Petition — Magwood v. Alabama

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

TERM 1983

eeeeeeeneenanne RECEIVED

BILLY JOE MAGWOOD, APR . . 55

a THE CLERK

PETITIONER, — COUNT, U.S.

V. EE |

enh én gry t *

DEFENDANT , APR 12 84

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Ale~rvder l. Stoves, Clerk |

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTICRARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF

STATE OF ALABAMA

The petitioner, Billy Joe Magwood, prays that a writ of Certiorari

issue to review the opinion and judgment of the Supreme Court of

Alabama rendered in these proceedings on January 7, 1983.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Supreme Court of Alabama, is yet unreported,

appears at Appendix A, p. .. The opinion of the Court of Criminal

Appeals of Alabama is unreported, but appears at Appendix A, p. 25 ,

and, the opinion of the Circuit Court of Coffee County is unreported,

but appears at Appendix A, p. 42 .

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama was entered January

7, 1983. Petitioner applied for a rehearing on January 21, 1933

and same was denied on February 11, 1983. This petition for certiorari

~ was filed less than ninety (90) days from the date petitioner's

1

petition for rehearing was denied. The jurisdiction of this Court

is invoked under 28 U.S. C. §1257(3).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The alleged facts presented at a trial of this matter shows

that Billy Joe Magwood shot and killed Sheriff Neil Grantham, within

a few weeks of his release from a State prison facility where he

was serving a four year term for possession and distribution of

a controlled substance. Billy Joe Magwood came up for parole in

October 1978 before the Parole Board but was denied on the basis

that “His release would not be compatible with the welfare and

protection of society."

Prior to his release, Magwood's probation was revoked on the

possession and distribution charge after he was charged with assault

and battery and threatening his probation officer.

The record shows that Magwood pulled up in front of the Coffee

County jail on March 1, 1979 between 6:00 A.M. and 6:30 A.M. He

parked the automobile he drove in the parking space alloted for

the sheriff.

Sheriff Neil Grantham arrived between 6:30 A.M. and 6:45 A.M.

He parked his car across the street from the jail, went to a trash

can and deposited a trash bag therein, came back across the street

behind the parked car of Billy Joe Magwood.

Magwood got out of his car, walked to the rear of the car

and shot the sheriff three times. Sheriff Niel Grantham fell to

the ground. Tom Weeks, a deputy sheriff was an eye witness to

the shooting. Weeks was standing in the doorway of the jail looking

out of the windows. After hearing the shots and seeing Sheriff

Grantham fall, Weeks went to a desk draw, retrieved a pistol and

attempted to apprehend Magwood.

Magwood fired at least two shots at deputy Weeks, got in the

automobile in which he arrived and drove off.

A short time thereafter, City, County and State officers arrested

Billy Joe Magwood after locating him sitting on the back porch of

his mother's house. The car he drove to the jail, a faded blue

Chevrolet, was parked out front.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On March 1, 1979, Billy Joe Magwood was arrested for the murder

of Sheriff Neil Grantham of Coffee County.

On March 12, 1979, Billy Joe Magwood was indicted for murder.

On May 5, 1981, Billy Joe Magwood was arraigned and pleaded

guilty by reason of insanity and not guilty.

On June 1, 1981, the case came to trial.

On June 2, 1981, Billy Joe Magwood was found guilty.

On June 20, 1981, Billy Joe Magwood was sentenced to death

by electrocution to occur August 4, 1981.

On July 20, 1981, a motion for new trial was filed and denied

on September 16, 1981.

Notice cf appeal was filed September 24, 1981.

On February 16, 1982, the case was submitted to the Court

of Criminal Appeals.

On April 5, 1981 oral argument was waived and the case was

submitted on briefs.

On May 18, 1982, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the

trial Court's decision.

oa May 28, 1982, application for rehearing was filed in the

Court of Criminal appeals.

| The application for rehearing was denied on June 8, 1982.

Writ of Certiorari and accompanying brief filed on June 22,

10922.

| On August 19, 1982, Petition for Writ of Certiorari was granted.

On January 7, 1983, State Supreme Court rendered its decision

affirming the Court of Criminal Appeals.

On January 21, 1983, Application for Rehearing was filed.

On February 11, 1983, application was denied.

et

I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN PAILING

TO GRANT PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE?

II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED es DISCRETION IN SUBMITTING

THIS CASE TO THE JURY IN THE FACE OF OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE INTRODUCED

BY DEFENDANT TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF SANITY?

III. WHETHER THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING

PETITIONER'S REQUEST TO HIRE A PSYCHIATRIST AFTER THE STATE SECURED

THE OPINION OF AN ADDITIONAL PSYCHOLOGIST?

IV. WHETHER THE DEATH STATUTE UNDER WHICH DEFENDANT WAS

TRIED AND CONVICTED IS CONSTITUTIONAL?

I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING

PETITIONER'S ION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE?

We realize that a motion for change of venue is within the

sound discretion of the trial court, and absent a showing of abuse

of that discretion, its ruling will not be disturbed. Those words

are supported by a linc of cases, Speigner v. State, 367 80. 2d

590; Coan v. State, 380 So.24 980; Dolvin v. State, 391 80. 2d 666.

And, on its face those words seem fair and logical, but how does

one gage a judge's discretion? Is the fact that every television

station, radio station and newspaper in the area and surrounding

area reported the fact that Billy Joe Magwood shot and killed Sheriff

Neil Grantham sufficient to warrant an abuse of discretion? Is

the fact that periodically for a period of nearly two years, these

same news services diligently reported the incident to the public

without also reporting that petitioner Magwood was innocent until

proven guilty, dispositive of the issue? Is it the judge's duty

to take these circumstances into consideration and how perpetual

reporting, that a black ex-convict shot and killed the local sheriff

is likely to effect potential jurors? Should the fact that petitioner

Magwood could not be housed in a Coffee County jail for nearly

two years after the killing for fear of his safety be considered

by the trial judge in deciding venue? We think so. The record

of this trial is filled with news reports of the killing. The

sensationalism, surrounding this trial mixed with the traditional

racial overtones present when a black kills a white, not to mention

@ black (ex-convict) killing the local sheriff. The courtroom

was packed with friends of the sheriff. Extra precaution had to

be taken for security throughout the trial. Certainly, to hold

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petitioner's trial in the midst of this atmosphere was an abuse

of the judges discretion. In makihg the claim of abuse of discretion,

we do not overlook Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 8. Ct. 1639,

6 L.Ed. 24. 751, but state that the highly pressured conditions

under which this trial was held in a small rural Alabama county

where virtually everyone knows everyone else distinguished Irvin

v. Dowd, supra, and makes the jurors assurances that they can place

aside their biases more than suspect, but critical. Murphy v.

Florida, 421 u. &. 794, 95 8. Ct. 2031, 44 L.Ed. 2d 589. A change

of venue would have remedied the situation and removed any and

211 doubt, especially since petitioner's life hangs in the balance.

11. 0 TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN SUBMITTING

| HE PACE RWHE

(ODUCED BY DEFENDANT TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF SANITY?

Defendant in this case presented the defense of not guilty

and not guilty by insanity. By presenting said plea, defendant

had the burden of rebutting the presumption of sanity. Herbert

wv. State, 357 80. 24. 683 (Ala. CR. App.). Billy Joe Magwood, defendant,

is charged with the murder of Sheriff Neil Grantham of Coffee County

on March 1, 1979.

Apprehended within hours after shooting the sheriff, defendant,

Billy Joe Magwood was transferred to a neighboring county for safety.

In the mean time his trial counsel requested that Magwood be tested

in order to determine his sanity. On May 31, 1979, the Court appointed

two local general practitioners, Dr. Donald Crook and Dr. Bancroft

Cooper to examine the defendant. After fifteen to thirty minutes

of examination on two separate occasions each doctor stated that

Gefendant was sane (T-236 & 272).

However, both doctors on cross examination stated that they

knew nothing of defendant's prior medical or mental history. Each

Goctor refused to rate their cursory diagnosis superior to the

Giagnosis of the Lunacy Commission appointed later (T-238, T-275).

Defendant's counsel not being satisfied with the results of

the examinations given his client by the two general practitioners

requested a covening of a Commission on Lunacy in order to determine

Gefendant's mental responsibility under Article 22, Chapter 16,

Title 15, Code of Alabama.

Said Lunacy Commission was duly provided in accordance with

Title 15-16-22 Code of Alabama. Billy Joe Magwood was transferred

to the custody of the Supreintendent of Searcy Hospital, Mt. Vernon,

Alabama for observation (T-383). J. E. Kimbrough, M. b., Assistant

Superintendant, Clinical Services, William H. Rudden, M. D., Staff

Psychiatrist, and A. Ronald Walker, M. D., Staff Psychiatrist were

appointed to constitute the commission.

There is no need to quote from their report here. It is part

of the record located at T. 384 to 386. The report speaks for

itself. After hours and hours of examination and evaluation the

commission individually and jointly found defendant Magwood to

be presently insane and incompetent on the day said crime was committed.

This report was submitted to the Clerk of the Coffee County

Court on August 16, 1979. These doctors only a few months after

the alleged commission of this crime by Magwood found him to be

totally crazy. The precise psychiatric examination are located

at T. 355 to 567. Through the reports, defendant Magwood is listed

as @ schizophrenia, paranoid type, violent, with capabilities of

"acting out” his fantasies.

At trial of this matter, attorney for defendant, Magwood,

called Dr. William Rudder, one of the participants on the Lunacy

Commission who was not present but h i s deposition was read into

the record, repeated over and over that defendant Magwood was out

of touch with reality, had a diseased mind, and that defendant

was incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong (T. 199).

The record further reflects defendant had a history of drug abuse,

utilizing such drugs as LSD, cocaine, heroine, opium, gualudes,

valium and marijuana (T.557). Treatment while under the custody

of the Lunacy Commission included loxitane, novane, taractan and

lellurial. All are potent drugs to treat psychosis (T. 245).

Dr. Rudder further stated that defendant Billy Joe Magwood's

mental illness is severe, so severe that he would be diagnosed

insance in any part of the world. In response to the prosecution's

question “People who have schizophrenia and people who have schizophrenia

paranoid type, they don't behave all alike in all respect, do they?

"Out of a given number of people, let's take a

hundred, for example, who are suspected of having

schizophrenia, there will be upwards to fifty to

seventy-five percent of those that anybody would

say has schizophrenia. There will be ten or fiften

of twenty percent, depending on the part of the world

you're in, that there would be--some le would say

were perfectly all right. There will be some

borderline people which would lead you to believe, if

you write up the statistics on these borderline people,

that we don't know what we're talking about and we

can't decide who's crazy and who ain't crazy, just in

street terms.

How, I want to go ahead.

Billy Joe Magwood falls into the category that would

be called cracy in Stockholm; he would be called crzay in

Calcutta, in Tokyo, any place. He is schizophrenic. He is

not in the borderline category.”

Prior to his trial on June 2, 1981, defendant was required

by the State to submit to examination by Dr. Douglas McKeown, a

licensed clinical psychologist. Between April 23 and April 27,

1981, at the Houston County Jail in Dothan, Dr. McKeown, examined

Gefendant from eight to ten hours. It was Dr. McKeown's opinion

that defendant was sane and knew the difference between right and

wrong on March 1, 1979, the date of the shooting. Dr. McKeown

readily admitted that he never examined or observed defendant at

any time when defendant was not taking his proper medication.

In order to rebut the presumption of senity, one's evidence

must be overwhelming, Boyle v. State, 229 Ala. 212, 154, So. 575;

Christian v. State, 351 So.24 623; Noris v. State, 401 So.24 191.

Both general practitioners who examined defendant only a few days

after the shooting refused to state that he was sane. One docter

deferred to the expertise and cpinion of the Lunacy Commission,

and the other stated that in his opinion defendant was sane but

suffered from the mental disorder paranoid schizophrenia, the same

condition upon which the Lunacy Commission found defendant to be

insane and incompetent to stand trial.

The Lunacy Commission's report speaks for itself. Furthermore,

it was an extensive report made within three months after the incident.

That commission's report found defendant insane presently and insane

on the date the crime was committed. The only other test administered

to defendant regarding his competency to stand trial and his competency

on the day the crime occurred over two years later after extensive

medical treatment. The clinical psychologist who made the report,

Douglas McKeown, stated that he had never examined the defendant

when the defendant was not on medication.

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3 1 ou ni SAAT . * 25 in e nk 2 oe ao . * ee 1 ala

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62 This Honorable Court need not be reminded that defendant had

been in jail and on no medication when the first two general

practitioners saw him e few days after the shooting. Their examination

was simply inadequate and they were not qualified in the field

of mental disorders to render such an opinion. This Court need

not be reminded that the Lunacy Commission was composed of three

very qualified psychiatrists who overwhelmingly pronounded defendant

insane. Finally, this court need not be reminded that Dr. McKeown's

opinion was based upon his examination of a completely different

Billy Jo» Magwood, some two years after the incident and some two

years of extensive medical treatment.

* We think here, that if this Court apply the principles of

law which are outlines in Christian v. State, supra, and its progeny

to the facts in this case, this Court will find that overwhelming

and uncontradicted evidence was present and sufficient to rebut

the presumption of sanity.

The State hired Dr. Dorald Crook and Dr. Bancroft Cooper

to examine defendant in order to determine his sanity on May 31,

1979. Defendant had no choice in the selection of said doctors.

Both doctors returned a finding that defendant was sane. These

examinations took place in the jail for a period of twenty to thirty

minutes each. On the 20th day of June 1979, the State convened

@ Lunacy Commission which conducted extensive examinations of defendant

and found him to be insane presently and insane at the tim the

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offense was committed. Being unsatisfied with the result of the

Lunacy Commission, the State went even further to employ the

assistance of Dr. Douglas McKeown, a clinical psychologist, in

order to have defendant examined two years after the alleged offense

occurred. Dr. McKeown stated that it was his professional opinion

that defendant was sane.

Defendant's counsel filed a motion on June 26, 1980 in order

to secure the services of a consultant psychologist to assist in

his defense. Said motion was denied.

Because he is indigent and unable to secure the services of

a consultant psychiatrist, defendant had to proceed to trial unassisted

2 the State with its limitless funds did so hire a psychologist

to assist in the prosecution of defendant. Such conduct by the

State violates defendant's Constitutional right to equal protection

under the 1% of both the State and Federal Constitution.

Herein lies the crux of petitioner's claim of unequal protection.

The State sought and secured the services of a clinical psychologist

over two years after the shooting and after petitioner had been

treated extensively with drugs. In fact, the State requested its

hand picked clinical psychologist to examine what amounts to a

Gifferent individual.

The State's action in securing an examination of petitioner

by Dr. Douglas McKeown, circumvents the mandate of Code of Alabama,

15-16-22 by, in fact, utilizing Dr. McKeown's testimony as the

testimony of a second Lunacy Commission. Surely, the State would

not have sought such additional testimony had the Lunacy Commission

found petitioner sane.

12

The effects of Dr. McKeown's testimony had tremendous effects

with the jurors since the testimony of both doctors who examined

petitioner was favorable with one doctor deferring his opinion

to that of the Lunacy Commission and the other doctor admitting

that petitioner suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. The Lunacy

Commission itself stated that petitioner was insane. Therefore,

Dr. McKeown's testimony was the duciding material proof. Especially,

since Dr. Rudder of the Lunacy Commission was not present and only

his testimony was read.

Because petitioner was indigent and unable to secure the services

of a clinical psychologist or psychiatrist, he was forced to proceed

to trial unassisted whereas the State with the limitless funds

Aid so hire a psychologist to assist in the prosecution of defendant.

Such conduct by the State violates defendant's Constitutional rights

to egual protection under the law of both the State and Federal

Constitution.

Although Harris v. State, 352 80. 2d 479, and Johnson v. State,

355 80. 2d 663, hold:

It has been repeatedly held that a denial of

funds to pay defense experts for investigations and

Geprivation of Constitutions! rights.

We think the present case is distinguishable. Petitioner did not

request funds to hire an expert initially. Only after the State waited

two years, and only after extensive medical treatment with drugs, only

after the State sought a re-evaluation of petitioner which tended

to state what his mental condition was two years prior without

medication, did petitioner seek additional funds to secure the

services of an expert. These circumstances distinguishes the

13

the posture of petitioner's case from other cases cited. Petitioner

should have been allowed funds to secure a psychologist or

psychiatrist cc the State, pursuant to the previously cited statute,

should have convened a second Lunacy Commission to order an opinion

on petitioner. Taking into consideration that petitioner had beer

on extensive medical treatment for two years since the incident.

IV. ETHER ' 7

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RIE D AND CONVICTE 5 1s CONSTY’

i259:

PUTIONA

Petitioner committed the alleged crime for which he has been

tried and convicted under Alabama's Criminal Law Punishment Statute,

13-ll-1 et. seq., which the ted States Supreme Court found to

be patently unconstitutional as a whole. Beck v. State, 100 8. Ct.

2382, 447 u. &. 625, 65 L. Bd. 24. 392.

On remand the State Court of Alabama sought to resurrect the

unconstitutional parts of the Statute by severing the constitutionally

infirm clauses which precluded the judge from giving an instruction

on lesser indicted offenses on a capital case and which provided

that a jury had to fix punishment at death if a defendant was found

guilty of e capital offense. Beck V. State, 396 80. 24 645.

However, Petitioner contend that the foundation of any s0o-

called new death statute must come from the Alabama Legislature

and not through reformulatory constructions of the Court. Petitioner

states that his conviction under any state scheme originating from

13-11-1 et. seq. is unconstitutional and in violation of his Six,

Eight and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights.

. 1 „ W

CONCLUSION

Petitioner requests this Honorable Court to grant a Writ of

Certiorari and review, reverse and remand his conviction on the

grounds that his constitutional rights under the Sixth, Eighth

and Fourteenth Amendment have been violated.

Respectfully submitted,

CHESTNUT, SANDERS, SANDERS

Pos T Office Box 1305

„ Alabama 36702-130

RTIFICATE OF

This is to certify that I have served counsel for the opposing

party with a copy of the within and foregoing Petition by depositing

a copy of the same in the U. 8. Mail, properly addressed with postage

prepaid.

This tne £74 aay of 9

19 3.

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iG TABLE OF CONTENTS P. No

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OPINIONS ELI UU

CERTIFICATE or sI. . 15

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TABLE OF A

pen. nn gi 25333600

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YI i s et. 16555 1. Bas 26. 7511

e. ct. 2031 47 1. Ba. 4 , 0%ç

CODE OF ALABAMA, Title 15-16-22

CODE OF ALABAMA, Article 22, Chapter 16, Title 15

PAGE NO.

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13

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TELEPHONE 032-6400

Agpod'y .

CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT t

STATE OF ALABAMA 1 D 1

REGEIMED

February 11, 1983 ron 1983

chestnut, Sanders N

!

Re: 61-792

: : J

Arg 183 por lr OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

(Re: Billy Joe Magvood ve. State of Alabama)

Appellant Appellee

You are hereby notified that the following indicated action was taken in the above cause by the Supreme Court

Appeal docketed. Future correspondence should refer to the above number.

. Reporter granted additional time to [ile reporter transcript to and including

— Clerk/Register granted additional time to file clerk's record/record on appeal to and including

Appell

Appellant) granted 7 additional days to file reply briefs to and including

-—— ee Record on Appeal filed

— Appendix Filed .

Submitted on Briefs |

———— Petition for Writ of Certiorari denied. No opinion. /

DR Application for rehearing overruled. No opinion written on rehearing. /

|

|

granted 7 additional days to file briefs to and including

Permission to file amicus curiae briefs granted

N ve 9 RECEIMED f

x ay MAF 1 6 1983

March 14, 1983 Chestnut, Sandus & Gc

THE STATE OF Mu u - - - - - - = = 4 gupIciAL vepaRmenT }

IN ‘TIE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 1982-83

81-792

EX PARTE BILY JOE MAGWOOD

PETITION POR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

(In re: Billy Joe Magwood v. State of Alabama)

ORDER

Billy Joe Magwood having filed in this Court his motion for stay setting an

execution date wherein he states that he intends to file a petition for writ of

certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States and seeks a stay of

judgment pending disposition of the petition of writ of certiorari in the

Supreme Court of the United States, and said petition for stay having been duly

submitted and examined by the Court,

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the judgment be, and the same is hereby,

stayed for a period of sixty (60) days from February 11, 1983.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Billy Joe Magwood, or his attorney, shall file

in this Court a copy of the petition for certiorari filed in the United States

Supreme Court and that unless a copy of such petition for certiorari is filed

in this Court within sixty (60) days from February 11, 1983, the stay herein

ordered shall automatically terminate.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Billy Joe Magwood, or his attorney, files in

= Court within sixty (60) days from February 11, 1983, a copy of the petition

Torbert, C. J., and Maddox, Faulkner, Jones, Shores, and Beatty, JJ., concur.

Alon, Embry, and Adams, JJ., not sitting.

Witnes« my hand this LY dayot HAI

4 a oe | 2 L uu.

8 AUGUST 19, 1982

HE STATE OF ALABAMA - ~ = ~ ~- - - = - = = ~ ~ = JUDICIAL enen

>, IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

W a '

81-792

Ex Parte: Billy Joe Magvood

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

(Re: Billy Joe Magwood vs. State of Alabama)

Upon a preliminary examination of the petition in the above cause,

the Court concludes there is a probability of merit in the petition and

has today granted the writ.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the writ issue to the Court of Criminae)

Appeals and that this cause stand ready for submission on briefs or oral

argument, if so desired, in accordance with Rule 39, Alabama Rules of

Appellate Procedure.

PER CURIAM.

TORBERT, C.J., JONES, SHORES, BEATTY AND ADAMS, JJ., CONCUR.

7

pee 6

. & en

THE STATE OF ALABAMA - - - = = ~- JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

OCTOBER TERM, 1982-83

4 Ex parte: Billy Joe Magwood

ee PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

. THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

(Re: Billy Joe Magwood

61-792 v.

State of Alabama)

TORBERT, CHIEF JUSTICE.

On March 1, 1979, Billy Joe Magwood, the petitioner,

en and killed Coffee County Sheriff Neil Grantham. After

ced „eee ner was declared an indigent and counsel was

nv 3

b 81-792

not guilty by reason of insanity. On motion of petitioner's

counsel, an investigation was instituted concerning the

sanity of the petitioner. He was interviewed by two local

physicians who testified at trial concerning his sanity.

Subsequently, he was transferred to Searcy Hospital for

observation and evaluation by a three-member lunacy commission.

Following that evaluation, he was also interviewed by Dr.

Doug McKeown, a clinical psychologist.

At trial, the defense read into evidence the deposition

of Dr. William Rudder, a member of the lunacy commission,

who had observed the petitioner for 8 to 10 hours over a 10-

month period beginning in July 1979. Dr. Rudder stated that

Magwood was a paranoid schizophrenic and in his opinion did

not know right from wrong at the time of the offense. The

defense offered no further evidence on the issue of insanity.

The state offered the testimony of Dr. Donald Crook, a

local physician, who had known the petitioner for 12 years

and who had examined him on June 6, 1979, for 30 minutes in

preparation for this trial. Dr. Crook testified that

petitioner exhibited no signs of schizophrenia. The state

also offered the testimony of Dr. Bancroft Cooper, another

local physician, who also examined the petitioner on June 6,

1979, for twenty minutes in preparation for this trial. Dr.

Cooper indicated that, in his opinion, the petitioner was

not insane at the time he examined hin.

The evaluations of petitioner's mental condition by the

State's witnesses took place in June 1979; the evaluation by

the lunacy commission presented by the petitioner took place

from July 1979 through April 1980. The case did not come to

trial until June of 1981, approximately two years after the

17 initial evaluations were made. In April of 1980, Magwood

was removed from Searcy Hospital to the Coffee County jail.

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The defense on June 26, 1980, made a motion to the court for

funds to hire a psychiatrist or psychologist of the petitioner's

own choosing to evaluate his sanity; that motion was denied.

On April 21, 1981, the court granted a motion by the State

to have the defendant examined by Dr. Doug McKeown.

Dr. McKeown testified at trial that, in his opinion, the

petitioner knew the difference between right and wrong on

the day Sheriff Crantham was killed.

The defendant was found guilty of the capital offense of

murder. The jury recommended the death sentence; the trial

court, after weighing any aggravating and mitigating circumstances,

sentenced the petitioner to death. The Court of Criminal

Appeals affirmed the conviction. The case is before this

Court on a petition for writ of certiorari, which is granted

as a matter of right in cases which impose the death penalty.

The petitioner raises several points of error for our

—

consideration. a e asserts that it was error

for the trial ne to deny his motion for change of venue

based on prejudicial pre-trial publicity.

Absent a showing of abuse of discretion, the ruling of

the trial court on a motion for change of venue will not be

Gisturbed. Speigner v. State, 367 So. 2d 590 (Ala. Crim.

App. 1978), cert. denied, 367 So. 2¢ 597 (Ala. 1979). The

defendant has the burden of showing that he will be unable

to receive an impartial trial and an unbiased verdict at the

present locale. Speigner, supra.

Absent a showing of actual prejudicial influence upon

the jury, the trial court was not in error in refusing to

grant a motion for change of venue. Dolvin v. State, 391

So. 2d 666 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979), aff'd, 391 So. 24 677

(Ala. 1980). The petitioner rests his assertion of bias on

his impressions of public feeling at the time of the trial.

La

81-792

Petitioner states in his brief, "Defendant's proof of such

prejudicial influence was only displayed by the jury's

verdict regarding his sanity." (Emphasis added.) Petitioner

appears to contend that because the jurors found him to be

sane they must have been prejudiced against hin. This

circuitous reasoning does not constitute a showing of actual

prejudice as required by the case law.

Our review of the voir dire examination of the jurors

reveals no indication of possible bias. We agree with the

Court of Criminal Appeals that the publicity surrounding the

crime was strictly factual in nature and was not designed to

inflame the community. Further, the trial took place two

years after the crime. Even if we considered the publicity

prejudicial, clearly the passage of time would diminish any

prejudicial effect of the media coverage. See, Speigner,

supra. Thus, the Court of Criminal Appeals did not err in

holding that the denial of petitioner's motion for change of

venue was not in error.

—

The ogra point of error raised by petitioner is that

the lower tourt erred in submitting the case to the jury in

light of the “overwhelming and uncontradicted” evidence

introduced by defendant to rebut the presumption of sanity.

This issue was addressed by this Court in Christian v.

State, 351 So. 2d 623 (Ala. 1977), wherein the Court established

guidelines on the insanity defense. The Court reaffirmed

the principle that the defendant is presumed sane and that

the defendant has the burden of proof on the issue of

insanity. The defendant must establish insanity by a

preponderance of the evidence and the question is to be

determined by the jury, except in cases where the evidence

is “overwhelming and uncontradicted." Christian v. State,

351 So. 2d at 624. See also, Lee vy. State, 246 Ala. 343, 20

*

85. 2 %% (1985). ‘

20 the case before us, the question of insanity was

o 6 0

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05 , ’ a

0 ¥ wi is

tee 2 ( ! ATT,

Pt

81-792

submitted to the jury, based upon conflicting testimony

given by @ series of four expert witnesses. Dr. Crook and

Dr. Cooper, both practicing physicians, testified for the

State that at the time of their examinations of the defendant

in June of 1979 he was sane. Dr. Doug McKeown, & clinical

psychologist who examined the petitioner in April of 1981,

testified that in his opinion the defendant knew the difference

between right and wrong on the day Sheriff Grantham was

killed. Finally, the deposition of Dr. Rudder, a psychiatrist,

was read at trial. In Dr. Rudder's opinion, Magwood was

insane at the time of the killing.

We cannot say that the evidence in this case was overwhelming

and uncontradicted on the issue of petitioner's claim of

insanity. The trial court was not in error in submitting

the question to the jury.

The third point of error raised by petitioner is that it

was Neroper for the court to deny his request to hire a

psychiatrist or psychologist of his own choosing. We hold

that the claim is without merit, since we agree with the

reasoning of the Court of Criminal Appeals and its conclusion

that "The trial judge's actions appropriately protected

appellant's rights in this regard.” Magwood „ State, (Ms.

May 16, 1982) 30. % __ (Ala. Crim. App. 1982).

Finally, petitioner argues that the lower court did not

properly weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances

prior to imposing the death penalty. Our review of the

record indicates that the court considered the capacity of

the defendant, the circumstances surrounding the murder, the

prior criminal activity of the defendant, his age at the

time of the offense and his omotional state at the time of

* the offense. We hold that the trial court properly considered

any aggravating and mitigating circumstances prior to

imposing the death ponalty. .

The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

. My)’ NOP as f age 10 * N ' | '

AFFIRMED.

All Justices concur.

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Acting Cie th. Supremo Coum of Alabama

of yeaa Mus?

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*

Tu. STATE OF ALABAMA - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

THE ALABAMA COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OCTOBER TERM, 1961-82

4 Div. 935

Billy Joe Magwood

Vv.

State

Appeal from Coffee Circuit Court

BARRON, JUDGE

Appellant was convicted under § 13-1l-2(a) (5), Code

1975, for the murder of Coffee County Sheriff Neil Grantham.

After a separate sentence hearing on aggravating and miti-

gating circumstances, the jury fixed the punishment at death.

Subsequently, the trial court weighed the aggravating and miti-

gating circumstances pursuant to § 13-11-3 and § 13-11-4, Code

1975, end sentenced appellant to death. The court issued

. 1 e 8

*

0

5 N NK aot * i

yee Ke atl sie! ’

*

written findings of fact which set forth the aggravating circum-

stances the court found sufficient to support the sentence of

death.

Thomas Weeks, a Coffee County Deputy Sheriff, testified

he was employed as the county jailer on March 1, 1979, under

Coffee County Sheriff Neil Grantham. The witness stated he

observed appellant, whom he recognized as a former jail inmate,

sitting in a car parked in Sheriff Grantham's parking space at

approximately 6:45 a.m. Shortly before 7:00 a.m., he observed

Sheriff Grantham drive up and park his vehicle. He got out of

the automobile, walked to some garbage cans and deposited a

trash bag, and then walked towards the jail door. Appellant got

out of his automobile with something in his hand and met Sheriff

Grantham at the rear of the car. At that point, Deputy Weeks

heard three gunshots and saw Sheriff Grantham fall. The witness

then turned back into the jail and obtained a gun. He observed

appellant get back into his car and saw that he held a pistol in

his hand. He exchanged fire with appellant as he drove away.

Deputy Weeks then went over to where Sheriff Grantham lay on the

ground and observed that the Sheriff's face was blue and that

he appeared not to be breathing, having apparently been hit in

the face and neck. Deputy Weeks stated he observed no one else

in the area at the time the Sheriff was killed.

William Hurd testified he answered a call as a member

of the Elba Rescue Squad on March 1 1979. He observed Sheriff

Grantham on the pavement in the front of the jail. They placed

the Sheriff in the ambulance and transported him to the Elba

General Hospital emergency room.

Dr. Bruno Santa Rossa stated he observed Sheriff Grantham

at the Elba General Hospital on the morning of the shooting and,

after assessing his condition, pronounced him dead upon arrival.

Dr. Richard Roper of the Alabama Department of Forensic

Sciences testified he examined the body of Sheriff Grantham on

Ihe trial court's determination of sentence, dated June 30, 1981,

is hereto att\ched as Appendix A (Vol. 2, R. 370-372).

‘

March 1, 1979, in Elba and found three gunshot wounds to the

chest, right face, and left side of the head. In his opinion,

Sheriff Grantham's death was caused by acute hemorrhage and

central nervous system trauma, due to multiple gunshot wounds

to the body and head. On cross-examination, he testified his

notes reflected that the body exhibited a set of natural teeth.

He identified o photograph of Sheriff Grantham as that of the

man he examined on March 1, 1979.

Billy Ray Cooper stated he became acquainted with appel-

lant as a fellow inmate at the Coffee County Jail in 1976.

Toward the end of 1977, he heard appellant state on two or three

occasions that he was being held without any reason and that he

would “get even and kill that 8. o. B., referring to Sheriff

Grantham. On cross-examination he was asked when this occurred.

He stated it was in November, and that on the third occasion,

appellant struck the jailer and tried to go downstairs to get to

the Sheriff.

James Kenneth Holder, another fellow inmate of appellant's,

testified he heard appellant state that they had no reason to

hold him in jail, that he didn't belong there, and that he was

going to get even one way or the other. The State rested at the

close of Holder's testimony, and appellant's motion for acquittal,

based upon the State's failure to prove a prima facie case, and

motion to exclude were denied.

The appellant called Ms. Bernice Clay who stated she was

the record keeper for Dr. James L. Clay. The records indicated

that Dr. Clay, a dentist, had relined a set of upper and lower

dentures for Sheriff Grantham in 1969.

The defense next called Dr. William M. Rudder to testify.

Dr. Rudder, a psychiatrist on the staff of Searcy Hospital, did

not appear. The trial court refused to issue a bench warrant for

his appearance after it was learned that the Sheriff's office,

in the county where Dr. Rudder was located, was closed for a legal

holiday and it could not be ascertained if Dr. Rudder had actually

been served with a subpoena. Appellant's counsel conceded to the

trial court that by statute a member of the Searcy staff could

8

\

notbe compelled to attend court proceedings. After the court

denied appellant's motion for a continuance to perfect service

on Dr. Rudder, a deposition taken from Dr. Rudder was read into

evidence at appellant's request in lieu of Dr. Rudder's appearing

at trial.

Dr. Rudder stated in his deposition that he had examined

appellant on July 3, 1979. His final diagnosis after 8 to 10

hours observation of appellant over a period of 10 months was

paranoid type schizophrenia in partial remission on medication.

He stated that this was a mental disease, and in his opinion,

appellant did not know right from wrong at the time of the

alleged offense on March 1, 1979. Appellant was completely out

of touch with reality and, in Dr. Rudder's words, would be con-

sidered “crazy” under any definition in any part of the world.

At the end of the time appellant spent at the institution, he

Vas in fairly good remission from the mental disease as a result

of drug therapy. The defense rested after presenting Dr. Rudder's

deposition.

The State called Dr. Donald Crook as a rebuttal witness.

Dr. Crook, a medical doctor practicing in Alabama, examined

appellant for 30 minutes at the request of the circuit court on

June 6, 1979. He found appellant's behavior and answers were

appropriate to the questions asked of him. In his opinion, appel-

lant was sane at that time and exhibited no symptoms indicative

of schizophrenia. Dr. Crook testified he was also familiar with

appellant, having treated him for minor ailments on a couple of

occasions from the time appellant was 15 years old.

Dr. Bancroft Cooper, a practicing physician in Elba,

testified he examined appellant for 20 minutes on June 6, 1979

at the circuit court's request. In Dr. Cooper's opinion, appel-

lant was not insane at the time he examined hin.

Douglas McKeown, a licensed clinical psychologist,

examined the appellant over a period of 8 to 10 hours on

April 23 and April 27, 1981, at the Houston County Jail in Dothan,

Alabama. Appellant's objewcion to the introduction of

Dr. McKeown's testimony, based pon privileyed. communication

and equal protection, was overruled. In Dr. McKeown's opinion,

appellant knew the difference between right and wrong on

March 1, 1979. His diagnostic impression was, however, that

appellant was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, a disease

of the mind. Dr. McKeown had never seen appellant, however,

when he was not under the medication prescribed for his mental

—

problems. The State rested at the close of Dr. McKeown's testi-

mony and requested that the court dismiss Counts 3, 4, and 5 of

the indictment. Appellant's motion to exclude the evidence as

to Counts 1 and 2 for failure to prove the Sheriff was "on duty”

was denied.

I

Appellant argues the jury's verdict was contrary to the

law and the evidence presented, in that the jury should have

returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.

In reviewing the question of insanity, the court must

apply the following general principles, enumerated in Herbert

v. State, 357 80. 2d 683 (Als. cr. App.], cert. denied, 357 80. 2d

690 (Ala. 1978):

"1. By statute, there is a presumption of

sanity extending to all persons over the

age of 14.

“2. The defense of insanity is an affirmative

defense. The burden of proving this defense

rests upon the defendant and never shifts to

the state. ¢

"3. The burden upon the defendant is to es-

tablish the issue of legal insanity by a pre-

ponderance of the evidence and to the reason-

able satisfaction of the jury.

“4. The question of insanity at the time of

the ssion of the crime is a matter to be

determined by the jury from a consideration

of all the evidence.

"5. In making its determination, the jury may

reject all expert testimony though it is with-

out conflict.

"6. However, opinion testimony, even of en-

perts must be weighed by the jury and may not

be arbitrarily ignored.

However, where proof of insanity is both overwhelming

and uncontradicted, the evidence of insanity may be so strong

5 Seyi

ess 105 WA *

meg

* K :

and undisputed that the jury should be so instructed, and a

. jury verdict to the contrary must be reversed. Christian v.

State, 351 80. 2d 623 (Ala. 1977).

The evidence pertaining to appellant's sanity in the

instant case is both extensive and contradictory. Appellant's

sanity was first brought into question by a pre-trial motion

by appellant's counsel requesting an investigation of appel-

lant's sanity pursuant to § 15-16-20, Code 1975. The trial

court appointed Dr. Donald Crook and Dr. Bancroft Cooper to

examine the appellant. Both were medical doctors of con-

siderable experience, but neither specialized in psychiatry.

Each doctor testified at trial that, in his opinion, appellant

was not insane at the time of his examination of appellant on

June 6, 1979. Dr. Crook stated that based upon the short time

he spent with appellant, he believe appellant was sane at that

, time. He also testified that he had treated appellant several

times over a period of years for various complaints, and that

appellant had never exhibited any symptoms of schizophrenia.

He stated he would, however, defer in his opinion of appel-

- oan —

—

— —

lant“s sanity to a psychiatrist who had spent a considerably

greater period of time observing appellant.

br. Cooper stated that in his opinion appellant was not

insane at the time of his examination of him on June 6, 1979.

He further testified that, based upon his 20 minute interview

with appellant, he could not make a decision as to whether

appellant was a schizophrenic, paranoid type on the day the

murder occurred.

Despite the two physicians’ positive view of appellant's

sanity, the trial court granted appellant's motion requesting

that a three-member Lunacy Commission be appointed in accordance

with § 15-16-22, Code 1975. Appellant was then committed to

the custody of the Superintendent of Searcy Hospital for ob-

servation by the Lunacy Commission by order dated June 20, 1979.

The report of the Lunacy Commission dated August 16, 1979, which

was returned to the circuit court clerk, indicated a diagnosis

of schizophrenia, paranoid type and that appellant was presently

-6- 30

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insane and incompetent. The report also stated it was the ‘

unanimous opinion of the Lunacy Commission that appellant was

insane at the time of his admission to Searcy Hospital, and

that appellant was probably insane and mentally incompetent

at the time of the commission of the offense. (Emphasis added.)

The trial court then issued an order dated August 22, 1979,

ending the Lunacy Commission and retaining appellant in the

custody of the superintendent of Searcy Hospital until such

time as he was restored to mental competency. By letter dated

April 7, 1980, the trial court was notified by Searcy Hospital

that appellant was competent to stand trial, his mental illness

having been placed in partial remission by medication. On

April 11, 1980, the court ordered that custody of appellant be

transferred to the Sheriff of Coffee County, and appellant was

placed in the Houston County Jail. The report of the Lunacy

Commission was introduced at trial and is present in the record.

As well, the appellant introduced the deposition of Dr. William

Rudder, after Dr. Rudder, for some reason, failed to respond to

& subpoena to attend the trial. Dr. Rudder, a psychiatrist and

member of the Lunacy Commission, testified appellant suffered

from the psychosis of paranoid type schizophrenia, but that it

was in partial remission under medication. In his opinion,

appellant did not know right from wrong on the date Sheriff

Grantham was murdered, and was completely out of touch with

reality. He stated appellant was not a borderline case and

would be considered “crazy” any place in the world.

Because of the time lapse between the Lunacy Commission's

diagnosis of appellant and the actual date set for trial the

prosecution filed a motion on April 15, 1970, requesting that

appellant be examined again to determine his mental competency.

After a hearing on the motion, at which appellant was represented,

the court granted the motion and ordered that the appellant be

examined by Dr. Douglas McKeown, a licensed clinical psycholo-

gist. Dr. McKeown was called as a rebuttal witness for the

State, over appellant's objection, and testified that he examined

appellant at the Houston County Jail on April 23 and 27, 1981.

‘

9

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1 ip ‘

He conducted a comprehensive psychological evaluation of appel-

lant, including a psychological interview, over a period of 8

to 10 hours. In Dr. McKeown's opinion, appellant did not know

the difference between right and wrong on the date the Sheriff

was shot. It was also his conclusion that appellant was suf-

fering from paranoid schizophrenia. Dr. McKeown stated that he

had never observed appellant when he was not under the medica-

tion prescribed for his mental problem.

After consideration of all the testimony in this case,

we do not find that the evidence of insanity was both overwhelm-

ing and uncontradicted. There was evidence presented which

could have supported a reasonable inference that the homicide

was an act committed by a man which the law would define as

sane. Although conflicting evidence was presented by the expert

witnesses who cxamincd appellant, it is clear that the issue of

whether appellant was sane or insane at the time of the offense

was a question for the jury to decide. Nobis v. State, 401 So.2d

191 (Ala.Cr.App.), 401 So.2d 204 (Ala. 1981). The evidence was

simply not sufficient as a matter of law to overcome the pre-

sumption of sanity and to justify reversing the jury's verdict.

Graham v. State, 383 So.2d 892 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 383

80. 2d 895 (Ala. 1980).

11

Appellant asserts the trial court abused its discretion in

refusing to grant his motion for a change of venue, based upon

prejudicial pre-trial publicity. The record indicates a large

amount of coverage was given to the sensational and notorious

crime by televi ion, radio, and the printed news media. However,

the vast majority of the news accounts were strictly factual in

nature and did not editorialize in such a manner as to inflame

the community. Coon v. State, 380 80. 2d 980 (Als. Cr. App. 1979),

affirmed, 380 So.24 990 (Ala. 1980). Additionally, much of the

coverage occurred at the time of the murder, or in the months

immediately following the event, with relatively little coverage

occurring at the time of the trial over two years later.

*

The existence of widespread publicity in and of itself

does not require a change of venue. Dolvin v. State, 391 80. 2d

666 (Als. cr. App. 1979), affirmed, 391 80. 2d 677 (Ala. 1980);

Speigner v. State, 367 80. 2d 590 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied,

367 80. 2d 597 (Ala. 1979). Without proof of actual prejudicial

influence upon the jury, a trial court will not be found to

have abused its discretion in refusing to grant a motion for a

change of venve based upon pre-trial publicity. Dolvin, supra.

We have reviewed the record carefully, scrutinizing both the

media coverage itself, and its effect upon the jury venire as

revealed by the voir dire examination of the prospective jurors.

We note that any potential prejudicial effect of media coverage

was diminished by the passage of time. Speigner, supra. The

record contains no showing of actual prejudice such as would have

rendered it reasonably unlikely that the appellant could secure

a fair and impartial trial. Dolvin, supra. The following

quotation from the record is representative of questions asked

of each member of the jury venire by the court and appellant's

counsel:

“THE COURT: We are going to now enter upon

a detailed inguiry with you, and we are going

to do it in such a fashion that we will call

twelve individual jurors to come and have a

seat in the jury box. After you are in the

box I will ask you some questions and then the

counsel for each will have the opportunity to

ask the questions.

—

* * * * *

“Do any of you have any interest in the con-

viction of or the acquittal of the defendant

Magwood? (No response.)

“Have any of you made any promise given any

person any assurance that if you were selected

on the jury to try this case you will convict

or you will acquit the defendant Magwood?

(No positive response.)

~~

“Are any of you witnesses in this case?

(None.

“Were any of you on the grand jury at the

Special March Term, 1979, which returned

this indictment, being on 12 March, 1979,

‘with Bernice Winston, forewoman? (None.)

"Do an; f you as jurors think that a con-

viction should not be had on circumstantial

evidence? (None)

"Do you as a juror have a fixed opinion

against punishment by imprisonment in the

penitentiary? (None.)

“Ladies and gentlemen, a possible penalty,

should the defendant be found guilty, is

death by electrocution. Is there any juror

who has an opinion against punishment by death

by electrocution? Stated another way, are any

of you opposed to capital punishment? (No

juror responded affirmatively.)”

“QUESTIONS BY MR. CASSADY:

"Q. Ladiesand gentlemen of the jury did any of

you know Neil Grantham? (Several of the twelve

indicated they knew Sheriff Grantham.)

"Q. Let me ask it this way, is there anybody

that did not know him? (One lady indicated

she didn't.)

"Q. Were you a casual acquaintance or were you

@ close acquaintance, if that is a proper way

to put it. (All answered casual.)

"Q. I know you have all heard about this case

or either read about it? (Several indicated

affirmative.)

"Q. Has what you have read or heard, has it in

any way, in any way in your mind--there is

nothing wrong in saying if it has--prejudiced

your thinking about this case? (All negative

response.)

"Q. Nothing that you have read or heard would

in any way affect you to any extent in your

deliberations if you served on this jury?

(Negative response.)

"Q. Those of you who knew Neil Grantham I

know would know one thing that he would expect

whatever the circumstances that a defer lant,

whoever he was, or whatever he did to «st a

fair trial. I knew him, he was my friend, I

know he would want that. Now, is there anyone

of you sitting in this jury box, regardless of

the circumstances, who would not give this de-

fendant a fair trial in this case? It is in-

portant. It is important to the defendant, it

is important to the State, it is important to

you as human beings, and I am asking you if you

will listen to s evidence that comes from

this witness stand and that alone and make up

your mind as to this man's innocence or guilt,

and nothing but that, nothing else coming into

your mind regardless. Can you all do that?

(No response to the contrary.)

— 10 34

“MR. CASSADY: That's all I have.”

(R. 98-103)

Of the entire venire, one juror answered that he had a

fixed opinion as to appellant's guilt or innocence. This juror

was an employee of the Coffee County Sheriff's Department which

had been involved in the investigation of the Sheriff's assassi-

nation, and he was excused from serving. None of the questions

of appellant's counsel concerning prejudice as a result of

publicity were answered in the affirmative. Two jurors expressed

an opinion of possible partiality, but stated it was based upon

their long-time friendship with Sheriff Grantham, not pre-trial

publicity. Both jurors were excused. The burden is upon appel-

lant to demonstrate the actual existence of a prejudicial opinion

in the mind of the jurors which will raise a presumption of

partiality. Speigner, supra. The introduction of news articles

alone, without more, is not sufficient evidence to justify a

change of venue; their prejudicial effect must be shown. Dolvin,

supraat 600; Dial v. State, 387 80. 2d 871 (Ale. Cr. App. 1979),

reversed on other grounds, 387 So.2d 879 (Ala. 1980).

The appellant in the instant case presented no evidence

that the jurors were actually prejudiced against the appellant's

case as a result of extensive publicity. Without such proof,

this court could not find error in the trial court's refusal to

grant a motion for change of venue. Dolvin, supra; Moberg v.

State, 385 80. 2d 74 (Ala.Cr.App. 1980); Coon, supra.

111

Appellant argues that both the trial court and the jury

failed to properly weigh mitigating circumstances. We have

examined the record and find that the trial court luly and

properly charged the jury concerning mitigating circumstances.

The trial judge's written finding of fact also indicates he

considered and weighed any possible mitigating circumstances

in appellant's favor. We find no error in that regard.

Iv

The trial court's failure to grant appellant's request

for funds to hire a psychiatrist or psychologist of his own

-ll- 35

eee F ee LR DO Oe ke ee

choosing is urged by appellant as reversible error. We do not

agree. As has often been stated, a denial of funds to pay ex-

porte for investigations and the assistance of experts does

not amount to a deprivation of constitutional rights. Thigpen

v. State, 372 80. 2d 385 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 372 80.24

387 (Ala. 1979); Brown v. State, 392 80. 2d 1248 (Ala.Cr.App.

1980), cert. denied, 392 60. 2d 1266 (Ala. 1981): Johnson v.

State, 335 80. 2d 663 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 335 80. 2d 678

(Ala. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1026 (1976). This general

rule applies equally to psychiatric experts and specialists.

Nelson ». State, 405 80. 2d 392 (Ala.Cr.App. 1980), reversed on

other grounds, 405 80. 2d 401 (Ala. 1981). Additionally, as

indicated heretofore in this opinion, the trial court exhausted

@ll available sources to assist appellant in presenting evi-

dence in support of his insanity plea. Not one, but six experts

examined appellant at the State's expense. Clark v. State,

56 Als. App. 67, 318 80. 2d 613 (1974), writ quashed, 294 Ala. 493,

318 80. 2d 622 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975). Three

experts were independent, and three were State connected. Al-

though a defendant may have some right to the appointment of an

expert for preparation of his defense, there exists no consti-

tutional right to have a private psychiatrist of the defendant's

own choosing appointed at public expense. (Emphasis added.)

Willie Clisby, Jr. v. State. $0.24 _ [Ale cr. App. 1982),

6 Div. 576 (Ms. May 2, 1962). ‘The trial judge's actions appro-

priately protected appellant's rights in this regard.

V.

Appellant alleges the trial court erred in admitting

the testimony of Doctors Crook, Cooper, and McKeown, because

appellant was not advised of the right to remain silent before

the interview, and because appellant's counsel was either not

present at, or not informed of, the time of the interviews.

Appellant contends the introduction of this expert testimony

violated the privilege against self-incrimination and the right

to effective assistance of counsel guaranteed under the Fifth

-~12- 36

. *

. . and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution. He

cites Estelle v. State, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1666, 68 L.Ed.2d

359 (1981), as dispositive of this issue.

The Supreme Court held in Estelle that the use of

certain psychiatric testimony at the sentencing phase of defen-

dant's apitel murder trial to establish his future dangerous

ness violated his Fifth Amendment rights. The court determined

that where a defendant never initiated a psychiatric exam, nor

ever attempted to introduce psychiatric evidence, he could not

be compelled to respond to a psychiatric examination instigated

sua sponte by the trial court if the statements could be used

against him at trial. Hence, it was necessary in such a 81 u-

ation that appellant be advised of his right to remain silent

and of the fact his answer could be used against him before such

examination could take place. The failure to so advise the

appellant rendered the psychiatrist's testimony, as to the sub-

stance of disclosures made to appellant, inadmissible at trial.

The court found there would have been no Fifth Amendment viola-

tion if the psychiatrist's testimony had been limited to the

question of the defendant's competency to stand trial. The

court also was careful to distinguish Estelle from a fact situa-

tion involving a psychological interview occasioned by a de-

fendant's plea of not guilty by reason of insanity at the time

of the offense. To allow a defendant to remain silent, when he

asserts the offense of insanity and introduces supporting

psychiatric testimony, might deprive the State of its only

effective measure of controverting the defendant's proof on an

Acne interjected into the trial by the defendant himself.

Estelle, supra, and cases cited therein.

As woll, the court found that the defendant's Sixth Amend-

ment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated be-

cause the defendant's counsel was not informed in advance that

the psychiatric examination would encompass the issue of future

dangerousness. The defendant was thus denied the valuable

assistance of his counsel in deciding whether to consent to the

We find in our review of the instant case that Estelle

is factually distinguishable and hence does not require reversal

here. Unlike the defendant in Estelle, appellant's counsel

herein first placed appellant's sanity in question by filing

@ motion which requested that an investigation be held into appel-

lant's sanity, and that, upon a finding of incompetence, appel-

lant be removed to a State hospital for the insane. Dr. Crook

and Dr. Cooper were appointed in compliance with the trial

court's order granting appellant's motion. Not only were appel-

lant's counsel] aware that the two doctors examined appellant, but

they were the parties that requested such an examination.

Additionally, the testimony of the two doctors was substantially

confined by the prosecution to the question of appellant's

mental competency at the time of the examination, and not at the

time of the crime. Additionally, we point out that all the ex-

pert testimony objected to here came in as rebuttal testimony,

after the defense rested, having presented a defense of not

guilty by reason of insanity. As to Dr. McKeown, a hearing was

had on the State's motion requesting a further examination of

appellant's mental status after his release from Searcy Hospitel.

Appellant and his counsel were present at the hearing on the

motion and were informed of the pending examination by Dr. McKeown.

Appellant's counsel agreed to the examination, conditioned upon

his receiving a copy of the report. Appellant's counsel stated

for the record that the court order granting the State's motion

would be in line with the motion for a mental examination appel-

lant had previously requested. Again, Dr. McKeown's testimony

was only brought in by the State on rebuttal after appellant's

insanity defense was presented.

In review, we find appellant's counsel initiated the

inguiry into appellant's sanity, resulting in the examination

by Doctors Crook and Cooper. Appellant's counsel acquiesced

in the examination by Dr. McKeown, albeit at the State's re-

quest, and stated such an examination was in partial compliance

with his own motion. At arraignment, appellant pled not guilty

- 14 — 38

by reason of insanity, and at triel presented an insanity de-

tense. The testimony of the three experts came in only on re-

buttal, after appellant presented an insanity defense. Their

testimony dealt with their diagnosis of appellant's mental

competency at various points in time and did not deal with the

substance of any incriminating information revealed to them by

appellant during their examination. Appellant's counsel were

informed of each examination and had every opportunity to counsel

with their client. Appellant and his counsel informed Dr.

McKeown that the examination would be reported to the court,

and there could therefore be no expectation of confidentiality.

We hold that by actively pursuing an insanity defense and intro-

@ucing the deposition of Dr. Rudder as a defense witness, appel

lant waived any potential psychotherapist-patient privilege

or privilege against self-incrimination against the subsequent

testimony of Dr. McKeown on rebuttal.

“As the Court of Criminal Appeals notes

in its opinion, there are states which

hold that by pleading insanity, a criminal

defendant waives his statutory privilege

against disclosure of a ‘psychotherapist-

patient communication.’ The better reasoned

cases hold, however, that there must be

some presentation of evidence of insanity

in addition to the plea, in order for the

question of ‘waiver’ to erise...."

50 8. 11 Day, 378 80. 2d 1159 (Ala. 1979),

To hold otherwise would be to allow appellant to call all those

psychotherapists or psychiatrists, who examined appellant under

State order, he desired. Then, on a claim of privilege, appel-

lant would be able to prevent the State from calling experts who

examined him for the same purpose on rebuttal to refute the

appellant's defense. Ex parte Day, supra; Estelle, supra, and

cases cited therein.

vI

Appellant asserts that the trial court's failure to issue

@ bench warrant to require Dr. Rudder to appear and testify was

reversible error. Appellant introduced Dr. hudder's deposition

at triel, after his failure to appear and the trial court's re-

fusal to command his appearance. br. Rudder is on the staff of

Searcy State Hospital. Section 22-50-22, Code 1975, provides that

-15-

é te ®

*. ' a

6

any physician of a State mental hospital may not be compelled

to attend as a witness to present expert testimony in any case

or any question of sanity if he certifies in writing within 10

days after receipt of a summons that his absence from the

hospital would interfere with his professional duties and the

welfare of his patients. A defendant who desires the testimony

of tne doctorsmay, however, depose them on all matters in-

volving their expert opinion. This furnishes to the defendant

a constitutional alternative to compulsory attendance. Seay v.

State, 390 So.2d 11 (Ala. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1134

(1980). Appellant's counsel at trial had not ascertained if

Dr. Rudder had been served with the subpoena at the time he

was called to testify. The trial judge contacted the local

county courthouse to verify service, but was unable to receive

any information because the offices were closed for a legal

holiday. No certificate from Dr. Rudder of his inability to

attend the trial appears in the record. Quite clearly, Dr. Rudder

could not have been compelled to attend had such a certification

been provided. Appellant had taken the precautionary step of

deposing Dr. Rudder in advance. This deposition was in fact

offered and received into evidence. Appellant's counsel did not

personally verify service on his witness. He was permitted by

the court to introduce Dr. Rudder's deposition, in lieu of his

testimony. The trial court used every available avenue to

determine if Dr. Rudder had been served, after it became apparent

that appellant had failed to do so. If Dr. Rudder had been

served, he could have easily refused to attend under the statute.

The subpoena for Dr. Rudder was issued May 26, and the trial

was on June 1 and 2. ‘The 10 days allowed by statute for

Dr. Rudder s certified response to the subpoena had not ex-

pired at the time appellant called Dr. Rudder to testify. We

find no error or prejudice to the appellant in the trial court's

refusal to issue the bench warrant under these circumstances.

Pollard v. State, 358 So.2d 778 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied,

358 80. 2d 762 (Ala. 1978).

- 16 - 40

vil

Appellant argues the statute under which he was indicted

is unconstitutional. This question has been resolved by the

Alabama Supreme Court in Beck v. State, 396 80. 2d 645 (Ala. 1981),

and by our recent decision in Clisby, supra.

The Supreme Court of Alabama in Beck, supra, has indi-

cated the standards and procedures it requires this court to

follow in reviewing capital murder cases. We have closely

scrutinized this case in light of those standards, and find

that the crime was properly punishable by death, and that the

sentence was appropriate in both its relation to the crime and

to the appellant. There were no accomplices with which to com-

pare appellant's punishment. We have searched the record for

error prejudicial to the substantial rights of appellant and

have found norm. This case is, therefore, affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

All the Judges concur.

° ite 41

7 20 ° 0

ö APPENDIX A

* 5 y 1

„ STATE OF ALABAMA, ) IN THE CIRCUT COURT OF

Plaintiff ) oes

; COFFEE COUNTY, ALABAMA '

vs. g

N 1 ) ELBA DIVISION

BILLY JOE MAGWOOD, )

Defendant ) CASE NO. CC 79-7

.

On June 2, 1981, Billy Joe Magwood was found guilty of the capital

felony set forth in Section 13+11-2(a)(5), Code 1975, and for the aggra-

vated murder of Coffee County Sheriff Neil Grantham, the Jury, fixed. the

punishment at death. A hearing mandated dy Sections 13-11-3 and 13-ll-4,

Code 1975, was ‘held June 9, 1981, and the issue of sentence was submitted.

The court is convinced the jury took into account the circumstances

of the murder together with the character and propensity of Magwood hnder

all relevant evidence. The court concludes there was no arbitrary and

capricious exercise of the power of the jury in finding guilt and fixing

the punishment at death. |

Magwood beyond any doubt. committed the charged aggravated murder.

The “aggravation” found to exist beyond-all doubt is that Magwocd unlaw-

fully, intentionally, and with malice aforethought killed Coffee County

Sheriff Neil Grantham by shooting him three times at close range with

a pistol while Grantham was on duty and because of official job related

acts as Sheriff of Coffee County, Alabama. The court does hot ‘find the

existence of an aggravating circumstance in Section 13-11-6, Code 1975,

other than the “aggravation” alleged in, the indictment. Beck v. State,

Ala., 396 80. 2d 645 (1981); Kyser v. State, Ala., 380.20

(1861). The court is required to focus on the particularized nature of

the crime. 8 is‘particularized by the aggravation. .

The matters relating to any mitigating circumstances including

those enumerated in Section 13-11-7, Code 1975, have been considered.

The court concludes that Magwood has no known significant prior criminal

activity other than a conviction for possession of a controlled substance

and his age at the time of the murder of Sheriff Grantham was twenty-seven

years. These mitigating circumstances exist. The jury in the guilt phase

‘of the trial rejected the not ane dy reason of insanity plea, The '

9 ars area al Ret, 1 N under bn «. extreme | 1

74. W RY - 4//4 PV “tn 1

- ' °

20 0 * *

W or emotional dioverbenes and when the three bullets ams? fired into the

* dody of Granthm, Magwood had the capacity to appreciate the criminality

a of his act. Magwood' s conduct was contrived, calculated and previously

designed with the capacity to conform his conduct to the: requirements of

the 140.

. The court has considered the relevant facets of the; character and

record of Billy Joe Magwood and the circumstances of the particular offense.

Magwood has been considered as a uniquely individual human being and not

a faceless yndifferentiated person who stands convicted ofa designated

capital offense. The court has considered the factors of why" & death

sentence should be imposed and why it should not be imposed. The circun-

stances of aggravation and mitigation have been weighed against each other.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED BY THE COURT AS **

1. That the verdicts of the jury finding Billy Joe Magwood guilty

of the capital felony and fixing the punishment at death for the murder

of Coffee County Sheriff Neil Grantham are sustained by the evidence be-

yond 2 reasonable doubt.

2. That the fixing of the punishment at death by the jury was not

the result of passion, prejudice or other arbitrary factor while delib-

erating and fixing the sentence.

3. That Billy Joe Magwood is adjudged guilty of the capital offense

.

u. That does Billy Joe Magwood have anything to say before sentence

of the murder of Coffee County Sheriff Neil Grantham. +9 %e {

or anything to say why the sentence of the luw should not be imposed in

accordance with law. ö

5. That the age of Magwood and no known significant prior criminal

activity by hin are insufficient to outweigh the unlawful, intentional |

and malicious killing of Coffee County Sheriff Neil Grantham by shooting

him with a pistol while Grantham was on duty and because of official job

related acts as’ Sheriff of Coffee County, Alabama. *

6. That it ds the judgment and sentence of the court that you,

Billy Joe Magwood, for the offense of aggravyted murder, be sentenced

to death by electrocution on August 4, 1981, dy the executioner causing

to pass through the body of e Joe Magwood a current of electricity

ot such intensity to cause death, and the application and continuance of .

a.

a

— 0

eh, eiirnbnits hdi your boa, in, * 1 wiel vou ee oba. *

„% a VS cae |

,*. 8 0 47 7 RR 9 2 95 7 j

4

“i 413 7. That execution of the sentence of death is stayed: Sending auto-

3 matic review provides by Section aun. Code 1975, sna Section 12- =42-

180, Coge 1975. 0

DONE AND ORDERED this ott, day of June, 1981.

Mew „

*

5

—

STATE OF ALABAMA

e s *

I, Jim Eirfs, Clerk ‘of the Circykt Court, Coffee County, Alabama,

original docum that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of the

1 document as the same appears on record in my office,

This the 14th day of July, 1982,

TERM 1983

Court, US. RECEIVED

3 wumper 89-GSG6O

APR 12 1983

Alevrvder L. Steves, Clerk BILLY JOE MAGWOOD,

PETITIONER,

vs.

STATE OF ALABAMA,

DEFENDANT

The Petitioner, Billy Joe Magwood, who is confined on

death row at the Alabama State prison known as Holman Unit

asks leave to file the attached petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the Alabama Supreme Court without prepayment of costs and

to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to Rule 5-B

The Petitioner's affidavit in support of this motion

is attached hereto.

Respectfully submitted,

A & TURNER

Office Box 1305

„ Alabama 36701

et.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that I have served counsel for the

opposing party with a copy of the within and foregoing Motion

by depositing a copy of the same in the United States Mail,

properly addressed with postage prepaid.

This the lithday of 51863.

* e COURT OP THB UMITED_ETFTEER CEIVED

BILLY JOE MAGWOOD, ‘ APR 1 6 1983

2

Orrave OF THE Cenk

PETITIONER, SUPREME COURT, US.

vs. * CASE NUMBER

STATE OF ALABAMA, ;

DEFENDANT, .

0

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE

N FORMA

STATE OF ALABAMA

APFIDAVIiT

COUNTY OF ESCAMBIA

I, Billy Joe Magwood, being first duly sworn according to

law, depose and say, in support of my motion for leave to proceed

without being required to prepay cost or fees:

A. (1) I am the Petitioner in the abcve entitled case.

(2) Because of my poverty, I am unable to pay costs

of said cause.

(3) I am unable to give security for the same.

(4) 1 believe that I am entitled to the redress I

seek in said case.

B. The nature of said cause or case is briefly stated as

follows:

„1 was sentenced to death by trial judge in the Circuit

Court of Coffee County, Alabama, on a capital charge of

having killed the Sheriff of Coffee County.

The present proceeding was commenced on direct appeal

through the Alabama State Court system. There are several

points of error:

Foam H AFF: DAVIT

REQUESTED

(1) The Court denied my motion for change of venue

based upon prejudicail pre-trial publicity.

(2) The case was submitted to the jury in the presence

of overwhelming evidence introduced which rebutted the

presumption of sanity.

(3) Improper denial of my request to hire a psychologist

for evaluation after the State hired a psychologist to evaluate

me over a year after the incident and over a year after

I had been placed on medication.

(4) That the capital sentencing scheme in Alabama's

death statute violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments

and that statue, as applied to me, resulted in an unconstitutional

sentence of death.

STATE OF ALBAMA

COUNTY OF EAC Y

BEFORE ME, a Notary Public, in and for said County and State,

personally appeared BILLY JOE MAGWOOD, who being duly sworn,

Geposes and says:

That the allegations contained in the foregoing Affidavit

are true and correct to the best of his information, knowledge

and belief. Wy, / A, 2% —

B

SWORN TO and SUBSCRIBED before me on this

*

/

1983.

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: mye ebe 1/10/89

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