Opposition — Missouri v. Crews

See a3

Number 80-1393

RE

IN THE CEIVED

SUPREME COURT OF THE unrTeD stareg APR 17 1981

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

STATE OF MISSOURI, eS SUPREME COURT, U.S. _|

Petitioner,

TIMOTHY CREWS, ET AL.,

ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee

Respondents.

MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Comes now TIMOTHY CREWS through his attorney, Leonard W.

Buckley, Jr., and moves this Court to allow him to proceed in

forma pauperis and for his reasons states:

1. That there has been filed with the Supreme Court of

the United States a Petition for Writ of Certiorari by the

State of Missouri; «

2. That Respondent is a citizen of the United States

incarcerated in the Missouri Department of Corrections, Jef-

ferson City, Missouri;.and without property or money with which

to pay the costs of defending an appeal and is unable to pay

costs or fees on appeal as more fully appears from the affiJdavit

attached hereto.

I 1 r

Leonard W. Buckley, Jr.

Attorney for Respondent Timothy Crews

1215 Pine Street

St. Louis, Missouri 63103

314/421-1008

STATE OF MISSOURI,

TIMOTHY CREWS,

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Petitioner,

~~ ee ee ee ee ee ee eee Se

Respondent.

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PROCEED ON APPEAL

IN FORMA PAUPERIS

I, TIMOTHY CREWS, being first duly sworn, depose and

say that I am a Respondent in the above-entitled case; that

in support of my motion to proceed on appeal without being

required to prepay fees, costs, or give security therefor,

I state that because of my poverty I am unable to pay the costs

of said proceeding or to give security therefor; that I believe .

I am entitled to redress; and that the issues which I desire to

present On appeal are none save to defend the decision of the

Court of Appeals.

I further swear that the responses whicn I have made to

the questions and instructions below relating to my ability to

pay the costs of prosecuting the appeal are true.

l.

5.

Are you presently employed?

No. I have been an inmate in the State Penitentiary

since 1978.

Have you received within the past twelve (12) months

any income from a business, profession, or other form

of self-employment, or in the form of rent payments,

interest, dividends, or other source?

No.

Do you own any case or checking or savings accounts?

No.

Do you Own any real estate, stocks, bonds, notes,

automobiles, or other valuable property (excluding

ordinary household furnishings and clothing)?

No.

List the persons who are dependent upon you for sup-

port and state your relationship to those persons.

None.

I understand that a false statement or answer to any

questions in this affidavit will subject me to penalties for

perjury.

| oy

fF of Cee

Timothy Crews

Missouri Department of Corrections

P.O. Box 900

Jefferson City, Missouri 65102

1 1 1981

an day of

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

1981.

PPO Dy he CP,

Notary Public

; REID H. BAKER

re eee NOTARY PUGLIC STATE OF MISSOURI

My Commission Expires Oct. 31, 1982

Let the applicant proceed without

prepayment of costs or fees or the

necessity of giving security there-

for.

Justice, United States Supreme Court

.

es tel. ee Le a - ee ee sisal

Number 80-1393

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

STATE OF MISSOURI,

Petitioner,

-vs-

TIMOTHY CREWS, ET AL.,

Respondents.

APPIDAVI?

Comes now Leonard W. Buckley, Jr., duly deposed and sworn,

states as follows:

1. I am Leonard W. Buckley, Jr., attorney for Timothy

Crews, a member of the bar of the Supreme Court of Missouri,

and the attorney of record for the Respondent in the petition

for Writ of Certiorari styled State of Missouri v. Timothy Crews,

et al.;

2. On April 16, 1981, I, on behalf of Respondent Timothy

Crews, placed in the mail at the United States Post Office in

St. Louis, Missouri, the appropriate number of petitions,

Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, and Affidavit of Indigency

addressed, first class postage prepaid, to the Clerk of the

United States Supreme Court in Washington, D. C. On that date

I also placed in the mail copies of each of these items addressed,

first class postage prepaid, to the following:

Joseph Webb

Assistant Public Defender

1320 Market Street

St. Louis, Missouri 63103

Mary Kay Wefelmeyer

Assistant Public Defender

1320 Market Street

St. Louis, Missouri 63103

Missouri Attorney General

P.O. Box 899

Jefferson City, Missouri 65102

3. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule

28.2 (effective June

30, 1980), the Respondent submits this affidavit to show timely

filing and proper service.

y r

Attorney for Respondent LaGEH

1215 Pine Street

St. Louis, Missouri 63103

314/421-1008

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of April,

1981.

, ‘

Moauceenieory be)

Maureen P. White, 'Notary Pu c

My Commission Expires:

MAUREEN P. WHITE

NOTARY P\JSLIC, STATE OF MISSOURI

MY COMM 'SSION EXPIRES 10/17/83

SL. Louis county

Number 80-1393

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1981

STATE OF MISSOURI,

Petitioner,

Vs.

TIMOTHY CREWS, ET AL.,

Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

TO GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Leonard W. Buckley, Jr.

1215 Pine Street

St. Louis, Missouri 63103

314/421-1008

Attorney for Respondent

Timothy Crews

2B Bros

ce: =

—_ SE er aE -—— a ve >

INDEX

Table of Authorities 1 ‘

Brief in Opposition to Granting

Petition for Writ of Certiorari 2

4 Questions Presented 2 .

‘i 4

. Reason for Denying the Writ 3 L

is

; 4

¥ Conclusion 9

Appendix :

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Albernaz v. United States, No. 79-1709 (March 9, 1981).

Brintley v. Michigan, 444 U.S. 948 (1979).

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).

Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).

Eastlake v. Forrest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976).

Furness, Withy & Co. v. Yang-Tsze Ins. Assn., 242 U.S. 430 (1917).

Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961).

Green v. Elbert, 137 U.S. 615 (1891).

_*s. Jankovich vy. Indiana Toll Road Co., 379 U.S. 487 (1965).

; °° Mandel vy. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173 (1977).

Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1973).

O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1973).

593 S.W. 2d 208 (Mo. en banc 1980); vacated and

esis U.S. ___, 64 L.Ed. 2d 820, affirmed after remand,

" "24 592 (Mo. en banc 1980), cert. denied, U.s. ’

No. 80-571 (January 26, 1980).

State v. Crews, No. 41073 (Mo. App. April 29, 1980).

United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

United States v. Simpson, 435 U.S. 6 (1978).

-~Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363;

mayne centy peseccu ter v. Recorder's Court Judge, 406 Mich. 374,

Whalen v. United States, U.S. » 63 L.Ed. 2d 715 (1980).

haccwins vs Soripp Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 53 L.Ed.

STATUTES CITED

es v. Thirt

Rule 21, Rules of the Supreme Court.

$359.225 R.S.Mo. (Supp. 1976). |

$560.120 R.S.Mo. (1969).

§560.135 R.S.Mo. (Supp. 1975).

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Number 80-1393

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1981

STATE OF MISSOURI,

Petitioner,

Vs.

TIMOTHY CREWS, ET AL.,

Respondents.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

TO GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The Respondent, Timothy Crews, in opposition to the granting

of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari in this case, states as

follows:

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Writ of Certiorari should not issue because

Petitioner has not established the source of this Court's juris-

diction, the threshold inquiry appropriate to the disposition of

this case.

2. Whether the Writ of Certiorari should not issue because

the decision issued by the Supreme Court of Missouri refusing to

transfer the decision of the Missouri Court of Appeals was based

upon the authority of Sours v. State, 593 S.W. 2d 208 (Mo. en

banc 1980); vacated and remanded, 445 U.S. __s, 64 L.Ed. 2d 820,

affirmed after remand, 603 S.W. 24 592 (Mo. en banc 1980), cert,

denied, U.S. » No. 80-571 (January 26, 1981), which moots

the issue raised herein.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT ISSUE BECAUSE PETITIONER

HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THE SOURCE OF THIS COURT'S JURISDICTION AS

REQUIRED BY RULE 21.1(e) OF THE RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The State of Missouri, Petitioner herein, has filed its

Petition for Certiorari which does not set out, as required by

the Rules of the Supreme Court, the source of this Court's:

jurisdiction.

Rule 21 of the Rules of the Supreme Court provides in perti-

nent part:

1. The Petition for Writ of Certiorari shall

contain in the order here indicated:

(e) A concise statement of the grounds

on which the jurisdiction of this Court is in-

voked showing:

(i) The date of the judgment or

decree sought to be reviewed, and the time *

of its entry;

(ii) The date of any order respecting

a rehearing, and the date and terms of any

order granting an extension of time within

which to petition for certiorari; and

(iii) Where a cross-petition for writ

of certiorari is filed under Rule 19.5,

reliance upon that Rule shall be expressly

noted and the cross-petition shall state

the date of receipt of the petition for

certiorari in connection with which the

cross-petition is filed;

(iv) The statutory pcévidlis believed

to confer on this Court jurisdiction to re-

view the judgment or decree in question by

writ of certiorari.

5. The failure of a petitioner to present

with accuracy, brevity, and clearness whatever

is essential to a ready and adequate understand-

ing of the points requiring consideration will be

a sufficient reason for denying hi tition

phasis supp

The threshold inquiry necessary to the disposition of every

case that comes before the Supreme Court is the source of this

Court's jurisdiction. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370

U.S. 294, 305-06 (1962).

.

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This principle is embodied in this Court's rules and reflects

the necessity for the proper presentation of matters to this Court

in order that it may properly dispose of the vast quantity of mat-

ters competing for this Court's time. These rules are obviously

necessary, and having been established, must not be ignored.

This Court, in Furness, Withy, and Co. v. Yang-Tsze Ins. Assn.,

242 U.S. 430 (1917), noted that petitions to the Supreme Court

are at the risk of the party making them and then stated:

Unless these (petitions) are carefully

prepared, contain appropriate references to

the record and present with studied accuracy,

brevit and clearness whatever is Seeentiet

to ge and adequate understanding of points

requiring our attention, the rights of inter-

ested parties may be prejudiced and the Court

will be impeded in its efforts properly to

dispose of the causes which constantly crowd

its docket. (Emphasis in original).

Id. at 434,

Furthermore, this Court stated in Green v. Elbert, 137 U.S.

615 (1891):

To the proper conduct of the business of

this Court rules are necessary, and, having been

prescribed, reasonable compliance with this is

expected and must be insisted upon. When they

are disregarded, dispensation from the consequences

can only be extended where the circumstances fur-

nish adequate excuse. Were this otherwise, our

he breach

regulations might become more honored in tt

than the observance, and the recognition of due

rocedure would be seriousl TET and impaired.

(Emphasis supplied).

Id. at 621.

This Court dismissed the writ of error in Green v. Elbert,

supra, stating that:

(m)ere carelessness in the inception may

have finally resulted in forgetfulness (in not

filing the docket fee); but we cénnot, therefore

absolve him from the penalty le itimately attach-

ing to this disregard of our op (Emphasis sup-

plied).

Id. at 623.

Petitioner has disregarded this Court's rules and would have

this Court, already over-burdened, glean from its Petition for

Certiorari the source of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

This Court has provided, by case law and its own rules, that it

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will not countenance such disregard for its rules, and should not

countenance such disregard here.

II

THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT ISSUE BECAUSE THE ISSUE

RAISED BY PETITIONER IS IDENTICAL IN ALL RESPECTS TO THE ISSUE

PRESENTED IN SOURS V. STATE, THE FINAL DISPOSITION OF WHICH MOOTS

THE ISSUE PRESENTED HEREIN.

The issue raised before this Court as a result of the

decision of the Missouri Supreme Court in Sours v. State, 593

S.W. 2d 208 (Mo. en banc 1980) (Sours I) was based on convictions

for the crimes of robbery first degree by means of a dangerous

and deadly weapon, 8560.120, R.S.Mo. 1969 and §560.135, R.S.Mo.

Supp. 1975, and armed criminal action, 8559.225, R.S.Mo. Supp.

1976, the identical statutes under which Respondent here was

convicted.

This Court vacated the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court

and remanded the case for reconsideration in the light of Whalen

v. United States, U.S. , 63 L.Ed. 2d 715 (1980). Missouri

v. Sours, U.S. » 64 L.Ed. 2d 820 (1980).

Upon remand, the Missouri Supreme Court, in Sours v. State,

603 S.W. 2d 592 (Mo. en banc 1980) (Sours II) noted that no opinion

of the Supreme Court had considered a statute that contained

wording similar to or identical to that found in Missouri's armed

criminal action statute. Id. at 593. The Missouri Supreme Court

held, based on its construction of Missouri law, that the under-

lying felony, robbery first degree by means of a dangerous and

deadly weapon, was either an included or lesser included offense

of armed criminal action. See generally, Ufited States v. Sampol,

636 F.2d 621, 651-55 (D. C. Cir. 1980).

The Missouri Supreme Court has definitively decided, which

this Court may not dispute, as follows: z ¢

1. It was the intention of the Missouri General Assembly that

separate and multiple punishments be imposed for armed criminal

OR err i rn perenne oe tT ae ea RI RR tT

action and the underlying felony.

2. Every element of the underlying felony herein, robbery

first degree by means of a dangerous and deadly weapon, is in-

cluded in Armed Criminal Action, that is, proof of robbery first

degree by means of a dangerous and deadly weapon does not require

proof of any additional elements not needed to prove Armed Criminal

Action; that is, Armed Criminal Action includes the underlying

felony and that Armed Criminal Action and robbery first degree

are in law and fact the same. e.g., Whalen v. United States, supra,

Eastlake v. Forrest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976);

Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1973); O'Brien

v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1973); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157

(1961).

This Court denied certiorari with respect to Sours II.

Missouri v. Sours, No. 80-571 (January 26, 1981). Petitioner,

however, attempts to overlook the effect of the denial of certi-

Orari, and seeks to sustain a breath of life to its arguments by

stating that this Court's most recent pronouncement in this matter

was presumably because the matter was moot. (Petition for Certi-

Orari, at 9).

The facts belie such an allegation. Only Justices Blackmun

and Rehnquist would have dismissed the petition for a writ of

certiorari as being moot. None of the remaining members of the

Supreme Court would have granted certiorari. Missouri v. Sours,

No. 80-571 (49 U.S.L.W. 3531, January 27, 1980). It is thus clear

that the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court in Sours I, affirmed

in Sours II, is the law of the State of Missouri and that the

decision rendered State v. Crews, No. 41073 (Mo. App. April 29,

1980), must stand.

Furthermore, the reliance placed on Brintley v. Michigan, 444

U.S. 948 (1979), by Petitioner and Petitioner's allegations that

the decision in Brintley should be controlling because of simi-

larities in the Michigan statutes involved in Brintley and the i

P

Missouri statutes ignores the effect of the holding of the Mis- Z

souri Supreme Court that no Supreme Court decision has considered F

4 a statute that contained wording similar or identical to that

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found in Missouri's armed criminal statute. Sours v. State, 603

S.W. 2d at 593.

The Michigan Supreme Court, in Wayne County Prosecutor Vv.

Recorder's Court Jud e, 406 Mich. 374, 280 N.W. 2d 794 (1979),

held, in essence, that the Michigan felony firearms statute

created a separate and distinct crime from the underlying felony

so that the two (2) offenses were not the same. This is contrary

to the Missouri Supreme Court's holding that, based on state law,

the armed criminal action statute and robbery first degree by

means Of a dangerous and deadly weapon are the same offen e.

The construction of the armed criminal action statute by the

Missouri Supreme Court is binding upon this Court because the

United States Supreme Court lacks jursidiction to construe state

laws. United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S.

363, rehearing denied, 403 U.S. 924 (1971); Coleman v. Alabama,

399 U.S. 1 (1970). As was stated in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa

County, supra at 256, "(I)t is not our function to construe a

state statute contrary to the construction given it by the highest

court of a state. See also, O'Brien v. Skinner, supra.

It is of no import that the Sours court went on to also base

its decision on federal constitutional grounds.

It is undoubtedly "'the settled rule that where

the judgment of a state court rests upon two grounds,

one of which is federal and the other non-federal in

character, our jurisdiction fails is the non-federal

ground is independent of the federal ground and adequate

to support the judgment. Fox Film Corporation v. Muller,

296 U.S. 207, 210, (80 L.Ed. ’

. Se .

Cramp v. Board of Public instruct , 368 U.S. 278, 281

eE * , ’ 22 Sct. *

Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road Company, 379 U.S. 487 (1965).

In Jankovich, the Indiana Supreme Court invalidated a city bat

ordinance as authorizing an unconstitutional taking without

compensation. The decision was based upon both the Indiana con-

stitution and the United States Constitution. This Court held

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that the ruling was based upon adequate state grounds and there-

fore dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.

In the same manner, the writ of certiorari should not issue in

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the case at hand, Ns,

The Missouri Supreme Court based its decision on adequate,

independent state grounds.

This is not a case . . . where the lower court

opinion as a whole “leaves the impression that the

court probably felt constrained to rule as it did

because of (decisions applying the 14th Amendment) ,"

Minnesota v. National Tea Compan supra, 309 U.S.

at 554-555, 64 L.Ed. at 922, OF bie it felt

under complusion of federal law as enunciated by this

Court so to hold,” Mississippi ex rel. Southern Railroad

Company v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 5, 95 L.Ed. 3, 8, 71 S.Ct.

1, with the result that the state: cand federal grounds

are "so interwoven that we are unable to conclude that

the judgment rests upon an independent interpretation

of the state law," State Tax Commissioner v. Van Catt,

306 U.S. 51l, 514, L. . 5 ’ ’ 9 S.Ct,

Jankovich, supra, at 443.

In order to follow the established practice of avoiding con-

stitutional decisions where possible, United States v. Simpson,

435 U.S. 6 (1978), the writ of certiorari should not issue because

the lower court's decision is supported by adequate state grounds.

The Supreme Court's power "is to correct wrong judgments, not to

revise opinions." Zacchini v. Scripp-Howard Broadcasting Company,

433 U.S. 562, 53 L.Ed. 2d 965, 970 (1977).

Finally, this Court's summary dismissal of Brintley v. Michigan,

supra, does not require the granting of the petition for certiorari

in this case, as Petitioner suggests. An unexplicated disposition

of a lower court's decision settles the case for the parties but

does not necessarily determine the validity of the lower court's

reasohing as expressed in its opinion. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S.

173 (1977). Brintley, supra, presented the question whether

separate convictions and consecutive sentences for both a felony

and for felony firearm violate the Michigan and the United States

constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy. The federal

constitutional issue was never reached, however, for the case was

decided as a matter of Michigan's highest court construing its

own statute in light of its own laws. Michigan is entitled to reach

a decision different from that reached by Missouri and the principle 2

involved in the two cases remains unchanged -- since the decisions _

were reached by ruling upon adequate, independent state grounds,

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there is no substantial federal question.

This Court's recent decision in Albernaz v. United States,

No. 79-1709 (March 9, 1981), does not dictate a contrary result

with respect to the issues raised herein. The holding in Albernaz

was based on the finding of the Supreme Court that the statutes in

question represented two (2) separate offenses. Justices Stewart,

Marshall, and Stevens, who joined in the majority opinion in Whalen,

supra, concurred in the judgment in Albernaz, supra, stating that

a legislature may not provide cumulative sentences for the same

crime.

Thus, the result reached by the Missouri Supreme Court in

Sours II, remains unchanged by the holding’ in Albernaz.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari

should not be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Leonard W. Buckley, Jr.

Attorney for Respondent Timothy Crews

1215 Pine Street

St. Louis, Missouri 63103

314/421-1008

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Rule 21

The Petition for Certiorari

The petition for writ of certiorari shall contain,

in the order here indicated:

(a) The questions presented for review, expressed in

the terms and circumstances of the case but without

unnecessary detail. The statement of the questions |

should be short and concise and should not be argumen-

tative or repetitious. The statement of a question pre-

sented will be deemed to comprise every subsidiary ques-

tion fairly included therein. Only the questions set

forth in the petition or fairly included therein will

be considered by the Court.

(b) A list of all perties to the proceeding in the court

whose judgment is sought to be reviewed, except where

the caption of the case in this Court contains the names

of all parties. This listing may be done in a footnote.

(c) A table of contents and table of authorities, if

required by Rule 33.5.

(a) A reference to the official and unofficial reports

of any opinions delivered in the courts of administrative

agency below.

(e) A concise statement of the grounds on which the

jurisdiction of this Court is invoked showing:

(i) The date of the judgment or decree sought to

be reviewed, and the time of its entry;

(ii) The date of any order respecting a rehearing,

and the date and terms of any order granting an

extension of time within which to petition for cer-

tiorari; and |

(iii) Where a cross-petition for writ of certiorari

is filed under Rule 19.5 reliance upon that Rule

shall be expressly noted and the cross-petition shall

state the date of receipt of the petition for certi-

orari in connection with which the cross-petition

is filed;

(iv) The statutory provision believed to confer on

this Court jurisdiction to review the judgment or

decree in question by writ of certiorari.

(f) The constitutional provisions, treaties, statutes,

ordinances, and regulations which the case involved, set-

ting them out verbatim, and giving the appropriate cita-

tion therefor. If the provisions involved are lengthy,

their citation alone will suffice at this point, and their

pertinent text then shall be set forth in the appendix

referred to in subparagraph 1 (k) of this Rule.

(g) A concise statement of the case containing the *

facts material to the consideration of the questions

presented.

(h) If review of the judgment of a state court is sought, |

the statement of the case shall also specify the state in

the proceedings, both in the court of first instance and in

the appellate court, at which the federal questions sought

to be reviewed were raised; the method or manner of

raising them and the way in which they were passed upon

by the court; such pertinent quotation of specific por-

tions of the record, or summary thereof, with specific

reference to the places in the record where the matter

appears (e.g., ruling on exception, portion of court's

charge and exception thereto, assignment of errors) as

will show that the federal question was timely and

properly raised so as to give this Court jurisdiction to

review the judgment on writ of certiorari.

Where the portions of the record relied upon under

this subparagraph are voluminous, they shall be included in

the appendix referred to in subparagraph 1 (k) of this

Rule.

(i) If review of the judgment of a federal court is

sought, the statement of the case shall also show the basis

for federal jurisdiction in the court of first instance.

(j) A direct and concise argument amplifying the rea-

sons relied on for the allowance of the writ. See Rule 17.

(k) An appendix containing, in the following order: }

(i) Copies of any opinions, orders, findings of fact, _

and conclusions of law, whether written or oral (if

, recorded and transcribed), delivered upon the render-

ing of the judgment or decree by the court whose

decision is sought to be reviewed.

(ii) Copies of any other such opinions, orders, find-

ings of fact, and conclusions of law rendered by courts

Or administrative agencies in the case, and, if refer-

ence thereto is necessary to ascertain the grounds of

the judgment or decree, of those in companion cases.

Each of these documents shall include the caption

showing the name of the issuing court or agency and

the title and number of the case, and the date of its

entry.

(iii) A copy of the judgment or decree sought to be

reviewed and any order on rehearing, including in

each the caption showing the name of the issuing

court or agency, the title and number of the case,

and the date of entry of the judgment, decree, or

: order on rehearing.

(iv) Any other appended materials:

If what is required by this paragraph or by subparagraphs

1(£) and (h) of this Rule, to be included in the petition

is voluminous, it may, if more convenient, be separately |

, presented. | ’

2. The petition for writ of certiorari shall be produced in oe

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conformity with Rule 33. The Clerk shall not accept any petition a

for writ of certiorari that does not comply with this Rule and %

with Rule 33, except that a party proceeding in forma pauperis may

proceed in the manner provided in Rule 46.

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3. All contentions in support of a petition for writ of cer-

tiorari shall be set forth in the body of the petition, as pro-

fan eee ~ see ee Ge

(eo

vided in subparagraph 1 (j) of this Rule, No separate brief

in support of a petition for a writ of certiorari will be received, | ae

rah

and the Clerk will refuse to file any petition for a writ of cer- |

tiorari to which is annexed or appended any supporting brief.

‘ee 4. The petition for writ of certiorari shall be as short as Be

possible, but may not exceed 30 pages, excluding the subject

index, table of authorities, any verbatim quotations required

by subparagraph 1 (f) of this Rule, and the appendix.

5. The failure of a petitioner to present with accuracy,

brevity, and clearness whatever is essential to a ready and ade-

quate understanding of the points requiring consideration will

be a sufficient reason for denying his petition.

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