Joint Appendix — United States v. SA Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense
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Office Supreme Court, U
F I
Nos. 82-1349 and 82-1350 .ee
In the Supreme Court of the Anited
OCTOBER TERM, 1983
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONE”
v.
S. A. EMPRESA DE VIACAO AEREA RIO GRANDENSE
(VARIG AIRLINES)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER
v.
EMMA ROSA MASCHER, ET AL.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER
v.
UNITED SCOTTISH INSURANCE CO., ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
NINTH CIRCUIT
JOINT APPENDIX
PHILLIP D. Bostwick, Esg.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge
1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 822-1000
ROBERT R. SMILEY, III, Esa. Rex E. LEE
Smiley, Olson & Gilman Solicitor General
1815 H Street, N.W., Suite 600 Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20006 Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 466-5100 (202) 633-2217
RICHARD F. Gerry, Esq. Counsel for Petitioners
110 Laurel Street
San Diego, California 92101
(819) 238-1811
Counsel for Respondents
a ae aD
PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI FILED
FEBRUARY 10, 1983
CERTIORARI GRANTED MAY 16, 1983
TABLE OF CONTENTS *
United States of America v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao
Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines); United States of
America v. Emma Rosa Mascher, et al., Supreme Court
No. 82-1349
Page
1. District court docket entries (Varig and
ED avis belo tan 6osssceees ce ehenaaen’ 1
2. Varig’s First Amended Complaint for Money
PE avetccnes ees ciuustewebssboueeuaer 16
8. Answer of Defendant, United States of Amer-
ica, to Varig’s First Amended Complaint .... 23
4. Complaint of Emma Rosa Mascher, et al. ...... 27
5. Answer of Defendant, United States of Amer-
ica, to Mascher Complaint .................. 39
6. First Amended Complaint of Emma Rosa
Sse sevastiiaesdeced bicnnceavare cs 45
7. Report of French Board of Inquiry ............ 49
Ey a A UD BOUND b ccdcvccsccccscaccss 99
Pe RE BA IIE orev bdceccccvcsenaccvs 101
10. Civil Air Regulation 4b.381(d) (1953) .......... 107
11. NTSB Safety Recommendations A-73-67 thru
Pubic sige ane on 545049 Moemashenenounebeuni 108
12. FAA Response to NTSB Safety Recommenda-
tions A-73-67 through A-73-70 .............. 110
18. FAA Airworthiness Directive 74-08-09 ........ 113
14. FAA Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Air-
worthiness Directive 74-21-63............... 115
15. Pretrial (excerpts) Deposition of Rudolf
DEED vnc cbdsoecasovecbobnokssdcdsaiens 118
*The opinions of the district court and the court of appeals are printed
in the appendices to the petitions for writs of certiorari and have not
been reproduced. Paragraph 17 of the district court's findings of fact
and conclusions of law (82-1349 Pet. App. 10a) was inadvertently in-
cluded. The district court struck that paragraph from the govern-
ment’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
(1)
(11)
Page
16. Pretrial (excerpts) Deposition of Richard Nel-
GO cauine cobiosicisteceneveckeeevisbansdae se 128
17. Pretrial (excerpts) Deposition of Rocco Lippis.. 1384
18. Pretrial (excerpts) Deposition of Rolland
es wkscakedpedsccsculivadtouaanes 142
19. Pretrial (excerpts) Deposition of Jack Bulmer .. 142
20. Pretrial (excerpts) Deposition of Harold Tanke. 143
21. Record of Visit to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil of
INS tina sa. cchuce bowers satin Ores i44
22. Affidavit of Frederico Ritter ...... fee rr Pe 149
23. Checklist—“Interior Arrangements,” dated
BN Ti ak aided hac dee kms ae camenas eran 154
24. FAA Type Certificate Number 4A26 .......... 156
25. Varig’s Motion to Strike the Affidavits of Cecile
Hatfield and Melvin Craig Beard............ 157
United States of America v. United Scottish Insurance
Co., et al., Supreme Court No. 82-1350
1. District court docket entries ................05: 161
2. Complaints and Answers in each of the five con-
SED hig. ctnrccodcvesecnessumeuaas 171
3. Findings of fact and conclusions of law, dated
ee ee 205
4. Judgment after trial, entered March 26,1976 ... 212
5. Transcript of hearing, June 10, 1980, pages 3-58. 214
6. Transcript of hearing, September 19, 1980, pages
BEE Cs dhe viv daacaehs aca iveneten teal 250
7. Transcript of original trial: .................46. 275
a. pages 415-451 (Jan. 30, 1975)............ 275
b. pages 883-884 (Feb. 5, 1975) ............ 297
c. page 899 (Feb. 6, 1975) ................. 298
d. pages 908-909 (Feb. 6, 1975) ............ 298
e. pages 912-917 (Feb. 6, 1975) ............ 300
f. pages 1430-1432 (Mar. 13, 1975) ......... 304
g. pages 2460-2474 (Apr. 2, 1975) .......... 306
(III)
Order allowing certiorari No. 82-1349
Order allowing certiorari No. 82-1350
“eee eee enenenne
Relevant Docket Entries
CV76-187-WPG
S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense vs USA
Date
1/16/76
2/3/76
2-9-76
3-8-76
3-11-76
3-19-76
3-25-76
4-2-76
4-23-78
Mar.31
NR.
nm
jmn
jmn
mn
jmr
jmr
lw
mn
mn
nm
Proceedings
Fld Complt. Issd summs.
Fld Req & ORD for serv of process by other
than USM, naming Gary C. Kuist.
Fld pltf Varig Airlines, note of chg of address
of ens.
Fld pltfs Varig Airlings note of tkg depos of
Rudolph Kapustin on 2/11/76 at 9:30AM.
Fld ORD (R for RJK) (WPG) dtd 2-4-76
transfng actn to the calendar of Judge Wil-
liam P. Gray for all fur procdngs. Attnys
notified.
Fld deft’s ANSWER to complaint.
LODGED deft’s proposed ord of transfer of
action.
Fld ORD(WPG) transfering action to USDC
Western District of Washington. Mid cpys
to prties & notfd prties. ce to elk civil.
(ENT 3/19/76)
Mld to USDC, W/D of Washington, ce Ord of
Transf, cc docket and all original docs ex-
cept Ord of Transf which is retained. Attny
notified.
Rec'd from USDC, W/D of Washington, copy
of transmittal letter. Given case no.
C76-232M.
Rec’d from USDC, W/D of Washington, their
file on Case #C76-232M. Fld each of the fol-
lowing documents.
Filed Varig’s notice of depositions of Prater
Hogue, Hall Piper, The BOEING officer
charged with the duty of obtaining a Type
Certificate for BOEING 707 aircraft, The
BOEING officer charged with duty of de-
signing and obtaining certification of lavato-
ries of BOEING 707 aircraft.
Apr.13
Apr. 16
Apr.30
May 5
May 27
Jul 6 10
11
Jul 22 lla
1lb
lle
Jul 27 12
12a
2
Filed Joinder of United States in Boeing’s mo-
tion for appointment of Master an’ Motion of
United States to vacate notice of . eposition
Ent. order continuing on stipulation Deft.
Boeing’s motion to appoint Special Master to
4/30/76. Deft. Boeing & Weber’s motion to
limit terminate or limit deposition of
Rudolph Kapustin denied. Order to be
signed.
Ent. Order, granting Defendant’s Boeing’s mo-
tion for appointment of Special Master. Or-
der to be signed.
Filed Affidavit of Mark A. Dombroff in re-
sponse to: (1) Varig’s opposition to Boeing’s
motion for appointment of a special master:
and (2) Varig’s motion to apply the provi-
sions of the manual for complex and multi-
district litigation to these cases and for an
order setting a first principal pretrial confer-
ence, a schedule for the first waiver of dis-
covery and establishing a document deposi-
tory and statement of reasons in support.
See C76-169M for filing of deposition of Rudolf
Kapustin
Filed letter approved by Court for service of
Special Master at amount of $272.60 to May
31, 1976.
Filed letter approved by Court for service of
Special Master at amount of $942.50 for June
1, 1976 to June 30, 1976.
Govt. motion to dismiss, noticeof hearing Aug. -
13, affidavitof Mark Dombroff and memoran-
dum filed.
Filed Stipulation rescheduling government’s
motion to dismiss for 9/24/76 from 8/13/76
and Varig’s opposition papers to be filed no
later than 9/20/76, at 4:30 P.M. Counsel
notified. ’
Filed Renotice of Motion of U.S. of A. to
11/5/76
”
-
Aug. 2
Aug. 2
Aug. 3
Sep. 10
Sep 10
Sep 20
Sep 23
Oct 4
Oct 4
Oct 8
Oct 15
Oct 19
13
14
15
3
Filed Responses to Varig’s modified Interrogs
by Weber Aircraft Corp. First Set, see
C76-169M for documents
Filed Varig’s interrogs to deft. Boeing (Sec-
ond Set) and answers thereto
Filed Boeing’s responses to Varig’s fourth set
of request for documents -see C 76-169 for
documents
Filed Motion of Weber Aircraft to Compel
Varig Airlines to Produce Documents, and
to Strike Objections; Affidavit of Joseph E.
Gregorich and Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support Thereof
Filed Motion of Weber Aircraft to Compel
Varig Airlines to Respond to Interrogato-
ries, and to Strike Objections (Second Set);
Affidavit of Joseph E. Gregorich and Memo-
randum of Points and Authorities in Sup-
port Thereof
Filed Motion of Weber Aircraft to Compel
Varig Aircraft to Compel Varig Airlines to
Respond to Intorrogatories, and to Strike
Objections
(First Set) Affidavit of Joseph E. Gregorich
and Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Support Thereof.
Filed Varig’s Memorandum of Points nd Au-
thorities in Opposition to Government’s Mo-
tion to Dismiss
Ent. order continuing def’s motion to dismiss
to 9:30 a.m. 10/8/76 Mr. Dombroff to notify
counsel and Clerk has notified Mr. Smith.
Filed United States’ Memorandum in Reply to
Points and Authorities Filed by Varig in
Opposition to Government’s Motion to
Dismiss
Filed Varig’s Rebuttal to United States Mem-
orandum in Reply to Points and Authorities
filed by Varig in Opposition to Govern-
ment’s Motion to Dismiss
Def.’s motion to dismiss continued to 10/15/76
Motion to dismiss continued to 10/19/76
Def.’s motion to dismiss under advisement.
Oct 21
Dec. 8
Dec. 27
1977
Jan. 6
Jan. 14
Jan. 31
Feb. 22
Mar. 9
Mar. 18
4
Filed Order (entered 10/22) denying Plaintiff's
motion for a continuance of defendant’s Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment. Copy to
counsel.
Filed and entered Order Denying Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss. Copy to counsel.
Filed Varig’s Memorandum of Points and Au-
thorities in Opposition to the United States’
Motion for a Protective Order,
Filed United States of America’s Memoran-
dum in Support of Motion to Vacate and to
Establish a Consolidated Discovery
Schedule
Filed United States of America’s Memoran-
dum in reply to Varig’s Opposition to the
United States Motion for Protective Order
Filed Varig’s Reply Memorandum in Opposi-
tion to the Government’s Motion for a Pro-
tective Order
Filed Varig’s Motion to Vacate Order of Ref-
erence and to Retransfer to the Centra!
District of California
Filed Varig’s Memorandum of Points and Au-
thorities in Support of its Motion to Vacate
Order of Reference and to Retransfer Case
to Central District of California
Filed Affidavit of Phillip D. Bostwick and Ap-
pendix in Support of Varig’s Motion to
Retransfer
Filed Notice of Motion to Vacate Order of
Reference and to Retransfer to the Central
District of California for 3/4/77
Filed United States of America’s Affidavit in
opposition to Varig’s Motion to Vacate Or-
der of Reference and to Retransfer case to
the Central District of California
Filed Affadavit of Jonathan Howe, Regional
Counsel, Northwest Region, Federal Avia-
tion Administration
Filed Reply Memorandum and appendix in
Support of Varig’s Motion to Vacate Order
of reference and to retransfer
1978
Jan. 20
1/23/78 nm
3/27/78 sam
8/11/78 rlb
8/24/78 aj
9-8-78 re
9/11/78 rlb
9-19-78 ke
9-20-78 ke
10/12/78 lb
5
Plaintiff's motions to vacate order of reference
and retransfer under advisement.
Filed Order retransferring case to the Central
District of California and vacating orders of
5/5/76 and 5/19/76 referring case to George
Bovingdon as Special Master. Copy to
counsel.
Fld ce Ord of Transf, cc docket, & ltr of
transf. Attys notified. Md re-opening 33.
Fld deft Weber resp to plitfs req for prod of
documents 2nd set.
34. Fld Varig’s nte of mot, rtnble 9/25/78 at
10am, for consolidation.
35. Fld Varig’s memo of P/As In suppt of mot
to consolidate.
36. Fld USA respnse to Varig’s mtn for
consoldiation.
37. Fld pltfs note of mtn & mtn for order
compelling discovery: retnbl 9-25-78
38. Fld pltf's Memo of P&A in support of mtn
to compel discovery.
39. Fld stip & ORD (1H for WPG) re dsevry.
40. Fld pltf Variz Airlines’ memo & affid in
oppstn to United States’ motn for
consolidation.
41. Fld pltf Varig Airlines’ note of depos of
Donald Swett on 4-17-78, John V__ on
4-19-78, Robert Rotberg on 4-20-78, Victor
Bassotti on 4-24-78, J. Turr on 4-26-78, &
Pat Vaughn on 4-27-78.
42. Fld pltf Varig Airlines’ certif of ens! in
compliance w/Loc Rule 3(L).
43. Fld pltf Varig’s memo of P&A in supp of
mot to strike Kidde’s 4th affirmatv defense.
44. Fld pltf Varig’s note of mot & mot to
strike 4th affirmatv defense retnbl 10/30/78
10AM. ;
45. Fld plitf Varig’s note of mot & mot to
strike deft USA’s lst & 2nd defenses retnbl
10/30/78 10AM.
46. Fld pitf Varig’s memo of P&A in supp of
mot to strike USA's defenses.
10-23-78
10-23-78
10-25-78
10-26-78
11/14/78
12/8/78
12/13/78
12/15/78
6/15/79
ke
ke
ke
ke
lb
Pg
Pg
Pg
6
47. Fld pltf Varig’s note of mot & mot to strike
kidde’s 4th defense or in the for an ord
revising the s/j ord of 1/14/77 w/ affid in
supp.
48. Fld pltf VARIG Airlines’ note of motn &
motn for cont of Kidde’s motn for & affid in
support retble 10-30-78.
49. Fld pltf VARIG Airlines’ affid of Phillip D.
Bostwick in support of motn to strike deft
Kidde’s 4th affirmative defense.
50. Fld plt VARIG Airlines’ memo of P/A’s in
support of VARIG’s motn for cont Kidde’s
motn for S/J.
51 Fld deft’s memo of P/A’s in oppstn to
Varig’s Motn to strike affirmative def &
entr-motn of U.S. to dism.
52. Fld deft USA’s supple brief & response to
pltf passengers’ brief in support Varig’s
motn to strike affirmative defenses of the
U.S.
53. Fld deft Weber Aircraft’s memo of P/A’s in
response to Varig’s motn for contc Kidde’s
motn for S/J.
54. Fld deft USA’s motn in oppstn to Varig’s
ex parte reqst to cont retnble 10-30-78.
55. Fld deft’s note of entrmot & cntrmot to
dism retnb] 12/11/75 2 PM.
56. Fld deft’s aff of Cecile Hatfield.
57. Fld defts reply to Varig’s response to US
mot to dism.
58. MIN ORD: Hrg on OTC to set aside S/J:
Crt ORD discharged—OSC & reaffirm the
S/J. deft Boeing shall submt memo re cert.
for interlocutory apeal by 1/14/78. Re Mot to
dism by deft GNRTD pltfs mot to strk gvmts
affirmative defense is DEN.
jmw 59. Fld pltf Varig’s note of tkg DEPOs of:
Chief of Aircraft Engineering Div FAA
West Region, 6-25-79/9:30 am; FAA employ-
ee responsible for review’g docs re Boeing
707, 6-26-79/9:30 am; unknown indiv (see
6-5-79
7/6/79
7-15-79
7-18-79
7-26-79
7-27-79
8-12-79
8-20-79
8-12-79
8-10-79
jmw
jmw
gll
jmw
gil
gil
gil
gil
lf
if
7
note), 6-28-79 at 9:30 am; unkn indiv(see
note), 7-9-79/9:30 am; unkn indiv (see notc)
7-10-79/9:30am; unkn indiv(see notc)
7-12-79/9:30am; unkn indiv(see notc)
7-13-79/9:30am.
60. Fld plitf Varig’s renote of motn for ORD
empelg dise fr U.S.A. (orig fld w/Crt 9-8-78)
for retnbl 6-11-79/10am.
61. Fld pitf Varig’s A/Note of DEPO of Custod
Boeing rerds, 6-22-79/9:30am
62. Fld pitf's cert of ens! in empliance w/loc rul
3(L).
63. Fld defi, Weber Aircraft Corp, reply memo
fr motn fr S/J; affid of Joseph E. Gregorich.
64. MIN ORD: PROCDGS: ORD tha deft We-
ber’s mot S/J stand sbmt’d; ORD GRNTG
pltf Varig’s mot to compel as to req 17 & 19.
LODGED prop ord re pitf's motn to compel
discov.
65. Fld ORD (WPG) granting Varig’s motn to
compel prod of docs; USA to prod docs by
7-18-79; USA to provide list of names & ad-
dresses re note of depos: thereafter Varig sh
be prmtd to depose 7 prsns.
66. Fld stip & ORD (WPG) cont motn fr S/J to
6 -18-79, 2pm; fur stip that motn of Varig to
compel discov agnst USA cont to 6-18-79 2
p.m,
67. Fld pltfs’ subst of attys & ORD (WPG)
subst Joseph T. Cook of Speiser, Krause &
Madole.
68. Fld plts note of tkg depos of Richard Nel-
son on 8-21-79 & Rocco Lippis on 8-28-79.
69. Fld plt’s note of motn & motn for ord
settng discov cut-off date, final PTC & trial
retnbl 8-27-79, 2PM
70. Fld pitf's memo of P&A in supp of motn for
ord setting discov cut-off date, final PTC &
trial
71. Fld pitf's note of motn & motn for sanctns
for gov’ts failure to comply w/dis ord
8-22-79
8-27-79
9-14-79
9-14-79
11-6-79
11-13-79
11-23-79
11-29-79
12/17/79
12/17/79
2-5-80
lf
If
lp
If
8
72. Fld plit’s memo of P&A in supp of motn for
sanctns for gov’ts failure to comp w/discov
ord
73. Fld pltf's memo of P&A in supp of motn for
lv to tk depos of Boeing Employees
74, Fld pitf's note of motn & motn for lv to tkg
depos of Boeing Employees
75. Fld pltf supp] memo on the 9th circuit’s sas
opinion
76. Fld pitf's aff of Phillip D. Bostwick in oppos
to Boeing’s motn to quash or modify Varig’s
subp & in supp of Varig’s motn to lv to tk
depos of Boeing
77. MIN ORD: motn for S/J fr Kidde is denied;
depos of USA to be tkn; motn for sanctns
tkn off cal
78. Fld deft’s gov’t memo in oppos to Varig’s
motn for ert-approvd discov sch & discov
cut-off date
79. Fid pltfs oppos to discov sch & discov
cut-off
80. Fld pltf's renote of depos of Richard Nelson
on 11-13-79
81. Fld pitf's renote of depos
LODGED pltfs prop ord re depos
82. Fld ORD re depostns; depos of Richard
Nelson & Rocco Lippis shall not go for ensl
for Mascher shall mk himself availbl in De-
cember for 7 depos: govt mk availbl list of 7
wits; depos complete by 12-31-79
83. Fld plt’s Varig’s amd renote of depos of
Richard Nelson on 12-4-79, Rocco Lippis on
12-10-79, Jack Bulmer on 12-11-79, Harold
Tanke on 12-12-79 & William Van Brockdorff
on 12-13-79. Issd 3
Fld DEPOSITION of John F. Turner takn on
12/17/79, Vol. I.
Fld DEPOSITION of Patrick Vaughn takn on
4/27/79, Vol. I.
84 Fld pltfs renote of depos of Richard Nelson
on 2-8-80
2-8-80
5-15-80
5-20-80
5-20-80
5-23-80
6-26-80
7-2-80
7-7-80
7-10-80
12-11-80
11-11-80
sb
kt
kt
sb
9
85 Fld pltf's amd renote of depos of Richard
Nelson on 2-20-80
Fld DEPOSITION of Harold Frederick Tanke
tkn on 12-12-79
Fld DEPOSITION of Jack K. Bulmer tkn on
12-11-79, Vol. I
Fld DEPOSITION of Jack K. Bulmer tkn on
12-12-79, Vol. II
LODGED pltfs prop ord
86. Fld pltf's renot of motn for sanctns for fail-
ure of the US to comply w/ert’s discov ord
etc RTNBLE 7-7-80 10AM
87 Fld plitfs renote of depos of Wes Slifer on
7-9-80; an employee of the boeing on 7-10-80
88 Fld deft’s memo in oppo to pitf Varig’s motn
for sanctns & for lv to file a lst amended
complt
89. Fld plitfs renot of depo of Wes Slifer on
7-9-80 & Raleigh Curtis on 7-10-80
90. Fld pitf's reply memo in supprt of its mot &
for lv to file a lst A/C
91 MIN ORD: ert ORDS depos of Mr. Curtis to
be tkn, pltfs mtn to amd GRANTD; govt
mtn to dism rtnbl 11-24-80, 10AM; govt may
file suppl papers, pitf respons due 11-7-80,
govt reply due 11-17-80
92. Fid pltf's FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT
LODGED prop ord
93 Fld ORD that Varig’s mtn for sanctns is
denied; Varig’s mtn for lv to file lst A/C
grantd; mtn for lv to tk the depos of Mr.
Raleigh Curtis GRANTD: US mtn for S/J
due 9-30-80; oppos due 11-7-80 & reply brief
due 11-17-80; rtnbl 11-24-80 2PM
Fld DEPOSITION of Rocco Louis Lippis tkn
on 12-11-79
Fld DEPOSITION of Rocca Louis Lippis tkn
on 12-10-79
11-20-80
11-20-80
12/1/80
12-12-80
12-11-80
12-2-80
12-29-80
12-6-80
12-8-80
12-2-80
If
If
rlb
rlb
md
md
md
md
md
md
10
94 Fld pltfs note of tkg depos of Wes Slifer on
9-3-80; Raleigh Curtis on 9-4-80, The FAA
Official on 9-15-80 & Craig Beard on 9-16-80
95Fld defts USA ANSWER TO FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT
96. Fld Varig’s amnd ntc of tkng depos of
various deponents on various dts.
97. Fld stip & ORD that US file mot for S/J on
or bf 10/31/80; opp on or bf 11/30/80 reply on
or bf 12/8/80; Hrg on mot 12/15/80, 2 pm.
98. Fla pltf Varig’s amded note of tkng depos
of M. Craig Beard, FAA on 10-21-80 and
Wes Slifer, FAA aero. engr on 10-22-80
99. Fld deft note of mot, retnbl 12-15-80, 2:00
pm.
100. Fld def. material facts as to which there is
no gen iss
LODGED deft prop findings of fact & concls of
law
LODGED deft prop ord for entry of S/J in fa-
vor of deft & against pltfs Varig & Mascher,
et al.
101. Fld pitf Varig Airlines note of fig depos of
Rocco Lippis, tkn 12-10 & 11-79; Jack
Bulmer, tkn 12-11 &12-79; & Harold Tanke,
tkn 12-12-79
Fld DEPOSITION of Rolland C. Curtiss tkn
10-10-80,
102. Fld pltfs’ Stip & ORD entg deft United
States’ mot for S/J & pltf's mot for lve to
amd cmplt to 1-26-81, 2:00 pm. Resp by
Varig & Mascher to U.S. mot for S/J due on
or bef 12-17-80 & reply by deft due on or bef
1-7-81
LODGED pltfs’ prop ord
103. Fld Varig’s memo of P&A in oppo to the
deft US's mot for S/J.
104. Fld Varig’s appendix in oppo to US’s mot
for S/J. (exhs)
105. Fld Varig’s stmt of gen iss of material
fact.
12-14-80
1-6-81
1-20-81
1-6-81
1-26-81
2-4-81
3-6-81
3/29/81
5-6-81
7/24/81
md
md
md
md
md
md
md
sb
am
1]
106. Fld pitf note of fig depo of Rolland C.
Curtis on 11-26-80.
107. Fld deft’s reply memo to pltf Varig’s
memo in oppo to U.S. mot for S/J.
108. Fld pitf Varig Airlines mot to strike affs
of Cecile Hatfield & Melvin Craig Beard.
109. Fld pitf Varig’s memo of P&A in sppt of
mot to strike affs
110. Fld pitf Varig’s notc of mot to strike affs,
rtnbl 2-17-81, 10 am
111. Fld pitf Varig’s memo of P&A in rebuttal
to US mot for S/J.
Fld DEPOSITION of Weston B. Slifer tkn
10-22-80
Fld DEPOSITION of Weston B. Slifer tkn
10-23-80.
112. MIN ORD: Crt hrs oral arg & grts deft’s
mot for S/J. Pitf may fi objs to s___ prop
fndgs at which ti ert will fi jdgmt & fndgs.
113. Fld pitf Varig Airlines note of flg depo of
Melvin Craig Brd, tkn 10-21-80 & Weston
B. Slifer, tkn 10-22-23, 1980
114. Fld Fndgs of Fact & Concls of Law
(WPG) tht S/J will be grtd in fav of deft
United States. (ENT 3-9-81) Mid cpys &
notcs to prtys.
115. Fld ORD (WPG) tht jdgmt be ent in fav
of deft United States & agnst pltfs Varig
and Mascher, et al. (78-0914-WPG) (ENT
3-9-81) Mid cpys & notes to prtys.
116.Fld plft NOTC OF APPEAL to the 9th
Cir. C/A fr ORD ent on 3/9/81; $70.00 Clk’s
fee & docket fee paid.
117. Fld pitf's designation Rpt trans
Fld rptr’s transcrs. of proceedings held on
12/15/78, 6/18/79, 8/27/79, 7/7/80, 1/26/81.
1/9/78
1/13/78
4/18/78
4/28/78
5/22/78
5/24/78
5-15-78
6-21-78
9/25/78
10-20-78
10/23/78
10/25/78
10/26/78
12
EMMA ROSA MASCHER, ET. AL
sam
rlb
rlb
rlb
rib
rlb
1. Fld complt. Issd summs.
2. Fld app & ORD that Charles F. Krause be
allowed to apear as non resident atty &
naming Ted Orliss as local ensl.
3. Fld app & ORD that Donald W. Madole be
allowed to appear as non resident atty &
naming Ted Orliss as local ens].
4. Fld app & ORD that Robert R. Smiley III
be allowed to appear as non resident atty &
naming Ted Orliss as loca! cnsl.
5. Fld summs rtnd srvd 3/17/78.
6. Fid ORD (R) (WPG) dtd 4/28/78, transfg the
actn to the cal of Judge Gray for all fur
predgs. Attys notified.
7. Fld deft’s ANSWER to COMPLAINT.
8. Fld USA’s Nte of Mtn & Mtn rtble 9/25/78,
10am for consolidtn.
9. Fid pltfs stmt in supp of mot by USA to
consolidate
10. Fld plitfs note of tk depos of various depo-
nents, various dates
11. MIN ORD: ORD mot plitf to compl dsevry
go off cal; Hrg mot pif for lv to amnd & con-
sol & Ord Grtng mot to amnd cmp & mot to
consolidate as to CV75-2325 & 6-187 a to hrg
of legal mots only
12. Fld pitf's memo of P&A
13. Fld pitf's memo of P&A
14. Fld plitf aff of Robert R. Smiley III
15. Fld plitf stmt of the case
16. Fld US’s memo of P/As in opp to Varig’s
mot to strk affrm defenses & counter mot to
dsm.
17. Fld US’ suppl brief & ‘rsp to pitf Passen-
gers’ brief in suppt of Varig’s mot to strk
affrm defense of US.
18. Fld rsp of pitfs Mascher et al’s to opp of
deft US to Varig mot to dsm & centr mot of
US to dsm.
1/14/78
1/20/78
2/8/78
2/15/78
7/20/79
7/10/79
9-14-79
7-14-80
8/21/80
rib
rlb
rib
rlb
rib
rlb
yd
dg
sb
kt
Tz
13
19. USA mot In opp to Varig’s ex parte rqst to
cont.
20. Fld USA’sntc of countermot & countermot
to dsm.
21. Fld plfs’ supp! brief in opp to Mot by deft
for S/J.
22. Fld affd Hatfield & memo in opp to Varig’s
mot for ord compelling dsevry.
23. MI N ORD: OSC to set aside S/J: ORD
OSC dischrged & S/J reaffirmed; deft Boeing
to sub memo re cert for interloc appeal by
1/14/79: defts mot to dsm s Denied & plifs
mot to strk is Denied, fing Of S/J after
dsevry will be allowed.
24. Fld sub & ORD sub Joseph T. Cook in
place & stead of Theodore Orliss.
25. Fld plfs’ cross nte of tkng depos of Richard
Nelson on 8/21/79 & Rocco Lippis on 8/28/79.
26. Fid pltfs opp to discov schedule & discov
cut-off
Fld DEPOSITION of Richard W. Nelson on
8-22-79
Fld Contd DEPOSITION of Richard W. Nel-
son of 8-21-79
Fld DEPOSITION of Richard W. Nelson tkn
on 2-26-80
Fld pltfs’ memo of law in spprt of mot by pltf
Varig to file an A/C & for sanctions against
deft U.S.
Fld pltfs’ stmt in spprt of mot by pltf Varig for
sanctions for lv to file an A/C & for 1v for
discovery from the Boeing Co.
Fid pitfs’ aff of Joseph T. Cook & attached
exhs
Fld pltfs Mascher et al’s note of depos of Wes
Slifer on 9/3/80; of Raleigh Curtis on 9/4/80;
FAA Official in charge of or responsib! fr
issuing Airworthiness Directives on the 707
aircraft & othrs during the year preceding
the Varig crash or his successor on 9/15/80;
of M. Craig Beard on 9/16/80
10/21/80
10-31-80
11/6/80
11/20/80
12/3/80
12/17/80
12/19/80
1/7/81
1/14/81
1/22/81
2/4/81
2-6-81
sb
Pz
kt
rlb
rlb
rlb
rlb
rib
rlb
rlb
rlb
lp
md
14
Fld DEPOSITION of Richard W. Nelson tkn
on 2-20-80
Fid DEPOSITION of Richard W. Nelson tkn
on 12-4-79
Fid DEPOSITION of Richard W. Nelsun tkn
on 12-5-79
Fid AUSA, U.S. memo in opp to pltfs
Mascher, et al mot to amd complt
Fid pltfs’ nte of mot, rtnbl 11-24-80, 10am
Fld pitfs’ mot to A/C
LODGED plitf's prop A/C
Fld response of plfs’ to memo of US in opp to
mot to amnd cmplt.
Fid stip & ORD ecntg mot to amnd complt to
12/15/80, 2pm.
Fld stip for cont of USA’s mot for S/J & for plf
Maschers’ mot for lv to amnd & ORD there-
on cntg mots to 1/26/81, 2pm.
Fld plfs’ memo of law.
affd Cook.
39. Fld US’ nte of mot, rtnble 1/26/81, 2pm to
strike.
40. Fld US’ memo in suppt its’ mot to strike.
41. Fld US’ reply memo to plfs’ opp to US’ mot
for S/J.
42. Fld US’s mot to strike portions of affd of
Cook III.
Fld DEPOSITIONS of Melvin Graig Beard,
tkn 10/21/80.
Fld DEPOSITION of Weston B. Slifer, tkn
10/22/80
Fld DEPOSITION of Weston B. Slifer, tkn
10/23/80
43. Fld pitf note of filing the takng depositn of
Melvin Craig Beard takng on 10/21/80.
44. Fld Findings of Fact & concls of law (WPG)
tht S/J will be ent in fav of deft United
States of America. (ENT 3-9-81) Mid cpys &
notes to prtys.
45. Fld ORD (WPG) for entry of S/J in fav of
deft, United States of America and agnst
15
pltfs Varig and Mascher, et al. (ENT 3-9-81)
Mild cpys & notes to prtys.
4/23/81 Ip 46. MIN ORD: (Nune Pro Tunc—1/26/81).
ORD that pltfs’ mot to amend the compInt is
Granted.
5-8-81 lw 47. Fid pltfs’ NOTC OF APPEAL to 9th Cir
frm Ord ent 3-9-81
16
PHILLIP D. BOSTWICK, ESQUIRE
SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE
18 M Strect, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 311-4100
and
DANIEL N. BELIN, ESQUIRE
McKENNA & FITTING
3435 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90010
Attorneys for Plaintiff
VARIG Airlines
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Civil Action No.
CV 76-0187-WPG
S.A. EMPRESA DE VIACAO AEREA RIO GRANDENSE
(VARIG AIRLINES), PLAINTIFF,
Vv.
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DEFENDANT
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
FOR MONEY DAMAGES
COUNT I
1. Plaintiff, S.A. EMPRESA DE \!ACAO AEREA RIO
GRANDENS (VARIG AIRLINES) (hereinafter “VA-
RIG”) is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the
Republic of the United States of Brazil, having its principal
place of business in Rio de Janerio, Brazil. As Brazil’s in-
ternational “flag” airline, VARIG flies its passenger-
carrying aircraft into and out of the International Airport
at Los Angeles, California, where it maintains offices and
does business.
2. Plaintiff's claim against defendant UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA (hereinafter “UNITED STATES”) arises
17
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 (b),
2671 et seq., as hereinafter more fully appears.
3. At all times mentioned herein the United States Fed-
eral Aviation Administration or its predecessor the Civil
Aeronautics Authority (hereinafter collectively referred to
as the FAA”) was an agency of defendant UNITED
STATES charged by law with the duty of promoting safety
of flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing such
minimum standards governing the design and performance
of aircraft as may be required in the interests of safety. In
furtherance of that duty the FAA was at all times men-
tioned herein empowered by law to issue type certificates
for passenger-carrying aircraft such as the BOEING Model
707 jet transport (hereinafter “BOEING Model 707 type
aircraft”) and upon application for such a certificate by air-
craft manufacturers such as THE BOEING COMPANY
(hereinafter “BOEING”) the FAA was charged by law with
the duty of reviewing the applicant’s designs, drawings,
tests, analyses, and aircraft and its component parts for the
purpose of ascertaining whether the applicant’s aircraft
complied with the applicable Civil Air Regulations and/or
Federal Aviation Regulations (hereinafter collectively re-
fered to as “FARs’”) and other star lards governing the de-
sign and performance of aircraft prescribed by the FAA;
and with the further duty of making, or requiring the appli-
cant to make, such tests during manufacture and upon com-
pletion of the aircraft as the FAA deemed reasonably nec-
essary in the interests of safety, including flight tests and
tests of any part of such aircraft.
4. At all times herein mentioned the FAA acted by and
through its officers, agents and employees, who were at all
times mentioned herein acting under color of their office,
within the scope and course of their employment, and on
behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity as employ-
ees of defendant UNITED STATES.
5. Prior to July 11, 1973, BOEING and WALTER
KIDDE & COMPANY, INC. (hereinafter “KIDDE”) de-
signed, tested, manufactured and sold a BOEING
707-320-C passenger-carrying transport jet aircraft, serial
number 19841; and prior to said date, plaintiff VARIG pur-
18
chased said aircraft from Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. and
operated it as Registration No, PP-VJZ (hereinafter said
aircraft is referred to as “PP-VJZ”"),
6. Prior to July 11, 1973, BOEING made application to
the FAA's Western Region in Los Angeles, California, for
a type certificate for the BOEING Model 707 type aircraft,
which certificate was issued by the FAA’s Western Region
prior to said date.
7. Prior to July 11, 1973, in California and elsewhere in
the United States, the defendant UNITED STATES,
through its agency the FAA, negligently and carelessly is-
sued a type certificate for the BOEING Model 707 type air-
craft, which aircraft the FAA knew or should have known
did not comply with the FARs and other minimum stand-
ards governing the design and performance of passenger-
carrying aircraft, and which aircraft the FAA knew or
should have known had defects and dangers in its design
and manufacture; negligently and carelessly failed to re-
view and inspect BOEING’s and KIDDE’s designs, draw-
ings, tests, analyses, and aircraft and its components for
the purpose of ascertaining whether the Model 707 type ai»
craft complied with the applicable FARs and aforemen-
tioned minimum standards governing the design and per-
formance of passenger-carrying aircraft; negligently and
carelessly failed to make, or failed to require BOEING and
KIDDE to make, such tests during the manufacture and
upon completion of the BOEING Model 707 type aircraft,
including PP-VJZ, as were necessary in the interests of
safety; negligently and carelessly failed to require
BOEING and KIDDE to modify or alter the design and
manufacture of the BOEING Model 707 type aircraft, in-
cluding PP-VJZ, prior to July 11, 1973, when it knew or
reasonably should have known that said aircraft was defec-
tive, dangerous and not in compliance with the FARs and
aforementioned minimum standards, governing the design
and performance of passenger-carrying aircraft; and negli-
gently and carelessly failed to notify and/or warn operators
and users of BOEING Model 707 type aircraft, including
VARIG, prior to July 11, 1978, through the issuance of
19
Airworthiness Directives (“hereinafter “ADs”), or other-
wise of the defects and dangers in said aircraft, including
PP-VJZ, of which defects and dangers the FAA knew or
should have known.
8. As a proximate result of the negligence of the defend-
ant UNITED STATES as alleged, on July 11, 1973, PP-
VJZ crash-landed near Paris, France following an in-flight
fire in the aircraft which became uncontrollable.
9. As a proximate result of this negligence PP-VJZ was
totally destroyed, all to the plaintiff's damage in the sum of
SIX MILLION DOLLARS ($6,000,000.00).
WHEREOF, VARIG prays judgment as hereinafter set
forth.
COUNT II
10. VARIG repeats and realleges each and every allega-
tion contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 of Count I of
the First Amended Complaint, as if set forth in full herein,
11. At all times herein mentioned the UNITED STATES
undertook to certify civil aircraft in air commerce, including
the BOEING Model 707 type aircraft, as airworthy and in
compliance with the applicable FARs and such minimum
standards governing the design, manufacture and perform-
ance of aircraft as were required in the interests of safety.
In furtherance of that undertaking the UNITED STATES,
through its agency the FAA and its employees and desig-
nated representatives, issued Type Certificates and Cer-
tificates of Airworthiness to aircraft designers and
manufacturers including BOEING, for civil aircraft in air
commerce, including the BOEING Model 707 type aircraft
and PP-VJZ, upon application for such certificates by man-
ufacturers, including BOEING, Following such application
the FAA, its employees and designated representatives,
undertook to review and inspect the applicant’s designs,
drawings, tests, analyses and aircraft, including its compo-
nent parts, for compliance with applicable FARs and the
aforesaid minimum standards. In addition, the FAA, its
employees and designated representatives undertook to re-
quire the applicants, including BOEING, to make such
tests, including flight tests, of passenger-carrying aircraft,
20
including the BOEING 707 type aircraft, as were required
in the interests of safety and to show compliance with the
applicable FARs and the aforesaid minimum standards.
The FAA further undertook to review the in-service oper-
ating and safety experience of aircraft which had been is-
sued the aforesaid certificates, including the BOEING
Mode! 707 type aircraft, after their delivery to operators,
including VARIG, for the purpose of discovering said dan-
gers and defects; to determine the continuing safety and
airworthiness of such aircraft; and to warn all operators of
such aircraft of all such dangers and defects and of the
means or methods of correcting or minimizing them. In fur-
therance of that undertaking the FAA issued ADs and
other communications to operators of such aircraft during
the operating life of the aircraft.
12. Prior to July 11, 1973, operators and users of
BOEING Model 707 type aircraft, including VARIG, rea-
sonably relied on the FAA’s various undertakings de-
scribed above, including but not limited to the issuance of
type certificates, certificates of airworthiness and ADs for
the BOEING Model 707 type aircraft, including PP-VJZ,
and the FAA was aware of such reliance.
13. Prior to July 11, 1973, in California and elsewhere in
the UNITED STATES, the defendant UNITED STATES,
through its agency the FAA, negligently and carelessly is-
sued a type certificate for the BOEING Model 707 type air-
craft, which aircraft the FAA knew or should have known
did not comply with the applicable FARs and other mini-
mum standards governing the design and performance of
passenger-carrying aircraft, and which aircraft the FAA
knew or should have known had defects and dangers in its
design and manufacture; negligently and carelessly failed to
review and inspect BOEING’s and KIDDE’s designs, draw-
ings, tests, analyses, and aircraft and its components for
the purpose of ascertaining whether the BOEING Model
707 type aircraft complied with the applicable FARs and
the aforementioned minimum standards governing the de-
sign and performance of passenger-carrying aircraft; negli-
gently and carelessly failed to make, or failed to require
BOEING and KIDDE to make, such tests during the man-
21
ufacture and upon completion of the BOEING Model 707
type aircraft, including PP-VJZ, as were necessary in the
interests of safety; negligently and carelessly failed to re-
quire BOEING and KIDDE to modify or alter the design
and manufacture of the BOEING Model 707 type aircraft,
incl ding PP-VJZ, prior to July 11, 1973, when it knew or
reasonably should have known that said aircraft was defec-
tive, dangerous and not in compliance with the applicable
FARs and aforementioned minimum standards, governing
the design and performance of passenger-carrying aircraft;
and negligently and carelessly failed to notify and/or warn
operators and users of BOEING Model 707 type aircraft,
including VARIG, prior to July 11, 1973, through the issu-
ance of ADs or otherwise of the defects and dangers in said
aircraft, including PP-VJZ, of which defects and dangers
the FAA knew or should have known.
14. As a proximate result of the negligence of the defend-
ant UNITED STATES as alleged, the risk of harm to users
and operators of BOEING Model 707 type aircraft, includ-
ing VARIG, was increased.
15. As a proximate result of the negligence of the defend-
ant UNITED STATES as alleged, on July 11, 1973, PP-
VJZ crash-landed near Paris, France, following an in-flight
fire in the aircraft which became uncontrollable.
16. As a proximate result of defendant UNITED
STATES’ negligence as alleged, PP-VJZ was totally de-
stroyed, all to plaintiff's damage in the sum of SIX MIL-
LION DOLLARS ($6,000,000.00).
WHEREOF, VARIG demands judgment against the
UNITED STATES in the sum of SIX MILLION DOL-
LARS ($6,000,000.00), for interest, for the costs of this ac-
tion, and for all other proper relief.
22
Dated:
SHAW, PITTMAN, Potts & TROWBRIDGE
1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Telephone: (202) 331-4100
TOF ccm's
PHILLIP D. BOSTWICK
J. THOMAS LENHART
PHILIP J. HARVEY
AND
MCKENNA & FITTING
3435 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90010
Telephone: (212) 384-3600
By: ee
DANIEL N. BELIN
G. HOWDEN FRASER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
VARIG AIRLINES
ANDREA SHERIDAN ORDIN
United States Attorney
312 North Spring Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012
GARY W. ALLEN, EsqQ.
Assistant Director
Torts Branch, Civil Division
CECILE HATFIELD, Esq.
Trials Attorney
Torts Branch, Civil Division
U.S. Department of Justice
P.O. Box 14271
Washington, D.C. 20044
Attorneys for Defendant
United States of America
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Civil Action No.
CV 76-0187-WPG
S. A. EMPRESA DE VIACAO AEREA RIO GRANDENSE
(VARIG AIRLINES), PLAINTIFF,
Vv.
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DEFENDANT
ANSWER OF DEFENDANT, UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR
MONEY DAMAGES
Defendant, United States of America, by its attorneys,
ANDREA SHERIDAN ORDIN, United States Attorney
for the Central District of California, and CECILE
HATFIELD, Trial Attorney, United States Department of
Justice, Washington, D.C., in answer to the Complaint for
Money Damages as filed herein states as follows:
COUNT I
1. The United States of America is without sufficient
knowledge and information to form an opinion as to the
24
truth of the allegations contained in Paragraph 1 of the
Complaint, but for the purposes of this Answer, they are
denied.
2. The allegations contained in Paragraph 2 of the Com-
plaint present questions of law which are respectfully re-
ferred to this Honorable Court for determination.
3. The allegations contained in Paragraph 3 of the Com-
plaint present questions of law which are respectfully re-
ferred to this Honorable Court for determination.
4, The United States of America is without sufficient
knowledge and information to form an opinion as to the
truth of the allegations contained in Paragraph 4 of the
Complaint, but for the purpose of this Answer, they are
denied.
5. The United States of America is without sufficient
knowledge and information to form an opinion as to the
truth of the allegations contained in Paragraph 5 of the
Complaint, but for the purpose of this Answer, they are
denied.
6. The United States of America admits the allegations
contained in Paragraph 6 of the Complaint.
7. The United States of America denies each and every
allegation contained in Paragraph 7 of the Complaint.
8. The United States of America denies each and every
allegation contained in Paragraph 8 of the Complaint.
9. The United States of America denies each and every
allegation contained in Paragraph 9 of the Complaint.
COUNT II
10. The United States of America repeats and reaffirms
each and every answer to Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
and 9 of Count I of the First Amended Complaint, as if set
forth in full herein.
11. The United States of America denies each and every
allegation contained in Paragraph 11 of the Complaint.
12. The United States of America denies each and every
allegation contained in Paragraph 12 of the Complaint.
13. The United States of America denies each and every
allegation contained in Paragraph 13 of the Complaint.
25
14. The United States of America denies each and every
allegation contained in Paragraph 14 of the Complaint.
15. The United States of America denies each and every
allegation contained in Paragraph 15 of the Complaint.
16. The United States of America denies each and every
allegation contained in Paragraph 16 of the Complaint.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
FIRST DEFENSE
17. The Complaint fails to state a cause of action.
SECOND DEFENSE
18. This Honorable Court lacks jurisdiction pursuant to
the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 2680(a), (h) and (k).
THIRD DEFENSE
19. No negligent or wrongful act of any agent and/or em-
ployee of the United States of America acting within the
scope of his employment in any way caused or contributed
to the happening of the subject accident.
FOURTH DEFENSE
20. The injury suffered herein by the Plaintiff was due to
the negligence of the Plaintiff herein acting by and through
its agents and/or employees,
WHEREFORE, Defendant, United States of America,
demands dismissal of the Complaint herein and for such
other, further and different relief which to the Court may
be just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
ALICE DANIEL
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Division
ANDREA SHERIDAN ORDIN
United States Attorney
JAMES STOTTER, II
Assistant United States Attorney
GARY W. ALLEN
Assistant Director
Torts Branch, Civil Division
26
By: /s/
CECILE HATFIELD
Trial Attorney
Torts Branch, Civil Division
U.S. Department of Justice
P.O. Box 14271
Washington, D.C. 20044
Telephone: 202-724-7333
27
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Civil No. 78 0914
EMMA ROSA MASCHER, ALFRED ROSA, GUIDO ROSA,
RAYMOND ROSA, BRUNO ROSA, CORIDO ROSA, AND ERNEST
ROSA, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS HEIRS AND LEGATEES OF ELIO
ROSA, DECEASED, ET AL. PLAINTIFFS,
Vv.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DEFENDANT
COMPLAINT FOR WRONGFUL DEATH
Plaintiffs, through their attorneys, SMILEY & LEAR,
P.C., SPEISER & KRAUSE, P.C. and SPEISER,
KRAUSE & MADOLE, respectfully allege as follows:
That pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346(b) and 2671-2680, et a!., the plaintiffs bring this ac-
tion for wrongful death.
That on or about July 10, 1975, administrative claims
were filed, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§2675(a), with the Department of Transportation, Federal
Aviation Administration, and other related governmental
agencies. On October 18, 1977, these claims were denied.
Therefore, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346(b) and 2675(a), the present action is brought.
That defendant operates the Department of Transporta-
tion and the Federal Aviation Administration, with head-
quarters in Washington, D.C. and related subdivisions lo-
cated in this district, and that the negligence described in
Paragraphs XIII through XVII, inclusive below, occurred
in the Western Region of the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion, in Los Angeles, California, within this judicial dis-
trict, as well as in Washington, D.C.
28
IV.
That this Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject matter based on the provisions of the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and 2671, et seq.
V.
That at all times relevant hereto, the principal business
of the Boeing Company (hereinafter referred to as
“Boeing”) within the United States was and is the planning,
design, manufacture, assembly, testing, modification,
servicing, inspection and sale of various types of aircraft,
including the Boeing 707 aircraft, and the component parts,
equipment, systems and accessories thereof, and manuals
and training devices pertaining thereto.
VI.
That prior to July 11, 1973, Boeing planned, designed,
manufactured, assembled, tested, serviced and inspected,
within the United States a Boeing 707-320C aircraft, serial
number 19841 (hereinafter referred to as the “subject air-
craft”), including the component parts, equipment, systems
and accessories thereof, and the manuals and training de-
vices pertaining thereto, and the subject aircraft was there-
after sold and delivered to SEABOARD WORLD
AIRLINES INC., (hereinafter referred to as “Seaboard”)
for use as a common carrier of passengers and property for
hire.
VIL.
That prior to the sale of the subject aircraft to Seaboard,
the aircraft, including its component parts, equipment, sys-
tems and accessories thereof, were inspected and certified
as being safe and suitable for public use by the defendant,
through its employees and agents, acting within the scope
of their employment.
VIII.
That prior to July 11, 1973, the subject aircraft was pur-
chased from Seaboard by S.A. EMPRESA DE VIACAO
AEREA RIO GRANDENSE, a Brazilian corporation trad-
29
ing as VARIG AIRLINES (hereinafter referred to as
“Varig”) for use as a common carrier of passengers and
property for hire.
IX,
That on July 11, 1978, the subject aircraft was operated
by Varig on a regular scheduled international flight be-
tween Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and Orly Airport, France,
carrying 117 fare-paying passengers.
X.
That on July 11, 1973, as the subject aircraft approached
Orly Airport, France, a fire broke out in the vicinity of a
lavatory in the aft section of the subject aircraft, causing
various materials used in the fuselage and interior furnish-
ings and upholstery of the aircraft to burn and emit danger-
ous and poisonous gases and fumes, resulting in death by
asphyxiation to plaintiffs’ decedents.
XI,
That on and prior to July 11, 1978, pursuant to the Fed-
eral Aviation Act, defendant United States of America by
and through the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration and its employees and agents, acting within
the scope of their employment, exercised a non-delegable
duty to issue such minimum standards governing the de-
sign, materials, workmanship, and construction of civil air-
craft as was necessary to promote the safety of such air-
craft in air commerce, including international air
commerce.
XII,
That prior to July 11, 1973, employees and agents of the
defendant United States, exercised a non-delegable duty to
exercise reasonable care in the formulation, issuance, publi-
cation, notification and enforcement of minimum standards
governing the design, materials, workmanship and con-
struction of aircraft intended to be employed in air com-
merce including international air commerce as well as a
non-delegable duty to warn operators of and passengers in
30
such aircraft of any dangers inherent in said design, materi-
als, workmanship and construction.
XIII,
That prior to July 11, 1978, the defendant, by and
through the Administratcr of the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration and its employees and agents negligently issued
minimum standards relating to the flammability of materi-
als used in the interior of civil aircraft including the Boeing
707 aircraft.
XIV,
That prior to July 11, 1978, the defendant, by and
through the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration and its employees and agents, acting within the
scope of their ermployment, negligently failed to issue mini-
mum standards relating to the toxicity of materials in the
interior of civil aircraft including Boeing 707 aircraft.
XV.
That prior to July 11, 1978, the defendant, by and
through the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration and its employees and agents, acting within the
scope of their employment, negligently certificated the in-
terior design of the Boeing 707 type aircraft, including but
not limited to, the lavatories thereof, the air conditioning
and pressurization system thereof, the oxygen system
thereof, the smoke evacuation system thereof, and the
manuals and instructions pertaining thereto.
XVI.
That prior to July 11, 1978, the defendant, by and
through the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration and its employees and agents, acting within the
scope of their employment, negligently certificated the pro-
duction of the subject aircraft, and following its production,
negligently issued an airworthiness certificate relating
thereto.
XVII.
That prior to July 11, 1978, the defendant, by and
through the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Admin-
31
istration and its employees and agents, acting within the
scope of their employment, negligently failed to warn oper-
ators of said aircraft and the flying public including plain-
tiffs’ decedents herein, of the dangers inherent in the inte-
rior design of the Boeing 707 aircraft, all of which was well
known to defendant.
XVIII.
That the aforesaid negligence of the defendant, by and
through its employees and agents, acting within the scope
of their employment, was in breach of duties imposed by
the Federal Aviation Act, the Civil Air Regulations, the
Federal Aviation Regulations, and the common law duty to
exercise reasonable care in the premises.
XIX,
That the death of plaintiffs’ decedents aboard the subject
aircraft on July 11, 1973, was proximately caused by the
negligent breach on the part of the defendant of its contin-
uing, nondelegable duties described above.
XX.
That as a direct and proximate result of the defendant’s
negligent and wrongful conduct in the premises, plaintiffs
have sustained pecuniary damages, including loss of sup-
port, services, counsel, society, companionship, consorti-
um, care, nurture, training, the prospect of inheritance of
future accumulations, and other damages, including grief
and moral damages.
XXI.
That as a direct and proximate result of the defendant’s
negligent and wrongful conduct in the premises, each of the
passengers aboard the subject aircraft suffered great physi-
cal pain and mental anguish in contemplation of impending
disaster and death, personal injuries and property loss. As
a result, the estate of each of the plaintiffs’ decedents has
sustained these and other damages.
XXII.
That by reason of all the foregoing, plaintiffs Emma Rosa
Mascher, Alfred Rosa, Guido Rosa, Raymond Rosa, Bruno
32
Rosa, Corido Rosa, and Ernest Rosa have been damaged
in the sum of Two Million Two Hundred Seventy Thousand
($2,270,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs Honor Christine Brogan
and Thomas James Patrick Brogan have been damaged in
the sum of Three Million Five Hundred Thousand
($3,500,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs Antoine Marie Rulhe
and Denise Louise Rulhe have been damaged in the sum of
One Million Four Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand
($1,475,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs Claude Marie-Josephe
Arnaud Lavaud, Francois Jerome Gabriel Lavaud, Sophie
Claude Marie Lavaud, Philippe Jean Marie Lavaud,
Brigitte Lavaud Pasteyer, and Catherine Christiane Elisa-
beth Lavaud have been damaged in the sum of Five Million
Two Hundred Thousand ($5,200,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs
Shri Prithi Singh and Ranjeeta Prithi Singh have been
damaged in the sum of One Million One Hundred Eighty
Thousand ($1,180,000,00) Dollars; plaintiffs Dirce Baratella
in Dainelli, Albertina Dainelli, Ugo Dainelli, Ornella
Dainelli in Allegri, and Regina Dainelli in Pisano, have
been damaged in the sum of One Million Two Hundred
Twenty Thousand ($1,220,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs Zelia
Rivetto Griglio and Sergio Griglio have been damaged in
the sum of Two Million Six Hundred Thousand
($2,600,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs Francesca Griglio
Bongiovanni, Fernanda Bongiovanni and Alberto
Bongiovanni have been damaged in the sum of Two Million
Nine Hundred Ten Thousand ($2,910,000.00) Dollars; plain-
tiff Ubaldo Zanardi has been damaged in the sum of Two
Hundred Fifty Thousand ($250,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs
Maria Lucia Bruder, Thomas Bruder and Georgia Bruder
have been damaged in the sum of One Million Five Hun-
dred Thousand ($1,500,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs Halim
Aidar Junior, Cristina Berriel Adar and Claudia Berriel
Aidar have been damaged in the sum of One Million Seven
Hundred Fifty Thousand ($1,750,000.00) Dollars; plaintiff
Ana Lucia Teixeira de Andrade Figueira has been damaged
in the sum of Two Million ($2,000,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs
Palmira de Oliveira Judice, Zulmira de Oliveira Homem de
Mello, Amalia da Cunha e Oliveira, Thereza Cunha de
Souza Andrade, Alexandrina de Oliveira Dalmaso, Elio
33
Afonso da Cunha, Selene da Cunha Moraes, Eros Afonso da
Cunha, Terezinha Afonso da Cunha and Antonio Afonso da
Cunha have been damaged in the sum of One Million
($1,000,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs Geni Nilsa Diefenthaler,
Ignes Diefenthaler, Carla Diefenthaler, Agnes
Diefenthaler, and Marcos Diefenthaler have been damged
in the sum of Two Million ($2,000,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs
Marcienne Chabrerat Mas, Christian Mas, and Joelle Mas
Gros have been damaged in the sum of One Million Five
Hundred Thousand ($1,500,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs Anna
Bernstrom Fauconnier, Peter Fauconnier and Mathias
Fauconnier have been damaged in the sum of Two Million
Five Hundred Thousand ($2,500,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs
Pierre Sarda, Michel Sarda, Alain Sarda and Nicole Sarda
de Claviere d’Hust have been damaged in the sum of One
Million ($1,000,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs Maddy Marie
Dietrich Aufrere de la Preugne, Solange Aufrere de la
Preugne, Isabelle Aufrere de la Preugne, and Anne Marie
Aufrere de la Preugne have been damaged in the sum of
Three Million ($3,000,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs Lucienne
Dando Tardif, Gerard Tardif and Claire Tardif Marette
have been damaged in the sum of Two Million Five Hun-
dred Thousand ($2,500,000,00) Dollars; plaintiffs Jacqueline
Dubois Fardel, Doris-Marie Fardel and Nicole-Suzanne
Fardel have been damaged in the sum of Two Million Five
Hundred Thousand ($2,500,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs
Danielle Cojan Ghorbanian, Pascal Karim Ghorbanian and
Philippe Guive Ghorbanian have been damaged in the sum
of Two Million Six Hundred Thousand ($2,600,000.00) Dol-
lars, plaintiffs Marie Sieber-Tschirky, Valentin Sieber,
Hedwig Graf-Sieber and Rose-Marie Sieber have been dam-
aged in the sum of Two Million Five Hundred Thousand
($2,500,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs Maria Neusa Consoni
Guimaraes, Cristina Lonsoni Guimaraes, Ana Luiza
Consoni Guimaraes, Silvia Consoni Guimaraes, Luiz
Humberto Guimaraes, and Elza Helena Consoni Guimaraes
have been damaged in the sum of Two Million
($2,000,000.00) Dollars; plaintiff Charlotte Danzberg has
been damaged in the sum of Five Hundred Thousand
($500,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs Egon Erny Kirst and Nelly
34
Ebling Kirst have been damaged in the sum of Seven Hun-
dred Fifty Thousand ($750,000.00) Dollars; plaintiff Maria
Reginato Paganella has been damaged in the sum of Five
Hundred Thousand ($500,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs Clara
Zimmerman de Peluffo, Santiago Peluffo, Veronica Peluffo,
Agustina Peluffo and Josefina Peluffo have been damged in
the sum of Two Million ($2,000,000.00) Dollars; plaintiff
Enilda Fernandez de Sortino has been damaged in the sum
of Eight Hundred Thousand ($800,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs
Suzanne Seve Jacquiot. Christophe Jacquiot, Denis
Jacquiot, and Charlotte Jacquiot have been damaged in the
sum of Two Million Four Hundred Fifty Thousand
($2,450,000.00) Dollars; plaintiff Emese Hegedus has been
damaged in the sum of One Million Five Hundred Thousand
($1,500,000.00) Dollars; plaintiff Maria Roth has been dam-
aged in the sum of One Million Five Hundred Thousand
($1,500,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs Margit Tarnay, Tunde
Tarnay, and Laszlo Tarnay have been damaged in the sum
of Two Million Six Hundred Fifty Thousand ($2,650,000.00)
Dollars; plaintiffs Felix Gutierrez Acuna and Maria
Mercedes Gutierrez Acuna have been damaged in the sum
of One Million Five Hundred Thousand ($1,500,000.00) Dol-
lars; plaintiffs Maria Luiza Pereira de Almeida Leite
Ribeiro, Patricia Leite Ribeiro, and Maria Fernanda Leite
Ribeiro have been damaged in the sum of One Million Five
Hundred Thousand ($1,500,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs
Marina Menezes de Oliveira Carvalho and Sergio Menezes
de Oliveira Carvalho have been damaged in the sum of
Three Million Five Hundred Thousand ($3,500,000.00) Dol-
lars; plaintiffs Magduiena de Auge, Enrique Auge and Juan
Claudio Auge have been damaged in the sum of Two Million
Five Hundred Thousand ($2,500,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs
Myriam Collier de Lamare, Guilherme de Lamare and
Claudia de Lamare have been damaged in the sum of One
Million Five Hundred Thousand ($1,500,000.00) Dollars;
plaintiffs Jose Narciso da Fonseca e Silva and Isis Souza da
Fonseca e Silva have been damaged in the sum of Seven
Hundred Fifty Thousand ($750,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs
Geraldo Gouvea Carrazedo and Celina Correa Carrazedo
have been damaged in the sum of Five Hundred Thousand
35
($500,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs Ciaudia de Souza Weiss,
Fabria de Souza Scavone and Alexei Scavone have been
damaged in the sum of Nine Hundred Fifty Thousand
($950,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs Walkiria di Vizio Silvana di
Vizio, Eduardo di Vizio and Claudia di Vizio have been
damaged in the sum of One Million Five Hundred Thousand
($1,500,000.00) Dollars; plaintiff Paulina Knijnik has been
damaged in the sum of Five Hundred Thousand
($500,000.00) Dollars; plainti*’s Amal Veron Yglesias, Raul
Yglesias and Elis Aparecida Yglesias have been damaged in
the sum of One Million Five Hundred Thousand
($1,500,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs Moise Daurier, Louis
Daurier, Jeanne Daurier, Andre Daurier, Albert Daurier,
Georges Daurier, Victor Daurier, Marie Daurier, Yvette
Meyer, Helene Barnaud, and Paulette Haro have been
damaged in the sum of Two Million Three Hundred Thou-
sand ($2,300,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs Hildegard Juesten,
Dr. Ulrich Juesten and Dr. Wolfgang Juesten have been
damaged in the sum of One Million Five Hundred Thousand
($1,500,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs Nancy Palleta dos Santos,
Augustinho dos Santos Junior and Airton Palleta dos
Santos have been damaged in the sum of One Million Five
Hundred Thousand ($1,500,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs
Luciana Zavaroni and Francesca Zavaroni have been dam-
aged in the sum of Two Million Five Hundred Thousand
($2,500,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs Monika Colli, Sven Colli,
and Tanja Colli have been damaged in the sum of Two Mil-
lion ($2,000,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs Francisca Arlita
Barbosa Quindere, Paulo Barbosa Quindere, Renata
Barbosa Quindere, Adriana Barbosa Quindere, Cristina
Barbosa Quindere and Luciana Barbosa Quindere have
been damaged in the sum of Three Million ($3,000,000.00)
Dollars; plaintiffs Cornelia Koeman-Nieuweborer, Maartje
Grietje Koeman, Klaas Evert Koeman and Martin Dik
Koeman have been damaged in the sum of Three Million
($3,000,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs Luiz Tiellet, Rivadavia
Tiellet, Aristotelino Tiellet, Floah Tiellet da Silva, Luiza de
Lourdes Tiellet Oliveira Hilda Alvares, Celanira Tiellet
Borges, Therezinha Tiellet Bueno and Dolores Velloso
Vianna have been damaged in the sum of Four Million
36
($4,000,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs Waldemar Martins
Ferreira Filho, Waldemar Ferreira Netto, Ana Maria Mar-
tins Ferreira and Maria Antonieta Martins Ferreira have
been damaged in the sum of One Million Five Hundred
Thousand ($1,500,000.00) Dollars; plaintiffs Maria Isabel
Malta Cardozo Barretto Prado, Evangelina Malta Cardozo
Junqueira de Aquino, Carlota Josephina Malta Cardozo dos
Reis Boto, Francisco Malta Cardozo Neto, Anna Maria
Martins Ferreira, Maria Antonieta Martins Ferreira, and
Waldemar Ferreira Netto have been damaged in the sum of
One Million Five Hundred Thousand ($1,500,000.00)
Dollars.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs demand judgment against
the defendant, United States of America, in the total sum
of One Hundred Million, Six Hundred Five Thousand
($100,605.000.00) Dollars, and each of them individually de-
mands judgment as set forth more particularly in para-
graph XXII of this Complaint, incorporated herein by ref-
erence, together with interest thereon, and the costs and
disbursements of this action.
SMILEY & LEAR, P.C.
1819 H Street, N.W., Suite 500
Washington, D.C. 20006
Telephone: (202) 466-8171
/s/ i ae er Se
ROBERT R. SMILEY, III
SPEISER & KRAUSE, P.C.
200 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10017
Telephone: (212) 661-0011
/s/
CHARLES F. KRAUSE
SPEISER, KRAUSE & MADOLE
1216 Sixteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Telephone: (202) 223-8501
/s/
DONALD W. MADOLE
OF COUNSEL:
BERRIS & SETON
37
1801 Century Park East
Los Angeles, California 90067
By: /s/
TED ORLISS
CLAIM FOR DAMAGE, INSTRUCTIONS: Prepare in ink or typewriter. Please read carefully the yn —
roval |
po pee os = “gy ne -_ supply information requested on both ey
i i .U t t
INJURY, OR DEATH - sides of this form. Use additional sheet(s) if necessary
1. SUBMIT TO. | 2. NAME AND ADORESS OF CLAIMANT (Number, street, city, State,
‘ ‘ ee , and Zip Code)
Federal Aviation Administration |
i
800 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20591
3. TYPE OF EMPLOY ENT 4. AGE | 5. MARITAL 6 NAME AND ADORESS OF SPOUSE, IF ANY (Number, street, city, State, and
STATUS Zip Code)
MILITARY |
2% CIVILIAN |
7. PLACE OF ACCIDENT (Give city or town and State; if outside city limits, indicate | 8. DATE ANO DAY 19. TIME
mileage ur distance to nearest city ur town) | OF ACCIDENT (A.M OR P.M)
Saulx les Chartreux, France | 11 July 1973 1358 GMT
10. AMMOUNT OF CLAIM (in dollars)
A PROPERTY DAMAGE B PERSONAL INJURY | C. WRONGFUL DEATH 0. TOTAL
11. DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT (State below, in detail, all oie Jacts and circumstances attending the damage, injury, or death, identifying
persons and property involved and the cause thereof) laimants decedent ied as a result of in-
halation of smoke & toxic gases emitted by a fire which burned out of
control in the lavatory of that certain Boeing 707 aircraft bearing
Brazilian registry PP-VJZ, manufacturer's serial No. 19841 on July ll,
1973. Conditions producing the fire were proximately caused by the
negligence of agents of the F.A.A. in the issuance of type, production
& airworthiness certificates relating to said aircraft.
12. PROPERTY DAMAGE
NAME ANO ADDRESS OF OWNER, IF OTHER THAN CLAIMANT (Number, street, city, State, and Zip Code)
BRIEFLY DESCRIBE KIND ANO LOCATION OF PROPERTY AND NATURE ANDO EXTENT OF DAMAGE (See instructions on reverse side for method uf substantiating claim)
13. PERSONAL INJURY
A.
STATE NATURE ANO EXTENT OF INJURY WHICH FORMS THE BASIS OF THIS CLAIM
14, WITNESSES
NAME AODORESS (Number, street, city, State, and Zip Code)
Capt.Gilberto Aranjo da Silva c/o Varig Airlines
2d Officer Alvio Basso Rio de Janeiro
Engineer Claunor Bello Brazil
Steward Luis Coelho
ERS ONLY DAMAGES AND INJURIES CAUSED BY THE ACCIDENT ABOVE AND AGREE TO ACCEPT SAID
AMOUNT IN FULL SATISFACTION AND FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THIS CLAIM
15. SIGNATURE OF CLAIMANT (Tiiis signature should be used in all future correspondence) | 16. DATE OF CLAIM
CIVIL PENALTY FOR PRESENTING CRIMINAL PENALTY FOR PRESENTING FRAUDULENT
FRAUDULENT CLAIM CLAIM OR MAKING FALSE STATEMENTS
The claimant shall forfeit and pay to the United States the sum Fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more
of $2,000, plus double the amount of damages sustained by the | than $ years or both. (See 62 Stat. 698, 749; 18 U.S.C. 287, 1001.)
United States. (See R.S. $3490, $438; 31 U.S.C. 231.)
REVISED FEBRUARY 1971
GSA FPR 101-118
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION-FPMR 101~11.8 STANDARD FORM 95
95-108 20
39
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Civil No. 78-0914
EMMA ROSA MASCHER, ALFRED ROSA, GUIDO Rosa,
RAYMOND ROSA, BRUNO ROSA, CORIDO ROSA, AND ERNEST
ROSA, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS HEIRS AND LEGATEES OF ELIO
ROSA, DECEASED, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DEFENDANT
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA’S
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT
I.
The allegations contained in paragraph I of plaintiffs’
complaint presents a question of law which is respectfully
referred to the Court for its determination.
Defendant United States of America admits that admin-
istrative claims were filed with the Department of Trans-
portation, Federal Aviation Administration, and that these
claims were denied.
Defendant United States of America denies each and ev-
ery allegation contained in paragraph III of plaintiffs’
complaint.
IV.
The allegations contained in paragraph IV of plaintiffs’
complaint presents a question of law which is respectfully
referred to the Court for its determination.
Vv
Defendant United States of America has insufficient
knowledge or information upon which to form a belief as to
40
the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph V of
plaintiffs’ complaint.
VI.
Defendant United States of America has insufficient
knowledge or information upon which to form a belief as to
the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph VI of
plaintiffs’ complaint.
VIL.
Defendant United States of America has insufficient
knowledge or information upon which to form a belief as to
the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph VII of
plaintiffs’ complaint.
VIII.
Defendant United States of America has insufficient
knowledge or information upon which to form a belief as to
the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph VIII of
plaintiffs’ complaint.
IX.
Defendant United States of America has insufficient
knowledge or information upon which to form a belief as to
the truth of the allegation contained in paragraph IX of
plaintiffs’ complaint.
) «i
Defendant United States of America has insufficient
knowledge cr information upon which to form a belief as to
the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph X of
plaintiffs’ complaint.
XI,
Defendant United States of America denies each and ev-
ery allegation contained in paragraph XI of plaintiffs’
complaint.
XII,
Defendant United States of America denies each and ev-
ery allegation contained in paragraph XII of plaintiffs’
complaint.
41
XIII.
Defendant United States of America denies each and ev-
ery allegation contained in paragraph XIII of plaintiffs’
complaint.
XIV.
Defendant United States of America denies each and ev-
ery allegation contained in paragraph XIV of plaintiffs’
complaint.
XV.
Defendant United States of America denies each and ev-
ery allegation contained in paragraph XV of plaintiffs’
complaint.
XVI.
Defendant United States of America denies each and ev-
ery allegation contained in paragraph XVI of plaintiffs’
complaint.
XVII.
Defendant United States of America denies each and ev-
ery allegation contained in paragraph XVII of plaintiffs’
complaint.
XVIII.
Defendant United States of America denies each and ev-
ery allegation contained in paragraph XVIII of plaintiffs’
complaint.
XIX.
Defendant United States of America denies each and ev-
ery allegation contained in paragraph XIX of plaintiffs’
complaint
XX.
Defendant United States of America denies each and ev-
ery allegation contained in paragraph XX of plaintiffs’
complaint.
XXI
Defendant United States of America denies each and ev-
ery allegation contained in paragraph XXI of plaintiffs’
complaint.
42
XXII.
Defendant United States of America denies each and ev-
ery allegation contained in paragraph XXII of plaintiffs’
complaint.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
As and for its affirmative defenses the United States of
America asserts as follows:
XXIII,
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted against this defendant.
XXIV.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Defendant United States of America and its agencies and
employees exercised due care and diligence in all matters
alleged in the complaint herein and no act or failure to act
of this defendant or any agency or employee of this defend-
ant was the proximate cause of any damage, loss or injury
to plaintiff.
XX‘.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
This Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of
this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2680(a)(h) and (k).
XXVI.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
No cause of action lies against the United States for the
promulgation of minimum regulatory standards.
fo XXVIL.
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
No cause of action lies against the United States for the
certification of aircraft.
WHEREFORE, Defendant, United States of America,
demands that the Complaint herein be dismissed as against
it, together with all appropriate costs, fees and expenses
and for such other and further relief as the Court may deem
just and proper.
43
ANDREA SHERIDAN ORDIN
United States Attorney
/s/
WILLIAM D. BLAKELY
Trial Attorney
Aviation Section, Civil Division
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
202-739-4309
Of Counse!:
JOHN R,. HARRISON
Assistant Chief Counsel
GARY W, ALLEN
Attorney
Federal Aviation Administration
U.S. Department of Transportation
Washington, D.C. 20591
44
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Defendant’s Answer To Complaint was
mailed this 16th day of May, 1978, to:
ROBERT R, SMILEY, III
SMILEY & LEAR, P.C.
1819 H Street, N.W., Suite 500
Washington, D.C. 20006
CHARLES F, KRAUSE
SPEISER & KRAUSE, P.C.
200 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10017
DONALD W. MADOLE
SPEISER, KRAUSE & MADOLE
1216 Sixteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
s/ Sere
WILLIAM D, BLAKELY
45
ROBERT R., SMILEY, Esq.
SMILEY, MURPHY, OLSON & GILMAN
1819 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Telephone: (202) 466-8171
JOSEPH T. COOK, Esq.
SPEISER, KRAUSE & MADOLE
700 South Flower Street
Los Angeles, California 90017
CHARLES F. KRAUSE, ESQ.
SPEISER & KRAUSE
200 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10017
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Mascher, et al.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Case NO, CV-78-0914-WPG
EMMA ROSA MASCHER; ALFRED ROSA; GUIDO ROSA;
RAYMOND RoSa; BRUNO ROSA; CORIDO ROSA; AND ERNEST
ROSAD, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS HEIRS AND LEGATEES OF
EILO Rosa, DECEASED, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS,
v.
DEFENDANT
PLAINTIFFS MASCHER ET AL.’S FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT FOR WRONGFUL DEATH, SECOND COUNT
Plaintiffs, through their undersigned attorneys Timothy
J. Cook, Robert R. Smiley, Speiser and Krause P.C. and
Speiser, Krause and Madole, amending their complaint to
add a second Cause of Action against defendant United
States of America allege as follows:
Plaintiffs incorporate by reference, paragraphs I-X,
XIII-XVII, XXI and XXII of the Complaint herein filed on
March 9, 1980 as if fully restated herein.
46
XXIII
That on and prior to July 11, 1973, pursuant to the Fed-
eral Aviation Act, defendant United States of America by
and through the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration and its employees and agents, acting within
the scope of their employment, undertook to issue such
minimum standards governing the design, materials, work-
manship, and construction of civil aircraft as was necessary
to promote the safety of passengers of such aircraft in air
commerce, including international air commerce, thereby
inducing reliance on such activities by the airlines and pas-
sengers alike.
XXIV
Prior to July 11, 1973, pursuant to certain bilateral
agreements between the United States of America and the
Government of Brazil, and in reliance upon certain inspec-
tions of the subject aircraft allegedly conducted by employ-
ees of the Federal Aviation Administration or its predeces-
sor agency, the Government of Brazil certified the subject
aircraft as airworthy.
XXV
Agents of the Federal Aviation Administration or its
predecessor agency negligently failed to make inspections
which the said agency undertook to make, or in the alterna-
tive, conducted said inspections negligently.
XXVI
That as a direct and proximate result of the defendant’s
negligent inspection, or failure to inspect, plaintiffs have
sustained pecuniary damages, including loss of support,
services, counsel, society, companionship, consortium,
care, nurture, training, the prospect of inheritance of fu-
ture accumulations, and other damages, including grief and
moral damages, as more particularly appears in paragraph
XX of the complaint.
XXVII
That as a direct and proximate result of the defendant’s
negligent inspection or failure to inspect, each of the pas-
47
sengers aboard the subject aircraft suffered great physical
pain and mental anguish in contemplation of impending dis-
aster and death, personal injuries and property loss. As a
result, the estate of each of the plaintiffs’ decedents has
sustained these and other damages, as more particularly
appears in paragraph XXI of the complaint.
XXVIII
That the aforesaid acts or omissions of the defendant, by
and through its employees and agents, acting within the
scope of their employment, was in breach of duties arising
from the undertaking of inspection which, if negligently
performed or omitted, increased the risk of harm to plain-
tiffs and their decedents.
XXIX
That the aforesaid acts or omission of the defendant, by
and through its employees and agents, acting within the
scope of their employment:
1. were undertaken to protect the safety of aircraft and
passengers in air commerce, including international air
commerce;
2. proximately caused a cabin fire which was a clearly
foreseeable result of a failure to inspect, or a negligent
inspection;
3. were the direct proximate causes of the deaths of
plaintiffs’ decedents;
5. was clearly contrary to the explicit safety policies of
air commerce of the United States and the international
community.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs demand judgment against
the defendant United States of America in the total sum of
One Hundred Million, Six Hundred Five Thousand
($100,605,000.00) Dollars, and each of them individually as
set forth more particularly in paragraph XXII of the Com-
plaint, incorporated herein by reference, together with in-
terest thereon, and the costs and disbursements of this
action.
Respectfully submitted.
/s/
ROBERT R, SMILEY
SMILEY, MURPHY, OLSON & GILMAN
1819 H STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006
/S/
JOSEPH T. CooK
Speiser, Krause & Madole
700 South Flower Street
Los Angeles, CA 90017
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
49
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR TRANSPORTATION
BOARD OF INQUIRY
ACCIDENT INVOLVING THE BOEING 707 PP-VJZ OF
THE VARIG COMPANY
(SAULX-les-CHARTREAUX-July 11, 1973)
FRENCH VARIG REPORT
Released 4/6/76
CONTENTS
DECREE CREATING THE BOARD OF INQUIRY
1. SUMMARY
2. TECHNICAL INVESTIGATIONS
2.1 The flight
2.2 The victims
2.3 Damage to the aircraft
2.4 Damages to third parties
2.5 Information on the crew
2.6 Information on the aircraft
2.7 Meteorological conditions
2.8 Aids to navigation
2.9 Telecommunications
2.10 Airports and ground installations
2.11 Flight recorders
2.12 Wreckage
2.13 Medical and pathological information
2.14 Fire
2.15 Survival
2.16 Expert evaluations
2.17 Additional information
3. ANALYSIS OF THE FACTS
4. CONCLUSIONS
50
DECREE CREATING THE BOARD OF INQUIRY
By decree of July 12, 1973, a Board of Inquiry was estab-
lished for examining the circumstances, seeking the causes
and bringing out the facts in the accident occurring on July
11, 1973 approaching Orly Airport involving a B 707, regis-
tered PP-VJZ of the Brazilian Company Varig.
The Board is composed of the following members:
Mr. René LEMAIRE, Engineer, Civil Engineering
Department, Chief of General Inspection for Civil
Aviation, CHAIRMAN;
General Maurice MARTINET, VICE-CHAIRMAN;
Mr. Philippe TESTU, check pilot, Head of the Flight
Control Agency;
Mr. Paul CAROUR, general engineer, civil aviation;
Mr. Paul GUILLEVIC, chief engineer, civil aviation;
Dr. GIGNOUX, Vice-President of the Civil Aeronaut-
ics Medical Council;
Mr. André GELY, aircraft commander for Air France.
1. SUMMARY
Date of the Accident Aircraft
Wednesday, July 11, 1973 Boeing 707 PP-VJZ
at 1402 UT* Owner and Operator
Location of the accident The Brazilian Company
SAULX-les-CHARTREUX VARIG
5 km southwest ofthe thresh- Persons aboard
old of Orly runway 07 Captain DA SILVA
Type of flight + 16 (2 crews)
Regular international trans- 117 passengers
port, RIO DE
JANEIRO—PARIS
Summary of the accident
Fire on board during approach to ORLY
Forced landing 5 km before the runway threshold, in the
countryside near Longjumeau
Wreckage destroyed by fire
Consequences
Material Third
Personnel Killed Injured Damage Lading Parties
Crew 7 10 Destroyed Destroyed Damage to
Passengers 116 1 by iznpact crops
and fire
51
*All times mentioned in this report are expressed in univer-
sal time (UT). Legal time may be obtained by adding one hour
thereto.
2. TECHNICAL INVESTIGATIONS
2.1 The Flight
On July 11, 1973 the B-707, PP-VJZ flies the regular
VARIG line RG 820 between Rio de Janeiro and Paris.
At 3:03 the plane takes off from GALEAO airport with a
weight of 326,700 pounds with 117 passengers and 17 crew
members aboard.
At 3:50 level 330, cruising level, is reached. The flight
proceeds with no particular difficulty at a Mach in the vicin-
ity of 0.8.
At 6:26 the plane ascends to level 370, and at 11:53, to
level 390. Cruising is completed at level 350.
At 13:40, when the plane makes contact with the West
Terminal sector of the Paris ACC, it is in descent in the di-
rection of the CHARTRES VOR (CHW), estimated time
13:52.
At 13:48, it passes level 230, and at 13:46, level 170.
At 13:50, Paris ACC has the plane turn slightly to the
right, short-circuiting CHW, and authorizes continuation of
the descent to level 100, reached at 13:52, then level 80,
reached at 13:55. At this time, the plane is heading towards
the TOUSSUS (TSU) VOR.
At 13:57 the VARIG 820 is transferred to ORLY ap-
proach, with which it makes contact one minute later.
It receives instructions to maintain level 80 and to head
for OLS, which will bring it into the tail-wind branch of
runway 26, in operation at ORLY. The meteorological con-
ditions are excellent and no special procedure is necessary.
At 13:58'20" the aircraft signals a “fire aboard” and re-
quests an “emergency descent”.
According to the Captain, this request follows the an-
nouncement by the cabin crew of smoke in the rear of the
passenger cabin.
At 1359 the plane is authorized to descend to 3,000 feet
for landing on runway 07, only 22 MN away and which
should allow a direct approach.
52
In response to a request from Control, the pilot signals
“total fire”, while the radar brings it onto line 07 and situ-
ates it 10 MN from the threshold. According to the crew,
this announcement coincides with the cabin steward’s
alarming indication that the situation is (illegible) invading
the cabin and that the passengers are being asphyxiated.
The transponder code appears for about one more minute
on the Orly radar screen.
The crew puts on the oxygen masks and smoke goggles.
However, the black smoke is invading the cockpit to such
an extent that the pilots can no longer see the instruments.
The side windows are open. Judging the situation desper-
ate, the Captain decides to effect a forced landing.
This is achieved at 14:03, the pilots viewing the ground
from the side windows.
Witnesses observe the plane just before its forced land-
ing. They notice a trail of smoke escaping from below the
rear fuselage.
The landing site selected, situated in bearing 230 of the
threshold of runway 07, 5 km from the latter, is a flat area
with small cultivations having a mean altitutde of 76 me-
ters, south of the village of SAULXIER (Municipality of
SAULX-les-CHARTREUX, Essonne).
The landing gear were extended, the flaps partially ex-
tended, the plane at a heading of about 080°, slightly in-
clined to the left and with a high, nose-up longitudinal
attitude.
It touched down just beyond a small road after it had
taken the tops off a few small fruit trees. Impact was se-
vere. The left landing gear yielded immediately and was
followed shortly thereafter by the right landing gear. The
plane then slid on its jet engines, then on its belly for al-
most 500 m. However, the unequal loss of the main landing
gear and the initial inclination to the left triggered a skid-
ding movement which increased until the plane came to a
halt.
The wreck came to a halt at heading 280° after losing all
of its jet engines and half of the left wing. The forced land-
ing was completely successful. The fuselage suffered little
53
damage. Only the bottom of the hull behind the main land-
ing gear wells is misshapen.
According to witnesses, the only visible sign of fire after
the plane stopped is smoke issuing to the right of the base
of the fin.
Ten occupants of the plane escape by their own means: 4
through the right side-window of the cockpit, 4 through the
left side-window, 1 through the left front passenger door, 1
through the right front galley door.
Among these ten survivors, all crew members, two (the
pilots) were seriously injured, one of them by a tree limb
which pierced the front pressure bulkhead while the plane
was sliding along the ground, the others suffered from
smoke inhalation.
These survivors were very soon met by the farmers
witnessing the crash, but all intervention is impossible be-
cause of the fire which developed inside the cabin, making
access therein impossible.
When the firemen arrive, 6 to 7 minutes after the crash,
the fire has caved in the top part of the fuselage in the rear.
The plane is filled with smoke. There is no sign of life. The
firemen evacuate 4 motionless occupants through the for-
ward door. Only one will survive.
A fire breaks out in the right wing between jet engine
struts 3 and 4 shortly before the arrival of the firemen. The
left and right wing-root tanks and the center tank do not ig-
nite. On the other hand, fire will break out in the rear hold
about one hour after the crash.
2.2 Victims Of The Crash
Crew Passengers Third Parties
Fatally injured 7 116 none
Injured 10 1 none
Uninjured 0 0
2.3 Damage To The Aircraft
The aircraft was completely destroyed, with the excep-
tion of equipment contained in the electronics hold, which it
was possible to salvage.
54
2.4 Damages To Third Parties
Damages to third-parties consist in the destruction of
crops in the crash zone, first by the plane, then by the res-
cuers, and in the destruction of several fruit trees.
2.5 Information On The Crew
Due to the length of the flight, there were 17 crew mem-
bers, twice the normal number.
Cockpit personnel
AIRCRAFT COMMANDER (on duty)
Name: GILBERTO ARAUJO DA SILVA
Date and place of birth: November 12, 1923, SANTA
LUZIA
Marital status: married
Airline transport pilot’s certificate no. 238
License and ratings valid until February 28, 1974
Medical examination valid until September, 1973
(unrestricted)
Joined the Company on February 1, 1952
Qualified for the B-707 on February 19, 1968
Date of last in-flight control: August 17, 1972
Date of last simulated control: February 26, 1973
Total flying time logged: 17,959.30
In the 30 days prior to the accident: 29.14
In the 48 hours prior to the accident: 14.03
On the type of plane involved in the accident: 4,642.44
Prior accidents: none
Rest before final flight: 35 hrs.
FIRST PILOT (on duty)
Name: ANTONIO FUZIMOTO
Date and place of birth: July 10, 1928 at BAURU
Marital status: married
Airline transport pilot’s certificate no. 787
License and ratings valid until August 31, 1973
Medical examination valid until November, 1973
(unrestricted)
Joined the Company on February 1, 1952
Qualified for the B-707 on December 5, 1969
Date of last in-flight control: February 21, 1973
55
Date of last simulated control: August 7, 1972
Total flying time logged: 17,788.27 hrs.
In the 30 days prior to the accident: 73 hrs. 47 min.
In the 48 hours prior to the accident: 11.03
On the type of plane involved in the accident: 3,331.33
Prior accidents: none
Rest before final flight: 61 hours.
SECOND PILOT (on duty)
Name: ALVIO BASSO
Date and place of birth: December 1, 1926 at BENTO
GONCALVES
Marital status: married
Commercial pilot’s certificate no. 1097
Group A single-engine rating valid without limitation
Medical examination valid until November 30, 1973
(unrestricted)
Joined the Company on May 4, 1954
Qualified for the B-707 on September 14, 1962
Total flying time logged: 12,613.02
In the 30 days prior to the accident: 69.38
In the 48 hours prior to the accident: 11.03
On the type of plane involved in the accident: 5,055.46
Prior accidents: none
Rest before final flight: 230 hours
SECOND PILOT
Name: RONALD UTERMOEHL
Date and place of birth: May 2, 1950 at PONTA GROSSA
Marital status: single
Commercial pilot’s certificate no. 3886
Group A single-engine rating valid without limitation
Medical examination valid until September 30, 1973
(unrestricted)
Joined the Company on February 16, 1970
Qualified for the B-707 on December 6, 1972
Total flying time logged: 1,540.19
In the 30 days prior to the accident: 47.26
In the 48 hours prior to the accident: 18.14
On the type of plane involved in the accident: 768.41
Prior accidents: none
Rest before final flight: 24 hours.
56
MECHANIC
Name: CARLOS DIFFENTHALER NETO
Date and place of birth: September 20, 1934, PORTO
ALEGRE
Marital status: married
Mechanic's certificate no. 731
License and rating valid until April 30, 1974
Medical examination valid until March 31, 1974
(unrestricted)
Joined the Company on March 1, 1954
Qualified for B-707 on June 20, 1960
Date of last in-flight control: April 20, 1973
Date of last simulated control: April 4, 1973
Total flying time logged: 16,672.39
In the 30 days prior to the accident: 90.53
In the 48 hours prior to the accident: 15.43
On the type of plane involved in the accident: 11,922.59
Prior accidents: none
Rest before final flight: 33 hours
MECHANIC (on duty)
Name: CLAUNOR BELLO
Date and piace of birth: February 7, 1935, SAO PAULO
Marital status: Married
Mechanic’s certificate no. 814
License and rating valid until October 31, 1973
Medical examination valid until December 31, 1973
(unrestricted)
Joined the Company on May 8, 1960
Qualified for B-707 on September 26, 1966
Date of last in-flight control: October 11, 1972
Total flying time logged: 9,655.16
In the 30 days prior to the accident: 64.32
In the 48 hours prior to the accident: 11.03
On the tye [sic] of plane involved in the accident: 4,827.39
Prior accidents: none
Rest before final flight: 63 hours
NAVIGATOR (on duty)
Name: ZILMAR GOMES DA CINHA
Date and place of birth: July 1, 1930, ARARUAMA
Marital status: married
57
Navigator’s certificate: No. 114
License and ratings valid until January 31, 1974 (B-707 and
DC-8)
Medical examination valid until June, 1974 (unrestricted)
Joined the Company on September 1, 1955
Qualified for B-707 on November 30, 1968
Date of last in-flight control: January 7, 1973
Total flying time logged: 14,140.09
In the 30 days prior to the accident: 74.42
In the 48 hours prior to the accident: 11.03
On the type of plane involved in the accident: 3,286.45
Prior accidents: none
Rest before final flight: 193 hours.
NAVIGATOR
Name: SALVADOR RAMOS HELENO
Date and place of birth: June 30, 1928, RIO DE JANEIRO
Marital status: married
Navigator’s certificate no. 89
License and rating valid until July 31, 1973
Medica! examination valid until January 22, 1974
(unrestricted)
Joined the Company on August 30, 1951
Qualified for B-707 on September 12, 1965
Date of last in-flight control: February 4, 1973
Total flying time logged: 15,157.02
In the 30 days prior to the accident: 75.22
In the 48 hours prior to the accident: 11.03
On the type of plane involved in the accident: 5,937.22
Prior accidents: none
Rest before final flight: 183 hours.
Cabin Crew
CHIEF STEWARD
Name: JOAO EGIDIO GALLETI
Date and place of birth: July 21, 1939, LINS
Marital status: married
Certificate no. 1003
Ratings valid until December 16, 1973 (B-707 and DC-8)
Medical examination valid until November, 1973
(unrestricted)
58
Joined the Company on September 1, 1962
Total flying time logged: 9,064
On the type of plane involved in the accident: 4,841
Rest before final flight: 96 hours
STEWARD
Name: EDEMAR GONCALVES MASCARENAS
Date and place of birth: October 20, 1941, CURITIBA
Marital status: married
Certificate no. 684
Ratings valid until January 29, 1975 (B-707 and DC-8)
Medical examination valid until January 14, 1974
(unrestricted)
Joined the Company on October 6, 1965
Total flying time logged: 6,666
On the type of plane involved in the accident: 3,582
Rest before final flight: 96 hours.
STEWARD
Name: CARMELINO PIRES DE OLIVEIRA, Jr.
Date and Place of birth: May 20, 1942, SAO PAULO
Marital status: married
Certificate no. 1546
Ratings valid until October 12, 1973 (B-707 and DC-8)
Medical examination valid until September 23, 1973
(unrestricted)
Joined the Company on June 12, 1967
Total flying time logged: 5,080
On the type of plane involved in the accident: 3,246
Rest before final flight: 48 hours.
STEWARD
Name: SERGIO CARVALHO BALBINO
Date and place of birth: April 18, 1945, ALEGRE
Martial status: single
Certificate no. 1704
Ratings valid until March 19, 1975 (B-707)
Medical examination valid until December 14, 1973
. (unrestricted)
Joined the Company on January 11, 1968
Total flying time logged: 3,983
On the type of plane involved in the accident: 2,407
59
Rest before final flight: 72 hours
STEWARD
Name: LUIZ EDMUNDO COELHO BRANDAO
Date and place of birth: May 17, 1939, RIO DE JANEIRO
Marital status: single
Certificate No. 1855
Ratings valid until June 16, 1974 (B-707 and DC-8)
Medical examination valid until January, 1975
(unrestricted)
Joined the Company on September 20, 1968
Total flying time logged: 3,295
On the type of plane involved in the accident: 779
Rest before final flight: 96 hours
STEWARD
Name: ALAIN HENRI TERSIS
Date and place of birth: August 13, 1946, PARIS (France)
Marital status: single
Certificate no. 2653
Ratings valid until April 30, 1974 (B-707)
Medical examination valid until September 23, 1973
(unrestricted)
Joined the Company on February 4, 1972
Total flying time logged: 937
On the type of plane involved in the accident: 886
Rest before final flight: 48 hours.
STEWARDESS
Name: ANDREE PHIA
Date and place of birth: January 22, 1949, CAIRO (Egypt)
Marital status: single
Certificate no. 2053
Ratings valid until May 31, 1975
Medical examination valid until November 11, 1973
(unrestricted)
Joined the Company on October 1, 1969
Total flying time logged: 3,015
On the type of plane involved in the accident: 2,685
Rest before final flight: 120 hours.
STEWARDESS
Name: ELVIRA STRAUSS
Date and place of birth: Apri] 28, 1949, FRANKFURT
(Germany)
Marital status: single
Certificate no. 2601
Ratings valid until December 22, 1973
Medical examination valid until October 13, 1973
(unrestricted)
Joined the Company on September 15, 1971
Total flying time logged: 1,250
On the type of plane involved in the accident: 1,181
Rest before final flight: 48 hours.
CHIEF STEWARDESS
Name: HANELORE DANZBERG
Date and place of birth: September 9, 1938, PORTO
ALEGRE
Marital status: single
Certificate no. 265
Ratings valid until] November 11, 1973
Medical examination valid until October 5, 1973
(unrestricted)
Joined the Company on March 4, 1961
Total flying time logged: 7,989
On the type of plane involved in the accident: 4,345
Rest before final flight: 48 hours
2.6 Information On The Aircraft
The PP-VJZ was a Boeing 707 345 C (manufacturing no.
19.841) which was built for the SEABOARD Company, but
purchased by VARIG Company, which had leased it to
SEABOARD for some time.
Its Certificate of Airworthiness was no. 5712, 1968,
which had been renewed the last time on February 12, 1973
and was valid until August 12, 1973.
Its total utilization time was 21,470 hours (5,677 land-
ings). Utilization time since the annual inspection on May
15, 1973 was 539 hours. The last brief inspection occurred
on June 24, 1973.
61
The history of the type JT3 D3 B jet engines is as
follows:
Position 1 2 3 4
No. 632.945 645.946 667.821 668.246
Total hours 24,571 16,479 15,966 20,094
Hours since RG 2,225 1,025 3,698 4,594
The status of the plane regarding mandatory inspections
and modifications is correct. Reports from flights prior to
the accident reveal no irregularities which could have had a
bearing on the accident.
Upon departure from RIO, the weight at takeoff was
within the prescribed limits: 326,700 pounds, 153,000 pounds
of which was fuel, as was the load distribution: 21.3%. The
arrangement of the cabin corresponded to version F: one
Ist-class cabin with 20 seats in 5 rows, a tourist cabin with
112 seats, 3 of which were —(illegible)—
Forward of the first class cabin there was a galley, a rest
station for the crew and three rest rooms. To the rear of the
tourist cabin there was a galley, three rest rooms and a
closet.
Interior design
Originally, the interior design of this plane was in con-
formity to specification Boeing D.619.676.
In 1971, the cabin decoration was replaced by a more at-
tractive decoration, conforming to specification Boeing
D6.25.601, called WIDE BODY LOOK.
The renovation basically concerned the seat covers, the
panelling of the walls and ceiling of the passenger cabin, but
the interior design of the rest rooms remained unchanged.
The renovation was performed by the VARIG Company.
The material needed for the transformation was supplied by
Boeing, with the exception of the carpeting and the fabric
for the seat covers, which VARIG procured directly. These
materials underwent quality control and in particular a test
for flame resistance, before they were used.
Specification D6 25.601 was fully respected, with the ex-
ception of the PNC seat covers, where vinyl was replaced by
62
leather. This material nonetheless satisfies the requirements
of the regulation.
Location of the portable orygen tanks
During the life of the plane, the portable oxygen tanks for
the rear area were placed in three different locations. Origi-
nally, they were stored near the cabin ceiling in the baggage
racks. Incidents occurring during flight led the Company to
seek a place that was cooler and less exposed to unexpected
handling. They were then placed behind the last row of
seats, near the floor, along the rear galley. It soon became
evident that this place is used by passengers to store their
carry-on baggage. For this reason, the Company had a
closed rack built inside the closet to store the four oxygen
tanks. The regulation requires only that it be easy to gain
access to the tanks.
2.7 Meteorological Conditions
The meteorological conditions during the descent and the
approach were excellent. Orly observations were as follows:
1300 hours—Wind 340/8 Kt
Clouds: 3/8 cirrus at 9000 m
Visibility: 15 km
Temperature: +24.9°
Dew point: +10.8° Humidity: 41%
QFE: 1008 QNH: 1018
1400 hours—Wind: 280/6 Kt
Clouds: 3/8 cirrus at 9000 m
3/8 alto cumulus at 3500 m
Visibility: 15 km
Temperature: +25.8°
Dew point: 11.4°
QFE: 1007 QNH: 1017
1400 UT corresponds to 1500 hours local time. There was
almost peak brightness from the sun.
2.8 Aids To Navigation
The radio aids were functioning normally and had no in-
fluence on the occurrence of the accident.
63
2.9 Telecommunications
The telecommunications equipment was functioning
properly.
The loss of contact during final approach can be attrib-
uted, on the one hand, to the fact that the crew did not po-
sition its selection box on “mask” and on the other hand, lis-
tening over the loud-speaker became impossible when the
side windows were opened.
The recording of control radar images was utilizable.
2.10 Airports And Ground Facilities
The facilities played no part in the origin of the accident.
2.11 Flight Recorders
The PP-VJZ was equipped with a UDC flight data re-
corder type 542 (time — bearing — speed — altitude —
vertical acceleration), but had no cockpit voice recorder.
The recorder was placed in the tail cone, behind the pres-
sure bulkhead. The temperature of the cylindrical protec-
tive case was enough to burn off the paint from its front
surface; however, the recorder itself was intact and the
metal tape could be read normally.
The recorder functioned properly, but stopped during the
descent at level 80. The examination of the apparatus ex-
cludes the possibility that this was caused by direct heating
or linked to a mechanical failure.
The rear pressure bulkhead melted, but the slight dam-
age it suffered in the rear point indicates that this bulkhead
gave way after the crash.
The indications given by the crew and by the Air Traffic
Control in their messages made it possible to establish a
quite accurate correlation between the audio recordings
and the FDR. This made it possible to establish the time
the recorder stopped at 13:58'30" + 30 seconds.
2.12 Wreckage
2.12.1 Tracks on the ground
The main landing gear of the plane make contact with
ground that is hard and dry. The depth of the tracks shows
that the plane set down cleanly.
A tilt to the left of about 4° was revealed by the fact that
the left reactors touched the ground almost immediaely af-
ter the main landing gear.
64
The elevation of the plane is indicated not only by the
tracks and the slight damage suffered by the front of the
fuselage, but especially by the fact that reactor no. 1 tou-
ched the ground before reactor no. 2.
The main landing gear give way almost immediately and
the plane, resting on its inside reactors for 48 meters after
the initial contact, slides thusly in a straight line for 265
meters before crossing a dirt road.
After this the track in the ground inclines to the left.
The plane is skidding to the right when it runs into an ap-
ple tree with its radome and left wing. A large branch from
this apple tree enters the cockpit behind the instrument
panel on the left-hand side, while the left wing is cut in
half.
This shock accelerates the skidding and the plane comes
to a nalt 240 meters later, after travelling a total distance
on the ground of almost 600 meters at a heading which is al-
most the opposite of the initial heading.
2.12.2 Examination of the fuselage
The damage to the fuselage during the crash is slight. It
did not break. The ventral keel is intact. Structural defor-
mations are minor, except near the rear hold. The lower
skin is torn only at the level of the left rear corner of the
rear hold. It is probable that the sliding over the ground
flattened the hull bottom under this rear hold, thus
creating a sharp angle which the final skidding opened.
This tear, parallel to one of the stringers, extends over ap-
proximately one meter.
Under the floor, the fuselage suffered little damage from
the fire. The electronic hold is almost intact. The front
landing gear leg was torn off at the end of the skidding and
remained perpendicular to the gear well. The front cargo
compartment is simply blackened by soot. Its door is func-
tioning. The oxygen tanks for this compartment are intact
and show no sign of heating. The air conditioning hold is in
good condition. The mid-wing frame is intact. The main
landing gear wells suffered only from the tearing away of
the gear. The cooling units were partially torn off just be-
fore the plane stopped.
65
The rear cargo compartment suffered from both the
crash and the fire. The floor above this compartment was
75% melted. The oxygen tanks from this compartment did
not explode. They are empty and burnt. The luggage was
partially burnt. The unused compartment behind the cargo
compartment, i.e., under the galley and the rest rooms,
was damaged by fire in those places were there is no more
upper floor. The tai! cone shows traces of fire only near the
pressure bulkhead.
Damage by fire to the fuselage above the floor level in-
creases when moving away from the forward part of the
plane. The top of the fuselage melted from the front of the
first class cabin as far as the rear pressure bulkhead.
On the sides, the damage stops above the port-holes in
front of the wing, but continues downwards almost to the
floor level behind the wing.
In front of the wing and on the wing, the floor is intact.
In front of the first class cabin, the carpet is only part‘ally
burned. On the other hand, the floor has disappeared under
the closet, the access corridor for the rear main door, facing
the galley, and behind the tourist class cabin. The flooring
under the galley and the fuselage wall which it rests
against, did not give way.
The rear pressure bulkhead melted.
The four portable oxygen tanks were found burned and
empty on their rack. They had lost their valves and
finishings.
This area is one of the points of maximum fire intensity.
Between the rear pressure bulkhead and the trailing
edge of the wing, only the metal parts of this part of the
cabin remained, with the exception, however, of what was
in the galley. The containers protected the combustible
products which they contained and thus made it possible to
identify them.
While the effect of the fire in the rear is almost identical
on the floor and on the ceiling, from the first-class cabin the
influence of the fire increases when moving away from the
floor. This can be better seen in the cockpit, where the in-
fluence of the heat is almost non-existent below the naviga-
tor and mechanic’s panel.
66
2.12.3 Examination of the wings and rudders.
The left wing is sheared between struts 1 and 2. How-
ever, the control cables did not give way and the extremity
of the wing stayed with the main wreckage. Tanks 2 and 5
contain fuel.
The right wing burned on the level of tank 4. Tank 3 did
not suffer from the fire, but was emptied as a result of dam-
age to the wing.
Jet engine struts 1 and 2 were torn off, while struts 3 and
4 remained in place.
The leading edge flaps are extended. The trailing edge
flaps are partially extended: 13 threads on the feed screw,
i.e., 6° of flap.
Ailerons and spoilers were damaged only by the crash.
The tail units are in place and only slightly damaged. The
control nut for the fin is at 17 threads, high position, corre-
sponding to a setting between 0 and 1° plane nose-down.
The control cables for the horizontal and rudder stabilizer
passing under the floor which burned, are in place.
2.12.4 Examination of the cockpit
Other than panel P 8 (instrument panel of left-hand pilot
seat) whose instruments were torn away from and pushed
back onto their support, the cockpit was undamaged by the
crash.
The heat in the upper part did no more than impair the
breaker panels, deform the switches and obscure the
instruments.
Indications concerning the general configuration of the
plane are as follows:
Plane:
Landing gear control: lowered
Flap control: 14°
Flap indicator: Outer L 30° R 0°
Inner L 43° R 27°
Air brake control: 50° (handle unjammed)
Fire-break: not pulled
Wing and naceile de-icers: off
Stabilizer: 0°
Aileron trim: 1° to the right
67
Rudder trim: at neutral
Automatic pilot: off
Transponder: operating
Doppler indicator: 166 KT on both
Fin (right indicator inoperable)
max. left.
Signs and exit lights: on
Flight recorder control: broken
Passenger oxygen: off
Crew oxygen: on
Air conditioning:
Turbocharger controls 2, 3, 4: normal
Tapping control: 1 and 3 on
2 and 4 off
Wing insulation valve control: left off
right on
Dynamic air intake control: off
Control for air conditioning units: both off
Control for thrust recovery valves: off
Control for mixture valves: both on manual
Electrical supply:
D.C.—battery on
measurement selector on primary T.R.
A.C.—all alternators dog-clutched
primary bus-bar on alternator 3
parallel control selector on alternator 3
Exciter relay switch: normal
Line relay switch: normal
Interlocking relay switch: normal
Wattmeter: minimum
Galley power supply: off
2.13 Medical and Pathological Information
122 bodies were found on the ground following the
forced landing of the B-707 PP-VJZ on July 11, 1973 at /
1500 hours in the community of SAULX-les. af
CHARTREUX (Essonne), or:
116 out of the 117 passengers who boarded the plane
6 crew members out of the 17 who boarded the plane,
4
68 A
while the only surviving passenger and the 11 surviving
crew members had to be transported to the Henri Mondor
Hospital in Créteil.
Among the latter, Mr. HELENO SALVADORE, navi-
gator, had attempted to take cover in the forward rest
rooms. He was burned externally on the face and neck, and
internally over the mucous membranes of the digestive
and respiratory tracts in the throat. He was taken in a
coma to level III of the Henri Mondor Hospital, where he
was to die on July 22, 1973, from kidney failure 11 days af-
ter the accident. The coefficient of carbon monoxide
poisoning was not investigated, but the proportion of car-
bon monoxide in the blood amounted to 40 milliliters per li-
ter, approximately corresponding to a coefficient of carbon
monoxide poisoning of .16. In this case, then, carbon mon-
oxide poison was not the cause of death.
Among the 122 victims found on the ground, the blood
was examined on all but two of the bodies.
From the 120 other bodies:
—16 showed a CO poisoning coefficient under .50
—11 had a coefficient ranging between .50 and .60
—93 had a coefficient equal or over .66.
It is usually thought that a coefficient of .66 is fatal.
Thus, out of the 120 bodies collected on the ground whose
blood was examined 78% showed a carbon monoxide
psoning coefficient equal or over 66%, and death must be
cur. videred as the result of carbon monoxide poisoning.
However, 9% had a coefficient ranging between .50 and
.60. For them, the probable, but not definite cause of death
may be considered as being carbon monoxide poisoning.
For the 13% whose coefficient of poisoning was lower
than .50, carbon monoxide poisoning cannot be excluded as
the cause of death. In fact, KOHN ABREST had pointed
out fatalities where the coefficient did not exceed 20%.
The analysis of escaping combustion gases from samples
taken in the cabin revealed, in addition to a substantial
amount of carbon dioxide, the presence of carbonic acid
gas, chlorhydric acid and fluorhydric acid.
The presence of the latter two acids, in contact with the
nasal and laryngeal mucous membranes, causes a reflex
69
characterized by respiratory failure and decrease in cardiac
rhythm.
This breathing failure, a veritable reflex inhibition, is the
result of a peripheral stimulation of the area innervated by
the trigeminal nerve and the upper laryngeal nerve.
Therefore, death would have been caused by inhibition.
It would have been helpful to know the seats occupied by
the passengers in the plane and to compare this information
with the results of the blood analyses. Given the
circumtances surrounding the accidents and the priority
which had to be accorded to saving the lives of the survi-
vors, it was impossible to observe the recommendations
specified in Chapter 9, appendix 9 of the ICAO’s manual on
airplane accidents. It is not possible to determine the exact
seat occupied by the victims at the time of the crash.
The results of analyses performed on the bodies of the six
crew members—other than HELENO SALVADOR—who
died in the accident are as follows:
1) UTERMOEL, second pilot
The coefficient of carbon monoxide poisoning was .78
and the proportion of carbon monoxide in the blood
amounted to 140 milliliters. The investigation reveals,
however, that he was in the rear, in the passenger cab-
in, next to stewardess ELVIRA STRAUSS.
2) DIEFENTHALER, mechanic
The poisoning coefficient was low: .37, and the propor-
tion of carbon monoxide was 90 milliliters.
It is also known that he was standing in the cockpit
and that he suffered a brutal shock when the plane land-
ed, the top of his skull being torn away and causing his
death.
3) MASCARENAS, Edomar, Steward
Coefficient of carbon monoxide poisoning: .48
Proportion of carbon monoxide in the blood: 100
milliliters
The inquiry did not reveal his location at the time of
the crash.
4) BALBINO CARVALHO, Steward
Coefficient of carbon monoxide poisoning: .66
70
Proportion of carbon monoxide in the blood: 130
milliliters
The body was found in the first-class gsiley and re-
moved by the firemen through the forward starboard
door.
5) ELVIRA STRAUSS, Stewardess
Coefficient of carbon monoxide poisoning: .78
Proportion of carbon monoxide in the blood: 140
milliliters
The inquiry established that she was in the rear of the
plane, in the tourist class cabin.
6) HANELORE DANTZBERG, chief stewardess
Coefficient of carbon monoxide poisoning: .66
Proportion of carbon monoxide in the blood: 130
milliliters.
The sole surviving passenger who, seating in the tourist
section, had followed chief steward GALETTI to the cock-
pit, was found in the first-class galley when the plane was
evacuated; his name is RICARDO TRAJANO. He suffered
from burns of the respiratory tract and from tegumentary
burns, especially in the lumbar region. He was taken to
Professor GUENAUD’s offices at the Mondor Hospital, and
returned to Brazil after seven weeks of hospitalization.
The following crew members had only slight injuries
causing no permanent physical damage: ALVIO BASSO,
CLAUNOR BELLO, ZILMAR DA CUNHA, GALETTI
JOAO, COELHO, TERSIS, PIA ANDREA.
2.14 The Fire
Since this was a cabin fire, it seemed useful in this sec-
tion to examine the statements of the survivors and to es-
tablish insofar as possible, a chronology of the facts based
on these statements.
The discovery of the fire is well documented, since two of
the stewards who were there survived the crash.
MASCARENAS (deceased) was in the rest room corri-
dor, TERSIS (survivar) was straightening up the galley,
CARMELINO (survivor) was seated on the fold-down seat
near the rear passenger door.
71
A woman passenger exiting from the port-side rest room
was heard to say, “I almost died in there”. MASCARENAS
and TERSIS went over to the rest room. CARMELINO
got up and looked.
TERSIS saw white smoke descending from the ceiling of
the rest room in the corner near the mid partition.
The two witnesses saw no flames.
TERSIS and MASCARENAS went back toward the
cabin.
TERSIS cut off the power for the rear galley, while
MASCARENAS grabbed the fire extinguisher which
CARMELINO was carrying back with him. CARMELINO
then went toward the cockpit to alert the cockpit
personnel.
CLAUNOR (survivor) was seated at the mechanic’s posi-
tion. He confirms that CARMELINO came in to say that
there was smoke in the rear rest rooms and that they
should go look.
CARMELINO returns toward the rear with DIEFEN-
THALER (deceased), the second mechanic. It is probable
that after MASCARENAS emptied his extinguisher he en-
tered the cockpit, since GALETTI (survivor) points out
that he was informed of the incident by MASCARENAS
who was holding an empty extinguisher in his hand.
GALETTI and MASCARENAS joined DIEFEN-
THALER and CARMELINO in the rear. At that time, the
smoke did not allow access to the rest rooms.
It appears that DIEFENTHALER was the first to re-
turn to the cockpit to get a mask and a tank of oxygen.
During this time, the smoke continued to advance: it en-
tered the tourist cabin. The stewards and chief steward
tried to reassure and calm the passengers.
GALETTI returned to the cockpit and warned of the se-
riousness of what was happening. All survivors from the
cockpit except CLAUNOR state that they learned of the
incident from GALETTI. It appears likely that the first an-
nouncement made over the frequency corresponds to
GALETTI’s intervention. According to the sequence of
events given by almost all witnesses, it was at this time
that the rest room circuits were broken. CLAUNOR says
72
that one of the circuit-breakers was already pulled out. He
re-engaged it only to have it pop out immediately after.
Stewardess ANDREA (survivor) who was re-applying
her makeup in one of the forward rest rooms, exited after
the lights went out. She then saw CARMELINO wearing
an oxygen mask. We know from CARMELINO that
DIEFENTHALER helped him put on his safety harness so
that he could go and open the tourist cabin wing emergency
exits. (In order for DIEFENTHALER to have suggested
this, it is certain that the plane was depressurized).
At the same time, ANDREA saw that the smoke was
starting to penetrate the first-class cabin.
Statements from witnesses reveal that the smoke, which
progressively invaded the rear of the plane from the rest
rooms to the last rows of seats was white.
The smoke front appears to have advanced regularly,
turning black. The statements from witnesses tend to re-
veal that the black smoke appeared on the cabin ceiling al-
most simultaneously in the tourist and first-class cabins and
that it advanced not only horizontally but also in the direc-
tion of the floor. 6 ica ae
GALETTI returned to the cockpit; he described the rap-
id and catastrophic development of the situation. This an-
nouncement by GALETTI presumably preceded the
message from the crew of “total fire on board”.
It was approximately at this time that CARMELINO re-
turned to the tourist cabin. Despite his mask he advanced
with difficulty, since visibility was zero. He saw three
flashes occurring in the back of the plane. The blast threw
him onto the floor. He returned toward the front.
General agreement among the survivors reveals that it
was on the second entry of GALETTI that the smoke could
be seen in the cockpit. An emergency descent was made
while, according to CLAUNOR and FUZIMOTO (survivor)
the plane was depressurized. The crew put on masks and
goggles.
It was apparently at that time that DIEFENTHALER
cut off alternators 1, 2 and 4.
The smoke rapidly became thicker in the cockpit. The pi-
lots state that they opened the side windows when it be-
came difficult to see the instrument panel and that they
made the decision to “crash land” the plane shortly
thereafter.
73
It would not appear, according to witnesses, that opening
the side windows improved visibility in the cockpit. The pi-
lots landed the plane using VFR, with their heads out the
window.
At the time of the crash, there were nine people in the
cockpit:
—FUZIMOTO, in the left pilot-seat
—GILBERTO, in the right pilot-seat
—ALVIO, in the observation seat
—ZILMAR, in the navigator seat
—CLAUNOR, in the mechanic’s seat
—DIEFENTHALER, standing behind CLAUNOR
—ANDREA and GALETTI, in the middle of the cockpit
—CARMELINO, against the cockpit door.
When the plane came to a halt, the fire was contained in
the fuselage. According to one of the witnesses on the
ground, a few minutes after the plane stopped, there were
flames under the fuselage, fully behind the port side, envel-
oping the skin on the outside. There were no flames visible
on the top.
The roof was pierced first to the right of the base of the
fin. The explosion of tank 3 seems to have occurred at this
time.
A ground witness who is an Air France B-707 steward
arrived on the scene and described the incident as follows:
The inside of the plane slightly behind the wings was on
fire. This was not a violent fire but rather a silent combus-
tion. The smoke was extremely thick. The rear part of the
roof was already destroyed. The fire advanced slowly for-
ward without, however, increasing in force.
The first fire engines arrived on the scene at 14:11 UT, 6
to 7 minutes following the crash. The fire was completely
extinguished at 14:50. It broke out again in the luggage
compartment, but was quickly brought under control.
2.15 Survival
The forced landing was fully successful. It was possible
to survive the accident from the standpoint of accelerations
undergone when the plane travelled along the ground. Only
second mechanic DIEFENTHALER was fatally injured
74
when the plane crashed, since he was standing,
unsupported and unharnessed.
It is, however, noteworthy that except for the occupants
of the cockpit and two members of the cabin personnel who
found themselves under special conditions (TERSIS and
COELHO), no one was able to escape from the plane on his
own, even though all exits remained completely utilizable.
Of the nine persons who were in the cockpit, five had
oxygen masks. Although tests proved that the opening of
the side windows caused smoke inhalation, it also caused
turbulence which was beneficial to those who had no mask.
TERSIS, seated near the forward passenger door, pro-
tected his face with a damp cloth. COELHO, seated near
the forward galley door, used the portable breathing appa-
ratus left behind by CARMELINO and which he had found
when freeing the access to the galley door.
In the cabin, no exit had been opened. Voluntarily, in the
absence of any instructions, the oxygen masks had not been
released.
The condition of the occupants of the cabin when the
plane came to a halt can be evaluated with the aid of sever-
al statements by witnesses. Among those persons carried
off by the firemen, i.e., those who suffered from the effects
of the smoke eight to ten minutes more than the first, it
was possible to revive two out of three. Only one of them,
however, survived.
In the forward area, where damage caused by smoke was
slightest, there are no apparent signs of attempts to
escape.
Those crew members (HELENO, BALBINO) who were
near the doors used by TERSIS and COELHO and who
were quite familiar with the layout of the plane, were
unable to exit.
It is therefore quite probable that the occupants of the
cabin were quickly powerless to react and that they were
unconscious at the time of the crash. It is likely that most
victims died only after the plane had come to a halt.
2.16. Expert Evaluations
2.16.1 Examination of the air outlet openings of the fuselage
The ventilating air escapes through five openings:
75
—two permanent outlets, one forward and the other
aft, which drain off fumes from the galleys and rest
room odors. They are equipped with a venturi for lim-
iting the flow rate when the differential pressure is
high.
—two outlets coming from the discharge control
valves which regulate pressure
—one cooling air discharge opening from the radio
installations.
The Board has made the following observations:
a) A substantial track caused by smoke and which
rapidly corroded, can be seen at the exit of the rear
permanent outlet. An analysis of the corrosion in this
trail showed that the metal had been attacked by
chlorhydric acid.
The inlet and the venturi were immediately taken
for an analysis of combustion deposits. These units
were useful in that they had not been handled by the
life savers or contaminated by the extinguisher
products.
b) There is a slight trail of soot behind the forward
permanent outlet with a mean axis which is not paral-
lel to the fuselage but which corresponds to a fuselage
angle of about 5°.
c) There are considerable traces of smoke around
the rear discharge valve outlet.
d) There were no traces of smoke around the for-
ward discharge valve outlet.
e) The same holds true for the most part for the
cooling air outlet from the —(illegible)—
2.16.2 Examination of the rear rest rooms
There are three rest rooms in the rear of the plane. Rest
76
room E is designed for easy removal in cargo utilization. It
consists of one unit which can be easily moved and hooked
up.
The three rest rooms were found in identical condition.
Doors, partitions, panels have disappeared. Only the metal
elements remained; tank, toilet motor and bowl, sink, fil-
ter, electrical wires. The floor of the plane under rest room
E, as well as the under skin of the fuselage next to this rest
room were less damaged here than elsewhere.
All that remains of the pressure dome is a rim about 30
em wide. The sealent where the dome and fuselage join is
blistered and burnt over its entire length except under the
floor. The two brackets and the upper reinforcing cross-
beam in the plane of the dome and fuselage joint were
melted.
The fuselage skin disappeared symmetrically in the up-
per part.
On the sides, the effect of the fire is much less
symmetrical.
On the starboard side, the skin was heated evenly over
the entire width of rest room C from a height of approxi-
mately 50 cm above the floor. The metal became soft and
broke under the weight of the tail unit between the two
ring-frames before the dome, i.e., near the toilet bowl of
rest room C (station 1415).
On the port side, the effect of the fire on the skin of the
plane begins clearly lower and more toward the front— al-
most at the limit of the closet and rest room D, slightly be-
low the level of the floor. On this side, the weight of the tail
unit not only caused, in the upper part, a vertical rip which
continued until just beyond the passenger door (station
1390) but also singed the lower part of the skin.
On the port side the floor is perforated. Here are found,
among considerable melted alloys, the oxygen tanks,
unexploded, but finishings destroyed.
The shape of the tears shows that the fire reached its
maximum intensity only after the plane had come to a halt.
2.16.3 Examination of the rear galley
This galley consists of three portable units, as was rest
room E. Units 3 and 4 are installed on the starboard side on
77
either side of the rear service door. Facing them, on the
port side, between the passenger door and the tourist-class
cabin, is unit 5.
Units 3 and 4 withstood the fire rather well. Damage is
external. Anything in a drawer, a container or an oven was
only slightly damaged. The wastepaper basket in unit 4 was
lost but its position would cause it to escape from its hous-
ing during considerable deceleration of the plane. The
newspapers which were piled up in unit 4 burned only su-
perficially. The electrical circuits of these two units were
destroyed. No evidence of a short circuit was revealed on
the conductors, but their condition is such that no formal
conclusion can be drawn.
Unit 5 no longer exists. This unit is basically a storage
area. It has no cooking equipment. It is not supplied by
electricity. In its upper part 60 woolen blankets are usually
stored.
The floor on the starboard side under units 3 and 4 fully
withstood the fire. On the port side, under unit 5, it disap-
peared. In front of this area, i.e., in the rear of the tourist
cabin, the floor melted over its entire width.
The fuselage walls resisted half way up the sides of the
cabin. Nothing remains of the top of the fuselage, the ceil-
ing and the lifesaving equipment (rafts) which are normally
stored over the access corridor to the tourist cabin.
2.16.4 Examination of the cabin
a) Galley, forward rest room, crew compartment
Damage by the fire involves only the upper third of this
space. The top of the fuselage is intact. The false ceiling
disappeared but the partitioning withstood. The rest rooms
suffered little from the fire.
In the crew compartment, the foam mattresses were only
partially burnt. The furniture in the galley was more
heated than burnt. The passenger and service doors oper-
ate normally. The extinguisher (water) placed near the pas-
senger door is intact, but the CO2 cartridge, swollen by the
heat, is empty.
b) First class cabin
The collapse of the top of the fuselage begins with the
first class cabin. Nothing remains of the arch above the line
of port holes beginning with the first rows of seats and con-
78
tinuing towards the rear. Laterally, the inner skin remains
in part. The air conditioning pipes are visible. The seats are
in place, and undeformed. Only the backs of the seats
burned completely. The carpet shows localized burns. The
partition separating first class from tourist has
disappeared.
¢c) Tourist class cabin
Over the wing the seats are completely burnt, but the
floor covering withstood. The inner wall coverings are to-
tally gone beyond the last wing exits. Over the landing
gear wells, the floor is intact. It sinks and then disappears
over the rear hold. Its destruction is not symmetrical. On
the port side, it is almost entirely destroyed over the entire
length of the hold. On the starboard side, its destruction is
practically limited to the space included between the two
hold doors. Similarly, the side wall withstood the fire bet-
ter on the starboard side than on the port side. It should be
noted that this port-side zone was used by the firemen to
gain access to the plane.
Nothing remains of the rear part of the tourist cabin, the
debris from which fell into the baggage hold.
2.16.5 Examination of the rear baggage hold
The rear baggage hold extends from the main landing
gear wells to the axis of the rear galley door. This hold has
two doors on the starboard side. On either side of the sec-
ond door are found the oxygen reserve of the normal cabin
circuit and in the rear, the water reserve for the rest rooms
and the rear galley.
The structure of this hold is that part of the plane most
damaged from the skidding of the plane over the ground.
Neither the keel nor the bottom of the hull gave way, but
both were misshapen. The skin was torn along a generating
line on the port side of the hold and in the rear.
The condition of one of the edges of the opening shows
that the fire had not yet reached this area at the time of the
crash.
All passenger luggage had been placed in this hold. Most
of this luggage was only partially burnt. Damage caused by
the fire is distinctly more substantial in the rear than in the
front, and for each of these two sectors, front and rear,
79
damage is greater when moving away from the floor of the
hold. When this hold was cleaned out no major, localized
source of heat was noted which would have allowed the pos-
sibility of luggage combustion.
The most calcinated area is at the level of the oxygen
tanks (three 3,200 liter tanks—pressure 120 bars). These
tanks emptied themselves but did not explode. The crash
did not tear them from their support, but it is probable that
the damage to the oxygen pipes is the result of deforma-
tions caused by the impact, although it may be that the
damage resulted from the heat of the fire or the interven-
tion of the rescuers.
This would explain the fact that the oxygen ejected
through the overpressure valves was not directed out-
wards, as is normally the case, but spread through the
hold. This would explain the intense burning in this area
and in particular the melting of the cabin floor above this
zone.
The pressure safety valve located in front of this hold
was recovered in good condition. The rear flow valve of the
pressure system was also recovered in good condition. This
valve is located outside the hold in the compartment which
is unused because it is too low. This compartment extends
the rear hold as far as the rear pressure dome. This space
contains only the air conditioning pipes of the rest room
zone, the water and drain pipes and the tail unit control ca-
bles. It has no direct access to the outside. The only possi-
ble access is gained by dismantling the partition in the back
of the baggage hold. This partition is not impermeable so
that proper pressurization of the hold can be maintained.
The only electrical supply in this space involve the de-icing
of the water pipes and the operation of the flow regulating
and thrust recovery valves.
This compartment was damaged by the fire only to the
right of the perforations o: the upper floor.
In summary, the observations made in the rear hold and
in the compartment next to it appear to eliminate the possi-
bility that the fire started there.
2.16.6 Examination of the forward holds
The forward baggage hold is situated between the elec-
tronic hold and the air conditioning compartment.
80
Neither the heat nor the impact damaged these three
spaces. A slight coating of soot can be seen in the baggage
hold, which contained only the suitcases of the crew and
some flight supplies.
The three oxygen tanks of the cockpit circuit are intact
but empty. The finishings and the oxygen distributing har-
ness are also intact.
The plane’s battery was not destroyed in the crash.
The air-conditioning units situated under the fuselage,
behind the forward hold were partially torn away when the
plane skidded along the ground.
2.16.7 Examination of the electrical circuits
a) Main supply
Examination of the mechanic’s console reveals that the
primary bus-tar was connected to alternator 3.
The surviving mechanic states that his co-worker turned
off alternators 1, 2 and 4 shortly before the crash.
The main relays were removed and evaluated. The fol-
lowing positions were found:
Excitation relay (GCR)
No. Control Pane! ZJ 3197 OL3552 XM 4356 UM 4311
GCR off on off off
Circuit breaker engaged engaged engaged engaged
Line relay (GB)
Number 11.662 11.668 11.641 19.617
GB off off off off
Coupling relay (BTB)
Number 23.401 ML 19.249 ML 27.983 ML 27.986
BTB on on on on
All of these units were verified as to their operation. They
were all found to be in operating condition with the mini-
mum required performances.
The switching off of the circuit breaker of Control Panel 4
is not significant. This circuit-breaker protects the bypass
circuit of the excitation relay and is only involved in the
start-up of the plane without voltage.
The positions found on the main relays suggest the follow-
ing hypothesis. During descent, the crew switched off the
line relays. The switching off of excitation relays no. 1, no. 3
and no. 4 is merely the consequence of the action of the auto-
81
matic protection devices following the damage suffered by
the primry power supply upon impact.
b) Distribution circuits
A major portion of these circuits passes through the ceil-
ing of the forward hold, an area which was not touched by
the fire. Examination of the conductors showed no damage.
c) Rear rest-room circuits
Seven circuits involve the rear rest-rooms:
1) Signals—This circuit illuminates a flashing light in
each rest room when the signs “Fasten your seat belts” are
operating. The light is located in the backing of the sink.
This circuit is protected by circuit-breaker 77 in panel P. 6.
The mechanic pointed out that the electric circuits of the
rear rest rooms were broken, one by one, from the circuit-
breaker panels, one of the circuit-breakers from the last row
of panel P. 6 was already switched off. He re-engaged it but
it switched off again.
After the mechanic examined the wreckage, he certified
that the circuit breaker in question was one of the following:
75. NO SMOKING off
76 NO SMOKING off
77 RETURN TO SEAT off
78 SEAT BELT on
79 SEAT BELT off
80 LAVATORY DOME LIGHT off
He cannot positively identify the circuit-breaker which had
switched itself off, but believes it to be number 77, RE-
TURN TO SEAT.
2) De-icing of water pipes —This is a heating coil which
surrounds the water pipes and a resistor which de-ices the
drain pipe. The latter circuit is protected by circuit-
breakers 4 and 33 in P1. The heating coil is supplied by the
toilet-flushing circuit by a fuse and a thermo-switch.
The pipes are located in the empty compartment under
the rest-rooms and which was only slightly damaged by the
fire. It is improbable that a short-circuit in this area started
the fire.
3) Rest room light —This circuit, signalling that the rest-
rooms are occupied, is almost entirely outside the rest
rooms themselves. It is protected by circuit-breaker 40 in
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P.7. Damage to it was so severe that no valid observation
could be made.
4) Razor power supply—This circuit supplies the razor
outlet situated on the back of the sink. It is protected by
circuit-breakers 14 in P.1 and 45 in P.5. The converter (one
for the three rest-rooms) is also protected by fuses. Dam-
age was so great that no valid observation could be made.
5) Rest room lighting—These circuits are protected by
circuit-breakers 19 and 22 in P.4 and 80 in P.6. The degree
of damage did not allow any valid conclusions to be drawn.
6) Flushing of toilets—This circuit supplies one pump
per toilet which flushes the bowl. It also supplies the re-
heating of the drain pipes. It is protected by circuit-breaker
25 in P.4. This circuit was also severely damaged by the
fire.
7) Water heater—This circuit is the most critical, on the
one hand because of the power installed and on the other,
because of the position of the water-heaters which are
placed in the space used as a receptacle for used paper tow-
els. The three water-heaters of the rear rest-rooms are
supplied by 115 triphase V. This circuit is protected by
circuit-breakers 7, 8 and 9 in P.3. Two phases supply the
heating resistors (400 W). The third controls the heating
relay by means of a thermostat. In addition to this ther-
mostat which is released at 52°, two overheat thermostats
in series with the heating rods, cut off the power when the
temperature reaches 71°.
An exhaustive study of the incidents involving the water-
heaters had been undertaken with the collaboration of the
Air France Company. The results of this study produced no
conclusive facts until January, 1974, when two serious inci-
dents occurred.
In the first incident (F-BHSI-January 5, 1974), a passen-
ger noted that there was smoke in the rear lavatory. Visual
inspecton revealed that the feed wires of the water-heater
had burned and melted in the coupler. The feed wires had
fallen into the used paper towels.
Upon dismantling, the heating coil was found to be burnt
along a generating line.
83
In the second case (F-BHSP-January 18, 1974) a steward
pointed out that there was no more hot water in the rear
rest room. Once again, the feed wires were found to be bro-
ken. The insulating part of the connector which contains
the two coupler plugs was burnt had been ejected from the
metal body of the coupler. The feed wires had fallen into
the used paper towels.
The two heating rocs have the following points in
common:
—corroded areas appear on the metal casing of the rods;
—the rods became swollen;
—one of the coupler pins was melted.
However, it was noted that in the first case the neoprene
joint between the heating rod and the coupler was swollen
outwards while in the second case, the joint was in place,
but the insulating assembly of the coupler was ejected.
The analysis of the heating rods in question, conducted at
the “Centre d’Essais des Propulseurs”, as well as those
which had shown low insulating resistance during the in-
spection campaign, made it possible to determine how the
breakdown occurred.
When the casing is perforated by corrosion, water ab-
sorbs the magnesium in which the resistor is embedded.
Under the influence of successive heatings, the water trav-
els toward the chamber at the base of the rod. The accumu-
lation of water in this chamber then causes a short-circuit
between the extremities of the resistor and the base of the
casing. This short-circuit heats and burns the coupler. The
steam pressure in the chamber can be sufficient to eject the
coupler.
The water-heaters of the PP-VJZ were evaluated in the
light of these observations. The internal coloring of the
water-heaters srows that they withstood a temperature
over 600°. With the exception of one of the heating rods of
the right front water-heater, all of the current supply sock-
ets disappeared.
Oxidation of the water-heaters and the rods appears to
be due solely to the effect of the fire.
84
The resistor casings are intact and the electrical elements
in good condition.
The insulating defect of the rods of the rear water-heater
is due to deposits originating from the combustion of the in-
sulators of the wires which connect to the sockets.
Briefly, there is nothing to indicate that the water-
heaters were the origin of the fire.
The electric water-supply control circuit is located out-
side the rest rooms and was not taken into consideration.
2.16.8 Examination of the air-conditioning circuits
The principal elements of the air-conditioning circuits in
the fuselage were removed for evaluation.
Following are the main observations noted upon
dismantling:
1. The internal condition of the circuits excludes the pos-
sibility of overheating or escape of smoke from this system.
2. The insulating valve of the right wing is closed, that of
the left wing is open. This confirms the indications of the
mechanic’s panel. The only possible sources then are
turbocharger no. 2 and taps 1 and 2. The mechanic’s panel
provides no certainty as to the functioning of turbocharger
no. 2, but indicates that tap no. 1 was in service and that
tap no. 2 was cut off. It may be noted that the operations
carried out by the crew correspond precisely with the
emergency procedure for smoke originating from the air-
conditioning system.
8. The thrust recovery valves are closed. The automatic
radio ventilation valve is open. These positions correspond
to normal, automatic operation when the differential pres-
sure becomes low.
2.17 Additional Information
2.17.1 VARIG instructions in case of fire
Chapter I of the VARIG Company’s emergency proce-
dures (January 1972 edition) covers smoke and fire
problems.
—Paragraph 1.1 deals with engine fires.
—Paragraph 1.2 concerns fires and smoke of electrical
origin
85
In the latter case, the procedure is divided into three
phases:
Phase I
. Put on masks and goggles (crew)
Open oxygen to 100% (crew)
Connect the intercom
Turn on white lighting
Compensate the plane for manual control
Open all line relays and coupling relays.
If the smoke persists:
Phase II
7. Close all line relays
8. Transfer power supply of left horizon
9. Place primary bus-bar selector on park
If the smoke persists:
10. Open the battery switch
11. Open circuit-breaker of bus-bar 28 volts D.C.
12. Open circuit-breaker of primary rectifying
transformer
13. Open circuit-breaker of ampli-intercom
14. Re-activate bus-bar
—Paragraph 1.2 concerns the emission of smoke through
the air-conditioning system.
The initial part of the procedure is aimed at locating the
source and halting the escape of smoke. The second part
deals with the evacuation of the smoke.
Phase I
Put on masks and goggies (crew)
Open oxygen to 100% (crew)
Connect the intercom
Close thrust-recovery valves
Turn off individual air vent
Activate turbocharger no. 2 or taps 1 and 2
. Close right wing insulating valve
If the smoke persists:
8. Open right wing insulating valve
9. Activate turbochargers 3 and 4 or taps 3 and 4
10. Close left wing insulating valve
P Oe CO tO
NP oP wre
86
If the smoke persists:
11. Close the left air-conditioning unit
If the smoke persists:
12. Open left air-conditioning unit
13. Close right air-conditioning unit
If the smoke persists
Descend to an altitude which is compatible with the safe-
ty and performance of the plane. Follow the procedures for
non-pressurized flight.
Phase II
a) Pressurized flight
Evacuation of smoke during pressurized flight is normal-
ly achieved with the usual ventilation. In cases of substan-
tial quantities of smoke, the following procedure supplies
maximum ventilation.
1. Put on masks and goggles (crew)
2. Open oxygen to 100% (crew)
3. Connect intercom
4. Increase cabin altitude (10,000 feet)
5. Activate maximum turbochargers and taps
Do not exceed an overpressure gain of 20 inches of water
Do not depressurize.
b) Non-pressurized flight
Smoke evacuation is better during pressurized flight.
Use the following procedure only during non-pressurized
flight:
1, Put on masks and goggles (crew)
2. Open oxygen to 100% (crew)
8. Connect intercom
4. Find holding speed
5. Open co-pilot window.
Paragraph 1.4 deals with landing-gear fires
Paragraph 1.5 concerns cargo hold fires.
2.17.2 Numerous analyses, evaluations and verifications
were performed. Among the most important requested by
the Board of Inquiry are the following:
87
—the evaluation performed by Colonel DUSCH of the
Paris Fire Department concerning the origins and
spreading of the fire in the PP-VJZ;
—the studies of escaping smoke undertaken by the
Toulouse Aeronautical Test Center;
—the research carried out by various airline companies,
in particular AIR INTER and UNITED AIRLINES,
and by the BOEING Company concerning the prob-
lems of smoke evacuation.
3. ANALYSIS OF THE FACTS
3.1 Locating The Origin Of The Fire
3.1.1 The examination of the wreckage reveals that the
zone where the fire initially broke out and developed is the
portion of pressurized cabin located over the cabin floor and
behind the tourist-class galley, i.e., in the space occupied
by the 3 rear rest rooms, the closet and the central corridor
giving access to them.
This examination, confirmed by other observations made,
makes it possible to eliminate the hypothesis of a hold fire.
Similarly, the hypothesis of a fire originally fed by the
fuel or hydraulic fluid was deemed unlikely due to the loca-
tion of these circuits and verifications made after the
accident.
3.1.2 Although witnesses directed research operations
on the rest rooms themselves, the possibility of a fire in the
space between the ceiling of the habitable sector of the
above-defined critical zone and the fuselage was not
eliminated.
Several electric cable systems pass through this space,
parallel to the plane’s axis and on either side of the sym-
metrical plane. The only cables carrying considerable pow-
er are those which supply the electric motors of the hori-
zontal stabilizer.
The servo-trim motor, which revolves permanently when
automatic pilot is functioning, absorbs three amperes per
phase under 115 volts.
The motor of the manually-controlled trim absorbs 15 am-
peres per phase under 115 volts when the pilot activates
88
the control-stick switches. This motor is used intermittent-
ly and for a few seconds at a time.
The pilots found no irregularity in the depth compensa-
tion during the initial descent.
In addition, no prior incident of short-circuiting on these
cable sysems was found for this type of plane.
Moreover, considering the distance of these cables from
combustible elements which could have gtarted the fire,
and considering the fact that the characteristic odor of
heated electrical insulators was not noted, the Board feels
that it is very unlikely that the fire originated in the false
ceiling of the rear zone of the cabin.
3.1.8 As concerns the discovery of the smoke, precise
and concordant statements from two eye witnesses are
available, Messrs. CARMELINO and TERSIS.
When their attention was drawn to the port-side rest
room, no flames were visible. The smoke occupied at most
the upper third of the rest room, It did not appear to be
issuing from any fixed place. The restroom continued to be
invaded by the smoke without locating its source.
Two hypotheses may be made:
—the fire started in the port rest room.
—the fire started in the adjacent space. It developed un-
known to the occupants. It was detected only when the
smoke had penetrated into the port-side lavatory. This
adjoins both the closet and the end starboard lavatory,
symmetrical to the port lavatory.
The closet consists of two partitions perpendicular to the
plane’s axis, against the side of the port fuselage. A simple
curtain is all that separates it from the center aisle. It has
an air inlet halfway up the wall of the fuselage. Re-
ventilation occurs through the passenger cabin. Any escape
of smoke in the closet, therefore, would only be evident in
the cabin and not in the rest room next-door.
It can be deduced that the fire did not start in the closet,
but in one of the two lavoratories located in the extreme
rear.
89
3.2 Study Of The Risks Of Fire And The Conditions For A
Fire Developing In The Extreme Rear Lavoratories.
3.2.1 Since the layout of the rear lavatories is identical,
_ the study of the possibilities of a fire is equally valid for ei-
ther one.
The rest-rooms are not equipped with combustible mate-
rials. American regulations establish conditions to be met
so that a fire cannot be caused easily, but there is no re-
quirement regarding emissions of smoke.
The manufacturer states that these materials comply
with standard CAR 4B-381 in effect when the plane was
placed in service.
However, a flame test carried out on the flap of a waste-
elimination trap door recovered from one of the forward
lavatories which was little damaged by the fire, showed
that this element was easily inflammable.
However, the fixtures do not constitute the greatest
source of risk. The risk is present in the large quantity of
paper in the form of hand-towels, napkins, seat-covers, etc.
There are three main stores of paper in the rear
lavatories:
a) the cupboard located against the rear pressure bulk-
head. No electric circuit passes through this space. It
consists of an iron case the front of which can be lowered.
This front surface is pierced by a slot, forming a distributor
of seat-covers.
This cupboard is separated from the toilet by a space
which is usually empty.
b) the towel-distributor, located over the sink, on the
wall of the fuselage, midway in height between the sink and
the lavatory ceiling. No electric circuit passes through it. It
consists of a plastic, bulging drop-leaf. The drop-leaf has
several openings for the distribution of various products.
c) the sink, the inside of which serves for the disposal of
90
This rear surface is covered by a piece of sheet metal at-
tached to the fuselage couplings, assuring the continuity of
the inner covering of the fuselage in the lavoratories.
The side and top surfaces are made of agglomerated
wood. The front surface is made of plastic-covered wood.
The sink itself, the bow! and its back are made ofa
shaped sheet of stainless steel.
A perforated center partition divides the sink unit into
two compartments.
Under the sink bowl there is the electrical box, an elec-
trical control box and a water-heater protected by sheet
metal.
This space is also the receptacle for used papers. These
are normally thrown through a trap located over the back
of the sink and accumulated under the sink. There is no
wastepaper basket strictly speaking, probably because of
the pipes and cables which pass through this area. There is
only a bin, 5 em high, protecting the lower part of this
compartment.
The compartment next to it is occupied by metal drawers
used as receptacles for paper bags. These drawers are filled
through traps located on the front surface of the sink unit,
and are removed through the other compartment.
There is no electrical installation in this second part of
the sink unit. It should be noted that this second part does
not extend as far as the pressure bulkhead.
The presence of reinforcing corner plates, to the right of
the coupling of the rear dome, creates a horseshoe-shaped
space common to both rear lavatories and which is
unusable. This space extends from the floor of the port lav-
atory to the floor of the starboard lavatory, passing
through the ceiling of both lavatories.
This space is separated from the lavatories by a light
plastic-covered wooden fixture. The cables previously men-
tioned pass through the ceiling on their way to the tail
cone. Laterally, the only piece of equipment is the loud-
speaker for passenger announcements.
The partition dividing the sink unit and this space is per-
forated with a hole approximately 15 cm in diameter.
91
3.2.2 The risks of fire are increased by the fact that easi-
ly ignitable materials exist near a possible hot point.
The focal points of heat considered are either electrical in
origin or the result of a human failing, such as carelessly
throwing away a lighted cigarette butt.
Prior known incidents of electrical origin on the B-707,
other than the problem of the heating rods which became
known after the accident, involve the following points:
—Power supply for the razor
—Power supply for the fluorescent lighting of the mirror
—Power supply for the toilet flushing motor.
Except for the cabling of the razor socket, these circuits
are not near easily inflammable items.
Examination of the locaton of combustible items reveals
that the three storage areas for paper show different risks
of fire.
It would appear difficult for the two paper distributors to
become ignited electrically.
In addition, it is easy to throw a cigarette butt into the
distributor located over the sin [sic], but much more diffi-
cult to do so in the distributor located over the toilets.
Moreover, the piling up of papers in the distributors does
not facilitate combustion.
On the other hand, in the area used to throw soiled pa-
pers, all of the conditions are present for a cigarette butt or
electrical incident to trigger a fire, the seriousness of which
depends on the volume of papers accumulated therein.
In this particular accident, involving a long flight (11
hours) with almost total occupancy of the tourist class sec-
tion (97 passengers out of 109 available seats), it can rightly
be supposed that the space used to dispose of papers was
full
This long voyage also allows the possibility that many of
the used paper towels had had time to dry. The air, which
is normally extremely dry during flight, is heated inside the
sink unit by the heat losses of the water-heater.
Investigations following the accident of the PP-VJZ re-
vealed that space used for disposing of papers often con-
tained cigarette butts. This would seem to indicate that the
92
ashtray placed on the front surface of the sink unit was not
adequately visible.
In summary, the risk of fire has been established as
follows:
—Distributor over toilet: low risk
— Distributor over sink: average risk linked with passen-
ger carelessness
—Trash-disposal space: high risk, both in the eventuality
of passenger carelessness as well as in the eventuality of an
electrical incident.
3.2.3 During pressurized flight, the air circulates in the
lavatory as follows: the air arrives partly from the individu-
al vent, in part from the ceiling, in part from the center
aisle. It is evacuated from a collector located on the level of
the toilet seat and eliminated directly to the exterior.
If fire breaks out in one of the distributors, not only
would their structure prevent the smoke from escaping
elsewhere than in the lavatory, but the forced ventilation
could only bring the smoke back.
It should be pointed out that the forced ventilation did
not contribute to the propagation of the fire in its initial
stage.
The fire in the sink unit has different characteristics. The
volume of air in the unit and the wrinkling of the paper fa-
vor an extremely rapid development of the fire. This could
develop in three different directions:
—upwards toward the trash-disposdl trap
—laterally, toward the case containing the loud-speaker
—downwards if the sink’s plastic drain pipe
(depressurized) is perforated.
It should also be noted that the flexible piping connecting
the individual vent to its supply piping is made of flexible
rubber. It could rapidly deteriorate and create a owrant of
air directly on the source of the fire.
3.3 Discussion And Hypotheses Retained
3.3.1 First hypothesis: Fire in the port lavatory.
The fact that the passenger was leaving the port lavatory
indicates that the smoke had just begun to escape, other-
wise she would not have entered the lavatory.
93
If the fire originated in this lavatory, this would signify
that it had just started.
It is difficult to imagine that if the source of smoke origi-
nated from one of the distributors, it could not have been
located and that no flames were quickly seen.
It is more likely that the smoke originated from a fire in
the sink unit. The supposed short-circuit of the “Return to
seat” circuit would corroborate this hypothesis (see page
29).
One of the few objective indications consists of the stop-
page of the recorder the supply of which passes through the
ceiling of the starboard ‘avatory, then in the unused space
common to both lavatories and located over the toilets.
In order for this electric circuit to be cut off by fire in the
port lavatory—which occurred almost at the same time the
crew was signalling to ATC that there was a fire
aboard—the fire had to advance very rapidly in the unused
space and damage the cabling.
This appears doubtful, since there is little combustible
material in this area, and the draft is limited as long as the
case’s fixture is still in place.
3.3.2 Fire in the starboard lavatory.
The survivors indicated that the door of the starboard
lavatory was closed when the smoke was discovered, and
that no one opened this door thereafter.
It is certain that during pressurized flight and provided
that not too much smoke escapes, no odor, and therefore no
smoke would be detectable in the cabin if fire broke out in a
closed lavatory.
The time factor, which is especially troublesome in the
hypothesis of fire in the port lavatory, is no longer a prob-
lem in the hypothesis of a fire in the starboard lavatory.
The examination of the partitions of this forward lavato-
ry, which are of the same type, shows that they resist fire
well,
It is therefore possible that, when the smoke filtered into
the port lavatory, the development of the fire on the star-
board side was substantial. The ceiling of this lavatory is.
not highly resistant to fire. It can be thought that the fire
94
was already developing in the false ceiling, and this better
explains why the recorder stopped.
The fact that there was little escape of heat in the port
lavatory favors this hypothesis.
The violent invasion of smoke in the center aisle between
the lavatories corresponds to the breakage e* the vent
shafts supplying the ceiling vent for this aisle.
The advance of the fire toward the front can be explained
by the presence of lifesaving equipment above the galley
area, and by the nature of the cabin ceiling, made of
moulded plastic.
Although the hypothesis of a fire originating in the port
lavatory cannot be definitively excluded, it is more proba-
ble that the fire started and developed in the rear star-
board lavatory, most likely in the sink unit.
3.4 Action Taken By The Crew
Mechanic DIEFENTHALER, who was not on duty at
the time the smoke was discovered, played an important
role in the fire fighting effort undertaken by the cabin per-
sonnel as well as the cockpit personnel in an attempt to pre-
vent further development of the fire.
Although the cabin personnel intervened quickly with
fire extinguishers, their efforts were to no avail, since the
source of the fire was never located.
The hypothesis of a fire originating from an electrical in-
cident was plausible. The cutting off of all rest room cir-
cuits and the generation of non-essential power were logical
steps to take.
Increasing the altitude of the cabin is the recommended
method for accelerating the evacuation of smoke. This was
done.
Despite this, the smoke continued to advance. This pro-
gression, which was uneven in the cabin, led naturally to
the suspicion that there was a problem originating in the
air-conditioning sysem. Examination of the wreckage
shows that the emergency procedure for smoke emission
from the air-conditioning system had been begun.
The rapid development of events led the cockpit person-
nel to apply successively and partially, procedures relating
95
to various hypothesis and which were thereby not totally
consistent. When this fact is considered, it may be seen
that the actions of the crew were well-founded.
The cre
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