Appendix — RAILWAY LABOR EXECUTIVES' ASSOCIATION v. UNITED STATES (Nos. 80-1439, 80-1434, 1632)

Supreme Court brief1981

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

ta 0 = 1 4 $ 9 Office-Supreme Court,

_ EILED

ee y FEB 23 1981

: STEV

CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1980

RAILWAY LABOR EXECUTIVES’ ASSOCIATION,

Petitioner,

V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ETAL.,

Respondents.

Se

SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX OF THE

PETITIONER

RAILWAY LABOR EXECUTIVES’

ASSOCIATION

JOHN O’BRIEN CLARKE, JR., ESQUIRE

HIGHSAW & MAHONEY, P.C.

Suite 210

1050 - 17th Street, NW

Washington, DC 20036

_ (202) 296-8500

Attorneys for Petitioner Railway

Labor Executives’ Association

Date: February 23, 1981

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS PRINTING, INC., WASHINGTON,

<> »

D.C,

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No. 1F), Burlington

Northern, Inc. — Control and Merger — St. Louis-San

= Railway Company, 360 I.C.C. 783 (April 17,

l

AP:

ier

Served April 17, 1980

F-98 51

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

FINANCE DOCKET NO. 28583 (SuUB-NO. IF)

BURLINGTON NORTHERN, INC.—CONTROL AND MERG-

ER—ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY COMPANY

INDEX TO THE DECISION

The applicants---------------------------------0-cceeenenenneeeeeneneeneneensenenneeees anne

Burlington Northern, Inc------ cccccnccesersecececcecesccccsecococcosccccscce

St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company ------------------------------------

Transaction -----------------+----0e-nnnnnnnnnnnencnnnnnnnnnnceceenenarenenecenenneneeneenee

Assumption of

Control of the

Alleged benefits of

obligations and liabilities -----------------------------+------

MOLOL CALPiCL ----------------------enwnn nnn nn nnn nnnnnnnnenenene

MEMES -------nnnn-nnnnnnnnennnnnnnnnnnnnnnnwnnnennnennnnnnannnnnne

Applicants’ underlying studies ------------------------------0-0eseeeeereesenenenene

Back ground --------------------+----00e----nenennennnnennncennenenecsseeeenecceesneees

Cost studies (traffic) ---------------------------eennennenveenecnenecnnncennnnnnneee

Operating studies -------------------------------0--ennceeeenneneenenensnennecnennees

Purchasing and

MALCTIAIS ---------------0---0---nnnnneennnenennnnnnennnnnnneneenne

Information systems -----------------ccccececceneeewnnenncecenescccscscscncceneeneee

The public interest benefits claimed by applicants ----------------------

Stock exchange -------------------------------e-eeneeeeneecseenenenennennseneenenenee

Employee impacts --------------------0--s0se-ceeeecencncncncenceceesncececcecesenes

Traffic volume studies---------------0----ce-seeenennenenneeecesescecerenseceees

Common poi

nt consolidation studies -------------------------------+------

Comparison of studies—labor and operational-------------------.------

Overhead study ------------------------+0+eeceennnnnnnnnnnsncnnnnnenneeeeeeenneees

Labor—scheduled ----------------------000e--eeee--nnnnennnnnnnncenennnneeeneeees

Labor—exempt---------------------------0e--enennnnnnnnnnnneeennneneeneenenenees

National defense ----------------------0+---00---eececneennnennneneeeseneneneceenenes

Shipper support sreceensenssooosconessosonossessoeensssooooeooosoosescooonscsosoonses

Financial analysis -----------------------------------0-esseeneeneeeennneennnnnnceeeneees

Positions of parties

Milwaukee Road

Summary of M

SFOS ESSE SESE ESE SE SSE ESSE S SESE SEES ES ESE ESE EE EESESESE CESSES SECSS

tate ee

ilwaukee Road's position ------------------------------------

Scope of operations-----------------------0----0--e--seceeeeencennenncenncenneeenee

Traffic diversion and net impact of merger --------------------------------

Impact on shippers—loss of service --------------------------+0--eeeee-eeenee

Impact on employees ----------------------------000--0ee-enennnennneeneceeneeeeees

Protective CONditiONS -----------------------0e---eeeneeenennneneecenseceecenecenees

Access to COalfields-----------------------0-----eeeeeneenenenennnnceceeneeesenes

Indemnification --------------0---.-ccceceeceveeneoecencecsccccnccccccscceceseccees

Liquidated damages ----------------2-.0---s--e-eeccccccceccsccncecescceceeecesee

Revision of joint facility agreements------------------------------ <a cceceee

Standard traffic conditions -+------------------------cseccseceeceeeeenesecceeee

Page

Rack Island ----cccccccccccenncecccccceccccccccccccccccccccccencccceseccccscoccccocccccee

Summary of Rock Island's position -----------------+---+---------ee--eeeeee-

Traffic diversion ----------- ecco

Common control--------

Additional issues

Employee impact -----------------

Proposed protective conditions--------- -_

Compensatory conditions --------------------------+-s0eeeeseeeeeenneeneeennes

A. Trackage rights -------------------------------0-0eeeesenneeneenennenenennes

B. Reciprocal switching ----------------------- . ; s€

C. Indemnification -------------cccccccerccceccccccccccecccccccscsccnceccccecs

D. Divisions ---

Divestiture --------------------- ° cheatin an

Traffic protective conditions

Applicants’ response to Rock Island ----------------------------00e0-e0e-ee00

Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company --------------------------------0000-

Summary of Katy's position ------------------0--+-----s-ne-neeeencenenneecenene

Scope of operations---------- cece

Katy's position as a protestant ----------- ran

Traffic diversion eee

Impact on shipper and employees---------------------

Relief sought by Katy ---------------------------s0ce-eeceeneeeeseennnennneenaneees

Indemnification ---------

Modified DT&I conditions --

Applicants’ response to Katy ---- --

Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Company ----------------------------------00-+0

Summary of ICG position--------------------------- on

? Scope of operations---------------------------------s0ceenensneeneeeeecnnenneeeees

Impacts of merger --------------2--------cecencenenceercceccnceccccecccecescncecenes

Protective CONDItIONS --------ccccececccccccccccocencocccenccccccscssccccccccecccces

Trackage rights --------------------s-0ceceeceseeeeneennnneceennececenscsenceseeees

Terminal operations ----------------------------00--0esseeseeneennnnnneennnneeees

Modified DTBI conditions -cccccccccccccccccccccccccccesccccccnccoccecccoccese

Soo Line Railroad Company

Summary of Soo Line's position ---

Scope of operations --

Traffic diversion cece

Net impacts of merger

Impact on shippers and employees -------------------------------0-eeeeeeeeee

i ta

Opening of western gateways-----------------------------0----eeseeeeeeeeneee

Trackage rights Options --------------------------s--eecececencceeceeeceescenees

Termination of pooling agreement--------------------------0--s--00s0-eeee

Tunnel agreement------------------0+-----00-e-neen-neeencenencnececeneencenenees

Modified traffic conditiong---<-cccccccccecccccccccsccoccccccsoceccceccsccceses

Commission jurisdiction------------------0------seceesseeescseecceeccenneenenes

Other railroads-----------------.

Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company -------------------

Missouri Pacific Railroad Company---------------------------0seeeeseeeneee-

360 1.C.C.

Kansas City Southern Railway Company «----+++++-+++---eneeeceenennnennnes

The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company ----------+-++-

Southern Railway System --++----+-------s0-seeeeeeeenenseeeenecencecenenenennenes

Family Lines ---------++-+---0eeenneneeneeennne

Chicago and North Western Transport

ation Company ------++++e--ee0+

Illinois Terminal Railroad Company---------++++00--sesseecenneeeeeeeenennnee

Southern Pacific Transportation Company -------+-+++++0+-eeeneeneneennenes

Union Pacific Corporation ------------+++-

Public BODIES -----+--eennceenneeenecseeceneenceneces

Department of Defense --------+-+++--««+-

Department (OT | SENRONER cucedececccccnnddcnduncvanesdnanesenstndenkacedebasenenienn

A. The Merger ------+--+-+00neneneneneenens

B. Conditions ----+++++-00-e0eeeceeeenesnes

lowa Department of Transportation -----+-+---0--ss+se-sesseeeeeneneeeeeeeees

Iinois Department of Transportation

Other Protestants ------------0--e0eeneeeennes

Fee CRE ROR Ree eeeee

Kansas City Board of Trade -------------sssccseeeeeseccennesecescnnsesscceeness

Montana Wheat Research and Marketing Committee -----------+++---+-

JohA W. O'Neih---cccccccccccccccccscccceccses

Employee organizations-------------e+----eee00-

Railway Labor Executives’ Association

United Transportation Union-------------

hth ttt

FTE EERE RRR RRR eee eee eee

FERRER RR RRR eRe eee eee

dh tht tt tet LLL Te

Railway Employees’ Department, AFL-CIO -----------+---s0sseeeeeeeenees

Envir OnMent ---------+-------0--eeneneennweeenenees

Merger criteria -----------+-------e0ceeensenesenneee

Discussion ------ Ame ec cccococcccecesescescccccceccesesceccecceccoccecececececececccoceccececs

Adequacy of transportation ------+-+------

The competitive impact of the proposed MEPQOT --+--+--0- enn nnnnnnnnnnne

Inclusion of other Carriers-----------------esessecceccceeenssneeecccccnseeeeesens

Fixed charges ---------++-+---ee-0e--oeneennes

Stock Oxchange ---------------eeeenneneenenes

hhh tthe

Envir onment-----------++0-e-eenn-ncennnnnennenennnnenesecneeansacerenssnscenereseeaes

Employee protection-------------++-+esse0-

ihe ee

CONGILIONS -----+---0-00reeernnnenanernnnnnnssscenenesessnncentenensencenssaccsseseececees

INDEMMIty ----------0+-00e-eeeennnnnnnsernsensnnccnncnnneneneccencnneeesenecsecsenes

SOO Lime ----+---+---eeceeneeeeeceneenenceees

ttt

Conditions imposed -------2---cceeeeseccccnssccescacececeescecescccccscccerecees

Comtsel Of PTC -ccccccecerccccceccccccscccccccnsesccnseccccccsccooccosececessecsscos

Appendix A—Abbreviations used in this decision ----------------0000ceeeeeee-

Appendix B—Siatus of related proceedings

5

Page

Appendix C—Shipper positions ------++++-sssssccssessecsscecsesssnsensennenneeccees 189

Appendix D—Summary of BN traffic, facilities, equipment, safety, and

DALE eocceccccccccccccecesessccccccccccnccscceccecscceccccccccceccecceccececccccceece 198

Appendix E—Summary of Frisco traffic, facilities. equipment, safety,

ANd Financial data------------eeeeeeesnecereerennesseeseeeesnnnnensaceeesesceeeeeeeeeens 223

Appendix F—Pro forma financial statement for merged company -------- 252

Appendix G—Map of BN and Frisco systems-------+++++00-essesscseeneeennenns 285

Appendix H—Analysis of traffic diversion studies ----------.<....+..--eeeenees 286

Appendix I—Cost analyses --------++--cccccecseeeecesseseenenesensececcsecccceecenenes 310

Appendix J—Financial matters ---------+--++-00ssssseseeeseceeeeeenneeceeeneenenenees 328

Appendix K—Protective conditions sought -----+-----++0000cssceccseeeeeenenennne 370

Appendix L—Route density charts and table of PEBIONS ~~ ---n--e enn nennnnnee 393

Appendix M—Protective conditions imposed ---+-+--+-++++000000..e-eeeeeennenee 397

360 LC.C,

6

FINANCE DOCKET No. 28583 (SuB-No. | F)'

BURLINGTON NORTHERN, INC.—CONTROL AND MERG-

ER—ST. LOUIS-SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY COMPANY

Decided March 25, 1980

1, In Finance Docket No, 28583 (Sub-No. IF), control and merger of the St. Louis-

San Francisco Railway Company into Burlington Northern, Inc. is authorized,

subject to conditions.

2. In Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No. 2F), authority is granted to Burlington

Northern, Inc.: (a) to issue 2,560,791 shares of common capital stock without par

value; (b) to issue 1,347,785 shares of $2.125 no par value preferred stock, $25

redemption value; and (c) to assume all obligations, liabilities, and guarantees

with respect to securities issued, assumed, or guaranteed by the St. Louis-San

Francisco Railway Company and subsidiary or affiliated companies.

‘This decision embraces Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No. 2F), Burlington Northern,

Inc.—Securities; No. MC-F-13500, Burlington Northern, Inc. —Control—Frisco Transportation

Company; Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No. 3F), Soo Line Railroad Company—Trackage

Rights—Over Burlington Northern, Inc., Between McGregor, MN and Superior, WI, a Distance of

69 Miles; Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No. 4F), Soo Line Railroad Company—Trackage

Rights—Over Burlington Northern, Inc., Between Paynesville, MN and Superior, WI, a Distance

of 162 I4iles; Finance Docket No, 28583 (Sub-No. SF), Soo Line Railroad Company—Trackage

Rights—Over surlington Northern, Inc., Between Schley (Soo Junction), MN and Superior, WI, a

Distance of 146.2 Miles; Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No. 6F) Soo Line Railroad

Company—Trackage Rights—Over Burlington Northern, Inc., Between Bald Eagle, MN and

Superior, Wi, a Distance of 126.4 Miles; Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No. 7F), Hlinois Central

Gulf Railroad Company Trackage Rights—Over the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company,

Between Memphis, TN and Jasper, AL. a Distance of 210 Miles; Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-

No. 8F), Chicago and North Western Transportation Company—Trackage Rights—Over

Burlington Northern, Inc., Between BN M.P. 492.7 at Council Bluffs, [A and BN M.P. 2.16 at BN

Junction, MO, a Distance of 168 Miles, Finance Docket No, 28583 (Sub-No. 9F), Chicago and

North Western Transportation Company—Trackage Rights—Over Burlington Northern, Inc.,

Between East Minneapolis, MN and East Superior, WI, a Distance of 143.8 Miles; Finance Docket

No. 28583 (Sub-No. 10F), William M. Gibbons, Trustee of the Property of the Chicago, Rock

Island and Pacific Railroad Company, Debtor—Trackage Rights—Over Burlington Northern,

Inc., Between Lincoln and Havelock, NE. a Distance of § Miles; Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-

No. 1IF), William M. Gibbons, Trustee of the Property of the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific

Railroad Company, Debtor—Trackage Rights—Over the Colorado and Southern Railroad

Company, Between Denver and Golden, CO, a Distance of 13 Miles; Finance Docket No. 28583

(Sub-No, 12F), William M. Gibbons, Trustee of the Property of the Chicago, Rock Island and

Pacific Railroad Company, Debtor—Trackage Rights—Over Burlington Northern, Inc., Between

Ottawa and Streator, IL, a Distance of 17 Miles; Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No, 13F), Stanley

E. G. Hillman, Trustee of the Property of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad

(footnote continued on next page)

360 L.C.C.

3. In No. MC-F-13500, acquisition of control by Burlington Northern, Inc., of the

Frisco Transportation Company, through the merger with the St. Louis-San

Francisco Railway Company, is authorized.

4. In Finance Docket No, 28583 (Sub-No. 3F), the Soo Line Railroad Company

application for trackage rights over Burlington Northern, Inc. between McGregor,

MN, and Superior, WI, is denied.

5. In Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No. 4F), the Soo Line Railroad Company

application for trackage rights over Burlington Northern, Inc. between

Paynesville, MN, and Superior, WI, is dismissed.

6. In Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No. SF), the Soo Line Railroad Company

application for trackage rights over Burlington Northern, Inc. between Schley

(Soo Junction), MN, and Superior, WI, is denied.

7. In Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No. 6F), the Soo Line Railroad Company

application for trackage rights over Burlington Northern, Inc. between Bald

Eagle, MN, and Superior, WI, is denied.

8. In Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No. 7F), the Iilinois Central Gulf Railroad

Company application for trackage rights over the St. Louis-San Francisco Railway

Company between Memphis, TN, and Jasper, AL, is denied.

. In Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No. 8F), the Chicago and North Western

Transportation Company application for trackage rights over Burlington

Northern, Inc. between Council Bluffs, 1A, and BN Junction, MO, is dismissed.

<<

(footnote | continued)

Company, Debtor—-Trackage Rights—Over Burlington Northern, Inc., Between Terry, MT and

Spokane, WA, a Distance of 1,081.07 Miles; Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No. 14F), Stanley E

G. Hillman, Trustee of the Property of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad

Company, Debtor--Trackage Rights—Over Burlington Northern, Inc, Between Tacoma, and

Chehalis, WA, a Distance of 62.7 Miles; Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No. I SF). Stanley E.G

Hillman, Trustee wf the Property of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacitic Railroad Company.

Debtor—Trackage Rights—Over Burlington Northern, Inc. Between Miles City, MT. and All

Present and Future Coal Mines Located on the BN in MT; Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No

16F), Stanley E. G. Hillman, Trustee of the Property of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific

Railroad Company, Debtor—Trackage Rights—Over Burlington Northern, Inc. Between Counc!

Bluffs, 1A and Kansas City, MO, a Distance of 189.69 Miles; Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No

17F), Stantey E. G. Hillman, Trustee of the Property of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific

Railroad Company, Debtor—Trackage Rights—Over Burlington Northern, Inc. Between

Bellingham and Cherry Point, WA, a Distance of 22 Miles; Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No

18F), Southern Pacific Transportation Company—Trackage Rights—Over Burlington Northern,

Inc., and the Union Pacific Railroad Company, Between the Connection of BN and the Portland

Terminal Railroad Company and (1) Trackage Serving North Rivergate and (2) the Barnes Yard of

Union Pacific Railroad Company, a Distance of 16.3 Miles; Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No

19F), Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company—Trackage Rights—Over the St. Louis-

San Francisco Railway Company, Between Tulsa and Oklahoma C ity, OK, a Distance of 112.8

Miles, Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No. 20F), Application of the Montana Wheat Research

and Marketing Committee for Stanley E. G. Hillman, Trustee of the Property of Chicago.

Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Company, Debtor—Trackage Rights—Over Burlington

Northern, Inc., Lines in MT; Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No. 21F). Application of Wyo- Ben,

Inc., tor Stanley E. G. Hillman, Trustee of the Property of Chicago. Milwaukee. St. Paul and

Pacific Railroad Company, Debtor—Trackage Rights—Over Burlington Northern, Inc., Between

Billings, MT, and Shobon, WY. a Distance of 227.1 Miles; Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No

22F), Richard B. Ogilvie, Trustee of the Property of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific

Railroad Company, Debtor—Trackage Rights—Over Burlington Northern, Inc. Between Miles

City, MT, and Big Sky and Kuehn, MT. a Distance of 138.9 Miles: and Finance Ducket No. 26583

(Sub-No. 23F), Iilinois Central Gulf Railroad Company—Terminal Operations—Over the

Missouri Pacific Railroad Company in Memphis, TN.

360 1.C.C.

12.

13.

4.

15.

16

17

In Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No. 9F), the Chicago and North Western

Transportation Company application for trackage rights over Burlington

Northern, Inc. between East Minneapolis, MN, and East Superior, WI, is

dismissed

in Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No. 10F), the application of William M.

Gibbons, trustee of the property of the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad

Company. debtor, for trackage rights over Burlington Northern, Inc. between

Lincoin and Havelock, NE was dismissed.’

in Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No. 11F), the application of William M.

Gibbons, trustee of the property of the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad

Company, debtor, for trackage rights over the Colorado and Southern Railroad

Company between Denver and Golden, CO, is denied.

in Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No. 12F), the application pf William M.

Gibbons, trustee of the property of the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad

Company, debtor, for trackage cights over Burlington Northern, Inc., between

Ottawa and Streator, IL. was dismissed.’

in Finance Docket No. 26583 (Sub-No. 13F), the application of Stanley E. G.

Hillman, trustee of the property of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific

Railroad Company, debtor, for trackage rights over Burlington Northern, Inc.

between Terry, MT. and Spokane, WA, was dismissed.’

in Finance Docket No. 26583 (Sub-No. 14F), the application of Stanley E. G.

Hillman, trustee of the property of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific

Railroad Company, debtor, for trackage rights over Burlington Northern, Inc.

between Tacoma and Chehalis. WA, was dismissed.’

in Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No. 15F), the application of Stanley E. G.

Hillman, trustee of the property of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific

Railroad Company. debtor, for trackage rights over Burlington Northern, Inc.,

between Miles City, MT, and all present and future coal mines located on BN in

Montana was rejected.”

In Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No. 16F), the application of Stanley E. G.

Hiliman, trustee of the property of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific

Railroad Company, debtor, for trackage rights over Burlington Northern, Inc.

between Council Biufls, 1A, and Kansas City, MO, was dismissed.’

in Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No. 17F), the application of Stanley E. G.

Hiliman, trustee of the property of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Pau! and Pacific

Railroad Company. debtor, for trackage rights over Burlington Northern, Inc.

between Bellingham and Cherry Point, WA, was dismissed.’

in Finance Docket No. 26583 (Sub-No. 1 8F), the Southern Pacific Transportation

Company application for trackage rights over Burlington Northern, Inc., and the

Union Pacific Raiiroad Company. between the connection of BN and the Portland

Terminal Railroad Company and (1) trackage serving North Rivergate and (2) the

Barnes Yard of Union Pacific Railroad Company, as amended, is denied.

"The decison to desmuss this proceeding was made November 29. 1978. and served December 5.

Vd

Vd

‘a

“The decision ww reject this application was made August 16, 1978. and served August 25. 1978

The decision to dasmuss this proceeding was made November 29. 1978. and served December 5.

“ld

160 ICL

20. In Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No. 19F), the Atchison. Topeka and Santa Fe

Railway Company application for trackage rights over the St. Louis-San Francisco

Railway Company between Tulsa and Oklahoma City, OK, is dismissed.

21. In Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No. 20F), the Montana Wheat Research and

Marketing Committee application for Stanley E. G. Hillman, trustee of the

property of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Company, debtor,

to obtain trackage rights over Burlington Northern, Inc., lines in Montana was

rejected.”

22. In Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No. 21F), the Wyo-Ben, Inc., application for

Stanley E. G. Hillman, trustee of the property of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul

and Pacific Railroad Company, debtor, to obtain trackage rights over Burlington

Northern, Inc., between Billings, MT, and Shobon, WY, was rejected.'”

23. In Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No. 22F), the application of Richard B.

Ogilvie, trustee of the property of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific

Railroad Company, debtor, for trackage rights over Burlington Northern, Inc.

between Miles City, MT, and Big Sky and Kuehn, MT, is denied.

24. In Finance Docket No. 28583 (Sub-No. 23F), the Ilinois Central Gulf Railroad

Company application for terminal operations over the Missouri Pacific Railroad

Company in Memphis, TN, is denied.

Christian Campbell, Eric Cunningham, Donald Engle, Frank

Farrell, John Haley, Martin Lucente, G. Paul Moates, Nicholas P.

Moros, and James Walker for applicants Burlington Northern, Inc.

and St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company.

James Armstrong for the Department of Defense.

Barbara Anthony, Arthur Federman, Joen Grant, and Cristy

Passman for the Department of Justice.

James Baxendale, Robert Heath, and Diane Liff for the

Department of Transportation. ''

Toby Dress for the Interstate Commerce Commission, Section of

Energy and Environment.

Michael Blaszak, Harry DeLung, Milton Nelson, C raig Smetko,

and Dennis Wilson for Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway

Company.

Louis Duerinck, Stuart Gassner, Christopher Mills, and Anne

Valle for Chicago and North Western Transportation Company.

Sarah Holzsweig, Thomas Ploss, and William Sippel for Richard B.

Ogilvie, trustee of the property of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and

Pacific Railroad Company, debtor.

Martin Cassell, Nicholas Manos, and Don McDevitt for William

M. Gibbons, trustee of the property of the Chicago, Rock Island and

Pacific Railroad Company, debtor.

"The decision tw reject this application was made August 18, 1978, and served August 25, 1978

"Id

“DOT did nut cross-examine witnesses. present evidence, take « position, or file # brief in these

proceedings |i will mu be mentioned again in this decision

360 ICC

10

Fritz Kahn and Kendall Sanford for Denver and Rio Grande

Western Railroad Company.

John Adams and Howard Koontz for Illinois Central Gulf

Railroad Company.

Philip Brown for Kansas City Southern Railroad Company.

Michael Roper, Harry Silleck, and William Thie for Missouri-

Kansas-Texas Railroad Company.

Leon Leighton for Missouri Pacific Railroad Company.

Emreid Cole and Edward Tannen for Seaboard Coast Line

Railroad Company, Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company,

Clinchfield Railroad Company, Georgia Railroad, Atlanta and West

Point Railroad Company, and Western Railway of Alabama.

F. W. Crouch, Robert Gehrz, and C. Harold Peterson for Soo Line

Railroad Company.

Charles Burkett, Marc Feldman, Carol Harris, and Jane White for

Southern Pacific Transportation Company and St. Louis

Southwestern Railway Company.

R. Allen Wimbish for Southern Railway Company.

Joseph Adams, William Higgins, Peter Hohenhaus, Mark Kalafut,

James Lowe, and John Weisser for Union Pacific Railroad Company.

T. Scott Bannister for the lowa Department of Transportation,

Transportation Regulation Board.

Richard Friedman and Harold Mesirow for the Illinois

Department of Transportation.

John Finnigan for the Nebraska Public Service Commission.

David Tiistola for the North Dakota Public Service Commission.

William Hickey and Thomas Woodley for the Railway Employees’

Department, AFL-CIO.

John Clark, Joseph Guerrieri, and William Mahoney for the

Railway Labor Executives’ Association.

Gordon MacDougall for John W. McGinness, I\linois Legislative

Director of the United Transportation Union and M. S. Stuckey,

general chairman of United Transportation Union on IIlinois

Central Gulf Railroad Company.

M. M. Winter for the United Transportation Union.

James Irlandi for Garvey, Inc.

Jon Hansen for the Kansas City Board of Trade.

Miké Miller for the North Dakota State Wheat Commission.

Griffin Dorschel for the Wisconsin Power and Light Company.

John O'Neil, pro se.

360 LCC.

1]

DECISION

BY THE COMMISSION:

INTRODUCTION

Burlington Northern, Inc. (BN or Burlington) and the St. Louis-

San Francisco Railway Company (SLSF or Frisco), common carriers

by railroad with principal offices at St. Paul, MN, and St. Louis, MO,

respectively, propose to merge Frisco into Burlington. The resulting

entity will be a single railroad operating over more than 29,000

miles of track through the northern tier of States between the

Pacific Northwest and the Great Lakes, and between the Great

Lakes and the Gulf of Mexico.

The merger proposal is contained in: (1) a joint application filed

by BN and Frisco on Decemiber 28, 1977, seeking authority for the

merger under 49 U.S.C. 11343, e¢ seq.; (2) a concurrently filed

application under 49 U.S.C. 11301 in which BN seeks authority to

issue certain securities and to assume certain obligations and

liabilities in connection with the proposed merger; and (3) an

application filed January 16, 1978, under 49 U.S.C. | 1343, et seq. in

which BN seeks authority to acquire control of Frisco’s wholly

owned motor carrier subsidiary, Frisco Transportation Company

(FTC). We accepted these applications for filing on January 27,

1978, and published an appropriate notice in the Federal Register.'’

In that notice we waived an initial decision by the Administrative

Law Judge, and determined that the merits of these applications

would be decided in the first instance by the entire Commission.'’

Public hearings were conducted by Administrative Law Judge

Paul J. Clerman, on a consolidated record, beginning May 16, 1978,

and concluding June 28, 1979. The record was closed and certified

to us on October 24, 1979. On November 14, 1979, we held oral

argument on specific issues in these proceedings. In all, the record

reflects 46 days of hearing, comprising 8,370 pages of transcript and

222 exhibits received in evidence.

Appendix B identifies the related proceedings embraced in this

decision. The position of parties in these proceedings is summarized

later in this decision.

Burlington is the largest railroad system in the United States in

miles of road operated, and the second largest in transportation

revenues.'*

“43 PR. 3799 (197K)

"49 USC. 11MSe)

"For the years 1976-197

360 LCC.

12

In its present form Burlington commenced operations in March

1970, following the merger of its predecessors, The Great Northern

Railway (GN), Northern Pacific Railway (NP), Chicago, Burlington

and Quincy Railroad (CB&Q), and other subsidiary lines, which was

approved by the Commission." As a system, BN and its subsidiaries

operate over almost 25,000 miles of track serving points in 19 States

and two Canadian provinces. Its lines extend generally between

Chicago, IL, and St. Louis, MO, in the east; Houston and Galveston,

TX, in the south; Duluth, MN, Superior, WI, and Winnipeg,

Manitoba, and Vancouver, British Columbia, in the north; and

Seattle, WA, Portland, OR, Bieber, CA, and Denver, CO, in the

west. Its principal routes are between: Denver and Chicago via

Lincoln, NE; Chicago and the Pacific Northwest via Minneapolis

and St. Paul, MN, Omaha, NE, and Billings, MT; Seattle and

Portland and Vancouver, British Columbia and northern California

via Wishram, WA; Lincoln and Laurel, MT via Alliance, NE; and

Spokane and Portland. BN’s facilities, equipment, traffic, and

financial data are described in appendix D.

BN and subsidiaries connect with Frisco primarily at Dallas-Fort

Worth, Kansas City, and St. Louis, MO. Frisco and a subsidiary

operate over some 4,700 miles of track in nine States. Frisco’s lines

generally extend between Kansas City and St. Louis in the north;

Dallas and Fort Worth, TX, Mobile, AL, and Pensacola, FL, in the

south; Quanah, TX, in the west; and Birmingham, AL, in the east. Its

principal routes are between: Kansas City and Birmingham via

Springfield and Memphis; St. Louis and Dallas-Fort Worth via

Springfield and Tulsa; Kansas City and Tulsa, OK; Amory, MS, and

Pensacola, FL, and Mobile, AL; and St. Louis and Memphis, TN.

Frisco’s facilities, equipment, traffic, and financial data are

described in appendix E.

The merger was initially conceived by senior management officials

of BN, in a continuing search for ways to strengthen their system.

They recognized that an end-to-end merger with Frisco would

provide BN access to the “Sunbelt.” the Southeastern and South-

western States in which economic growth and development are

said to be occurring at the highest rate. A merger was suggested

to the chairman and chief executive officer of Frisco on January 27,

1977. A joint study team was established to investigate the potential

benefits to the shareholders, employees, and public from a

unification of the two systems. It reported that the consolidation was

"Great Northern Pac.—Merger—Great Northern, 331 1.C.C. 228 (1967). sometimes referred to

as the Northern Lines Merger

360 LCC.

13

likely to produce significant service and financial benefits. An

agreement in principle was reached, which was approved by the two

boards of directors on September 23, 1977. A final merger

agreement was executed December 5, 1977. The agreement

provides for BN to be the surviving corporation. The merger

agreement was approved by the respective stockholders of BN and

Frisco in May 1978.

THE APPLICANTS

BURLINGTON NORTHERN. INC.

BN is a diversified transportation and natural resources company.

It was incorporated in Delaware as the Great Northern Pacific &

Burlington Lines, Inc. (GNP&B) in 1961. The present name was

adopted in 1970 after consummation of the Northern Lines Merger.

BN and its predecessors have conducted railroad operations

continuously since 1849.

BN’s transportation activities encompass rail, truck and airfreight

forwarding operations. Truck operations conducted by BN

Transport, Inc. (BN Transport) and Hart Motor Express, Inc. (Hart

Motor) provide motor carrier freight service in 15 Midwest and

Western States. Burlington Northern Air Freight (BN Air), a wholly

owned subsidiary, provides airfreight forwarding service. BN also

engages in real estate and land development through subsidiaries.

Scope of operations.—BN and its subsidiaries operate a 24,950-

mile rail system serving the States of California, Colorado, Idaho,

Illinois, lowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,

Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota,

Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming, and the Canadian

Provinces of British Columbia and Manitoba. The principal rail

subsidiaries are Colorado and Southern Railway Company (C&S),

Fort Worth and Denver Railway Company (FW&D), Oregon Trunk

Railway (OT), Oregon Electric Railway Company (OE), and Walla

Walla Valley Railroad Company (WWV). Main and branch line

mileages are shown below:

360 L.C.C.

14

TABLE |

BN system main line and branch line mileage (1976)

Carrier Main line Branch line Total

DD ciddadttinintisnantnimnotnanebenadandanteicnaesassiund 12,373 10,297 22,670

ae 593 90 683

PWED ccccccccccccccccccccccccccoccccccccecssseccccessse 1,241 0 1,241

OT ccccmcccceccccccccccccccocccccccossccccocccccccoconcecs 152 0 152

0 ae 142 43 185

A 19 0 19

Total SyStem -------+-----0----enennenneeneennenee 14,520 10,430 24,950

BN operates intercity rail passenger service under contract for

Amtrak between (1) the Twin Cities and Seattle; (2) Duluth, MN and

the Twin Cities; and (3) Portland and Seattle and Vancouver, British

Columbia. In addition, BN provides commuter service between

Chicago and Aurora, IL, under an agreement with the Regional

Transportation Authority.

BN and Frisco interchange at St. Louis and Kansas City, MO. BN’s

subsidiary FW&D interchanges with Frisco at Quanah, Irving, Fort

Worth, and Dallas, TX, and with Frisco’s subsidiary the Quanah,

Acme and Pacific Railroad Company (QAP) at Quanah. Other major

BN interchange points include Chicago; Denver; Portland;

Minneapolis; Grand Island, NE; Bieber; and Peoria, Centralia, and

Eola, IL.

In 1976 BN and its subsidiaries owned or leased a total of 112,810

cars. These were comprised of: 50,652 boxcars; 10,064 gondola cars;

17,716 open hopper cars; 15,825 covered hopper cars; 5,384

refrigerated cars; 2,321 stock cars; 218 tank cars; 8,547 flatcars and

2,083 miscellaneous cars.

The top five commodities handled by BN in 1976 were coal, farm

products, lumber and wood products (except furniture), food and

kindred products, and chemicals and allied products.

In 1976 BN and its subsidiaries handled 2,724,438 carloads. They

carried 171,700,000 revenue tons over 89,780,124,000 revenue ton-

miles, generating $1,628,907,000 in freight revenue.

The five largest origin points of traffic on BN and its subsidiaries

in 1976, in order, were Decker, MT, Chicago, IL, Colstrip, MT,

Belle Ayr, WY, and Kuehn, MT. The five largest termination points

360 L.C.C.

15

on BN and its subsidiaries in 1976, in order, were Alloredoc, WI,

Minneapolis, MN, Seattle, WA, Superior, WI, and Chicago, IL.

BN operates 25 run-through trains, all but 4 of which are unit

coal trains. The run-through trains are listed in appendix D. BN has

no preferential solicitation agreements with any other railroad.

BN owns all of the outstanding stock of the following seven

carriers: Burlington Northern (Manitoba) Limited; Burlington

Northern Dock Corporation; BN Transport, Inc.; Oregon Electric

Railway Company; Oregon Trunk Railway; Spokane, Portland and

Seattle Railway Company; and Walla Walla Valley Railroad

Company.

BN also owns, directly or indirectly, stock in the following 29

carriers: The Belt Railway Company of Chicago (7.69 percent);

Butte Pipe Line Company (10.00 percent); Camas Prairie Railroad

Company (50.00 percent); Chicago Union Station Company (25.00

percent); the Colorado and Southern Railway Company (90.57

percent); Davenport, Rock Island and North Western Railway

Company (DRI&NW) (50.00 percent); Delta Alaska Terminal Ltd.

(66.67 percent); Denver Union Terminal Railway Company (33.34

percent); Fort Worth and Denver Railway Company (99.97 percent);

Galveston Terminal Railway Company (50.00 percent); Houston

Belt and Terminal Railway Company (12.50 percent); Illinois

Terminal Railroad Company (9.09 percent); lowa Transfer Railway

Company (25.00 percent); Kansas City Terminal Railway Company

(8.34 percent); Keokuk Union Depot Company (40.00 percent); The

Labe Superior Terminal and Transfer Railway Company (66.67

percent); Longview Switching Company (33.33 percent); Minnesota

Transfer Railway Company (33.33 percent); National Railroad

Passenger Corporation (36.00 percent); Paducah and Illinois

Railroad Company (33.33 percent); Portal Pipe Line Company

(50.00 percent); Portland Terminal Railroad Company (40.00

percent); Pueblo Union Depot (25.00 percent); the Pullman

Company (2.97 percent); the St. Paul Union Depot Company (40.20

percent); Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis (6.25 percent);

Trailer Train Company (7.32 percent); Western Fruit Express

Company (97.14 percent); and Winona Bridge Railway Company

(66.67 percent).

BN also owns 18 noncarrier companies, either directly or

indirectly. They are: Arden Lumber Company, Inc. (100.00

percent); BNL Development Corporation (100.00 percent);

Burlington Equipment Company (100.00 percent); Burlington

360 LCC. _

16

Northern Air Freight, Inc. (100.00 percent); Burlington Northern

Air Freight (Australian) PTY. Ltd. (99.99 percent); Dreyer Bros.,

Inc. (100.00 percent); Glacier Park Company (100.00 percent);

Great Midwest Corporation (49.35 percent); Ksanka Lumber Co.,

Inc. (100.00 percent); Lemhi Telephone Company (100.00 percent);

Midwest Precote Company (100.00 percent); Northern Airmotive,

Inc. (100.00 percent); Plum Creek Lumber Company (100.00

percent); Royal Logging Company (100.00 percent); Ruth Realty

Company (100.00 percent); Saxony Corporation (100.00 percent);

Underground Development Company (100.00 percent); and

Universal Pipeline Constructors Inc. (100.00 percent).

These companies comprise BN’s natural resources and corporate

divisions. The natural resources division includes responsibility for

forest products (including timber sales), oil and gas, coal and

minerals, and agricultural land development. The corporate division

overseas commercial land development, local telephone service,

and fixed base aircraft sales and service.

On May 11, 1978, BN shareholders adopted a resolution

approving the merger, subject to Commission approval. Of

10,227,413 shares voting (79.6 percent of total outstanding),

8,883,980 shares (69.1 percent of voting shares) were voted in favor

of the merger.

As of December 31, 1976, BN properties were valued at

$3,451,013,257.

BN is able to utilize several routes through the northern and

central corridors. It is able to penetrate many transportation

markets, originate most of the traffic handled, and serve most of the

important pe in the northern half of the western district. It

possesses a large freight car fleet and enjoys long average hauls in a

territory largely | free of terminal congestion other than at the

carrier's eastern gateways.

Since 1970, the carrier has compiled a good traffic and revenue

growth record. Coal traffic has become increasingly important to

the railroad. Coal accounted for 5.3 percent of freight revenue in

1970, increasing to 17.5 percent in 1976. During the past several

years, BN has continuously increased its market share in terms of

revenue ton-miles.

The financial strength of BN is due in large measure to the

existence and development of its nonrail assets. The carrier owns in

fee nearly 2.4 million acres in the mountain and Northwestern States

and holds mineral rights on an additional 5 million acres. Revenues

derived from the mining of taconite, coal, and other minerals, the

360 1.C.C.

17

production of oil and gas, and the harvesting of forest products have

become important sources of income during recent years.

ST. Louis-‘SAN FRANCISCO RAILWAY COMPANY

Frisco was incorporated in Missouri in 1916 as the successor of

the St. Louis and San Francisco Railroad Co. Frisco operates a rail

system in nine States. The system includes the QAP, a wholly owned

subsidiary, which operates a rail line through the Texas Panhandle

to a connection with the Santa Fe. The Frisco’s wholly owned motor

carrier subsidiary, FTC, operates over routes generally paralleling

the Frisco’s rail lines in Missouri and it holds operating rights over

other routes in Arkansas, Tennessee, Mississippi, Oklahoma and

Texas. Frisco owns two land companies whose primary purpose is to

acquire and develop property for the location of traffic-producing

industries along the lines of the rail system. Frisco also owns

approximately 50.04 percent of the stock of the New Mexico and

Arizona Land Company (New Mex.).

Frisco and QAP operate 4,710 miles of track within the States of

Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri,

Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Texas. The main line mileage totals

3,601 miles, of which 56 are leased. Frisco’s branch line mileage

totals 1,109 miles, of which 73 are operated under trackage right

agreements.

As stated earlier, Frisco interchanges with BN at Kansas City and

St. Louis, and with FW&D at Dallas, Irving, Fort Worth, and

Quanah, TX. QAP connects with FW&D at Quanah. Other major

Frisco interchange points include Birmingham, Memphis, and

Avard.

In 1976 Frisco owned or leased 18,548 cars consisting of: 8,847

boxcars; 1,276 flatcars; 2,620 gondola cars; 2,601 open hopper cars;

3,102 covered hopper car; 100 refrigerator cars; and 2 tank cars.

Frisco and its subsidiary handled 773,437 carloads. This resulted

in 40,544,103 revenue tons traveling 14,563,803,000 revenue ton-

miles and generating $318,625,605 of gross freight revenue.

In 1976, the five major commodities transported on Frisco and its

subsidiaries were: food and kindred products; chemicals and allied

products; transportation equipment; farm products; and pulp, paper

and allied products.

The major revenue carload origin points for Frisco in 1976, in

order were: Memphis, TN; Valley Park, MO; Tulsa, OK; Catale, OK;

and St. Louis, MO. In that same year Frisco’s six major revenue

360 I.C.C,

18

carload termination points in order were: Memphis, TN; Springfield,

MO; Kansas City, MO; Rush Tower, MO; Oklahoma City, OK; and

Dallas, TX. If the Dallas-Fort Worth-Irving, TX area is considered

one termination point, it becomes the second largest on the Frisco

system. Additionally, if Kansas City, KS, and Kansas City, MO, are

considered together they become the third largest termination point

on Frisco.

Frisco participates in 17 run-through train operations. Six of these

involve unit coal trains and two are in one direction only. A list of

these trains is in appendix E.

Frisco has no preferential solicitation agreements with other

railroads.

Frisco has an interest in eight other carriers: The Terminal

Railroad Association of St. Louis (6.25 percent); Illinois Terminal

Railway Company (9.09 percent); Kansas City Terminal Railway

Company (8.33-1/3 percent); the Pullman Company (1.1562

percent); Quanah, Acme and Pacific Railroad Company (100.00

percent); Trailer Train Company (2.44 percent); Wichita Union

Terminal Railway Company (33.33-1/3 percent); and Frisco

Transportation Company (100.00 percent).

Frisco also has an interest in four noncarrier companies:

Clarkland, Inc. (100 percent); Clarkland Realty, Inc. (100 percent);

906 Olive Corporation (100 percent), and New Mexico and Arizona

Land Company (50.04 percent).

Frisco shareholders met on May 9, 1978, to vote on the merger.

There were 2,349,995 shares (89.53 percent of the total shares

Outstanding) represented. Of the total shares, 2,116,735 (80.64

percent of the total and 90.07 of those present) voted for the

merger, while 67,961 (2.58 percent of the total shares outstanding)

voted against the merger.

As of December 31, 1976, Frisco properties were valued at

$673,962,652. This includes 533,770.48 shares of New Mex, which

Frisco valued at $14,211,639 based on the American Stock

Exchange quotation on that date. As of December 31, 1979, New

Mex was selling at over $28 per share, after having split 2-for-! in

July 1978. The valuation of Frisco'’s New Mex stock would now be

nearly $30 million.

TRANSACTION

Terms.—The terms of the agreement provide for all assets and

businesses of Frisco to be absorbed by BN; BN will assume all the

360 1.C.C.

19

debts, liabilities and other obligations of the Frisco. Frisco

nominees will constitute the greater of five or 20 percent of the

surviving company’s board of directors.

Each share of Frisco common stock will be converted into 0.95

share of BN common stock and one-half share of BN $2.125 no par

value preferred stock, $25 redemption value (new preferred stock).

The holders of the new preferred stock will receive fully cumulative

dividends at the rate of $2.125 per share per annum, payable

quarterly. Fractional shares of BN common stock shall not be

issued; holders of fractional shares will receive a cash equivalent. A

mandatory sinking fund commencing in the 6th year from issuance is

designed to retire all the new preferred stock by the end of the 20th

year. The new preferred stock is callable on or after the fifth

anniversary of the issuance.

The merger agreement may be terminated for various reasons. The

agreement provides that if the Commission imposes any conditions

on its approval of the merger, the conditions, if accepted by

resolutions of the boards of directors of BN and Frisco, shall be

deemed to be as binding as if included in the agreement. However,

the boards of directors may not accept (without first obtaining the

approval of the holders of the requisite number of shares of affected

stock) any conditions which would vary or change: the exchange

ratios; the dividend rate of or redemption provisions applicable to

the new preferred stock; or the financial structure of the surviving

corporation.

Securities.—BN currently has 25 million shares of common stock

authorized, of which 12,500,569 are outstanding. This excludes:

1,181,818 shares which have been initially reserved for issuance

pursuant to BN’s 5.25 percent convertible debentures, due 1992:

580,545 shares reserved for issuance pursuant to BN stock option

plans; 287,375 shares initially reserved for issuance on conversion of

BN series A no par value preferred stock; 1,777,800 shares initially

reserved for issuance for BN’s $2.85 no par value convertible

preferred stock; and 540 shares held in BN's treasury.

BN currently has 5 million shares of no par value preferred stock

authorized, of which 2,344,850 shares are outstanding. This is

composed of 2 million shares of $2.85 no par value convertible

preferred stock and 344,850 shares of series A no par value

preferred stock.

BN has reserved and intends to issue up to 2,560,791 shares of

common stock in exchange for the Frisco stock. This is based on the

360 1.C.C, -

20

number of Frisco shares now outstanding, the number of shares

subject to outstanding options, and the number of shares available

for the future grant of options. BN also has reserved and intends to

issue up to 1,347,785 shares of new preferred stock. The amount of

the new preferred stock to be issued is based on the same number of

Frisco shares described above.'*

BN has estimated the commissions, expenses, and discount to be

incurred in issuing the common and preferred stock to total

approximately $300,000.

Assumption of obligations and liabilities.—In addition to issuing

stock, BN will assume the obligations and liabilities of Frisco upon

consummation of the merger. These include: (1) $57,391,000

principal amount of first mortgage bonds, series A, 4 percent, due

January 1, 1997; (2) $13,902,000 principal amount of first mortgage

bonds, series B, 4 percent, due September 1, 1980; (3) $5,400,000

principal amount of refunding and purchase money mortgage notes

dated February |, 1968; (4) 5-percent income debentures, series A,

due after 1977; (5S) remaining indebtedness, if any, on the Frisco

equipment trust, series N (currently $800,037); and (6) the

remaining indebtedness, if any, under Frisco equipment trust, series

O (currently $900,045).

The series A bonds provide for annual sinking fund payments from

available net income equal to: (a) 0.25 percent of the maximum

principal amount of series A bonds theretofore authenticated and

uncanceled (which was $73,385,000 at date of issue); or (b) interest

on bonds acquired by operation of the sinking fund. The series B

bonds provides for annual sinking funds payments from available net

income of | percent of the maximum principal amount of such

bonds heretofore authenticated (which was $19,500,000 on the date

of issue). Both sinking funds’ obligations in practice are satisfied by

the purchase of bonds on the open market.

The series A bonds may be called at any time at premiums from

5.0 percent (prior to 1957) to 0.5 percent (1989-92); there is no

premium after 1992. Series B bonds are callable at premiums from

3.25 percent (in 1955) to 0 percent (in 1979).

Encumbered by the refunding purchase money mortgage

indenture is a 32.67-mile line extending from a connection with the

Salem Branch of Frisco's line (approximately 1.75 miles north of

Keysville, Crawford County, MO), in a southeasterly direction

through Viburnum and Bixby to Buick, Iron County, MO. Under this

“This information was contained in a letter to the Commission dated October 29, 1979 from the

applicants attorney

360 L.C.C.

21

indenture the total issue of notes authorized is limited to an

aggregate principal amount of $6 million. The interest rate is 6.75

percent and the notes are due August |, 1992. Interest on the notes

is payable semiannually. The notes are entitled to the benefit of a

sinking fund designed to retire $150,000 principal amount of notes

during each of the years 1973 through 1991. The notes are

redeemable before maturity at premiums from 5.75 percent (in

1969) to 0.25 percent (in 1991). They are subject to redemption

through operation of the sinking fund.

As of December 31, 1976, Frisco had two equipment trust

agreements, series N and L outstanding. Series N covers 16

locomotives and 183 freight cars, bearing an interest rate of 4.25

percent and matures March 15, 1980. On December 31, 1976, the

outstanding indebtedness under series N was $1,116,000. Series O

covers 321 freight cars, bears an interest rate of 4.38 percent and

matures on May 15, 1980. On December 31, 1976, outstanding

indebtedness under series O was $1,260,000. Under both series,

interest and principal installments are paid semiannually.

In addition, on December 31, 1976, Frisco had outstanding 80

conditional sales agreements covering 281 locomotives, 7,780

freight cars, and 80 enclosed auto racks. The unpaid conditional

sales indebtedness was $1 14,791,000, none of which was in default.

Interest rates vary from 4.45 percent to 10.12 percent with some

interest related to the prime rate. Interest and Principal payments

are due annually or semiannually. With few exceptions, the term is

15 years. Maturity dates extend from November |, 1977 to March 1,

1992.

Control of the motor carrier.—After the merger, BN will own the

FTC. FTC is authorized to provide service over regular routes

carrying general commodities (with the usual exceptions) between

points in Arkansas, Missouri, Kansas, Tennessee, Mississippi, and

Illinois. FTC operations are generally restricted to service which is

auxiliary to or supplemental to Frisco rail service.

ALLEGED BENEFITS OF MERGER

Applicants contend that the proposed merger will result in

improved quality and efficiency of the rail transportation services

offered to shippers, together with increased utilization and

productivity of applicants’ human and physical assets. Further, the

merger will result in an increased financial strength greater than the

two applicants could achieve separately.

360 1.C.C.

22

Efficiencies of the nature claimed are particularly beneficial in

the railroad industry, which earned an average rate of return in 1976

(exctuding Amtrak and AutoTrain) of only 1.97 percent. That of the

western railroads was only 3.37 percent. For the same year, BN

realized a 2.42 percent rate of return and Frisco a 4.6 percent rate of

return. The roads typically identified as being in the strongest

financial condition realized rates of return of oniy 5.92 percent

(Union Pacific Railroad Company), 6.21 percent (Southern Railway

Company), and 7.85 percent (Norfolk and Western Railroad

Company).

APPLICANTS, UNDERLYING STUDIES

Background

Applicants undertook a series of studies of their traffic bases,

operations, and overhead expenses. 1976 was used as the base year

with which to compare anticipated effects of the merger in each of

the 3 years following implementation.

The traffic diversion study, based on a sample of traffic settled

during 1976, depicts volumes of cars or units by routes between

specific origins and destinations, the tonnage involved, and the

expected revenue gains to the merged system. Marketing personnel

from BN and Frisco produced this study. BN personal studied its

traffic that was geographically susceptible to movement over Frisco,

FW&D, and C&S. Frisco and QAP personnel studied their traffic

that was susceptible to movement over BN and its subsidiaries and

also the traffic that was joint between the companies.

The operating study was subdivided into nine separate studies:

Common point consolidation;

Frisco operating divisional organization,

Routes and service;

Operating and train blocking plan;

Freight car equipment utilization:

Condition of roadway property:

Major shops and repair facilities;

Impact on passenger and commuter services, and

Communications.

The loaded freight cars, weights, origins, and destinations

determined by the traffic study group were used by the operations

study group to formulaie computer programs to provide the

360 LCC.

23

information for analyzing complete segment-by-segment operating

requirements. The result indicated the specific amounts and

locations of savings and costs to be incurred on the merged system.

This same information was also used to calculate the additional

gross revenues and the cost of handling added traffic. The costs were

calculated using the Commission’s Rail Form A costing formula. A

concurrent study was undertaken to determine systemwide

standards to be used on the merged system for rolling stock and

fixed facilities and to meet various union, State, and other legal

requirements.

The overhead study was undertaken to determine the changes

necessary in each department of the merged companies for a 3-year

period subsequent to merger. This and the operating study.

developed information for both nonunion and union positions. The

overhead study also determined the estimated savings in insurance

premiums and in data processing equipment rent and maintenance.

A separate study determined a potential for reducing the cost of

purchasing materials and supplies. An environmental impact report

was developed to determine changes in property conditions, traffic

densities, employee counts, and operations.

Traffic studies

The applicants’ traffic studies were developed to determine the

impact that the consolidation would have on applicants’ traffic and

revenue, as well as the impact on other carriers. Frisco prepared a

study of its traffic, and BN prepared studies covering its traffic and

that of FW&D and C&S. A complete analysis of this study is

contained in appendix H. It estimated gross revenue changes

resulting from diversion, summarized in table 2.

TABLE 2

Applicants’ estimates of gains losses) in gross revenue for other railroads'

Carrier’ Total Carrier Total Carrier Total

ACY ----------------- 6.620) EJ&E ------------ $3,900 PLE-------.-... (200)

ATSF ---------------- (6.712.400) FEC-----------.-- 32,100 PW..-...-...-.-. (16,000)

BCE ------------.-.-- 1600 FW&D----------- 1.139.900 QAP-.---------- 3.300

BM ------------------- (42,120) GA--------------- (14,540) RFP------------ (600)

BO ------------------- (643.180) GB&W-.---------- 87.220 RSP------------ 500

BS -------------------- (800) GNA------------- 4.900 SAN ----------- 300

CCO ----------------- (46.100) GTW.--------.---- 365.100 SCL ------------ 1,271,940

See footnotes at end of table.

360 I.C.C.

CC SEEEES'S 3s

24

Applicants’ estimates of gains (losses) in gross revenue for other railroads'—Continued

Carrier’ Total Carrier Total Carrier Total

CHV ---------------.- 400 HPTD.---.-.--.-. 4,600 SN ------........ (53,600)

MILW..--------.-.... (3,054,960) ICG ---.-...--.... (6,592,500) $I--------.-----. 2.900

CN ----------------- - (390.320) ITC -..--....... (80.700) S00 ----.-..--- (243,200)

CNL -----------.----- (3,000) KCS-L&A------ (2,027,420) SOU ----------- (7,925,260)

CNW --------.---.... (1,895,180) L&N ---.......... (6,469,700) SP ---.--..--..-. (2,047,620)

CO ----------------- - . 61.700 LNW............. 800 SS ------........ 2.800

CP. 2.580 MBRR-..--..-..--. (360) SSLV--.--..... 100

CR ------------------- (2,494,000) MCR---------..-. 3.700 SSW-.--......-.. (1,432,320)

CRIP ---------------. (4,504,680) MDW...--..---.. (2,700) TM-----------.- 100

C&S--------------.-.. (1.691.420) MEC----.--..-... (6,880) TOE ----.--..-- (540)

DH ----------------- - 3,000 MKT----.....-... (6,531,180) TP&W---.---.- (4,800)

DM ------------ veesee 1.500 MN&S.--........- (100,300) UP ---.........- . (5,855,660)

DOE ---------------.. (2.760) MP" --.-.......--. (7,748,740) VTR -----.----- (3,000)

D&RGW--------.--- 1.426.200 MTW..--....--... 1600 WA.-.-.--..-.-... (3.680)

DS (13,400) N&W---...------- (2,083,800) WM. ------------ (25,300)

DT&i -----------..... (68,100) NWP .----..-...... (3.300) WP.---.-.--.---- (166,600)

DVS --------------.-. (2,000) OE€.------.......... 14,800 WSS--.-........ 1.500

DW&P.-.-.----.-..-... (82,600) OT-------.---.--.- (8.900)

'No gains or losses were anticipated for carriers by other modes.

‘The carrier abbreviations are identified in appendix A.

“Includes C&EI and T&P.

After estimating the changes in gross revenue resulting from the

diversion of traffic from other carriers and internal rerouting

between applicants and their subsidiaries, applicants determined the

net revenue gains or losses after deducting the “cost of handling”

such traffic. Table 3 displays the estimates of gross revenue gains

(losses), cost of handling, and net revenue gains (losses) for a merged

BN-Frisco and each of its rail subsidiaries.

TABLE 3

Applicants’ estimated net benefits from diverted traffic

BN-Frisco FW&D C&s OE OT QAP Total

Thousands

Gross freight

revenue ---------..---..... $66,644 $1.140 $(1,691) $15 %(9) $3 $66,102

CUBIS ----2--.---2nceees- once 48,545 927 (1,598) 3D cccccccces cccceccese 47,904

Net revenue’ ---------.... 18,099 213 (93) (15) (9) 3 18,198

See footnote at end of table.

25

Applicants’ estimated net benefits from diverted traffic—C ontinued

BN-Frisco FW&D C&s OE OT QAP Total

Thousands

Less: added net cost

of TRRA service at

St. Louis ----------------- $1,342 ccccccasccccs ssccsenesctss scccssseses $1,342

Grand wwtal' ------------ 16,757 $213 $(93) %(15) $(9) $3 16,856

( ) Indicates loss or contra item.

"May not agree due to rounding.

As shown earlier in tabie 1, the $16,856,000 in annual benefits is

estimated to be realized fully for the first time in the third year

following the merger.

Cost studies (traffic)

The unit costs in the analysis were derived from a combined BN-

Frisco-C&S-FW&D 1976 analysis using the ICC Rail Form A cost

formula. There were 2,037 sample movements costed, of which only

23 were not calculated by computer. A detailed analysis of the

costing by all parties appears in appendix I.

Changes in mileage and interchange switching, if any, caused by

rerouting, together with any changes in origin and destination

terminal operations were determined for each movement. Utilizing

the foregoing service change data, changes in equipment turnaround

time were calculated. Per diem/mileage rates were calculated using

average age and average cost per car for each Association of

American Railroads (AAR) car type, based on 1976 rates. Unit costs

and empty return ratios were taken directly from the combined BN-

Frisco-C&S-FW&D Rail Form A analysis.

The principal cost elements studied included expense per gross

ton-mile, expenses related to line hauls, interchange switching

expense, intertrain switching (intermediate on-line switching

between trains or switch moves on one train) expense, terminal

switching and station clerical expenses, loss and damage, car

ownership costs, and “special cost items.” The latter were van-

related costs in trailer-on-flatcar (TOFC) service, mechanical

360 1.C.C.

‘Cas, 26

refrigerator inspection costs, and switching charges by the Terminal

Railroad Association of St. Louis (TRRA).

The cost estimates derived from the foregoing studies are shown

in: table 3, for diverted traffic including added costs for service from

the TRRA at St. Louis; in table 6, (item (h)), for unchanged joint

traffic and certain costs avoided at St. Louis for TRRA services; and

also in table 6 (item (j)), for avoided equipment utilization costs.

Similar procedures were used to determine avoided costs

($418,960 annually) resulting from shorter hauls of (1) new rail to

the rail welding plant at Springfield awd (2) welded rail from the

plant to installation sites. These avoided costs are included in item g

of table 6.

Operating studies

A series of studies were undertaken by applicants to determine

the changes in operations necessary to accommodate the proposed

transaction. The shifts in traffic flow were determined by analyzing

the new routings for diverted traffic, internal reroutings, and

unchanged joint traffic (traffic now interchanged between the Frisco

and BN systems which is not subject to diversion but which will have

the interchange eliminated), referred to collectively as the “through

traffic pool.”

Table 4 shows the estimated number of carloads in this pool. The

“Diversion study” carloads reflect new traffic (traffic diverted from

other carriers to the merged system) and reroutings of diverted

traffic between the merged company and its subsidiaries. For

example, a car which formerly moved by FW&D, Frisco, and a

connecting carrier is diverted from the connecting carrier to a new

route comprised of the (former) Frisco and BN, eliminating both the

connecting carrier and FW&D as participants and adding BN as a

participant.

360 1.C.C.

27

TABLE 4

Components of the through-traffic pool

Carload impact on

Source

BN Frisco Frisco. FW&D Total

Diversion study:

DIN ancocnsnnensrencossscesensccsnsecesscrcscccssocessescooass a ae 99,250

Fri8ci) -------0---+e0nennnnnennnnnnencencnnnnenesnsecsneences 72,360 6,100 78,460

FWD ----00---000-nnnnennnnnnnnnnneeacennnnsencenceenerens 1,050 4,770 5,820

CUS ---00----n0e--nnnnnnnnnnennnnnenneccecenenneneseencenens | 60

Tistll <nscosnreesescsasanscenesecsesccocsssacensscsoeveconss 172,720 10,870 183,590 (77%)

Unchanged joint traffic--------------------00----000--0 38,500 15,600 54,100 (23%)

Total through traffic ----------------------c000ee0see- 211,220 26.470 237,690 (100%)

Pool ---------0-----00-- Percent ------------+--+------- (89% ) (11%)

To select the routes capable of providing the best service,

alternate routes were evaluated on the basis of their physical

characteristics, the desirability of routing via Kansas City or St.

Louis, an appraisal of the approximate transit times, and existing

traffic levels. The following list identifies (1) the principal routes to

be used for the through-traffic pool between Frisco’s major

terminals of Tulsa and Memphis, and BN’s major terminals of

Galesburg, Chicago, Minneapolis, Lincoln, Denver, Laurel, Minot

and Spokane, and (2) the principal routes presently used for unit

coal trains.

(1) Proposed principal routes in the major traffic flow corridors

Traffic corridor Route

Between Memphis and:

Galesburg ----------------------------0-----0-00-eeeneenenes via St. Louis and West Quincy

Chicago ----------------0-00------20nenenenn nnn eseereennenees via St. Louis and Galesburg

Minneapolis ---------------------+---0-0--s00eeeeene-neenee via St. Louis and Galesburg

LiNCOIN ----------------0.00--ee0-nennnnnnnnanenneeneennenee via Kansas City

Denver ------------+---------00ee-nncnnnennncneeneeeneennnene via Kansas City and Lincoln

Laurel -----------------------00---2e-eeneeneneeeneneneennenee via Kansas City and Lincoln

MiNOt-------------0-00-00-- enn cnnnnnnneseeeneneeeceneennenne via Kansas City and Willmar

SPpok ane-------------+--0----ne-nnennennnnennnneeeeeeenerenne via Kansas City and Minot

Between Tulsa and Springfield and:

Galesburg --------------------------0---0-0eseneennsneeneene via Kansas City and West Quincy

Chicago ---------------------00--0enenesnnnnseeneeeeenneennee via Kansas City and Galesburg

Minneapolis ------------------------000e0+-eeeeeneneenneeee via Kansas City and Willmar

LINCOIN ----------+---------2-0-e0eneennnneneneeneee teceenane via Kansas City

28

(1) Proposed principal routes in the major traffic flow coridors—Continued

Traffic corridor Route

Denver ------------+-----------+--- via Kansas City and Lincoln

Laurel -------------------------0------0--0-0-20002 - via Kansas City and Lincola

Minot - via Kansas City and Willmar

Spokane via Kansas City and Minot

(2) BN/FW&D/C&S routes carrying unit coal trains (June 1, 1978)

Traffic corridor Route

Between Huntley, MT and:

Kansas City --- --- via Alliance and Lincoln, NE; Napier, KS;

and St. Joseph, MO

Dallas , via Alliance, NE; Brush and Denver, CO

Twin Cities ----------------------+-------- via Glendive, MT; Casselton, ND; Willmar, MN

Duluth/Superior via Glendive, MT; Casselton, ND; Staples, MN

Gunn, MN -------------------0--0-0eeeeee= via Glendive, MT; Casselton, ND; Fargo, ND;

Grand Fosks, ND; Bemidji, MN

Between Fargo, ND and Fergus Falls,

MN

Between Twin Cities and St. Louis--- via Dubuque, IA; Galesburg, IL; Burlington,

1A

Between Galesburg and Paduach---- via Bushnell and Concord, IL; Shattuc, IL

Between Fargo, ND and Fergus Falls

MN

Between Twin Cities and St. Louis--- via Dubuque, 1A; Galesburg, IL; Burlington,

1A

Between Galesburg and Paduach---- via Bushnell and Concord, IL; Shattuc, IL

Between Galesburg and Chicago---- via Aurora, IL

Between Chicago and Denver-------- via Galesburg, IL; Creston, IA; Lincoln and

Oxford Jct., NE; Brush, CO

Between St. Louis and Shattuc, IL

Between Galesburg and Peoria

The following routes or route segments would remain primarily as

coal routes after merger:

Between Huntley, MT and Casselton, ND---- via Glendive, MT

Between Casselton, ND and Twin Cities ------ via Staples, MN

Between Fargo, ND and Bunn, MN------------- via Grand Forks, ND and Bemidji,

MN

Between Galesburg and Paduach----------------- via Bushnell, Concord, and Shattuc,

IL

Between St. Louis and Shattuc, IL

Between Alliance, NE and Brush, CO --------- via Northport, NE

Between Denver and Dallas --- - via Texline, TX

Between Ashland, NE and Galesburg ---------- via Creston, IA

360 LC.C.

29

It was determined that there will be 12,000 loads and 9,720

corresponding return empties, or 21,720 cars presently interchanged

annually between BN and Frisco that will be handled via shorter

routes on the merged company. This determination was based on

analysis of 31 percent of a total of 385 study movements. Use of the

shorter routes on the consolidated company will result in a net

reduction of 1,130,913 car-miles and savings in transportation costs

of $630,539 annually begining in the first year of merger. (See table

6, item (h).)

The reduction in freight car time/mileage costs resulting from the

elimination of interchange between the merging carriers at St. Louis

and Kansas City will produce an annual saving of $480,332, and the

reduced use of TRAA services at St. Louis will produce an annual

saving of $26,188 in the first year of merger (table 6).

The change in the number of cars (4,525 additional through

Kansas City, with a like reduction through St. Louis) results from

the rerouting to use shorter internal routes. In addition to the cost

savings, considerable savings in transit time will result. Applicants

believe the time saved will result in quicker turnaround of

equipment, thereby improving equipment utilization.

Applicants conclude that the major gateways to realize increased

traffic are Birmingham, Memphis, Tulsa, and Chicago. The

Centralia-Woodlawn gateway will realize decreased traffic, but BN

States that service at these gateways will be at least equal to what it

is presently. However, there will be a reduction of one train daily in

each direction on the Galesburg-Centralia route.

There are 183,590 carloads annually in the diverted traffic base,

including 172,720 between BN-Frisco and 10,870 between FW&D-

Frisco (see table 4). Of this total, 73,290 carloads are “new” to the

BN and 105,130 carloads are “new” to the Frisco. Applying an 81

percent empty return factor, the total annual increase would be

158,445 cars on the BN and 164,495 cars on the Frisco, beginning in

the third year of merger.

On the Frisco, the additional traffic would be concentrated on the

main traffic corridors between Birmingham-Memphis and St. Louis-

Kansas City, and between Tulsa and Kansas City. On the BN, the

new traffic would be concentrated on the St. Louis-Galesburg,

Kansas City-Chicago, and Kansas City-Lincoln corridors. Other

additional traffic is widely dispersed throughout the system.

Applicants, expect no delay or impact upon commuter or

passenger operation. On the BN, passenger commuter service is

operated between Chicago and Aurora, IL, with approximately 68

360 1.C.C.

30

commuter trains operated daily, primarily between the hours of 6

a.m. and 6 p.m. After merger there will be two additional freight

trains operated on this line between Cicero Yard and Aurora,

scheduled between the hours of 6 p.m. and 6 a.m when commuter

operation is minimal.

The following BN line segments carry Amtrak passenger trains

and are segments on which additional freight train operation is

scheduled as result of merger:

Line segment Number of Amtrak

trains daily

Chicago-Galesburg, IL -------.----2-----cccesecesso--coennneeceenscccceeecercees 4

Galesburg, IL-West Quincy, MO -----------..+----------2ecceceseenecneeeee 2

Willmar-Breckenridge, MN -------------c-2-.-.----eeceneeececececcenenncececee 2

Applicants state that the schedules of the added freight trains will

not conflict with Amtrak operations.

No Amtrak, passenger, or commuter service is operated on Frisco.

Applicants believe that the merged company would offer

substantial service improvements to both its on-line customers and

to many of the customers of its connecting railroads. The merged

company would provide singie-line service from such major

southeastern traffic generating points at Birmingham, Memphis, and

Mobile to the northwestern points of Portland, Seattle, and

Vancouver (British Columbia); and from the Chicago gateway to

Tulsa, Oklahoma City, Dallas-Fort Worth, Houston, and Galveston.

Consolidations of traffic flows would enable the movement of trains

over longer distances with no need for interchange and with minimal

en route switching.

Applicants acknowledge that they will exert their best efforts

toward obtaining longer hauls over the merged single-line routes

where possible. Nonetheless, they expect to maintain existing

gateways and joint routes with connecting carriers, and anticipate

that traffic will continue to move via such gateways and routes

where service considerations dictate. For example, applicants

believe that certain traffic moving in connection with UP at Kansas

City between the Pacific Northwest and Memphis and beyond will

continue to be so routed because this route will be shorter and

involve less transit time than the proposed BN-Frisco single-line

route via Minot, ND . However, applicants will not guarantee per-

merger traffic levels.

Applicants anticipate savings both in the resources required to

serve the traftic and the time required to handle the shipments from

360 1.C.C.

31

origin to destination. They believe that service reliability would also

increase. They will route internal traffic over shorter routes without

sacrificing long-haul divisions, but reducing transit time, switching,

and interchanges. The merged system will have significantly greater

control over the movement of individual shipments. Consolidation

of computerized information systems for freight car location and

distribution would give the merged company the ability to inform

shippers of the location and the expected delivery date of shipments

over a wider geographic area. In turn, this would enable the merged

company to match the available supply of empty freight cars to

shipper demands, thereby improving the ability to meet shippers’

needs and the utilization of the combined equipment fleet, with a

potential reduction in the amount of handling of certain shipments.

Applicants believe that there would be an opportunity to reduce the

incidence of loss and damage.

Applicants have concluded that the condition of road, yards, and

terminals is adequate to handle the present and proposed traffic

volumes and thai no rehabilitation or upgrading is required. These

property studies confirmed applicants’ belief that their policies and

Practices are similar and compatible, and will not require any

substantial change. Further, the studies of facilities and maintenance

programs produced no opportunities for savings on the merged

company except for rail welding. Expansion of rail welding facilities

at Springfield is expected to cost $54,000, while annual recurring

savings of $418,960 are expected from shorter hauls of both new rail

and welded rail.

Applicants plan to upgrade 27 miles of Frisco track between

Rosedale Yard in Kansas City and Paola, KS, at a cost of $556,475.

They plan to accomplish two-thirds of the rail relay ($370,983) in

the second year, and the balance ($185,492) in the third year of

merger. (Table 6, item (i).) Applicants believe this will result in an

increase in the allowable freight train speed and in increased line

capacity sufficient to provide for the efficient movement of trains

and the achievement of train schedules without delay.

In determining postmerger equipment requirements, applicants

analyzed the availability of motive power and cabooses, the changed

train services attendant to the changed traffic volumes, the pooling

of the BN and Frisco locomotives and cabooses, and the

requirements of the run-through train between Tulsa and Houston in

connection with the FW&D. Of the routes over which more trains

will be operated, only the Kansas City-Minot route restricts the

locomotive size (to four-axle units because of the limited capacity of

360 1.C.C.

32

the Missouri River Bridge at Sioux City). Anticipated new

equipment acquisitions are shown below.

Equipment Type and horse- Number Cost per Total invest- Annual recurr-

power of units units ment cost ing cost

Locomotives ---- Four-axle 2,000 HP- 14 $464,650 $6.505.100 $1,235,969

Do--------------- Six-axle 3,000 HP--- 14 = $43,395 22,279,195 4,233,047

Cabouses--------- Cupola------------------ 17 43,500 739.500 140,505

Total 29,523,795 ‘5,609,521

‘The annual recurring cost is included in table 6, item j.

Due to increased freight car equipment utilization resulting from

the merger, applicants believe the merged company will be able to

avoid the purchase of 800 freight cars in the future. Based on the

1976 car acquisition program, 3 years would be required to realize

the full acquisition saving. Using the 1976 average cost for new

equipment, an estimated $26,941,000 investment in new equipment

would be avoided. Based on BN's estimated 1976 before-tax cost of

capital (19 percent), investment cost savings $1,706,000 would be

realized in the first year of merger, $3,440,000 in the second, and

$5,118,600 in the third and each year thereafter.

Applicants assert that operation of the combined freight car fleet

will permit greater flexibility in car management and more efficient

use of cars. Specifically, the cross-haul of like equipment types,

which generated approximately 11.9 million car-miles, can be

reduced by minimizing the empty return of cars which are now

under separate ownership and control. The reduced handling of

empty cars would produce an annual car-mile savings of 5.8 million,

which in turn would generate an annual savings in transportation

costs of $887,504.

Applicants contend that the merged rail company would be

enhanced by BN’s nontransportation operations. These operations

include the sale of timber and logs, the manufacture and sales of

forest products, and the exploration, development and/or sale of

petroleum, coal, and other natural resources. In:addition, BN is

engaged in airfreight forwarding, as well as fixed base aircraft

operations and real estate development. Applicants state that such

nontransportation operations ‘(particularly those involving timber

and coal) permit BN to commit internally-generated funds to capital

intensive projects: required by its raif service.

7 360 1.C.C.

33

Applicants estimate the following net benefits from the proposed

merger, based on the underlying studies:

TABLE 5

Merger benefits (costs) by year following consummation'

Year

Study areas

One Two Three

Millions

Traffic (New):

BN-Frisco $10.89 $15.92 $16.76

Rail subsidiaries 0.23 0.33 0.10

Subtotal 11.12 16.25 16.86

Operations’ 7.27 17.09 20.83

Employee protection --------------------0--0+-00eesseeeseneenennseeees (15.96) (7.84) (4.64)

Total ---- 2.43 25.50 33.05

‘1976 dollars.

‘Includes net benefits from changes in internal (to merged system) routings of traffic and from

unchanged joint traffic no longer requiring interchange.

A summary of the economic results of the operating and labor

studies (the latter study is discussed later) for the first 3 years after

merger is shown in table 6.

TABLE 6

Summary of merger economic benefits operating and labor savings (costs)

Year

Operating

One Two Three

(a) Common point consolidation ---------- $3,804,264 $3,804,264 $3,804,264

(b) Operating division organization- (40,487) (40,487) (40,487)

(c) Informations ---------------++-----0---0eenee (1,612,500) (1,015,000) (712,000)

(d) Communications -----------------------+-- (1,298,586) (530,031) (66,031)

(e) Compatibility of equipment ------------ (879,582) (534,405) (519,659)

(f) Standardized locomotive heavy repair

policy ooee (1,240,781) (503,823) 232,816

(g) Consolidated maintenance facilities

and functions sreeeceneenees $23,922 1,048,730 1,048,730

(h) Unchanged joint traffic:

Use of shorter routes ------------------ 630,539 630.539 630,539

Interchange cost savings -------------- 480,332 480.332 580,332

TRRA cust savings -------------------+- 26.188 26,188 26,188

eoonsenecncsase (370,983) (185,492)

(i) Upgrading plans ------------------------+-+-

360 1.C.C.

34

Summary of merger ecanomic benefits operating and labor savings (costs)—Continued

Year

Operating

One Two Three

(j) Equipment:

Acquisition. locomotives and ca-

booses see (5,009,521) (5.609.521) (5,609,521)

Freight car utilization---- --------------- 2.593.504 4,327,504 6,006, 104

(k) Purchasing-material - 1,135,232 1.135.232 1,135,232

(1) Overhead:

Nonlabor - scccccesececcseseccorcneees 2.557.417 4.231.370 4,335,724

Labor -------------+--------00-00--ee-eeeeeee-- 6,759,994 10,417,256 10,659,831

(m) Exempt employee benefits-—----------- (560,836) (408,285) (397,389)

Total! ----------------+--------2--002----20--- 7,269,099 17,088.088 20,829. 181

Employee protection:

(a) Scheduled -----------------------0--.0+00-000- (7,771,180) (6,776,263) (4,546,696)

(b) Exempt -----------------------------0----eeee- (8,187,991) (1.061.614) (91.901)

Total '---------------+--0--0eeeneeneeeecennee ee (15,959,171) (7.837.877) (4,638,597)

‘Totals are shown in table 5.

Applicants note that the proposed merger would be entirely end-

to-end in nature. In their opinion, an end-to-end merger represents

the best approach to extending the systems’ strength because it

serves to buttress existing traffic volume and activities, while

rationalizing the industry's corporate structures. Applicants

maintain that through an end-to-end merger, there is no loss of

competitors in any geographic market; rather, both intra- and

intermodal competition is strengthened. In addition, end-to-end

mergers generate little or no abandonment of rail lines because, by

their nature, few of the facilities are duplicative and therefore made

redundant by the consolidation. Finally, applicants urge that end-to-

end mergers do not drain available capital resources in order to

unite the two companies, but instead allow merger benefits to be

achieved almost immediately after consolidation, with limited, or at

most transitory, impacts on employees.

Purchasing and materials

The applicants estimate a total recurring savings of purchasing

and material of $1,135,232 (table 6, item (k)) with three

components: increased revenue from scrap ($195,232); general

purchases ($840,000); and freight car purchases ($100,000). These

savings will fluctuate with business volumes.

360 L.C.C.

35

Information systems

To develop a single standardized information system for the

merged carrier, a joint BN-Frisco study team concludéd that BN’s

Complete Operating Movement Processing and Service System

(COMPASS) should be expanded to include Frisco data. To

accomplish this, applicants estimate $1,175,000 in nonrecurring

costs in the first year and recurring costs of $437,500 (first year),

$1,015,000 (second year), and $712,000 (third year). (Table 6, item

(c).)

The public interest benefits claimed by applicants

On brief, applicants summarize and discuss the several benefits

they claim will result from their proposed merger. They maintain

that the merger will significantly improve service to shippers in the

form of new single-line service, reduced transit times, more efficient

and frequent service, and improved car utilization. Applicants point

out that the merged company would offer new single-line service in

major market areas extending from the Gulf Coast through the

Midwest to the Northwest and from the Great Lakes region to the

Texas coast. The new company would provide single-line service

from principal southeastern cities such as Birmingham, Memphis,

and Mobile to cities in the northwest such as Portland, Seattle, and

Vancouver; and from Chicago to cities such as Tulsa, Oklahoma

City, and Houston; and a more direct route from Chicago to Dailas-

Fort Worth, Houston, and Galveston than the circuitous Denver

route which BN now operates with its subsidiaries C&S and FW&D.

his new single-line service, according to applicants, would result

in significant service improvements for shippers. One of the

principal claimed benefits resulting from the single-line service

would be reduced transit times. Single-line service would allow

preblocked trains to move over long distances without interchange

and with minimal switching en route, expecially at the congested

common points of Kansas City and St. Louis, thereby saving time

and resources. For example, through-train schedules are proposed

from Portland and Seattle via Minot and between Chicago and

Memphis-Birmingham, Minneapolis and Memphis, Lincoin and

Tulsa, Chicago and Tulsa, and Tulsa and Houston. Applicants claim

that transit time will be reduced from (1) Chicago to Tulsa by 19

hours or 43 percent, (2) Portland to Memphis by 14 hours or 12

percent, and (3) Minneapolis to Memphis by 46 hours or 49 percent.

360 L.C.C.

36

Applicants contend that improved service resulting from single-

line routes opened up by this merger would also create the potential

for shippers to compete in new markets, heretofore not feasible

because of inadequate, costly, or inefficient service. For example,

opening a single-line route froin the northwest to the expanding

markets in the southeast would significantly facilitate development

of important western coal ix. the Powder River Basin of Montana and

Wyoming. In view of the energy crises, applicants urge that the

development of this market as an alternative to petroleum and

natural gas is urgent.

Applicants also state that faster transit times and reduced

intermediate switching would decrease the amount of handling of

shipments, reducing the incidence of loss and damage. Moreover,

reduced transit time would increase freight car and locomotive

utilization, and thus increase car availability to the shipping public.

More efficient utilization of the combined freight car fleets will

help alleviate car shortages, applicants claim. They plan to use a

computerized information system for centralized car location and

distribution which will expeditiously inform shippers of the location

and delivery dates of shipments. This system would also permit a

more efficient match-up of the supply of available empty fre ight cars

with shipper demand.

In applicants’ opinion car utilization would also be improved

dramatically because car service rules which currently impede the

movement of empty freight cars between the two companies would

not apply. It is anticipated that over 5 million BN-Frisco empty car-

miles will be eliminated each year.

In addition to faster and more reliable service to shippers,

applicants claim that their operating plan provides for more

frequent service for shippers in major traffic corridors.

Approximately 12 new trains per day will be operated, and only 4

presently scheduled trains will be eliminated.

Applicants state that the proposed merger would afford greater

rerouting capabilities, improving service by avoiding delays or

interruptions and using shorter line-haul movements over the

consolidated system. Currently, traffic tends to move via the longest

haul within each respective system in order to attain the maximum

revenue division.

The proposed merger in applicants’ judgment would result in a

financially strong new company able to attract necessary capital.

They anticipate that the net financial benefits to the merged system

after the third year of consolidation would be approximately $33

360 LC.C.

37

million. These financial benefits would stem primarily from two

sources—the attraction of new traffic through improved service and

consolidation savings resulting from the end-to-end character of the

merger.

The new traffic is expected from two sources: traffic now carried

on the BN, Frisco, or their subsidiaries which will be carried on a

longer haul in the merged system; and traffic presently carried by

other modes which would be attracted to the merged system due to

superior service. After the third year of merger it is expected that

the gross freight revenue gains from the first source would be

$66,101,900, the associated costs would be $49,245,586 and the net

traffic revenue gains would be $16,856,314.

Applicants’ estimate of the net savings that would result from the

unification of operating functions, including elimination of

independent operations at the common points of Kansas City and St.

Louis, after the third year of operations, would be $20,829,181.

Applicants believe that their management policies are

compatible, with consistent objectives and performance.

Applicants argue that the merger represents an opportunity for

Frisco to reduce its dependence on overhead traffic by

incorporating it into a viable and strengthened BN system. In 1976,

31.5 percent of Frisco’s 796,108 freight carloads were interline

forwarded, 28.4 percent were interline received, 23.6 percent were

intermediate or overhead, and only 16.5 percent were local. Frisco

belives this consolidation is necessary for it to continue to provide

quality transportation services in the future. Applicants also state

that Frisco’s financial base would be expanded, because BN’s

internally generated funds from nontransportation activities would

be available to the merged system. Further, Frisco’s present

marketing strategies for the economically expanding Sunbelt would

be extended throughout BN'’s territory.

Applicants argue that the benefits of the merger would create a

strong new competitor, and that this strength will force competing

carriers to improve service to meet the service and rates offered by

the merged company. Applicants contend that the protective

conditions sought by protestants to shelter themselves from the

increased competition are anticompetitive.

In applicants’ view, the merged company’s improved ability to

compete intermodally is equally important. Applicants note that in

the past 30 years, the railroad industry has lost 50 percent of its

market to other transportation modes, even though railroads are

among the most energy efficient. (They consume the least amount of

360 1.C.C.

38

energy per gross ton-mile of traffic hauled by any form of ground

transportation). Applicants believe that the superior service which

the merged company will offer shippers, together with competitive

ratemaking and improved car supply, should attract business which

has been diverted to trucks and barges, particularly on grain traffic

from the Midwest. Further, new single-line service between the

Northwest and the Su»belt should also attract a substantial portion

of the business which has been lost to motor carriers as a result of

poor rail service.

Applicants believe that the merged company’s improved

intermodal competitive strength will also result in increased traffic

for connecting rail carriers. In turn, this would partially offset the

diversionary impact resulting from the merger. Applicants state that

it is impossible to quantify the amount of business potentially

attracted from otler modes, but they believe the amount would be

significant.

Applicants contend that the concurrence of rivalry and

intecdependence (“Balkanization”) among rail carriers has created

humerous long-run problems. Effective competition is hindered if

other rail competitors are able to retaliate on interline shipments in

their capacity as connecting carriers. Interchanging traffic alone

adds to the total costs of handling traffic, including operational costs

(car switching) and clerical costs (recordkeeping). Interchanging

freight impairs service by significantly adding to delivery transit

time.

Even more important, in applicants’ estimation, are the intangible

factors of loss of control and sense of responsibility for the shipment

by the originating carriers when the freight is transferred to

intermediate or destination carriers. Applicants maintain that this

minimizes the incentive to make service improvements on interline

traffic or to solicit interline traffic on the basis of superior service.

In addition to discouraging marketing and service initiatives on

interline shipments, applicants argue that “Balkanization”

discourages innovative ratesetting. The tendency has been to

continue longstanding practices rather than initiate imaginative or

aggressive pricing, because the reactions of competing and

connecting carriers are too unpredictable and their powers of

retaliation too strong. The reluctance to change pricing more

flexibly in response to changing competitive factors is also

responsible, according to applicants, for the continuing shift of

traffic to other modes.

360 1.C.C.

39

Applicants argue that end-to-end mergers effectively eliminate

the problems described above, and thus their transaction is

consistent with Federal goals of rail rationalization. They cite the

Commission's Rail Services Planning Office in its final report in the

“Rail Merger Study,” issued February 1, 1978, and the November

1973 report of the Task Force on Railroad Productivity made to the

National Commission on Productivity and the Council of Economic

Advisors. Further, applicants state that since the proposed merger is

end-to-end, no abandonments of lines or of service would be made,

and no competitors would be eliminated (as in a “parallel” merger).

Applicants point out that while fixed charges would increase by

$6.04 million in the first year of merged operations, the increase is

minimal compared to the financial benefits to be realized.

Applicants contend that the merged company’s increased business

would in turn create new job opportunities. Although consolidation

of facilities at Kansas City and St. Louis would result in relocation

of forces, applicants state that in most cases any employees

adversely affected would be promptly reabsorbed by the merged

company into new vacancies created increased traffic and by normal

attrition. They also contend that the security of existing jobs would

be enhanced by the increased strength of a merged BN-Frisco.

Stock exchange

Morgan Stanley assisted BN in structuring and negotiating a

security package to accomplish the merger. The package was

designed to:

Maintain the dividend level of Frisco shares;

Provide an equity interest to Frisco shareholders consistent with its past and

expected earnings contributions,

Result in no material dilution in expected earnings of BN shares; and

Avoid any material adverse effects on BN’'s capitalization and fixed charged

coverage.

After a detailed review of both BN and Frisco which included

financial statements, operations, characteristics, and performance,

Morgan Stanley recommended a number of combinations of security

packages to fit the criteria. It recommended that BN offer a security

package of a new BN straight preferred and BN common stock. This

combination was preferred because it best met the objectives of (1)

maintaining the Frisco dividend, and (2) providing a_ stock

360 1.C.C.

40

component consistent with both the past and future expected —

earnings contribution of Frisco. A price range of $50 to $55 was

recommended for each share of Frisco stock.

Salomon Brothers assisted Frisco in its merger discussions with

BN. Financial and operational data of both railroads were reviewed

and analyzed. It was determined that the appropriate combination

should be a nontaxable merger to Frisco shareholders and they

should not receive any diminution in current dividend income.

Since Frisco stockholders could not expect to receive dividend

parity based upon current dividend levels from an acceptable

exchange ratio of common stock, it was determined that some

combination of common and preferred stock should form the

security package.

Salomon Brothers believed that Frisco stockholders should be

offered a premium in market price, not only in current terms, but

one which appeared to be sustainable over a reasonable period of

time.

Salomon Brothers’ approach viewed BN and Frisco as

transportation entities with other interests of which Frisco’s was

small and BN’s was substantial. The merger benefits were shared

equally and were considered in the negotiation. Prior to the final

discussions with BN, Salomon Brothers recommended that Frisco

could reasonably agree to a package valued in the range of $52 to

$56.

After extensive negotiations between BN and Frisco, the parties

agreed to merge based upon a securities package consisting of 0.95

share of BN common and 1/2 share of a new BN $2.125 no par value

preferred with $25 redemption value for each outstanding Frisco

common share.

The total value of the security package, based upon average prices

from February | through August 31, 1977, and on prices current as

of the negotiation, is as follows:

Average February September 20,

to August 1977 1977

Price of BN COMMON ---------ceceeccececcecccncccesececee $47.63 $41.375

Price of Frisco COMMON ---------0+--+-e-eeneeneeenee see 43.23 42.50

Value of $12.50 of new BN -------------eeceesenenceeeee 12.125 12.125

Value of 0.95 of BN common -----------0--ceeeeeneeee 45.249 39.306

Value of package ---------0------0ees-eeeccseeenneseneccnees 57.374 51.431

Premium------ PCTCONL --------0--nnnnnennnrenennnnnnnennsenne 36.7 21.0

360 I.C.C.

4\

Therefore, the dividend for each share of Frisco would meet the

critical element of dividend maintenance at $2.5825 per share

(representing 0.95 of the $1.60'’ per share dividend on the BN

common stock, plus 0.5 of the dividend per preferred share of

$2.125), a slight premium in the Frisco’s current dividend. Frisco

shareholders would hold 16.8 percent of the total equity in the

combined enterprise.

Morgan Stanley believes the merger terms are fair and reasonable

to BN stockholders. Salomon Brothers believes that the offer is in

the interest of Frisco shareholders.

Consideration was given to the spinning-off of Frisco’s interest in

New Mex to Frisco stockholders or placing a separate valuation on

the interests in the merger negotiations. However, a spinoff would

have been taxable to Frisco stockholders. It could have complicated

merger discussions and, if the merger was not consummated, Frisco

would be left without its interest. A separate valuation of

nontransportation holding would not have benefitted Frisco

stockholders, since BN has much larger nontransportation assets;

any valuation placed on New Mex would have been overshadowed

by the valuation of BN’s nontransportation assets. After discussions

with New Mex management, Morgan Stanley recommended that BN

acquire New Mex in the merger. Salomon Brothers agreed.

Employee impacts

Applicants believe that because of increased traffic volumes, a

slight increase in employment over 1976 levels can be expected asa

result of the merger. Nonetheless, there will be some realignment of

work forces. Reductions in force are expected in some work areas as

a consequence of the consolidation of headquarters functions and

activities at St. Louis and Kansas City. With few exceptions,

surplused employees will be absorbed almost immediately by new

positions and vacancies caused by the demand of the increased

traffic, and by the normal process of attrition. Further, a large

percentage of the redundant employees are not represented by labor

organizations, and can be expected to transfer where needed and to

accept a variety of work assignments. Thus, applicants contend that

any adverse impact on employees will be short term only and

confined to a relatively few locations. Because of labor protective

conditions which are required by statute, no employee would face

involuntary unemployment as a direct result of the merger without

ample financial protection.

'"BN's most recent dividend was $2.10 per share.

360 1.C.C.

42

Traffic volume studies.—Employment impacts resulting from

changed traffic volumes were examined by applicants. The work

force was adjusted for each line segment and location which would

experience increased or decreased car and train volume.

These adjustments would occur in the maintenance of way (track,

bridge and building), transportation (train, engine and yard crews,

and clerks) and mechanical (machinists, electricians, boilermakers,

sheetmetal workers, carmen and laborers) functions. The applicants’

study projected the following net changes in the number of these

positions:

euler

Net change in

number of positions’

Department

Year

One Two Total

Maintenance of Way -------------------000-ne ws 243 243

Transportation -----------------------e-ne-eeee- 287 (39) 248

Mechanical (locomotive) -------------------+- 92 23 115

Mechanical (car)------------------------------+- 129 67 196

Material ---------------0---00-----20eeeeneneenenees 2 I 3

510 295 805

'( )Decrease

Common point consolidation studies.—The applicants also

performed studies on those geographic locations where both

railroads conduct operations (common points). While the studies

considered the common points between the Frisco, QAP, and

FW&D at Fort Worth, Irving, Dallas, and Quanah, major

improvements through consolidation were evident only at St. Louis

and Kansas City. Special studies were conducted to determine the

potential for combining facilities and/or forces for improved or

more efficient performance at the latter two terminals.

General guidelines used in these studies were that: (1) no changes

would be considered that could be accomplished without the merger

of the two companies; (2) functions of a similar nature would be

concentrated at fewer work centers; (3) quality of present service

performance could not be reduced as a result of the consolidation;

and (4) the means properly to monitor performances would be

implemented.

360 1.C.C.

43

Applicants’ estimated reductions in work forces are listed below:

Reductions

St. Louis Kansas City

Transportation:

Officers and exempts ----------------------------200-0-00 2 5

Clerical ------------- stenceneneeceecreeececeeceneeses 19 17

Vardmasters ----------------------00-0esereeennnenenennenene 3 5

Yard engineers-------------+-----+-+----e-e-eenene-eenennes 7 4

Yard conductors -- 7 4

Yard helpers -----------------------0--eeeeeeeeseeeesneneeee 14 8

Subtotal -------------0-e--0-neeenenne-nenneecnnneeeanerneeees $2 43

Mechanical:

Supervision ---------------------0+--00-eeseeteneeeeeeenenenee 3 2

Clerical --------------0-00--ne-neenenncenenensseeeeneceseeenes BR iia

Car inspectors ----------------------0000e-eeeseeeeeeeneeene eo en

Machinists -----------------0--00---0c0neeeeneeenecensenenenee nn a

Laborer --------------0+---00--ee00e----nneneennenneeenennenen 0 ail

Carmen -----------ececncnccccccccccncencececenncncecerecceces 14 10

Carmen apprentice --------------------++-e0-ee--eee0ne=ee Bk Co kiki

Subtotal ----------------2-0----000--2--eeeeee eens Lecwccececee 32 12

Maintenance of way:

Officers and CxeMpts ----------------eenenneneeneeeeweree wee |

TOtal --------++---eene-enneceneneneeeenen rene -neneeeesenenes 84 56

Reflected in the work force reductions is a reduction in switch

engine shifts of seven per day at St. Louis and four daily at Kansas

City. There will also be a reduction of one switch engine locomotive

unit assigned at each location.

The overall savings that will accrue at those two points are:

Savings per year

Item

St. Louis Kansas City

Wage and fringe benefits ------------+-+-+ececeee-neeeees $2,100,943 $1,426,250

Expenses other than labor -------------+--+--------0000- 6,000 — 6,000

Switch engine operation and maintenance

CSE ---enerene er eneeennenneeeeeneenenceneneenenerareceeencee 149.621 85,496

Switch engine ownership CoSts -----------+----------+5- 14,976 14,976

Total ------------0eeeeeeeeneneneeennn er eneeneneeneeeeecnneneens 2.271.540 1,.§32,724

For the St. Louis and Kansas City terminals combined, common

point consolidation savings totaled $3,804,264 per year (table 6,

360 L.C.C.

44

item (a)), of which $3,527,193 are Savings in wages and fringe

benefits.

Comparison of studies—labor and operational.—Applicants used

different costing methods for their labor and operating studies. The

differences are de minimus, but are reflected in the subsequent

discussion.

Overhead study.—The overhead study determined savings from

combining the existing BN-Frisco forces engaged in systemwide

functions, which include all supervisory and staff positions above

the operation division level. It is essentially a plan for the

unification of the headquarters and the general staff functions of the

two companies.

Included in the studies were 3,166 BN and 1,335 Frisco jobs, of

which 2,763 were exempt (nonunion) and 1,738 were scheduled

(union). Of the total jobs studied, it has been estimated that there

will be a net reduction of 428 jobs (264 exempt and 164 scheduled),

and the relocation of another 126 exempt and 76 scheduled jobs.

The resulting labor savings, including payroll additives, will amount

to $10,704,915 annually (see table 7 below).

TABLE 7

Overhead study labor savings

Net jobs Wages Payroll Labor saving

abolished saved additives’ (4) =

(1) (2) (3) (2) + (3)

Exempt --------------------- 264 $6,008 898 $1,798,463 7,807,361

Scheduled juobs----------- 164 2.367.863 529.691 2,897,554

Total --------0-----200ee00- 428 8.376.761 2,328,154 10,704,915

‘Payroll additives were calculated as a percentage of the wages saved in the overhead study. The

percentage applied to exempt wages was 29.93 pereent and i the scheduled wages 22.37 percent.

San aon 360 L.C.C.

vi) 2tnem ’

r

7 oe od a vit

45

Table 8 presents the cumulative summary of savings by year.

TABLE 8

Cumulative summary of realized savings

overhead study

Year

Savings

One Two Three

Labor' ----- tee eenneenneennes $6,759,994 $10,417,256 $10,659,831

Other than labor' ------ 2.557.417 4,231,370 4,335,724

Total ----------------.- 9.317.411 14,231,628 14,995,555

‘These amounts are also shown in table 6, item 1.

During the fourth and fifth years of the merged operation, another

$135,084 will be realized, according to applicants, raising total

savings in overhead to $15,130,639.

Savings other than labor have been estimated at $4,425,724.

Approximately three-quarters of these savings represent savings in

insurance premiums ($1,864,810), data processing equipment rent

and maintenance ($794,775), and expense accounts ($626,698).

Labor—scheduled.—No protective or implementing agreements

have been entered into with employee organizations.

Applicants conducted studies of the impact of the merger on

union employees and their wage and employment protection costs.

They assumed that work transfers and consolidation of facilities

would be timed, where reasonably possible, to maximize utilization

of available manpower and to avoid a loss of skilled employees.

Positions were counted as abolished whenever work equivalent toa

5-day per week, full-time position was eliminated at a particular

location, even though it could be possible to reassign the employees

involved to other work without a formal abolishment and rebulletin

of positions, or a new position at the same location. Rates for 1976

wages, payroll taxes, insurance premiums and other benefits were

used in performing the studies. :

Applicants conclude that 704 new scheduled positions would be

created and 452 positions abolished in the first year following the

merger. Reductions in force will occur principally at Springfield, St.

Louis, and Kansas City, where a net 144, 127, and 41 jobs would be

abolished. Total changes in position and wage costs are shown in

table 9.

360 1.C.C.

46

TABLE 9

Scheduled employees:

changes in position and wages

Year

lem

One Two Three

Positions added (excluding transfers) ----------++++eeeeeeeseneeennens 704 355 0

Positions abolished (excluding transfers) ------++-++-eeceseeeeeeenees 452 86 27

Net positions added (saved) -----+--+--+e++eeeeneenneesenweneeneeneenenes 252 269 (27)

Positions (fAnelerred concccccccceccccccccccccccccccecccccccccccccccccceccces 100 0 5

New wages, insurance and taxes added ------- MINIONS. -20n0e on $6.0 $10.6 $10.1

Among the crafts affected, trainmen, carmen, and machinists show

the greatest gains in positions, with net increases of 168, 80, and 68

positions, respectively, in the first. Maintenance-of-way positions

also showed increases, but not until the second year, when a net 243

positions would be added. Among the crafts losing net positions,

clerks are hardest hit, losing a net 157 positions in the first year. Net

changes within other crafts during the first year include: enginemen

(+55 positions); electricians (+27); sheetmetal workers (+17);

boilermakers (+11); dispatchers (+1); yardmasters (-11); and

laborers (-7).

Applicants also determined the number of employees becoming

surplus. In each of the three years following the merger, applicants

estimate that surplus employees will number no more than 358, 285,

and 186, respectively. While applicants expect most of these

employees to be absorbed into new positions or other vacancies or

to receive opportunities for retraining for other crafts, those

employees who are surplussed, displaced, or transferred due to the

transaction will be covered by protective conditions.

In estimating the cost of protective benefits, applicants assumed

that the Commission would impose only the protective conditions

required by statute.'* Applicants further assumed that: (1) job

abolishments, transfers, or creations would occur on the first day of

the year; (2) abolished jobs would be coordinated with created jobs

of a similar nature to the extent possible; (3) no separations would

occur, but that in each craft at each location, costs for surplus

employees would be at least as much as if all surplus employees took

separation pay when eligible; and (4) attrition would occur at an

even rate throughout the year. In Assuming an even rate of attrition,

"49 U.S.C. 11347,

360 1.C.C.

47

applicants charged an average 6-month wage expense for each

surplus employee absorbed through attrition per year and 12-month

wages for remaining surplus employees.

Other assumptions used in determining the cost of protection

included:

(1) For each net job eliminated, in each craft at each location, 1.5 employees, in

addition to those made surplus, would be displaced to lower-rated positions for an

average of 36 months, which would require a displacement allowance payment of 5

percent of the average annual wage, unless a larger allowance was indicated by the

circumstances,

(2) At common points, seniority districts would be consolidated so that a displaced

employee would have the opportunity to exercise seniority in this existing seniority

district and at least all other jobs in the craft in the surrounding terminal area.

Multiple seniority districts, which exist for clerks and certain shop crafts at

Springfield, would be consolidated into a single overall craft district.

(3) The attrition rate for union employees would be 7.5 percent per year at all

locations, and the amount that could be utilized to absorb surplus employees would

be 90 percent for clerical employees and 100 percent in other classifications.’

(4) Ten percent of the union employees asked to transfer their residence out of their

existing seniority district would do so, at an average cost of $10,000 for moving

allowances, relocation expenses, moving time, and real estate protection.

Based on their studies, applicants conclude that costs for

employees’ protective benefits will total $7.8 million in the first year

following the merger, $6.8 million in year two and $4.5 million in

year three. (Table 6, Employee Protection, item (a).) Total costs to

the applicants resulting from impacts on union employees (i.e., net

wages added as a result of increased union positions and protective

conditions for union employees becoming surplus or who are

displaced or transferred) amount to $13.7 million, $17.3 million and

$14.6 million, in each of the three years following the merger.

Labor—exempt.—The impacts on nonunion employees (exempt)

and their attendant wage and protective benefit costs to the

applicants were developed by determining (1) the cost of job

protection and moving expenses for displaced or transferred

employees and (2) the costs of providing a unified program of

employee benefits for exempt employees.

Applicants’ estimated changes in positions and attendant savings

for the first 3 years following merger are shown in table 10.

"The applicants did not use the attrition information contained in the application. They claim

that this information was not useful because the rates are influenced by high turnover of newly

employed persons, a group which creates no vacancies for surplus employees in a merger

situation,

360 I1.C.C.

TABLE 10

Impacts on exempt employees

Year

lrem

One Two Three

Seabee abollghed occcccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccncccecescceccecececcccccs 449 i 3

Bee SE cicectiecensntnstesececsenieetbinetesntetatnddnnbbeeeseceneounstbiin 212 5 0

Jobs transferred -------+-+-++0---sneewnnenerennenncennnnencnsensennnenseenees 126 0 !

Net surplus employees «--------+e+seeeeeseneeesenennennneneneesnnsenseenen 237 6 3

Net wages and fringe benefits saved-------- MITIOMB=-- = ene eeees $7.1 $7.3 $7.4

In determining the cost of placing employees into vacant

positions, an attrition rate of 6.2 percent was used to determine

vacancies. This rate was based on past actual attrition of BN exempt

employees. Exempt employees were considered a single class for

attrition purposes and it was assumed that job abolishments and

additions would occur on the first day of the period. Applicants

further assumed that the matching of skills and qualifications would

allow the use of 50 percent of the available vacancies to absorb

unassigned exempt employees. It was also assumed that 5 percent of

their employees required to transfer would not do so and resign.

In calculating its costs, applicants charged a 6-month wage

expense based on the average salary of unassigned exempt

employees for each employee absorbed during the year. A 12-month

salary expense for the remaining unassigned employees was used. By

applying the average salary of unassigned exempt employees and the

average benefit costs of the two applicants, a fringe benefit of 29.93

percent was developed. Total transfer costs, including costs for

employees whose positions are transferred or who transfer to fill a

newly created position, were based on actual BN merger transfer

cost experience, elevated to 1976 price levels. Applicants conclude

that employee protection costs will total $8.2 million in the first

year following merger, $1.1 million in the second year and $91.9

thousand in the third year. (Table 6, Employee protection, item (b).)

The study for providing unified benefits was based on the premise

that no employee would be placed in a worse position as a result of

the merger, and with the object of equalizing benefits for employees

of BN and Frisco. Each railroad's benefit programs were studied.

Cost efficient changes in current administrative procedures and data

commonly used in establishing the rating structure (i.e., age, service,

360 1.C.C.

49

payroll volume and the current number of employees with

applicable dependent ratios) were considered. Initial cost statistics,

based on the actual 1976 cost, and then new costs, were established

by combining all exempt employees under the new program. Pension

costs were determined, based on a preliminary actuarial study, by

adding Frisco employee data into BN’s pension plan. Consideration

was given to the unfunded total and vested liabilities of BN’s plan.

Applicants’ estimate of the cost of providing a unified benefit

program (table 6, item (m)) is detailed in table 11.

TABLe Il

BN-Frisco exempt employee benefit costs

Benefis Premerger plan Year

combined cost One Twe Three

PeEMsion PAN «--<-sseeeeeeeee ee eeeeees $12,104,000 $12,696,825 $12,605,475 $12,598,950

Medical plan ----- ntanaenecneeeenens 4,331,900 4,202,280 4.172.080 4,169,880

Life IMSUPANCE--------ers seer eee eee eee 1,728,600 1,946, 767 1.932.781 1.938. 782

Accidental death and dismem-

DEP MENE «+n s0enneen eet nee eee nereeeees 8,050 48.964 48.611 48.586

Short-term disability «<---> 797,900 653,288 O48 S84 068.248

Long-term disability----------- > 729.000 787.120 751.660 791.270

Dental plan -rrss--s--eeeseeererrne 904, 500 853.654 847 $22 847.084

Travel accident --------eeesceeeee: 19.500 45.388 45,062 45.0”

Total annual Cost «-...s-e8 seen 20,64 1,450 21,204,286 21,051,738 21,080,819

Increased Cust! ------ecseeeeee cee S60.8 408,285 7 wae

‘Table 6. item (Mm).

Note: Reductions in costs tor particular benetits are the result of jobs being abulished during the

‘year period,

Total net costs resulting from impacts on nonunion employees

(i.e., wages saved, protection costs and increased costs for providing

a unified benefit program) amount to $1.6 million in the first year,

followed by saving of $5.9 million and $6.9 million, respectively, in

each of the next two years following merger.

National defense

The applicants believe that no defense-related service presently

provided by either BN or Frisco will be hindered by the proposed

merger, but in fact, will be improved to the same degree as for

shipments by the public.

360 LCC.

50

Shipper support

A dozen shippers testified in support of the merger. Combined

they paid over $1 billion for rail transportation services in 1977.

Their testimony is detailed in appendix C.

The reasons for their support vary; however, the overriding factor

is their belief that the merged company could provide better

service. This service ranges from faster transit times to easier tracing

of shipments. The combined car fleet, and particularly the ability to

have BN equipment available in the South and Southeast and Frisco

equipment available in the Northwest and North Central regions,

are considered particularly important.

FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

Burlington Northern

BN has reported net incomes in each year since the Northern

Lines merger, with the exception of 1971 dve to an extraordinary

item of $67.5 million. While net railway operating income has been

substantial, other income has been greater than $50 million annually

since 1973. The carrier has reported positive working capital each

year since 1968, with a working capital ratio ranging from a high of

1.68 to a low of 1.15. In 1976, the base year, BN earned a net income

of $72.6 million on railway operating revenues of $1.5 billion. The

rate of return averaged 2.24 percent for the period 1968-78, with a

return of 2.40 percent for 1976. The carrier's debt-to-equity ratio

has averaged in the low thirties for the period 1968-77. Fixed

charges have been covered rather well, with an average coverage of

slightly over 2.0 times for the 11-year period and a good 2.3 times

for 1976.

St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company

Frisco has been profitable in each year since 1968, and reported a

net income of $12.0 million for 1976. The carrier had positive

working capital in each year from 1968-77, with an average working

capital ratio for the 10 years of 1.22. Frisco’s rate of return averaged

4.86 percent for the |1-year study period. In 1976 the carrier

reported a return of 4.51 percent. The debt-to-equity ratio has been

acceptable, ranging from a low of 43.9 percent to a high of 49.6

percent. The average fixed charges coverage for the period 1968-78

was a good 2.33 times. A 2.1 coverage was reported for the base

year, 1976.

360 L.C.C.

5]

Financial benefits to merged company

The applicants’ pro forma income statement indicates that the

third year after the merger, the merged company expects a net

increase in railway operating revenues of $65,328 million, for

combined railway operating revenues of $1,918.2 million. This

projection was made using a base year of 1976, thus taking no

economic considerations into account. The applicants anticipate

that railway operating expenses would increase by a net amount of

$27.113 million, for combined railway operating expenses of

$1,524.5 million. The estimated profit is $112.9 million, of which

$28.4 million is attributable to the merger.

Impact on the exchange offer on income Statement.—Because the

purchase price is less than the net book value, the depreciable assets

of the Frisco will be written down to purchase cost, hence reducing

the depreciation base. In so doing, the depreciation expense to be

recorded in the income statement will have a lesser impact on

earnings, thus adding to net income. As an offset, the long-term debt

will be written down to its present value. Since long-term debt is

retired at par value, the difference between book value and the

restated value will be amortized over the life of the debt. This will

result in an increase in fixed charges that will more than offset the

decrease in depreciation expenses. The additional fixed charges

required ($6.6 million) exceeds the $4.7 million decrease in

depreciation expense, so that the overall effect on the income

statement is to reduce net taxable income by $1.9 million in the first

pro forma year.

This decrease in taxable income should not be looked upon as

detrimental, since it does not require any cash outlay and reduces

the cash outlay required to pay Federal income taxes.

The table below presents fixed charge coverage for the base year

and each of the first three years after the merger.

360 1.C.C.

52

TABLE 12

Fixed charge coverage

Merged company

BN Frisco

1976 1976 Year

One Two Three

Thousands

Income available for fixed

CNALBOS ++ = en nn ennnewnwnen nnn $131,829 $25,367 $168,389 $185,904 $190,311

Fixed charges ----------------- 59,241 12,049 77,328 76,462 76,024

Coverage (times) ---------+++- 2.23 2.11 2.18 2.43 2.50

The net increase in fixed charges resulting from the proposed

merger is estimated to be $6.04 million in the first year of merged

operation. This increase is the result of two factors. The first is the

discounting of the principal amount of debt and capitalized lease

obligations to reflect current interest rates. The increase so

computed does not result in any increase in the cash payments for

existing fixed charges because this is purely a purchase accounting

change in interest rates. Second, to accommodate the projected

increase in traffic volume, it is estimated that the merged company

will acquire 17 new cabooses. The resulting increase in fixed charges

will be offset, at least in part, by the avoidance of certain locomotive

and freight car purchases. In the case of the BN-Frisco merger, the

most important impacts are a reduction in depreciation due to a

writedown of the historical cost of depreciable property to allocated

purchase cost and an offsetting increase in accounting fixed charges

due to the writedown of long-term debt to present values. Since

such long-term debt must be retired at fixed or par value, additional

fixed charges are required to amortize the discount created by the

purchase accounting adjustment. The operating expenses,

equipment rents and fixed charges in the pro forma income

Statement reflect adjustments for the adoption by Frisco of

accounting for leases as provided by Financial Accounting

Standards Board Statement (FASB) No. 13. This accounting already

is reflected in BN statements.

Improved revenues, additional costs, and Savings are expressed in

additional cash receipts and reduced cash expenditures. In

360 1.C.C.

53

preparing the pro forma financial statements, however, it was

necessary to give different treatment to certain of those amounts

which are in the nature of additions and betterments rather than

expenses, as well as the effect of purchase accounting. Thus, pro

forma operating expenses must reflect the reduction in depreciation

expense resulting from purchase accounting as well as the additional

costs of handling increased traffic and the merger savings. Other

portions of the pro forma income statement reflect additional fixed

charges, again resulting from purchase accounting. The increase in

pro forma net income is on an after-tax basis.

» The following table indicates cash flow for each applicant for

1976, the base year, and the merged company for the first 3 years

after the proposed merger. This table demonstrates the ability to

repay debt and make necessary capital investments.

TABLE 13

Cash flow and debt coverage

Merged company

BN Frisco

1976 1976 Year

One Two Three

Thousands

Ordinary income ------------- $72,588 $11,956 $89,699 $108,080 $112,925

Depreciation and retire-

MENL -+---20-eeeeweeennnnnnnne- 66.874 14.450 76,371 76,091 75,812

Deferred income taxes ----- 2,847 1,635 4,482 4,482 4,482

Undistributed earnings ----- (7,621) (143) (7,990) (8,096) (8,113)

TOL --eeeeeeenee nnn eeneeee 134,688 27,898 162,562 183,557 185,106

Long-term debt due within

TYCO wnnrnnenwnnnneennnnnnnne 50.911 13,935 66,438 66,438 66,438

Coverage (times) ------------- 2.65 2.00 2.45 2.76 2.79

Each carrier had adequate cash flow to cover its long-term debt

due within | year for the base year. The coverage of debt maturity

after merger should allow an adequate contribution toward future

capital investments.

Impact of the exchange offer on balance sheet.—The con-

sideration given by BN is the fair value of the common and preferred

shares which it proposes to issue plus the fair value of the liabilities

360 1.C.C, ”

54

to be assumed. The fair value of the liabilities assumed is the

discounted value of debt at current interest rates and the present

value of certain other liabilities, such as that for unfunded pensions.

The fair value of the consideration given must be apportioned to

the assets acquired. Briefly, current assets are reported at book

value and the remaining fair value of consideration given is

apportioned to other assets, including investments and road and

equipment property, in proportion to the fair values of assets.

The pro forma balance sheet illustrates this technique. Using the

valuation figures estimated by Salomon Brothers, the book value was

reduced by $88.6 million.

The pro forma balance sheet reflects the purchase accounting

adjustments as wel! as the pro forma adoption by Frisco of

accounting for leases as provided by FASB No. 13.

The working capital position of the applicants and the merged

company is presented below.

TABLE 14

Working capital

BN Frisco Merged

1976 1976 company

Thousands

Current assets ----------- HAtenanennannneeeeeeneanenateneeananenannenns $388,482 $59,946 $448,428

Current liabilities! -------+---------------seeeees-onecenneeeeeeseoeees 357.934 68,959 423,519

Working capital ----------------------- wtereneeneneeeenseeeennsennns 30,548 (9.013) 24.909

Working capital ratio ---------------------0ee-ss-eeeeneeerenecneee 1.09 0.87 1.06

‘Includes long-term debt due within | year.

It is expected that the anticipated growth in cash flow and earning

power of the merged company would lead to a stronger working

capital position that either road could attain alone.

’ The pro forma balance sheet indicates that the merged company

will have a debt-to-debt plus equity ratio of 38.0. This ratio is

slightly higher than BN’s ratio of 35.6 for 1976 and-below Frisco’s

48.4 for 1976. A ratio of 38.0 should not have an adverse impact on

the merged company’s future financing.

Normally a carrier will have capitalizable assets in excess of total

capitalization, as in the case of the merged company as shown

below.

360 1.C.C.

55

TABLE 15

Capitalizable assets of merged company

Working capital ------------------sssssseeeecsnennesececccnsneccccceseececeeeseececees $91,347,000

Carrier operating property less depreciation ------------------+----------0-- 2,739,251 ,000

Investment in transportation subsidiaries plus undistributed earnings- 363,453,000

Total capitalizable assets -------------------------0-eeec-eeeecceeeencesescenennes 3,194,051 ,000

Total capitalization’ ---------------------00-ceesessenneeccnneneceeeeseceseeccenenes 3,094,218,000

Capitalization assets in excess of capitalization ----------------+------------ 99,833,000

‘See schedule of capitalization of merged company below.

Since the merged company will have Capitalizable assets in excess

of capitalization, the attendant pressures of overcapitalization

Should not be felt and further expansion of Capitalization is possible.

TABLE 16

Capitalization of Burlington Northern, Inc. after merger, December 31, 1976

BN Frisco Adjust- Pro forma

ments

Thousands

Short-term borrowings—notes payable

(1) --e----nwereneneennnennnnennceneeecencenenns $17,343 wneceeenncnneeene eneneeees ones $17,343

Current portion of long-term debt and

capitalized lease obligations (2)------ 55,877 $13,935 $(3,374) 66.438

Long-term debt and capitalized lease

obligations:

Mortgage and collateral trust bonds

i) 471,597 105,608 (40,018) 537,187

Equipment and other obligations (4)- 323,249 104,101 6.471 433,821

Capitalized lease obligations (5)------- 3O,3OS --2 220-22 -nnnweee 12,287 48,592

Due to affiliated cost --------------------- $9,712 278 -nn--nnnnennnnnne 59,987

Convertible debentures (6)-------------- 65,000 --enenerecccecece cenenceeeeeseeees 65,000

Tal ------0--0e seen eneneneenneeneenee 955,863 209,984 ------2-n-nnnnens 1,144,587

Stockholders’ equity (7) and (14):

Preterred stock:

$10 par value; authorized, 2,978,875

Shares; outstanding, 2.899.326

SNALES -----------20-eennennweneneneeeeecenee 7. ke 28,993

No par value, authorized, 5 million

shares (8), outstanding:

Series A, 344,850 shares------------- 10,346 -----n-enceeenene cereneeneneeeeees 10,346

$2.125. $25 redemption value

(10) -reccrcccccrsnsnnsenscccccncsescceccecs sencccrencsernece sescssececseceses 32,642 32,642

360 1.C.C

56

Capitalization of Burlington Northern. Inc. after merger. December 31, 1976—Continued

BN Frisco Adjust- Pro forma

ments

Thousands

. Preferred stock—Continued:

$100 par value; authorized 1,500,000

Shares, issued. MoMe (11 )-------seecee- caccenceeeceeccee ceccenee

$10,000 par value, redeemable pref-

erence shares; authorized 3,000;

shares issued, none (9) see seeeeccenssescoes oe

Common stock, without par value au-

thorized. 25 million shares; out-

standing. 12,457,876 shares (12)------ $544,329 ----------e-neeee $104,370 $648,699

Common stock, without par value;

authorized, 6 million shares; issued

2,611,436 shares: outstanding,

2.611.386 shares (13) ------c--ceeecceeeee seocceecccesecees 113,967 (113,967) -----0--eenennnne

Capital surplus (13) ------------------+--- fo ceennennnaeensane 19,019 (19,019) ------nennnnnne

Retained carnings (13) ----------------++- 1,145,170 90,554 (90,554) 1,145,170

TWA) ------00neennnennecenneneeneneneeenee 1,728,838 223,40 ------2---0000000 1,865,850

Total capitalization -------------..--- 2.757.921 447,489 -------0--enennne 3,094,218

Explanatory notes

(1) BN short-term borrowings (historical) consisted of $16,388 of notes payable and $1,000 ‘

commercial paper. The average interest rates at December 31, 1976 were 4.76 percent and 4.75

percent for notes payable and commercial paper, respectively.

(2) Frisco’s historical current portion of long-term debt and capitalized lease obligations have

been adjusted to reflect the fair value of long-term debt maturities and capitalized lease

obligations in arriving at the pro forma amount.

(3) Interest rates on BN obligations range from 2.625 percent to 8.60 percent and are due from

1978 to 2047. Interest rates on Frisco's obligations have been adjusted to reflect, on a pro forma

basis, fair value at December 31, 1976, resulting in a pro forma reduction of $40,018,000 in

Principal amount; accordingly, such amounts included in the pro forma column have interest rates

ranging from 8.25 percent to 13.16 percent and are due 1978 to 2006.

(4) BN’s equipment and other obligations bear interest ranging from 3 7/8 percent to 9 3/4

percent and are due 1978 to 1993. Interest rates on SLSF's obligations have been adjusted tw

reflect, on a pro forma basis, fair value at December 31, 1976. resulting in a pro forma increase of

$6,471,000; accordingly. such amounts included in the pro forma column have an interest rate of

8.25 percent and are due 1978 to 1992.

(5) BN's long-term capitalized lease obligations are due 1978 to 1991. Frisco’s capitalized lease

obligations (long-term portion of $12,287,000 at December 31, 1976) have been included in the

pro forma column in order to reflect the adoption of FASB No. 13. Such lease obligations are due

1978 to 1993.

(6) BN's covertible debentures bear interest at 5 1/4 percent and are due 1992. The convertible

debentures may be converted into common stock at $55 per share, subject to antidilution

Provisions, at any time on or before January 15, 1992. The debentures are redeemable at the

option of BN at 103.7 percent of principal amount in 1977, at declining percentages through 1988,

360 1.C.C.

&

57

Explanatory notes—Continued

and at par thereafter. Beginning in 1983 and continuing through 1991, BN is required to retire

annually $5 million principal amount of debentures, subject to adjustment for debentures

previously converted, acquired, or redeemed. In addition, during such period BN has the

noncumulative option annually to provide cash for the retirement at 100 percent of the principal

amount, of up to an additional $5 million of outstanding debentures. BN has reserved 1,181,818

shares of its authorized but unissued common stock for issuance upon conversion of the

debentures.

(7) On May 12, 1977, BN stockholders approved an amendment to the restated certificate of

incorporation creating a new class of redeemable preference shares consisting of 10,000 shares

having a par value of $10,000 each. On the same date, the stockholders approved the 1977 stock

option incentive plan, authorizing the granting of nonqualified options to purchase up to 600,000

shares of BN common stock officers and key salaried employees of BN and its subsidiaries.

Pursuant to such authorization, the board of directors on May 12, 1977 granted options to 451

persons, covering 125,850 shares of common stock at a price of $48.50 per share.

(8) On July 7, 1977, BN issued 2 million shares of $2.85 convertible preferred stock at a price of

$50 per share and accrued dividends for $96,932,000 net of issuance costs. The shares are

convertible at any time into common stock of BN, unless previously redeemed, at a conversion

rate of 0.8889 shares of common stock for cach share of preferred stock subject to adjustments in

certain events. BN may, at its option, redeem such preferred stock, in whole or in part, upon at

least W days’ notice at $52.85 per share prior to July |, 1979, at decreasing prices thereafter prior

to July |, 1987, and thereafter at $50 per share.

(9) On May 11, 1976, Frisco stockholders approved an amendment to the articles of association

creating a new class of redeemable preference shares consisting of 3,000 shares having a par value

of $10,000 each.

(10) For pro forma purposes it is assumed that |,305,693 shares of BN $2.125 no par value

preferred stock, $25 redemption value, were issued December 31, 1976, at par at an exchange

ratio of one-half share of preferred stock for each outstanding share of Frisco common stock. The

pro forma share amount assumes no cash payments for fractional shares. Such payments are

provided for in the merger agreement. The ultimate issuance of such stock is subject to approvals

of the merger by BN and Frisco shareholders and the ICC. For *** the ICC, (Ina letter to the

Commission dated October 29, 1979, attorneys for the applicants stated that 1,347,785 shares of

the new preferred stock would be issued or reserved for issuance).

(11) None of the Frisco $100 par value preferred stock ($1,500,000 shares authorized) has been

issued.

(12) For pro forma purposes, it is assumed that an additional 2,480,817 shares of BN’s common

stock were issued December 31, 1976, at an exchange ratio of 0.95 BN share for each outstanding

share of Frisco common stock. The pro forma share amount assumes no cash payments or

fractional shares. Such payments are provided for in the merger agreement and are reflected in

the adjustments and pro forma columns at a price of $41.25 per share. the closing market | ice of

BN common stock on the date the respective boards of directors agreed in principle to the terms

of the proposed merger. In addition, $2,036,000, which represents the assumed conversion of all

outstanding Frisco stock options at the merger conversion rate less the grant price ($23.44) of

such options, has been added to the common stock. For *** common stock, (In a letter to the

Commission dated October 29, 1979, attorneys for the applicant stated that 2,560,791 shares of

BN common stock are anticipated to be issued or reserved for issuance).

(13) The proposed transaction will be accounted for as a purchase and, accordingly, the Frisco

common stock will be retired and Frisco capital surplus and retained earnings of prior to the date

of merger are eliminated.

(14) Does not include: 1.181.818 shares of BN common stock initially reserved for issuance

upon conversion of BN's 5 1/4 percent convertible debentures, due 1992; 580,545 shares of BN

common stock reserved for issuance pursuant to the BN stock option incentive plan, 287,375

shares of BN common stock initially reserved for issuance upon conversion of the series A no par

360 1.C.C,

58

Explanatory notes—C ontinued

value preferred stock; |,777,800 shares of BN common stock initially reserved for issuance upon

conversion of the BN $2.85 convertible preferred stock issued on July 7, 1977 (see (8) above); and

540 shares of BN common stock held in the treasury. Also not included are 79,974 shares of BN

common stock and 42,092 shares of $2.125 no par value preferred stock which may be reserved

for issuance at the exchange rate for the merger transaction, for Frisco common stock. pursuant to

the Frisco stock option plan.

POSITIONS OF PARTIES

Supporting the merger application are the U.S. Department of

Defense (DOD), Boise Cascade Corporation, Care-Nicky

Corporation, International Mineral and Chemical Corporation,

Proctor and Gamble Company, Farmlands Industries, Inc.,

American Cast Iron Pipe Company, Amax Coal Company, Lamb-

Weston, Weyerhaeuser Company, Shell Oil Company, Nabisco, Inc.,

and the Pacific Northwest Traffic League. The U.S. Department of

Justice (DOJ) does not oppose the merger.

If the Commission imposes the stipulated conditions negotiated

with applicants, the following carriers do not oppose the merger: the

Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company (Santa Fe),

Chicago and North Western Transportation Company (CNW),

Illinois Terminal Railroad Company (ITC), the Family Lines,

Southern Railway Company (Southern), Kansas City Southern

Railway Company (KCS), Southern Pacific Transportation Company

(SP), St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company (Cotton Belt), Union

Pacific Railroad Company (UP), and Missouri-Pacific Railroad

Company (Mopac). The stipulated conditions are set forth in

appendix K. BN and Frisco support these conditions.

Six railroads are opposed to the merger. They are Chicago, Rock

Island and Pacific Railroad Company, William M. Gibbons, trustee

(Rock Island), Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad

Company, Richard B. Ogilvie, trustee (Milwaukee Road or MILW),

Soo Line Railroad Company (Soo Line), Illinois Central Gulf

Railroad Company (ICG), Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad

Company (MKT or Katy), and Denver and Rio Grande Western

Railroad Company (DRGW or Rio Grande). Additionally, the

Railway Labor Executives’ Association (RLEA); John W.

McGinness, Illinois Legislative Director of the United

Transportation Union (UTU-IL); Railway Employees’ Department,

AFL-CIO (RED); M. S. Stuckey, General Chairman of United

Transportation Union on Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Company

(UTU-ICG); M. M. Winter, General Chairman of United

360 I1.C.C.

59

Transportation Union on BN (UTU-BN); lowa Department of

Transportation, Transportation Regulation Board (IA-DOT); Illinois

Department of Transportation (IL-DOT); Kansas City Board of

Trade (KC Board); Montana Wheat Research and Marketing

Committee (MT-Wheat); Wyo-Ben, Inc.; Riceland Foods; Superior

Corp.; and John W. O'Neil oppose the merger.

No parties support Soo Lines’ requests for trackage rights over BN

between Superior, WI, and (a) McGregor, MN, (b) Schley, MN, and

(c) Bald Eagle, MN. BN, Frisco, DOJ, and UTU-ICG oppose the

request. BN and Frisco also oppose all other relief requested by Soo

Line (set out in appendix K).

ICG's proposal for trackage rights over Frisco between Memphis,

TN, and Jasper, AL, and terminal operations over Mopac in

Memphis is opposed by BN, Frisco, DOJ, and UTU-ICG. BN and

Frisco also oppose the other conditions sought by ICG.

The CNW proposal for trackage rights over BN between the Twin

Cities and the Twin Ports over the White Bear Lake route is

supported by BN and Frisco. However, DOJ opposes these trackage

rights.

SP’s proposed trackage rights in Portland, OR, are supported by

BN, Frisco, and Crown Zellerbach. UP, DOJ, and UTU-ICG are

opposed.

Milwaukee Road's proposed trackage rights to serve coalfields in

eastern Montana are supported by the Wisconsin Power and Light

Company (WI-P&L), Northern States Power Company, and the

Westera Energy Company, but opposed by BN, Frisco, DOJ, and

UTU-ICG. BN and Frisco oppose other conditions sought by

Milwaukee Road.

Rock Island's proposal for trackage rights over BN between

Denver and Golden, CO, is supported by the Adolph Coors

Company, the major shipper on the line. BN, Frisco, DOJ, and UTU-

ICG oppose the trackage rights. Rock Island's use of the DRIKNW

line is opposed by BN, Frisco, Termicold, Lamb-Weston, and Alcoa.

Applicants oppose all other proposed protection for Rock Island.

The indemnity protection sought by MKT is supported by the

Lower Colorado River Authority, La Barge, Inc., Breton

Corporation, Clareden, Inc., the Denison Area Chamber of

Commerce, and Gifford-Hill & Co., Inc. This condition is opposed

by BN, Frisco, and DOJ.

DOJ also opposes the proposed indemnity conditions sought by

Milwaukee Road and Rock Island.

360 1.C.C.

60

The impact of the merger on each rail carrier participating in the

proceeding and the relief requested are discussed separate below.

MILWAUKEE ROAD

Summary of Milwaukee Road's position

MILW contends that applicants have not shown the merger to be

in the public interest. Many of its benefits could be accomplished

without merger. Milwaukee asserts that 50 percent of all merger

benefits attributed to the transaction would be derived from

diverted traffic. MILW notes that applicants contend there is

insufficient traffic to justify run-through operations short of merger;

however, when diversions add to applicants’ traffic base, such

operations will commence.

MILW questions some of the anticipated benefits of the merger.

It believes that applicants’ “improved car supply” is an un-

substantiated claim, particularly in view of the impossibility of

estimating the effect of internal traffic reroutings. Applicants’

proposed minor reductions in overhead staff conflict with the BN

chairman’s offer of continued employment to all Frisco senior

management, thereby destroying a prime merger economy. MILW

also contends that another claimed economy, joint purchasing,

could be done now without merger, but BN policy stands against it.

MILW contends that the supporting shippers agree that they could

not count on applicants’ innovative ratemaking policies, which

could occur without merger.

MILW points to other shortcomings in applicants’ case. MILW

notes that applicants failed to calculate any benefit from increased

productivity, one of the foremost problems of the railroad industry.

MILW points out that terminal congestion directly affects railroad

productivity and that applicants’ proposal does nothing to relieve

the general problem at their Kansas City interchange. MILW fears

that, with the elimination of applicants’ interchange at Kansas City,

the situation may become worse. It believes that the same result may

occur at St. Louis. MILW contends that problems may stem from

the necessary conversion of applicants’ incompatible informa-

tion/computer systems. MILW stresses that the slightest miscalcula-

tion easily could cause the monumental foul-up experienced follow-

ing the Penn Central merger.

MIL W asserts that neither applicant needs the merger to saves its

service as each is a large, strong, and prosperous railroad. MILW

360 L.C.C,

61]

believes that BN’s low rate of return for its transportation division

must be considered in conjunction with its line-upgrading and

construction investments, which would provide the rate of return

relied upon by investors. MILW contends that merged, the

applicants will be able to expand their return on investment

exponetially, not arithmetically, to an extent overwhelming to

competitors. Even if reorganzied, MILW asserts that its competition

would disappear in the Chicago-Kansas City market and diminish in

other markets as a result of this merger. MILW submits that the

public interest will not tolerate that result and that the proposal

must be denied.

Should the merger be approved, Milwaukee Road seeks

imposition of conditions for its benefit. On brief Milwaukee Road

abandoned its request to use BN's Dayton's Bluff Yard. It maintains

its request for the following conditions: (1) access to BN's coalfields

near Colstrip and Kuehn, MT, through trackage rights over BN lines

from Miles City, MT; (2) indemnification for traffic losses since

1970 as a result of the Northern Lines Merger and losses from this

merger, including the cost of labor protection, reduced by

Milwaukee Road revenue gains as a result of conditions imposed for

its benefit; (3) liquidated damages of $100,000 for every violation by

the new company of any condition which may be imposed upon the

merger, (4) revision of all joint-facility agreements between

Milwaukee Road and BN to allow free assignment by Milwaukee

Road of its rights; and (5) modified traffic conditions similar to the

standard “DT&I conditions.””°

Scope of operations

In 1976, Milwaukee Road operated in Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,

lowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,

Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, and

Wisconsin. It entered bankruptcy on December 19, 1977. Since that

date, Milwaukee Road has engaged in a massive abandonment

program. Recently a majority of the Commission recommended to

the bankruptcy court that Milwaukee Road be permitted to abandon

all lines west of Miles City, MT (2,497.7 miles). The scope of future

MILW operations will depend on the reorganizability of the carrier

and the resulting configuration.

“Detroit, T. & LR. Ca. Control, 278 LC.C, 488 (1980)

360 L.C.C,

62

Traffic diversion and net impact of merger

Milwaukee Road contends that applicants seriously understated

the gains that will be achieved by the merged company, as well as

the losses to competing carriers. Applicants admit that MILW will

sustain a loss of $3,054,960. Milwaukee Road estimates that its

losses as a result of the merger will be $14,089,930. Milwaukee

Road firmly believes that the new company, with its inherent

advantages of single-line service, abundance of equipment, and

combined sales force, will have the ability to “outsell” its

competition. Milwaukee Road's traffic study shows a $5.7 million

loss in the first year after the merger is consummated and an $8.3

million loss in the second year. Milwaukee Road points out that

applicants’ traffic study excludes traffic that was moving entirely

over other rail carriers’ lines. Neither applicant studied traffic which

did not appear in their records.

Milwaukee Road contends that the Commission should not regard

as mere rhetoric applicants’ boasts of the “synergistic effect” of the

merged railroads’ future success in wresting traffic from

competitors. Milwaukee Road maintains the traffic losses it

projected from the Northern Lines Merger fell far short of what

actually occurred. (Milwaukee Road projected a loss of $16 million

per year and claims that, at todays’ average revenue per car to

Milwaukee, its losses from that merger exceed $19 million.) BN’s

testimony reveals that new traffic not presently carried by applicants

is a target of the merger. Milwaukee Road contends that the

judgmental error made by Frisco as to divertibility (based on the

existing Frisco system rather than on the merged railroads) is

sufficient cause to discard the applicants’ traffic study. Additionally,

Milwaukee Road objects to the reliance by applicants on subjective

factors such as “good relations” with customers to justify diversion

estimates.

Applicants show a revenue loss of $3,054,960 in diverted traffic

from Milwaukee Road, in contrast to the Milwaukee Road study

Showing $5,775,340 for divertible traffic. Milwaukee Road has

submitted a chart of traffic movements which alleged accounts for

$2,037,634 of the $2.7 million difference between Milwaukee

Road's divertible traffic and applicants’ conceded diversions.

Milwaukee Road notes that the understated amount. coupled with

applicants’ admitted revenue diversions, results in a total loss of

$5,091,794 on divertible traffic only. A comparison between

applicants’ and MILW's traffic studies shows that a difference of

360 1.C.C,

63

only $682,746 exists. MILW contends that the close correlation

between the traffic studies, as corrected, proves that applicants’

traffic study was deliberately understated and is of no evidentiary

weight.

MILW contends applicants were remise in not considering the

long-term effects of the merger on competing railroads. In its study,

MILW identified and quantified traffic not presently handled by

either BN or Frisco, but subject to diversion upon consummation of

the merger. It concluded a vulnerable category to identify the long-

term impact of the merger. Milwaukee Road asserts that the merger

will strengthen only applicants and their share of the transportation

market at the expense of competing carriers. Further, as the strength

of the applicants increases with the advantages the merger will

create, the more vulnerable MILW’s traffic becomes.

In MIL W's traffic study, full value was given to the merged status

of the applicants. MILW's traffic Study shows that 10,480 cars and

$5,775,340 in revenues were classified as vulnerable traffic. The

total amount of cars to be diverted exceeds 23,000: the revenue

diversions exceed $14 million.

Abandonment of Milwaukee Road's lines west of Miles City, MT

would reduce Milwaukee Road's system substantially.‘' However,

even with this reduction, Milwaukee Road alleges $7,991,635 will

be either divertible ($3,740,224) or vulnerable to diversion

($4,211,411) as a result of the proposed merger. Milwaukee Road

points out that additional Single-line service between points such as

Minneapolis-Chicago and Houston-Dallas-Oklahoma City, and

Houston and Argo, IL only intensifies its problems.

MILW notes that applicants took the Position that all but three

railroads could survive the revenue loss caused by the traffic

diversion by making a few economies. The three systems which

concededly would not be able to adjust to diversions, but are

candidates for liquidation, are Milwaukee Road, Rock Island, and

MKT. Although MILW operations currently produce a large deficit,

MILW is endeavoring to reorganize so as to minimize dislocations

and the possibility of Federal intervention. Loss of $14.1 million or

more in annual revenue is a lethal attack upon the foundation of the

trustee's reorganization plan. MILW submits that it has exhausted

the possibilities of practicing economies in operations. It has been

‘A majority of the Commission recommended to the bankruptcy court that it permit Milwaukee

Road to abandon these lines in AB? (Sub-No. 86), Richard & Ogilvie, Trustee of the Property of

Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pac Vic Railroad Company—A bandonment—Por tions of Pacific

Coast Extension in Montana, Idaho. Washington. and Oregon (nor printed), decided January 29.

19RO

360 LCC.

64

in bankruptcy since December 19, 1977, thus, deferring most prior

debts. It is striving to abandon its money-losing lines, and 55 sepa-

rate abandonment applications have been filed with the Commission

since December 1977. Milwaukee Road expects most of the revenue

it loses as a result of the merger to be translated directly to net loss.

It suggests that such a loss could be disastrous, for it amounts to

fully 5 percent of the revenues forecast under the trustee's reorgani-

zation plan.

Applicants address Milwaukee Road's arguments that (1) approval

of the merger will interfere with the trustee's efforts to reorganize

the Milwaukee Road, and (2) by diverting traffic from the

Milwaukee Road, the merger will impair its ability to compete

effectively with the new company. Applicants assert that neither of

these arguments address the proper issue of whether the proposed

merger will improve transportation services to the shipping public,

but instead are premised on preservation of Milwaukee Road as a

corporate entity.

As to the first argument, applicants assert that progress in railroad

industry restructuring through end-to-end mergers must not be

impeded while the reconfiguration or liquidation of bankrupt

carriers is determined. Applicants suggest that the problems of

bankrupt carriers are unrelated to this merger and that in the case of

the Milwaukee Road there is substantial doubt as to whether it is

reorganizable at all.

Applicants state that Milwaukee Road's second argument is also

unfounded. The Milwaukee Road claims that diversions to the new

company will impair its ability to compete with the new company in

the corridors which both presently serve assumes that Milwaukee

Road is today a viable competitor. Applicants dispute that

assumption. Milwaukee Road is engaged in an ambitious

abandonment program that may involve one-third of its system.

Plans for abandonment include, according to applicants, the line

between Muscatine, IA, and Kansas City, thus, removing Milwaukee

Road from the Chicago-Kansas City market. Applicants also note

that Milwaukee Road is involved in negotiations for the sale of

substantial parts of its system. By its own withdrawal from

transportation markets, Milwaukee Road has allegedly established

that it is not presently a viable competitor and that the protective

conditions it seeks would not serve the public interest.

Applicants also argue that Milwaukee Road has grossly

exaggerated the impact of the proposed merger. Applicants estimate

360 1.C.C.

65

that Milwaukee Road will lose $3,054,960 in gross revenue, with a

resulting net revenue loss of $353,571 a year. Even the $3 million

figure is said to be overstated because it is based on 1976 traffic.

Since that time, Milwaukee Road has lost considerable traffic it

formerly carried due to service deterioration and inadequate

equipment. Applicants assert that a substantial portion of the

predicted losses Milwaukee Road attributes to this merger have

already taken place and will continue as a result of factors entirely

unrelated to this merger. Therefore, applicants argue, the plight of

Milwaukee Road should not be used as a basis to deny the merger.

Impact on shippers—loss of service

Milwaukee Road asserts that depletion of its revenue base caused

by the merger directly will cause cessation of service. Milwaukee

Road states that continued service on its Chicago-Kansas City route

presently is justifiable. However, it is highly probable that the

revenue losses over the Kansas City gateway seriously will deter

MILW's participation in this competitive market. Retention of

MILW's Chicago-Kansas City route despite loss of interchange

traffic from the BN-Frisco merger would place Milwaukee Road in

immediate jeopardy.

MILW points out that IA-DOT believes that in the present

proceeding, important rail service may be lost and competition

eventually retarded and, in many areas, lost altogether. MILW

believes that the opinion of IA-DOT should be afforded particular

weight because of the State's familiarity with the economic problems

of MILW and other of its serving railroads and the State's knowledge

of the needs of its commerce. MILW notes that continued service

over its main line to lowa interior points (Chicago-Omaha) is not a

part of the trustee's reorganization plan. However, permutations of

the trustee's reorganization plan may permit continuance of MILW

service in the grain gathering areas. MILW service along eastern

lowa on the Chicago-Kansas City route would continue if the Kansas

City interchange traffic does not disappear through the diversionary

impact of this merger.

Applicants state that Milwaukee Road has failed to introduce any

evidence that its claimed traffic diversions will impair any essential

transportation services offered to the shipping public. Appticants

argue that there is considerable excess rail capacity in the Midwest

and that, in the event of cessation of service or liquidation of a

bankrupt carrier such as Milwaukee Road, other viable carriers will

360 L.C.C.

66

be available to provide service over economically feasible lines. As

support for this position, applicants cite Milwaukee Road’s own

program of sale and abandonment of trackage. These activities,

according to applicants, indicate that other viable carriers will be

called upon to assume Milwaukee Road's services regardless of this

merger. Applicants suggest that by emphasizing the need to preserve

its Current corporate structure instead of preservation of essential

transportation services, Milwaukee Road has failed to present a case

against the merger.

Applicants also argue that Milwaukee Road's reliance on Iowa as

an example of lost service is misplaced, for Milwaukee allegedly

plans to dispose of most of its facilities in lowa as part of its

reorganization plan whether or not the merger takes place.

Moreover, applicants assert that other midwestern railroads have

expressed great interest in purchasing Milwaukee lines in lowa.

Impact on employees

Milwaukee Road suggests that its expected loss of $14,090,000 a

year will result in a general reduction in its employment of about 5.5

percent. Milwaukee Road estimates that reductions will involve the

following: 26 executive personnel, 137 professional and

adm

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.

Appendix — RAILWAY LABOR EXECUTIVES' ASSOCIATION v. UNITED STATES (Nos. 80-1439, 80-1434, 1632) | Frix