Supplemental Brief — In re Ainsworth
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Supreme Couit, Us.
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No. 90-1397 OFFICE OF THE CLERK |
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1990
IN RE JONATHAN B. AINSWORTH,
Petitioner
Vv.
CALIFORNIA STATE SUPREME COURT,
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
Respondents
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS, OR
IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR A WRIT OF
PROHIBITION,
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. SECTION 1651
AND MOTION AND APPILCATION FOR
ATTORNEYS' FEES, DAMAGES, INTEREST, AND
COSTS PURSUANT TO 18 USC 3006A AND
28 USC 1927
JONATHAN AINSWORTH
2237 S. Acadian Thruway
Suite 301
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70808
Telephone: (504) 923-0311
Petitioner
In Propria Persona
hn Nir
No. 90-1397
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1990
IN RE JONATHAN B. AINSWORTH,
Petitioner
Vv.
CALIFORNIA STATE SUPREME COURT,
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
Respondents
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS, OR
IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR A WRIT OF
PROHIBITION,
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. SECTION 1651
AND MOTION AND APPILCATION FOR
ATTORNEYS' FEES, DAMAGES, INTEREST, AND
COSTS PURSUANT TO 18 USC 3006A AND
28 USC 1927
JONATHAN AINSWORTH
2237 S. Acadian Thruway
Suite 301
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70808
Telephone: (504) 923-0311
Petitioner
In Propria Persona
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
JONATHAN B. NO. 90-1397
AINSWORTH ) SUPPLEMENTAL
PETITIONER BRIEF FOR
PETITION FOR A
WRIT OF
MANDAMUS, OR IN
THE ALTERNATIVE
FOR A WRIT OF
vs.
)
)
)
THE SUPREME COURT )
OF CALIFORNIA, THE )
STATE BAR OF )_ PROHIBITION
CALIFORNIA, ) PURSUANT TO 28
RESPONDENTS ) USC SECTION
) 16551 AND MOTION
) AND APPLICATION
) FOR ATTORNEYS'
) FEES, DAMAGES
) INTEREST, AND
) COSTS PURSUANT
) TO 18 USC 3006A
) AND 28 USC 1927
Petitioner, Jonathan Ainsworth,
hereby applies to the U.S. Supreme Court
for attorneys' fees, damages, interest
and costs pursuant to 18 USC 3006A and
28 USC 1927. |
This petitioner had bee.: awarded a
court-appointed attorney by the State
Bar Court of California. Said attorney
was deliberately taken away without due
process, in violation of both California
State law as well as in violation of
United States Supreme Court precedent
in Gideon v Wainwright 372 U.S. 335.
Payment by respondents of the attorneys'
fees that were incurred by this
petitioner, which he could not pay, and
which they knew he could not pay, should
now be authorized and so ordered by the
United States Supreme Court pursuant to
18 USC 3006A as well as by 28 USC 1927
as well as otherwise and according to
the authority that follows.
Respectfully submitted
March 19, 1991
Jonathan Ainsworth
Attorney for Petitioner
In Pro Per
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
AND INTEREST
1. 28 USC 1915 and 1746 regard
proceeding in forma pauperis. This
petitioner has been forced to
represent himself in pro per because
his court-appointed attorney in the
State Bar proceedings was summarily
taken away from him without due
process, in violation of both
California law, the United States
Constitution, as well as United
States Supreme Court precedent in
Gideon v Wainwright 372 U.S. 335!
This has created enormous debts for
this petitioner who was only able to
retain counsel to represent him for
a time, all of whom quit for
financial considerations! This
petitioner was forced to defend
himself without his court-ordered
appointed attorney, despite the
State Bar Court's earlier order
appointing counsel! This petitioner
should be compensated for the
arbitrary and capricious actions of
the California State Bar, the
California State Supreme Court in
allowing this, as well as the acts
of the State Bar of California's
prosecutor in doing these acts!
Since these are all agencies or
agents of the State of California,
the award should be against the
State of California as well! 18 USC
3006A, as well as U.S. Supreme Court
Rule 39.7, as well as the additional
authority presented herein, state
a
the authority which the United
States Supreme Court may use in
awarding such sums as attorneys'
fees, damages, interest and costs.
The U.S. Supreme Court may also in
its discretion, use a "lodestar"
multiplier, if it wishes.
2. 28 USC 1927 states that this Court
has the power to award attorneys'
fees incurred as a result of
unreasonable and vexatious delay or
multiplication of proceedings. None
of these matters need ever have come
to the attention of the United
States Supreme Court if the State
of California, the Supreme Court of
California and the State Bar of
California had simply corrected
their mistakes and "confessed error"
as in Young v United States 315 U.S.
2573 Petite v United States 361
U.S. 529; Sibron v New York 392 U.S.
40.
28 USC 1927 reads:
"Any attorney or other
erson" admitted to
conduct cases in any
court of the United
States or any Territory
thereof who so multiplies
the proceedings in any
case unreasonably and
vexatiously may be
required by the Court to
satisfy personally the
extra costs, expenses,
and attorneys fees
reasonably incurred
because of such conduct."
Clearly the State Bar of
California's prosecutor, Jerome
Fishkin, is guilty of such
prosecutorial abuse for several
reasons and the case law shows that
his client, the State of California
as well as the State Bar of
California, are likewise responsible
financially for his actions. Among
the most extreme abuses are the
following: they should never have
brought two alleged charges of
conversion of chattels when they had
copies of the bills of sale for said
chattels! These are in addition to
other abuses detailed below. The
State Bar's Prosecutor, Jerome
Fishkin, even went so far as to
bring the completely unfounded
charges, with the State Bar's and
the California Supreme Court's
acquiescence, even though the State
Bar even hired a handwriting expert
who said he could not dispute the
genuineness of the signature on the
bill of sale that we know he was
asked to examine. The handwriting
expert's report on the other
document, if such a report existed,
was never disclosed! It is not
known what said expert's conclusion,
if any, was regarding the second
bill of sale; however, the State Bar
Prosecutor waited until the middle
of trial to dismiss the second
alleged charges of conversion. The
case law will likewise show that
this is no excuse and an award of
attorneys' fees and damages is
Clearly warranted under the case
law, as will be shown.
All of this ,as well as other
factors that will be shown,
deliberately caused a
"multiplication of proceedings"
"unreasonably and vexatiously"
within the clear meaning of the
above law. As such, this Court may
award this petitioner his attorneys’
fees and damages as well as his
interest and costs!
The assessment of attorneys'
fees may be made against the client,
here the State of California, the
State Bar of California as well as
the attorney here, Jerome Fishkin!
Lipsig v National Student Marketing
Corp. 663 F2d 178,214 (D.C. Circuit;
Dreiling v_ Pugeot Motors of America
850 F2d 1373.
Bad faith on the part of the
guilty attorney is sufficient to
justify such an award of attorneys’
fees even though it need not be
shown! s Vv agile
Markets, Inc. 883 F2d 1184.
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This court need not even find
that the attorney, here the State
Bar's Prosecutor, acted with malice
(even though it is clearly shown in
the present case)! Knorr Brake
Corp. v Harbill, Inc. 738 F2d 223.
The case law goes on to show
that it is not even a defense that
some of the alleged charges were
later dropped! The mere filing of
unfounded charges is sufficient to
warrant the imposition of an award
of attorneys' fees! Ginter v Texas
Commerce Bank 111 F.R.D. 615.
Additional examples of bad faith
by both the Supreme Court of
California, as well as by the State
Bar of California's unbridled
Prosecutor follow, even though it is
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not necessary to show bad faith to
warrant an award of attorneys' fees
as the above case law proves.
In the present case both the Supreme
Court of California and the State
Bar of California should have
"confessed error" long ago!
QUESTIONS ONE, TWO AND THREE:
IN BRINGING CLAIMS AGAINST THIS
PETITIONER WITH THREE SEPARATE
JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS, THE STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA KNOWINGLY, WILLINGLY, AND
MALICIOUSLY ACTED IN BAD FAITH!
l. The State Bar of California and
the California State Supreme Court
knowingly, willfully and
deliberately usurped the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal and completely ignored said
11
6 nese
Tribunal's findings that a certain
Iranian individual did not have
standing to represent a certain
"Iranian Government controlled
entity" and hence, the alleged
complaining witnesses did not even
have standing to file a complaint
against this petitioner in the first
place! In the second place, neither
the California State Bar nor the
California Supreme Court had
jurisdiction to consider the alleged
complaint which concerned the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal which had
exclusive jurisdiction. Both
Respondents erroneously concluded,
using deliberately falsified
information, that Hassan Haschemi in
fact owned Tchacosh, a fact which
was completely disproved by the
12
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official judgment of the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal which had
exclusive jurisdiction to decide all
matters that concerned any Iranian
government "controlled entity," and
therefore both the California State
Bar as well as the California State
Supreme Court acted totally without
any jurisdiction in this matter!
The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
decided in Rexnord v Tchacosh, et
al, published in The Iranian Assets
itigation eporte at p 5959
(available at the Library of
Congress) that Tchacosh was
"controlled" by the Islamic Republic
of Iran! (The California Supreme
Court erroneously found otherwise!)
Applying the correct decision of the
correct court that had exclusive
13
| a
jurisdiction according to President
Carter's Executive Agreement that
established the Court and according
to the U.S. Supreme Court in Dames
and Moore v Regan 453 U.S. 654, the
United States District Court in Los
Angeles threw Hassan Haschemi out of
court as an impostor! The
California Supreme Court and the
State Bar of California erroneously
ruled contrary to this, erroneously
saying that Hassan Haschemi was the
owner and thus not an impostor and
erroneously concluding that Hassan
Haschemi's attorney, Stephen Miller
had authority on behalf of Tchacosh
to file a complaint with the State
Bar of California against this
petitioner! Clearly both
conclusions were incorrect! The
14
Bree
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decision of the U.S. District Court
that threw Hassan Haschemi out of
court as an impostor was affirmed by
the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit. (Please See
Tchacosh v Rockwell 766 F2d 1333.)
The California Supreme Court and the
State Bar of California once again
found contrary to this, completely
usurping the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
that had been granted by
Presidential Executive Agreement
which had been upheld by the United
Supreme Court in Dames and Moore v
Regan 453 U.S 654.)
2. The second obv us
jurisdictional abuse which the State
Bar of California still refuses to
correct is the actual hiring of the
15
’ i
"Compensated Referee" by the State
Bar to decide cases in its favor,
despite the obvious conflict of
interests! This obvious abuse has
incurred the scorn of the California
State Attorney General's Office
which recognized it as clearly a
conflict of interests! This
practice has also been outlawed by
the United States Supreme Court, yet
the California State Bar and the
California State Supreme Court still
persist and still adamantly refuse
to change it! (Please see Wong Yang
Sun v McGrath 339 U.S. 33 70 S. Ct.
445 in which the U.S. Supreme Court
specifically outlawed this
practice!)
16
The third obvious jurisdictional
abuse which the State of California
Supreme Court and the State Bar of
California committed was in allowing
a single judge when three judges
were explicitly required by law!
(Please see California State Bar
Court Rule 558.) This specifically
violated the principles announced
and upheld by the United States
Supreme Court in Ex Parte Northern
Railway Company 280 U.S. 142; Ex
Parte Cogdel] 342 U.S. 163; Ex Parte
metropolitan Water Company of West
Virginia 220 U.S. 539, and numerous
other cases that were cited in the
petition! All of the cases cited
are U.S. Supreme Court cases and all
were deliberately ignored by both
the California Supreme Court and by
17
the State Bar of California and by
the Prosecutor, all of whom
continued to act in and with
complete bad faith in failing and
refusing to “confess error" and to
reinstate this petitioner as a
member in good standing of the
California State Bar Association!
This warrants an increased
multiplier in the award of attorney
fees, damages and interests as
described later in these papers!
QUESTION FOUR:
IN DELIBERATELY CONVICTING THIS
PETITIONER, DESPITE HIS U.S.
CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS WHICH WERE
TRAMPLED UPON, THE STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA ACTED WILLFULLY,
DELIBERATELY AND MALICIOUSLY IN ORDER TO
18
REMOVE PRESSURE THAT IT WAS THEN
RECEIVING FROM THE CALIFORNIA STATE
LEGISLATURE AND FROM A NEWSPAPER!
This petitioner documented the
pretrial publicity and political
pressure that were brought to bear on
the California State Bar Association and
the California Supreme Court by the
"yellow journalistic" San Francisco
Examiner newspaper and by the California
Legislature! For these judicial bodies
to abandon their former regard for
United States Supreme Court precedents
and constitutional rights because of
this political pressure and pretrial
publicity is unfathomable! Rideau
Louisiana 373 U.S. 723 and Chandler v
Florida 449 U.S. 560 are U.S. Supreme
I<
19
Court cases which overturned convictions
that resulted from pretrial publicity
just as in the present case!
District of Columbia Federation of
Civic Associations v Volpe 459 F2d 1231;
Eastern Airlines v CAB 271 F2d 752;
Pillsbury v FTC 354 F2d 298; and Sicoma
Club v Castle 657 F2d 298 are U.S.
Supreme Court cases which overturned
cases whose outcomes had resulted from
"legislative prodding," as in the
present case!
The State Bar of California and the
California Supreme Court's unreasonable
actions in deliberately and totally
ignoring the above U.S. Supreme Court
precedents willfully and deliberately
caused "a multiplicity of actions," as
the term is used in 28 USC 1927, because
each of the above-mentioned respondents
20
|
unreasonably gave into the political
pressures that emanated from the
newspaper and from the California State
Legislature, which were documented by
quotes from the WETA television
documentary, quoted in this petitioner's
application for a writ.
QUESTION FIVE:
IN UNCONSTITUTIONALLY ADDING NEW CHARGES
DURING TRIAL AND PERMITTING IT DESPITE
OBVIOUS UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
CASES WHICH PROHIBIT THIS PRACTICE, BOTH
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA AS WELL AS
THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT ARE GUILTY
OF DELIBERATE OPPRESSION, FRAUD AND
MALICE!
Both the Supreme Court of California
as well as the State Bar of California
willfully and deliberately ignored the
21
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following United States Supreme Court
cases: In Re Ruffalo 390 U.S. 644 and
Cole v Arkansas 333 U.S. 196, when they
unreasonably, deliberately and
capriciously added and allowed to be
added completely new charges during the
trial itself! This proved complete bad
faith on their parts and attorneys'
fees, damages, cost, and interest are
clearly indicated!
QUESTION SIX:
IN ACTUALLY COACHING WITNESSES TO
DELIBERATELY MISLEAD THIS PETITIONER
INTO BELIEVING THAT MOST OF THE MAJOR
ALLEGED CHARGES AGAINST HIM HAD BEEN
DISMISSED IN ORDER TO WILLFULLY AND
DELIBERATELY TRICK THIS PETITIONER INTO
NOT PREPARING ANY DEFENSE TO THESE
ALLEGED CHARGES WHATSOEVER, THE STATE
22
|
’
BAR OF CALIFORNIA WAS GUILTY OF
OPPRESSION, FRAUD, MALICE AS WELL AS
EXTREMELY BAD FAITH!
These overt acts by the California
Bar's Prosecutor which were admitted to
at trial, were not only tolerated but
were even “winked at" by the State Bar's
"Compensated Referee" and by California
State Supreme Court,which didn't seem to
mind these obvious abuses,despite the
fact that in United States Supreme Court
previously condemned this practice in
United States v Throckmorton 98 U.S. 61;
and in Hazel Atlas Glass v Hartford 322
U.S. 328. This clearly and obviously
justifies an award of attorneys' fees,
damages, interests and costs against
each of the respondents and each of
their individual attorneys!
23
’
QUESTION SEVEN:
IN DELIBERATELY IGNORING THE EXPLICIT
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS FOR ALMOST ALL
OF THE ALLEGED CHARGES, THE STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA, AS WELL AS THE CALIFORNIA
SUPREME COURT, ARE GUILTY OF OPPRESSION,
FRAUD AND MALICE!
Both the California State Supreme
Court as well as the State Bar of
California deliberately, willfully, and
maliciously ignored the applicable
statutes of limitations for most of the
alleged charges, despite the fact that
this was pointed out to them on numerous
occasions! This was in clear violation
of the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Schiavone v Fortune 477 U.S.
21.
24
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QUESTION EIGHT:
IN DELIBERATELY DENYING THIS PETITIONER
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE
ALLEGED WITNESSES AGAINST HIM, BOTH THE
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT AS WELL AS THE
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA WERE GUILTY OF
OPPRESSION, FRAUD, MALICE AND BAD FAITH!
In Pointer v Texas 380 U.S. 400;
Ohio v Roberts 448 U.S. 56; California v
Green 399 U.S. 149; Dutton vy Evans 400
U.S. 74, the United States Supreme Court
reiterated the constitutional right to
confront and cross-examine the alleged
witnesses against an accused! Once
again this right was denied this
petitioner on numerous occasions and
several so-called “complaining
witnesses" even failed to appear at the
trial at all! This did not prevent the
State Bar's Prosecutor from giving his
25
own alleged testimony in their place!
"Trial," if it could even be called a
"trial," was by surmisal and conjecture!
The State Bar Prosecutor in effect even
testified, according to what he said
that these witness would have said had
they appeared at all, i.e. he really
said whatever he wanted without any
showing of unavailability of the absent
alleged witnesses and completely without
any showing of any statements by the
alleged witnesses whatsoever! The State
Bar's Prosecutor even went so far as to
give medical testimony that he said his
alleged medical expert would have given
had he appeared! This is only one of
many, many completely outrageous
examples!
26
In doing these acts and allowing
them, both the State Bar of California
and the California Supreme Court were
guilty of overt and obvious oppression,
fraud and malice!
QUESTION NINE:
IN DELIBERATELY VOIDING CONTRACTS
BETWEEN AND AMONG MOST OF THE ALLEGED
COMPLAINING WITNESSES AND ALLOWING IT,
WHEREIN THE ALLEGED COMPLAINING
WITNESSES HAD AGREED IN WRITING TO AN
OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL OF THEIR ALLEGED
COMPLAINTS AGAINST THIS PETITIONER, THE
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA AND ITS
ATTORNEYS, AS WELL AS THE STATE SUPREME
COURT OF CALIFORNIA, WERE GUILTY OF
EXTREMELY BAD FAITH, AND AS SUCH SHOULD
BE MADE TO PAY ATTORNEYS' FEES,
INTEREST, COSTS AND DAMAGES.
27
The Contract Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, Article 1 Section 10,
specifically prohibits voiding contracts
such as the contracts that involved this
petitioner and most of the alleged
complaining witnesses in which most of
the alleged complaining witnesses agreed
in writing to dismiss their alleged
complaints! Fletcher v Peck 10 U.S.
(Cranch) 87 and Home Building and Loan
Association v Beaisdell 290 U.S. 398,
are the leading United States Supreme
Court cases reaffirming the
constitutional right of citizens against
state action which "impairs" the right
of contract, as both the California
State Supreme Court and the California
State Bar did in the present case, as
was previously shown in the petition!
28
QUESTION TEN:
IN WILLFULLY AND KNOWINGLY ACTING IN AN
OBVIOUS UNCONSTITUTIONAL MANNER TO
DEPRIVE THIS PETITIONER OF HIS SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL, IN CLEAR
VIOLATION OF GIDEON V WAINWRIGHT 371
U.S. 335, AS WELL AS BY NUMEROUS OTHER
EXTREME EXAMPLES, THE STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA AND THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME
COURT ACTED WILLFULLY, DELIBERATELY AND
MALICIOUSLY!
The unconscionable way the
California Supreme Court and the State
Bar of California denied petitioner his
Sixth amendment Constitutional right to
an attorney, after an attorney had been
ordered to be appointed but was never
appointed, then summarily taken away
with less than six days notice, which
29
Wh het Pili at tied anit! %
was never sent to said attorney, and
when the explicit California law
provided a minimum of 15 days notice
plus an additional 5 days when mailed,
for a minimum of 20 days notice, has
been adequately documented.
In doing the above acts and in
tolerating them, the State Bar of
California and the California State
Supreme Court acted unreasonably, to say
the least. An award of attorney's fees,
damages, interest and costs is clearly
warranted!
QUESTIONS ELEVEN AND TWELVE:
IN BRINGING TWO SEPARATE CLAIMS FOR
ALLEGED CONVERSION OF CHATTELS EVEN
THOUGH IT HAD COPIES OF THE BILLS OF
SALE IN BOTH SEPARATE CLAIMS AS WELL AS
AN AUTHENTICATED SIGNATURE FROM THE
30
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA'S OWN
HANDWRITING EXPERT, AS WELL AS OTHER
OBVIOUS ABUSES, THE STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA WILLFULLY, KNOWINGLY AND
DELIBERATELY COMMITTED EXTREME BAD
FAITH!
The State Bar of California and its
arrogant and completely biased
prosecutor even brought two completely
unfounded charges that alleged
conversion of chattels, even though it
had in its possession two separate bills
of sale by which the clients had
conveyed title to the chattels to the
attorney! The State Bar Prosecutor
later withdrew one charge during the
course of the Mayes-Ulricksen hearing,
after Mayes-Ulricksen had testified, yet
the State Bar of California ordered
Mayes-Ulricksen to be paid the value of
31
the old car from the client security
fund, despite the obvious inconsistency!
The California State Bar Prosecutor and
the California State Bar likewise
prosecuted this petitioner despite its
own handwriting expert's written
testimony that one alleged complaining
witnesses' signature on the bill of sale
for his old boat was not contrived! The
State Bar's “Compensated Referee" then
buried his finding that there was no
conversion in the transcript!
CONCLUSION:
The above statutes, 28 USC 1915,
1746 and 1927 clearly warrant the
imposition of an award of attorneys'
fees against all of respondents, as well
as their attorneys, who willfully and
wantonly, deliberately and maliciously
withheld vital information (many of the
32
alleged complaining witness' statements
as well as other information) that could
have exculpated this petitioner at an
earlier date, and even went so far as to
deliberately commit the other extreme
acts of malice, fraud and oppression as
indicated! Indeed, the prosecution is
still deliberately withholding
information and evidence in the
Haschemi/Miller and Ghasemloo matters,
i.e., the alleged complaining witness'
alleged reports which they continue to
refuse to divulge!
All of the above matters were not
mistakes! The prosecution and the other
attorneys for the State Bar of
CaJifornia knowingly, willfully and
deliberately used perjured information
in the Haschemi/Miller, Ghasemloo and in
other matters as indicated.
33
Immediate disbarment for the
prosecutor should also be appropriate!
In each and every one of the above
matters the State Bar and ‘its
prosecutors showed complete and utter
disrespect for the law! They engaged in
a witch hunt reminiscent of Salen,
Massachusetts.
Also, in regard to damages, the U.S.
Supreme Court should award an additional
$5,000,000 to $25,000,000 in additional
damages against each of the respondents,
as well as the State of California and
each of the respondents' willful and
deliberate nefarious attorneys, in order
to compensate this petitioner for the
extreme damage to his reputation. This
petitioner is from a family of attorneys
and one of his relatives was well-known
to almost all of the individual Justices
34
of the U.S. Supreme Court. Known for
his integrity, this judge drafted the
code of ethics for all federal judges
and was Chairman of the federal
judiciary's Ethics and Administrative
Practices Committees! The damage and
sever injury to this petitioner and to
this petitioner's family was enormous!
This Court, in its discretion,
should award this petitioner at least an
additional $5,000,000 in damages. An
additional award of an additional
$25,000,000 in damages would not be
unreasonable under the circumstances!
In this day and age, prosecutorial
abuses should be made to cease! The
extreme damages to this petitioner's
entire family that was caused by the
completely unfounded and scurrilous
decision being published and disbursed
35
in public and private law libraries
throughout the entire United States and
abroad could only be remedied by a
proper opinion of this Court and a
substantial award of attorney's fees,
damages, interest and costs against the
following:
1.
2.
The State of California
The State Bar of California,
a division of the State of
California
The California Supreme Court
Jerome Fishkin, Attorney for
the State Bar
Attorneys for the State Bar,
Diane C. Yu, Truitt Richey,
Goel Infande Weiss
Each and every other
attorney for respondents!
36
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Respectfully submitted
March 19, 1991.
[pees DO arene,
Jonathan Ainsworth
’ In Pro Per
Y
37
Declaration of Jonathan Ainsworth
in Support of Application
for Attorneys' Fees
I, Jonathan Ainsworth, declare as
follows:
I request 50% of my total billable
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
hours for the last five
years be paid to me as
attorneys' fees with at
least a 150% lodestar factor
increase. Damages is a
separate subject which will
be discussed at the end of
this declaration. The hours
I expended are as follows:
- 50% of part of the year
50% of all of the year
50% of all of the year
50% of all of the year
50% of all of the year
50% of part of the year
38
1987, 1988 - $100,000
in out-of-pocket attorneys’
fees paid to other lawyers
The work included the following: a
"trial" that lasted over two weeks in
which I was forced and compelled to
defend myself, without an attorney,
despite the fact that one had been
ordered appointed by the State Bar Court
then summarily and erroneously taken
away from me without proper notice to
either an appointed attorney or to me,
over my strenuous objection! Many,
many, many pretrial and post trial
motions, legal briefs, applications and
petitions to the California State
Supreme Court were performed, numerous
letters to the individual Justices of
the California State Supreme Court were
39
TT
sent that complain of the willful,
deliberate and outrageous conduct of the
State Bar's Prosecutor, the State Bar's
"Compensated Referee" and attorney
Stephen Miller, who I proved to the
California Supreme Court actually
perjured himself under oath! (As well
as other perjury and outright and
deliberate acts of willful bad faith
previously mentioned.) The Supreme
Court of California and the State Bar of
California willfully, wantonly and
deliberately failed and refused and
still continue to fail and refuse to
even answer said correspondence or even
to investigate at all, despite numerous
items of documentation!
I request my billing rate of $200
per hour be granted me for a total of
5,000 billable hours over the past five
40
years. This equals $1,000,000, which -
should be multiplied by a lodestar
factor of at least 1.5 which gives
$1,500,000, plus out-of-pocket
attorneys' fees which are approximately
$100,000 in out-of-pocket fees to date!
This gives a total of at least
$1,600,000, plus costs, interest and
damages, and even more if the U.S.
Supreme Court believes a lodestar factor
greater than 1.5 is warranted! These
amounts are approximate. More detailed
figures can be supplied if the Court in
its discretion deems is appropriate.
An award of at least $5,000,000 in
additional damages is clearly indicated
and an award of $25,000,000 in
additional damages would be more clearly
appropriate.
41
These amounts should be awarded
against the following:
1. The State of California
2. The Supreme Court of
California
3. The State Bar of California
4. Jerome Fishkin, Attorney for
the State Bar
5, Attorneys for the State Bar
Diane C. Yu, Truitt Richey,
Gael Infande Weiss
6. Each and every other
attorney for respondents.
I declare under penalty of perjury
that the above is true and correct.
Executed March 19, 1991, at Baton Rouge,
Louisiana.
a ee Sy i*
Jonathan Ainsworth ‘
/ In Pro Per
42
No. 90-1397
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES
October Term, 1990
IN RE JONATHAN AINSWORTH,
Petitioner
THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA,
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA,
Respondents
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS, OR
IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR A WRIT OF
PROHIBITION, PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.
SECTION 1651 AND MOTION AND APPILCATION
FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES, DAMAGES, INTEREST,
AND COSTS PURSUANT TO 18 USC 3006A AND 28
USC 1927
Jonathan Ainsworth, deposes and
affirms, I am in propria persona. I
personally mailed to the Clerk of the
United States Supreme Court,
Supplementtal Brief for Petition for Writ
of Mandate, Petition for Writ of
Prohibition pursuant to 28 USC 1651, and
Motion and Application for Attorneys'
fees, damages, interest, and costs
pursuant to 18 USC 3006A and 28 USC 1927.
I also mailed three copies first class
mail to office of Trial Counsel State,
State Bar of California, 555 Franklin
St., San Francisco, California 94102,
attorney for Respondent. This was done
on March 19, 1991 at Baton Rouge,
Louisiana.
ae en
onathan Ainsworth
2237 S. Acadian Thruway
Suite 301
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70808
(504) 923-0311
Petitioner, In Pro Per
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.