Opposition — Local 9, International Chemical Workers Union v. Eisenberg
Supreme Court brief1981
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ene Court, U.S,
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ee aba s 1981
— — * L. STEVAS, |
CLERK
Iu the Supreme Court of the Unites States
OCTOBER TERM, 1980
LOCAL 9, INTERNATIONAL CHEMICAL WORKERS
UNION, AFL-CIO, PETITIONER
V.
ARTHUR EISENBERG, ETC.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RESPONDENT
IN OPPOSITION
LAWRENCE G. WALLACE
Acting Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20580
(202) 633-2217
WILLIAM A, LUBBERS
General Counsel
National Labor Relations Board
Washington, D.C. 20570
|
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Page
J. L. G. M. U., Local 415-475 v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 823.. 3
Local 761, Int’l Union of Electrical, Radio & Ma-
chine Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 2
NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 182........
Samoff v. Williamsport Building & Construction
Trades Council, 318 F.Supp. 1105 aff'd, 451 F.2d
— . 5
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpet, Linoleum, Soft
Tile & Resilient Floor Covering Layers, Local
enen 3
Solien v. Miscellaneous Drivers & Helpers Union,
Local 610, 440 F.2d 124, cert. denied, 403 U.S.
Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 US.
—— ³˙A A bea tacdatiataessedends
United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629.
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 1477
>> >
Statute:
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 151 et
geg.:
Section 8 (b) (4) (B), 29 U.S.C. 158 (b) (4)
6 — ——— —— 1
Section 10 (0), 29 U.S.C. 160 () ee 2, 3
In the Supreme Court of the United Siates
OCTOBER TERM, 1980
No. 80-2052
LOCAL 9, INTERNATIONAL CHEMICAL WORKERS
UNION, AFL-CIO, PETITIONER
V.
ARTHUR EISENBERG, ETC.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RESPONDENT
IN OPPOSITION
1. On April 18, 1980, Ciba-Geigy Corporation filed
a charge with the National Labor Relations Board,
alleging that petitioner was engaging in a secondary
boycott in violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (B) (29 U.S.C.
158 (b) (4) (B)) of the National Labor Relations Act
(A. 14). Respondent, an NLRB Regional Director,
1“A.” refers to the appendix, and “S.A.” to the supple-
mental appendix, filed as part of the briefs in the court
below.
(1)
2
determined that a complaint should issue on the
charges and, pursuant to Section 10(l) (29 U.S.C.
160(l) of the Act, petitioned the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey for an
injunction against petitioner’s activity (A. 10-13).’
After a hearing held on May 5 and 8, 1980, the
court found reasonable cause to believe petitioner
had violated Section 8 (b) (4) (B) of the Act, and it
enjoined petitioner, inter alia, from picketing at or
in the vicinity of the contractors’ entrance “pending
the final disposition of the matters involved pending
before the National Labor Relations Board” (Pet.
App. 4a). Petitioner filed a notice of appeal from
the district court’s order on July 7, 1980. The appeal
was confined to the issue of the court’s refusal to
fashion its order so as “to permit [petitioner] inspec-
tions or discovery of the type of work being performed
by contractors using the alleged construction gate“
(A. 55).*
2In particular, the complaint alleged that petitioner had
violated the Act by maintaining pickets at the “Contractors’
Entrance” on the premises of Ciba-Geigy, a reserved gate
that was used exclusively by contractors and suppliers
neutral to the primary dispute between petitioner and Ciba-
Geigy. See Local 761, Int’l Union of Electrical, Radio &
Machine Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 681 (1961).
At the Section 10(/) hearing, petitioner informally re-
quested that the judge modify the proposed injunction to
permit petitioner to enter the Ciba-Geigy premises to moni-
tor the neutrality of the contractors’ entrance (S.A. 9-11).
The judge refused petitioner’s request after receiving as-
surances from counsel for the Regional Director that the
Board would continue to furnish petitioner with the names
of all contractors using the reserved entrance (S.A. 14-17,
21-22). Petitioner made no formal motions for discovery
until June 30 and July 7, 1980 (A. 46-54). The district
court took no action with respect to these motions.
3
In the meantime, on May 22, 1980, petitioner and
Ciba-Geigy entered into a settlement agreement in
which petitioner agreed not to picket at or in the
vicinity of the contractors’ entrance and to post for
a 60-day period an official notice stating its intention
to abide by the terms of the agreement (A. 44-45).
The agreement was approved by the Acting Regional
Director. On August 6, 1980, following expiration
of the 60-day notice posting period, the Acting Re-
gional Director informed petitioner and Ciba-Geigy
that the unfair labor practice proceedings were closed
(S.A. 1-2).
On February 23, 1981, the court of appeals dis-
missed petitioner’s appeal as moot (Pet. App. la-2a).
The present petition seeks review of that dismissal
and of the alleged refusal of the district court to
permit discovery.
2. An injunction proceeding under Section 10(l)
of the Act is ancillary to the underlying unfair labor
practice case, and any injunction issued thereunder
expires upon final Board action. Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Carpet, Linoleum, Soft Tile & Resilient Floor
Covering Layers, Local Union No. 419, 397 U.S. 655
(1970). The withdrawal by the Regional Director,
on behalf of the General Counsel of the Board, of an
unfair labor practice complaint as part of an in-
formal settlement agreement constitutes final Board
action. See, e. g., I. L. G. W. U., Local 415-475 v. NLRB,
501 F.2d 823, 830-831 (D.C. Cir. 1974). When the
Acting Regional Director withdrew the complaint in
this case on August 6, 1980, the injunction hat had
been issued “pending the final disposition * * * be-
fore the National Labor Relations Board” (Pet. App.
4a) expired both by its own terms and by *
of law.
1
Contrary to petitioner's contention (Pet. 12-13),
this case does not present an issue that is “ capable of
repetition, yet evading review.“ Super Tire Engineer-
ing Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 122 (1974). The
question presented for review is whether petitioners
may properly be enjoined from picketing at a gate
allegedly reserved for neutral contractors without
being afforded an opportunity to determine, through
either entry on the premises or discovery, that the
gate was not in fact being used by the primary em-
ployer or his suppliers. However, petitioner volun-
tarily entered into an informal settlement agreement
that provided for the Acting Regional Director to
dismiss the complaint and to close the proceedings
upon petitioner’s compliance. If petitioner had made
timely requests for discovery in the district court
(see note 3, supra) and had pursued rather than
settled the case, the dispute would not have been “in
its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to
its cessation or expiration.” Weinstein v. Bradford,
423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975).* Moreover, it is entirely
speculative whether petitioner will have occasion to
engage in picketing under similar circumstances in
the future, and there is no “demonstrated probabil-
ity” or “reasonable expectation that the same com-
plaining party would be subjected to the same action
again” (ibid.).
* Contrary to petitioner’s assertion (Pet. 11, 12), the in-
junction did not terminate in 60 days, but remained in
force pending final disposition of the case. Nor would a vol-
untary cessation of the strike necessarily have rendered this
case moot, as contended by petitioner (Pet. 12). Cf. United
States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953); Solien
v. Miscellaneous Drivers & Helpers Union, Local 610, 440
F.2d 124, 127 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 905 (1971).
5
3. With regard to the issue of discovery in district
court injunction proceedings (Pet. 13-16), it is clear
that discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedures is available to all parties in Section 10(l)
actions.“ See, e. g., Samoff v. Williamsport Building &
Construction Trades Council, 313 F. Supp. 1105
(M.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 451 F.2d 272 (3d Cir.
1971). Since petitioner made no formal discovery
motions until after the Section 10 (“) hearing had
been completed, and since the case was ultimately
settled, the district court had no occasion to rule on
petitioner’s motions for discovery.
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
LAWRENCE G. WALLACE
Acting Solicitor General
WILLIAM A. LUBBERS
General Counsel
National Labor Relations Board
August 1981
s It is immaterial here whether discovery is available in
proceedings before the Board. The petition seeks review
not of any Board proceeding but of the proceeding in the
district court.
W ov. 6. GoveRNmenT Printing orrice, 1961 351454 570
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