Motion to Dismiss or Affirm — Mason v. Abrams

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Office-Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

JUL 18 1981

No. 80-1977 ALEXAND ® L. STEVAS,

CLERK

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

— *

Liypva F. Mason,

Appellant,

against

Rosert Asrams, Attorney General of the

State of New York,

Appellee.

Own APPEAL FROM THE CouRT or APPEALS

or THE State or New York

MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

Rosert Asrams

Attorney General of the

State of New York

Attorney Pro Se

Office & P.O. Address

Two World Trade Center

New York, New York 10047

Tel. No. (212) 488-7407

Surecey Apevson Srecen

Solicitor General

Caries Bropy

Assistant Attorney General

Of Counsel

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ey Ge SONEIOND 5, 5 ob csc wlaicek's eee by ewer i

Motion To Dismiss Or, In The Alternative, Affirm 1

Gee 0H CD FCOOCOUINE co nkcccccncccnsduscceteace 1

PE EE DOU i spk asveassces stakvonecnereeas 2

Background and Pleadings ................0.0+5 2

The Good Cause Hearing ........ccccccccccees 4

Pornt I—The Federal Questions Is Insubstantial .... 8

Pornt II—In the Alternative, the order of the Court

of Appeals of the State of New York should be

PE Sabievseveckpsrieentacsacctustdrcenves 9

PU EE oak £6 0 0054s uve escesstereeeue 10

PUD Ss o-cess bdovccdcssnetenceuhiesbronpeue 10

DRL §114 is constitutional as applied to Ap-

EG os bcc co'sccecrecssccenveathevesvubnens 13

SOE 5-0 ia coc cedeacucwh esaysduversuelenneei 14

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ALMA Society, Inc. v. Mellon, 459 F. Supp. 912

(S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff’d, 601 F. 2d 1225 (2d Cir.)

cert, denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979) ............. 8,11, 12

Application of Maples, 563 S.W. 2d 760 (Mo. 1978)

CON DUE) kee bu coded ndduseectseviersnipeens 9,10, 12

SUT) cevcsvevsvccccvcccrccvcescesovevceenace

Chattman v. Bennett, 57 A D 2d 618, 393 N Y S 2d 768

We IN 5 cide iiiivicsssseve en 13

ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE

Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976) 10

Eisenstadt y. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) .......... 10

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) ...... 10

In re Adoption of Rand, 347 So. 2d 450 (Fla. Ct. App.

FEE ioe caste louves caved viscpuvixoessseess 9

In re Application of Anonymous, 89 Mise. 2d 132, 390

N Y S 2d 779 (Sur. Ct. Qns. Co. 1976) ......... 9,12

In re Application of Anonymous, 92 Mise. 2d 224, 399

N Y S 2d 857 (Sur. Ct. Qns. Co. 1977) .......... 12

In re C.A.B., 384 A. 2d 679 (D.C. Ct. App. 1978) .... 9

In re Linda F.M. (I), 92 Mise. 2d 828, 401 N Y S 2d

Fem Cs Ces Es GA, BO) ov ke csvvosesccsscess 3

In re Linda F.M. (II), 95 Mise. 2d 581, 409 N Y S 2d

638 (Sur. Ct. Bx. Co. 1978) ........ceceeeeeeees 12,13

In re Maxtone-Graham, 90 Mise. 2d 107, 393 N Y S 2d

Sew Ce AA, Fe GO SDFG) cscceccececccpeus> 9,12

In re Spinks, 232 S.E. 2d 479 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977) . 12

Isaac v. Town of ee 277 N.Y. 37, 12 N.E. 2d

gt. error res PP PPerr rr rer rer rrrrrrr 14

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) .......... 11,12

Mills v. Atlantic City Department of Vital Statistics,

372 A. 2d 646 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1977) ............ 9,12

People ex rel. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption

Service, 28 N Y 2d 185, 321 N Y S 2d 651 (1971) = 11

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) ........seeeeeeee 10

Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality

and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) ........0000e: 13

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) ........ 10

Yesterday’s Children v, Kennedy, 569 F, 2d 431 (7th

Cir. 1977), reh. denied, cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904

TE st nuda Micdedhass Mabeereeesebuees eeees 9

No. 80-1977

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

’'

Linpa F. Mason,

Appellant,

against

Rosert Asprams, Attorney General of the

State of New York,

Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE Court oF APPEALS

OF THE State oF New York

MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM

Motion To Dismiss Or, In The Alternative, Affirm

Robert Abrams, Attorney General of the State of New

York, respectfully moves this Court to dismiss this appeal

or, in the alternative, to affirm the order of the Court of

Appeals of the State of New York.

Parties to the Proceeding

The parties to this proceeding are Linda F. Mason,

appellant, and Robert Abrams, Attorney General of the

State of New York, appellee.

Statement of Facts

Background and Pleadings

Appellant was born on July 19, 1940. She was adopted

on March 4, 1941 pursuant to an order of the Surrogate’s

Court of Bronx County of the State of New York. Ap-

pellant’s adoption records and original birth certificate

were sealed pursuant to Section 114 of the Domestic Rela-

tions Law (McKinney’s) (‘‘DRL’’) and to Section 567-2.0

of the New York City Administrative Code, respectively.*

* DRL § 114 provides, in pertinent part,

‘*{the adoption] order and all papers in the proceeding shall

be filed in the office of the court granting the adoption and

the order shall be entered in books which shall be kept under

seal and which shall be indexed by the name of the adoptive

parent and by the full original name of the child. Such

order, including orders heretofore entered, shall be subject to

inspection only as hereinafter provided.’’

NYC Administrative Code § 567-2.0 provides:

**§ 567-2.0 Supplemental birth records.

a. A new birth record shall be made whenever:

oo + co .

3. Notification is received by the department from the clerk

of a court of competent jurisdiction or proof is submitted of

a judgment, order or decree relating to the adoption of the

person. (Subd. as amended by L, 1950, ch, 415, July 1).

ec. When a new birth record is made the department shall

substitute such new record for the birth record then on file.

The department shall place the original birth record and the

proof, notification and papers pertaining to the new birth

record under seal. Seals shall not be broken except by order

of a court of competent jurisdiction. Thereafter when a

certified copy of the certificate of birth of such a person is

issued, it shall be a copy of the new certificate of birth, except

when an order of a court of competent jurisdiction shall re-

quire the issuance of a copy of the original certificate of

birth.’’

On June 3, 1977, appellant petitioned the Surrogate’s

Court of Bronx County to inspect her adoption records.

Her petition alleged various psychological and medical

reasons to justify her desire to review her records and

claimed that these reasons satisfied the ‘‘good cause’’ re-

quirement of DRL 4 114 necessary to unseal the records.”

Finally, the petition alleged that if appellant’s petition

were dismissed for failure to establish good cause, the

requirement of good cause was unconstitutional as applied

to appellant.

The Attorney General was cited pursuant to Section 71

of the Executive Law to appear in support of the con-

stitutionality of the statute. The Corporation Counsel of

New York City appeared as the legal representative of the

New York City Department of Health, which had posses-

sion of appellant’s sealed original birth certificate. The

Attorney General and the Corporation Counsel denied that

DRL § 114 was unconstitutional.

The trial court held that appellant’s natural parents

were necessary parties to the application. Jn re Linda

F.M., 92 Mise 2d 828, 829, 401 N Y S 2d 960, 962 (Sur. Ct.

Bx. Co. 1978) (‘‘In re Linda F.M. (I)’’). Rather than ap-

point a guardian ad litem to represent these parties, the

***No person shall be allowed access to such sealed records

and order and any index thereof except upon an order of a

judge or surrogate of the court in which the order was made

or of a justice of the supreme court. No order for disclosure

or access and inspection shall be granted except on good cause

shown and on due notice to the adoptive parents and to such

additional persons as the court may direct.’’

The petitioner further alleged that this requirement of the

statute did not apply to either a private adoption or an application

by an — adoptive. Appellant has since abandoned these issues

on appeal.

judge requested the Attorney General to participate in the

good cause hearing.*

The Good Cause Hearing

Five witnesses testified at the good cause hearing: Mrs.

Anne Mason, appellant’s adoptive mother; Ms. Mason, ap-

pellant; Dr. Gendel, a psychiatrist who specialized in

psychiatry and genetics; Rabbi Ebner, an orthodox Jewish

rabbi; and Dr. Reynolds, a psychologist.

Mrs. Mason testified that in 1971 when appellant was 31

years old, appellant was first told she was adopted.

(Tr. 16).°*

Appellant testified that in 1959, when she was 19, she

dropped out of college to get married. (Tr. 41). Less than

a year later, on September 13, 1960, appellant had a child.

Ibid. The next spring she transferred colleges and re-

entered school. In December of 1960 she divorced her

husband, after approximately two years of marriage. (Tr.

43). Appellant graduated from college two years later in

February of 1963 with a BA in Fine Arts. (Tr. 40-41).

Ms. Mason testified that she spent most of her time after

graduation at home caring for her son (Tr. 42), although

she did work part time, as a clerk. Jbid. In 1979, she

began working full time with a small typesetting firm and

now works in a law firm doing related work. (Tr. 42-43).

Ms. Mason remarried on November 2, 1971 (Tr. 50) but

the parties separated in January, 1974. (Tr. 28). Appel-

* Appellant challenged the participation of the Attorney Gen-

eral in the courts below. Appellant’s objection was based solely

on her claim that no other party was necessary for the hearing and

not that appellant was prejudiced in any way by the failure of

the trial court to appoint a guardian ad litem. In any event, this

issue has not been raised in this appeal.

** References to the transcript refer to the transcript of the good

cause hearing held on March 16, 1978, and are designated

sé (Tr. ).””

lant attributed the breakup of her marriage to the fact that

three years earlier she had learned of her adoption. On

cross-examination, she testified that during the marital

breakup she never sought help. (Tr. 28-29). Appellant

also testified to other causes for the dissolution of the mar-

riage. Her parents were opposed to the marriage because

her husband was younger than she and of a different

religion. (Tr. 22). In addition, her adoptive farther was

dying of cancer. (Tr. 22-23, 28).

Appellant testified that in 1974 she searched for records

dealing with her adoption, eventually finding a birth

certificate and her natural name. (Tr. 31). Her adoptive

mother then supplied her with her natural mother’s name

and address. (Tr. 32). There was no testimony of how

long the search took or its relevance to the instant pro-

ceeding.®

Ms. Mason testified that she had allergies which could

have been inherited by her son. (Tr. 21). However, she

admitted that her lack of knowledge of her natural parents

had not affected her son’s medical treatment. (Tr. 58).

There was no evidence that appellant or her son are under-

going, or had undergone, any medical treatment for which

genetic data was needed.**

Ms. Mason testified she could relate to people and to her

adoptive family. (Tr. 47). She testified that she had

consulted a psychiatrist in 1967 for about a year. (Tr. 45).

However, these consultations were not related to her

adoptive status. (Tr. 37). She saw Dr. Reynolds, a

* Apparently as a result of this investigation, appellant con-

cluded that the information in the sealed records was inaccurate.

Petition of Linda Mason verified May 24, 1977 at p. 5.

** Dr. Gendel is a psychiatrist specializing in psychiatry and

human genetics. (Tr. 60). He merely indicated that genetic his-

tory is useful in diagnosing certain ailments. There was no at-

tempt to relate his testimony to appellant’s claim, and he did not

discuss the only conditions appellant mentioned in her testimony :

hay fever, some allergies and asthma, (Tr. 21, 44-45).

psychologist, for a few times, but then terminated the

visits, (Tr. 36, 46).

Appellant testified that she wanted to inspect her records

because she was curious about what they contained,

When her counsel asked why she wanted to see the

records (which she concluded were inaccurate anyway)

Ms. Mason stated:

‘*Well, I don’t know if the documents are accurate as

to whatever names and addresses might be in them,

but if my mother’s signature is there, to just see some-

thing of hers and perhaps to be able to tell from how

she writes her name what level of education she had or

if it looks like forgery: would be very meanjngful to

me,’’ (Tr, 40).

Rabbi Ebner, a rabbi of the Orthodox Jewish faith, was

the next witness. There was no claim that appellant was,

or wanted to be, an Orthodox Jew. Therefore, his testi-

mony was excused as speculative.

The key witness in the good cause hearing was Dr.

Reynolds. Dr. Reynolds is a psychologist who has con-

ducted a study of adoptees. Ms. Mason first met Dr.

Reynolds when she responded to his advertisement for sub-

jects for his study. (Tr. 109). As part of the study, he

administered five written tests to her which were admitted

into evidence. (Tr. 145). The results were inconclusive.*

* Counsel for appellant sought Rabbi Ebner’s testimony to show

that Ms, Mason's son might want to marry an Orthodox Jewish

girl (Tr, 92) or might want to emigrate to Israel. (Tr, 96).

* Appellant scored in the middle range of a test measuring

self-reliance and in the middle range of a test measuring anxiety,

In two multi-phasic tests, Dr. Reynolds interpreted his scores as

indicating a high de of inquisitiveness, compulsivn, low trust

and emotional instability. In the last multi-phasic measuring some

fifteen different characteristics, appellant scored out of the normal

range on only one, which Dr, Reynolds described as self-image.

(Tr. 156-158).

(Tr. 158). Even the limited variations noted could have

been caused by events which were unrelated to her adop-

tion. (Tr. 156-158).

Dr. Reynolds testified that Ms. Mason subsequently came

to see him in February of 1977. Although he characterized

her condition as ‘‘quite disturbed’’ (Tr. 123), in a ‘‘fairly

large life crisis’? (Tr. 127) and ‘‘extremely disturbed’’

about discovering six years earlier that she was adopted

(Tr. 127), all of the courts that have reviewed this case

have rejected his conclusory testimony.

In February and March of 1977, Ms. Mason consulted

Dr. Reynolds for a very limited time, for three one-hour

sessions which consisted solely of interviews. (Tr. 144).

He saw her again one hour in September of 1977, three

months after appellant filed her petition. (Tr. 144). Dr.

Reynolds testified that he normally sees patients with

serious conditions for a year or more, (Tr. 146-147).

Furthermore, Dr. Reynolds stated that he was not treating

Ms. Mason, nor did he recommend that she receive any

treatment. (Tr. 140, 148). Dr. Reynolds admitted that in-

spection of the adoption records was not based on need,

but on his opinion that it would be beneficial to Ms, Mason

‘simply in terms of finding out about herself.’’ (Tr. 151).

He admitted that even this opinion as to a limited benefit

might be wrong because of his limited knowledge of her

background, (Tr. 136, 151-59).

The Surrogate held that appellant had not established

good cause and that the requirement of good cause was not

prohibited by the Constitution of the United States. Jn re

Linda F'.M., 95 Mise. 2d 581, 409 N Y 8 2d 638 (Sur. Ct.

Bx. Co. 1978) (hereinafter cited as ‘‘In re Linda F.M.

(11)’’). The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed on

the opinion below. The case was appealed to the Court of

Appeals, which unanimously affirmed without opinion the

decision of the trial court. See Jurisdictional Statement,

Appendix A.

POINT I

The Federal Question is Insubstantial.

New York’s requirement that adoptees must show good

cause before allowing inspection of adoption records was

held constitutional in ALMA Society, Inc. v, Mellon, 459 F.

Supp. 912 (8.D.N.Y. 1978), aff’d, 601 I, 2d 1225 (2d Cir.),

cert, denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979). In ALMA, the Courts

rejected the same claims raised in this appeal. The District

Court held:

‘*It is the opinion of this Court that plaintiff’s rights

to privacy and to receive important information are

not constitutionally abridged by the New York statutes

but rather are permissibly limited in accordance with

a valid state interest to balance conflicting rights of

privacy and to protect the integrity of the adoption

process, which is likely to suffer if the assurances of

secrecy are not present. Constitutional principles of

equal protection do not require that all persons be

treated identically.

The state has more than a rational basis; it has a

compelling interest in regulating the access here.’’

459 I’, Supp. at 917.

This holding is clearly correct.

Of the 50 states, only six have adoption records access

to laws which are substantively different from the laws of

New York.* Every court that has considered the con-

*Only Alabama, Georgia, Kansas, Michigan, Montana and

Oklahoma open all adoption records to adult adoptees, 16 Ala.

Code § 26-104; Ga. Code § 74-417 (1981 stg an, Stat, § 65-

2423 (1979 Su P.) ; Mich, Stat. § 710.67 (1981 Supp.) ; Mont. Rev.

Codes Ann. ge 1-213, 69-4421; Okla. Stat. § 60.18 (1981 Supp.).

The District of Columbia, Montana and Pennsylvania allow adult

adoptees access to their original birth certificates, D.C. Code

16-314 (1979 Supp.) ; Mont. Rev. Codes Ann, § 69-4421; 1 Pa.

ons, Stat. § 507. lowa, South Dakota and Virginia allow adult

adoptees to inspect redacted adoption records. Iowa Code Nee ng

(1980 Supp.) ; 8. D. Compiled Laws Ann, § 625-6-15 (1972); Va.

Code § 63,1-236.

stitutionality of a statute restricting access to adoption

records has affirmed its constitutionality. Yesterday’s

Children v. Kennedy, 569 F. 2d 481 (7th Cir, 1977), reh.

denied, cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978); Application of

Maples, 563 8.W. 2d 760 (Mo. 1978) (en bane), The im-

portance of the state interest in preserving the con-

fidentiality of adoption records and the interest of the

natural parents in maintaining their privacy have been

universally recognized by the courts. ALMA Society, Ine.

v. Mellon, supra, 601 F. 2d 1225; In re Application of

Anonymous, 89 Mise. 2d 132, 134-35, 890 N Y S 2d 779, 782

(Sur. Ct. Qns. Co. 1976); In re Maxtone-Graham, 90 Mise.

2d 107, 109-10, 393 N Y S 2d 835, 836-37 (Sur, Ct, N.Y. Co.

1975). See also Application of Maples, supra; In re Adop-

tion of Rand, 347 So. 2d 450 (Fla. Ct. App. 1977); Mills v.

Atlantic City Department of Vital Statistics, 372 A. 2d

646, 655-56 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1977). Even courts in states

that provide for open access to adoption records by adult

adoptees have expressed concern for these competing in-

terests. In re C.A.B., 384 A. 2d 679 (D.C. Ct. App. 1978) ;

Chambers v. Parker, 349 So, 2d 424 (La. Ct. App. 1977).*

This consistent judicial recognition that there are im-

portant interests competing with appellant’s claimed right

to inspect adoption records established that there is no

substantial federal question involved in this appeal and

the appeal should be dismissed.

POINT Il

In the alternative, the order of the Court of Appeals

of the State of New York should be affirmed.

Appellant challenges the constitutionality of DRL $114

on the ground that it infringes upon her right of privacy

*For this reason, a number of states that once provided for

access by adult adoptees have imposed new restrictions. See 11

Ariz. Rev, Stat. § 36-326 (1981 Supp.); Conn. Gen, Stat. § 7-53

‘ 7 aan ); Pla. Stat. Ann. § 382.22 (1980) ; La. Rev. Stat. Ann,

and rights protected by the First Amendment. Every

court that has considered the question has rejected these

contentions without dissent.

First Amendment

Appellant misinterprets the First Amendment right to

receive information, which is the freedom to read and

listen to what we please without the State’s intrusion into

either our book or tape library. Stanley v. Georgia, 394

U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (App. br. 20, 21, 22). This is a far

ery from having a constitutional right to require an un-

willing speaker to speak or to receive information which

the State maintains as confidential, especially where there

are competing interests involved.

Privacy

Appellant alleges that DRL $114 interferes with a

fundamental constitutional ‘‘right of privacy’. Appellant

tries to transform a general right of privacy-a right to be

free from unwanted intrusion into her personal affairs-

into a quite different right, the right to foree government

to communicate with her about confidential information the

legislature has appropriately determined should be sealed

because it affects state interest and the privacy of other

individuals. This is the vital distinction between the lead-

ing privacy cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.

479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Lisenstadt

v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) and the case at bar.*

It is appellant who would invade the right of privacy

of others. This difference was recognized by the court in

Application of Maples, supra:

‘*Here, something quite different occurs; the natural

parents’ right of privacy is shielded by the statute but

appellant insists the state strip the anonymity they

* This distinction is also recognized in the Freedom of Informa-

tion Act cited by a ts (AP . br. 15). Department of Air

Force v. Rose, 425 U.S, 352 (1976).

believed was there and divulge the information re-

ceived under an additional cloak of confidentiality.

. . « There must be finality for the natural parents

and a new beginning; if there is a right of privacy not

to be lightly infringed, it would seem to be theirs.’’

563 S.W. 2d at 763.

Even if appellant’s privacy were in fact somehow in-

fringed by DRL § 114, the statute is still constitutional as

the scope of the general right to privacy is for the state

to define. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-57

(1967). The New York legislature has balanced appel-

lant’s right to inspect her adoption records with valid, com-

peting state interests that the state has also recognized:

the state’s interest in promoting successful adoptions and

the right of privacy granted to the natural parents as past

of the adoption process.

New York has a strong public policy in favor of sealing

these records and in protecting the natural parents’ rights.

ALMA Society, Inc. vy. Mellon, supra; People ex rel.

Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Service, 28 N Y 2d

185, 321 N Y S 2d 651 (1971). DRL §114 is part of a

carefully considered and integrated statutory scheme. New

York’s scheme promotes the insulation of the adoptive

family from the natural parents. DRL §111-3. Con-

fidentiality also promotes the maximum candor of the

natural parents and the adoptive parents. The natural

parents must disclose intimate facts about themselves. An

extensive investigation is also made of prospective adopt-

ing parents. Clearly, confidentiality increases the likeli-

hood that such disclosure is freely given:

‘*Adoption is favored and encouraged as a matter of

public policy. To this end the natural parent or

parents must feel secure in the knowledge that their

identity usually will remain confidential. Certainly

the assurance of anonymity is an important considera-

tion in the parents’ decision to consent to the adoption

of their child.’’ In re Spinks, 232 8. 2d 479, 483

(N.C, Ct. App. 1977).

Accord, ALMA Society, Inc. v. Mellon, supra, 459 F. Supp.

at 916; Mills v. Atlantic City Department of Vital

Statistics, supra at 651, 653; In re Linda FM. (II); In re

Application of Anonymous, 89 Mise. 2d at 133-34, 390

N Y 8 2d at 780; Application of Maples, swpra at 763-65.

The State has reasonably provided the natural parents

with more than the expectation of privacy, to wit, with

statutory recognition of their rights, which are also pro-

tected by the Constitution. Katz v. United States, supra;

Roe v. Wade, supra at 152; Mills v. Atlantic City Depart-

ment of Vital Statistics, supra at 651.

Appellant’s claim that DRL § 114 impermissibly inter-

fers with an adoptee’s right to ‘‘identity’’ is fallacious.*

Any ‘‘identity crisis’’ is a result of adoption, a process

appellant is not challenging. It is the essence of adoption

that the natural family unit is severed and a new one

created. DRL $117; Application of Maples, supra; In re

Application of Anonymous, 89 Mise. 2d at 133, 390 N Y 8 2d

at 780. Proof that this creates severe psychological dis-

turbances at later times can constitute good cause entitling

the adoptee to access to her records. In re Application of

Anonymous, 92 Mise. 2d 224, 399 N Y 8 2d 857 (Sur. Ct.

Qns. Co. 1977); In re Maxtone-Graham, supra. However,

the mere fact that there is a ‘‘gap’’ in one’s life history is

not sufficient to establish good cause nor to establish a con-

stitutionally prohibited harm to an adoptee. ALMA

Society, Inc. v. Mellon, supra. As the trial court herein

held:

“It cannot be concluded that the constitution

envisaged rights such [as] ‘personality’ or an un-

* A few isolated studies are cited by appellant, some without

proper controls, (Tr. 110). As the Court of Appeals found, this

does not establish that adoptees per se have good cause to inspect

their records.

fettered right to receive any information one might

desire. Petitioner has neither shown a valid basis for

concluding from either the United States or New York

Constitutions that such rights exist or if they do exist

how they are violated by the statute at issue exceeding

the legitimate exercise by the state of its police powers.

In re Linda F.M. (II), 95 Mise. 2d at 591,409 NYS

2d at 643.

Similarly, if there is a need for genetic material, this can

also constitute good cause under the New York statute for

allowing access. Chattman v. Bennett, 57 A D 2d 618, 393

N Y 8S 2d 768 (2d Dept. 1977). The proof was simply in-

adequate here.

The issue before this Court is not whether New York’s

statutory scheme is the best possible but whether New

York could rationally conclude that maximum disclosure

during the adoption process (and successful placements)

is promoted by protecting the confidentiality of adoption

records. As this Court stated in Smith v. Organization of

Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816,

855-56 (1977),

‘We deal here with issues of unusual delicacy, in an

area where professional judgments regarding desire-

able procedures are constantly and rapidly changing.

In such a context, restraint is appropriate on the part

of courts called upon to adjudicate whether a par-

ticular procedural scheme is adequate under the Con-

stitution.’’

DRL § 114 is constitutional as applied to appellant

The trial court found that appellant had failed to estab-

lish good cause to view her adoption records. This was

unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division and the

Court of Appeals. The trial court heard the witnesses and

could determine their credibility.

The Court should not overturn this determination. In

determining this appeal, evidence favorable to the prevail-

ing party should be construed as true and the prevailing

party should receive the benefit of every favorable in-

ference that can be drawn. Jsaac v. Town of Queensbury,

277 N.Y. 37, 12 N.E. 2d 785 (1938).

The record establishes that appellant proved no medical

need to inspect the record. Nor was there any attempt to

connect appellant’s lack of success in her second marriage

with the instant proceeding. The court was within its

rights to reject the conclusions of the psychologist, Dr.

Reynolds, because the facts did not support his conclusion.

Rather, Dr. Reynolds’ testimony was based on his belief

that any adoptee should be able to inspect her records;

this belief does not establish the unconstitutionality of DRL

§ 114.

The trial judge’s conclusion that no good cause was

shown was completely justified by the record and should be

affirmed by the Court.

CONCLUSION

Appeal should be dismissed, or, in the alternative,

the order of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.

Dated: New York, New York

July 7, 1981

Respectfully submitted,

Rosert ABRAMS