Opposition — 31.72 Acres of Land, Executor of the Estate of Estelle Day Phillips, and Eva Day Leber v. United States of America

.

ene eR PET OC ES

Office - Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

a

MAY 22 1981

ALEXANDER L. STEVAS,

nmaseesd

iL

No. 80-1750

Inu the Supreme Court of the Hnited States

OcTOBER TERM, 1980

31.72 ACRES OF LAND, More or LESS. ET AL.. PETITIONERS

v

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ?

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

WADE H. McCrer, Jr.

Solicitor General

CarOL E. DINKINS

Assistant Attorney General

EDWARD J. SHAWAKER

THOMAS L.. RIESENBERG

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

202) 633-2217

7%

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether a possibility of reverter ripened into title when

jurisdiction of property granted to the State of Michigan in

1920 for use as a “public state park” was transferred to the

United States for continued use as a park.

eX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

co RTE OTe Pee TT OPET ER TARTS. l

ERS AES SAR OSES EY ew fn l

PET cicceereregacveceaeevgesdcvoeaseesethn l

PE TGs Chics Cobos ce Pumnl be oes seed Os buied eee 4

SE Wa-e's bok cand Rho dees ube bes Se eeenees 5

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Baldwin Manor, Inc. v. City of Birmingham,

341 Mich. 423, 67 N.W. 2d 812 ........eeeees 4

Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 ......cceeeeees 4,5

Evans v. Newton, 392 U.S. 296 .......cceceeees 4

Constitution and statutes:

United States Constitution, Fourteenth

IE AE rere fet eet her ee 4

Act of October 21, 1970, 16 U.S.C. 460x

DE EC iains cts ced hare daddivesvens 2

1974 Mich. Pub. Acts. No. 359, Mich. Comp. L.

§ 3.901 (Mich. Stat. Ann. § 13.766(1)

et seq.) (Callaghan 1980 Supp.)...........005: 2

PRECEDING PAGE WAS BLANK|

|

Iu the Supreme Court of the Hnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

No. 80-1750

31.72 ACRES OF LAND, MORE OR LESS, ET AL., PETITIONERS

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinions of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-2a)

and of the district court (Pet. App. 3a-18a) are unreported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

January 21, 1981. The petition for a writ of certiorari was

filed on April 15, 1981. The jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENT

This suit was commenced by the United States in order to

determine the validity of the claim of the heirs of David H.

Day and Eva E. Day that their reversionary interest in 31.72

acres of land ripened into fee title (Pet. App. la). The land at

issue is within the boundaries of the Sleeping Bear Dunes

National Lakeshore, which was established by the Act of

é

7%

°F

2

October 21, 1970, 16 U.S.C. 460x et seq. (Pet. App. 2a). The

Days had conveyed the land to the State of Michigan in

1920 by a warranty deed that provided that the land was (id.

at la)

to be used for a public state park, should the same be

abandoned for that purpose, it shall revert to the party

of the first part, their heirs and assigns.

The State of Michigan authorized the Michigan Depart-

ment of Natural Resources to convey the subject land by

quitclaim deed to the United States. 1974 Mich. Pub. Acts

No. 359, Mich. Comp. L. § 3.901 (Mich. Stat. Ann.

§ 13.766(1) et seq.) (Callaghan 1980 Supp.). However, no

such deed was executed prior to the commencement of this

proceeding (Pet. App. 4a).

On May |, 1975, the State of Michigan issued a permit

granting jurisdiction over the parkland to the National

Park Service in connection with the operation of the Sleep-

ing Bear Dunes National Lakeshore. This permit author-

ized the National Park Service to make use of the property

as if a deed had been delivered, although the State did not

relinquish title to the property. The term of the permit was

for one year and year-to-year thereafter until terminated by

delivery of the deed (Pet. App. 5a). The condition precedent

to delivery of a deed was the satisfactory removal of the

remainderman interest reserved by the Days in the original

deed (id. at 2a, Sa).

With the exception of certain minor changes such as the

removal of some signs, buildings, and fixtures in the park,

the United States has left the facilities intact. Operation of

the park also remains largely unchanged, with the United

States continuing Michigan’s policy of charging fees to

camp at the park. The park was known as the “D.H. Day

State Park” when it was managed by Michigan; it is now

7%

3

called the “D.H. Day Campground” within the Sleeping

Bear Dunes National Lakeshore (Pet. App. 2a, 5a n.1I,

17a-18a).

The complaint in this case excepted the interest of the

State of Michigan and various easements and, for practical

purposes, concerned only the reversionary interest asserted

by the heirs of the Days (J.A. 4).' After a stipulation of facts

was submitted (J.A. 18-23), the heirs filed a motion for

partial summary judgment on the ground that the land was

no longer being used as a “public state park” and therefore

that they held “a reversionary fee simple interest” (J.A.

24-26). The government filed a cross-motion for summary

judgment (J.A. 27).

The district court granted the government’s motion for

summary judgment, holding that the possibility of reverter

under the original deed did not ripen into title in favor of the

heirs when the State transferred jurisdiction of the park to

the United States (Pet. App. 3a-18a). Based on a review of

Michigan law (id. at 10a-lla) and “exhaustive research

* * * [into] the historical context in which the grant was

given [to the State of Michigan in 1920]” (id. at 2a), the

court found that the action of the State in transferring

control of the property to the National Park Service did not

violate the condition that the Days placed in the 1920 deed

for the primary purpose of preserving the land as a public

park (id. at 10a, 17a-18a).

The court of appeals affirmed by order (Pet. App. la-2a).

In light of “well-settled Michigan law” (id. at 2a), the court

of appeals sustained the district court's determination that

the transfer of jurisdiction did not interfere materially with

the Days’ primary intent to make a gift of the land so that

the people of the State could enjoy and use the property as a

park (ibid.).

'“J.A.” refers to the joint appendix filed in the court of appeals.

-

4

ARGUMENT

The decision of the court of appeals is correct and does

not conflict with any decision of this Court or of the other

courts of appeals. Moreover, resolution of this case turns

largely on the factual issue of the intent of the Days in 1920,

and the only disputed legal issue involves a question of state

law. Accordingly, further review is unwarranted. |

A long line of Michigan cases relied upon by the district

court (Pet. App. 10a) holds that conditions in deeds are

strictly construed to prevent forfeiture. Contrary to peti-

tioners’ assertion (Pet. 6-11), this well-established principle

was not altered by the decision in Baldwin Manor, Inc. v.

City of Birmingham, 341 Mich. 423, 67 N:W. 2d 812

(1954).2 There, the court held that the building of a highway

over parkland constituted a breach of the condition imposed

by the donor that the land be used solely for park purposes.

In the instant case, on the other hand, the courts below

found that the transfer of management of a park from the

State to the federal government did not materially or sub-

stantially interfere with the grantor’s purpose. The holding

in this case is not inconsistent with governing state law.

Nor is a different result required by this Court’s decision

in Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970). At issue in that

case was a will that conveyed property in trust to a city for

use as a public park exclusively by white people of that city.

In Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), this Court found

that the condition requiring operation of the park on a

racially discriminatory basis violated the Fourteenth Amend-

ment to the United States Constitution. The Supreme

Court of Georgia then ruled that the testator’s condition

had become impossible to fulfill, that the trust therefore

failed, and that the property consequently reverted by oper-

ation of Georgia law to the testator’s heirs. This Court, in

2The district court specifically considered and distinguished the

Baldwin Manor decision (Pet. App. 10a n.3).

7%

°F?

5

rejecting constitutional challenges to that decision, ob-

served that the state court “did no more than apply well-

settled general principles of Georgia law to determine the

meaning and effect of a Georgia will” (Evans v. Abney,

supra, 396 U.S. at 439). Similarly, the courts in the present

case did no more than follow well-established Michigan law

in concluding that the condition in the original deed was not

violated here.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

WADE H. McCREE, JR.

Solicitor General

CAROL E. DINKINS

Assistant Attorney General

EDWARD J. SHAWAKER

THOMAS L. RIESENBERG

Attorneys

May 1981

DOJ-1981-05