Amicus Curiae Brief — Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. United States
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GF JUL 29 1992
No. 90-1800
FICE OF THE CLERK
IN THE
Supreme Court of the GAnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1990
GRUMMAN AEROSPACE CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
¥i
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT BAR ASSOCIATION
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
PETITIONER, GRUMMAN AEROSPACE CORPORATION
OF COUNSEL: CLARENCE T. KIPPS, JR.
(Counsel of Record)
Cyrus E. PHILLIPS, IV MILLER & CHEVALIER,
McGuIRE, Woops, BATTLE CHARTERED
& BOOTHE Metropolitan Square
Suite 1000 Suite 900
1627 Eye Street, N.W. 655 Fifteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006 Washington, D.C. 20005-5701
(202) 626-5800
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae,
The Federal Circuit Bar Association
July 29, 1991
PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203
TABLE OF CONTENTS
FAG TE BUT EEMOD erccestiteitvciaancseesicsnseesecesses
THE AMICUS AND ITS INTERESTS .......................
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ...................
L.
Il.
If.
IV.
The Court of Claims’ and Federal Circuit’s
Decisions That Certification of Claims Is Ju-
- Tisdictional Hinder the Administration of
RU alae a
The Jurisdictions of the United States Claims
Court and the Boards of Contract Appeals
Is Not a Upon the Certification of
RD I SID. civennocsenctcccsnesicisononscenss
FAR 33. a ay Is Invalid Because It Con-
flicts with the Plain Language and Express
Purpose of the Statute It Purports To
ST itiinehiedienaucidipeiinenbiaiaetienspeiniienssinesss
A Decision Overruling Lehman Could Be
Limited To Prospective Application. ............
Se INNNET sctionsncektinnensvindbmacedihnasatesinauiiimkebiavinaiies
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Page
A. P. Green Export Company v. United States, 284
F.2d 383 (Ct. Cl. 1960) ........sccccesrrerseeereeessenees 17
Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986) .......sescceeeeees 17
Allied Painting & Decorating Co., ASBCA No.
42496 (June 10, 1991) .......cceerceesereeesereeseeees 5
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) ..........0++++ 17
Boeing Co. v. United States, 680 F.2d 132 (Ct. Cl.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1081 (1983) ....... 18
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) .....sesecseereeeees 18
Clark Mechanical Contractors v. United States, 12
Cl. Ct. 415 (1987) ...cccrcrccccccccccccccccesccssssosssessees 7,8
Harbert Int’l, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 41144, 41571 (June
DE. TODA) ncncnascresiessernssnsnterechocciarzsmeonstessnneogenssss 4
JAYCOR, ASBCA No. 40911 (June 10, 1991)....... 5
Lake Shore, Inc., ASBCA No. 42578 (June 11,
TODD) .cncaccocasecsccreesesedassoonesssccssarteteneesoeronesecebssase 5
Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co.,
ASBCA No. 83244 (June 26, 1991) .............++ 4
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) .......-cee0e 17
Paul E. Lehman, Inc. v. United States, 673 F.2d
B52 (Ct. Cl. 1982) ..........ccccccsrcccserecsssrscssscsseoes 11,12
Placeway Construction Corp. v. United States, 920
F.2d 903 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ..........cccsssserseesseeeees 7
Sademi Joint Venture, ASBCA No. 41025 (June 4,
BODE) scevsssnieiscievorcicccntersessevcnsmnamcomnentapelnsae 5
Service Engineering Co., ASBCA No. 33787 (June
DB, TIED ccivcicecesonssesencssncsonsvinessesotecnemnvinsesannnrannts 5
Skelly and Loy v. United States, 685 F.2d 414 (Cl.
CE, RID ou citensesencsicpsacentonsctnseensssseaiomnpmvenmernaares 5
Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638 (1984) ..............000 17
ili
Table of Authorities Continued
Page
Union Boiler Works, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 41857,
41858, 41860 (June 27, 1991) wooo. eececcccceceeee. 4
United States v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 927
F.2d 575 (Fed. Cir. 1991) oo....ececccccescocceceeess.. passim
United States v. W.H. Moseley Co., 730 F.2d 1472
i caseaneane, 6,7
W.H. Moseley Co. v. United States, 677 F.2d 850
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 836 (1982) oo....eececcccess. 6
William L. Crow Constr. Co., ASBCA Nos. 40998,
ES | eae 5
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385
i eos sas eresveameresecsice..,. 13,14
Statutes:
Do ccunenseseuenes 3
Contract Disputes Act of 1978,
er 2,8
a 9
Ee 9
| ee passim
I Ge os csnscessevsnscouséckadeaccoseserss. 6,10,15
MID ic cccscnvevencosceoseoesecesacoe.eees,., 10,14
RN TMD oo cinecnscsenresocersseescosseoscossesessess,. 6
io cs canccponsveosiorscosueeoseesce, 10
8 11,14
Regulations:
Federal Acquisition Regulation Subpart 33.207(c\2),
RS, BCR coccccccsecseassenseoose.,.,..... passim
iv
Table of Authorities Continued
Legislative Materials:
Contract Disputes Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-563,
92 Stat. 2383
(codified at 41 U.S.C. §§ IED sic coseciicdiccasese
§ 2(4), 92 Stat. 2383 .......cercerresereerserseseereeeees
§ G(cK1), 92 Stat. 2385 .......cecceeeeereerreeeererees
Federal Courts Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-164 92 Stat. 25 .........ccccccceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeenes
H.R. Rep. No. 1556, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) .
S. Rep. No. 1118, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
«sien dacaesunambibteibessssanenmeeniesuevasnshaguvnss
124 Cong. Rec. 31,641-46 (1978) .....-.:-csseseereeeseeees
124 Cong. Rec. 36,261-68 (1978) .....-..sssseeseeeseeees
124 Cong. Rec. 37,074-76 (1978) ......sssseessreseeerees
9
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1990
No. 90-1800
GRUMMAN AEROSPACE CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT BAR ASSOCIATION
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
PETITIONER, GRUMMAN AEROSPACE CORPORATION
The Federal Circuit Bar Association, with the con-
sent of all parties, submits this brief amicus curiae
pursuant to Rule 37.2 of the Rules of this Court in
support of the petition for a writ of certiorari filed
by Grumman Aerospace Corporation.
THE AMICUS AND ITS INTERESTS
The Federal Circuit Bar Association is a national
organization with over 1,700 members. Its primary
purpose is to improve and facilitate the administration
of justice in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit.
Members of The Federal Circuit Bar Association
are directly affected by United States v. Grumman
Aerospace Corp., 927 F.2d 575 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The
decision has generated enormous confusion regarding
fundamental issues of the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the United States
Claims Court and the agency Boards of Contract
Appeals to hear and decide disputes pursuant to the
Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613.
The decision will serve only to increase the time and
expense of litigation without any offsetting benefit to
the administration of justice.
The Grumman panel has held that Federal Acqui-
sition Regulation (FAR) 33.207(c\2), 48 C.F.R. Ch. 1
(1990), a procurement regulation that purports to de-
scribe the persons who may properly certify non-in-
dividual contractor claims, is a reasonable explication
of the certification requirements of section 6(c\1) of
the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
563, 92 Stat. 2383, 2385 (codified at 41 U.S.C.
§ 605(c\1)) (the “‘Act’’). The Grumman panel viewed
the certification requirements of the Contract Dis-
putes Act as incomplete, and FAR 33.207(c\2) as fill-
ing the legislative gap. Grumman, 927 F.2d at 578-
79. In so holding, the Grumman panel disregarded
the plain meaning of the Contract Disputes Act and
the express intent of Congress in enacting that stat-
ute.
The Grumman decision has had a devastating im-
pact on pending cases. The Armed Services Board of
Contract Appeals has swa sponte directed parties to
review the certifications in more than one hundred
cases. Numerous motions to dismiss based on Grum-
man are being filed before agency boards, the Claims
Court, and in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit. Many of these claims and cases
have already been pending for many years. Indeed,
in some cases, the jurisdiction of the forum is being
challenged for the first time after trial. Government
contractors and the Bar cannot be sure whether claim
certifications submitted months, or even years ago,
will be considered proper, or will be challenged on
jurisdictional grounds.
The Grumman panel refused to revisit its earlier
decisions holding that certification was jurisdictional.
For the past nine years, those decisions have created
chaos over the effect to be given a failure to comply
with the technical certification requirements imposed
by the courts or by regulation. These requirements
are not imposed by the Act. Instead, for the most
part, they have been judicially legislated. These re-
quirements have been a colossal waste of judicial re-
sources and a major frustration of the Contract
Disputes Act.
While the court has allowed the recertification and
resubmission of defective claims, the result does not
eliminate the enormous waste of resources and ex-
pense in litigating issues unrelated to the merits of
the claims. Moreover, the eighteen-month statute of
limitations for the filing of claims on shipbuilding con-
tracts (10 U.S.C. § 2405) has recently been raised as
a possible bar to resubmission. If upheld, the result
would be that millions of dollars in valid claims could
be voided because of ambiguous technicalities.
The Federal Circuit Bar Association and its mem-
bers have a direct and substantial interest in the is-
EN hai ii dct wie oes a
sues presented to this Court by Grumman Aerospace
Corporation’s petition, and in urging this Court to
review and reverse the decision of the court below.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
The Court of Claims and Federal Circuit decisions
holding that the certification requirement in the Con-
tracts Disputes Act is jurisdictional have spawned
hundreds upon hundreds of useless decisions and will
continue to waste judicial resources and frustrate the
purposes of the Act until those cases are overruled.
The Federal Acquisition Regulation applied by the
court to limit the contractor representatives qualified
to certify for the contractor is contrary to the plain
terms and purpose of the Act and is invalid.
I. The Court of Claims’ and Federal Circuit’s Decisions
That Certification of Claims Is Jurisdictional Hinder the
Administration of Justice.
No issue arising under the Contract Disputes Act
has generated as much litigation as the technicalities
of claim certification. As identified in the attached
Appendix, the validity of the contractor certification
has been litigated in approximately one hundred cases
before the Federal Circuit, the Court of Claims, and
the Claims Court. The countless decisions of the
agency Boards of Contract Appeals far exceed this
number but are illustrated by the fact that in the
single month of June 1991, the Armed Services Board
of Contract Appeals issued nine published decisions
addressing the adequacy of claims certification.'
"1 Union Boiler Works, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 41857, 41858, 41860
(June 27, 1991); Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co.,
ASBCA No. 33244 (June 26, 1991); Harbert Int’l, Inc., ASBCA
oO
These hundreds of cases discuss in detail the tech-
nicalities of the precise words necessary for the cert-
ification, who can sign the certification, whether a
change in the amount of the claim requires a new
certification, whether the claim is a contractor claim
or a claim by the Government against the contractor
for which a certification is unnecessary, and when the
certification is required to be submitted.? This body
of decisional law evinces an enormous but pointless
investment of the resources of the courts, the Boards
of Contract Appeals and the parties. These decisions a
contradict the fundamental purpose of the Contract
Disputes Act, which is to provide fair and expeditious
resolution of government contract disputes.
This waste of resources accomplishes nothing. The
only result is to delay the fair consideration of the
contractors ¢laim. As the Court of Claims held in
Skelly and Loy v. United States, 685 F.2d 414, 419
(Ct. Cl. 1982) and as the Federal Circuit repeated in
Nos. 41144, 41571 (June 25, 1991); William L. Crow Constr.
Co., ASBCA Nos. 40998, 41508 (June 14, 1991); Lake Shore,
Inc., ASBCA No. 42578 (June 11, 1991); JAYCOR, ASBCA No.
40911 (June 10, 1991); Allied Painting & Decorating Co., ASBCA
No. 42496 (June 10, 1991); Sademi Joint Venture, ASBCA No.
41025 (June 4, 1991); Service Engineering Co., ASBCA No. 33787
(June 3, 1991).
*The Appendix indicates the certification issue presented in
each of the listed cases. The Appendix also sets forth the date
that the claim at issue was submitted to the Contracting Officer
for decision and the date the court or Board issued its decision
addressing the validity of the certification. Typically several years
elapsed between these dates. In those cases in which the claim
was dismissed because the certification was deemed inadequate,
all of these years of effort were lost since the contractor is
required to begin the process anew with a refiled and recertified
claim.
a ahi a i
Grumman, 927 F.2d at 581, the ‘‘proper course’ for
a contractor whose claim is dismissed for lack of a
valid certification is to “‘(1) properly certify the claim;
(2) resubmit the claim to the contracting officer; and
(3) if there is then an adverse contracting officer’s
decision, appeal either to the board (section 606) or
directly to this court (section 609).”’
The absurdity and unfairness of this result is ap-
parent in cases such as United States v. W.H. Moseley
Co., 730 F.2d 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984). In Moseley, the
contractor submitted a claim for over $1,000,000 in
1979. The following year the contracting officer is-
sued her final decision denying the claim and advised
the contractor in writing of its right to appeal the
decision either under the disputes clause of the con-
tract, or under the Contract Disputes Act. Pursuant
to the transition rules then in effect, the contractor
elected to proceed to the Court of Claims under the
Act. Notwithstanding thé contracting officer’s instruc-
tions to the company, the Government moved to dis-
miss the appeal on the grounds that the contractor
had failed to certify the claim and consequently could
not appeal under the Act. The court granted the Gov-
ernment’s motion in W.H. Moseley Co. v. United
States, 677 F.2d 850, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 836 (1982).
The contractor then certified and refiled its claim,
but the contracting officer refused to accept it, ar-
guing that her prior decision was valid. Pursuant to
the Act, the contractor obtained an order from the
Department of Agriculture Board of Contract Appeals
directing the contracting officer to issue a new final
decision, but the Government appealed that decision
to the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit dismissed
the appeal as interlocutory, leaving the jurisdictional
issue undecided until after the Board decided the mer-
its. 730 F.2d at 1475-76. Thus, five years after the
claim was filed, the contractor was allowed for the
first time to present the merits of its case, but with
the threat that on appeal, jurisdiction might once
again be found lacking. The Federal Circuit imposed
this senseless result notwithstanding its regret that
‘some contractors ... have become entangled in a
procedural maze created by uncertainties regarding
the proper application of the Act’s provisions.’’ 730
F.2d at 1476.
Even when the contractor prevails, the litigation of
certification issues results in substantial delays and
expense, and wastes the resources of the courts. For
example, in Placeway Construction Corp. v. United
States, 920 F.2d 903 (Fed. Cir. 1990), the contractor
filed a claim in 1986. In 1987, suit was filed in the
Claims Court, but the case was dismissed on certi-
fication grounds. In 1990, the Federal Circuit re-
versed the Claims Court’s dismissal and remanded the
case for proceedings on the merits. After four years
and three published decisions, the parties finally
turned to the merits of the dispute.
The Claims Court’s and Federal Circuit’s decisions
on certification produce a result that is contrary to
the express purpose of the Act. The repercussions of
these decisions were well summarized by Chief Judge
Smith of the Claims Court as he reluctantly dismissed
the contractor’s suit in Clark Mechanical Contractors-
v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 415 (1987). Judge Smith
concluded by stating:
The plaintiff in this case is not barred by the
statute of limitations from refiling, but is
being required to waste judicial resources as
~—well as its own and the government’s re-
sources. The plaintiff must refile the identical
claim with the contracting officer; the only
difference being that the claim will now be
certified before filing rather than after. Upon
receipt of a final decision, the plaintiff can
either refile with this court or appeal to the
Board of Contract Appeals.
12 Cl. Ct. at 417 (emphasis added).
These decisions are contrary to the fair adminis-
tration of justice and warrant review by this Court.
The petition for writ of certiorari should be granted
and the decision of the Federal Circuit reversed.
II. The Jurisdictions of the United States Claims Court
and the Boards of Contract Appeals Are Not Dependant
Upon the Certification of the Underlying Claim.
The-linchpin of the Federal Circuit’s decision below
was its reaffirmation that the absence of certification
of a claim pursuant to Section 6(c\1) of the Contract
Disputes Act deprives a Board of Contract Appeals
or the Claims Court of jurisdiction to hear a contract
dispute. This holding is erroneous. The Contract Dis-
putes Act of 1978 grants jurisdiction to the Boards
and the Claims Court to hear appeals of any final
decision of a contracting officer. This grant of juris-
diction is unconditional; certification of the underlying
claim is unrelated to the authority of these forums
to resolve contract disputes.
The Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 41 U.S.C.
§§ 601-613, was enacted in order to provide a “‘fair,
3 Public Law 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383.
balanced, and comprehensive statutory system of legal
and administrative remedies in resolving Government
contract claims.”* The Act was based on the rec-
ommendations of the Commission on Government
Procurement, established pursuant to Pub. Law 91-
129. Senate Report at 4; House Report at 5-6.
The disputes resolution process embodied in the Act
is intended, in the first instance, to encourage the
parties to resolve controversies through negotiation.
Failing that, however, the Act grants the Govern-
ment’s contracting officer the right to unilaterally de-
cide the dispute by issuing a “‘final decision.”’ Section
6(a) of the Act, 41 U.S.C. § 605(a), provides that all
claims by the contractor against the Government, or
by the Government against the contractor, shall be
the subject of a final decision. That decision is final
and conclusive unless appealed by the contractor. 41
U.S.C. § 605(b).
A cornerstone of the Contract Disputes Act was
Congress’ decision to permit the contractor to appeal
any adverse final decision to either the agency’s Board
of Contract Appeals, or to the United States Court
of Claims.’ To this end, the Act granted, without
4S. Rep. No. 95-1118, Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1978\hereafter ‘‘Senate Report’’). See also
H.R. Rep. No. 95-1556, Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 95th
Cong., 2d. Sess. 5-6 (1978\hereafter “‘House Report’’).
5 In 1982, the Federal Courts Improvements Act, Pub. Law.
97-164, 96 Stat. 25, was enacted. That statute created the United
States Claims Court and transferred the contract jurisdiction of
the Court of Claims to that new court. The statute also created
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and provided for
the appeal of the decisions of the Claims Court or of the Boards
of Contract Appeals to that Circuit.
10
condition or qualification, jurisdiction to both the
Claims Court and Boards of Contract Appeals to de-
cide appeals of final decisions. With respect to the
Boards of Contract Appeals, § 7 of the Act, 41 U.S.C.
§ 606, provides that the contractor may appeal to any
agency Board of Contract Appeals within ninety days
of receipt of the final decision. Section 8(d) of the
Act, 41 U.S.C. § 607(d), grants jurisdiction to the
Boards to decide these appeals, stating:
Each agency Board shall have jurisdiction to
decide any appeal from a decision of a con-
tracting officer (1) relative to a contract made
by its agency, and (2) relative to a contract
made by any other agency when such agency
or the Administrator has designated the
agency board to decide the appeal. In exer-
cising this jurisdiction, the agency board is
authorized to grant any relief that would be
available to a litigant asserting a contract
claim in the Claims Court.
With respect to the Claims Court, § 10(aX1) of the
Act provides that:
[I]n lieu of appealing the decision of the con-
tracting officer under section 6 to an agency
board, a contractor may bring action directly
on the claim in the United States Claims
Court, notwithstanding any contract provi-
sion, regulation, or rule of law to the con-
trary.
Section 14(i) of the Act amended the Tucker Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1491, to grant the Claims Court jurisdiction
to decide any such appeal. The Tucker Act now pro-
vides:
11
The Claims Court shall have jurisdiction to
render judgement upon any claim by or
against, or dispute with, a contractor arising
under section 10(aX1) of the Contract Dis-
putes Act of 1978.
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)2).
Despite the unequivocal language of these jurisdic-
tional provisions, the Court of Claims held in Paul
E. Lehman, Inc. v. United States, 673 F.2d 352, 355
(Ct. Cl. 1982) that a contractor could not appeal a
contracting officer’s decision to the court be-
cause, ‘‘[uJnless [the certification] requirement is met,
there simply is no claim that this court may review
under the Act.’”’ The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has restated in numerous cases, including
Grumman, that certification is a jurisdictional pre-
requisite for court review.
The Lehman decision and its progeny ignore the
recommendations of the Commission on Government
Procurement and the system structured by the Com-
mission and by Congress after lengthy hearings and
deliberations. These decisions rest on the fallacy that
certification “‘is an important part of the new pro-
cedures Congress provided in the Act for the handling
of claims by government contractors.’ Lehman, 673
F.2d at 354.
To the contrary, the history of the Contract Dis-
putes Act reflects that claims certification was a mi-
nor afterthought based on the testimony of one
disgruntled witness. Based on the Commission’s rec-
ommendations, the Act provided a comprehensive set
of procedures and remedies. In separate sections, the
Act specifies each of the steps to be followed for
12
submitting a claim to the Contracting Officer, for
appealing directly to court, or for appealing to an
agency board of contract appeals and appealing there-
from to court.
The requirement for certification of claims, how-
ever, was not among the recommendations of the
Commission, was not in the bills as reported by the
House and Senate Judiciary Committees, and was not
in the bill as originally passed by the House (H.R.
11002). 124 Cong. Rec. 31,641-46 (1978). Instead, the
certification provision was included as one small part
of a package of floor amendments passed by the Sen-
ate two days before Congress adjourned. 124 Cong.
Rec. 36,266 (1978). No mention was made of the cert-
ification provision in the explanation provided with
the amendments. Jd. at 36,266-67.° The House acceded
to the Senate’s version of the bill because the short
time remaining in the legislative session left no time
for a conference. See 124 Cong. Rec. 37,076 (1978)
(remarks of Rep. Kindness). In accepting these
amendments, the certification requirement was again
ignored. Rather than addressing this supposedly ‘‘im-
portant’”” amendment, Congressman Danielson sum-
* The Court of Claims in Lehman mistakenly stated that the
sponsor of the amendments, Senator Byrd, explained the amend-
ments to section 6(c) as intended to address the concerns of
Admiral Rickover. Lehman, 673 F.2d at 354-55. In fact, the
passage from Senator Byrd’s statement on which the Court re-
lied referred to the deletion of Section 6 as reported by the
Judiciary Committee. That section addressed informal adminis-
trative conferences (124 Cong. Rec. 36,267); section 6 as enacted
was based on section of the reported bill. 124 Cong. Rec. 36,266.
In fact, Senator Byrd in his Explanation of Amendments never
referred to the addition of the certification requirement. 124
Cong. Rec. 36,266-67.
13
marized the package of Senate amendments with the
single statement: ‘“[T]he Senate amendment to this
bill simply reinstates existing iaw on the burden of
proof on an appeal from a contract dispute.” Jd.
This history belies the prominence which the Fed-
eral Circuit has accorded certification. Despite the
apparent insignificance of this provision to Congress,
the court below has elevated claims certification to
be the keystone of the disputes process. The court’s
treatment of certification as a jurisdictional prereq-
uisite is a flagrant example of judicial legislation.
The Federal Circuit’s holding that claims certifi-
cation is jurisdictional is akin to the decision reversed
by this Court in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
455 U.S. 385 (1982). In Zipes, the Seventh Circuit
held that the timely filing of a charge of sex discrim-
ination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (‘““EEOC’’) was a jurisdictional prerequisite to
a suit in federal court under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(g). This Court reversed, holding that
filing with the EEOC is not jurisdictional, but is ‘“‘a
requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is sub-
ject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.”’ 455
U.S. at 393. In reaching this conclusion, this Court
explained:
The provision granting district courts juris-
diction . . . does not limit jurisdiction to those
cases in which there has been a timely filing
with the EEOC. It contains no reference to
the timely-filing requirement. The provision
specifying the time for filing charges with
the EEOC appears as an entirely separate
14
provision, and it does not speak in jurisdic-
tional terms or refer in any way to the ju-
risdiction of the district courts.
455 U.S. at 394 (footnotes omitted).
Likewise here, the provisions of the Contract Dis-
putes Act granting jurisdiction to the Boards of Con-
tract Appeals and Claims Court to decide appeals of
contracting officers’ final decisions—41 U.S.C. § 607(d)
and 28 U.S.C. § 1491(aX2) respectively—do not limit
jurisdiction to those cases in which there has been a
proper certification of the claim, or contain any ref-
erence to the certification requirement. Like the ti-
mely filing provisions in Title VII, the certification
requirement appears as an entirely separate provision
that neither speaks in jurisdictional terms, nor refers
in any way to the jurisdiction of the Claims Court or
the Boards. Section 6(cX1) of the Contracts Disputes
Act, 41 U.S.C. § 605(cX1), simply provides:
For claims of more than $50,000, the contractor
shall certify that the claim is made in good faith,
that the supporting data are accurate and com-
plete to the best of his knowledge and belief, and
that the amount requested accurately reflects the
contract adjustment for which the contractor be-
lieves the government is liable.
The sole jurisdictional predicate for an appeal under
the Contract Disputes Act is a final decision of a
contracting officer. Here, Grumman’s claim was de-
nied by the Department of the Navy’s Corporate Ad-
ministrative Contracting Officer on March 4, 1987.
Grumman, 927 F.2d at 577. Grumman appealed that
decision to the Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals on April 1, 1987—well within the ninety day
15
period for appeal specified in § 7 of the Act, 41 U.S.C.
§ 606. Nothing more was necessary to establish the
jurisdiction of the Board to decide the dispute, and
it decided in favor of Grumman. The Federal Circuit
erred in dismissing Grumman’s claim for lack of ju-
risdiction. This Court should accept certiorari and
should reverse that court’s decision.
III. FAR 33.207(c)(2) Is Invalid Because It Conflicts with
the Plain Language and Express Purpose of the Stat-
ute It Purports To Interpret.
Section 6(cX1) of the Contract Disputes Act pro-
vides that “the contractor shall certify’’ the claim.
Section 2(4) of the Act defines ‘‘contractor’’ simply
as ‘‘a party to a Government contract other than the
Government.”’ The Act properly leaves to the con-
tractor the choice of who can execute the certifica-
tion, the only question being whether the person is
authorized to act on behalf of the contractor. Under
the plain terms of the statute, any contractor rep-
resentative authorized to bind the contractor can cer-
tify.
Despite the seemingly unambiguous language of the
statute, FAR 33.207(c\2) purports to limit the range
of persons authorized to execute certifications to:
(i) A senior company official in charge at the con-
tractor’s plant or location involved; or
(ii) An officer or general partner of the contrac-
tor having overall responsibility for the con-
duct of the contractor’s affairs.
This regulatory requirement is more than a tech-
nicality. Given the Federal Circuit’s decisions that a
proper certification is jurisdictional, upholding this
regulation cedes to the administrative agencies the
16
power to restrict the jurisdiction of the courts, and
to limit the rights of contractors to appeal adverse
final decisions that was granted to them by Congress.
The only limitations on this agency power would be
that the limitations be ‘“‘reasonable.”’ Certainly, no
administrative agency can limit the appealability of
its own decisions in the face of a statutory right of
appeal, yet that is the effect of FAR 33.207(c\2). On
its face, the regulation conflicts with the Contract
Disputes Act and should be disregarded.
Moreover, this regulation is so ambiguous that even
experts in government procurement law are unable
to advise their clients who the proper person is to
sign, or provide assurance that any particular certi-
fication will withstand a challenge by the Government.
The dozens of published decisions addressing who can
sign a certification attest to the difficulties of apply-
ing the regulatory language in practice.
The Grumman majority justified the regulation as
a “permissible act of administrative gap-filling.’’ 927
F.2d at 578. As the dissent makes clear, however,
such gap-filling is permissible only when a statute is
ambiguous or silent on a particular point, and then
only when the Executive branch gap-filling accords
with legislative history. Grumman, 927 F.2d at 582.
A Congressional purpose underlying the comprehen-
sive disputes resolution system enacted with the Con-
tract Disputes Act was to eliminate Executive branch
manipulation of the disputes resolution process. Sen-
ate Report at 2. FAR 33.207(cX2) conflicts with this
purpose.
FAR 33.207(cX2) conflicts with the plain language
of the very statute it purports to implement. When
confronted with an attempt to modify the plain mean-
17
ing of a statute through the use of a single example
from its legislative history, Chief Judge Marvin Jones
of the former United States Court of Claims appro-
priately stated: ‘‘[aJn explanatory tale should not wag
a statutory dog.’’ A. P. Green Export Company v.
United States, 284 F.2d 383, 386 (Ct. Cl. 1960). This
colorful language aptly characterizes the narrow lim-
itation in FAR 33.207(cX2) of the otherwise unam-
biguous term ‘‘contractor.”’
IV. A Decision Overruling Lehman Could Be Limited To
Prospective Application.
A decision overruling the Grumman and Lehman
decisions could be limited to prospective application
so as to avoid disturbing decided cases. This Court
and the Courts of Appeal have often declined to ret-
roactively apply decisions that overrule clear past
precedent. See Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 646-
- 47 (1984) (an announcement of a new standard “‘is
almost automatically nonretroactive’’ where the de-
cision “has explicitly overruled past precedent’). “or
example, in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87-88 (1982),
this Court he!d that the broad grant of jurisdiction
to the bankruptcy courts in 28 U.S.C § 1471 was un-
constitutional, but declined to make that ruling ret-
roactive in part because “retroactive application ...
would surely visit substantial injustice and hardship
upon those litigants who relied upon the Act’s vesting
of jurisdiction in the bankruptcy courts.” See also id.
at 92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Similarly, in Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 260
(1986) (per curiam), this Court declined to apply Bat-
son v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) retroactively to
proceedings that were final when Batson was an-
18
nounced. It found that retroactive application “would
seriously disrupt the administration of justice,’’ be-
cause of the need to hold hearings after the prior
proceedings had become final in order to determine
if they had been held in accordance with the rule
established for the first time in Batson. Cf. Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 142-43 (1976) (actions of FEC
prior to Court decision accorded de facto validity, de-
spite holding that method of FEC selection was un-
constitutional); Boeing Co. v. United States, 680 F.2d
132, 141 (Cv. Cl. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1081
(1983). Similarly, this Court can determine that cert-
ification of claims is not jurisdictional without dis-
turbing cases previously decided.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in the dissent in Grum-
man, 927 F.2d at 581-84, and all of the foregoing
reasons, the petition for a writ of certiorari should
be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
CLARENCE T. KIpps, JR.
OF COUNSEL: (Counsel of Record)
MILLER & CHEVALIER,
Cyrus E. PHILLIPs, IV CHARTERED
McGutIRE, Woops, BATTLE Metropolitan Square
& BOOTHE Suite 900
Suite 1000 655 Fifteenth Street, N.W.
1627 Eye Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005-5701
Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 626-5800
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae,
The Federal Circuit Bar Association
July 29, 1991
APPENDIX
pA ARS Ai sR AGRE INE in
la
APPENDIX
Decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
Court of Claims and Claims Court on Certification of
Claims
Claim
Case Name Date
Decisions in
Which Claim
Was Dismissed
for Lack of
Proper
Certification
W.M. Schlosser
Co., Inc. v.
United States, 705
F.2d 1136 (Fed.
Cir. 1983)
Thoen v. United
States, 5 Cl. Ct.
823 (1984),
vacated, 765 F.2d
1110 (Fed. Cir.
1985)
Sante Fe Eng’rs,
Inc. v. United
States, 818 F.2d
856 (Fed. Cir.
1987)
Ball, Ball &
Brosamer, Inc. v.
United States, 878
F.2d 1426 (Fed.
Cir. 1989)
02/80
06/23/83
03/11/81
11/30/84
Decision
Date
(4/22/83
06/25/85
05/13/87
07/07/89
Issue
No certification.
No certification.
Change in
nature of claim.
Who can sign
certification?
Claim
Case Name Date
Placeway Constr. 05/28/86
Corp. v. United
States, 18 Cl. Ct.
159 (1989), affd
in part and
vacated in part,
910 F.2d 835,
reh’g granted in
part, 920 F.2d
903 (Fed. Cir.
1990)
United States v.
Grumman
Aerospace Corp.,
918 F.2d 185, 927
F.2d 575 (Fed.
Cir. 1991)
Paul E. Lehman,
Inc. v. United
States, 673 F.2d
352 (Ct. Cl. 1982)
W.H. Moseley Co.
v. United States,
677 F.2d 850 (Ct.
Cl. 1982), 730
F.2d 1472 (Fed.
Cir. 1984)
01/07/87
12/79
06/15/79
Tri-Central, Inc.
v. United States,
230 Ct. Cl. 842
(1982)
2a
01/80 est.
Decision
Date
11/14/$9
02/27/91
02/24/82
03/26/84
03/23/82
Issue
Change in
amount of
claim.
Who can sign
certification?
No certification.
Form of
certification.
No certification.
Case Name
Arlington
Alliance, Ltd. v. -
United States, 685
F.2d 1353 (Ct. Cl.
1982)
Skelly and Loy v.
United States, 685
F.2d 414 (Ct. Cl.
1982)
Troup Bros. Inc.
v. United States,
231 Ct. Cl. 370
(1982)
Grad Partnership
v. United States,
1 Cl. Ct. 616
(1982)
Fidelity and
Deposit Co. of
Md. v. United
States, 2 Cl. Ct.
137 (1983)
A.B.M. Precision
Metal Works,
Inc., v. United
States, 2 Cl. Ct.
332 (1983)
Warchol Constr.
Co., Ince. v.
United States, 2
Cl. Ct. 384 (1983)
3a
Claim
Date
09/21/81
12/11/80
1980 est.
04/06/81
09/18/80
07/82
09/25/80
Decision
Date
08/11/82
08/11/82
06/08/82
11/22/82
03/23/83
04/26/83
04/21/83
Issue
No certification.
Form of
certification.
Timing of
certification.
No certification.
No certification.
No certification.
No certification.
ciate aetna
Claim
Case Name Date
Conoc Constr. 01/05/82
Corp. v. United
States, 3 Cl. Ct.
146 (1983)
Walsky Constr. 09/28/81
Co. v. United
States, 3 Cl. Ct.
615 (1983)
Alchemy, Inc. v.- 02/17/83
United States, 3
Cl. Ct. 727 (1983)
Palmer & Sicard, 03/27/81
Inc. v. United
States, 4 Cl. Ct.
420 (1984)
Black Star Sec., 11/18/81
Inc. v. United
States, 5 Cl. Ct.
110 (1984)
Parking Co. of 05/12/82
America v. United
States, 5 Cl. Ct.
139 (1984)
Cosmic Constr. 11/03/81
Co. v. United
States, 5 Cl. Ct.
237 (1984)
T.J.D. Servs., Inc. 08/05/81
v. United States,
6 Cl. Ct. 257
(1984)
4a
Decision
Date
07/29/83
10/20/83
11/16/83
02/06/84
04/06/84
05/08/84
05/21/84
09/11/84
Issue
No certification.
No certification.
Timing of
certification.
Form of
certification.
No certification.
No certification.
No certification.
Form of
certification.
Claim
Date
07/29/83
Case Name
Pinkston v.
United States, 6
Cl. Ct. 263 (1984)
Halec Constr. Co.,
Inc. v. United
States, 6 Cl. Ct.
439 (1984)
LDG Timber
Enterprises, Inc.
v. Umted States,
8 Cl. Ct. 445
(1985)
Gunn-Williams v.
United States, 6
Cl. Ct. 820
(1984), 8 Cl. Ct.
531 (1985)
Beacon Oil Co. v.
United States, 8
Cl. Ct. 695 (1985)
Prefab Prods.,
Inc. v. United
States, 9 Cl. Ct.
786 (1986)
Fredenburg v.
United States, 10
Cl. Ct. 216 (1986)
Universal Sur.
Co. v. United
States, 10 Cl. Ct.
794 (1986)
01/26/81
11/04/83
03/30/82
12/17/85
03/01/85
03/23/84
5a
Decision
Date
09/14/84
10/19/84
07/03/85
07/17/85
09/18/85
05/09/86
07/14/86
09/18/86
Issue
No certification.
Change in
amount of
claim.
Change in
amount of
claim.
No certification.
No certification.
Timing of
certification.
Form of
certification.
No certification.
Case Name
Aeronet-es Div.,
AAR Brooks &
Perkins Corp. v.
United States, 12
Cl. Ct. 132 (1987)
H.H.O. Company
v. United States,
12 Cl. Ct. 147
(1987)
Romala Corp. v.
United States, 12
Cl. Ct. 411 (1987)
Clark Mechanical
Contractors v.
United States, 12
Cl. Ct. 415 (1987)
Donald M. Drake
Co., v. United
States, 12 Cl. Ct.
518 (1987)
_rtizens Assocs.,
Ltd. v. United
States, 12 Cl. Ct.
599 (1987)
Technassociates,
Inc. v. United
States, 14 Cl. Ct.
200 (1988)
Gardner Mach.
Corp. v. United
States, 14 Cl. Ct.
286 (1988)
Claim
Date
05/30/85
05/09/85
04/10/86
07/16/86
10/06/83
10/16/86
03/25/85
12/21/83
6a
Decision
Date
04/09/87
04/09/87
06/03/87
05/13/87
06/30/87
07/10/87
01/27/88
02/09/88
Issue
Form of
certification.
No certification.
Who can sign
certification?
Timing of
certification.
Who can sign
certification?
No certification.
Form of
certification.
Form of
certification.
Claim
Date
Frawley v. United 06/11/87
States, 14 Cl. Ct.
766 (1988)
Claude E. Atkins 12/18/86
Enterprises, Inc.
v. United States,
15 Cl. Ct. 644
(1988)
Al-Kurdi v. 12/10/87
United States, 16
Cl. Ct. 660 (1989)
Cecile Indus., Inc. 04/23/84
v. United States,
18 Cl. Ct. 730
(1989)
Spirit Leveling 12/14/84
Contractors v.
United States, 19
Cl. Ct. 84 (1989)
New Chardon 05/03/89
Street Ltd.
Partnership v.
United States, 19
Cl. Ct. 208 (1990)
Clean Giant, Inc. 12/21/87
v. United States,
19 Cl. Ct. 390
(1990)
SMS Data Prods. 04/20/87
Group, Inc. v.
United States, 17
Cl. Ct. 1 (1989)
Case Name
7a
Decision
Date
05/31/88
10/28/88
04/26/89
11/22/89
12/15/89
01/08/90
02/07/90
03/01/90
aa aia
Issue
No certification.
Timing of
certification.
No certification.
No certification.
Change in
nature of claim.
Form of
certification.
No certification.
Change in
amount of
claim.
Case Name
Al Johnson
Constr. Co. v.
United States, 19
Cl. Ct. 732 (1990)
SGW, Inc. v.
United States, 20
Cl. Ct. 174 (1990)
National Sur.
Corp. v. United
States, 20 Cl. Ct.
407 (1990)
American Nat.
Bank & Trust Co.
of Chicago v.
United States, 20
Cl. Ct. 530 (1990)
Westech Corp. v.
United States, 20
Cl. Ct. 745 (1990)
Lakeview Constr.
Co. v. United
States, 21 Cl. Ct.
269 (1990)
Century Constr.
Co. v. United
States, 22 Cl. Ct.
63 (1990)
Robin Industries,
Inc. v. United
States, 22 Cl. Ct.
448 (1991)
Claim
Date
09/02/86
01/22/88
07/31/86
02/24/89
06/22/84
07/17/87
04/30/86
01/26/89
8a
Decision
Date
02/21/90
04/19/90
05/15/90
05/30/90
07/02/90
08/23/90
11/20/90
01/28/91
Issue
Who can sign
certification?
No certification.
Who can sign
certification?
Form of
certification.
Who can sign
certification?
No certification.
Form of
certification.
Form of
certification.
Claim
Date
12/18/87
Case Name
AAI Corp. v.
United States, 22
Cl. Ct. 541 (1991)
KDH Corp. v.
United States, 23
Cl. Ct. 34 (1991)
Reliance Ins. Co. 04/08/86
v. United States,
23 Cl. Ct. 108
(1991)
Cupey Bajo
Nursing Home,
Inc. v. United
States, 1991
United States Cl.
Ct. Lexis 256
Decisions in
Which Interest
Was Forfeited
for Lack of
Proper
Certification
03/25/86
06/08/87
Fidelity Constr.
Co. v. United
States, 700 F.2d
1379 (Fed. Cir.
1983)
Essex Electro |
Engineers, Inc. v.
United States, 702
F.2d 998 (Fed.
Cir. 1983)
10/26/79
02/22/80
Decision
Date
02/22/91 Change in
nature of claim.
Issue
04/30/91 Form of
certification.
05/08/91 Who can sign
certification?
06/19/91 Form of
certification.
02/18/83 No certification.
03/11/83 No certification.
a
Case Name
ReCon Paving,
Inc. v. United
States, 745 F.2d
34 (Fed. Cir.
1984)
J.M.T. Mach. Co.,
Inc. v. United
States, 826 F.2d
1042 (Fed. Cir.
1987)
Black Leaf Prods.
Co. v. United
States, 4 Cl. Ct.
307 (1984)
Hoffman Constr.
Ce. v. United
States, 7 Cl. Ct.
518 (1985)
Weeks Dredging
& Contracting,
Inc. v. United
States, 13 Cl. Ct.
193 (1987), affd,
861 F.2d 728
(Fed. Cir. 1988)
Timberland
Paving and
Constr. Co. v.
United States, 18
Cl. Ct. 129 (1989)
Claim
Date
06/24/82
02/20/84
11/19/79
02/09/83
07/06/83
12/17/79
10a
Decision
Date
10/03/84
04/30/87
01/09/84
03/13/85
08/28/27
08/31/89
Issue
Form of
certification.
Untimely
certification.
No certification.
No certification.
Form of
certification.
No certification.
lla
Claim
Case Name Date
Decisions in
Which Contractor
Prevailed on
Government
Challenge to
Certification
United States v. 11/13/79
General Elec.
Corp., 727 F.2d
1567 (Fed. Cir.
1984)
Tecom, Inc. v.
United Stutes, 732
F.2d 935 (Fed.
Cir. 1984)
Cedar Lumber,
Inc. v. United
States, 799 F.2d
743 (Fed. Cir.
1986)
Contract Cleaning 10/15/76
Maintenance, Inc.
v. United States,
811 F.2d 586
(Fed. Cir. 1987)
Institut Pasteur
v. United States,
10 Cl. Ct. 304
(1986), rev’d, 814
F.2d 624 (Fed.
Cir. 1987)
12/09/80
02/09/84
10/04/84
Decision
Date
02/28/84
04/24/84
08/20/86
02/12/87
07/07/86
Issue
Form of
certification.
Change in
amount of
claim.
No certification.
Change in
amount of
claim. “=
No certification.
Case Name
United States v.
Turner Constr.
Co., 827 F.2d
1554 (Fed. Cir.
1987)
Glenn v. United
States, 13 Cl. Ct.
784 (1987),
vacated, 858 F.2d
1577 (Fea. Cir.
1988)
Dawco Constr.,
Inc. v. United
States, 18 Cl. Ct.
682 (1989), affd
in part and rev'd
in part, 930 F.2d
872 (Fed. Cir.
1991)
United States v.
Newport News
Shipbuilding and
Dry Dock Co.,
933 F.2d 996
(Fed. Cir. 1991)
Folk Constr. Co.,
Inc., 226 Ct. Cl.
602 (1981)
Paragon Energy
Corp. v. United
States, 645 F.2d
966 (Ct. Cl. 1981)
12a
Claim
Date
05/19/80
06/08/87
05/21/84
02/09/84
07/31/78
09/03/79
Decision
Date
09/03/87
10/13/88
04/03/91
5/20/91
01/16/91
04/08/81
Issue
Certification of
subcontractor’s
claim.
Change in
amount of
claim.
No certification.
Who can sign
certification?
No certification.
Form of claim.
13a
Claim Decision
Date Date
Brookfield Constr. 06/29/79 09/23/81 No certification.
Co., Inc. v.
United States, 661
F.2d 159 (Ct. Cl.
Case Name Issue
1981)
Metric Constr. 04/07/81 02/08/83 Form of
Co., Inc. v. certification.
United States, 1
Cl. Ct. 383 (1983)
Klochko Equip. 06/11/80 07/06/83 No certification.
Rental Co., Inc. v.
United States, 2
Cl. Ct. 733 (1983)
J. F. Shea Co., 06/23/80 11/30/83 Change in
Inc. v. United amount of
States, 4 Cl. Ct. claim.
46 (1983)
Curley, Inc. v. 02/18/82 09/25/84 Change in
United States, 6 amount of
Cl. Ct. 274 (1984) claim.
Transamerica Ins. 10/03/84 Who can sign
Co. v. United certification?
States, 6 Cl. Ct.
367 (1984)
Gregory Lumber 08/80 - 01/31/86 No certification.
Co. v. United 03/11/81
States, 9 Cl. Ct.
503, 11 Cl. Ct.
489 (1986)
Elgin Builders, 1979-1980 05/20/86 No certification.
Inc. v. United est.
States, 10 Cl. Ct.
40 (1986)
Case Name
Todd Bldg. Co. v.
United States, 13
Cl. Ct. 587 (1987)
El Centro v.
United States, 17
Cl. Ct. 794 (1989)
Embrey v. United
States, 17 Cl. Ct.
617 (1989)
Triax Co. v.
United States, 17
Cl. Ct. 653
(1989), vacated,
20 Cl. Ct. 507
(1990)
Cubic Corp. v.
United States, 20
Cl. Ct. 610 (1990)
Western Empire
Constructors, Inc.
v. United States,
20 Cl. Ct. 668
(1990)
Sun Cal, Ince. v.
United States, 21
Cl. Ct. 31 (1990)
Cox Constr. Co. v.
United States, 21
Cl. Ct. 98 (1990)
l4a
Claim
Date
11/21/85
02/85
07/22/87
04/01/85
03/28/86
10/05/83
03/01/85
01/21/88
Decision
Date
11/13/87
08/07/89
07/17/89
05/25/90
06/06/90
06/13/90
07/10/90
08/07/90
Issue
Form of
certification.
No certification.
Change in
amount of
claim.
Who can sign
certification?
Form of
certification.
Who can sign
certification?
Who can sign
certification?
Who can sign
certification?
15a
Claim Decision
Case Name Date Rete Issue
Little River 04/14/78 09/28/90 Who can sign
Lumber Co. v.~ certification?
United States, 21
Cl. Ct. 527 (1990)
Manning Elec. & 07/28/88 01/03/91 Who can sign
Repair Co., Inc. certification?
v. United States,
22 Cl. Ct. 240
(1991)
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.