Amicus Brief — International Longshoremen's Association v. Allied International, Inc.

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LE Supreme Court. U

FIL F D

No. 80-1663 DEC 22 1981

ALEXANDER L. STEVAS,

IN THE CLERK 1

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1981

INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO, Loca

799, INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO

and T. W. GLEASON, Individually and as he is President of

International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO and H. R.

HASSELGREN, Individually and as he is Secretary-Treasurer of

International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO and N. J.

Bowers, Individually and as he is Executive Vice President of

International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO and F. R.

FIELD, JR., Individually and as he is General Organizer of Inter-

national Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO and A. Scorro,

Individually and as he is Regional Director of International

Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO and J. T. Moock, Indi-

vidually and as he is First Vice President of International

Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO and R. A. Massey, Indi-

vidually and as he is Second Vice President of International

Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO and G. W. Drxon, In-

dividually and as he is Third Vice President of International

Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO and W. P. LyNncu, Indi-

vidually and as he is Fourth Vice President of International

Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO,

Petitioners,

ALLIED INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals

for the First Circuit

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE

AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION

IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT

ALLEN A. LAUTERBACH KENNETH C. MCGUINESS

C. DAVID MAYFIELD ROBERT E. WILLIAMS

AMERICAN FARM BUREAU DAVID H. LARRY

FEDERATION McGuINnEss & WILLIAMS

225 Touhy Avenue 1015 Fifteenth Street, N.W.

Park Ridge, Illinois 60068 Washington, D.C. 20005

(812) 899-5782 (202) 789-8600

Attorneys for the

American Farm Bureau Federation

WILSON - Epes PriNTING CO.. INC. - 769-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

ARGUMENT

I. This Court’s “Foreign Flag” Decisions Do Not

Preclude National Labor Relations Act Juris-

diction Over a Union’s Domestic Secondary Boy-

cott Activity When the Union’s Conduct Is Not

In Furtherance of a Primary Labor Relations

Dispute or Objective Concerning the Foreign

Crew Members of Foreign-Owned Vessels .........

A. The “Foreign Flag” Cases Are All “Labor

Dispute” Cases, and the Court’s Withholding

of Jurisdiction Has Been Grounded in Inter-

national Comity Consideraticns Regarding

the Impropriety of Intruding Domestic Labor

Act Jurisdiction Into Foreign Maritime

Labor Disputes

B. Where There Is No Foreign Maritime Labor

Dispute, But Only Domestic Secondary Ac-

tivity, the Court’s Foreign Flag Concerns

‘Are Irrelevant and the Board Has Jurisdic-

tion Even If The “Primary” Is Located

Outside The United States

. The Board Is Not Deprived of Section 8(b) (4)

Jurisdiction Over a Union’s Secondary Boycott

By the Absence Of a Primary Labor Dispute....

The ILA’s Statements and Other Conduct Have

Induced Employees to Engage In a Concerted

Refusal to Handle Cargo Bound To or From

Russia and have Thus Coerced Neutral Persons

Engaged In Commerce

Page

& ee — E:

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

IV. The ILA’s Unlawful Object of Forcing Neutral

Employers To Cease Doing Business May Be

Inferred From the Reasonably Foreseeable Con-

sequences Of the Union’s Secondary Boycott

Conduct

V. Conduct Forbidden By Section 8(b) (4) Is Not

Protected By The First Amendment

CONCLUSION

Page

iii

AUTHORITIES CITED

Cases:

Abington Township School District v. Schempp,

374 U.S. 203 (1963) 27

Allied International, Inc. v. International Long-

shoremen’s Association, 492 F. Supp. 334 (D.

Mass. 1980) 4

Allied International Inc. v. International Long-

shoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO, 640 F.2d

1368 (Ist Cir. 1981) 3, 4, 5, 7, 12, 15

American Radio Association v. Mobile Steamship

Association, 419 U.S. 215 (1974)........ 4, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12,

17, 22

Page

A Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 516 F.2d 717

D.C. Cir. 1975) 23

Baldovin v. International Longshoremen’s Associa-

tion AFL-CIO, 626 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1980) ..2, 3, 21, 24

Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S.

138 (1957) 4, 8, 11, 12, 15

Board of Education of Central School District No.

1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) 27

Brown ex rel. N. L. R. B. v. American Federation of

Television and Radio Artists, 191 F. Supp. 676

(N. D. Cal. 1961) 24

Bullock v. Mumford, 509 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir.

1975) i 23

Carey v. Brown, —— U.S. ——, 100 S. Ct. 2286

(1980) 26

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (19717 23

Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 487 (1970)...... 26, 27

Grain Elevator, Flour and Feed Mill Workers, In-

ternational Longshoremen’s Associaiton, Local

418, AFL-CIO v. N.L.R.B., 376 F.2d 774 (D.C.

Cir.) , cert. denied, 389 U.S. 932 (1967) 11, 12, 19

Harrington & Company, Inc. v. ILA, 356 F. Supp.

1079 (S. D. Fla. 1973) 16

Incres Steamship Company, Ltd. v. International

Maritime Workers Union, et al., 372 U.S. 24

(1963) 4, 8, 9, 13

iv.

AUTHORITIES CITED—Continued

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,

Local 501 v. N.L.R.B., 341 U.S. 694 (1951) 7, 18,

International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-

CIO v. Ariadne Shipping Company, 397 U.S.

195 (1970) 4, 8, 10, 11, 12

International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-

CIO, ete., (Shipside Packing Company, Inc.),

227 NLRB 659 (1976) 19

International Longshoremen’s Association (Allied

International, Inc.), 257 NLRB No. 151 (1981).. 6, 12,

18, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21

International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-

CIO (Kansas Farm Bureau), NLRB-JD-99-81

(1981) 18, 19

Joyce v. United States, 454 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir.

1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 969 (1972) ............ 23

Local 399, International Brotherhood of Electrical

Workers, 235 NLRB 555 (1978) .................... 19, 23, 24

Local 418, Sheet Metal Workers International

Asa’n, AFL-CIO, 235 NLRB 144 (1978) 20

Local 732, International Brotherhood of Team-

sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers

of America, 229 NLRB 392 (1977) .................... 18

Local 761, International Union of Electrical, Radio

and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO v. N.L.R.B.,

366 U.S. 667 (1961) 21

Local 1355, International Longshoremen’s Associa-

tion (Ocean Shipping Service, Ltd.), 146 NLRB

728, enforcement denied, 332 F.2d 992 (4th Cir.

1964) 8, 13, 17, 20, 22

Madden v. Grain Elevator, Flour and Feed Mill

Workers, International Longshoremen’s Associa-

tion, Local 418, 334 F.2d 1014 (7th Cir. 1964),

cert. denied, 379 U.S. 967 (1965) 11,12

McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, etc., 372 U.S. 10

(1963) 4, 8, 9, 11, 15

AUTHORITIES CITED—Continued

Page

Mountain Navigation Co. v. Seafarer’s Interna-

tional Union of North America, 348 F. Supp.

1298 (W.D. Wis. 1971) 16

N. L. R. B. v. International Longshoremen’s Associa-

tion and Local 1855, 382 F.2d 922 (4th Cir.

T 13, 15, 19

N. L. R. B. v. Denver Building and Construction

Trades Council, et al., 341 U.S. 675 (1951) 17

N. L. R. B. v. Local Union No. 3, International

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO,

477 F.2d 260 (2nd Cir. 1973), enforcing 197

NLRB 828 (1972) . 18,24

N.L.R.B. v. Local 85, International Brotherhood

of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and

Helpers of America, 454 F.2d 875 (9th Cir.

3972), enforcing 180 NLRB 709 (1970) ............ 19

N. L. R. B. v. Local 825, International Union of Op-

erating Engineers (Burns and Roe, Inc.), 400

U.S. 297 (1971) 19

N. L. R. B. v. Local 825, International Union of Op-

erating Engineers, AFL-CIO, 315 F.2d 695 (8rd

1 20

N. L. R. B. v. Retail Store Employees Union Local

1001, 447 U.S. 607 (1980) 6, 20, 21, 22, 26

National Maritime Union of America (Delta

Steamship Lines, Inc.), 147 NLRB 1828 (1964),

enforced National Maritime Union v. N.L.R.B.,

846 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382

U.S. 840, reh. denied, 382 U.S. 988 (1965) 16, 24

National Maritime Union of America (Shippers

Stevedoring Company), 245 NLRB 149 (1979).. 18, 14,

National Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO,

(The Weyerhaeuser Co.), 147 NLRB 1317

(1964), enforced, National Maritime Union v.

N.L.R.B., 842 F.2d 588 (2nd Cir. 1965), cert.

denied, 382 U.S. 885 (1965) 16

AUTHORITIES CITED—Continued

Page

New Orleans Steamship Association v. General

Longshore Workers ILA Local Union No, 1418,

626 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1980) ‘abs 24

Orange County District Council of Carpenters,

242 NLRB 587 (1979) 18

Penello v. International Longshoremen’s Associa-

tion, 227 F. Supp. 164 (D. Md. 1964) 20

Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S.

92 (1972) 26

Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (19399 25

Seafarers International Union of North America,

Atlantic and Gulf District, Harbor and Water-

ways Division v. N.L.R.B., 266 F.2d 585 (D.C.

Cir. 1959) 21

Sherbert v. Verner, 874 U.S. 898 (1963 oe 27

Teamsters Union v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284

J%ͤ 8 ̃ 2 — — 22

Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment

Security Division, —— U.S. ——, 101 S. Ct.

1425 (1981) 27

United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 1245,

229 NLRB 236 (1977) 8

US. v. Crosson, 462 F.2d 96 (9th Cir.), cert. de-

nied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972) JCA A NER 23

United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, rehearing

denied, 393 U.S. 900 (1968) 23

United States v. Seeger, 880 U.S. 163 (1968) ........ 25, 27

Walsh ex rel. N. L. R. B. v. International Longshore-

men’s Association, 488 F. Supp. 524 (D. Mass.

1980) 4, 5, 17, 19, 20

Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) 27

Windward Shipping v. American Radio Ass’n, 415

e eee 4. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1971) 27

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 87 (19717. * 23

vii

AUTHORITIES CITED—Continued

Page

Constitution and Statutes:

The First Amendmenltt 23, 25

National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29

U.S.C. § 160 et seq.:

Section 8 (b) (4) passim

Section 303 4

Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. App. 451,

et seq.:

Section 6(j) [50 U.S.C. App. 456(j)] .......... 27

Legislative Materials:

II Leg. History of the Labor Management Report-

ing and Disclosure Act 1036 (195999 q 17

1825 17

1383-84 17

1708 17

1720-21 17

1810 17

3 17

1821 17

1834 17

Miscellaneous:

Carter Urges ILA To Send Remaining Grain To

Soviets, 18 Daily Lab. Rep. A-8 (BNA Jan. 10,

1980) 4

ILA Refuses To Work Russian Ships, Move Rus-

sian Cargo, 6 Daily Lab. Rep. A-6 (BNA Jan.

7, 1980) 3

Inman, Doc workers To Boycott Ships, Cargo for

Russia, Houston Post, Oct. 10, 1980, at 27, Col.

8 3

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,

Vol. 16, No. 2, Mon, Jan. 14, 1980 ...................... 3

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1981

No. 80-1663

INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCIATION,

AFL-CIO, et al.,

ALLIED INTERNATIONAL, ING.,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals

for the First Circuit

Petitioners,

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE

AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION

IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT

The American Farm Bureau Federation, with the

written consents of all parties,’ respectfully submits this

brief as Amicus Curiae in support of the Respondent.

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE

The American Farm Bureau Federation is a voluntary

general farm organization organized in 1919 under the

“General Not For Profit Corporation Act” of the State

of Illinois. The purpose of the American Farm Bureau

Federation is the promotion, protection and representation

of the business, economic, social and educational interests

of the farmers and ranchers of the United States. It has

member State Farm Bureau organizations in 48 states and

in Puerto Rico, representing more than 3 million member

families.

1 Their consents have been filed with the Clerk of the Court.

The American Farm Bureau Federation is vitally con-

cerned with the propensity of the International Long-

shoremen’s Association leadership to order secondary

boycotts to exert leverage in support of political or other

goals unrelated to any primary labor dispute. Such lev-

erage is substantial: each of the grain ships affected by

such boycotts carries a multimillion dollar cargo, and

the ILA’s refusal to load that cargo leads to disrupted

business arrangements and financial losses not only for

the shipping and stevedoring companies but for the grain

elevators, the rail and truck transporters, and the farm-

ers themselves.”

In 1975, as in 1980, the American Farm Bureau Fed-

eration, along with the Kansas Farm Bureau and the

Texas Farm Bureau, filed charges with the National

Labor Relations Board’s Regional Office in Houston alleg-

ing that the International Longshoremen’s Association,

the ILA’s South Atlantic & Gulf Coast District, and

ILA Locals 872 and 1278 had violated Section 8(b) (4) of

the National Labor Relations Act by engaging in a boycott

of grain bound for the Soviet Union.“

Today, as in 1975, the American Farm Bureau Fed-

eration seeks to protect the economic interests of this

nation’s farmers from the ILA’s inclination to use farm

products as a pawn in the Union’s machinations. Given

2“The ILA refusal to work ... has affected the farmers who

produce the grain, the transportation companies who move it to

ports, and the stevedores who load it aboard vessels.” Baldovin v.

International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO, 626 F.2d 445,

448 (5th Cir. 1980).

* Pursuant to the parties’ Settlement Stipulation (drafted by the

Board’s General Counsel), the Board on June 22, 1976, issued a

Decision and Order [DS-857, unreported] requiring that the ILA

and the other respondents abandon their boycott. See Baldovin

v. International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO, supra, 626

F.2d at 448, n. 2, which inaccurately asserts that the settlement

was concluded “before the case reached the Board.” The American

Farm Bureau Federation, the Kansas Farm Bureau, and the Texas

Farm Bureau were also the charging parties in the unfair labor

practice proceedings related to Baldovin, 626 F. ad at 448.

the Union’s established predeliction for instituting sec-

ondary boycotts as a means of expressing its political

positions,“ the American Farm Bureau Federation is

concerned that the ILA will continue to call boycotts for

those purposes unless this Court makes it clear that such

conduct is forbidden by the National Labor Relations

Act.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

At a press conference in New York on January 9,

1980, ILA President Thomas W. Gleason issued a state-

ment ordering ILA members to suspend handling cargo

bound to or from Russia.“ Gleason “estimated that

the boycott would affect hundreds of millions of dollars in

direct shipments between the United States and the

Soviet Union and in Soviet cargo shipped through for-

eign ports.“ Furthermore, Iiln making Soviet goods

‘hot cargo,’ Gleason maintained that he did not want to

‘embarass or second guess’ [President] Carter and said

that he would respect any requests that might come from

the president.“ When he met with President Carter

4 See ILA’s Petition For A Writ of Certiorari (ILA cert. pet.)

at 12-13; ILA’s Brief For Respondents-Appellees-Appellants to the

Fifth Circuit in Baldovin v. I. L.A., supra (ILA Brief to Fifth Cir-

cuit) at 26-27. And see Local 1855, International Longshoremen’s

Association (Ocean Shipping Service, Ltd.), 146 NLRB 723, en-

forcement denied, 382 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1964) (ILA’s boycott of

ships used in trade with Cuba).

5 The text of Gleason’s statement appears in Allied International,

Inc. v. International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO, 640

F.2d 1368, 1369 n. 2 (Ist Cir. 1981).

Inman, Dockworkers To Boycott Ships, Cargo for Russia, Hous-

ton Post, Oct. 10, 1980, at 27, Col. 3.

Id. at Col. 2. And see ILA Refuses To Work Russian Ships,

Move Russian Cargo, 6 Daily Lab. Rep. A-6-A-7, Jan. 7, 1980. On

January 7, 1980, President Carter, responding to the Soviet in-

vasion of Afghanistan, had announced that no agricultural product

may be exported to the Soviet Union except under validated export

licenses issued to cover unshipped grain committed under the 1975

agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. See

“Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,” Vol. 16, No. 2,

Mon., Jan. 14, 1980, pp. 25-27, 32-33.

eight days later, however, and “was told that his union’s

actions are ‘clogging the pipeline and interfering with

commerce’ and are ‘unfair to farmers who need to move

their grain, Gleason failed to call the boycott off.

As Gleason’s directive required, the boycott was im-

plemented in all Atlantic and Gulf Coast ports wherever

ILA longshoremen handle cargo, forcing a variety of

American companies, completely “neutral” to the ILA’s

“dispute” with the Soviet Union, to cease doing business

with each other vis-a-vis cargo bound to or from Russia.

Allied International, Inc., an importer of wood products

from the Soviet Union, filed the complaint in the instant

case, alleging, inter alia, that the ILA’s actions violated

Section 8 (b) (4) of the National Labor Relations Act,’

and that Allied was thus entitled to damages under Sec-

tion 303 of the Act.“

As fully set forth in its decision,“ the United States

Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the dis-

trict court’s dismissal of Allied’s NLRA claims,” and

held that: (1) the Supreme Court’s “foreign flag” deci-

sions,“ which deny NLRA jurisdiction in situations in-

Carter Urges ILA To Send Remaining Grain To Soviets, 18

Daily Lab. Rep. A-8, Jza. 10, 1980.

The text of Section 8 (b) (4) (i) and (ii) (B) appears in Ap-

pendix A.

10 The text of Section 303 appears in Appendix B.

11 Allied International, Inc. v. International Longskoremen's

Association, AFL-CIO, 640 F.2d 1868 (1st Cir. 1981).

12 Allied International, Inc. v. International Longshoremen’s As-

sociation, 492 F.Supp. 334 (D. Mass. 1980), relying on Walsh v.

International Longshoremen’s Association, 488 F.Supp. 524 (D.

Mass. 1980).

18 Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 368 U.S. 188 (1957) ;

McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, etc., 872 U.S. 10 (1968); Incres

S.S. Co. v. International Maritime Workers Union, 872 U.S. 24

(1968); International Longshoremen’s Local 1416, AFL-CIO v.

Ariadne Shipping Company, 397 U.S. 195 (1970); Windward Ship-

ping (London) Ltd. v. American Radio Association, AFL-CIO, 415

U.S. 104 (1974); American Radio Association, AFL-CIO v. Mobile

Steamship Association, Inc., 419 U.S, 216 (1974).

volving American labor unions’ labor disputes or labor

objectives concerning foreign crews of foreign ships,

are inapplicable to the instant case since “[t]here is no

question of interference in the affairs of a foreign em-

ployer;” “ (2) “the ILA leadership directed ILA mem-

bers. . . to engage in a concerted refusal to handle a

certain class of goods.; (3) “the object of a boy-

cott, for purposes of section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B), can be in-

ferred from the virtually inevitable results generated by

it, at least when, as here, the union’s conduct can under

no reading of the facts be characterized as ‘primary ac-

tivity’ protected by the Act“; (4) “when a union or-

ders all employees of a neutral employer to cease han-

dling goods originating from a particular source, it is

a fortiori forcing that employer to ‘cease doing business

with’ that source“; (5) absence of a primary labor

dispute does not preclude National Labor Relations

Board jurisdiction over a union’s secondary boycott con-

duct; “ (6) application of Section 8 (b) (4) to “national

boycotts undertaken as a form of ‘political expression“

deprives neither ILA leaders nor members of their statu-

tory or constitutional rights of expression; “ and (7) the

ILA’s boycott violates Section 8(b) (4) as alleged.”

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In its “foreign flag” decisions,” this Court has estab-

lished the principles that considerations of international

14 Allied International, supra, 640 F. ad at 1371-74.

18 Jd. at 1874.

16 Jd. at 1875-76. And see id. at 1877 (“we think it plain that the

ILA was not engaged in primary activity and that the boycott . . .

was ‘calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere.’”). Compare

Walsh v. 1.L.A., supra, 488 F.Supp. at 531 (“this a primary boycott

of Russian goods, with incidental effects upon those employers who

deal in such goods.“)

17 640 F.2d at 1377-78.

18 Jd. at 1877-78. And see fn. 70 below.

19 Jd. at 1878-79.

20 Id. at 1879.

21 See fn. 18, supra.

comity preclude intrusion of National Labor Relations

Act jurisdiction into international maritime labor dis-

putes, and therefore, that the NLRB may not assert

jurisdiction over either a union’s primary labor dispute

concerning the foreign crew members of a foreign-owned

ship [Windward, supra, 415 U.S. at 115] or the second-

ary effects of such a dispute upon neutral domestic em-

ployers. Mobile, supra, 419 U.S. at 224-25. The Court

has emphasized, however, that where foreign shipboard

labor relations are not at issue, “the Board has jurisdic-

tion under 88 (b) (4) of domestic secondary activities

which are in commerce, even though the primary em-

ployer is located outside the United States.” Id. at 225,

n. 10.

Since the instant case involves no primary employer

and no primary labor dispute, but only secondary boy-

cott activity in furtherance of the ILA’s “dispute” with

the Soviet Union, this Court’s “foreign flag” concerns

regarding interference with international martime labor

relations are not germane to the jurisdictional issue here.

Furthermore, as the NLRB and most courts have held,

the absence of a primary labor dispute does not deprive

the Board of jurisdiction over a union’s secondary boy-

cott. Accordingly, there is no barrier to the assertion

of Section 8(b) (4) jurisdiction in this case.

The ILA’s conduct, including Thomas W. Gleason’s

order instituting the boycott and the refusal of the ILA

locals to refer longshoremen to handle cargo bound to or

from Russia, induced ILA members to engage in a con-

certed refusal to handle such cargo and thus coerced or

restrained a variety of neutral employers. And since it

was reasonably foreseeable that the boycott would force

neutral employers to cease doing business vis-a-vis Soviet

cargo, an unlawful object of forcing such a cessation of

business may be inferred. N.L.R.B. v. Retail Store Em-

ployees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607 (1980).

22 See International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO( Allied

International, Inc), 257 NLRB No. 151 (1981), slip op. at 11-13,

and cases cited therein.

Finally, contrary to the ILA’s claims, the boycott is

not protected by the First Amendment. International

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501 v. N.L.R.B.,

341 U.S. 694 (1951).

In sum, the court below correctly held that the ILA has

violated Section 8 (b) (4) (B) by instituting and main-

taining a secondary boycott of cargo bound to or from

Russia.

ARGUMENT

I. This Court’s “Foreign Flag” Decisions Do Not Pre-

clude National Labor Relations Act Jurisdiction Over

A Union’s Domestic Secondary Boycott Activity When

The Union’s Conduct Is Not In Furtherance of a

Primary Labor Relations Dispute Or Objective Con-

cerning the Foreign Crew Members of Foreign-Owned

Vessels.

A. The “Foreign Flag” Cases Are All “Labor Dispute”

Cases, and the Court’s Withholding of Jurisdiction

Has Been Grounded In International Comity Con-

siderations Regarding the Impropriety of Intruding

Domestic Labor Act Jurisdiction Into Foreign

Maritime Labor Disputes.

As the court below correctly found, this Court’s “for-

eign flag” holdings,” which delineate “the threshold of

interference with the maritime operations of foreign ves-

sels which makes the [Act] inapplicable,” “do not pre-

clude the assertion of NLRA jurisdiction over the ILA’s

boycott activities in the instant ease.

In its “foreign flag” decisions, this Court has held

that American unions’ labor disputes or labor relations

objectives vis-a-vis foreign shipowners and their foreign

crews are beyond the jurisdiction of the NLRB because

assertion of such jurisdiction would intrude the domestic

labor law into the maritime operations of foreign ves-

23 See n. 18, supra.

2 Allied International, supra, 640 F.2d at 1372, quoting Wind-

ward, supra, 415 U.S. at 114.

20 Allied, 640 F. 2d at 1871-74.

sels, contrary to “longstanding principles of comity and

accommodation in international trade.“ Furthermore,

where a union’s conduct in furtherance of its primary

labor objective or dispute with a foreign shipowner is

beyond the Act’s jurisdiction,” the effects of that conduct

upon neutral “secondary” employers are also beyond the

Act’s jurisdiction.”

The central focus of all the “foreign flag” cases is

some sort of labor dispute. In each case, one or more

American unions were attempting to achieve a labor-

oriented goal vis-a-vis employees of foreign shipowners.”

In Windward and Mobile, as this Court observed, the

union’s objective was to protest the undermining of area

standards by foreign shipowners and, hopefully, to force

20 Windward, 415 U.S. 112-18. And see the Court’s summary of

its holdings in Benz, McCulloch, Incres, and Ariadne at 415 U.S.

109-113.

27 Windward, 415 U.S. at 115.

28 Mobile, 419 U.S. 224-26.

2° Picketing to support striking foreign employees of foreign

shipowners (Benz); organizational picketing seeking to represent

foreign employees of foreign shipowners (Incres); seeking to

represent foreign employees of foreign shipowners in a Board-

ordered election (McCulloch); protesting wages paid by foreign

shipowners to U.S. longshoremen servicing foreign ships (Ariadne) ;

and picketing to protest foreign shipowner’s payment of “sub-

standard” wages to foreign crewmen (Windward and Mobile).

The facts of Windward/Mobile show that the union, which was

concerned with declining jobs caused by the “competitive advantage

enjoyed by [foreign] vessels because of the differences between

foreign and domestic seamen’s wages” [Windward, 415 U.S. at

106-107], essentially was engaging in what is known as “area

standards” picketing. See, e. g., United Brotherhood of Carpenters,

Local 1245, NLRB 236, 240 (1977). In Windward, foreign

shipowners undermined United States mariners’ job opportunities

by paying wages below area standards and thus gained a competi-

tive advantage in the shipping market. As the union’s picket signs

proclaimed, “the wages and benefits paid seamen aboard the vessel

. .. are substandard to those of American seamen. This results

in extreme damage to our wage standards and loss of our jobs.

Windward, 415 U.S. at 107; Mobile, 419 U.S. at 217, n. 2.

those shipowners to raise their costs, including wage

costs, so as to eliminate the competitive edge they de-

_ rived from paying low wages to their foreign crews.”

Furthermore, from the facts of Incres and McCulloch, it

is apparent that the American maritime unions’ first

line of attack had been to organize such foreign crews.”

Presumably, had they been successful in such organizing

efforts, the unions in those cases would have attempted

to negotiate wage increases for the foreign crews.

In Windward, the Court considered the possibility that

foreign shippers might respond to the picketing by tak-

ing action, other than raising wages, that would affect

their maritime operations. But the Court stressed that,

of all the possible “predictable responses,” wage increases

would have the greatest impact on “maritime opera-

tions” :

A decision by the foreign owners to raise foreign

seamen’s wages to a level mollifying the American

pickets would have the most significant and far-

reaching effect on the maritime operations of these

ships throughout the world.”

The effects of the shippers’ other possible responses were

described by the Court in far less dramatic terms.“

The crucial issue in all of the “foreign flag” cases is

whether the union’s conduct crosses the “threshold of in-

terference with the maritime operations of foreign ves-

sels which makes the LMRA inapplicable.”™ If the

3° See n. 29, supra.

31 Thus, National Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO, filed

the representation petition in McCulloch, 372 U.S. 10, 18, and

International Maritime Workers Union, “an American labor or-

ganization formed by two other American unions for the primary

purpose of organizing foreign seamen on foreign-flag ships,” en-

gaged in the organizational picketing in Incres. 372 U.S. at 25-26.

82 Windward, 415 U.S. at 114 (emphasis supplied).

38 Windward, 415 U.S. at 114-115.

1 Id. at 114.

Court in these cases has not treated “maritime opera-

tions” as conceptually identical with “labor relations,” it

clearly has viewed labor relations as the central and most

significant aspect of such operations. The majority in

Mobile emphasized the primacy of the labor relations

aspect of maritime operations in its rejection of the dis-

sent’s suggestion that the majority’s rationale required

reversal of Ariadne since that case “held that longshore-

men servicing ‘foreign flag’ vessels in American ports are

‘in commerce .. The majority countered by ob-

serving that in contrast to the situation in Ariadne,

where the pickets protested wages paid to fellow Ameri-

can longshoremen, [here the picketing which triggered

the dispute was not directed toward any wages or con-

ditions of employment of the longshoremen. It was in-

stead directed to substandard wages being paid to the

crews of ‘foreign-flag’ vessels throughout those vessels’

worldwide maritime operations.” * In the Court’s view,

it was this “effect,” which, of course, bears directly upon

employer-employee relations on foreign vessels, that

crossed the threshold of interference with maritime oper-

ations and rendered the LMRA inapplicable.”

The ILA reads this Court’s Windward and Mobile de-

cisions as holding that Section 8 (b) (4) jurisdiction is

obviated whenever a union’s domestic secondary boycott

is in furtherance of any kind of “dispute” with any kind

of foreign “entity.”** The ILA’s interpretation thus

assumes that a primary labor dispute or labor relations

objective is irrelevant to the Court’s Windward-Mobile

%5 Mobile, 419 U.S. at 223, fn. 9.

36 Id.

37 Td.

38 See ILA cert. petition at 6-8. The only kind of dispute between

an “American union and a foreign entity” which the ILA concedes

to be jurisdictional is that in Ariadne—a “dispute over the hiring

in United States ports of unionized American labor.” Id. at 6, n. 3.

And see ILA’s “Brief For Petitioners” (“ILA Brief“ or Brief“)

at 5, 10, 19-21).

rationale, and, therefore, that the principles developed by

this Court in Benz through Ariadne are irrelevant as

well. If the ILA were correct, the pre-Windward cases

could have been decided simply on the issue of whether

the union had a dispute with a foreign “entity” whose

“predictable responses” would not beneficially effect

American workingmen’s wages,” regardless of whether

assertion of Board jurisdiction would raise conflicts with

foreign labor laws * or would require inquiry into labor

disputes between foreign shipowners and their foreign

crews.”

But the language of the Windward/Mobile decisions

simply does not support the notion that the Court was

* See the discussion above, pp. 7-10.

4 ILA Brief at 9.

“1 McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 20-22.

42 Benz, 353 U.S. at 143. The ILA’s analysis also ignores this

Court’s statement in Mobile that its holding there “cast no doubt”

upon Madden v. Grain Elevator, Flour and Feed Mill Workers,

International Longshoremen Assn., Local 418, 334 F.2d 1014 (7th

Cir. 1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 967 (1965), and Grain Elevator,

Flour and Feed Mill Workers, International Longshoremen Assn.,

Local 418, AFL-CIO v. N.L.R.B., 376 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir.), cert.

denied, 389 U.S. 982 (1967), which recognized “that the Board has

jurisdiction under § 8(b)(4) of domestic secondary activities which

are in commerce, even though the primary employer is located

outside the United States.” 419 U.S. at 225, n. 10. That the Court’s

specific preservation of Board jurisdiction in cases like Madden

and Grain Elevator Workers rests upon the factual differences

between those cases and Windward/Mobile demonstrates that the

Court’s rationale for denying jurisdiction over the “domestic second-

ary activities” in Mobile is closely tied to the facts of that case.

As the majority in Mobile put it, where “picketing activities.

so directly affect the maritime operations of foreign vessels,” the

Board will not have jurisdiction over either the primary picketing

or its secondary effects. 419 U.S. at 228 (emphasis supplied).

Where the only conduct at issue, however, is “domestic secondary

activity which is in commerce” (as in Madden/Grain Elevator

Workers), it is apparent that the Court does not view such activity

as directly affecting maritime operations so as to negate Board

jurisdiction.

abandoning or rendering irrelevant the principles enun-

ciated in Benz through Ariadne. Rather, those princi-

ples obviously are the foundation upon which the Wind-

ward/Mobile rationale is built and play a necessary part

in the jurisdictional analysis.”

B. Where There Is No Foreign Maritime Labor Dis-

pute, But Only Domestic Secondary Activity, the

Court’s “Foreign Flag” Concerns Are Irrelevant

and the Board Has Jurisdiction Even If the “Pri-

mary” Is Located Outside the United States.

The court below perceived the central labor relations

focus of this Court’s “foreign flag” rulings and viewed

Windward/Mobile as establishing the principle that:

[I]n a case involving intertwined “primary” and

“secondary” labor disputes, lack of Board jurisdic-

tion over the primary dispute will preclude Board

jurisdiction over the secondary conduct—more par-

ticularly where a contrary rule might well suggest

an improper interference by the United States in the

relationship between foreign employers and labor-

ers.

The court observed that, as in Madden and Grain Eleva-

tor Workers,” “application of Section 8 (b) (4) here

would portend no interference in the management or

affairs of foreign companies, workers, or labor organiza-

tions. This case is thus far removed from the situation

that faced the court in Mobile.“ Because It] he only

labor-related activity in issue has been played out by an

all-American cast,“ the “foreign flag” principles are

inapplicable here.

For the Board’s summary of this Court’s “foreign flag” hold-

ings, see International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO (Al.

lied International, Inc.), 257 NLRB No. 151, slip op. at 15.

Allied International, 640 F.2d at 1874, n. 4 (emphasis in origi-

nal). And see, International Longshoremen’s Asen. (Allied Inter-

national, Inc.), 257 NLRB No. 151, slip op. at 18-21, 23.

45 See fn. 42, supra.

4% Allied, 640 F.2d at 1374.

* Id. at 1878.

The court’s conclusion that neutral employers in these

circumstances are entitled to the Act’s protection was en-

dorsed by the NLRB in its decision in the related unfair

labor practice case.** Moreover, the Board’s Allied holding

is consistent with its 1964 assertion of jurisdiction over an

earlier ILA political boycott of vessels used in trade with

Cuba, Local 1355, International Longshoremen’s Associa-

tion (Ocean Shipping Service, Ltd.).“ Rejecting the ILA’s

contention there that Incres et al. precluded NLRB juris-

diction because tise vessel at issue was a foreign ship with

an alien crew, the Board made it clear that this Court’s

foreign flag concerns were not applicable.”

Although the Fourth Circuit reversed the Board’s jur-

isdictional holding on other grounds, the court agreed

with the Board that this Court’s “foreign flag” rulings

did not foreclose jurisdiction over the ILA’s conduct.”

Similarly, in its Allied decision, the Board emphasized

that Ocean Shipping is “in harmony with the Supreme

Courts’ rulings in Windward and Mobile.“ It is thus

apparent that today, as in 1964, the ILA’s non-labor

“dispute” with a foreign entity“ * is irrelevant to the

issue of Board jurisdiction over the Union’s secondary

boycott activities.“ Holding those activities unlawful

48 See Allied International, supra, 257 NLRB No. 151, slip op.

at 28-24; and see id. at 9, nn. 12 & 18; 15; 36.

4% 146 NLRB 728 (1964), rev'd. sub nom. N. L. R. B. v. Inter-

national Longshoremen’s Association and Local 1855, 332 F. 2d 922

(Ath Cir. 1964).

0 146 NLRB at 724, fn. 3.

51 N. L. R. B. v. I. L. A., supra, 382 F. ad at 995.

52 257 NLRB No. 151, slip op. at 24. And see id. at 35.

53 See fn. 70 below.

The ILA claims [cert. pet. at 9; Brief at 15, n. 18; 16] that

assertion of NLRA jurisdiction over its boycott also conflicts with

the Board’s holding in National Maritime Union of America (Ship-

pers Stevedoring Company), 245 NLRB 149 (1979). The Board,

however, rejected this contention in its Allied decision, indicating

would not resolve labor disputes between nationals of

other countries operating ships under foreign

that Shippers, unlike the instant case, falls within the Windward/

Mobile lim tation on jurisdiction because the union there sought

to compel “the total replacement of the foreign ship and its foreign

crew with an American ship and its American crew. [T]he

dispute directly intruded into the maritime operations of a foreign

ship.” [257 NLRB No. 151, siip op. at 22, n. 29, emphasis in

original.]

While the amicus agrees with the Board that Shippers is not

controlling here, it disagrees with the Board’s analysis of that

case and maintains that Shippers was itself incorrectly decided.

As set forth by the NLRB’s Administrative Law Judge, the facts

of Shippers do not raise the kinds of issues that concerned this

Court in the “foreign flag” cases. No labor dispute was involved.

The union in Shippers picketed a Russian vessel, not in order to

influence shipboard labor relations of Russia or of any foreign

shipper, but rather to protest the alleged failure of the United

States Department of Transportation to comply with the “Mer-

chant Marine Act’s law of cargo preference” which required that

a certain proportion of imported cargo purchased by the United

States Government be carried on American ships. The union 80

stated its purpose, prior to engaging in its picketing, both to the

press and to the stevedoring company affected. And the union

called off its pickets when it received assurances from the Depart-

ment of Transportation that the government would comply with

the cargo preference requirements. 245 NLRB at 150-52. In spite

of these facts, however, the Board in Shippers adopted the ALJ’s

holding that the union’s picketing “was not picketing in commerce

within the meaning of the LMRA” (Id. at 157), apparently because

none of the Russian shipowners’ “predictable responses” would

benefit American seamen represented by the union (Id.).

The impropriety of focusing upon a foreign shipowner’s “pre-

dictable responses” in assessing the jurisdictional issue is demon-

strated by the facts of Shippers: the responses of Russian ship-

owners were irrelevant, since the union’s objectives could be satisfied

(and ultimately were satisfied) only by the “response” of an agency

of the United States Government. Furthermore, the full extent

(and object) of the union’s effect upon the “operations of foreign

ships” was simply what was mandated in the cargo preference law.

Therefore, it was Congress, presumably taking into account the

substantial international ramifications of its conduct, which ad-

versely affected the “foreign maritime operations” at issue in

Shippers.

laws .. „ * raise “the possibilities of international dis-

cord. .. and retaliative action ., * or “exert United

States jurisdiction over and apply its laws to the internal

management and affairs of [foreign-owned] ves-

sels ....” As the ILA well knows, the only entity

whose conduct or policies would be significantly affected

by such jurisdiction is the ILA itself.

II. The Board Is Not Deprived Of Section 8(b)(4) Juris-

diction Over A Union’s Secondary Boycott By The

Absence Of A Primary Labor Dispute.

The court below rightly rejected the argument that

Section 8(b) (4) requires a dispute with a primary em-

ployer as a pre-condition to finding a union’s secondary

pressures unlawful."* As the Board observed in its

Allied decision :

Although Section 8(b) (4) is commonly described as

prohibiting secondary boycotts, its prohibitions do

not encompass a primary-secondary dichotomy.

Rather, Section 8(b) (4) prohibits certain specified

conduct if engaged in with certain specified objec-

tives. The absence of a primary labor dispute does

not preclude the invocation of Section 8(b) (4)’s pro-

tections.

Although the Fourth Circuit, overturning the Board’s

Ocean Shipping decision, held that the Board may not

exercise Section 8(b) (4) jurisdiction over a boycott that

is “political in nature” because the existence of a labor

dispute with a primary employer is an “indispensible

prerequisite 0 jurisdiction,” ® the Board itself, and indeed

% Benz, 363 U.S. at 143.

Id. at 147.

* McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 20-22.

68 640 F. ad at 1377-78. And see ILA Brief at 28-29.

6° 257 NLRB No. 151, slip op. at 11-12, fn. omitted. And see

id. at 12-13 and cases cited therein.

found that the ILA’s refusal to refer employees was not “coercive”

within the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B), and, therefore, that

the Board’s order must be denied enforcement. Id. at 999, 997.

most courts, have rejected the Fourth Circuit’s position.

In fact, shortly after the Fourth Circuit’s decision issued,

the Board, in National Maritime Union of America, AFL-

CIO (The Weyerhaeuser Co.), specifically refused to

follow it.

Furthermore, [olf the five circuits that have consid-

ered the issue, only the Fourth Circuit found a primary

labor] dispute necessary to the finding of a violation

of Sec. 8 (b) (4) .. .,” and several courts have criti-

cized the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning.”

Beyond the relatively straightforward error of assum-

ing that a primary labor dispute is a prerequisite to

Section 8(b) (4) jurisdiction, imprecise reasoning con-

cerning the nature and relationship of “primary” and

“secondary” conduct can cloud the analysis in equally

misleading ways. For example, the pitfalls of assum-

ing, explicitly or implicity, that there must be some form

of “primary” activity from which secondary conduct may

be distinguished are illustrated by the Fourth Circuit’s

conclusion in Ocean Shipping,“ adopted by the district

court in Walsh, that political boycotts are protected by

¢1 147 NLRB 1817-18, n. 3 (1964), enforced in National Maritime

Union v. N. L. R. B., 842 F.2d 588 (2nd Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382

U.S. 885 (1965).

2 257 NLRB No. 151, slip op. at 12, fn. 15.

Contrary to the ILA’s contentions, [Brief at 39-40] the Second,

Eighth, and D.C. Circuits did not “suggest[] that the presence of

a political dispute would protect” a secondary boycott in furtherance

of such a “dispute,” but merely noted that political disputes were

not before them. The courts’ distinctions were not, as ILA urges,

“motivated” by “First Amendment considerations.” Brief at 40.

See, e. g., National Maritime Union v. N. L. R. B., 346 F.2d 411,

415-16 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Mountain Navigation Co., Inc. v. Sea-

farers International Union of North America, 348 F. Supp. 1298,

1802-08 (W.D. Wis. 1971); and Harrington & Company, Inc. v.

1.L.A., 356 F. Supp. 1079, 1082-83 (S.D. Fla. 1978).

* 332 F. ad at 997.

488 F. Supp. at 581.

the primary conduct proviso to Section 8 (b) (4) (B).

Congress’ purpose in enacting that proviso, however, was

to preserve “the right of labor organizations to bring

pressure to bear on offending employers in primary labor

disputes ....”™ In the instant case, as in Ocean Ship-

ping, there is no primary employer and no labor dispute

with a primary employer. Accordingly, the conditions

to which the proviso applies simply are not present, and,

contrary to the Fourth Circuit in Ocean Shipping and

the district court in Walsh, that proviso is irrelevant to

an analysis of the legality of political boycotts.”

Similarly, when the ILA states that the First Cir-

cuit’s holding on the jurisdictional issue “is a classic

example of ‘bifurcating’ the domestic effects and the

underlying dispute . . , * the Union is analogizing its

“underlying foreign dispute” to the primary labor dis-

pute at issue in Mobile and thus is attempting to camou-

flage the absence in this case of the very factor that was

crucial to this Court’s analysis in Mobile and the other

foreign flag decisions.“

In sum, the absence of a primary labor dispute in

this case not only is no barrier to the assertion of Sec-

tion 8(b) (4) jurisdiction over the ILA’s domestic sec-

See Appendix A.

* II Leg. History of the Labor Management Reporting and Dis-

closure Act 1086 (1959), quoting N.L.R.B. v. Denver Bldg. & Constr.

Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (emphasis supplied). And see

II Leg. Hist. at 1825 [remarks of Sen. Morse], 1383-84, 1708, 1720-

21, 1810, 1818, 1821, and 18384.

¢8 Furthermore, as the court below observed, there are substantial

public policy considerations which militate against reading a politi-

cal boycott exception into the Section 8(b)(4) prohibitions of

secondary activity. 640 F.2d at 1378.

0 ILA cert. pet. at 6. And see Brief at 15, 18.

7 Significantly, the ILA not only has no primary labor dis-

pute or objective vis-a-vis a foreign shipowner, it has no “pri-

mary dispute” of any kind with any entity. The “dispute” is

between Russia and Afghanistan, and while the ILA may be dis-

pleased with Russia’s actions in Afghanistan, the union certainly

may not be regarded as a party to that dispute.

ondary boycott activities, it renders irrelevant both the

primary conduct proviso of Section 8(b) (4) (B) and this

Court’s foreign flag rulings.

III. The ILA’s Statements and Conduct Have Induced

Employees to Engage In a Concerted Refusal to

Handle Cargo Bound To or From Russia and Have

Thus Coerced Neutral Persons Engaged In Commerce.

There can be no doubt that Thomas W. Gleason’s

January 9, 1980, statement was a “binding order from

the president of the ILA to the rank-and-file member-

ship,” and that this directive emanating from the ILA

leadership “induced and encouraged ILA members

to engage in, a refusal to handle . . .” products bound

to or from Russia.“

This Court has held that “[t]he words ‘induce or en-

courage’ are broad enough to include in them every form

of influence and persuasion.” * Picketing or similar con-

duct is not a necessary element; written or oral state-

ments are sufficient inducement or encouragement. In

fact, as the Second Circuit has held, “proof of actual in-

tent [is] unnecessary,” and even a union leader’s “equivo-

cal” statement of assertedly “personal views” will be held

to constitute unlawful inducement if work stoppages

actually occur as a result of such statements.”

1 J. L. A. (Allied Int’l.), supra, 257 NLRB No. 151, slip op. at

28-29. And see Allied Int’l., supra, 640 F.2d at 1874 (“it is uncon-

troverted that the ILA leadership directed ILA members

to engage in a concerted refusal to handle a certain class of

goods. ); International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO

(Kansas Farm Bureau), NLRB-JD-99-81, slip op. at 5-6. See also

ILA Brief at 35, n. 47 (“The ILA certainly ‘encouraged’ its

members in the stance they had taken by backing them.“)

72 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501 v.

N.L.R.B., 341 U.S. 694, 701-702 (1951). And see Local 722, Inter-

national Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen

and Helpers of America, 229 NLRB 392, 400 (1977); Orange

County District Council of Carpenters, 242 NLRB 687, n. 10 (1979).

73 N. L. R. B. v. Local Union No. 8, Int. Bro. of Elec. Wkrs., AFL-

CIO, 477 F.2d 260, 264-65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1065

(1978).

A union cannot shift responsibility for unlawful sec-

ondary conduct to the employees it represents. As the

District of Columbia Circuit has held, where union policy

supports a boycott, a finding of violation would not be

“undermined on the ground that the secondary employees

had acted individually in deciding to avoid the struck

ship.” ““ Similarly, the Board has held that where a union

is aware of Section 8 (b) (4) activities by or on behalf

of employees it represents, and fails to “discourage or

disclaim those activities,” the union will be held “respon-

sible for the activities found illegal.” “

Union conduct which has a prohibited object or effect

will be found unlawful even if the cessation of business

relations is not complete.“ Rather, “if the foreseeable

result of secondary activity will be more than a ‘slight’

disruption of business relations, the ‘cease doing business’

requirement is met.“ *

Finally, a union engages in prohibited coercion or re-

straint of neutral persons when, as the ILA has done

here, it refuses to refer workers.” Thus, contrary to

™ Grain Elevator, Flour and Feed Mill Workers, International

Longshoremen’s Association, Local 418, AFL-CIO v. N.L.R.B., 376

F.2d 774, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1967).

™% International Longshoremen’s Association, AFL-CIO, etc. (Ship-

side Packing Company, Inc), 227 NLRB 659, n. 1 (1976). But

see N. L. R. B. v. I. L.A. (Ocean Shipping), supra, 332 F.2d at 997-99

and Walsh v. J L. A., supra, 488 F. Supp. at 530-31, wherein the

courts take th view that Section 8 (b) (4) is not violated by em-

ployees’ politically motivated refusals to work vessels or cargo

which are subject to an ILA-ordered boycott.

76 See, e.g., Local 399, Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,

235 NLRB 556, 560 (1978), citing N.L.R.B. v. Local 825, Int'l

Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO [Burns and Roe, Inc.},

400 U.S. 297 (1971).

Tt N. L. R. B. v. Local 85, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,

Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, 454 F.2d

875, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1972).

78 International Longshoremen’s Association, Inc., supra, 257

NLRB No. 151, slip op. at 36; and see, International Longshore-

men’s Association, AFL-CIO (Kansas Farm Bureau), NLRB JD-

the ILA’s claim that it has engaged in merely a “passive

protest,” the evidence clearly shows that the union has,

within the meaning of the Act, induced or encouraged em-

ployees to refuse to handle cargo bound to or from Rus-

sia, and has restrained or coerced neutral persons en-

gaged in domestic and foreign commerce.

IV. The ILA’s Unlawful Object Of Forcing Neutral Em-

ployers To Cease Doing Business May Be Inferred

From the Reasonably Foreseeable Consequences of

the Union’s Secondary Boycott Conduct.

Rejecting the ILA’s contention that its “sole object is

to vindicate the consciences of its members . . . and, by

passive action, to protest politically the invasion of Af-

ghanistan,” the court below found that “the ILA has

chosen to carry out its goal of protest through action—

a selective work stoppage—which by its very nature is

designed to force at least partial cessation of business

between companies with which ILA has no labor-related

grievance.” Citing this Court’s holding in N.L.R.B. v.

Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 that a union

is “responsible for the foreseeable consequences of its

conduct,” * the court held that “the object of a boycott,

for purposes of section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B), can be inferred

from the virtually inevitable results generated by it, at

99-81 (1981), slip op. at 5. And see Local Union No. 418, Sheet

Metal Workers International Association, AFL-CIO, 235 NLRB

144, 146 (1978); Penello v. International Longshoremen’s As-

sociation, 227 F. Supp. 164, 169 (D. Md. 1964); N. L. R. B. v. Local

825, International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, 315

F.2d 696, 697-98 (8rd Cir. 1963). Contrary to the weight of au-

thority, the Fourth Circuit in Ocean Shipping held that a union’s

refusal for “political” reasons to refer workers to selected neutral

employers does not constitute retraint or coercion of such employers

within the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (ii)(B). 332 F.2d at 996-99.

Other than Walsh, however, no subsequent decisions have been

found which follow the court’s views on this issue.

7° 640 F. ad at 1875.

0 447 U.S. 607, 100 S. Ct. 2872 (1980).

8 Jd., 100 S. Ct. at 2877, n. 9.

least when, as here, the union’s conduct can under no read-

ing of the facts be characterized as ‘primary activity’ pro-

tected by the Act.” *

Like the court below, the Board found that the ILA’s

conduct “is exclusively secondary. . . . Respondents at-

tempted to pressure the USSR through those parties do-

ing business with it—the very tactic Section 8(b) (4) was

enacted to prohibit.” ** And the Board agreed that the

ILA’s unlawful intent may be inferred from the foresee-

able consequences of the union’s conduct.”

Contrary to ILA’s contention that the First Circuit’s

holding constitutes an “unwarranted and dangerous

the court’s reasoning is fully consonant with that of a

long line of Board and court decisions to the effect that

„ln the absence of admissions by the union of an

illegal intent, the nature of the acts performed shows the

intent.” * In fact, the ILA has been “on notice” since

1964 that the Board would draw such an inference, for

* 640 F. ad at 1375-76 (citations and footnote omitted).

nternational Longshoremen’s Association (Allied Int'l.),

supra, 257 NLRB No. 151, slip op. at 34, fn. omitted.

Id. at 30, 33.

SILA cert. petition at 12. In contrast to the position espoused

in its petition for certiorari, the ILA in its Brief to the Fifth Cir-

cuit in Baldovin admitted that if its boycott does not fall within

the protections of the First Amendment, it violates the National

Labor Relation Act’s prohibition on secondary boycotts: “In the

instant case, there is an either/or situation. Either respondents’

actions violate § 8(b) (4) or they are free speech. No other alterna-

tive exists.” Id. at 45.

8 Seafarers International Union of North America, Atlantic &

Gulf District, Harbor and Waterways Division v. N.L.R.B., 265

F.2d 585, 591 (D.C. Cir. 1959), as quoted in Local 761, Inter-

national Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-

CIO v. N.L.R.B., 366 U.S. 667, 674 (1961). And see International

Longshoremen’s Association (Allied International), supra, 257

NLRB No. 151, slip op. at 29-36 and cases cited therein.

—

the Board did so when it found that the ILA’s political

boycott of ships used in trade with Cuba violated Section

8(b) (4)."

And far from being “unwarranted,” the inference that

the ILA intended a cessation of business is almost super-

fluous in light of the ILA’s statements and conduct which

show that from the boycott’s inception, the Union’s leader-

ship recognized that making goods bound to or from

Russia “hot cargo” would affect hundreds of millions of

dollars in shipments of such goods.“ In the circumstances

of this case, therefore, the court below was fully justified

in finding that an object of the ILA boycott was forcing

or requiring a cessation of domestic business vis-a-vis

cargo bound to or from the Soviet Union, an object pro-

hibited by the Act.

V. Conduct Forbidden By Section 8(b)(4) Is Not Pro-

tected By the First Amendment.

The court below correctly brushed aside “ILA’s argu-

ment that its concerted conduct, carried out on orders of

top union management, is protected by the First Amend-

ment.“ » There is no guarantee under the First Amend-

* Local 1855, International Longshoremen’s Association (Ocean

Shipping Service, Ltd.), 146 NLRB 728, 727, (1964).

88 See, pp. 3-4, supra. While the ILA, in its Brief to this Court,

asserts that there is not a “jot of evidence” that the ILA intended

to cause a cessation of business (Brief at 25), it admits that “[t]o

the extent that the domestic impact could be said to have any

purpose, it was a ‘crucial part of the mechanism’ by which the

union’s foreign objective was to be achieved.” Brief at 13. In

other words, while the union and its members could have protested

the Afghan invasion without involving neutrals, the ILA, despite

its claims to the contrary, made a “deliberate choice . . . to engage

in activity beyond what was strictly necessary.. to register such

a protest. See ILA cert. petition at 12, n. 10.

640 F.2d at 1879, citing N.L.R.B. v. Retail Store Employees

Union, Local 1001, supra, 447 U.S. 607; International Brotherhood

of Electrical Workers v. NURB, 341 U.S. 694 (1951); American

Radio Association v. Mobile Steamship Association, 419 U.S. 215,

229-81 (1974) ; Teamsters Union v. Vogt, Inc., 364 U.S. 284 (1957).

ment or the NLRA that expression, whether speech or

conduct, may never be abridged. The First Amendment

does not “give absolute protection to every individual to

speak whenever or wherever he pleases or to use any form

of address in any circumstances that he chooses.” Fur-

thermore, while the First Amendment’s protections do

“apply to certain non-verbal conduct of communicative

nature, the communication of ideas by conduct is not

guaranteed the same degree of protection accorded com-

munication by pure speech.” ™

Rejecting the argument that the First Amendment pro-

tects “all modes of communication of ideas by conduct,

this Court has held that:

[Glovernmental regulation [of conduct] is sufficient-

ly justified if it is within the constitutional power

of government; if it furthers an important or sub-

stantial governmental interest; if the governmental

interest is unrelated to the suppression of free ex-

ression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged

irst Amendment freedoms is no greater than is

essential to the furtherance of that interest.”

With particular regard to the secondary boycott provi-

sions of the National Labor Relations Act, this Court long

ago held in International Brotherhood of Electrical Work-

ers, Local 501 v. N. L. R. B. that “the prohibition of in-

ducement of secondary pressure by § 8 (b) (4) (A) carries

no constitutional abridgement of free speech.”™ This

Joyce v. United States, 454 F.2d 971, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1971),

cert. denied, 405 U.S. 969 (1972).

* United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77, rehearing

denied, 8398 U.S. 900 (1968). See also, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.

87, 52 (1971), and cases cited there; A Quaker Action Group v.

Morton, 516 F.2d 717, 725-726 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Bullock v. Mum-

ford, 509 F.2d 884, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ; U.S. v. Crosson, 462 F.2d

96, 100 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).

*3 $41 U.S. 694 (1951).

™ Jd. at 705. And note that the operative provisions of what

was Section 8(b)(4)(A) when I. B. Z. W. was decided now appear

in Section 8(b) (4) (B), pursuant to the 1959 amendments.

principle has been reaffirmed consistently by the courts

since I. B. E. W. was decided.”

The ILA’s claim that the First Amendment protects its

boycott * exemplifies what might be termed the “right-

eous brigand” theory of freedom of expression and ac-

tion—that otherwise unlawful conduct motivated by

“moral” considerations is insulated from legal sanctions

by an unspecified amalgam of First Amendment “free

speech” and “free exercise” principles. Thus, while the

ILA asserts a right under the First Amendment “to

engage in passive protest as a means of expression,”

the Union urges that part of the First Circuit’s error

resides in the court’s fail [ure] to distinguish between

the right of expression, which is reflected in the publicity

proviso of NLRA § 8(b) (4) itself, and the right of con-

scientious refusal. .. „ i.e., “the right of union mem-

bers .. to abstain from participating in what they deem

an immoral endeavor” and the right of the Union to

support such abstention.** The ILA emphasizes the pri-

% See, e. g., N. L. R. B. v. Local Union No. 8, International Brother-

hood of Electrical Workers, 477 F.2d 260, 266 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 414 U.S. 1065 (1973); National Maritime Union of Amer-

ica,\ AFL-CIO v. N.L.R.B., 846 F.2d 411, 420 (D.C. Cir.), cert.

denied, 382 U.S. 840, rehearing denied, 382 U.S. 933 (1965);

National Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO v. N.L.R.B., 342

F.2d 598, 546 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 835, rehearing

denied, 382 U.S. 988 (1965); Brown ex rel. N. L. R. B. v. American

Federation of Television and Radio Artists, 191 F. Supp. 676 (N.D.

Cal. 1961). And see New Orleans Steamship Association v. Gen-

eral Longshore Workers ILA Local Union No. 1418, 626 F.2d 448,

462-68 (5th Cir. 1980).

% See ILA cert. pet. at 12-14; ILA Brief at 33-43; and ILA

Brief to the Fifth Circuit in Baldovin v. International Longshore-

men’s Association, AFL-CIO at 26-47, wherein the ILA contended

that application of Section 8(b) (4) would abrogate union members’

First Amendment rights by “compelling them to perform work

repugnant to their political, moral, and religious beliefs.”

* ILA cert. pet. at 12-18, emphasis supplied

%8 Jd, at 18-14, emphasis supplied.

Although the Union’s “free exercise” defense was raised only

implicitly in its petition for certiorari (cert. pet. at 13, n. 11),

the ILA’s Brief to this Court explicitly urges that the Court view

macy of this “right of conscientious refusal” by contend-

ing that “[s]ince this case does not involve any picketing,

advertising or other publicity, the conscientious motive,

rather than free expression, is paramount.” ”

Although the ILA has misread both the First Circuit’s

analysis % and the publicity proviso to Section 8 (b)

(4), % the Union is at least correct in its apparent recog-

nition of the weakness of its claim that the boycott is a

form of expression protected by the First Amendment.

the motivation of the ILA and its members in implementing this

boycott as “occupy[ing] in the [lives] of its possessor[s] a place

parallel to that fulfilled by ... God. Brief at 38-34, quoting

United States v. Seeger, 880 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).

Id. at n. 18. Similarly, ILA maintains that “the union’s action

had as its object. . governing only [ILA’s] own conduct” and

that the First Circuit’s decision “deprived union members of any

right in conscience to regulate their own behavior... .” Jd. at 14.

10° As is clear from its decision, 640 F.2d 1878-79, the First

Circuit was addressing only the applicability of the primary strike

or picketing proviso, and not the publicity proviso.

101 Like the primary strike/picketing proviso, the publicity pro-

viso is applicable only where there is a primary labor dispute with

a primary employer. See Appendix A.

2 In fact, Schneider v. Irvington, 808 U.S. 147 (1989), cited

by the ILA in support of the proposition that “infringement of

freedom of expression may not be justified on the grounds that

alternative means of communication are open” [cert. pet. at 13,

n. 12; Brief at 38, n. 58), is inapposite. In Schneider, the Court

held that an ordinance which prohibited distribution of printed

matter in streets and alleys but not in other public places nonethe-

less improperly abridged First Amendment freedom of expression,

since “one is not to have the exercise of his liberty or expression in

appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised

in some other place.” 308 U.S. at 168. The Court emphasized,

however, that government may, “in the interest of the public

safety, health, welfare, or convenience,” properly limit the conduct

of persons using streets or other public places without abridging

the protected freedom of expression. Id. at 160-61. In the instant

case, as the ILA concedes, “expression” is not the major issue,

and, in any event, the court below did not suggest that the ILA

should be prohibited from engaging in its boycott in Boston but

not in some other place. On the contrary, emphasizing the strong

Prohibiting the ILA from ordering or encouraging its

members to withhold their services from neutral employ-

ers would in no way abridge the freedom of the ILA or

its members to express their views concerning the Russian

invasion of Afghanistan. Secondary boycott conduct is

unlawful, and the inducement of such conduct by oral or

written statements is likewise unlawful. Application of

Section 8 (b) (4) (i) and (ii) (B) to the ILA’s statements

and conduct would not, therefore, constitute a content-

based regulation of expression, d but rather a straight-

forward prohibition of illegal activity and the induce-

ment or encouragement thereof.

The ILA’s argument that its conduct is protected by

the Free Exercise Clause must also fail. As this Court

emphasized in Gillette v. United States,™ „ol ur cases

do not at their farthest reach support the proposition that

a stance of conscientious opposition relieves an objector

from any colliding duty fixed by a democratic govern-

ment.“ "** The ILA’s assertedly conscientious abstention

from handling Soviet cargo collides head on with its obli-

gation to refrain from engaging in secondary boycotts.

Moreover, even if a factual setting could be conceived

wherein application of Section 8(b)(4) to a union’s

otherwise unlawful secondary boycott would impede un-

justifiably some individuals’ religious beliefs, that factual

setting is not before this Court. First, “[o]nly beliefs

rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise

public policy objectives supporting Section 8(b) (4), 640 F.2d at

1877-78, the court stressed that prohibiting the union’s “coercive

tactics against neutral parties” would not “rob either the ILA or

its members of their ‘right of expression.“ Id. at 1378-79.

103 See N.L.R.B. v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001,

447 U.S. 607, 100 S.Ct. 2872, 2378-79 (1980), concurrences of

Justices Blackman and Stevens; Carey v. Brown, US. .

100 S.Ct. 2286, 2295-96 (1980); Police Department of Chicago v.

Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).

104 401 U.S. 487, rehearing denied, 402 U.S. 984 (1971).

100 401 U.S. at 461, and see cases cited there.

Clause. % Philosophical and personal beliefs of

standards of conduct are not “religious” for purposes of

the Religion Clauses.” Furthermore, to establish that a

statute or other governmental act offends the Free Exer-

cise Clause, it is necessary. . . for one to show the

coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against him

in the practice of his religion.“ s Unless he can make

such a showing, an individual has no standing to claim

that a statute abrogates his Free Exercise Clause rights.

Here, although the ILA has alluded vaguely to the “reli-

gious” underpinnings of the boycott,’ the credibility of

such allusions is undercut by the Union’s assertions else-

where that “the [ILA’s] action is, whatever its practi-

cality, solely political,” no and by the absence of any ref-

erence to religious considerations in ILA President Glea-

106 Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security

Division, US. 101 S. Ct. 1425, 1430 (1981), citing Sher-

bert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.

205, 215-16 (1971).

101 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-216.

ILA’s citation (Brief at 33-34) of the conscientious objector

cases [Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 487 (1970); Welsh v.

United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); and United States v. Seeger,

880 U.S. 163 (1965)] is clearly inappropriate since those cases

involved this Court’s interpretation of a statutory exemption for

religious objectors to participation in war, Section 6(j) of the

Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j). As stated

in Seeger, this Court’s construction of the terms “religious” and

“Supreme Being“ pertained solely. . to the language of Section

6(j) and not otherwise.” 880 U.S. at 174. There is, of course,

no “religious” or “conscientious” exemption to Section 8(b) (4)’s

prohibition of secondary activity.

108 Abington Township School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,

223 (1963), as quoted in Board of Education of Central School

District No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248-49 (1968).

109 See n. 98 above.

110 ILA Brief to Fifth Circuit at 16, emphasis added. And see

id. at 14 (“the ILA’s activities . .. are grounded in a solely political

protest designed to elicit a political, it any, reaction.“)

son’s statement ordering the boycott’s commencement."

Similarly, no evidence has been introduced showing that

any individual longshoreman or ILA officer has been or

would be coerced in the exercise of his religion by the

application of Section 8 (b) (4). On the contrary, given

the ILA’s willingness to abandon its boycott when ordered

to do so by an arbitrator or a court enforcing a labor con-

tract’s no-strike provision, or more significantly, when

the Union’s support for the policies of a new President

and its sense of “fairness and evenhandedness towards all

American business” 1 outweigh the demands of con-

science,“* the ILA’s plea for Free Exercise Clause pro-

tection seems particularly specious.

111 See n. 5 above.

112 See the news release issued on June 8, 1981 by the office of

ILA President Thomas W. Gleason, Appendix C.

118 See Brief at 34-35, and especially n. 46 wherein the ILA

suggests that handling cargo bound to or from Russia might

constitute treason.

CONCLUSION

Contrary to the expressed request of the then-President

of the United States, the ILA has attempted to influence

the foreign policy of another nation by engaging in an

unlawful secondary boycott in this country. As ILA Pres-

ident Gleason predicted, the boycott had a tremendous

impact upon neutral domestic employers in the chain

of this Nation’s commerce with the Soviet Union. The

statute requires, and neither the First Amendment nor

any decision of this Court precludes, the application of

Section 8 (b) (4) (i) and (ii) (B) to the ILA’s conduct.

Accordingly, the amicus curiae American Farm Bureau

Federation respectfully urges that this Court affirm the

holding of the court below and make it clear that there

is no political protest exception to the statutory prohibi-

tion of secondary boycotts.

Respectfully submitted,

ALLEN A. LAUTERBACH KENNETH C. MCOGUINESS

C. DAVID MAYFIELD Rosert E. WILLIAMS

AMERICAN FARM BUREAU Davip H. LARRY

FEDERATION McGuINEss & WILLIAMS

225 Touhy Avenue 1015 Fifteenth Street, N.W.

Park Ridge, Illinois 60068 Washington, D.C. 20005

(312) 399-5732 (202) 789-8600

Attorneys for the

American Farm Bureau Federation

December 22, 1981

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Section 8 (b) (4) (i) and (ii) (B) makes it an unfair

labor practice for a labor organization:

to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individ-

ual employed by any person engaged in commerce or

in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a

strike or a refusal in the course of his employment

to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise

handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or

commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to

threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in

commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where

in either case an object thereof is:. . (B) forcing

or requiring any person to cease using, selling, han-

dling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the prod-

ucts of any other producer, processor, or manufac-

turer, or to cease doing business with any other per-

son, or forcing or requiring any other employer to

recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the

representative of his employees unless such labor or-

ganization has been certified as the representative of

such employees under the provisions of section 9:

Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B)

shall be construed to make unlawful, where not other-

wise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picket-

ing; Provided further, That for the purposes of

this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained in such

paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity,

other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully

advising the public, including consumers and mem-

bers of a labor organization, that a product or prod-

ucts are produced by an employer with whom the

labor organization has a primary dispute and are

distributed by another employer, as long as such pub-

licity does not have an effect of inducing any indi-

vidual employed by any person other than the pri-

mary employer in the course of his employment to

refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or

not to perform any services, at the establishment of

the employer engaged in such distribution.

APPENDIX B

Section 303 provides that:

(a) It shall be unlawful, for the purpose of this

section only, in an industry or activity affecting com-

merce, for any labor organization to engage in any

activity defined as an unfair labor practice in section

8(b) (4) of the National Labor Relations Act, as

amended.

(b) whoever shall be injured in his business or

property by reason of any violation of subsection (a)

may sue therefor in any district court of the United

States subject to the limitations and provisions of

section 301 hereof without respect to the amount in

controversy, or in any other court having jurisdiction

of the parties, and shall recover the damages by him

sustained and the cost of the suit.

APPENDIX C

The text of the news release issued on June 3, 1981 by

the office of ILA President Thomas W. Gleason is as

follows:

INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN’S ASSOCI-

ATION URGES MEMBERS TO REMOVE BOY-

COTT ON ALL OCEAN TRADE WITH SOVIET

UNION

Thomas W. Gleason, President of the International

Longshoremen’s Association today announced that the

100,000 members of the union have been urged by

the leadership to handle all ocean trade between the

United States and the Soviet Union in normal man-

ner effective immediately.

He noted that ILA on April 24, 1981 recommended

that the membership resume handling grains, phos-

phate rock and fertilizer material bound for the So-

viet Union in keeping with a trade policy decision of

the Reagan administration. This marked the first

voluntary break in the union boycott against Russian

cargoes that was imposed on January 9, 1980.

Mr. Gleason said the union leadership now feels

that ILA longshoremen should handle all commodi-

ties in ocean commerce between the two countries

with no restrictions as a matter of equity to all

parties.

He said that producers, manufacturers and im-

porters of products which were never embargoed by

United States government policy should be given

handling treatment by ILA similar to that for grains,

phosphate rock and fertilizer material.

“In the interests of fairness and evenhandedness

towards all American business and in further sup-

port of President Reagan’s present trade policy, the

ILA recommends to its members that they now dis-

continue their refusal to handle goods bound to and

from the Soviet Union,” Mr. Gleason said.

The ILA is the nation’s largest waterfront union

and it represents dockworkers in ports from Maine

to Texas as well as the Great Lakes, Puerto Rico, and

Canada.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.