Petition — Lewy v. Weinberger, 104 S. Ct. 77 (1983) (No. 82-1869)

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82 we 1 86 9 ( Office-Supreme Court, U.S.

4 FEL EOD

MAY 17 1983

ALEXANDER L. STEVAS,

No. CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1982

MORRIS L. LEWY, et al.,

Petitioners,

VS.

WILLIAM B. WEINBERGER, et al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

I. WALTON BADER

BADER AND BADER

Attorneys for Petitioners

65 Court Street

White Plains, N.Y. 10601

(914) 682-0072

0 7

Ged Bailey Fe. 203 Richmond Avenue @ Staten Island, New York 10302

Tel.: (212) 447-5358 — (516) 222-2470 — (914) 682-0848

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. May parties to a purported Class Action, which

has not been certified by the Court as such, collusively

agree to establish a ‘‘settlement class”’ for the purpose

of settlement.

2. May parties to a purported Class Action, prior

to any certification being made by the Court, agree to

establish a settlement class and amend their com-

plaint years after the filing thereof so as to destroy

State Court Class Litigation which has been diligently

prosecuted to arrive at a settlement in the Federal Ac-

tion of about five-hundreths of a cent on the dollar of

claims.

3. May a Federal Court grant pendent jurisdiction

over purely state claims when the settlement class in-

cludes members who have no Federal Claims and

whose claims are pending in State Court.

4. May a District Judge, in approving a settle

ment, avoid the requirements for a hearing, proper ex-

amination of the parties, and the normal requirements

for approval upon the ground that a Bankruptcy

Judge, in approving a settlement of $.21 on the dollar

of bondholder claims, 400 times greater than the set-

tlement arrived at in this case, has passed upon the

issues involved making further consideration by the

District Court unnecessary.

5. Where a District Court approves a Class Action

settlement which destroys pending State Court Class

Litigation is such action on the part of said Court in

violation of the ‘“‘Anti-Injunction Act.”

il

6. 1s there a conflict between the determination of

the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh

Circuit in In Re General Motors and the determina-

tion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Se-

cond Circuit in this case.

7. In view of the fact that this Court has not yet

passed on the validity of ‘‘opt out’’ requests or at-

torneys’ fees to be awarded in this case is this action

now “‘final’’ for the purpose of Supreme Court Review.

ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Questions Presented for eee en he i

List of All Parties to This Proceeding........ 2

Decisions of the Courts Below.......----->: 2

Time Periods Involved........--+::sss00: 3

Jurisdiction of the Court to Hear This Petition. 3

Statutes, Rules and Other Matters Involved

Oe i ee eee ess 3

Table of Contents and Table of Other

EEE 3

Statement of the Case........-..-:ssseeee: rl

Reasons Why This Petition Should be Granted 7

POINT ONE—

May Parties to a Purported Class Action

Which has not Been Certified by the Court

as such, Collusively Agree to Establish

a “Settlement Class’ for the Purpose

of Settlement Only.........-- esse eecee: 9

POINT TWO—

May Parties to a Purported Class Action,

Years After Filing, Amend Their Complaint

to Encompass State Claims Which Have

Been Heretofore Prosecuted in State Court

iV

and Then Enter Into a Collusive Settlement

to Destroy the State Claims..............

POINT THREE—

May a Federal Court Grant Pendent Juris-

diction Over Purely State Claims When the

Settlement Class Includes Members Who

Have no Federal Claims and Whose State

Claims Are Pending in State Court.........

POINT FOUR—

The Settlement Involved Herein is Clearly

RE a

POINT FIVE—

The Bankruptcy Determination of Judge

Galgay Relied Upon by the Court of

Appels to Sustain the Present Settlement

a ee

POINT SIX—

The Approval of the Settlement Herein,

Coupled with the Prohibition of the Conduct

of Related Proceedings is a Violation of

Ce Americus Act.................

POINT SEVEN—

The Case is Believed to be Final for Supreme

Court Review Even Though the Attorneys’

Fees in this Case Have Not yet Been Fixed

or the Validity of Certain Parties Who Have

“Opted Out” of the Present Settlement, of

Their Requests for Exclusion Have not Yet

Been Passed on by the Court..............

CONCLUSION—

The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to

the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit Should be Granted

i}

13

17

19

21

22

23

Vv

TABLE OF CASES

Page

Blue Chip Stamp Co. vs. Manor Drug Stores,

re Pe i ak a ee ee ce ks i 7,8,14

City of New Orleans vs. Dukes, 427 US 297.... 23

Clarkson Co. vs. Shaheen, 660 F2nd 506...... 18

Pat oe AO OEE Ue Oe. . 2 8. ee ee 16

Geddes vs. Anaconda Mining Co., 254 US 590. 20

In Re American Lumber Co., 5 BR 470....... 19

In Re General Motors Engine Interchange

Litigation 594 F.2nd 1106................ 4,8

Matter of Multiponics, Inc., 622 F. 2nd 709. ... 19

Meyerhofer vs. Empire Fire & Marine In-

wees Ce. TA Ps LOE... 6 oo se ee we: 16

National Super Spuds vs. New York Mercan-

tile Bxchange, G60 F.2nd9............... 8,15

New York Credit Men’s Adjustment Bureau

ee I 8 oa ee ae ee 18

Pepper us. Litton, 308 US 295.............. 19

Perdondani vs. Riker-Maxon Corporation, 50

eee cs. oe 17

vi

Piper us. Christ-Craft Industries, 430 US1.... 8,16

tective Committee vs. Anderson, 390US414 8

Santa Fe Industries vs. Green, 430 US 462.... 8,16

United Mine Workers vs. Gibbs, 383 US715... 14

Ward us. City Trust Co. of New York, 192

lb I a 18

Weiss us. Chalker, 55FRD168.............. 18

TABLE OF OTHER AUTHORITIES

ee ee 9

colegio 21

INDEX TO APPENDICES

Appendix A—Opinions of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Affirm-

ing the Determination of the District Court ............. la

Appendix B—Rule 23 FRCP. ................0.<ccccsceccoscosses. 48a

Appendix C—Docket Entries In U.S. Court Of

Appeals for the Second Circuit ........0...ccccccecceccccceee 52a

Appendix D—Opinion of the United States

District Court For The Southern District of New

York Approving The Proposed Settlement Ob-

FE ey FI ong conc cccscncvciececceesecccescooss. 62a

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES

MORRIS L. LEWY, MELVIN KIMMEL, HELEN

SISK, MILDRED B. ANDERSON, GERALD J.

ANDERSON, WALTER E. BARRIE, ANNE

CRAWFORD, MALCOLM PINE, HERBERT

LAPHAM, ARTHUR GARSON, and ANDRE R.

JURKIEWICZ, and ARCHIE & ANNE PLESCIA

individually and as representatives of Classes con-

sisting of stockholders and bondholders of W.T.

GRANT COMPANY,

Petitioners,

-against-

WILLIAM B. WEINBERGER, ROBERT SMITH,

STEIN FAMILY FOUNDATION, INC., EDITH

CITRON, LEO E. PANZIRER, and EMANUEL G.

ROSENBLATT, JAMES C. KENDRICK, HARRY

E. PIERSON, A. RICHARD BUTLER, ROBERT H.

ANDERSON, JOHN E. SUNDMAN, ROBERT M.

SCARLATA, JOSEPH W. CHINN, JR., RAYMOND

H. FOGLER, JOSEPH HINSEY, JOHN G. GRAY,

DEWITT PETERKIN, J E., LOUIS

LUSTENBERGER, CHARLES PHILLIPS, ASA T.

SPAULDING, C.W. SPANGLE, E. ROBERT

KINSEY, RICHARD W. MAYER, MORGAN

GUARANTY TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK,

individually and as Agent for a Group of Twenty-

Seven Lending Banks described herein, CHASE

MANHATTAN BANK, N.A., CITIBANK, N.A.,

THE BANK OF NEW YORK, BANKERS TRUST

COMPANY, CHEMICAL BANK, IRVING TRUST

2

COMPANY, MARINE MIDLAND BANK, SANWA

BANK LTD., MANUFACTURERS HANOVER

TRUST COMPANY, ERNST & ERNST, W.T.

GRANT CO. and J.P. MORGAN & CO., INC..

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

The petitioners herein pray that this Court grant

a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The grounds

supporting this petition are set forth in full in the

body thereof.

LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING

In addition to the parties listed in the caption of

this petition this appeal is being brought in behalf of a

putative class of stockholders and debenture holders

of WT GRANT COMPANY who have State Claims

which are being prosecuted in pending State Litiga-

tion in the Courts of the State of New York. In addi-

tion, in the proceedings before the United States

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, there were

approximately four hundred fifty (450) individual par-

ties who were objecting to the proposed settlement ar-

rived at in the District Court.

DECISIONS OF THE COURTS BELOW

See appendix. The District Court opinion was not

officially reported. The opinion of the Court of Ap-

3

peals for the Second Circuit was reported at 698 F.

2nd 61.

TIME PERIODS INVOLVED

As indicated in the Docket sheets submitted in

the appendix to this Petition the original Order of the

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was filed on

July 4th, 1982 approving the proposed settlement.

Petitions for Rehearing were thereafter filed by Ap-

pellants and others which were eventually granted by

this Court. On January 26th, 1983 the Court essential-

ly denied the Petition for Rehearing filed by certain

appellants and on February 22nd, 1983 denied the

Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing

en banc filed by the Petitioners herein. This Petition

for Certiorari is filed within 90 days from the date of

such denial.

JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT

TO HEAR THIS PETITION

This Court acquires jurisdiction pursuant to 28

USC 1254(1).

STATUTES, RULES AND OTHER MATTERS

INVOLVED IN THIS PETITION

See appendix.

TABLE OF CONTENTS AND TABLE

OF OTHER AUTHORITIES

See the documents set forth supra in this petition.

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is the first time that the approval by a Court

of a settlement class (approved by the Court by agree-

ment of the parties and not by adversary proceedings)

has reached this Court for review. The practice was

disapproved by the United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit in In Re General Motors

Engine Interchange Litigation, 594 F.2nd 1106 (1979).

It has been approved by various other Courts in-

cluding, in this case, the United States Court of Ap-

peals for the Second Circuit.

This is also the first time that a settlement has

been approved, over objection by a_ substantial

number of putative Class Members, without any ef-

forts by the District Court or the Court of Appeals to

determine the fairness and adequacy of the settle-

ment. The District Court and the Court of Appeals

merely adopted a determination made by a Barkrupt-

cy Judge in another proceeding relating to the fairness

and adequacy of a settlement of bondholder claims on

equitable subordination grounds. Interestingly

enough this settlement, which was obtained by

counsel bringing on this petition, resulted not in a set-

tlement of five-hundreths of a cent on the dollar of

claims (as was involved in this case) but a settlement

about 400 times greater (i.e. $.21 on the dollar of

claims). The prior determination of the Bankruptcy

Judge, of course, did not consider stockholder claims

at all.

The parties have conceded, before both the

District Court and the Court of Appeals, that the

basis of the claims originally brought by the plaintiffs

in this case was extremely weak and therefore the

+)

miniscule settlement arrived at was justified. On the

other hand the attorneys bringing on this matter,

despite its conceded weaknesses, are seeking a hand-

some fee reward.

In fact, of course, as the fragmentary record in

this case amply demonstrates, the State breach of

fiduciary duty, conspiracy, and breach of trust claims

were extremely strong. These claims were never inter-

posed into this action until the State Court litigation

was moving forward to trial and, at that time, were

merely interposed into the case to destroy these

claims for the benefit of the defendants and the plain-

tiffs’ counsel.

This case amply demonstrates all of the criticisms

that have been levelled at Class Actions by many par-

ties. This Court should review the matter and set

things right.

In 1975, by reason of the collapse of the WT

GRANT COMPANY, there were two major Class Ac-

tions brought against the ‘‘creditor banks” who,

through a high official of Morgan Guaranty Bank, one

PETERKIN, were effectively in control of WT

GRANT COMPANY. PETERKIN was also a director

of WT GRANT COMPANY and in practical control of

its policy making machinery.

The Weinberger action (brought by a “‘profes-

sional plaintiff'’ who has been involved in a myriad of

Class Actions and probably has a close relationship

with the plaintiffs’ attorneys) was a Section 10(b)

Securities Fraud Action. The State Litigation (the

Lewy action) involved State Claims only and was

primarily based on the fiduciary duties owned by a

corporate management to creditors and stockholders

€

the ‘‘trust fund theory”’ relating to the assets of a cor-

poration when the corporation is insolvent, conspiracy

and fraud.

The defendants moved to dismiss the Weinberger

complaint and, in January 1977 District J udge Duffy

dismissed the complaint since it did not set forth

viable claims. Leave to file an amended complaint was

thereafter granted and an amended Complaint was fil-

ed on March 25th, 1977.

Thereafter, on April 4th, 1977 the Weinberger

plaintiffs filed a motion for permission to file a Second

Amended Complaint. This motion was made by

reason of the fact the Weinberger plaintiffs became

aware of the Lewy action and wished to “ride piggy

back”’ on the Lewy allegations which constituted the

heart of the claims against the creditor banks. The

evidence clearly indicated that the Section 10-b

securities claims were so weak as to be practically

non-existent.

While the Second Amended complaint attempted

to plead common law fraud under State Law the

claims were not spelled out in detail and constituted a

‘‘broad brush” attempt to pre-empt the strong claims

pending in Lewy. There were, in fact, no allegations in

the said Weinberger second amended complaint which

would be sufficient, either under federal or state law,

to allege fraud.

Defendants thereafter moved to dismiss the Se-

cond Amended Cemplaint and, with respect to the

defendant ERNST & ERNST, the complaint was, in

fact, dismissed. The motion to dismiss by *he creditor

banks was held in abeyance by agreement of the par-

ties.

7

In the meantime the Lewy action was proceeding

apace. Therefore the defendant banks moved to stay

this action on the ground that the Federal Action was

all inclusive on the issues involved. The motion for a

stay was denied on January 23rd, 1980 and was

thereafter affirmed by the New York State Appellate

Division of the Supreme Court.

Thereafter the plaintiffs in Weinberger and the

defendant banks collusively decided to destroy the

viability of the Lewy action by, in effect, ‘“‘copying”’

the Lewy State Claims in a “Third Amended Com-

plaint”’ in Weinberger, filing a Stipulation of Settle-

ment and providing for a ‘‘settlement class’ covering

not only those plaintiffs who purchased Grant stock

during the “Class Period’’ but also those plaintiffs

who held such stock during the period even if they

purchased earlier. This, of course, was completely at

variance with the prior decisions of this Court and, in

particular, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drugs Stores,

421 US 723.

The District Court, without an evidentiary hear-

ing, and over objections by parties adversely affected,

approved the settlement involved. The determination

was sustained by the Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit and the opinions of the Court involved are set

forth in the appendix to this petition.

REASONS WHY THIS PETITION

SHOULD BE GRANTED

1. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in

rendering the determination sought to be reviewed,

has rendered a decision in conflict with a decision of

the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh

8

Circuit (In Re General Motors Corp. Engine Inter

change Litigation, 594 F. 2nd 1106 (1979) and in con-

flict with another decision in the United States Court

of Appeals for the Second Circuit (National Super

Spuds vs. New York Mercantile Exchange, 660 F. 2nd

17 (1981). In General Motors the Court condemned

settlement negotiations undertaken by a putative

class representative who had not yet been certified as

such. In National Super Spuds, the Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit refused to approve a settlement

where a part of the certified class received nothing.

Yet, in the present case, the United States Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit did precisely what was

condemned in the prior opinions.

2. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has

decided this case in contravention of other decisions of

this Court, in particular, Blue Chip Stamps vs. Manor

Drug Stores, supra, Protective Committee vs. Ander-

son 390 US 414, Santa Fe Industries vs. Green, 430

US 462, Cort vs. Ash, 422 US 66, and Piper vs. Chris-

Craft Industries, Inc., 430 US 1 and taken jurisdiction

of claims under State Law where no jurisdiction ex-

isted.

3. The Court of Appeals, in approving the settle-

ment involved, has so far departed from proper prac-

tice as to require the exercise of this Court’s supervi-

sion.

9

POINT ONE

MAY PARTIES TO A PURPORTED CLASS

ACTION, WHICH HAS NOT BEEN CER-

TIFIED BY THE COURT AS SUCH, COL-

LUSIVELY AGREE TO ESTABLISH A “SET-

TLEMENT CLASS” FOR THE PURPOSE OF

SETTLEMENT.

Rule 23, FRCP, requires that a Class be certified

in a case ‘‘as soon as practicable after the commence-

ment of an action brought as a class action.’’ The

Local Rules of many Courts, including the United

States District Court for the Southern District of New

York, require that a Class be certified within 60 days

after the commencement of the action. These salutory

rules are consistently flouted by collusive parties by

entering into stipulations indefinitely extending the

time for moving for Class Certification, then agreeing

to a settlement, and certifying a Class, on consent,

‘for the purpose of settlement only.”’

This Court has not passed on this practice. It has

been approved by many lower courts and specifically

disapproved by the United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit. In so disapproving, in General

Motors, supra, the Court, on page 1125 of the opinion,

held as follows:

‘‘* * A person who unofficially represents the class

during settlement negotiations must be under strong

pressure to conform to the defendants’ wishes...

KK’

* * *

‘“* * Finally, unauthorized settlement negotiations

deny other class counsel access to information about

the negotiations which is helpful in evaluating the

fairness of the settlement. * * *”

10

In the present case, while the Weinberger action

was commenced in 1975, a Class was not certified un-

til 1981, a period of six years.

Even after this long period of time, the Class was

certified for the purposes of settlement only.

Therefore, if the settlement were not had, or if the

plaintiffs’ counsel did not conform to the defendants’

wishes, there would be no Class Certification.

In addition, in this case the defendants knew that

there was another Class Action pending in State

Court. In that action the State Claims were previously

set forth. Contrary to the position of the plaintiffs in

the Federal Class Action the Complaint, in the State

Action, was sustained against attack. Thus conduc-

ting settlement negotiations with one set of attorneys

to exclusion of the others is conduct to be condemned.

(See General Motors, supra.)

Where Federal and State Class Actions are both

pending, and particularly where the State Court has

refused to stay the State Action, and where State

Claims have not been involved in the Federal Action

any settlement which excludes the State action is not

proper under General Motors. Had the defendants

been required to negotiate a settlement of both the

Federal and State actions simultaneously the results

would have been very different to the Class Members.

The action of the District Court, in approving a

settlement arrived at between the Federal Class

Counsel having a weak case without the simultaneous

settlement of the State Action, is a violation of Rule

23(b)(3)(b) and Rule 23(b)(3)(C) which requires that, in

determining the propriety of a Class Action, the Court

must consider:

11

‘“* * the extent and nature of any litigation concern-

ing the controversy already commenced by or against

members of the Class. * * *”’

and

‘““* * the desirability or undesirability of concentrating

the litigation of the claims in the particular forum.

* * &’’

The exclusion of the State Court action from the

proposed settlement and the Court’s allowance of a

“Third Amended Complaint’’ by agreement of the

parties including the State Allegations when they had

not been placed in the Federal Complaint heretofore

and the Federal Action had been pending for years

should simply not be permitted. The supervision of

this Court so as to definitely forbid such practices is

mandatory.

POINT TWO

MAY PARTIES TO A PURPORTED CLASS

ACTION, YEARS AFTER FILING, AMEND

THEIR COMPLAINT TO ENCOMPASS

STATE CLAIMS WHICH HAVE BEEN

HERETOFORE PROSECUTED IN STATE

COURT AND THEN ENTER INTO A COL-

LUSIVE SETTLEMENT TO DESTROY THE

STATE CLAIMS.

The parties in Weinberger are required to concede

that the purported attempi to “copy” the State

Claims set forth in Lewy without conducting any pro-

ceedings with respect to such claims, would normally

be improper.

The sole justification for this practice, as set forth

in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, is that the

12

State Claims were also weak and that, for this reason,

the actions of the parties were not sufficiently gross to

void the settlement arrived at.

The Court of Appeals relied, for this conclusion,

on a decision of Bankruptcy Judge Galgay who, in the

Bankruptcy Proceedings involving W T GRANT

COMPANY, approved a settlement with subor-

dinated debenture holders of $.21 on the dollar of

claims.

This settlement, in the Bankruptcy Court, was

negotiated principally by the attorneys filing this

Petition and indicates to the Court what would have

occurred had the settlement involved in this case been

negotiated with State Court Counsel.

The Bankruptcy Settlement, of course, was

negotiated purely for debenture holders and

amounted to approximately 400 times the settlement

arrived at in this case. It is also noteworthy that the

settlement in this case, in effect, gives the debenture

holders nothing because the settlement received in the

Bankruptcy Proceeding is deducted from the settle-

ment received in this case. Since the Bankruptcy Set-

tlement amounted to $.21 on the dollar of claims the

debenture holders are, in connection with this case,

receiving nothing.

Quite obviously, a Court cannot deprive parties of

their rights in another suit by taking over claims

presented in that suit and then dismissing them.

Assuming, arguendo, that the Court had jurisdic-

tion over the State Claims, (which is doubtful as will

be set forth infra in this Petition), the general practice

13

is, of course, that a Court that first has jurisdiction of

a controversy is entitled to proceed to a conclusion

with respect to such controversy. Thus, for example, if

a plaintiff brings an action in a State Court, and the

defendant thereafter commences a similar action in

Federal Court, the Federal Court will refuse to take

jurisdiction of the second suit on the ground that

another action is pending.

What the Court has done in this case is to stand

the salutory doctrine preventing duplication of litiga-

tion and prevention of ‘forum shopping”’ on its head.

If this settlement is permitted to stand the Court will

have set forth a Rule to the effect that, once a federal

suit is commenced, regardless of the weakness of the

claims presented, the parties, by collusion, can

destroy related State Litigation by simply copying

the State Claims in the Federal Proceeding.

POINT THREE

MAY A FEDERAL COURT GRANT PEN-

DENT JURISDICTION OVER PURELY

STATE CLAIMS WHEN THE SETTLEMENT

CLASS INCLUDES MEMBERS WHO HAVE

NO FEDERAL CLAIMS AND WHOSE STATE

CLAIMS ARE PENDING IN STATE COURT

Federal Courts are, by definition, Courts of

limited jurisdiction. In order to prevent duplication of

litigation a judge-made doctrine has developed known

as pendent jurisdiction. Thus, if a Federal Claim is

presented in a Federal Court, and a State Claim arises

out of the same factual pattern, the Federal Court, as

a matter of discretion only, may take pendent jurisdic-

tion of the non-federal claims. However, if there js no

14

federal claim presented by a party, pendent jurisdic-

tion is not available. (United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,

383 US 715 (1966).

In the present case since the Court certified a

class of parties who purchased or held securities of

WT GRANT COMPANY during the ‘‘Class Period,’’

those security holders of W T GRANT COMPANY,

who did not purchase their securities during the

‘Class Period’”’ had no Federal Claims. Thus, in Blue

Chip Stamps vs. Manor Drug Stores, 421 US 723, this

Court, on pages 737 and 738 of the opinion, pointed

out that the Birnbaum Rule, requiring a party to have

purchased or sold a security during the appropriate

period, was viable and affirmed. In its opinion this

Court specifically held that holders of securities dur-

ing the Class Period did not qualify as plaintiffs under

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, the

Court stating as follows:

‘‘* * * Three principal classes of plaintiffs are present-

ly barred by the Birnbaum Rule.

* * x

Second are actual shareholders of the issuer who

allege that they decided not to sell their shares

because of an unduly rosy repres.atation or a failure

to disclose unfavorable material. Third are

shareholders, creditors, and perhaps others related to

an issuer who suffered loss in the value of their invest-

ment due to corporate or insider activities. * *”’

The Court, in Blue Chip, further points out that

State remedies may be available for such parties but a

federal remedy is not.

The Court of Appeals, in supporting the utiliza-

tion of ‘‘pendent jurisdiction” to cover the claims of

15

the mere holders of said securities pointed out that the

State and Federal claims had a common factual pat-

tern. Even assuming that this was correct (which it is

not) pendent jurisdiction is simply not available with

respect to parties who have no federal claims. Thus, at

least with respect to the putative class members who

did not purchase their Grant securities during the

“Class Period” the Court had no jurisdiction over

them.

The grant of pendent jurisdiction over the deben-

ture holders of Grant who are present holders thereof

is likewise improper since these parties are receiving

nothing in connection with the present settlement.

Since the Bankruptcy Settlement of $.21 on the dollar

of claims is about FOUR HUNDRED times more

than the settlement in this case and the settlement

provides that any amount awarded to the putative

class members in the Bankruptcy Proceeding must be

deducted from the amount to be awarded in this pro-

ceeding, these parties are receiving nothing. Thus the

approval of the grant of pendent jurisdiction over

these parties is in violation of a determination of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

in National Super Spuds vs. New York Mercantile Ex-

change, 660 F. 2nd 9 where the Court disapproved a

settlement which had the effect of destroying State

Claims of certain Class Members end awarded them

nothing.

While the grant of pendent jurisdiction with

respect to (1) those putative class members who mere-

ly held Grant securities during the ‘‘Class Period”’ and

(2) the present holders of Grant debentures, was clear-

ly improper the grant of pendent jurisdiction with

respect to the remaining putative Class Members with

16

respect to State Claims was an abuse of discretion

under the specific facts involved.

Since the State Claims were being dilligently pro-

secuted in State Court and an application to the State

Court for a stay was denied and affirmed on appeal,

the District Court, as a matter of discretion, abused

such discretion by permitting pendent jurisdiction to

be applied.

The petitioners submit that, where State Claims

are first presented in State Court, a federal court has

no power to grant pendent jurisdiction over these

claims. While, this Court has not heretofore taken

such a position it may very well desire to do so.

However, it is submitted that under the specific facts

of this case the Federal Court abused its discretion in

granting pendent jurisdiction in this case.

In the first place this Court has held that claims

for breach of fiduciary duties, breach of trust, and con-

spiracy are traditionally state remedies. Thus, where

these claims are presented to a federal court, federal

jurisdiction over them is uniformly denied. See, for ex-

ample, Santa Fe Industries vs. Green, 430 US 462;

Cort vs. Ash, 422 US 66 and Piper us. Chris-Craft In-

dustries, Inc., 430 US 1.

There have been, of course, a number of cases

where a Court has refused to grant pendent jurisdic-

tion over State Claims where the ‘‘center of gravity’’

of the claims resides in State Court. See, for example,

Meyerhofer vs. Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Com-

pany, 74 FRD 151 (Federal pendent jurisdiction

denied over State Claims related to Federal Securities

Claims).

sf

In the present case, particularly because of the

weakness of the Federal Claims presented, the

District Court abused its discretion in granting pen-

dent jurisdiction in this case.

POINT FOUR

THE SETTLEMENT INVOLVED HEREIN 1S

CLEARLY INADEQUATE

It has been conceded by all parties, in the prior

proceedings in this case, that the amount of the pre-

sent settlement is about $.05 on the dollar of claims.

The settlement in the related Bankruptcy Proceeding

(which is relied upon to sustain this settlement) is

about four hundred times higher at $.21 on the dollar

with this amount deducted from any amount to be

received by the Class Members in connection with the

present settlement.

The inadequacy of this settlement cries out for

review. Why would present counsel bringing on this

petition have received forty times more than the

counsel supporting the present settlement. If, indeed,

the Bankruptcy Proceedings and this proceeding are

related, then is not the fact that the Bankruptcy pro-

ceedings resulted in a 400 times increase in settlement

amount compared to the amount obtained in this pro-

ceeding, absolute proof of the inadequacy of the pre-

sent settlement.

Courts have rejected settlements for inadequacy

which have permitted a far greater recovery than the

settlement in the present case. Thus in Percondani vs.

Riker-Maxon Corporation, 50 FRD 473 the Court

refused to permit a settlement to proceed which

18

granted the Class Members only 15% of the possible

recovery. (Not one-half of one percent which the pre-

sent settlement grants to the Class Members).

In Weiss us. Chalker, 44 FRD 168 the Court re-

quired that further discovery be conducted before a

settlement that could be inadequate was approved.

The State Law theory of the case (which was not

considered by either the Bankruptcy Court or by the

Courts below) involves the fiduciary duties that of-

ficers and directors of an insolvent corporation owe to

stockholders and creditors thereof.

W T GRANT COMPANY was headquartered in

New York and New York Law applies to this Com-

pany. In Clarkson Co. vs. Shaheen, 660 F. 2nd 506

(1981) the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit set

forth the New York Rule as follows:

‘“* * If the corporation was insolvent at that time it is

clear that defendants, as officers and directors

thereof, were to be considered as though trustees of

the property for the corporate beneficiaries * *’’

See also Ward us. City Trust Co. of New York, 192

NY 61 and New York Credit Men’s Adjustment

Bureau, Inc. vs. Weiss, 305 NY 1.

In the present case PETERKIN was the controll-

ing director of W TGRANT COMPANY and also was

an officer and director of the principal bank lender of

W T GRANT COMPANY. While this company was

insolvent he so manipulated the corporation so as to

protect the position of the creditor banks and destroy

the position of the stockholders and debenture holders

of that corporation.

19

The ‘‘trust fund doctrine” set forth herein as ap-

plied under State Law is not the same as “equitable

subordination’’ applied in a Bankruptcy Context.

However the facts involved are of some import on the

question of equitable subordination. This explains

why the creditor banks were willing to pay about forty

times more than in the present lawsuit to settle the

Bankruptcy Proceedings. It also explains the despera-

tion of the defendants to conclude a ‘‘sweetheart set-

tlement”’ with the weak plaintiffs in Weinberger so as

to destroy the strong viable claims pending in State

Court in Lewy.

POINT FIVE

THE BANKRUPTCY DETERMINATION OF

JUDGE GALGAY RELIED UPON BY THE

COURT OF APPEALS TO SUSTAIN THE

PRESENT SETTLEMENT IS NOT IN POINT

The Court of Appeals, in its opinion, admits that

the District Judge did not conduct the required

evidentiary proceedings necessary to approve a Class

Settlement. However it relies on an opinion of

Bankruptcy Judge Galgay which was rendered in the

W T GRANT BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS

which approved a settlement of $.21 on the dollar of

claims (not five-hundreths of a cent on the dollar of

claims as involved in this case) for subordinated

debenture holders based on theories of ‘‘equitable

subordination.”

That “equitable subordination” is a viable theory

in Bankruptcy Proceedings is, of course, correct. See,

for example, Matter of Multiponics, Inc. 622 F.2nd

709: In Re American Lumber Co., 5 BR 470; Pepper vs.

20

Litton, 308 US 295 and Geddes vs. Anaconda Mining

Co., 254 US 590. Based on the factual pattern involv-

ed, and considering that a settlement of about 25% of

the total claims was being presented, Bankruptcy

Judge Galgay correctly held that the proposed settle-

ment was approvable. Petitioners do not question

Judge Galgay’s approval of that settlement.

The rules, however, with respect to ‘‘equitable

subordination” involve discretionary powers on the

part of the Bankruptcy Judge. These rules, of course,

do not apply to the violation of the fiduciary duties

that officers and directors of a corporation owe to the

stockholders thereof. Thus Judge Galgay did not con-

sider the effect of stockholder claims.

Similarly Judge Galgay did not consider the effect

of the questioned conduct under the New York “‘trust

fund’”’ rule. Thus, Judge Galgay did not consider

whether W T GRANT was insolvent prior to the filing

of the Petition in Bankruptcy nor a number of other

questions which are germane to the imposition of

liability upon the creditor banks under New York

State Law in a plenary suit as opposed to claim priori-

ty questions under Bankruptcy Law. The only matter

that Judge Galgay had before him was the relative

priority between the subordinated debenture holders

claims and the bank creditor claims. Breach of

Fiduciary Duty claims, conspiracy claims and other

State Claims were just not before him.

More importantly, of course, is the fact that

Judge Galgay did not have any merit determination of

the claims involved before him. In any event discre-

tionary and mandatory liability is quite different.

21

Thus the matters before Judge Galgay were not

material with respect to the approval or disapproval

of the proposed settlement of this litigation.

The District Judge, since the State claims involv-

ed different theories than the claims for equitable

subordination passed upon by Judge Galgay, could

not avoid the requirements relating to settlement of

class actions by merely relying on Judge Galgay’s opi-

nion.

Further confirmation of the above facts is found

in the determination of the State Court which, in de-

nying an application to stay the State Proceedings

because of the pendency of the Weinberger litigation

held that the Weinberger action and the Bankruptcy

Proceedings were:

‘“# * not so all-encompassing as to render certain that

a settlement therein will necessarily obviate the tort

claims before this Court * * *”’

POINT SIX

THE APPROVAL OF THE SETTLEMENT

HEREIN, COUPLED WITH THE PROHIBI-

TION OF THE CONDUCT OF RELATED PRO-

CEEDINGS IS A VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-

INJUNCTION ACT

Congress, in its wisdom, in order to avoid unseem-

ly conflicts between Federal and State Courts of coor-

dinate jurisdiction has passed the ‘‘Anti-Injunction

Act’’ 28 USC 2283 which provides, in pertinent part

that:

“* * A court of the United States may not grant an in-

22

junction to stay proceedings in a State Court except

as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where

necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or ef-

fectuate its judgments. * * *”’

The Act was passed to prevent defendants, who

were subjected to proceedings in a forum not of their

liking, to bring on some type of proceeding in a federal

court and enjoin the State Proceedings.

In the case at Bar it is conceded that the State

Claims involved were presented, for the first time, in

the State Court and were only ‘“‘copied”’ by the parties

in Weinberger as part of the settlement objected to in

this proceeding. Thus, in effect, the federal court has,

as a practical matter, enjoined a State Proceeding and

prevented the prosecution of State Claims in the

forum where they were initially presented.

This is in clear violation of the Congressional in-

tent in passing the ‘‘Anti-Injunction Statute’ and

should be reviewed by this Court.

POINT SEVEN

THE CASE IS BELIEVED TO BE FINAL FOR

SUPREME COURT REVIEW EVEN THOUGH

THE ATTORNEYS’ FEES IN THIS CASE

HAVE NOT YET BEEN FIXED OR THE

VALIDITY OF CERTAIN PARTIES WHO

HAVE “OPTED OUT” OF THE PRESENT

SETTLEMENT, OF THEIR REQUESTS FOR

EXCLUSION HAVE NOT YET BEEN PASSED

ON BY THE COURT

In order to have this Court grant a Petition for a

Writ of Certiorari the determination complained of

23

must be ‘‘final’’ and not subject to further review. In

the present case, while the validity of the proposed

settlement has been finally determined by the District

Court and the Court of Appeals there are still other

matters to be considered by the District Court in this

matter.

There has been no determination as to the amount

of fees to be awarded to the plaintiffs’ attorneys if this

settlement is approved and there is another proposed

settlement to be considered by the District Court

relating to claims against officers and directors of

W T GRANT COMPANY.

Based on the decisional law (Cf. City of New

Orleans vs. Dukes, 427 US 297 it would appear to the

undersigned that this Petition is properly filed at this

time.

However, in fairness to the Court, the finality

question is being presented for the Court’s considera-

tion.

CONCLUSION

THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CER-

TIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SHOULD BE GRANTED.

Respectfully submitted,

I. WALTON BADER

BADER AND BADER

Attorneys for Petitioners

65 Court Street

White Plains, NY 10601

914-682-0072

—————————— i“.

la

OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

AFFIRMING THE DETERMINATION OF THE

DISTRICT COURT

William B. WEINBERGER, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

Vv.

James C. KENDRICK, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees,

Charles M. Coyne, et al., Appellants.

Nos. 956-959, Dockets 81-7317, 81-7629,

81-7827, 81-7829.

United States Court of Appeals,

Second Circuit.

Argued April 19, 1982.

Decided July 14, 1982.

Order on Petitions for Rehearing

Jan. 26, 1983.

* * *

20. Federal Civil Procedure 2737.5

In view of fact that district court offered little by

way of explanation for its attorneys’ fee award and

that scope of document was narrowed by telephone

conversation and trial judge erroneously relied upon

assumption that there were no objections to settle-

ment in determining that issuance of subpoenas was

improper, record failed to support finding that there

2a

was Clear evidence of bad faith or vexatiousness in is-

suing subpoenas which trial court described as ‘“‘on

their face, grossly overbroad,’”’ and sanction of fee

award was not shown to be justified.

SF A SS se

Benedict Wolf and Lester L. Levy, New York City

(Wolf, Popper, Ross, Wolf & Jones, and Wolf,

Haldenstein, Adler, Freeman & Herz, New York City),

for plaintiffs-appellees.

Philip C. Potter, Jr., Ogden N. Lewis and Denny

Chin, New York City (Davis, Polk & Wardwell, New

York City), for defendants-appellees.

Bradley R. Brewer, New York City (Brewer &

Soeiro, New York City), for appellants Coyne, Collins

and 580 other named appellants.

I.W. Bader, White Plains, N.Y. (Bader & Bader,

White Plains, N.Y.), for appellants Lewy, Anderson,

Barrie, Pine, Lapham, Garson, Howe, Barnes &

Johnson and Jurkiewicz.

Before WATERMAN, FRIENDLY and

MESKILL, Circuit Judges.

FRIENDLY, Circuit Judge:

These consolidated appeals are from a final judg-

ment of Judge Duffy of the District Court for the

Southern District of New York, entered on October

16, 1981, 91 F.R.D. 494, approving, pursuant to F.R.

Civ.P. 23, the settlement of two securities class ac-

tions consolidated below— Weinberger, et al. v. Ken-

drick, et al, and Panzirer v. Peterkin, et al. The com-

plaints in these actions, filed on October 3, 1975, and

3a

October 22, 1976, respectively, asserted claims on

behalf of classes consisting of persons who had pur-

chased securities of W.T. Grant Company (Grant) dur-

ing the 34 months prior to that company’s bankrupt-

cy on October 2, 1975 (sometimes referred to hereafter

as the class period). The defendants named in the ac-

tions were financial institutions (the banks) that loan-

ed Grant more than $600 million prior to its bankrupt-

cy,! and Dewitt Peterkin, Jr., a former vice-chairman

of Morgan Guaranty and a Grant director. The com-

plaints alleged that the defendants had dominated the

management of Grant in the years preceding its

bankruptcy and had concealed from the public both

the seriousness of Grant’s financial predicament and

the inflated value of Grant securities. The plaintiffs

asserted, among other things, claims against the

defendant-appellees based on §10(b) of the Securities

Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78j(b), Rule 10b-5

promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5, and

common law fraud. The complaints in Weinberger and

Panzirer were superseded by a consolidated amended

complaint, filed July 25, 1980, along with the propos-

ed settlement. In addition to the claims previously

asserted, this advanced state law breach of fiduciary

duty claims; the new complaint also expanded the

plaintiff class to include persons who merely held

Grant securities during the class period. The settle-

ment approved by Judge Duffy would extinguish a

number of these claims? in return for some $2.84

million,? which, after allowance of attorneys’ fees,

would be distributed to the plaintiff class. While no

determination has been made how even the gross

amount of the settlement compares to the amounts

claimed, estimated by objectors’ counsel as between

$250 million and $1 billion, it is not disputed that the

recovery will be only a negligible percentage of the

4a

losses suffered by the class. Both the plaintiffs and

the defendants below are here as appellees defending

the settlement’s adequacy.

The appellants are a number of persons who pur-

chased or held Grant securities during the class

period. One group, the Coyne appellants, allegedly 583

in number, represented by Bradley R. Brewer, fit the

above description simpliciter. The other group, the

Lewy appellants, are the eight named plaintiffs in a

class action, Index No. 17857-75, filed in September

1975 in the Supreme Court of New York County which

is now against three of the lending banks, Morgan

Guaranty, Chase Manhattan and Citibank, asserting

some of the claims asserted in the Weinberger/Pan-

zirer actions but only under state law. Appellants

raise a number of procedural and substantive

challenges to the determination that the settlement is

fair, reasonable and adequate. We affirm.

I. Background

On October 2, 1975, Grant, with recorded

liabilities of well over a billion dollars, filed a petition

in bankruptcy court in the Southern District of New

York for an arrangement under Chapter XI of the

former Bankruptcy Act. Grant’s petition came after

two years of declining earnings and credit ratings.

When the company’s publicly reported earnings for

the year ending January 31, 1974, declined by some

$85,000,000, rating agencies downgraded Grant’s

commercial paper, thereby effectively denying the

company access to the commercial paper market. As a

result, in the spring of 1974, Grant began to obtain

financing from commercial banks, first on an ad hoc

basis with credit lines from numerous lenders

5a

throughout the country, and later, in the fall of 1974,

under a $600,000,000 committed revolving credit

agreement arranged by the company’s principal

banks. Morgan Guaranty was the lead lender and

acted as agent for the other banks, see note 1, supra.

The revolving credit was secured by Grant’s accounts

receivable and certain securities it held in a sub-

sidiary.

Despite the new credit, and various other steps

taken by its lenders to ameliorate Grant’s situation,*

and contrary to rosy predictions by Grant’s manage-

ment, the company’s financial position continued to

deteriorate. The seriousness of this became fully ap-

parent when an internal study ordered in the summer

of 1975 by a new Grant president, Robert Anderson,

was completed in late September: this revealed that

the company had a negative net worth. The evidence

indicates that the news came as a surprise to the

banks and Grant’s board. Grant’s Chapter XI petition

quickly followed.

Even more quickly came the first complaint in the

Weinberger action, filed October 3, 1975. The com-

plaint alleged that, as a result of their large loans,

Grant’s principal lenders had been in a position to,

and in fact did, exercise considerable control over the

management of the company in its final years. It fur-

ther charged that the defendant banks and Grant’s

management had cooperated in presenting a

misleadingly optimistic picture of the company’s

future to the public. The Panzirer complaint, filed on

October 22, 1976, elaborated on this theme. It alleged

that Peterkin became aware of Grant's true financial

predicament in March, 1973, and passed this informa-

tion to Morgan Guaranty, including the Trust and In-

vestment Division, which thereafter sold virtually its

64

entire holding of Grant securities on the open market.

Motions for class certification were filed in

Weinberger in June, 1977, and in Panzirer in August,

1977; the motions were later adjourned during settle-

ment discussions and were not renewed until agree-

ment had been reached.

The development and settlement of the

Weinberger/Panzirer action require an understanding

of Grant’s bankruptcy proceedings. Some six months

after the filing of Grant’s Chapter XI petition, the

Bankruptcy Court, on April 13, 1976, determined that

the company could not be reorganized and ordered its

liquidation. On July 2, 1976, the principal banks com-

menced an adversary proceeding seeking enforcement

of security interests they held in property of Grant’s

estate, see p. 64, supra. In his September 24, 1976,

answer, the trustee in bankruptcy challenged these

security interests on the grounds that they were

preferential transfers and fraudulent conveyances;

more important for our purposes, he also claimed that,

because of the control they allegedly exercised over

Grant’s affairs during the years 1973-75, the com-

pany’s principal lenders should be equitably subor-

dinated® to other claimants.

In an effort to substantiate his charges, par-

ticularly his claim to equitable subordination, the

trustee conducted investigations throughout the re-

mainder of 1976 and 1977 into the relationship bet-

ween Grant and its lenders during the class period. He

relied principally on testimony taken under Bankrupt-

cy Rule 205 and un documents subpoenaed from

various parties.* Rule 205 examinations were taken of

all the principal officers and directors of Grant, the

principal officers at Morgan Guaranty responsible for

dealings with Grant, and two officers of other major

ia

lending banks. The testimony ran to some 10,000

pages. The trustee also subpoenaed those files of

Grant’s principal lenders which related to the com-

pany—comprising hundreds of thousands of

documents.’ In short, the trustee conducted a far-

reaching and intensive probe of the banks’ involve-

ment in Grant’s affairs during the class period.

Despite his extensive investigations, Grant's

trustee concluded that his chances of proving any

fraud or other wrongdoing by the lending banks were

extremely slim, cf. 4 B.R. at 73-79 (Judge Galgay’s ap-

proval of similar determinations by the trustee). Ac-

cordingly, he attempted, ultimately successfully, to

settle the banks’ claims. On February 24, 1978, the

trustee and the banks entered into a settlement

whereby the banks released their security interests in

Grant’s property in return for allowance of principal

and interest on all prepetition loans which it was

estimated would result in their receiving distributions

of 55% or more of their claims, 4 B.R. at 59. The

Bankruptcy Court, in a careful decision, 4 B.C.D. 597,

issued on July 20, 1978, approved the settlement, and

shortly thereafter the banks began receiving distribu-

tions. The appellees have averred that, despite the set-

tlement, the banks will have lost more than

$250,000,000 on their loans to Grant by the time the

estate is fully liquidated.

Following approval of the settlement of the

banks’ claims, negotiations commenced regarding

claims of holders of Grant’s subordinated debt.* By

April, 1979, an agreeinent had been reached and the

trustee applied to the Bankruptcy Court for permis-

sion to offer the proposed settlement to holders of

Grant’s subordinated debt. On February 20, 1980,

after six days of hearings on the proposed settlement,

8a

including cross-examination of the trustee, his

counsel, and his chief staff assistant regarding the

fairness of the settlement, Judge Galgay, in a second

lengthy decision, 4 B.R. 53, approved the settlement.

He expressly found, among other things, that the

banks’ relationship with Grant during the class period

had been one of ‘‘arms-length negotiations’’ and that

Grant’s actions “‘reflected independent policy deci-

sions’, 4 B.R. at 76-77. Eleven bondholders appealed

this order to the District Court for the Southern

District of New York (Conner, J.), which stayed con-

sideration of the appeals so that Bankruptcy Judge

Galgay could supervise continuing negotiations

among the bankruptcy trustee, the indenture trustee,

the banks, and the debentureholders for an improved

offer to the latter. Counsel for the debentureholders

who had appealed from the order approving the earlier

offer stipulated that these appeals be withdrawn with

prejudice, and this was so ordered. On June 23, 1981,

an amended offer was approved by Judge Galgay.

Two groups of debentureholders appealed to the

District Court (Duffy, J.) from the order approving

the amended offer. In an opinion and order dated

March 15, 1982, Judge Duffy affirmed the order, 20

B.R. 186. He rested his decision primarily on the

ground of res judicata, although he also stated that

the appeals were without merit. Two groups of deben-

tureholders have appealed to this court.

After agreement in principle was reached regar-

ding the claims of Grant’s major creditors, efforts

focused, in the fall of 1979, on settling the Weinberger

and Panzirer actions. Plaintiffs’ counsel had engaged

in a wide range of discovery during the four years

prior to the commencement of settlement discussions.

They had access to, and reviewed, both the bank

documents subpoenaed by the trustee and the

9a

testimony from the Rule 205 examinations he con-

ducted. In addition, plaintiffs’ counsel deposed

several officers of Morgan Guaranty, paying par-

ticular attention to the relationship between that

bank and Grant during the class period. Like Grant's

trustee and Judge Galgay, however, plaintiffs’

counsel found virtually nothing to substantiate their

allegations against the banks: “‘[o]n the basis of all the

evidence we were ccmpelled to the conclusion that our

chance of prevailing against the banks, while not

nonexistent, was slim.’’ With this in mind, and after

rejecting as inadequate one settlement offer by the

banks, plaintiffs’ counsel agreed in late 1979 to the

settlement of a number of the class action claims

asserted in the Weinberger/Panzirer actions. An

original settlement fund of $2.6 million agreed upon in

May of 1980 was later increased to $2.84 million,

which, with interest, now exceeds $3.5 million.

This proposed settlement was submitted to Judge

Duffy for approval on July 25, 1980. It was accom-

panied by a consolidated amended complaint. Count I

of the consolidated amended complaint, brought on

behalf of all purchasers of Grant securities during the

class period, alleged, as had the Weinberger com-

plaint, that the banks ‘‘were in a position to, and did,

control, influence and participate in Grant’s opera-

tions, including the disclosure and nondisclosure of in-

formation relating to Grant’s financial condition,’

428, and that, using this control the banks ‘‘engaged

in a scheme, plan and continuous course of conduct to

present a falsely inflated and optimistic picture of

Grant's... financial condition, and to conceal the true

nature of Grant’s operations and deteriorating finan-

cial condition from the investing public...” 430. It

also asserted that the purchasers of Grant securities

during the class period had relied in purchasing the

10a

allegedly overvalued Grant securities upon false or

misleading disclosures and nondisclosures resulting

from the defendants’ ‘‘course of conduct.’ Based on

these allegations Count I of the complaint claimed

violations of §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of

1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 942, as

well as of common law fraud principles, 9/44.

Count II of the consolidated amended complaint

asserted claims on behalf of a broader class of plain-

tiffs. In addition to purchasers of Grant securities, the

class included persons not previously included in

either the Panzirer or Weinberger classes—persons

who merely held, rather than purchased, Grant

securities during the class period 948(B). In addition

to alleging the claims described above under the

federal securities laws, 449, the complaint charged

that the defendants ‘‘have committed common law

fraud and have breached their fiduciary duties to

plaintiffs...’’, 958, the latter theory not having

previously been expressly advanced by plaintiffs. All

these claims were based upon factual allegations

almost identical to those underlying the federal

securities law claims. The banks were charged with

having ‘‘caused Grant to delay disclosing facts

relating to the financial condition of Grant” and hav-

ing caused Grant ‘‘to delay for their own benefit the

filing of a petition in bankruptcy by Grant,” 956.

Count III of the consolidated amended complaint,

asserted on behalf of a class limited to purchasers of

Grant common stock during the class period, alleged

that Morgan Guaranty and Peterkin had violated

Rule 10b-5 by engaging in insider trading during the

class period. It also alleged that, during the class

period, Morgan Guaranty was a controlling person of

Grant under §20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of

1934.

lia

The proposed settlement agreement submitted to

the district court along with the consolidated amend-

ed complaint, was accompanied by the parties’ con-

sent to the filing of the new complaint. In addition,

the agreement requested the district court to enter an

order determining, ‘‘for the purpose of effectuating

the settlement”’ 8(a), that the action be maintained

as a Class action on behalf of the previously discussed

classes of purchasers and holders of Grant securities.

Substantively, the settlement agreement provided for

the release of the above-described class claims

asserted in the consolidated amended complaint, as

well as any related claims arising out of the same tran-

sactions which might have been asserted, cf. note 2,

supra, in return for the payment to the class of some

$2.84 million.

Submitted to Judge Duffy on July 25, 1980, along

with the consolidated amended complaint and the pro-

posed settlement agreement, were notices of the

pendency of class action, the class action determina-

tion, the proposed settlement and settlement hearing,

which were to be mailed to prospective class members.

These notices, among other things described the

Weinberger/Panzirer action, set out the terms of the

proposed settlement, defined the class that approval

of the settlement would bind, and informed class

members that they could opt out of the settlement, by

so requesting before January 24, 1981,° or enter an ap-

pearance through counsel. Objections to the proposed

settlement were required to be filed not later than two

weeks before the scheduled February 18, 1982,

fairness hearing; no deadline was set for submission of

affidavits supporting the proposed settlement. Pur-

suant to the July 28, 1980, order of Judge Duffy, these

notices were mailed to class members on December 9,

1980, and were published in the Wall Street Journal.

124

In a January 19, 1981, motion to vacate the July 25

order, counsel for appellants alleged that the settle-

ment was inadequate and that the class notification

procedure was defective in a number of respects.

Judge Duffy denied the motion on February 6, 1981.

On February 17, 1981, the appellees filed papers

supporting the settlereat, including lengthy af-

fidavits from counsel fer both plaintiffs and defen-

dants attesting to the fairness and adequacy of the

settlement. Judge Duffy conducted the fairness hear-

ing the next day; appellants tell us that this took no

more than 10 minutes. At this hearing counsel for ap-

pellants submitted a memorandum requesting that

the court treat their January 19 motion and certain

letters counsel had written to the court as timely ob-

jections to the settlement. Judge Duffy refused to do

so, although in his opinion approving the settlement,

91 F.R.D. at 495 n.3, he also rejected the objections as

without merit. By May 19, 1981‘the deadline for filing

proofs of claim—some 26,000 claims had been filed.

[1] On August 13, 1981, Judge Duffy issued an

opinion approving the proposed settlement as fair,

reasonable and adequate. He found that “‘able and ex-

perienced”’ counsel for the class had conducted pro-

tracted arms-length negotiations in good faith; that

‘‘extensive’’ pre-trial discovery had enabled the par-

ties to ‘“‘fully...evaluate the strengths and

weaknesses of the class claims’’; that both he and the

parties properly could rely on factual and legal find-

ings made by Bankruptcy Judge Galgay, In re W. T.

Grant Co., 4 B.R. 53 (Bkrtcy. S.D.N.Y. 1980), which

dealt with the circumstances underlying the settle-

ment and which indicated that the plaintiffs’ “chances

of prevailing were slim’; that the plaintiffs’ claims

were ‘‘complex”’ and “‘not easily proven,”’ particularly

13a

in view of the ‘‘heavy burdens of proof’’ faced by

plaintiffs and ‘‘vigorous defenses’’ asserted by defen-

dants; and that a trial would inevitably involve

“lengthy and costly litigation.’’ He concluded that,

‘‘[iJn view of the difficulties plaintiffs would confront

if this case went to trial, the recommendation of ex-

perienced counsel and the lack of individual objections

to the settlement, I find that the sum offered by the

defendants is acceptable.’’ The opinion did not discuss

most of the procedural objections considered in this

opinion, perhaps because of the judge’s findings that

no timely objections were filed.'°

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Class Notice

[2] We deal first with appellants’ numerous

challenges to the notice of class action and proposed

settlement mailed to prospective class members on

December 9, 1980. Appellants initially argue that the

notice failed adequately to describe the proposed set-

tlement. They also contend that it should have con-

tained a wide variety of additional information more

fully describing the terms of the proposed settlement

and the manner in which the negotiations leading to it

had been conducted. ''

Although no rigid standards govern the contents

of notice to class members, Mullane v. Central

Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct.

652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), the notice must ‘‘fairly

apprise the prospective members of the class of the

terms of the proposed settlement and of the options

that are open to them in connection with [the] pro-

ceedings,’’ Grunin v. International House of Pan-

cakes, 513 F.2d 114, 122 (8 Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.

l4a

864, 96 S. Ct. 124, 46 L.Ed.2d 93 (1975), quoting

Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American

Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 323 F. Supp.

364, 378 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub nom., Ace Heating

& Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30 (3 Cir. 1971);

See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,

supra, 339 U.S. at 314, 70 S. Ct. at 657, and it must be

neutral, see Grunin, supra, 513 F.2d at 122. Numerous

decisions, no doubt recognizing that notices to class

members can practicably contain only a limited

amount of information, have approved ‘‘very general

description[s] of the proposed settlement,’’ Grunin uv.

International House of Pancakes, supra, 513 F.2d at

122. See In re Equity Funding Corp. of America

Securities Litigation, 603 F.2d 1353, 1361-62 (9 Cir.

1979); Mendoza v. United States, 623 F.2d 1338,

1351-52 (9 Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912, 101 S.

Ct. 1351, 67 L.Ed. 2d 336 (1981), In re Corrugated

Container Antitrust Litigation, 643 F.2d 195, 223-24

(5 Cir. 1981).

[3] The December 9, 1980, class action notice, met

the foregoing requirements. It fairly, accurately and

neutrally described the claims and parties in the

Weinherger/Panzirer litigation, as well as the terms of

the proposed settlement and the identity of persons

entitled to participate in it. The notice described in

detail a related state court action—Lewy v. The Chase

Manhattan Bank, N.A., et al., App. Div. 437 N.Y.S.2d

263—brought by counsel for the appellants.'? It ex-

plicitly informed class members that “‘[p]articipation

in the present settlement would preclude any par-

ticipation in the Lewy case.” The notice also explained

that class members could exclude themselves from the

settlement by requesting this prior to January 24,

1981, or could enter an appearance at the fairness

hearing through counsel. Finally, it informed the class

15<

that the recovery would be subject to the district

court's allowance of attorney’s fees and expenses and

that counsel expected to apply for fees not exceeding

25% of the settlement fund. There is little question

that all this ‘‘fairly apprise[d]’’ prospective class

members of the class action’s pendency, the relevant

terms of the proposed settlement, and their options in

connection with that case. Those who wanted to probe

more deeply could, as the notice plainly told them, ex-

amine “‘[t]he settlement stipulation and the papers

and documents filed in this action... ’’"

[4] Appellants next contend that the mailing of in-

dividual notices to the last known addresses of all

class members, as determined from the records of

Grant and various brokerage houses and nominees,

was inadequate since the addresses of many security-

holders might have changed during the period since

Grant’s bankruptcy. Feeral Rule of Civil Procedure

23(c)(2)'* and Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S.

156, 176, 94 S Ct. 2140, 2151, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974),

require only that ‘“‘each class member who can be iden-

tified through reasonable effort’’ (emphasis added), be

notified. In Jn re Franklin National Bank Securities

Litigation, 574 F.2d 662, modified, 599 F.2d 1109

(1978), we discussed the application of the Hisen re-

quirement to classes consisting of purchasers of

securities, noting the difficulty of ensuring that notice

is received by persons whose purchases are recorded

in ‘“‘street names’’—typically banks or brokerage

houses. We disapproved the practice of sending class

notices to street name addresses with a request that

the recipient forward the notice to the beneficial

holder of the securities but without an offer to defray

the resulting expenses, 574 F.2d at 669-70. We in-

dicated approval, however, of the use of bank and

brokerage house records to compile a list of actual

164

holders of securities to whom individual notices would

be mailed, 574 F.2d at 672. Here appellees compiled

such a list, mailed individual notices, and, in addition,

published notice of the class action and settlement in

the Wall Street Journal. Some 26,000 proofs of claim

have been filed as a result of these notice procedures.

The district court, in its July 28, 1980, order, express-

ly found this procedure adequate and we see no reason

to disturb its finding, particularly since no alternative

method of ascertaining class members’ identities has

been suggested to us, see Grunin v. International

House of Pancakes, supra, 513 F.2d at 121-22 (in-

dividual mailing to last known address, without sup-

plemental newspaper publication, approved, despite

evidence that one third of prospective class did not

receive notices).

(5, 6] Likewise, the timing of the notices, which

were mailed on December 9, 1980; the opt-out

deadline, January 24, 1981; the deadline for the filing

of objections, February 4; the date affidavits in sup-

port of the settlement were filed, February 17; and the

fairness hearing, February 18, were not beyond the

authority of the Court. According to the Professor

Moore, ‘‘[t]he manner of giving notice is committed to

the sound discretion of the court,’ 3B Moore's

Federal Practice 423.80[3], at 23-513 (1982). as is sug-

gested by Rule 23’s statement that notice of settle

ment shall be ‘“‘in such manner as the court directs."

The notice, however, must be ‘‘reasonably calculated,

under all the circumstances, to apprise interested par-

ties of the pendency of the action and afford them an

opportunity to present their objections,’’ Mullane v.

Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., supra, 339 U.S. at

314, 70 S. Ct. at 657, and it must ‘‘afford a reasonable

time for those interested to make their appearance,’

17a

Id. Prospective class members had some six weeks in

which to decide whether or not to accept the settle-

ment. Although we think it would have been

preferable if appellees’ affidavits and other papers in

support of the settlement had been required to be

available at a date earlier than the eve of the hearing,

the failure of the district court to demand this does

not require reversal. Objectors were fully apprised of

the terms of the proposed settlement and, although

they did not avail themselves of the opportunity, had

complete access to materials discovered in the case;

this provided an adequate base from which objections

could be developed. See 3 Newberg, Class Actions

$5660d (1977). The requirement, challenged by ap-

pellants, that requests to opt-out be filed prior to the

fairness hearing placed prospective objectors in no

worse position than occurs when formal class cer-

tification precedes settlement; indeed, their position

was better in that they knew the terms of the propos-

ed settlement before having to decide whether to opt

out.

Appellant’s final procedural objections relate to

appellees’ having engaged in and concluded settle-

ment negotiations prior to class certification and

notice. Closely related to this, they challenge the

simultaneous notification of class members of the

class determination (for purposes of settlement) and

the proposed settlement. We shall discuss this initially

as if the class certification related solely to the class

named in the earlier Weinberger/Panzirer complaints,

i.e., Claims arising from the purchase of Grant

securities during the class period, and will deal later

with the added problems arising from the inclusion of

other claims.

18a

In In re Franklin National Bank Securities Litiga-

tion, supra, 574 F.2d at 671-72 n.6, we questioned in

dictum the practice of bypassing the formal class cer-

tification procedure and of sending simultaneous

notice of the pendency of a class action and of a pro-

posed settlement to prospective class members. We

voiced concern that the praactice might be ‘‘inconsis-

tent with the requirement [of Rule 23] that certifica-

tion as a class action be determined ‘as soon as prac-

ticable after the commencement of the action’ and the

implication that the initial class notice should follow

promptly after the certification,’ id. and said that

“(slo far as we are aware the only cases in which this

question has been specifically passed upon have held

that the sending of the initial class notice should not

be postponed,”’ id. Our hesitation to approve the prac-

tice echoed the concerns expressed in the Manual for

Complex Litigation §1.46, at 60-61 (1977) (Manual),

which argues that the practice may create the

possibility of collusion or improper pressure by defen-

dants on “unofficial’’ counsel for the class. The

Manual recommends a firm prophylactic rule pro-

hibiting the bypassing of an early formal class cer-

tification and the formation of temporary classes for

settlement purposes.

Despite the Manual’s concerns and the misgiv-

ings expressed in the Franklin National Bank foot-

note, we concluded in Plummer v. Chemical National

Bank, 668 F.2d 654, 656 (2 Cir. 1982), that ‘‘[a]lthough

negotiations in the instant case were conducted by

undesignated class representatives without pretrial

discovery, this, standing alone, did not preclude

judicial approval,’’ 668 F.2d at 658. See also City of

Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 464-66 (2 Cir.

1974). A similar view is taken in Judge Wisdom's

19a

thorough opinion in Jn re Beef Industry Antitrust

Litigation, 607 F.2d 167, 173-78 (5 Cir. 1979), cert.

denied, 452 U.S. 905, 101 S. Ct. 3029, 69 L.Ed.2d 405

(1981), which carefully reviews the authorities and

commentary on the question. Much like our decision

in Plummer v. Chemical Bank, the Fifth Circuit con-

cluded that:

A blanket rule prohibiting the use of temporary settle-

ment classes may render it virtually impossible for the

parties to compromise class issues and reach a propos-

ed class settlement before a class certification. Such a

firm restriction does not appear necessary or

desirable. The hallmark of Rule 23 is the flexibility it

affords to the courts to utilize the class device in a par-

ticular case to best serve the ends of justice for the af-

fected parties and to promote judicial efficiencies.

* * *

Temporary settlement classes have proved to be quite

useful in resolving major class action disputes. While

their use may still be controversial, most courts have

recognized their utility and have authorized the par-

ties to seek to compromise their differences, including

class action issues, through this means.

In re: Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, supra, 607

F.2d at 177-78, quoting 3 Newberg, Class Actions

§5570c, at 479-80 (1977).

Other circuits have held that the absence of class

certification prior to the notice of the settlement is not

an absolute bar to approval. See Ace Heating & Plum-

bing Co. v. Crane Co., supra, 453 F.2d at 33; In re Cor

rugated Container Antiirust Litigation, supra, 643

F.2d at 228 (‘‘Rule 23 includes no language proscrib-

ing combined notice of a class action and a proposed

settlement.”’); Marshall v. Holiday Magic, Inc., 550

20a

F.2d 1173, 1176 (9 Cir. 1977); Valerio v. Boise Cascade

Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 639 (N.D.Cal.1978), aff'd, 645

F.2d 699 (9 Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126, 102

S.Ct. 976, 71 L.Ed.2d 113 (1981).

[7] Although we thus refuse to adopt a per se rule

prohibiting approval when a class action settlement

has been reached by means of settlement classes cer-

tified after the settlement, with notice simultaneous

with that of the settlement, we emphasize that we are

permitting, not requiring, use of this procedure, and

also underscore that, as intimated by us in Plummer,

supra, 668 F.2d at 658, district judges who decide to

employ such a procedure are bound to scrutinize the

fairness of the settlement agreement with even more

than the usual care. This is necessary in order to meet

the concerns, noted in the Manual, regarding the

possibilities of collusion or of undue pressure by the

defendants on would-be class representatives. Accor-

dingly, we will demand a clearer showing of a settle-

ment’s fairness, reasonableness and adequacy and the

propriety of the negotiations leading to it in such

cases than where a class has been certified and class

representatives have been recognized at an earlier

date. As discussed below, we are satisfied that the set-

tlement in this case meets these requirements.

B. The Fairness, Reasonableness and Adequacy of the

Proposed Settlement

[8] The central question raised by the proposed

settlement of a class action is whether the com-

promise is fair, reasonable and adequate. There are

weighty justifications, such as the reduction of litiga-

tion and related expenses, for the general policy favor-

ing the settlement of litigation, 3 Newberg, Class Ac-

2la

tions §5570c, at 479-80 (1977); cf. Williams v. First

National Bank, 216 U.S. 582, 595, 30 S.Ct. 441, 445,

54 L.Ed. 625 (1910). In part to realize these advan-

tages of settlements negotiated by litigants, we have

long recognized that a district court’s disposition of a

proposed class action settlement should be accorded

considerable deference, West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer

& Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1085 (2 Cir.), cert. denied sub

nom. Cotler Drugs, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 404 U.S.

871, 92 S.Ct. 81, 30 L.Ed.2d 115 (1971); Newman v.

Stein, 464 F.2d 689, 692 (2 Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.,

Benson v. Newman, 409 U.S. 1039, 93 S.Ct. 521, 34

L.Ed.2d 488 (1972); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.,

supra, 495 F.2d at 454-55 (2 Cir. 1974); Patterson v.

Newspaper & Mail Delivery Union, 514 F.2d 767, 771

(2 Cir. 1975). The trial judge ‘‘is exposed to the

litigants, and their strategies, positions and proof. He

is aware of the expense and possible legal bars to suc-

cess. Simply stated, he is on the firing line and can

evaluate the action accordingly.”’ Ace Heating &

Plumbing Co. v. Crane Co., supra, 453 F.2d at 34.

While this principle does not apply in full force when

settlement of a class action has been negotiated before

a class has been certified and a higher degree of

judicial scrutiny is required, particularly when, as

here, there is nothing to indicate that the district

judge felt compelled to do this, it is not wholly depriv-

ed of force.

[9] Determination whether a proposed class action

settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate involves

consideration of two types of evidence. The primary

concern is with the substantive terms of the settle-

ment: ‘‘Basic to this ... is the need to compare the

terms of the compromise with the likely rewards of

litigation.’ Protective Committee for Independent

224

Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson,

390 U.S. 414, 424-25, 88 S.Ct. 1157, 1163, 20 L.Ed.2d

1 (1968). See also Newman v. Stein, supra, 464 F.2d

689; City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., supra, 495 F.2d

at 455. In order to make this comparison, the trial

judge must “‘apprise[ ] himself of all facts necessary

for an intelligent and objective opinion of the pre

babilities of ultimate success should the claim be

litigated.’’ Protective Committee for Independent

Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson,

supra, 390 U.S. at 424, 88 S.Ct. at 1163. However,

“‘all’”’ cannot really mean “‘all’’. The Supreme Court

could not have intended that, in order to avoid a trial,

the judge must in effect conduct one. Saylor v. Lind-

sley, supra, 456 F.2d at 904; Newman v. Stein, supra,

464 F.2d at 691-92; City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.,

supra, 495 F.2d at 462. In order to supplement the

thus necessarily limited examination of the settle-

ment’s substantive terms, attention also has been

paid to the negotiating process by which the settle-

ment was reached, and courts have demanded that the

compromise be the result of arm’s-length negotiations

and that plaintiffs’ counsel have possessed the ex-

perience and ability, and have engaged in the

discovery, necessary to effective representation of the

class’s interests, City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.,

supra, 495 F.2d at 463-66.

[10] The appellants, citing Protective Committee

vu. Anderson, supra, argue at great length that the

lower court’s two page opinion demonstrates that it

did not adequately scrutinize either the substantive

terms of the proposed settlement or the propriety of

the process of neyotiations. We see nothing in the lat-

ter point. The district court noted the absence of any

indication of collusion, the protracted settlement

negotiations, the ability and experience of plaintiffs’

23a

counsel, the extensive discovery preceding settlement

and the fact that counsel for all parties—including the

objectors—had access to materials produced in

discovery, including the extensive and detailed

discovery of Grant’s trustee, who commanded finan-

cial resources and professional assistance, see note 6,

supra, not always available to plaintiffs’ counsel in

class actions. All these considerations, as previous

decisions have noted, City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.,

supra, 495 F.2d at 465; In re Beef Industry Antitrust

Litigation, supra, 607 F.2d at 176; Plummer v.

Chemical Bank, supra, 668 F.2d at 658, are important

indicia of the propriety of settlement negotiations. In-

deed, as discussed more fully below, plaintiffs’ preset-

tlement preparation and discovery efforts in this case

were substantially more thorough than those in many

other decisions where settlements have been approv-

ed.

We are almost equally confident as regards the

substantive terms of the proposed settlement.

Although the district court’s discussion of this was

rather cursory, our own examination of the record

leads us to conclude that the court had before it suffi-

cient materials to evaluate the settlement and came to

the correct conclusion.

Both the defendants and plaintiffs in

Weinberger/Panzirer submitted lengthy affidavits to

the district court. These carefully described the

history of the litigation and, more important,

thoroughly canvassed the evidence, both that suppor-

ting and that refuting plaintiffs’ claims. As noted

above, this evidence included the materials amassed

in the trustee’s investigation. Since his claim of

equitable subordination required a detailed inquiry in-

to the relationship between the banks and Grant,

24a

which is precisely the issue raised in the

Weinberger/Panzirer actions, his discovery efforts

were extremely relevant to the plaintiffs’ claims. The

lower court also had the unusual and important

benefit of several careful and well-reasoned opinions

by Bankruptcy Judge Galgay, see pp. 7-8, supra.

These opinions, particularly as they related to the

equitable subordination question, provided excellent

guidance from a disinterested source on questions cen-

tral to the fairness and adequacy of the proposed set-

tlement. Taken together, these materials provided a

satisfactory record on which the district court could

base its decision.

Moreover, from what we have distilled from the

record, we think the district court’s decision met the

higher standard of scrutiny we believe appropriate in

this case. As plaintiffs’ counsel observed, ‘‘[i]n

weighing the class’ chance of prevailing on the merits

in the case against the banks it was ... important to

differentiate between proving the liability of a

bankrupt Grant to the class and proving any liability

on the part of the defendant banks, who themselves

lost hundreds of millions of dollars by reason of their

transactions with Grant during the class period.”

Levy Affidavit §59. Central to plaintiffs’ claims

against the banks under both the federal securities

laws and the common law was the allegation that the

defendants ‘‘were in a position to, and did, control, in-

fluence and participate in Grant’s operations.’ Con-

solidated Amended Complaint 428. This precise point

had been considered by Judge Galgay in Grant’s

bankruptcy proceedings. He said:

I am satisfied that in the case of Grant the trans-

actions between the Bank Claimants and Grant are

the result of arms-length negotiations conducted in

25a

good faith and governed by the dictates of sound

business judgment. I have reviewed the evidence and,

in particular, the portions of testimony elicited in ex-

aminations pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 205(a) which

the [objectants] claim establish control and domina-

tion on the part of the Bank Claimants. The excerpts

referred to by the [objectants] constitute but a small

portion of the vast amount of information, facts and

materials considered by the Trustee. To a considerable

extent, the ‘‘facts’’ presented by the [objectants] are

based upon hearsay testimony, distortions of

testimony, out-of-context statements or

misstatements.

The record establishes the converse. It appears

that the action taken by Grant reflected independent

policy decisions and not rigid submission to the dic-

tates of the Bank Claimants. Mr. Sundman, a chief

financial officer of Grant who had been appointed a

director in 1974, testified that he operated without in-

structions from the Bank Claimants and that the ad-

visory group organized by the Bank Claimants in 1974

offered neither suggestions nor opinions as to the

business operations of Grant. There has been no

evidence introduced by the [objectants] which would

tend to establish that the Bank Claimants prevented

Grant from initiating a proceeding under the

Bankruptcy Act in 1974 or 1975. The record

demonstrates that prior to the decision made by the

Grant Baord of Directors during the end of September

1975 to seek relief under the Bankruptcy Act, both the

Bank Claimants and Grant management viewed

Grant as a turnaround situation and not insolvent.

Accordingly, it must be concluded that the pro-

babilities of success as to the prosecution of claims of

equitable subordination are very remote. In that con-

text, the Trustee’s recommendation is well founded.

264

4 B.R. at 76-77 (footnote omitted).

Likewise the affidavit of plaintiffs’ counsel

described the uncontradicted deposition statements

of various officers of Morgan Guaranty to the effect

that the bank was “‘not capable or desirous of making

management decisions and did not attempt to tell

Grant how to run its business.”’

The evidence adduced in discovery had also failed

to support plaintiffs’ claims in other respects. Counsel

for the plaintiffs averred that the evidence indicated

that ‘“‘the banks themselves were misled by Grant’s

management’s statements and projections that the

fortunes of Grant would recover.’’ Levy Affidavit 56.

The allegation, advanced in the Panzirer action, and

Count III of the consolidated amended complaint,

that Morgan Guaranty’s Trust and Investment Divi-

sion had sold approximately one million shares of

Grant common stock in 1973 based on inside informa-

tion obtained from Peterkin regarding Grant’s finan-

cial condition, was also belied by the evidence.

Peterkin testified that in 1973 he had not foreseen

Grant’s later troubles. Harrison U. Smith, Vice-

Chairman of Morgan Guaranty’s Trust and Invest-

ment Committee, testified that the decision to sell

Grant securities had been reached in 1972 and that no

discussions with Peterkin had occurred. Plaintiffs’

counsel frankly conceded, ‘‘[w]e do not have any hard

evidence to contradict Smith” and admitted that the

fact that Morgan commenced selling Grant shares in

1972 severely cut against his case.

We should thus have no difficulty in affirming the

approval of the settlement were it not for appellants’

contentions based on the inclusion in the consolidated

2%a

amended complaint and thus in the settlement of

‘‘state law” claims arising from the purchase of Grant

securities prior to the ‘‘class period”’ but held into or

beyond the period—a subject to which we now turn.

C. The Inclusion of Claims Arising Out of the Mere

Holding of Grant Securities

[11,12] So far as concerns a class member who had

purchased Grant securities prior to and during the

class period, the court clearly had jurisdiction to

entertain the claims arising from mere holding as well

as those arising from purchase as a matter of pendent

jurisdiction. The requirement of United Mine Workers

v. Gibbs, 383 U.S 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138, 16

L.Ed.2d 218 (1966), that federal and state claims

share a ‘‘common nucleus of operative fact’’ before the

doctrine may apply is satisfied, as our discussion of

the similarities between the rule 10b-5 and the state

common law claims, pp. 31-35, infra, demonstrates.

Likewise, there is no question that plaintiffs’ Rule

10b-5 claims are constitutionally ‘‘substantial’’. The

requirement of ‘‘an examination of the posture in

which the non-federal claim is asserted and of the

specific statute that confers jurisdiction over the

federal claim, in order to determine whether ‘Congress

... has ... expressly or by implication negated’ the

exercise of jurisdiction over the particular nonfederal

claim,’ Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger,

437 U.S. 365, 373, 98 S.Ct. 2396, 2402, 57 L.Ed.2d 274

(1978), is readily met since the Securities Exchange

Act’s conferal of exclusive jurisdiction on federal

courts, §27, for violations of that act permits ad-

judication of all rclated claims only in those courts,

see International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 593 F.2d

166, 175 n.5 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941, 99

S.Ct. 2884, 61 L.Ed.2d 311 (1979).

28a

[13] A more difficult jurisdictional question would

be raised by the inclusion of persons having only

claims arising from purchases prior to the class

period, if such there be. Such a person would lack the

federal claim necessary as a predicate to pendent

jurisdiction; federal jurisdiction with respect to him

seemingly would have to rest on the notion that when

there is federal jurisdiction over the claims of many

parties having both federal and state claims with a

common nucleus of law and fact, a federal court, in the

exercise of sound discretion, may also join as

plaintiffs persons holding only state claims having

such a nexus.

The law on this subject, including the Supreme

Court’s decision in Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 96

S.Ct. 2413, 49 L.Ed.2d 276 (1976), is fully discussed in

3A Moore, Federal Practice 420.07 [5.-1]-[5.-3] (1982).

Although the Aldinger Court disapproved of the

joinder of a pendent party defendant in the case before

it, the Court explicitly limited its conclusion to ‘‘the

issue of so-called ‘pendent party’ jurisdiction with

respect to a claim brought under [28 U.S.C.] §§1343(3)

and [42 U.S.C.] 1983”, id. at 18, 96 S.Ct. at 2422, and

noted that ‘“‘o]ther statutory grants and other

alignments of parties and claims might call for a dif-

ferent result,” id., and that “‘it would be as unwise as

it would be unnecessary to lay down any sweeping

pronouncement upon the existence or exercise of such

jurisdiction’, id.

The circumstances here are about as powerful for

the exercise of pendent party jurisdiction as can be

imagined. The exclusivity of federal jurisdiction over

claims for violation of the Securities Exchange Act

makes a federal court the only one where a complete

29a

disposition of federal and related state claims can be

rendered. Cf. the Court’s comment in Aldinger that

‘“{w]hen the grant of jurisdiction to a federal court is

exclusive, for example, as in the prosecution of tort

claims against the United States under 28 U.S.C.

§1346, the argument of judicial economy and conve-

nience can be coupled with the additional argument

that only in federal court may all of the claims be tried

together,’ 427 U.S. at 18, 96 S.Ct. at 2422. The con-

cern most frequently voiced with regard to the pen-

dent party doctrine is that it requires a party not

otherwise subject to suit in federal court to defend

himself in that forum, see Aldinger v. Howard, supra,

427 U.S. at 18, 96 S.Ct. at 2422. In this case pendent

party jurisdiction serves, see Almenares v. Wyman,

453 F.2d 1075, 1084-85 (2 Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405

U.S. 944, 92 S.Ct. 962, 30 L.Ed.2d 815 (1972), to ex-

tend federal jurisdiction to a new group of plaintiffs.

Pursuant to the opt-out procedures established by the

district court, plaintiffs who did not wish to have their

claim settled in a federal forum and in fact received

notice of the settlement needed only to request exclu-

sion. Finally, the state law claims asserted on behalf

of the pendent plaintiffs are already before the federal

courts, having been asserted on behalf of persons who

purchased Grant securities during the class period.'®

Appellants contend further that what was done

here with respect to claims arising out of purchases of

Grant securities before the class period was, for all

practical purposes, what we condemned in National

Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exchange,

660 F.2d 9 (2 Cir. 1981). We disagree. in that case class

certification had been ordered fairly early in the game;

the class was limited to persons who had purchased

May 1976 Maine Potato Future Contracts and were

30a

damaged in liquidating such contracts between April

13, 1976, and the close of trading on May 7, 1976. The

settlement, executed a year after notice of the cer-

tification had been sent and long after the opting out

period had expired, purported to settle claims going

beyond those asserted on behalf of this class and in-

cluding the objector’s claims for losses on contracts

which were not liquidated on or before May 7, 1976,

but on which he claimed to have suffered a loss

thereafter. However, the proceeds of the settlement

were to go solely to persons who had suffered losses

on contracts which were liquidated on or before May

7, 1976.

The situation here is quite different. Before the

class was certified, it was expanded to include persons

holding state as well as federal claims. The notice sent

to security holders clearly stated this and afforded an

opportunity to opt out. Moreover, the settlement

made provision for payments to holders of state

claims although these were generally less than to

holders of federal claims. We have no intention to

depart in any way from National Super Spuds; we

simply find it inapplicable to the facts here and hold,

in agreement with other courts, that there is no rigid

rule against the addition of new claims shortly before

submission of a proposed settlement provided that

proper notice and opportunity for opting out are af-

forded, see Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 221

F.Supp. 48, 50 (D.Mass.1958); Heddendorf ov.

Goldfine, 167 F.Supp. 915, 921, 928 (D.Mass.1958);

Pergament v. Frazer, 93 F.Supp. 13, 20 (E.D.Mich.

1950), aff'd sub nom., Masterson v. Pergament, 203

F.2d 315 (6 Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832, 74 S.Ct.

33, 98 L.Ed. 355 (1953), and that the settlement fairly

and adequately provides for the new claims. See also

National Super Spuds v. New York Mercantile Ex-

3ia

change, supra, 660 F.2d at 18 n.7; TBK Partners Ltd.

v. Western Union Corp., 675 F.2d 456 (2nd Cir. 1982).

[14,15] In considering whether the settlement

discriminated unfairly against the state versus the

federal claims, we confront the reiterated contention

by appellants that the state law fraud and breach of

fiduciary duty claims faced less worrisome legal

obstacles than did the federal securities law claims.

Such a position runs counter to generally received

learning. 5 Jacobs, Litigation and Practice under Rule

10b-5, §11.01, at 1-272 to 1-273 (1981) (footnotes omit-

ted) (‘‘it is now generally agreed that [rule] 10b-5 is

procedurally more advantageous and substantively

broader than the common law.’’) (citing cases);

Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,

Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 239 (2 Cir. 1974) (citing cases). For

example, the plaintiff's burden of proof in a common

law fraud case—clear and convincing evidence—is

more demanding than in a Rule 10b-5 case. Rudman v.

Cowles Communications, Inc., 30 N.Y.2d 1, 330

N.Y.S.2d 33, 280 N.E.2d 867 (1972); Pierce v. Richard

Ellis & Co., 62 Misc.2d 771, 773, 310 N.Y.S.2d 266,

269 (Civ. Ct. 1970); Ajax Hardware Mfg. Corp. v. In-

dustrial Plants Corp., 569 F.2d 181, 186 (2 Cir. 1977); 5

Jacobs, supra, at 1-277. Similarly, Rule 10b-5 is

typically regarded as better suited than common law

fraud principles for application to novel theories of

securities frauds—which is admittedly the type of ac-

tion involved in Weinberger/Panzirer, see, e.g., Frohl-

ing, The Promoter and Rule 10b-5; Basis for Accoun-

tability, 48 Cornell L.Q. 274, 290 (1963). The one ele-

ment in which Rule 10b-5 is more rigorous against a

plaintiff than New York law, which appellants assume

would apply to the common law fraud claims, is its re-

quirement that the fraud be ‘‘in connection with”’ the

purchase or sale of a security, see Blue Chip Stamps v.

32a

Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730, 95 S.Ct. 1917,

1922, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1976), in contrast to the rule of

New York law whereby persons who merely held

Grant securities would have been permitted to show

reliance by proving that defendants’ alleged

misrepresentations and nondisclosures caused them

to hold securities they would otherwise have sold.

Continental Insurance Co. v. Mercadanta, 222 A.D.

181, 225 N.Y.S. 488 (1927); 24 N.Y.Jur. Fraud and

Deceit §165, at 233-34 (1962 & 1982 Supp.). This,

however, simply shows which claims get into the

federal basket, not that those that don’t are more

valuable than those that do. In the light of all this, we

conclude that the common law fraud claims against

the defendants were generally less valuable than the

Rule 10b-5 claims of actual purchasers of Grant

securities, and that it was not unfair for the settle-

ment’s distribution formula to reflect this.

[16] We are similarly unimpressed by the ap-

pellants’ contentions as to the strength of their com-

mon law breach of fiduciary duty claims. Appellants

make much of the point that under New York law the

general rule that plaintiff has the burden of proving

fraud is ‘‘somewhat relaxed in cases where a fiduciary

relation exists between the parties to a transaction,

and where one has a dominant and controlling force

over the other’, 24 N.Y. Jur. §278, at 360 (1962 &

1982 Supp.). Application of this principle ordinarily

has been limited to relationships such as those bet-

ween ‘guardian and ward, trustee and cestui que

trust, attorney and client, and physician and patient”’,

id., with more recent extensions to relationships such

as those between social worker and client, Hector M.

v. Commissioner of Social Services, 102 Misc.2d 676,

425 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Family Ct. N.Y. City 1980) (ad hoc

33a

application only), and nursing home and patient, Gor-

don v. Bialystoker Center & Bikur Cholim, Inc., 45

N.Y.2d 692, 412 N.Y.S.2d 593, 385 N.E.2d 285 (1978).

In order for the principle to apply plaintiffs must affir-

matively show the existence of a fiduciary relation-

ship between defendants and themselves, which re-

quires judicial inquiry into the legitimate expecta-

tions of the parties and, more generally, the practical

implications of recognition of a fiduciary relationship,

24 N.Y.Jur. §278 (1962 & 1982 Supp.); see Diamond v.

Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 248

N.E.2d 910 (1969); Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial

Dynamics Fund, 524 F.2d 275, 278-79 (2 Cir. 1975).

Plaintiffs would have faced serious difficulties in

establishing the existence of a fiduciary relationship

between a lending bank and the security holders of a

borrowing corporation. While such a development is

not beyond the realm of possibility, it would have re-

quired a significant extension of existing procedures.

The fiduciary relation recognized in Diamond uv.

Oreamuno, supra—between a manager of a corpora-

tion and its shareholders—has been accorded such

status for nearly a century. In contrast, appellants

have cited us to no decisions in which a fiduciary rela-

tionship was found to exist between a bank and its

borrower’s security holders. Moreover, the extension

of fiduciary principles to this relationship would face

serious obstacles, such as arguments that lending

relations between banks and large corporations are

the product of arm’s-length bargaining and that it

would be anomalous to require a lender to act as a

fiduciary for interests on the opposite side of the

negotiating table.'® Similarly, Bankruptcy Judge

Galgay’s findings that ‘‘the transaction between the

Bank Claimants and Grant are the result of arms-

length negotiations” and ‘‘the action taken by Grant

34a

reflected independent policy decisions’, 4 B.R. at

76-77, would cut strongly against the application of

fiduciary principles to the banks in this case.

[17] Even assuming that the banks could be

shown to stand in a fiduciary relation to Grant’s

security holders, the record indicates that neither

they nor Peterkin, who as a director concededly was in

such a relation, engaged in any wrong-doing. Indeed,

as the above-quoted findings of Judge Galgay on the

closely-related subject of equitable subordination

show, see pp. 24-26, supra, there is virtually no

evidence that the defendants engaged in any wrongdo-

ing in their dealings with Grant. In light of all this, we

agree with appellees that the state law claims were ex-

tremely weak and that the proposed settlement’s

treatment of such claims was fair and adequate, even

though the fairness of the treatment of claims added

on the eve of settlement is subject to especial

scrutiny. Finally, as to the settlement’s release of

unasserted class claims arising out of the facts

underlying the consolidated amended complaint, ap-

pellants have suggested no such claims, and we are

aware of none, which wouid have had even the slight

chance of success that the Rule 10b-5 and common law

claims possessed.

D. The Lack of an Evidentiary Hearing

[18] We next deal with appellants’ contention that

the district court erred in refusing to conduct an

evidentiary hearing preceded by additional discovery

on the adequacy of the settlement. As the court below

obseryed; counsel for appellants have had complete

access to the extensive materials compiled in this

litigation in the bankruptcy proceedings, and their

35a

state court claim provided them with yet another

route for discovery. Appellants appear to have done

little to explore any of these options. In addition, they

came forward with ne specific objections to the

substantive fairness of the settlement, and they have

provided no specific criticisms of Judge Galgay’s

careful examination of the relationship between the

banks and Grant. Moreover, aside from expressing a

desire to cross-examine plaintiffs’ counsel regarding

their efforts in the litigation, appellants did not sug-

gest what further efforts at discovery might be pur-

sued.

On these facts we see no reason to require an

evidentiary hearing preceded by discovery. The only

objections raised by appellants which have required

serious consideration deal with points of law. Given

the adequacy of the existing record and the absence of

cogent factual objections to the settlement, we do not

see what purpose an evidentiary hearing would have

served. As we said in City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.,

supra, 495 F.2d at 464:

Although the parties reaching the settlement have the

obligation to support their conclusion to the satisfac-

tion of the District Court, once they have done so,

they are not under any recurring obligation to take up

their burden again and again ad infinitum unless the

objectors have made a clear and specific showing that

vital material was ignored by the District Court.

III. Propriety of the Fee Award against Appellants

One other matter requires discussion. On

~ a

February 13, 1981, five days before the scheduled

February 18 fairness hearing, Mr. Brewer served sub-

poenas duces tecum on counsel for both plaintiffs and

364

defendants. The subpoena served on lead counsel for

the banks, Davis Polk & Wardwell, sought production

of ‘‘[aJll documents and records ... relating to the

commencement, prosecution and settlement’’ of the

Weinberger/Panzirer action, and listed ten categories

of documents. Mr. Brewer claims that in a subsequent

phone conversation with an attorney at Davis Polk he

limited the scope of the subpoena; the attorney aver-

red that even if Mr. Brewer’s recollection was correct,

he continued to seek production of an extremely wide

range of materials, many of which he must have

known to be privileged.

On February 17 Davis Polk applied for an order to

show cause why an order quashing the subpoena and

awarding Morgan Guaranty $1,800 in attorneys’ fees

and expenses should not be issued. Counsel for the

plaintiffs also moved to quash the subpoena, but did

not seek a fee award. Judge Duffy did not sign the

Davis Polk order, but, in an endorsement on the ap-

plication, stayed the subpoena. A copy of Judge Duf-

fy’s endorsement was delivered to Mr. Brewer on

February 17, although it appears he was not then in-

formed of Davis Polk’s request for fees. At the

February 18 fairness hearing, Judge Duffy briefly

questioned Mr. Brewer as to why he had served the

February 13 subpoenas. Not satisfied with Mr.

Brewer's responses, he imposed two $2,500 fee awards

against him, one to plaintiffs’ attorneys, and the other

to Davis Polk. These were later reduced to a single

$1,800 award to Davis Polk.

Appellees argue that the award against Mr.

Brewer was warranted because he acted “vexatiously

both in issuing subpoenas seeking obviously privileg-

ed materials ... and in doing so without having pro-

37a

perly identified any client or having properly filed any

objections.’’ Mr. Brewer vigorously denies these

charges, averring that ‘‘the subpoenas in question

were issued by my office in good faith on my part and

in the honest belief and expectation that the pro-

ceedings at the hearing on the fairness and adequacy

of the proposed settlement would be evidentiary and

adversary in nature.’’ Brewer Affidavit 94. He stated

that he intended to use the documents produced to at-

tack the adequacy of plaintiffs’ preparations for the

case.

[19] ‘The general American rule governing alloca-

tion of the costs of litigation places the burden of

counsel fees on each party ... .'’ Nemeroff v. Abelson,

620 F.2d 339, 348 (2 Cir. 1980), citing Alyeska

Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S.

240, 247, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 1616, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975).

There is, however, an ‘‘exceptional power to shift fees

where an action has been commenced or conducted ‘in

bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive

reasons.’ ’’ F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. In-

dustrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129, 94 S.Ct. 2157,

2165, 40 L.Ed.2d 703 (1974); Browning Debenture

Holders’ Committee v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078 (2

Cir. 1977). We have previously found that a pro-

cedural step such as the issuance of ‘‘dragnet sub-

poenas’’, id. at 1088-89, may constitute bad faith or

vexatiousness. We have required, however, a high

degree of specificity in the factual findings of lower

courts when attorneys’ fees are awarded on the basis

of bad faith, id. at 1089, and that there be ‘“‘clear

evidence” that the challenged actions “are entirely

without color and [are taken] for reasons of harass-

ment or delay or for other improper purposes’’,

Nemeroff v. Abelson, supra, 620 F.2d at 348, quoting

38a

Browning Debenture Holders’ Committee v. DASA

Corp., supra, 560 F.2d at 1088. These requirements

are a sound means of ensuring that persons with col-

orable claims will not be deterred from pursuing their

rights by the fear of an award of attorneys’ fees

against them, see id. at 1088.

[20] The district court offered little by way of ex-

planation for its fee award. At the February 18

fairness hearing, when the awards were initially im-

posed—even in favor of the plaintiffs who had not

sought one—no reasons were stated. In a brief order of

March 26, 1981, the court characterized the sub-

poenas as ‘‘on their face, grossly overbroad.’’ The

order also relied on the fact that ‘“‘there were no objec-

tions’’ to the settlement in determining that the is-

suance of the subpoenas was improper.

The record does not support a finding that there

was ‘‘clear evidence’ of bad faith or vexatiousness.

Mr. Brewer contends that he was expecting an eviden-

tiary hearing to be held on February 18 and that he

needed to have the documents in court, particularly

since the affidavits supporting the settlement were

not yet available. His phone conversation with Mr.

Lewis narroing the scope of the document request was

at least some evidence that he had not in fact been ac-

ting in bad faith in issuing the February 13 sub-

poenas. As noted previously, the judge erred with

respect to the absence of any objections to the propos-

ed settlement. Davis Polk contends that Mr. Brewer

had no standing t to be heard on February 18 since all

Nee ee RY ys 7) ee ees

his clients who had filed objections had withdrawn

them. The judge did not so find and this is not piain to

us. In short, while not applauding Mr. Brewer’s con-

duct, we do not think it reached the level at which the

sanction of a fee award would be justified.

39a

The judgment approving the settlement is affirm-

ed. The order imposing sanctions on Brewer is revers-

ed. No costs.

FURTHER ORDER ON PETITIONS

FOR REHEARING

On September 10, 1982, we entered an unpublish-

ed order on petitions for rehearing and suggestions for

rehearing in banc filed by both sets of appellants with

respect to our opinion of July 14, 1982, slip opinions at

61, in which we affirmed an order of Judge Duffy, in

the District Court for the Southern District of New

York, approving the settlement of class actions

brought by purchasers of W. T. Grant Co. securities

alleging violations of federal and state securities law.

We corrected a factual statement, slip opinions at 67,

full paragraph, last sentence, in a manner stated

therein. Beyond that we noted the contention made on

behalf of the Coyne appellants that by affirming

Judge Duffy’s order approving the settlement despite

his failure to render more than a cursory opinion, we

had placed ourselves in conflict with Jn re General

Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litigation, 594 F.2d

1106 (7 Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Oswald v. General

Motors Corp., 444 U.S. 870 (1979), and Girsh v. Jep-

son, 521 F.2d 153 (3 Cir. 1975), and indeed had ignored

the command of Protective Committee for Indepen-

dent Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc., v.

Anderson, 390 U.S. 414 (1968). We stated that we had

no intention of doing anything of the sort but rather

had regarded this as a unique situation where, because

——— 7 we Oe eee

yy

of the careful and well-reasoned opinions of Bankrupt-

cy Judge Galgay on closely related issues arising in

the bankruptcy liquidation of Grant, the district

judge could properly have considered himself relieved

40a

of what would otherwise have been his obligation to

make a detailed assessment of the settlement. See slip

opinions at 74. However, because the point ha not

been adequately brought to our attention, we had not

sufficiently focused on the fact that Judge Galgay’s

findings and conclusions were being seriously attack-

ed in an appeal in the Grant bankruptcy proceedings

that would shortly reach this court. We therefore

directed that argument on the appeal from the order

of Judge Duffy affirming Bankruptcy Judge Galgay’s

order in the Grant bankruptcy proceedings

(hereinafter the Cosoff and Miller appeals) be heard

before this same panel and ordered that issuance of

the mandate in this case be stayed pending further

order of this court.

Because of the number of issues raised in the

Cosoff and Miller appeals, the need to supplement the

inadequate record that had been filed, and the fact

that Judge Duffy had rested his approval in that case

primarily on res judicata, disposition of those appeals

has taken longer than we had anticipated. However,

by decision filed today, In re W.T. Grant Co., we have

generally approved Judge Galgay’s findings of fact

and conclusions of law in his opinion of February 20,

1980, 4 B.R. 53, as supplemented by his order of June

23, 1981, approving the settlement with the subor-

dinated debentureholders there at issue. Specifically,

after examining the findings and conclusions submit-

ted by counsel for the trustee in bankruptcy in that

case, we have rejected the assertions made by at-

torney Brewer, both in that case and in this, that

Judge Galgay had simply rubber-stamped the submis-

sions of counsel for the trustee, a practice disapproved

by United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S.

651, 656-67 (1964). Taking note of that decision Judge

4li

Galgay said he had adopted the trustee’s proposed fin-

dings of fact where he had found no reason to do other-

wise; however, he formulated his own discussion of the

law of equitable subordination, the issue that is of par-

ticular moment here. In light of his opinion and our

own examination of much of the evidence, we find that

the chances of plaintiffs’ establishing that the banks

promoted a public belief in the viability of Grant

which the banks did not share are extremely pro-

blematic.

We thus adhere to our opinion of July 14, 1982. In

doing so we reaffirm the duty of district judges in this

circuit to make a considered and detailed assessment

of the reasonableness of proposed settlements of class

actions, as held by the Third Circuit in Girsh, supra,

521 F.2d 153, 157-58, 159-60, and by the Seventh Cir-

cuit in General Motors, supra, 594 F.2d 1106, 1132 n.

44,

The factual correction made by our order of

September 10, 1982, is further revised as follows:

Strike last sentence of the full paragraph on p. 67 and

substitute:

Eleven bondholders appealed this order to the District

Court for the Southern District of New York (Conner,

J.), which stayed consideration of the appeals so that

Bankruptcy Judge Galgay could supervise continuing

negotiations among the bankruptcy trustee, the in-

denture trustee, the banks, and the debentureholders

for an improved offer to the latter. Counsel for the

debentureholders who had appealed from the order ap-

proving the earlier offer stipulated that these appeals

be withdrawn with prejudice, and this was so ordered.

On June 23, 1981, an amended offer was approved by

Judge Galgay. Two groups of debentureholders ap-

424

pealed to the District Court (Duffy, J.) from the order

approving the amended offer. In an opinion and order

dated March 15, 1982, Judge Duffy affirmed the

order, 20 B.R. 186. He rested his decision primarily on

the ground of res judicata, although he also stated

that the appeals were without merit. Two groups of

debentureholders have appealed to this court.

The petitions for rehearing are thus granted in-

sofar as concerns the correction of the factual state-

ment but are otherwise denied. The clerk will ap-

propriate steps with respect to appellants’ suggestion

for rehearing in banc. The stay of the mandate will be

revoked if no judge in regular active service requests

rehearing in banc or, if this is done, such a request is

denied.

FOOTNOTES

1. The principal lender to Grant was Morgan Guaranty

Trust Company of New York (Morgan Guaranty), a wholly

owned subsidiary of J. P. Morgan & Co., Inc. The banks

named as defendants in the actions below, in addition to

Morgan Guaranty are Citibank, N.A., The Sanwa Bank,

Ltd., The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., Chemical Bank,

Irving Trust Company, Marine Midland Bank, Bankers

Trust Company, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company

and The Bank of New York. The settlement also applies to

a number of other banks that had been major lenders to

Grant, because the suits below were brought against

Morgan Guaranty both individually and as agent for these

banks and also because the loan agreements among the

banks and Grant provide for the sharing of obligations and

recoveries on the loans to Grant.

2. Federal securities and state common law claims

asserted against a number of defendants, including certain

43a

officers and directors of Grant and Grant’s auditors, are

not involved in the settlement. In addition, claims against

Mr. Peterkin that do not relate to insider trading (Count

III of the consolidated amended complaint) are not includ-

ed in the settlement. Finally, the settlement does not affect

claims against Chase Manhattan as Indenture Trustee for

Grant’s 4%% Debentures, see note 8, infra, or claims

asserted in Grant’s bankruptcy proceedings on behalf of

present debenture holders.

3. This was deposited in an interest-bearing account

and by the date of oral argument had increased to approx-

imately $3.5 million.

4. For example, the banks agreed to the granting of a

senior security interest to Grant’s vendors in early 1975,

extended the maturity of the revolving credit agreement

from June 2, 1975, to March 31, 1976, permitted the early

repayment of loans due to a number of small banks, and

subordinated payments of $300,000,000 of the outstanding

bank loans to the payment of Grant’s vendors. The last ac-

tion was taken less than a month before Grant filed its

Chapter XI petition. Naturally the objectors place a quite

different interpretation upon those actions.

5. The Bankruptcy Court defined equitable subordina-

tion as requiring proof that ‘‘the claimant sought to be

subordinated (a) has acted in a fiduciary capacity; (b) has

breached a fiduciary duty; [and] (c) that breach resulted in

detriment to those claimants to whom a duty was owed,”’

In re W. T Grant Co., 4 B.R. 53, 74 (Bkrtcy. N.Y. 1980). See

Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07, 60 S.Ct. 238, 245, 84

L.Ed. 281 (1939) (‘‘The essence of the [equitable subordina-

tion] test is whether or not under all the circumstances the

transaction carries the earmarks of an arm’s length

bargain.’’)

444

6. The trustee was assisted by the law firm of Weil,

Gotshal & Manges and the accounting firm of Price

Waterhouse & Co.

7. On March 20, 1976, Bankruptcy Judge Galgay

ordered that various of Grant’s business records be

preserved and made available to counsel for the plaintiffs

below; Grant’s employees also were enjoined from dispos-

ing of or destroying any of these documents.

8. These were holders of Grant’s 4%4% convertible

subordinated debentures due 1996 ($92,507,000 face

amount outstanding) and 4% convertible subordinated

debentures due 1990 ($834,000 face amount outstanding).

The settlement covered only claims of persons then

holding the debentures.

9. Judge Duffy later extended the deadline for opting

out as to states represented by Mr. Brewer whose pension

funds had invested in Grant securities, but not as to other

class members, until February 16, 1981.

10. In addition to the January 19 motion, a letter by

Mr. Brewer to Judge Duffy dated September 16, 1980,

with copies to counsel for the plaintiffs and for the defen-

dants in the Weinberger action, clearly raised the objec-

tions as to the inclusion of state law claims not previously

pleaded and as to the making of class determination only

as incident to a settlement considered below. Objections

which have been brought to the attention of the court and

of counsel for proponents of a settlement by counsel for ob-

jectors should not be disregarded simply because they do

not precisely comply with the procedures for the filing of

individual objections specified in the notice of settlement.

See 3 Newberg, Class Action §5660d (1977). In passing on

settlements of class actions under F.R.Civ.P. 23 the judge

should not regard himself as an umpire in typical adver-

sary litigation. He sits also as a guardian for class

members who have not received a notice or who lack the in-

45a

tellectual or financial resources to press objections, Na-

tional Super Spuds v. New York Mercantile Exchange, 660

F.2d 9, 20 (2nd Cir. 1981) (citing cases); Mandujano v. Basic

Vegetable Products, Inc., 541 F.2d 832, 834-36 (9 Cir.

1976). Here the judge evidently did consider all the objec-

tions, see 91 F.R.D. at 495 n.4 and the February 6 order,

although erroneously believing he was not required to do

so and accordingly not discussing many of them or doing

so only conclusorily.

11. Appellants also argue that the notice was defective

because it did not state what proportion of the class’s total

loss the settlement fund represented. Appellees meet this

by noting that any estimate as to class losses—much less

individual losses—would have been highly speculative and

more likely to hinder informed decision-making by class

members than advance it.

12. The Second Amended Complaint in Lewy served in

March, 1979, named only Chase Manhattan, Morgan

Guaranty and Citibank as defendants. The complaint,

which relies on factual allegations almost identical to those

in the consolidated amended complaint, asserts that the

defendants “‘exercised dominance and control over the

board of directors and management of Grant’”’ 99. In addi-

tion, the complaint alleges that the defendants

‘‘conceal[ed] negative facts concerning the financial condi-

tion and unlawful mismanagement of Grant’’ thus effec-

ting a manipulation of the securities market. 911. The com-

plaint goes on to describe numerous acts allegedly commit-

ted in furtherance of defendants’ conspiracy, dwelling prin-

cipally upon those set out in the Weinberger/Panzirer

papers. Like the consolidated amended complaint, the

Lewy complaint asserts causes of action based on common

law fraud, 91, and on breach of fiduciary duties, 791, 31. So

far as we can tell, the Lewy action would require proof of

fault identical to what would be demanded in the

Weinberger/Panzirer cases.

46u

13. Appellants also allege that the notice was

“substantially incorrect and seriously isleading’’ in a

number of respects, Appellants’ Br. in No. 81-7829, at

19-21. The defects cited by appellants either do not ex-

ist—owing to misreadings by appellants’ counsel of the

notice or other publicly filed documents—or are im-

material.

14. The subsection provides, in pertinent part, that

In any class action maintained under subdivision

(b)(3), the court shall direct to the members of the class

the best notice practicable under the circumstances,

including individual notice to all members who can be

identified through reasonable effort.

15. Our holding regarding pendent party

jurisdiction is also limited to the peculiar ‘alignment of

parties and claims” involved here, namely, the joinder of

plaintiffs in a settlement of an action involving Rule 10b-5

and state law claims. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug

Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 44 L.Ed. 2d 539 might

be read as discerning a congressional intent to preclude the

joinder of mere holders of securities in Rule 10b-5 cases in

federal court, because of a desire to prevent disruption of

the nation’s businesses and to reduce vexatious litigation,

421 U.S. at 739-49, 95 S.Ct. at 1927-31. Whatever the

strength of this argument as to claims that are proceeding

to litigation, it surely is inapplicable when, as here, exten-

sion of pendent party jurisdiction permits the comprehen-

sive settlement of plaintiffs’ claims, thus furthering the

policies underlying Blue Chip Stamps. We need not now

decide how Blue Chip Stamps would affect the assertion of

pendent plaintiff jurisdiction in a case not involving a set-

tlement.

47a

16. Cf, Rader v. Boyd, 252 F.2d 585, 587 (10 Cir. 1958)

(‘Parties may assuredly deal at arm’s length for their

mutual benefit without raising a confidential relationship

between them.’’) In passing on a settlement we are “not

to...resolve unsettled legal questions,’’ Carson uv.

American Brands Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n.14, 101 S.Ct. 993,

998 n. 14, 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), which a theory of recovery

based on breach of fiduciary duty by the lenders surely

would be.

48a

RULE 23 FRCP

Rule 23. Class Actions.

(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more

members of a class may sue or be sued as represen-

tative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so

numerous that joinder of all members is imprac-

ticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common

to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the represen-

tative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of

the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly

and adequately protect the interests of the class.

(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be

maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of

subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:

(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or

against individual members of the class would create

a risk of

(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications

with respect to individual members of the class

which would establish incompatible standards of

conduct for the party opposing the class, or

(B) adjudications with respect to individual

members of the class which would as a practical

matter be dispositive of the interests of the other

members not parties to the adjudications or

substantially impair or impede their ability to

protect their interests; or

(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refus-

ed to act on grounds generally applicable to the class,

49u

thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or

corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the

class as a whole; or

(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact

common to the members of the class predominate over

any questions affecting only individual members, and

that a class action is superior to other available

methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the

controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings in-

clude: (A) the interest of members of the class in in-

dividually controlling the prosecution or defense of

separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any

litigation concerning the controversy already com-

menced by or against members of the class; (C) the

desirability or undesirability of concentrating the

litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the

difficulties likely to be encountered in the manage-

ment of a class action.

(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action

to Be Maintained; Notice; Judgment; Actions Con-

ducted Partially as Class Actions.

(1) As soon as practicable after the commence-

ment of an action brought as a class action, the court

shall determine by order whether it is to be so main-

tained. An order under this subdivision may be condi-

tional, and may be altered or amended before the deci-

sion on the merits.

(2) In any class action maintained under subdivi-

sion (b)(3), the court shall direct to the members of the

class the best notice practicable under the cir-

cumstances, including individual notice to all

members who can be identified through reasonable ef-

50u

fort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the

court will exclude him from the class if he so requests

by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether

favorable or not, will include all members who do not

request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not

request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an ap-

pearance through his counsel.

(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a

class action under subdivision (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether

or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe

those whom the court finds to be members of the

class. The judgment in an action maintained as a class

action under subdivision (b)(3), whether or not

favorable to the class, shall include and specify or

describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivi-

sion (c)(2) was directed, and who have not requested

exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of

the class.

(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be

brought or maintained as a class action with respect

to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into

subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and

the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and

applied accordingly.

(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct

of actions to which this rule applies, the court may

make appropriate orders: (1) determining the course of

proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue

repetition or complication in the presentation of

evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection

of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair

conduct of the action, that notice be given in such

manner as the court may direct to some or all of the

5la

members of any step in the action, or of the proposed

extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of

members to signify whether they consider the

representation fair and adequate, to intervene and

present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into

the action; (3) imposing conditions on the represen-

tative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the

pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allega-

tions as to representation of absent persons, and that

the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with

similar procedural matters. The orders may be com-

bined with an order under Rule 16, and may be altered

or amended as may be desirable from time to time.

(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall

not be dismissed or compromised without the ap-

proval of the court, and notice of the proposed

dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members

of the class in such manner as the court directs.

52a

DOCKET ENTRIES IN U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

4/28/81—Copies of docket entries and notice of appeal

on behalf of Brewer & Soeiro filed.

5/8/81—Copy of receipt of payment of docketing fee on

behalf of Brewer & Soeiro filed.

5/8/81—Appellant Brewer & Soeiro Form C, pfs filed.

5/8/81—Appellant Brewer & Soeiro Form D, pfs filed.

5/12/81—Scheduling Order No. 1, PC filed.

6/1/81—Order withdrawing the appeal of Brewer &

Soeiro and such motions, if any now pending without

costs and without attorney’s fees and without pre-

judice to whatever rights appellant has under law to

appeal after entry of final judgment, filed. (JON). (on

consent).

6/1/82—Issued certified copy of order withdrawing the

appeal, etc.

6/9/81—Receipt of certified copy of order withdrawing

the appeal received.

1/15/82—Record on appeal filed [& in 81-7629,

81-7827, & 81-7829].

1/20/82—Appellants Brewer & Soeiro notice of

reinstatement of the appeal filed.

2/8/82—Scheduling Order No. 2 filed; further ordered

that Appeals Docket Nos. 81-7827, 81-7829, 81-7629 &

81-7317 be and are hereby consolidated filed [& in

81-7827, 81-7829, 81-7629]

53a

2/9/82—Supplemental record on appeal filed [copies of

original papers filed in district court]

2/9/82— Appellants Coyne, Collins & 580 other named

appellants brief filed [w/pfs] [& in 81-7827]

2/9/82—Appellants Lewy, Anderson, Barrie, Pine

Lapham, Garson, Howe, Barnes & Johnson and

Jurkiewicz brief filed [w/pfs]

2/9/82—Appellants Coyne, et al. joint appendix filed

[w/pfs] [Volume I]

2/9/82—Appellants Coyne, et al. joint appendix filed

[w/pfs] [Volume IT]

3/3/82—Order granted, Appellants Coyne, et al. mo-

tion for leave to supplement the record on appeal with

office copies of certain documents filed [LWP, CJ] [en-

dorsed on motion for 1-29-82 filed in 81-7827]

3/8/82—Appellees Kendrick, et al., brief filed [w/pfs]

3/8/82— Appellees Weinberger, et al. brief filed [w/pfs]

3/22/82—Appellants Coyne, et al., reply brief filed

[w/pfs] [& in 81-7827]

3/26/82—Appellants Coyne, Collins, et al., motion for

an order adjourning the argument of this appeal filed;

Appellants Coyne, Collins, et al., motion for an order

consolidating this appeal with an appeal being taken

from the S.D.N.Y. concerning the underlying

bankruptcy proceeding filed [w/pfs] [& in 81-7827]

54a

3/30/82—Appellees Weinberger, et al. affidavit in op-

position to motion to delay this appeal filed [w/pfs]

3/31/82— Appellees Kendrick, et al. affidavit in opposi-

tion to motion for modification of order entered by

staff counsel and for consolidation with proposed ap-

peal in Cosoff v. Rodman filed [w/pfs]

4/1/82—Order denied, Appellants Coyne, Collins, et

al., motion for an order adjourning the argument of

this appeal filed; Order denied, Appellants Coyne, Col-

lins, et al., motion for an order consolidating this ap-

peal with an appeal being taken from the S.D.N.Y.

concerning the underlying bankruptcy proceeding fil-

ed [TJM, CJ] [endorsed on motion of 3-26-82]

4/19/82—Case argued before: Waterman, Friendly &

Meskill, CJJ

4/19/82—Appellant Lewy reply brief filed [w/pfs]

[handed up in open court]

6/23/82—Second supplemental record on appeal filed

(original papers of district court) (pursuant to Court’s

Request)

7/14/82—Order approving settlement affirmed; order

awarding $1,800 in attorneys’ fees against one of ob-

jectors’ counsel reversed by published, signed opinion

filed [HJF, CJ] [& in 81-7629, 81-7827 & 81-7828.

7/14/82—Judgment filed [& in 81-7629, 81-7827 &

81-7829]

55a

7/27/82— Appellants Lewy, et al. petition for rehearing

with suggestion for rehearing in banc filed [w/pfs]

7/29/82— Appellants Coyne, Collins & 580 other nam-

ed appellants motion for leave to file a petition for

rehearing with suggestion for rehearing in banc one

day out of time filed [w/pfs] [& in 81-7827]

7/29/82— Appellants Coyne, Collins & 580 other nam-

ed appellants petition for rehearing with suggestion

for rehearing in banc received [& in 81-7827] (granted;

8/27/82; see motion, HJF)

8/27/82—Appellants Coyne, Collins & 580, etc. peti-

tion for rehearing with a suggestion for rehearing en

banc filed, pfs.

9/1/82—Appellants Lewy et al. motion to file sup-

plemental Petition for Reconsideration and sugges-

tion for rehearing en banc, pfs filed. (Granted)

9/1/8.1—Appellants Lewy, et al petition for rehearing

received.

9/10/82—Order on petitions for reconsideration; ap-

pellees are directed to file within 14 days a response to

both petitions for rehearing. This shall include all

issues raised in the petitions and should consider

whether we ought not at least to direct the mandate

be deferred until argument and decision of the appeal

in the bankruptcy case and that that appeal should be

heard before this panel.

9/10/82—Appellant Lewy supplemental petition for

rehearing with suggestion for rehearing in banc filed

(per 9/10/82 order)

564

9/10/82—Corrected order on petitions for reconsidera-

tion, etc., filed.

9/24/82—Appellant Weinberger response to petition

for rehearing filed, pfs

9/24/82—Appellees J.P. Morgan et ano ‘appendix to

response to petition for rehearing filed, pfs.

10/1/82—Order on petitions for reconsideration: Ap-

pellees in 81-7317, et al. having filed responses to the

petitions for reconsideration as directed by our order

of 9-10-82, it is order that: Oral arguement 8n docket

nos. 82-5019 and 82-5023 shall be heard on November

9, 1982 at 2:00 p.m. before Judges Watreman, Friend-

ly and Meskill. One half hour is allotted to each side,

to be divided as counsel may agree; Counsel in the

Weinberger appeals are directed to be present at the

time of the foregoing argument in order to be

available for any questions which the court may desire

to ask; The mandate in the Weinberger appeals shall

continue to be stayed pending the further order of this

court. (HJF, TJM)

10/14/82—Appellant Coyne motion for leave to file a

reply to reargument statements, pfs filed (order en-

dorsed: 10/14/82 granted; TJM)

10/14/82—Appellee Weinberger affidavit in opposition

to motion to appellant’s motion pfs filed.

10/14/82—Appellants Coyne, Collins, et al., reply

statement filed.

10/18/82—Appellant Lewy motion for leave to file rep-

ly statement to statements of appellees filed in con-

57a

nection with petitions for reargument and en banc

suggestion filed by appellants, pfs filed (order endors-

ed: 10/18/82 granted)

10/18/82—Appellant Lewy, et al., reply statement, pfs

filed

1/26/83—Petitions for rehearing are thus granted in-

sofar as concerns the correction of the factual state-

ment but are otherwise denied, Published Signed Opi-

non.

2/22/83—Order denying Appellant Lewy petition for

rehearing with suggestion for rehearing en banc, filed.

(clerk)

3/2/83—Mandate Issued (Opinion, Judgment)

58a

OPINION OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF

NEW YORK APPROVING THE PROPOSED SET-

TLEMENT OBJECTED TO BY PETITIONERS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

WILLIAM B. WEINBERGER, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

-against-

JAMES C. KENDRICK, et al.,

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:

WOLF POPPER ROSS WOLF & JONES

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

845 Third Avenue

New York, New York 10022

Of Counsel: Lester L. Levy, Esq.

-and-

WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER

FREEMAN & HERZ

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

270 Madison Avenue

New York, New York 10016

Of Counsel: Daniel W. Krasner, Esq.

DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL

Attorneys for Defendant

Morgan Guaranty Trust Company

59a

of New York

1 Chase Manhattan Plaza

New York, New York 10005

Of Counsel: Philip C. Potter, Jr.

Ogden N. Lewis, Esq.

Laureen F. Bedell, Esq.

SHEARMAN & STERLING

Attorneys for Defendant

Citibank, N.A.

53 Wall Street

New York, New York 10005

MILBANK TWEED HADLEY & McCLOY

Attorneys for Defendant

The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.

1 Chase Manhattan Plaza

New York, New York 10005

HERTZOG CALAMARI & GLEASON,

Of Counsel to

Cravath Swaine & Moore

Attorneys for Defendants

Chemical Bank, Irving Trust Company,

Marine Midland Bank and Bankers Trust Company

100 Park Avenue

New York, New York 10017

SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT

Attorneys for Defendant

Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company

One Battery Park Plaza

New York, New York 10004

60a

EMMET MARVIN & MARTIN

Attorneys for Defendant

The Bank of New York

48 Wall Street

New York, New York 10005

KEVIN THOMAS, D.J.:

On October 2, 1975, the W.T. Grant Company

[(““Grant’’] filed a petition for bankruptcy under

Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. The next day cer-

tain purchasers of Grant securities instituted this

class action claiming, inter alia, that defendant banks,

[the ‘‘Banks’’] and Morgan Guaranty, its corporate

parent, J.P. Morgan & Co., Inc., and its former Vice-

Chairman DeWitt Peterkin violated Section 10 of the

Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5

thereunder.

In essence, plaintiffs claimed that the Banks par-

ticipated in a scheme to conceal from purchasers of

Grant securities the allegedly far worse financial con-

dition of Grant than was revealed to the investing

public. Plaintiffs also asserted that Morgan Guaran-

ty’s Trust and Investment Division sold substantial

holdings of Grant common stock on material inside in-

formation supplied by Mr. Peterkin.

The parties to this case have now reached a settle-

ment [the ‘‘Settlement’’] with respect to these claims

and hereby submit it to this court for approval in ac-

cordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. The proposed Settle-

ment, in short, settles the fraud claims of purchasers

and holders’ of Grant securities against the Banks for

alleged violations of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5

thereunder, as well as alleged violations of state

6la

statutory law and common law fraud.” The Settlement

also settles class members’ insider trading claims

against Morgan Guaranty, its corporate parent, J.P.

Morgan & Co., Inc., and Mr. Peterkin.

The Settlement provides that the Banks pay

$2,840,000 in settlement of these claims. This sum has

been deposited by the Banks into an escrow account.

Notice of the class action determination, the pro-

posed Settlement and dismissal of certain claims

against the settling defendants was mailed in early

December, 1980 to all persons who purchased or held

Grant securities during the class period. Notice of the

Settlement also was published in The Wall Street

Journal.

Class members were also notifed about the hear-

ing on the fairness of the proposed Settlement

scheduled for February 18, 1981. Deadlines were set

for class members to object to the terms of the Settle-

ment or to exclude themselves from the Settlement.

Proof of claim forms were included with the notice.

No objections to the Settlement were timely

filed.* The fairness hearing was held on February 18,

1981. At the hearing, certain plaintiffs’ attorneys at-

tempted to file late objections and asked the court to

waive the deadline for filing such objections. This re-

quest was denied.

The rest of the parties present at the hearing sub-

mitted papers in support of the Settlement. I reserved

judgment.

62a

Discussion

Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides that a class action ‘‘shall not be dismissed or

compromised without approval of the court.”’ If fair,

reasonable and adequate, however, the settlement of a

class action should be approved. City of Detroit v.

Grinnell Corp., 356 F. Supp. 1380 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in

part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 405 F.2d 448 (2d

Cir. 1974).

In deciding whether a settlement is fair, the court

must determine (i) whether the settlement was

negotiated at arms length and in good faith; (ii) the

probabilities of plaintiff’s ultimate success or failure if

settlement is not achieved; and (iii) the reasonableness

of the amount offered in settlement.

The Settlement in this case satisfies each of these

criteria. There is no indication that the Settlement

was handled in a collusive manner. The settlement

negotiations took place over a period of many months

and were conducted by able and experienced counsel

who are respected members of the bar of this court. I

am confident that plaintiffs’ attorneys have

represented the class adequately and would not enter

into any settlement agreement which would jeopar-

dize the interests of the class.

Moreover, the decision to settle this case was bas-

ed on extensive discovery conducted in connection

with this case and in the related bankruptcy pro-

ceedings.’ Counsel for all parties had full access to the

record in this case and the bankruptcy record. I am

satisfied, therefore, that the parties were fully able to

evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the class

63a

claims against the defendants. In view of the findings

of fact and conclusions of law entered by Bankruptcy

Judge Galgay and the difficulties of proof present in

this case, plaintiffs’ conclusion that their chances of

prevailing were slim was by no means an unreasonable

one.

I also find that the sum offered in settlement by

the defendants is fair considering the likelihood of

plaintiffs’ success on the merits. Plaintiffs’ position

with respect to each claim in this case is not so strong

that settlement should be lightly rejected. Plaintiffs’

claims against the defendants are complex and not

easily proven. Indeed, plaintiffs have heavy burdens

of proof with respect to each claim and the establish-

ment of damages. Furthermore, the defendants have

asserted vigorous defenses to each claim. Should the

case proceed to trial, lengthy and costly litigation can

be expected.

The reasonableness of the Settlement is further

supported by the fact that the majority of counsel for

the class members is recommending the acceptance of

this Settlement. See Philadelphia Housing Authority

vu. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 322

F. supp. 834, 838 (E.D. Penn. 1971), aff'd in part and

modified in part, 435 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1971). Finally, no

objections to the Settlement have been filed by any

members of the class.

In view of the difficulties plaintiffs would con-

front if this case went to trial, the recommendation of

experienced counsei and the lack of individual objec-

tions to the Settlement, I find that the sum offered by

the defendants is acceptable.

64a

Accordingly, I hereby approve the Settlement as

fair and reasonable. The claims against the settling

defendants are dismissed with prejudice in accordance

with the terms of the Settlement.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: New York, New York

August 13, 1981

s/Kevin Thomas Duffy, U.S.D.J.

KEVIN THOMAS DUFFY, U.S.D.J.

FOOTNOTES

1. On July 29, 1980, I entered an order with respect to

the class action determination and the hearing on the pro-

posed settlement in this case. That order provided that the

class was amended to include not only those persons who

purchased but also those who held Grant securities during

the period March 1, 1973 to October 2, 1975 inclusive.

2. On July 28, 1980, I approved the consolidation of

Weinberger v. Kendrick, 75 Civ. 4870 (KTD) with Panzirer

v. Peterkin, 77 Civ. 3462 (KTD). I also approved the filing

of a consolidated amended complaint. That complaint in-

cluded, in addition to the original claims, pendent state

claims for breach of fiduciary duty.

3. The order filed on July 29, 1980, see note 1, supra, re-

quired class members who did not wish to be bound by the

Settlement to request exclusion in writing from the Settle-

ment not less than 25 days pricr to the fairness hearing on

February 18, 1981. Class members who did not wish to be

excluded from the Settlement but wanted to file objections

to it were required by the July 24, 1980 order to file them at

least 14 days prior to the fairness hearing.

65a

4. Certain plaintiffs’ attorneys have attempted to file

late objections. Not only were these objections late, they

were also without merit. I, therefore, reaffirm my denial of

the late filing of these objections.

5. In re W. T. Grant Company, Bankruptcy No. 75 B

1735.

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