR THE CITY OF PARK RIDGE, ILLINOIS, and

States as follows:

1. That on April 15, 1980, the plaintuff, RICHARD R.

BEGG, had been suspended for a period of three days without

pay by Director of Public Safety for the City of Park Ridge.

Illinois, G. Joe Moffitt, in that he had violated a certain

performance standard of the City of Park Ridge relative to

(an

fi

traffic arrests (traffic index) and non-traffic arrests covering a

period from April 1, 1980, through June 30. 1980.

2. That the plaintiff had appealed the three day suspension

order without pay as described in paragraph | of this complaint

for administrative review to the Board of Fire and Police

Commissioners of the City of Park Ridge. Illinois.

3. That on December 29, 1980, an administrative decision

was rendered by the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners of

the City of Park Ridge, Illinois, Edward A. Cruse, Richard P.

Hefferan, and Robert E. Bergmann, defendants, affecting the

rights of the plainutf, a copy of the said decision was served on

the plainuff personally on December 29, 1980.

4. That the plaintiff desires a judicial review of the final

decision of the administrative agency which decision upheld the

three-day suspension without pay of the plaintiff, said suspen-

sion order being issued by the Director of Public Safety of the

City of Park Ridge, Illinois, G. Joe Moffitt, in connection with

the plainuff allegedly violating a certain performance standard

of the City of Park Ridge. Illinois relative to traffic arrests

(traffic index) covering the period from April 1, 1980, through

June 30, 1980.

5S. That judicial review is sought for the reason that the

decision is both contrary to |aw and contrary to the actual facts

of the case and specifically a traffic/ticket quota system 1s

against public policy.

6. That the defendant, G. Joe Moffitt, Director of Public

Safety of the City of Park Ridge, Illinois, is named as a

defendant in that he is an interested party in these proceedings.

7. That the defendants, Board of Fire and Police Commis-

sioners of the City of Park Ridge, Illinois, Edward A. Cruse.

Richard P. Hefferan, Robert E. Bergmann, are hereby re-

quested to file the record of proceedings had before them

6a

pertaining to the entry of the aforementioned decision together

with whatever evidence. exhibits of other matters that were

submitted to the hearing officers on December 8, 1980.

WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF, RICHARD R. BEGG,

RESPECTFULLY PRAYS:

A. That the record sustaining the three-day suspension

without pay of the plaintiff by the Director of Public Safety of

the City of Park Ridge, Illinois, G. Joe Moffitt, in connection

with the plaintiff allegedly violating a2 certain standard of

performance of the City of Park Ridge, Illinois, relative to

traffic arrests (traffic index) and non-traffic arrests covering a

period from April i, 1980, through June 30, 1980, had, or

considered, by the hearing officers of the Board of Fire and

Police Commissioners of the City of Park Ridge, Illinois, be

judicially reviewed.

B. That the decision of the Board of Fire and Police

Commissioners of the City of Park Ridge, Illinois, be reversed.

C. That the plaintiff be granted such other and further

relief as he would be entitled under the law.

Richard R. Begg

7a

STATE OF ILLINOIS

COUNTY OF COOK

RICHARD R. BEGG, after first being duly sworn upon

oath, deposes and says he has read the foregoing complaint by

him subscribed, knows the contents thereof and that the same is

true.

Subscribed and swern to before me

this day of , 1981.

Notary Public

Stanley H. Jakala

Attorney for Plaintiff

3219 Maple Avenue

Berwyn, Illinois 60402

(312) 788-5733

aN

8a

STATE OF ILLINOIS |

COUNTY OF COOK |

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS

COUNTY DEPARTMENT—LAW DIVISION

RICHARD R. BEGG,

Plaintiff

-VS-

BOARD OF FIRE AND POLICE COM-

MISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF PARK

RIDGE, EDWARD A. CRUSE, RIC-

HARD P. HEFFERMAN, ROBERT E.

BERGMANN, and G. JOE MOFFITT,

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SAFETY FOR

THE CITY OF PARK RIDGE, IL-

LINOIS,

Defendants

- NO. 81 L 2184

|

|

4

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S

COMPLAINT FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On August 15, 1981, G. Joe Moffitt, Director of Public

Safety, City of Park Ridge, Illinois, issued a letter to the

plainuff wherein it was stated that from April 1, 1980 through

June 30, 1980, the plaintiff did not write the required daily City

of Park Ridge Police Department traffic citations and had not

involved himself in the daily required non-traffic arrest situ-

ations as demanded by the City of Park Ridge Police Depart-

ment thereby failing to meet the performance standards for

both categories resulting in a three-day suspension, a copy of

said dated correspondence of August 15, 1980 is marked as

“Exhibit A” and attached to this Brief.

—————~rrrere

9a

From the three-day suspension, the plaintiff appealed to

the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners of the City of Park

Ridge, Illinois.

After the hearing before the Board of Fire and Police

Commissioners of the City of Park Ridge, Illinois, the Board

sustained the three-day suspension by ruling that the plaintiff

had not met the performance standards of the City of Park

Ridge, Illinois concerning the issuance of the required daily

traffic ticket citations covering the period from April 1, 1980

through June 30, 1980, that the plaintiff had not met the non-

traffic performance standard covering the same period, and that

the plaintiff had not demonstrated any mitigating circumstances

sufficient to excuse his performance in conforming with the

standards.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue is whether a traffic quota system violates public

policy.

ARGUMENT

In analyzing the Transcript of Proceedings, the City of

Park Ridge contended that its demand of its police officers to

issue a certain amount of traffic ticket citations per day related

to a traffic index score. (Tr. p. 32).

That the purpose of the traffic index score was to reduce

injuries and deaths caused by automobile accidents. (Tr. p. 39,

40).

Nevertheless, in the presentation of its evidence, the City

of Park Ridge admitted that its traffic index score did not

minimize or decrease injuries, deaths or automobile accidents in

Park Ridge, Illinois. (Tr. p. 41-44).

10a

At the same time, the City of Park Ridge, in its testimony,

admitted that the traffic index score is not the best way to

measure the qualifications of a police officer. (Tr. p. 45).

In questioning Police Lieutenant George Tuene of the City

of Park Ridge, Illinois Police Department, one of the two

witnesses testifying for the City of Park Ridge, the Lieutenant

admitted that the traffic index score of the City of Park Ridge is

a traffic quota system which requires the issuance of a certain

amount of traffic citation tickets per day. (Tr. p. 76-77).

In the presentation of the plaintiff's evidence, the plaintiff's

evidence abundantly established that the traffic index score of

the City of Park Ridge was indeed a traffic quota system. (Tr.

p. 79, 84, 89, 98, 112, 113).

It is the contention of the plaintiff that the quota system is

contrary to the public policy of the State of Illinois as reflected

by the following quotation from People v. Patterson, 88 Ill.

App. 3d 144, Page 146:

“... an officer may also warn of a traffic violation or

reprimand the driver without citing him...”

In this instance, the traffic quota system of the City of Park

Ridge neither reduced injuries, deaths or automobile accidents.

Likewise, the traffic quota system was not utilized in a

minimal evaluation of the plaintiff as was suggested by Park

Ridge Police Captain John Boudek, Commander of Field

Operations Bureau of the City of Park Ridge Police Depart-

ment. (Tr. p. 45).

On the contrary, the traffic quota system evaluation con-

Stitutes at least 40% to 90% of a City of Park Ridge evaluation

of a police officer’s ability. (Tr. p. 73, 81, 82, 92, 117).

lla

Therefore, the decision of the Board of Fire and Police

Commissioners of the City of Park Ridge is against the manifest

weight of the evidence in that plaintiff did demonstrate mitigat-

ing circumstances to excuse his performance from observing

traffic ticket quota system in that the traffic quota system is

against public policy by requiring a police officer to issue daily a

specific number of traffic citations without affording him the

discretion to either write or not write those citations.

Furthermore, the decision of the Board of Fire and Police

Commissioners of the City of Park Ridge is against the manifest

weight of the evidence in that it does not promote the public

welfare or safety, since injuries, deaths and automobile acci-

dents have not been decreased by the establishment of the

quota traffic system of the Park Ridge Police Department.

In addition, the public welfare or safety of Park Ridge is

not being promoted by the traffic quota system in that question-

able traffic violations result in the issuance of traffic tickets for

the purpose of meeting a traffic quota system thereby depriving

the Park Ridge police officer of his discretion to determine

whether or not a violation in question justifiably deserves the

issuance of a traffic ticket.

For reasons enumerated herein, the decision of the Board

of Fire and Police Commissioners of the City of Park Ridge,

Illinois is against the manifest weight of the evidence and is

subject to reversal. Sudduth v. Board of Fire and Police

Commissioners of the City of Rockford, 1964, 48 Ill App 2d 194;

Fantozzi v. Board of Fire and Poiice Commissioners of the

Village of Villa Park, 35 Ill App 2d 248 (1963); Davern v. Civil

Service Commission (1970) 47 Ill 2d 469; Oliver B. Christensen

v. Board of Fire and Police Commissioners of the Village of Oak

Forest, 11 Ill App 3d 487 (1973); Basketfield v. Police Board of

the City of Chicago, 56 Ill 2d 351 (1974); Stanton v. Board of

Fire and Police Commissioners of the Village of Bridgeview, 37

Ill App 3d 108 (1976); Brawka v. Board of Fire and Police

12a

Commissioners, 9 Ill App 3d 879 (1973); and Chigaros v.

Murphy, 27 Ill App 3d 545 (1975).

/s/ STANLEY H. JAKALA

Stanley H. Jakala

Stanley H. Jakala

Attorney ‘or Plaintiff

3219 Maple Avenue

Berwyn, Illinois 60602

(312) 788-5733