Petition — Ortega v. Perez

Supreme Court brief1980

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; | Wi 16 1900

AK, JR., CLERK

e. Supreme Court, U. S.

In the Supreme Court of the Hnited States

WILFREDO SANTIAGO ORTEGA

PETITIONER

US.

EPIFANIA PEREZ

RESPONDENT

DOCKET NUMBER:

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI FROM

THE SUPREME COURT OF PUERTO RICO

COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER

MARIA DOLORES FERNOS

GEORGINA CANDAL

P.O. BOX “CM”

Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT

ANTONIO CAJIGAS LLAMAS

STREET 2-B No. 142

URB. SEVERO QUINONES

CAROLINA, PUERTO RICO.

INDEX

Page

I. Opinions Delivered by the Court 2

II. Concise Statement of the Ground on which

jurisdiction is invoked 3

III. Questions Presented for Review -- 4

IV. Constitutional Provisions and Statutes

involved in the case 26

V. Statement of the Case 29

IV. Argument Amplifying the Reasons Relied

on for the Allowance of the Writ 35

Appendix I 39

Appendix II 41

Appendix III 43

Appendix IV 46

Appendix V 48

Appendix VI 56

Appendix VII 58

Appendix VIII 59

Appendix IX 60

CITATIONS

Cases:

Bill v. Gattavara, 209 2d 457 21

Bonet v. Texas Co. 84 LED 401 22,37

Bright v. Boyd, Story 478 - 20

Burron v. Carlus, 210 Col 95 20

Calero Toledo v. Pearson Yacht

Leasing Co., 416 US 663 35

Cleland v. Clark, 81 NW 1086 19

Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Colin, 420:US 469 - 37

Culp v. US, 181 F 2d 293 12

De Castro v. Board o

Commissioners, 322 VS 451 22

Dent v. West Virginia, 129 US 114 13

Diaz v. Delgado, 41 PRR 827 15

Duffy v. Scott, 292 NW 273 21

Eagle v. Koch, 471 F. Supp. 175 21

Examining Board of Engineers v. Flores,

426 US 572 36

Franks v. Lockward, 150 A 2d 215 21

Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 US 67 11,25

Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 US 493 36

Gibson v. Herriot, 55 Ark 85 20

Glandowski v. Felczak, 31 A 2d 718 21

Goode v. Gaines, 145 VS 141 20

Hall v. Boatright, 36 SE 1001 - 18

Herring v. Polland, 23 Tenn 362 - 20

Hill v. Waxberg, 237 F 2d 936 22

Kester v. Bostwick, 15 SO 2nd 201 19

Lauffer v. Vial 33 A 2d 777 21

Loeb v. Conley, 169 SW 575 20

Mathew v. Elridge, 424 US 319 12

McKelway v. Armour, 10 NJ Eng. 115 ----------- 20

Mehl v. Norton, 113 ALR 21

Meyers v. Canutt, 46 NW 2d 72 19

Monagas v. Vidal, 170 Fed 2d 99 ---------- 22,23,37

N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 US 449 12

Numitor Gold Mine Co. v. Katzer, 256 P 464 -- 19

Olin v. Reineche, 168 NE 676 20

Pakulski v. Ludwiezewski, 289 NW 231 --------- 20

Preston v. Brown, 35 Ohio St. 18 20

Pritchard v. Williams, 96 SE 733 19

Rhyne v. Sheppard, 32 SE 2d 316 20

Sargeant v. Texas, 318 US 418 36

ili

Santos Green v. Cruz, 100 P.R.R. 9 ------------ 17,18

Schleider v. Schleider, 104 ALR 572 ---------- 19,21

Searl v. School District, 133 US 553 --- 9,18,19,23

Stumps v. Hornback, 18 SW 37 20

Thompson v. Illinois, 129 NE 55 18

Thompson v. City of Luisville. 362 US 199 ----- 37

Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 US 478 --------- 37

Valle 7. Fleming, 29 MO 152 - 18,20

Warwick v. Harvey, 68 ALR 284 - 20

Williams v. Vanderbilt, 145 Tl 238 20

U.S. Rubber v. Batesburg, 110 ALR 144 --------- 21

Constitution:

Constitution of the United States

-Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment ------------ 4,13,

18,25,26,37

Statutes:

Civil Code of Puerto Rico 32 L.P.R.A.

Article 300 5,26

Article 297 6,13,14,24,25,27,37

Article 382 6,13,14,24,25,27,37

Article 383 6,13,14,16,24,25,27,37

Article 384 16,17,24,25,27,37

Article 364 16,17,37

Section 1859 16

Constitution of the Commonwealth of

Puerto Rico

Article II, Section VII 32,33

Code of Civil Procedures

32 L.P.R.A. 3561-3566 ---------- 23,24,25,28,29,35

28 U.S.C. 1257, 1258 3,35

Text Books:

42 CFS Section 6 7

41 Am. Jr. 2d Section 5 & 6 8,19

42 CFS Section 7 9,14

Inu the Supreme Court of the Hnited States

WILFREDO SANTIAGO ORTEGA

Petitioner

VS.

EPIFANIA PEREZ

Respondent

DOCKET NUMBER:

on writ of Certiorari from the Supreme Court of

Puerto Rico

I. OPINIONS DELIVERED BY THE COURT

BELOW

The opinions delivered in the Courts below are as

follows:

1. On August 3, 1977 the Superior Court of

Puerto Rico entered a decree against the Peti-

tioner ordering him to vacate the land and to

abstain from disturbing Respondent’s right as

occupant of the land. This opinion is not

reported.

On February 20, 1979 the Superior Court of

Puerto Rico sustained the decree made on

August 3, 1977. This opinion is not reported.

On October 18, 1979 the Supreme Court of

Puerto Rico denied the Writ of Certiorari

requested by Petitioner to review the Super-

ior Court decision of February 20, 1979. This

opinion is not reported.

On December 20, 1979 the Supreme Court of

Puerto Rico denied appeal to review the deci-

sion of the Superior Court not to stay order to

vacate which would come in effect on

December 7, 1979. This opinion is not

reported.

On February 28, 1980 the Superior Court of

Puerto Rico denied motion to strike decree

and order of August 3, 1977. This opinion is

not reported.

On April 17, 1980 the Supreme Court of

Puerto Rico denied the writ of Review filed by

Petitioner. This opinion is not reported.

II.

7. On May 15, 1980 the Supreme Court of Puerto

Rico denied the Motion for reconsideration

filed by the Petitigner. This opinion is not

reported. ;

8. The opinions delivered by the Superior and

Supreme Court of Puerto Rico are included as

appendices. Petitioner has filed a Motion in

the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico to obtain

the official translation of the opinions entered

by the Court as requested by Rule 23 and 37 of

this Court.

CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE GROUND

ON WHICH JURISDICTION IS INVOKED

1. The Superior Court of the Commonwealth of

Puerto Rico decided against the Petitioner on

August 3, 1977.

2. Petitioner filed a timely Review on April 12,

1980, which was denied and a Motion for

Reconsideration before the Supreme Court of

the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico which was

denied on May 15, 1980. Petitioner filed a

Motion of Reconsideration stating the federal

question of violation of due process of law gua-

ranteed by the 5th and 14th amendment on

June 3, 1980. No motion for extention of time

has been filed.

3. The statutory provision which grants the

Supreme Court of the United States jurisdic-

tion to review this judgement by writ of Certi-

orari is 28 U.S.C. Section 1258 (38).

III. QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR

REVIEW

A) The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico disregarded

Petitioner’s right to due process of law guaranteed

by the Fourteenth and/or Fifth amendment of the

United States Constitution by denying him a

hearing.

The State Court deprived Petitioner of property

without due process of law and therefore disregarded

his right under the United States Constitution. The

state court made no legal statement in regard to the

Petitioner’s right to compensation and Petitioner was

denied due process of law guaranteed by the For-

teenth Amendment and Fifth Amendment when he

was denied a hearing to determine his rights to com-

pensation as a good faith occupant.

The failure of the trial Court to make a finding on

Petitioner’s good faith in making improvements to

the land was reversible error, in view of the state

statute which establishes different compensations for

the good and the bad faith occupant. A determination

as to when and why Petitioner’s possession was in bad

or good faith is required in order to justly determine

the statutory cempensation.

The Superior Court decree on February 20, 1979

stated that both parties are “confessed squatters” but

it did not apply the statutes which provides for the

present situation when both parties are bad faith

occupants.

This determination of the Court was based on the

fact that the plot of land belongs to an unknown per-

son, not a party in this action. Neither party in this

action claimed ownership, but only possession.

Respondent by her own testimony, only lived for 3 or

4 weeks in a wooden shack she buiit on said land in

1974. In 1976, when the shack did no longer exist

Petitioner entered into possession of the land and has

occupied it as its owner, constructing a cement, wood

and zinc house. The trial Court refused to hold a hear-

ing whereby Petitioner could present proof as to his

good faith and the time in which he was in good faith

this would vary the degree of compensation to Peti-

tioner according to the Puerto Rican Civil Code

which we forthwith discuss.

The failure of the trial Court to hold a hearing

where determinations of good faith, bad faith and

time in each and compensation for any or both situa-

tions be made was a plain error and basis for

reversal.

The Articule 300 of the Civil Code states:

“Bad Faith of Both Parties - when there has

existed bad faith, not only on the part of the per-

son who build, sowed or planted on another’s

land, but also on the part of the owner of such

land, the rights of both shall be the same as

though both had acted in good faith” 31 L.P.R.A.

1167.

By the provision of the applicable state law, once

the Superior Court held that both parties were con-

fessed squatiers and thereby both were bad faith

occupants, the rights of each would be as if both has

acted in good faith. The bad faith of both parties is

cancelled, and the law states that in that situation

both parties will be considered in good faith. This

brings us to the second phase.

The good faith occupant has property rights ascer-

tained by state law and accepted by equity.

Article 297 of the Civil Codes States: “the owner of

the land which has been built upon in good faith shall

have the rights to appropriate as his own the work, by

previously paying to the owner of the work, the cost of

materials and labor, or the cost of reproducing the

work at the time the owner of the land exercises his

right, deducting depreciation, whichever is greater or

to compel the person who constructed to pay the value

of the land”. 31 L.P.R.A.-1164 (Emphasis Added).

Article 382 of the Civil Code states:

“Necessary expenses are refunded to every posses-

sor; but only the possessor in good faith may

retain a thing until such expenses are made good

to him. Useful expenses are refunded to the pos-

sessor in good faith with the same rights to reten-

tion, it being at the option of the party who has

defeated him in his possession to refund the

amount of the expenses or to pay the increase in

the value of the thing in consequence of such

expenses”. (Emphasis Supplied).

Article 383 States:

“Expenses incurred purely for luxury or mere

pleasure are not returnable to the possessor in

good faith; but he may remove the ornaments

with which he embellished the principal thing if

it suffer no injury thereby, and 7f his successor in

the possession does not prefer to refund the amount

expended”. 31 L.P.R.A. 1469 (Emphasis Added).

The right of good faith occupants to be compen-

sated for improvements is also accepted in the federal

jurisdiction.

In 42 C.F.S. Section 6 it is stated:

“Even prior to the modified common law rule, it

was the rule under the civil law, on the broad

principle of equity, that no one ought to enrich

himself at the expense of another, that, were one

made permanent improvements on land in his

possession under a bona fide belief of ownership,

he was entitled to full compensation therefore,

less a fair compensation for rents and profits

during the period of occupancy, before the owner

of the property could recover the same. Courts of

equity, following the Civil law rule, and applying

the principle that he who seeks equity must do

equity, held that were an owner of land is

required to come into a court of equity to seek a

relief as, for instance, to recover the land or

obtain an accounting for rents and profits, he

must make compensation to the bona fide occu-

pant as a condition to his obtaining the relief

sought, the occupant’s right to compensation

being governed by the particular facts of each

case. The right to compensation exists under the

principle of equity independently of the statutory

provisions which expressly grant it in certain

actions or in certain cases”. (Emphasis Added)

In 42 Corpus Juris Secundum further states in Sec-

tion 6 (b) that:

“The reason and justice of recognizing better-

ment rights as well as the harshness and inequity

of the common law in many cases, has resulted in

many, perhaps most, jurisdictions, in the enact-

ment of statutes generally known as “betterment

acts” or as “occupancy claimant laws” which

expressly grant and in some cases enlarge, the

rights of the bona fide occupants in respect of

compensation for improvements. The general

effect of the statutes, however is to compel the

owner of the land to pay to the bona fide occupant

the amount due for improvements over and

above the value of rents and profits during the

period of occupancy, as a conditions to his recov-

ery of, or entry on, the land, whether by eject-

ment, tresspass to try title or other possessory

proceedings or as a conditions to his recovery ina

suit against the occupant for removing the

improvements. The constitutionality of these sta-

tutes has generally been upheld”. (Also, see 41

American Jurisdiction 3d. Sections 5 and 6.)

The essential requirements for the bona fide occu-

pant’s, right to compensation are:

a.. good faith-which required his honest and reas-

onable belief in his claim to ownership.

b. possession- the person must have been in the

possession of the land at the time the improve-

ments were made and be in possession at the

time the claim is made.

ec. color of title or claim of title- “ordinarily to

constitute color or title to land, the occupant

should have paper title, but this in the absence

of a statutory requirements is not always

necessary, for color of title may be based on

adverse possession under a bona fide claim of

title and under the express provisions of some

statutes a person has color of title who has

occupied the land for a prescribed, number of

years or for a less time if he has made

improvements with the owner’s knowledge

and consent. Adverse claim of title, as distin-

guished from color or title, need not be evi-

denced by a writing” 42 Corpus Juris

Secundum, Section 7. (Emphasis Added)

d. the person entitled to compensation is the

owner of the improvements at the time he

seeks recovery.

In the present case Petitioner complied with all

these essential requirements. Petitioner believed that

the plot of land was without owner or occupant and

therefore occupied it in October 1976 with the belief

that he was the sole possessor of the land. Petitioner

occupied the land since October 1976 until present, in

that period of time he has made the improvement.s

Both parties, Petitioner and Respondent are squat-

ters and they have no written title to the plot of land,

but claim possession which under the law of Puerto

Rico entitles the occupant to become owner of the

land after a number of years. 31 L.P.R.A. 5280.

In Searl vs. School District, 133 U.S. 553, this court

held that a bonafide occupant had a right to be com-

pensated for the improvements he made in the land of

another. This Court declared:

“ and Court of equity, in accord with the princi-

ples of the Civil law, when their aid is sought by

the real owner, compel him to make allowance

for permanent improvements made bonafide by

the party lawiuily in possession under a defective

title. The Civil Law recognized the principle of

reimbursing to the bonafide possesor the expense

of his improvements if he was removed from his

possession by the legal owner, by allowing him

the increase in the value of the land created there-

by. And the betterment laws of the several

states proceed upon that equitable view. The

right to recovery, when the occupant in good

faith believes himself to be the owner, is declared

to stand upon a principle of natural justice and

equity and such laws are held not to be unconsti-

tutional as impairing vested rights, since they

adjust the equities of the parties as nearly as pos-

sible according to natural justice and in its appli-

cation as a shield of protection, the term “vested

rights” is not used in any narrow sense, but as

implying a vested interest of which the individ-

ual cannot be deprived arbitrarily without

injustice”

The Petitioner requested the Superior Court and

the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico to hold a hearing to

determine the Petitioner’s right to compensation as

the state law recognizes. This was requested by Peti-

tioner several times. On the Motion to Strike Order to

Vacate of August 1, 1979, on the Certiorari filed at

the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico on September 27,

1979, on Motion to Strike Decree and Order to Vacate

filed on December 4, 1979; on a Memorandum of Law

filed at the Superior Court in February 15, 1980, in

the Writ of Review filed in the Supreme Court of

Puerto Rico on March 26, 1980, on the Motion of

Reconsideration filed in the Supreme Court of Puerto

Rico on May Ist., 1980 and the Motion of Reconsidera-

tion filed in the Supreme Court on June 3, 1980. The

Superior Court and the Supreme Court denied Peti-

tioner’s request of due process of law in regard to

compensation.

Petitioner was never granted a hearing on the mer-

its of their case; both hearings in the case: the hear-

ings on March 18, 1977, December 19, 1978 and

January 15, 1979 and the hearing on January 18,

1980 were limited. On the first set of hearings the

issue was limited by the Court to Petitioner’s claim

that he was not served summons to the action. On the

hearing held on January 18, 1980 the issue was

limited by the Court to Petitioner’s claim that

respondent had committed fraud.

In Fuentes vs. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, at page 80, this

court held:

“The Constitutional Right to be heard is a basic

aspect of the duty of government to follow a fair

process of decisionmaking when it acts to deprive

a person of his possessions. The purpose of this

requirement is not only to ensure abstract fair

play to the individual. It purpose, more particu-

larly, is to protect his use and possession of prop-

erty from arbitrary encroachment- to minimize

substantively unfair or mistaken deprivation of

property, a danger that is especially great when

the state seizes goods simply upon the application

of and for the benefit of a private party. So

viewed, the prohibition against the deprivation

of property without due process of law reflects

the high value, embedded in our constitutional

and political history, that we place on a person’s

right to enjoy what is his, free of government

interference”.

The Court also stated in Fuentes, at p. 86,

“The Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of

property, however, has never been interpreted to

safeguard only the rights of undisputed ownership.

Rather it has been read broadly to extend protec-

tion to “any significant property interest”.

(Emphasis Supplied)

In Eagle vs. Koch, 471 Federal Supp 175. the Court

held unconstitutional a law which did not provide

appropriate hearing to peedler’s before they were

deprived of their goods. The Court declared:

“In sum, local law No. 77 itself has no provision

for a hearing upon confiscation of property under

exigent circumstances. Therefore, the law does

not withstand constitutional attack unless a hear-

ing is otherwise provided”.

In the present case, the Court did not allow a hear-

ing to provide due process of law to Petitioner before

his being deprived of the house he built in the plot of

land and the improvements he made to the land.

In N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama (357 U.S. 449 at page

463) the Court held:

“It is not of moment that the state has acted soley

through its judicial branch, for whether legisla-

tive or judicial, it is the application of state power

which we are,asked to scrutinize”.

In Culp vs. U.S., 181 F 2d 293, the Court held that

the right not to be deprived of property without due

process of law is a fundamental right.

In Mathew vs. Elridge, 424 US 319, this Court

declared:

13 ©

“This Court has consistently held that some form

of hearing is required before an individual is

finally deprived of a property interest. Wolff vs.

Mc Donnel, 418 US 539, 557-558, see e.g., Phillips

vs. Commissioner, 283 US 589. See also Dent vs.

West Virginia, 129 US 114.”

A hearing should be ordered to guarantee the Peti-

tioner’s right to be compensated for the house he built

and for the necessary and useful expenditures made

by the Petitioner, with the right of retention of the

property until he is indemnified by the Respondent.

Petitioner also has the right to be compensated for

the luxury or recreation expenditures made in the

property if Respondent wishes to keep them.

A Certiorari must be granted in this case so that

this Court may review the decision of the Supreme

Court of Puerto Rico which disregarded Petitioner’s

rights to due process of law guarantee by the Four-

teenth and Fifth Amendment.

In the alternative that this Court sould sustain the

Superior Court decree that Petitioner was a bad faith

occupant, the state law, provides right to compensa-

tion for the necessary expenditures for the conserva-

tion of the land, 31 L.P.R.A. 1468 and for the

expenses incurred for luxury or mere pleasure if the

Respondent wanted to keep them. 31 L.P.R.A. 1470.

Petitioner’s was‘denied due process of law guaran-

teed by the Fourteenth Amendment because he was

denied a hearing in which his right to compensation

even as a bad faith occupant, would be determined.

The State Court did not establish at what time did

Petitioner become a bad faith occupant and his right

to be compensated as bonafide occupant prior to

becoming a bad faith occupant, 31 L.P.R.A. 1425.

In the present case, the State Court never held a

hearing, nor made a determination in regard to the

exact time when Petitioner became a bad faith occu-

pant. This is of particular relevance in this case

because the Puerto Rico law provides that “good faith

_ is always presumed and any person averring bad

faith on the part of the possession is bound to prove

the same”. 31 L.P.R.A. 1425.

The presumption of good faith protected Petition-

er’s acts until he was notitied of an adverse claim of

possession by Respondent. The expenditures which

Petitioner made until the notification of this action

are bonafide and therefore, protected by the Statutes

which provide compensation to good faith possessors,

31 L.P.R.A. 1164, 1468 and 1469.

In 42 C.J.S. Sec. 7-4(a) Improvements, states:

“As a general Rule an occupant of land is not a

possessor in good faith and hence is not entitled

to compensation for improvements which he

makes thereon after he has notice or knowledge of

an adverse title...” (emphasis supplied.

In 42 Corpus Juris Secundum it also states:

“Under some statutes, the occupant may recover

for improvements which he made in good faith

prior to notice of the adverse claim of title as,

where he has been a possessor in good faith, he

ceases to be such only from the moment when

knowledge or notice of the defects in his title are

imparted to him. And although ordinarily the

recovery is limited to improvements made before

notice of plaintiffs superior adverse claim,

where an improvement is substantially com-

pleted at the time of receipt of notice of another’s

claim to the land, and completion is necessary to

preserve the improvement and make it useful

and valuable, the possessor may complete it and

set off the value of the completed improvement”.

(Emphasis Supplied).

The doctrine which Corpus Juris Secundum

exposes is the one that the Supreme Court of Puerto

Rico has accepted. That is, that the possessor is consi-

dered as bonafide until he is notified of an adverse

claim.

In Diaz vs. Delgado, 41 P.R.R. 827, the court held

“We do not agree, since one of the premises on

which this argument is based is the good faith of

the defendants up to the time of the rendition of

judgement, whereas under the law and the juris-

prudence, once the yudgement has been rendered,

such good faith can only be deemed to have existed

up to the day on which defendants were sum-

moned in the action of redemption.” -

Section 438 of the Civil Code in force says:

“It is presumed that possession is continued

under the same understanding by which it

was acquired, until the contrary be proven”.

In his commentaries on Article 435 of the

former Civil Code, equivalent to Section 438,

Supra, Manresa expressed himself as follows:

“Possessor in good faith converted into posses-

sor in bad faith- Under Article 435 a posses-

sor in good faith becomes a possessor in bad

faith from the moment he becomes aware

that his possession is wrongful, as stated by

us when commenting on the said article. Sim-

ilarly as to a defeated possessor, from the

time he is first judicially summoned”.

The rules set forth above concerning the posses-

sor in good faith control up to the time such pos-

session is considered lost; thereafter, the Rules

relating to the possession in bad faith must be

applied. 4 Manresa, Commentaries on the Span-

ish Civil Code, 2 nd. Ed., p. 274”.

It is necessary to conclude that Petitioner must be

compensated for the improvements that he made as a

bonafide occupant prior to being notified of the pres-

ent action filed by Respondent. Thereby, Petitioner is

entiled to compensation for what Petitioner built

prior to being notified of this action, 31 L.P.R.A.

1164, and for the necessary and useful expenses prior

to notification of this action, 31 L.P.R.A. 1468, with

the right to retain the property until he is duly

refunded.

Even as a bad faith possessor the state law provides

compensation for Petitioner for certain expenditures.

The Civil Code States that “necessary expenses are

refunded to every possesor” 31 L.P.R.A. 1468

(Emphasis Supplied).

The State law also provides:

“A possessor in bad faith... shall only have the

right to be reimbursed for the necessary

expenses incurred in the preservation of the

thing. Expenses incurred in improvements for

luxury and pleasure, shall not be refunded to the

possessor in bad faith, but he may remove the

objects for which such expenses have been

incurred, provided, the thing suffers no injury

thereby, and the lawful possessor does not prefer

to retain them and pay the value they may have at

the time he enters into possession”. 31 L.P.R.A.

1470 (Emphasis Supplied).

Petitioner was denied the right to compensation for

the expenses he incurred as a bona fide possessor and

as a bad faith occupant which the law states. Thus,

his right to due process before being deprived of his

property guaranteed by the Fourteenth and Fifth

Amendment of the United States Constitution was

violated.

The right to compensation as established by the

state law was applied in Santos Green v. Cruz, 100

P.R.R. 9, where the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico

established:

“The circumstances set forth show that, upon

taking possession of the property before the judi-

cial approval of the lease in question was

obtained, Guillermo Cruz was aware of the

defect in his title consisting in the absence of said

approval, which was required because the

owners of the greater part of the property were

minors. Therefore, he is a possessor in bad faith

of said property. (Section 363 of the Civil Code 31

L.P.R.A. 1424). By virtue thereof his right con-

cerning the improvements he might have made

in the property and in regard to the fruits is

defined in Article 384 of the Civil Code, 31

L.P.R.A. 1470”.

In that case the Court held:

“Also, the case should be remanded to the trial

Court to determine in the light of the evidence

adduced, Cruz liability as such possessor in bad

faith as well as apellant -appellee’s rights result-

ing from such condition”. (Emphasis supplied).

Petitioner’s right to compensation was violated and

thus his property was taken without due process of

law as no hearing was held to determine his

compensation.

B) Petitioner has a right to compensation that has

been violated by the State Courts constituting this

fact unjust enrichment in violation of the due pro-

cess law clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth amend-

ment of the United States and the rules of equity.

Initially by the rules of the common law, whoever

put improvements on real estate did so at his peril.

Even though he acted in good faith and in the honest

conviction that the land was his, whenever another

party judicially established his title to the land, such

party had a right to all the improvements situated

upon it without any obligation to compensate the

improver. Thompson v. Illinois 129NE55; Hall v.

Boatright 36SE1001.

Under the rules of the civil laws, norms were more

liberal. It permitted one who had made permanent

improvements on land in his possession, to compensa-

tion for the value of such improvements. Searl v.

School District, 183 VS 558; Valle v. Fleming, 29 MO

152.

Chancery borrowed the rule of natural equity from

the civil law. Searl v. School District, supra. Where

such owner had only an equitabie title and was com-

pelled to sue in equity for a recovery of the land, the

court refused its aid to the complainant, except on the

terms of compensation to the occupant for this

improvements, on the principle that he wao seeds

equity must do equity. Schleider v. Schleider, 104

ALR 572; Kester v. Bostwick, 15 SO 2nd 201; 41 Am.

Jr. 2d Section 5, pg. 482-483.

Such is the birth of Betterments acts such as the

sections discussed in our first question presented for

review, 31 LPRA 1468, 1167, 1164, 1469 and 1470.

They are founded on equitable grounds and pro-

ceed on the theory that no one should be made richer at

the expenses of another. Searl v. School District,

supra; Numitor Gold Mine Co. v. Katzer, 256 P 464,

Cleland v. Clark, 81 NW 1086.

In Pritchard v. Williams 96SE733, the Court

stated:

“The right to betterments is based on the

obvious principle of justice that the owner of the

land has not just claim to anything except the

land itself. If the claimant, acting under an

erroneous but honest and reasonable belief that

he is the owner, makes valuable and permanent

improvements, the true owner should not take

them urithout compensation.” (Emphasis Supplied).

Betterment statutes are remedial in character.

Kester v. Bostwick, supra. They should be liberally

construed the purpose of securing an equitable and fair

adjustment of the rights of the parties. Meyers v.

Canutt, 46, NW 2d 72; Stumps v. Hornback, 18 SW 37.

NW 2d 72; Stumps v. Hornback, 18 SW 37.

Even in jurisdictions where no betterments act such

as the ones in the Civil Code of Puerto Rico exist, courts

of equity have exercised jurisdiction under general prin-

ciples of equity for the purpose of affording relief to an

occupying claimant in respect to improvements made

by him. They have taken cognizance of suits brought by

an occupying claimant as plaintiff against the time

owner of the land to recover for improvements. See,

Schlerder v. Schleider, supra, Valle v. Fleming, supra,

McKelway v. Armour, 10 NJ Eg. 115, Rhyne v. Shep-

pard, 32 SE 2d 316; Herring v. Pollard, 23 Tenn. 362.

Under the rule of avoiding an unjust enrichment, sev-

eral cases have been decided whereby an owner will not

be permitted to claim improvements if these were

erected on the state in good faith and with the tolerance

of the rightful owner. See Goode v. Gaines, 145 VS 141;

Gibson v. Herriot, 55 Ark 85; Burron v. Carlus, 210 Col

95: Williams v. Vanderbilt, 145 I1l] 238; Loeb v. Conley

169 SW 575.

Although the silence of the owner under such circum-

stances does not operate in itself to transfer the title to

the improved premises to the improver, equity can com-

pel the owner to either pay for the improvements or

surrender his title on receiving compensation. Carolina

C.R., Co. v. McCaskill, 94 NC 746; 76 ALR 309. Equity

acts in these respects on the principle that an unjust

enrichment should be prevented. See, Bright v. Boyd, 1

Story 478; Olin v. Reineche, 168 NE 676; Warwick v.

Harvey,, 68 ALR 284 Pakulski v. Ludwiezwski, 289

NW 231; Rhyne v. Sheppard, 32 SE 2d 316; Preston v.

Brown, 35 Ohio St. 18.

The rule of unjust enrichment is also founded on the

maxim that when one person confers a benefit on

another through a mistake, whether of law or fact, the

other is liable to make restitutions. See Duffy v. Scott,

292 NW 273. Generally, the object to the attained is the

prevention of unjust enrichment of defendant and the

securing for plaintiff of that to which he is justly and in

good conscience entitled: Glandowski v. Felczak, 31 A 2d

718; Lauffer v. Vial, 33 A 2d 777.

A person who has been unjustly enriched at the

expense of another is required to make restitution to the

other. Duffy v. Scott, supra.

Case law has not made necessary that in order to

create an obligation to make restitution, that the party

unjustly enriched should have been guilty of any tortious

or fraudulent act. (Bill v. Gattavara, 209 2d 457). The

question posed in such cases is: Did he, to the detriment

of someone else, obtain something of value to which he

was not entitled? Such is the questions we pose before

this Court today.

It is a general principle, underlying various legal doc-

trines and remedies, that one person should not be per-

mitted unjustly to enrich himself at the expense of

another, but should be required to make restitution of or

for property or benefits received, retained or approp-

riated, where it is just and equitable that such restitu-

tion be made, and where such action involves no

violation or frustration of law or opposition to public

policy, either directly or indirectly. See Franks v. Lock-

wood, 150 A 2d 215; Mehl v. Norton, 113 ALR 1055; US

Rubber v. Batesburg, 110 ALR 144; Duffy v. Scott, supra.

No violation of law or opposition to public policy, directly

or indirectly is present in this case.

In Hill v. Waxberg, 237 F 2d 936 (9th Cir. 1956) the

Court discussed the differences between an implied in

law and in fact contracts and stated:

“An implied in law” contract, is a fiction of the

law which is based on the maxim that one who is

unjustly enriched at the expense of another is

required to make restitution to the other. The inten-

tions of the parties have little or no influence on the

determination of the proper measure of damages.

In the absence of fraud or other tortious conduct on

the part of the person enriched, restitution is prop-

erly limited to the value of the benefit which was

acquired.” (ibid at page 939).

See also, Martin v. Campanaro, 156 F 2d 127 (2d Cir.

1946)

In Monagas v. Vidal, 170 F 2d 99 (lst. circuit, 1948)

the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Reviewed a judgement of the Supreme Court of Puerto

Rico. Such was the procedure prior to the establishment

of the Commonwealth. Review of said decisions since

then is done by the Supreme Court of the United States.

In said case the reviewing Court examined the inter-

pretation of Puerto Rican statute by the Supreme Court

of Puerto Rico in order to conclude if it was “inescapably

wrong” or “patently enormeous”. See Bonet v. Texas Co.

84LED 401; De Castro v. Board of Commissioners 322

VS 451 “or plainly inconsistent with established princi-

ples of local law”. (De Castro v. Board, at page 1384.)

A similar determination should be made in this case

as the decision of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico in

the case at bar not only is in disagreement with its

own previous decisions, as discussed previously in

this unit, but in disagreement with the holdings of the

Supreme Court of the United States in Searl v. School

District, supra and others and in disagreement with

decisions in other states. See the Court in Monagas v.

Vidal, supra, concluded:

“It is our function to reverse that Court (the

Supreme Court of Puerto Rico) in such a matter

only when we are forced to the conclusion that the

result reached below cannot be justified on any

logical ground”.

(Emphasis Supplied)

Petitioner believe that such are the facts in the

case at bar as the decision is an interpretation of local

law that causes an unjust enrichment with prejudice .

towards Petitioner.

* Petitioner thus request that the judgement of the

Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

be reversed and remanded with orders that a hearing

“ be held solely for the purpose of determining Peti-

tioner’s right to specific compensation under the sec-

tions of the Puerto Rico Civil Code.

C) The interpretation given by the State Court to the

Section 32 LPRA 3561-66 of the Code of Civil

Procedure as applied are unconstitutional as it

allows for the taking of property without the due

process of law guaranteed by the Fifth and Four-

teenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution.

As previously stated, 31 LPRA 1468, established

the rights of a good faith possessor. 31 LPRA Section

1167 establishes that when both parties are in bad

faith, these are mutually cancelled and both revert to

a good faith status, guaranteeing them the rights

established in 31 LPRA 1468. Finally 31 LPRA 1468

also established the rights of a bad faith possessor

relative to necessary expenses incurred while in pos-

session of the real property.

All these rights and protections of the good or bad

faith possessors, established in the Civil Code have

been made inapplicable and denied to the Petitioner

as he was not afforded a hearing on such matters in

the Injunction for the recovery of possession of real

properly filed by Plaintiff-Respondent. (82 LPRA

Section 3561 to 3566).

_ Such an interpretation or application of the Injunc-

tion procedure make it an unconstitutional statute as

it allows for the taking of property without due pro-

cess of law.

Petitioner has not been able to prove he was.a good

faith possessor for a specific period of time thereby

being due the compensation established in 31 LPRA

1468 relative to the necessary and useful expenses,

and accrued value and the right of retention until

duly compensated for the expenses incurred and

improvements made.

Petitioner was deprived of his due process right

through a procedure established in a state statute

whereby in addition to the inmediate possession, the

Superior Court of Puerto Rico determined through

dismissing all arguments and allegations that there

was a need for a hearing to determine the rights of

compensation provided in the previously cited sec-

tions of the Civil Code. The State Courts refused to

provide a hearing thereby restricting the Possessory

Injunction (832 LPRA 3561 to 3566) to an unconstitu-

tional procedural statute as it allows for the taking of

property without due process of law.

Petitioners specifically refer this court once again

to its holding in Fuentes v. Shevin, supra.

In June 3, 1980 Petitioner filed a Motion of Recon-

sideration before the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico

on the ground that the decision to apply 32 L.P.R.A.

Section 3561-3566 of the Code of Civil Procedure as

denying rights to Petitioner to be compensated, vio-

lated his rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Four-

teenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

To apply the Sections of the Code of Civil Proce-

cure as precluding a right to compensation is viola-

tive of due process of law. Also this interpretation

would go against the right of a bona fide occupant to a

retention of the property until he has been compen-

sated for the necessary and useful expenses, 31

L.P.R.A. 1468 and for the buildings he has done, 31

L.P.R.A. 1164.

Since bona fide occupant has a right to the reten-

tion of the property until he has been payed for the

necessary and useful expenses and for the buildings

he has done on the land, 31 L.P.R.A. 1468 and 1164,

the Court is violating Petitioner’s right, because he

was ordered to vacate the property without being

payed the improvemerts he made as a bona fide

occupant.

The decision in this case goes against the Petition-

er’s rights, which the State Statute recognizes to bona

fide, and bad faith occupant’s and violates the Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution.

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STA-

TUTES INVOLVED IN THE CASE

The right to due process of law guaranteed, by the

Fourteenth Amendment Section 1 of the United

States Constitution which states: “nor shall any state

deprive any person of life, liberty or property, with-

out due process of law...” U.S.C.S. *Constitution

Amendment 14, page 444.

The right to due process of law guaranteed by the

Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution

which states: “nor shall any person... be deprived of

life, liberty or property, without due proéess of law”.

U.S.C.A. Constitution Amendment 5, page 4.

In the state law, the Civil Code statutes:

Article 300-- “when there has existed bad faith, not

only on the part of the persons who built, sowed or

planted on another’s land but also on the part of the

owner of such land the right of both shall be the same

as though both had acted in good faith” 31 L.P.R.A.

1167, page 46.

Article 297-- “the owner of the land which has been

built upon in good faith shall have the right to

appropriate as his own the work, by previously pay-

ing to the owner of the work the cost of materials and

labor, or the cost of reproducing the work at the time

the owner of the land exercised his right, deducting

depreciation whichever is greater to compel the per-

son who constructed to pay the value of the land” 31

L.P.R.A. 1164, page 38.

Article 382-- “necessary expenses are refunded to

every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith

may retain a thing until such expenses are made good

to him; useful expenses are refunded to the possessor

in good faith with the same right to retention, it being

at the option of the party who has defeated him in his

possession to refund the amount of the expenses or to

pay the i::trease in the value of the thing in conse-

quence of such expenses”. 31 L.P.R.A. 1468, page 118.

Article 383-- “expenses incurred purely for luxury

or mere pleasure are not returnable to the possessor

in good faith but he may remove the ornaments with

which he embellished the principal thing if it suffer

no injury thereby, and if his successor in the posses-

sion does not prefer to refund the amount expended”.

31 L.P.R.A 1469, page 120.

Article 364-- “good faith is always presumed, and

any person averring bad faith on the part of a pos-

sesor is bound to prove the same” 31 L.P.R.A. 1425,

page 104.

Article 384-- “a possessor in bad faith... shall only

have the right to be reimbursed for the necessary

expenses incurred in the preservation of the thing.

Expenses incurred in improvements for luxury and

pleasure shall not be refunded to the possessor in bad

faith but he may remove the objects for which such

expenses have been incurred, provided the thing

suffers no injury thereby, and the lawful possessor

does not prefer to retain them and pay the value they

may have at the time he enters into possession”. 31

L.P.R.A. 1470, page 120.

Article 690-- When injunction granted

An injuction for the retention or recovery of mate-

rial possession of real property shall be granted on

petition of the interested party provided he shows to

the satisfaction of the court that he has been dis-

turbed in his possession or tenancy of said property

by acts showing intention of disturbing or depriving

him of such possession, or when he has already been

deprived of said possession or tenancy. 32 LPRA 3561

page 731.

Article 691-- Contents of complaint

The complaint shall be drafted and sworn to, pur-

suant to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedures

and shall set forth:

(1) That the complainant was within the year

preceding the filing of the complaint in the actual

possession of the property described in said com-

plaint if it is sought to recover it, and was and is in

possession thereof if it is sought to retain it.

(2) That he has been disturbed or deprived of the

said possession or tenancy.

He shall also describe clearly the facts constituting

the disturbance or deprivation and whether said acts

were committed by the defendant or by some other

person by order of the said defendant. 32 LPRA 3562,

page 739.

Article 692-- Date for hearing; summons

The court shall set a date for a hearing upon such

complaint, which date shall be within the following

fifteen days, and the defendant shall be summoned at

least eight days prior to the date set for such hearing.

32 LPRA 35638, page 743.

Article 693-- Motions

All motions or demurrers shall be filed and heard

at the time of said hearing. 32 LPRA 3564 Page 743.

Article 694-- Judgement; costs

The court shall render judgment without undue

delay. Costs shall be taxed against the party against

whom judgment is rendered. 32 LPRA 3565 Page

743.

Article 695-- Form of injunction

Such injunction shall direct that the plaintiff be

restored to possession and shall require the distuber

to abstain in future from the commission of such acts,

or of others which show the same intent, and shall

warn him that disobedience of such injunction shall

constitute contempt of court. 32 LPRA 3566 Page

747.

‘ V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On June or July of 1974 Respondent occupied a plot

of land in a suburb of Guaynabo, Puerto Rico known

as Villa Islefia.

Respondent occupied the land as a squatter because

she was not the lawful owner of this land and has

never claimed to be such. Respondent occupied that

land for approximately 3 to 4 weeks to a month and

built a shack there and left four posts of wood in the

land. She had a problem with her son and left the plot

of land, on 1974.

On October 1976, the Petitioner occupied a portion

of the plot of land that the Respondent had occupied

in 1974 but had left three weeks to a month later.

Petitioner inmediately built a room which he later

extended, where he lives with his family. Petitioner

occupied the plot of land also as a squatter in the

belief that the land was vacant because he did not

find any structure or house in that land. The only

thing that was left in the land were pieces of wood

that were laying among the grass and the untilled

plot of land.

Petitioner continued building and improving the

plot of land and made a house of wood and concrete

consisting of three bedrooms, two baths, a kitchen, a

porch, a dinning room of an approximate value of

$10,000, where he actually lives with his family.

On October 21, 1976, Respondent filed an injunction

against the Petitioner claiming that the Petitioner

was disturbing her occupant rights to the plot of land

and claiming that the Petitioner had built on top of

the post that she had left on the plot of land when she

left on 1974.

On December Ist., 1976 the Petitioner was held in

the default because he did not answer the injunction

filed by Respondent.

On March 18, 1977 a hearing on default was held in

which Respondent was the sole witness.

On August 3, 1977 the Superior Court of Puerto

Rico issued a decree against the Petitioner ordering

him to vacate the land and to abstain from disturbing

Respondent’s right as occupant of the land.

This sentence was never notified to the Petitioner

because it was returned from the Guaynabo Post

Office as unclaimed to the Superior Court.

On March 27, 1978 the Superior Court of Puerto

Rico ordered the Petitioner and his family to vacate

the plot of land.

On August, 1978 Petitioner wife’s was notified by

the Court Marshall that the Petitioner and his family

had until September 6, 1978 to vacate the land.

On September Ilst., 1978 Petitioner filed a Motion

to strike the order to vacate and the decree against

him challenging the summons on the ground that he

was never notified of the complaint.

On December 19, 1978 and January 15, 1979 hear-

ings were held in regard to the motion filed by

Petitioner.

On February 20, 1979, the Superior Court decreed

that both parties were squatters and denied the

motion to strike the decree and order to vacate

against Petitioner.

On July 23, 1979 Respondent moved the Court for

an order to vacate against Petitioner.

On August Ist., 1979, Petitioner filed opposition to

motion to vacate of Respondent in which he claimed

his rights to compensation for what he had built in

the land.

Petitioner claimed .nat the decree of the Superior

Court was erroneous and alleged that Petitioner had

a right to compensation before he vacated the land

guaranteed by the Civil Code Statutes and the doc-

trine of unjust enrichment.

On August 13, 1979 the Superior court sustained its

decree of February 20, 1979.

On September 24, 1979 the Petitioner filed writ of

Certiorari in the Puerto Rico Supreme Court alleging

right to compensation guaranteed by the Civil Code

Statutes and the doctrine of unjust enrichment.

On October 14, 1979 Respondent filed opposition to

Certiorari.

On October 18, 1979 the Puerto Rico Supreme

Court denied Certiorari.

On December 4, 1979 the Petitioner filed a motion

to strike order of March 27, 1978 and decree of the

Superior Court of August 3, 1977 in which he claimed

his rights to due process under the Puerto Rican con-

stitution Art. II Section VII to be compensated before

depriving him of property.

Petitioner claimed that Respondent had commited

fraud by claiming that Petitioner had not built any

structure in the plot of land knowing this to be false.

Also that Petitioner was never notified of the Motion

to default or of the default order of the Court. Peti-

tioner claimed that he was never notified of the

decree of the Court of August 3, 1977 and that the

decree was not final because of this.

Petitioner claimed he had a right to due process of

law under the State Constitution which would deter-

mine the compensation for the house he had built in

the plot of land and from all the improvements he had

done to the land and for the necessary and ordinary

expenditures he had made for the conservation of

the land. Petitioner requested a stay of the order to

vacate which would come in effect on December 7,

1979.

The Superior Court did not order the stay to the

order to vacate.

On December 10, 1979 the Petitioner filed an

Appeal before the Puerto Rico Supreme Court requir-

ing the Supreme Court to review the decision of the

Superior Court not to stay the order to vacate. In this

Appeal Petitioner claimed his right to due process of

law under the Puerto Rico constitution had been vio-

lated. He claimed that before depriving him of his

house he should be compensated.

On December 20, 1979 the Puerto Rico Supreme

Court denied the Appeal.

On December 27, 1979 Petitioner requested the

Superior Court to hold a hearing in the Motion to

vacate the order and decree filed on December 4,

1979.

On January 18, 1980 a hearing was held to consider

the Motion to vacate the order and decree.

On February 28, 1980 the Superior Court of Puerto

Rico denied the Motion to vacate the Order and

decree.

On March 26, 1980 the Petitioner filed a writ of

Review before the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico

which requested the court to Review the order

entered by the Superior Court on February 28, 1980.

In this writ of review again Petitioner claimed his

right to due process under the State Constitution

before being deprived of his property.

On April 17, 1980 the Supreme Court of Puerto

Rico. denied the writ of Review filed by Petitioner.

On May, 1, 1980 the Petitioner filed a Motion for

Reconsideration.

On May 15, 1980 the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico

denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

On June 3, 1980 Petitioner filed a Motion for Recon-

sideration on the grounds that the application of the

State Court of the Code of Civil Procedures 32 LPRA

3561-3566 violated Petitioner’s right to due process of

law under the United States Constitution. That Peti-

tioner was denied a hearing before being ordered to

vacate the land and he had a right to compensation.

Petitioner never was granted a hearing in which

his right to compensation for the improvements he

made in the land was determined. This constitutes a

violation of Petitioner’s right to due process of law

guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment

of the United States Constitution, which prohibits the

state from depriving a person of his property without

due process of law. The State Court interpretation of

3561-3566 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 32 L.P.R.A.

3561-3566 violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-

ment of the United States Constitution inasmuch as

it allows the taking of property without due process of

law. Also it constitutes an unjust enrichment for

Respondent.

The disregard by the Supreme Court of Puerto

Rico of the due process of law guaranteed to Peti-

tioner by the United States Constitution and the pat-

ently erroneous interpretation of the Puerto Rican

statute by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico make it

necessary for this Court to reverse and remand with

orders that.a hearing be held were Petitioner’s right

to due process be guaranteed.

VI. ARGUMENT AMPLIFYING THE REASONS

RELIED ON FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF

THE WRIT

As previously cited in this Petition the appellate

jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 USC,

Section 1258 relative to reviews of judgments from

the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico.

For the consideration of writs of Certiorari, the

requirements set forth for the jurisdiction of this

Court in 28 USC. Section 1257 are the same than for

Section 1258, therefore, case law for Section 1257

squarely applies to Section 1258. 4

Petitioner claims that a right not to be deprived of

his property without the due process of law guaran-

teed by the Fifth and/or the Fourteenth Amendment

to the Federal Constitution. This claim by Petitioner

is accompanied by a second claim whereby Petitioner

alleges that a state statute, to wit Puerto Rico Posses-

sory Injunction statute 32 L.P.R.A., Section 3561-

3566, as applied in this case, is unconstitutional as it

deprives Petitioner of his property without a hearing,

thereby, said Injunction statute being repugnant to

the Constitution of the United States. This second

claim falls also under the situation where this Court

has jurisdiction, by writ of Certiorari, to review a

judgement of a state court.

A statute of Puerto Rico was held to be a “State

Statute” for purposes of appeal jurisdiction in Calero

Toledo vs. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co, 416 U.S. 663

and Eivamining Board of Engineers vs. Flores de

Otero, 426 U.S. 572. This case involves a Puerto Rican

statute.

The jurisdiction in this case is averred in Petition-

er’s claim that a state statute offends federal law and,

thus, that a right under federal law has been rejected.

Jurisdiction lies in the Supreme Court even though

the state Court is not explicit in overuling a timely

challenge on federal grounds to the validity of astate

statute. See, Sargent vs. Texas, 318 US 418. Certio-

rari under Section 1257 (3) is the only proper method

of seeking review of whatever federal issues when a

state court refuses to reach a challenge to the validity

of a state statute. See Garrity vs. New Jersey 385 US

493. Such is the situation previously described, in the

case at bar.

It is also essential to the jurisdiction of the Supreme

Court under Section 1257 and 1258 that a substantial

federal question not devoid of merit has been prop-

erly raised. Nor can it be so explicitly foreclosed by

prior decisions as to leave no room for real

controversy.

In the present action a federal substantial claim

has been raised, deprivation of property without due

process, it is not devoid of merit as it encompasses the

deprivation of the sole property of Petitioner and his

whole lives savings and is an issue which this Court

specifically has never addressed itself to.

Lastly a concise discussion of the “drawn in ques-

tion” requirement proceeds.

The doctrine is that the “drawn in question”

requirement of Section 1257 is met where the validity

of the statute is “drawn in question in a manner

directly bearing on the merit of the action”. See, Cox

Broadcasting Corp. vs. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469. Petitioner

has met with this requirement while discussing the

questions presented to this Court for review.

This Court has also invoked its review power over

state courts determinations on the basis of a “plain

error”, of federal constitutional proportions, that was

not raised or decided below. See, Vachon v. New

Hampshire, 414 US 478 and Thomson v. City of

Louisville, 362 US 199 and specifically Monagas v.

Vidal, 170 Fed. 2d. 99 where the Court of Appeals

acting as a reviewing Court of the Supreme Court of

Puerto Rico, said:

“.the narrow question for us under the his-

toric rule reaffirmed and restated by the

Supreme Court of the United States in De Castro

vs. Board of Commissioner, (822 US 4651) is

whether the decisions of the Supreme Court of

Puerto Rico... (are) “inescapably wrong” or “pat-

ently erroneus or plainly inconsistent with estab-

lished principles of the local law”. See also, Bonet

vs. Texas, 84 L Eds. 401.

No more but definitely no less is Petitioners request

from this Supreme Court today: a finding that the

Supreme Court of Puerto Rico decided wrongly this

case and that its decision is plainly inconsistent with

sections 1167, 1164, 1468, 1469, 1425 and 1470 of the

Puerto Rican Civil Code, 31 L.P.R.A. 1167, 1164,

1468, 1469, 1425, and 1470, in addition to being

repugnant to the due process clause of the Fifth

and/or Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal

Constitution.

For the reasons stated therein, the Petitioner

Respectfully moves the Court to review by Writ of

Certiorari the order and decree of the State Court.

Respectfully Submitted.

Maria Dolores Fernos, Esquire

Georgina Candal, Esquire

Counsel for Petitioner

Puerto Rico Legal Service, Inc.

P.O. Box CM

Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico 00928

APENDICE I

EN EL TRIBUNAL SUPERIOR DE PUERTO RICO

SALA DE BAYAMON

CIVIL NUM.: 76-2974

SOBRE: ACCION CIVIL

(Injunction Posesorio)

EPIFANIA PEREZ GUZMAN,

DEMANDANTE

VS.

BASILIO VEGA VEGA Y

LUIS SANTIAGO ORTEGA,

DEMANDADOS

SENTENCIA

A la vista del presente caso sefalado en rebeldia

para el dia 18 de marzo de 1977, comparecio la

demandante, EPIFANIA PEREZ GUZMAN, con su

abogado el Ledo. Antonio Cajigas Llamas.

De los autos se desprende que los demandados

fueron debidamente emplazados, no contestaron la

Demanda y tampoco comparecieron a la vista del

presente caso.

Oida la prueba testifical ofrecida por la demandan-

te el Tribunal encuentra probadas las alegaciones de

la Demanda y en su consecuencia dicta la siguiente:

SENTENCIA

Se ordena a los demandados, BASILIO VEGA

VEGA y LUIS SANTIAGO ORTEGA que dentro del

término de veinte (20) dias de notificarsele esta

Sentencia, desalojen la propiedad de la demandante,

EPIFANIA PEREZ GUZMAN y se abstengan de

cometer actos de dominio en dicha propiedad bajo

apercibimiento de desacato al Tribunal y ademas se

condena a cada uno de los demandados, a pagar la

suma de $250.00 en concepto de honorarios de

abogado la cual deberan consignar en la Secretaria

del Tribunal a nombre del Ledo. Antonio Cajigas

Llamas dentro del término de veinte (20) dias de

notificarsele esta Sentencia.

DADA en Bayamon, Puerto Rico, a 3 de agosto de

1977.

REGISTRESE Y NOTIFIQUESE.

JOSE F. RODRIGUEZ RIVERA

JUEZ SUPERIOR

APENDICE II

EN EL TRIBUNAL SUPERIOR DE PUERTO RICO

SALA DE BAYAMON

CIVIL NUM.: 76-2974 (504)

SOBRE: ACCION CIVIL

(Injunction Posesorio)

EPIFANIA PEREZ GUZMAN,

DEMANDANTE

VS.

BASILIO VEGA VEGA Y

LUIS SANTIAGO ORTEGA,

DEMANDADOS

ORDEN DE LANZAMIENTO

Vista la Mocién de la Parte Demandante en el caso

del epigrafe en la cual solicita el lanzamiento de los

demandados Luis Santiago Ortega y Basilio Vega

Vega y sus familiares, empleados y/o cualesquiera

persona o personas que ocupen la propiedad objeto de

la Demanda del epigrafe; examinados los autos de

este caso y la Ley aplicable, el Tribunal declara CON

LUGAR la referida Mocién y en su consecuencia

ordena el lanzamiento de los demandados Luis

Santiago Ortega y Basilio Vega Vega y sus

familiares, empleados y/o cualesquiera persona o

personas que ocupen la propiedad siguiente:

“Parcela de terreno con una cabida superficial de

QUINIENTOS METROS (500) CUADRADOS,

localizada en Villa Islefia en la Carretera Estatal

Numero Ochocientos Treinta y Cinco (835) del

Barrio Guaraguao del término municipal de

Guaynabo, Puerto Rico, en lindes por el NORTE

en una distancia de Treinta y dos puntos

sesentidos (32.62) metros con la Carretera o

camino vecinal pavimentada; por el SUR en una

distancia de Nueve punto Cuarenticinco (9.45)

metros con la Familia Alvarado Colon: por el

ESTE en una distancia de Veintisiete punto

Trece (27.13) metros con Angel F. Candelaria y

por el OKSTE en una distancia de Ocho punto

Veintitres (8.23) metros con un camino vecinal

pavimentado. En esta parcela hay construidas

unas estructuras de madera techadas de zinc

dedicadas a uso residencial.” —

Esta orden quedara sin efecto en el caso de que la

parte demandada haya desalojado la propiedad

objeto de la demanda y haya pagado las costas y

gastos de este procedimiento asi como los honorarios

de abogado que fijé el Tribunal. |

DADA en Bayamon, Puerto Rico, a 27 de marzo de

1978.

REGISTRESE Y NOTIFIQUESE.

JOSE F. RODRIGUEZ RIVERA

JUEZ SUPERIOR

APENDICE III

EN EL TRIBUNAL SUPERIOR DE PUERTO RICO

SALA DE BAYAMON

CIVIL NUM.: 76-2974

SOBRE: ACCION CIVIL

(Injunction Posesorio)

EPIFANIA PEREZ GUZMAN,

DEMANDANTE

VS.

BASILIO VEGA VEGA Y

LUIS SANTIAGO ORTEGA,

DEMANDADOS

MANDAMIENTO AL ALGUACIL

PARA QUE CUMPLIMENTE

ORDEN DE LANZAMIENTO

AL SR. ALGUACIL DEL TRIBUNAL:

Con fecha de enero de 1978, este Honorable

Tribunal ha dictado la Orden que a continuacion se

transcribe:

“Vista la Mocion de la Parte Demandante en el caso

del epigrafe en la cual solicita el lanzamiento de los

demandados Basilio Vega Vega y Luis Santiago

Ortega, sus familiares, empleados y/o personas que

ocupen la propiedad mencionada en la Demanda

del epigrafe; examinados los autos del caso y la Ley

aplicable, el Tribunal declara CON LUGAR la

referida Mocién y en su consecuencia ordena el

lanzamiento de los demandados Basilio Vega Vega

y Luis Santiago Ortega, sus familiares, empleados

y/o persona o personas que ocupen la propiedad

“Parcela de terreno con una cabida superficial de

QUINIENTOS METROS (500) CUADRADOS,

localizada en Villa Islefia en la Carretera Estatal

Nuamero Ochocientos Treinta y Cinco (835) del

Barrio Guaraguao del término municipal de

Guaynabo, Puerto Rico, en lindes por el NORTE

en una distancia de Treinta y dos puntos

sesentidos (32.62) metros con la Carretera o

camino vecinal pavimentada; por el SUR en una

distancia de Nueve punto Cuarenticinco (9.45)

metros con la Familia Alvarado Colon; por el

ESTE en una distancia de Veintisiete punto

Trece (27.13) metros con Angel F. Candelaria y

por el OESTE en una distancia de Ocho punto

Veintitres (8.23) metros con un camino vecinal

pavimentado. En esta parcela hay construidas

unas estructuras de madera techadas de zinc

dedicadas a uso residencial.”

Esta orden quedara sin efecto en el caso de que la

parte demandada, sus familiares, empleados o

persona o personas que ocupaban la propiedad objeto

de la demanda hayan desalojado la misma y hayan

pagado los costos y gastos de este procedimiento mas

los honorarios de abogado que fijé el Tribunal.

DADA en Bayamon, Puerto Rico a 27 de marzo de

1978.

REGISTRESE Y NOTIQUESE.

JOSE F. RODRIGUEZ RIVERA

JUEZ SUPERIOR _

POR TANTO, Usted, Sr. Alguacil, de este

Tribunal, es requerido por la presente para que dé

fiel cumplimiento a la orden antes descrita y proceda

con el correspondiente lanzamiento en el caso del

epigrafe.

DADA en Bayamon, Puerto Rico, a 5 de abril de

1978.

REGISTRESE Y NOTIQUESE.

MARIA MORALES DE POU

SECRETARIA

APENDICE IV

EN EL TRIBUNAL SUPERIOR DE PUERTO RICO

SALA DE BAYAMON

CIVIL NUM.: CS 76-2974

SOBRE: ACCION CIVIL

(Inj. Pos.)

EPIFANIA PEREZ GUZMAN,

DEMANDANTE

VS.

BASILIO VEGA VEGA Y OTRO,

DEMANDADOS

RESOLUCION

En este caso ambas partes son invasores confesos de

propiedad ajena. La parte demandante acudio al

Tribunal mediante el recurso de injunction posesorio

para que se ordenara a los demandados a desalojar el

terreno que alegadamente invadieron a quien antes lo

habian también invadido. Emitimos sentencia prote-

giendo la posesion de la demandante. Comparecieron

mas tarde los demandados pidiendo que dejasemos

sin efecto la sentencia en base a que no fueran

emplazados debidamente y a que uno de los

demandados no fue debidamente traido al pleito.

Senalamos el incidente para vista en la cual se adujo

abundante prueba testifical.

Para la fecha de la vista uno de los demandados,

Basilio Vega Vega, ya no ocupaba el terreno en

controversia. En cuanto al otro demandado revela la

prueba ante el Tribunal que se le conoce como Luis y

como Wiso y fue uno de los que invadié y construy6

una casucha en el sitio objeto de la demanda.

Comparece ahora en el presente incidente alegando

ser Luis Santiago Ortega. No puede negar, sin

embargo, que es la misma persona demandada bajo el

nombre de Luis Santiago Ortega, conocido por Guiso.

Nos merecié completo crédito el testigo Javier

Fragoso, quien dijo llevar 25 afos en labores

relacionadas con el emplazamiento de personas y

otras funciones en los Registros de Propiedad.

Aseveré6 que emplazé debidamente a los dos

demandados. Detallé su viaje a los terrenos de la

invasion y la forma en que entreg6 las notificaciones.

Las demas circunstancias de la prueba nos convencen

aun mas de que efectivamente se cumpli6 con la Ley

en el emplazamiento de los demandados y de que no

tienen raz6n en sus presentes alegaciones.

Se deja en todo su efecto y vigor la sentencia y se

deniega la mocién para dejar sin efecto lo actuado.

Registrese y Notifiquese.

DADA en Bayamon, Puerto Rico, hoy dia 20 de

febrero de 1979.

JOSE F. RODRIGUEZ RIVERA |

JUEZ SUPERIOR

APENDICE V

EN EL TRIBUNAL SUPERIOR DE PUERTO RICO

SALA DE BAYAMON

CIVIL NUM.: 76-2974 (505)

SOBRE: Injunction Posesorio

EPIFANIA PEREZ,

DEMANDANTE

VS.

BASILIO VEGA Y

LUIS SANTIAGO ORTEGA

C/P GUISO,

DEMANDADOS

RESOLUCION

Para mayor claridad del incidente que nos toca

resolver en el presente caso se hace necesario una

relacion del peregrinaje judicial de éste. Veamos.

ki] 27 de octubre de 1976 radicé la demandante una

accion de “Injunction Posesorio” contra los demanda-

dos, alegando que estos le invadieron la posesién del

predio de terreno que en la demanda se describi6é. Es

procedente sefalar que la alegada ocupacién de dicho

predio por la parte demandante advino también

mediante una invasién de terrenos, por lo que nos

encontramos frente a una alegada invasién contra otro

invasor.

Se emplaz6 a ambos demandados el 13 de noviembre

de 1976. Por no haber comparecido al pleito a

responder el 1 de diciembre de 1976. E] 18 de marzo de

1977 se vié la vista en rebeldia y se dicté sentencia el 3

de agosto de 1977; copia de la notificacién se archivé en

autos el 26 de octubre de 1977.

kl 27 de marzo de 1978 se expidid orden de

lanzamiento para que se desalojara a los demandados

de la propiedad. E]| 1 de septiembre de 1978, fecha para

la cual atin no se habia Ilevado a cabo el desalojo, y

habiendo transcurrido casi un ano de la notificacién de

la sentencia, radicaron los demandados un escrito que

titularon “Mocién para Dejar sin Efecto Mocién (sic) y

Otros Extremos”, en la que se pide al Tribunal que deje

sin efecto la sentencia al amparo de la Regia 49.2,

aduciendo que el Tribunal no adquirié jurisdiccién

sobre las partes. No se adujo ningun otro argumento

para que se dejara sin efecto la sentencia. Se acompané

la Mocién con declaraciones de los demandados

negando bajo juramento que conocieran del caso antes

del tramite de desalojo. Luego de celebrarse una vista,

en la que las partes aportaron pruebas sobre la

contencién de cada cual, mediante Resolucién del 20 de

febrero de 1979 el Tribunal resolviéd que los

demandados fueron validamente emplazados por lo que

dej6 en efecto la sentencia. Nada hizo la parte

demandada en torno a la Resolucién del Tribunal hasta

que se comienza a gestionar nuevamente el lanzamien-

to de los demandados, seis meses después de la fecha de

dicha Resolucién. Se solicité entonces que no se

expidiera nueva orden de lanzamiento, a lo que el

Tribunal dispuso No Ha Lugar, mediante Orden del 13

de agosto de 1979. Se recurrié al Tribunal Supremo en

Certiorari, y éste no expidié el auto. (Resolucién del 18

de octubre de 1979).

El 4 de diciembre de 1979 vuelven los demandados a

radicar otra “Mocién de Relevo de Sentencia”. Se aduce

para ello una serie de fundamentos, entre ellos, que la

demandante “cometié fraude al Tribunal al declarar

falsamente que se encontraba en la posesién real del

inmueble objeto de la controversia...”. Es esta la Mocién

que esta ahora para nosotros resolver.

Simultaneamente con la radicacién de esta nueva

solicitud de relevo de sentencia se pidié la inhibicién en

el caso del Hon. José P. Rodriguez Rivera. Mediante

Resolucién y Orden del 6 de diciembre de 1979, el

referido juez dispuso que aunque “los fundamentos

para la recusacion son frivolos... como estan formulados

dentro de un espiritu de pequefia intriga...” se inhibia

en el caso. Asi llegé a nuestra atencion.

El 11 de diciembre de 1979 los demandados

radicaron ante el Tribunal Supremo un escrito que

titularon “Apelacién”, con copia ante esta Sala del

Tribunal Superior'. Se apelé aparentemente de una

determinacién inexistente, pues se hace referencia a

una alegada sentencia o determinacion en el caso, por el

Hon. Juan José Rios Martinez, que se aduce pone fin a

la cuestién litigiosa, pero que ni se habia dictado a

aquella fecha ni se dicté luego. Ek] 20 de diciembre de

1979 el Tribunal Supremo dispuso “no ha lugar” a)

escrito de apelacioén.

Sefalamos una vista en torno a la Mocidén bajo la

Regla 49.2 para el 18 de enero de 1980. En la misma

limitamos el planteamiento al alegado fraude al

Tribunal, por entender que careciamos de jurisdiccién

| Se hizo contrario a lo preceptuado en la Regla 53.1 de Procedimiento

Civil.

para considerar los demas fundamentos alegados en la

Mocién. En dicha vista ambas partes ofrecieron prueba

en torno a sus sendas contenciones, quedando sometido

el incidente, sujeto solo a un memorando de autoridades

que se requirié que cada parte rindiera en o antes del

15 de febrero de 1980. Ambas partes lo radicaron fuera

de término; el demandante lo hizo el 19 de febrero de

1980; el demandado el 25 de febrero de 1980.

Luego de Ja vista en la que ya el incidente habia

quedado sometido, la parte demandada solicité la

transcripcién de unas vistas anteriores “para poder

probar dicho fraude” de la parte demandante. Al pasar

juicio sobre esta solicitud sefialamos que el incidente

habia quedado sometido con la prueba presentada en la

vista. Solicité también la parte demandada mediante

otro escrito, la reconsideracién « la admisién en

evidencia de algunos documentos, los que acompafié en

su mocién. Sin entrar a considerar la propiedad de tal

solicitud en esa etapa de los procedimientos, que

equivale practicamente a una invitacién a que abramos

mas las puertas al anarquismo procesal que ya parece

haberse asomado en este caso, dispusimos No Ha Lugar

a la misma.

Merece hacerse mencién que en la vista del 18 de

enero de 1980 se radicé por los abogados de la parte

demandada, y fue declarada con lugar, una mocién

renunciando a la representaci6n legal de Basilio Vega,

luego de aclarar que la solicitud para la que sefialé la

vista se hacia solamente en nombre de otro demandado.

Se estipul6 que el Sr. Basilio Vega ya habia

abandonado la propiedad objeto del pleito.

La propia prueba de la parte demandada en la vista

antes indicada no establece la existencia de fraude al

Tribunal que alega dicha parte. Con el testimonio de

uno de sus testigos, el Sr. Rafael Lopez, qued6é

establecido que cuando llegé el demandado Wilfredo

Santiago, que es el mismo demandado Luis A. Santiago

(conocido por Guiso), a la propiedad, habia en el solar

una caseta de madera como de un cuarto, que se —

establecio era de la demandante. Tenia alli herramien-

tas para construir en el solar y equipo de cocina.

Ademas de la caseta habia instalados los denominados

“socos” para la edificacién. El propio demandado

expres6 que lleg6 al solar en octubre de 1976 (mes en

que se radicd originalmente el pleito); que la

demandante enseguida lo llev6 a la Corte de Distrito de

Guaynabo. Alli el Juez Toro le indicé a la demandante

que tenia que radicar “Injunction”. Asi lo hizo, y

mientras tanto el demandado sigui6é construyendo alli,

a sabiendas de que habia una accion pendiente en el

Tribunal, pues habia sido debidamente emplazado.

La Regla 49.2 de Procedimiento Civil es un

mecanismo para abrir camino a la justicia (Sen. de

Bravo Gonzalez v. Secretario de Hacienda, 106 D.P.R.

672). No es, sin embargo, un medio para conseguir que

se extiendan términos de revision de una Sentencia, que

es en esencia lo que se pretende ahora en este caso

(Vease Figuerva v. Banco de San Juan, resuelto el 16 de

mayo de 1979, 79 J.T.S.; 46 Gonzilez v. Chaves, 103

D.P.R. 478; Rodriguez v. Tribunal Superior, 102 D.P.R.

290). El uso de este mecanismo procesal tiene unas

limitaciones que impone la propia Regla.

Dispone la citada Regla, en la parte que ahora nos

concierne que:

“..Esta regla no limita el poder del tribunal para

(a) conocer de un pleito independiente con el

proposito de relevar a una parte de una sentencia,

orden o procedimiento; (b) conceder un remedio a

una parte que en realidad no hubiera sido

emplazada; y (c) dejar sin efecto una sentencia por

motivo de fraude al tribunal”.

No tenemos ante nosotros la situaci6n que contempla

la parte (a) del parrafo transcrito. La situaci6n cobijada

en la parte (b) ya fue adjudicada al considerar el

Tribunal la anterior Mocién de Relevo de Sentencia.

Ello dejaria disponible para este incidente unicamente

lo cubierto bajo la letra (c), el llamado fraude al

Tribunal.

En estos casos no impera la limitacién del término de

seis meses (G.A.C. Finance Corp. v. Rodriguez, 102

D.P.R. 213; Municipio de Coamo v. Tribunal Superior,

99 D.P.R. 932).

E] demandado pretende sostener el alegado fraude

amparandose en que la demandante no trajo la verdad

a la consideracién del Tribunal en la vista del caso.

Para ello trae a nuestra atencién unos testimonios que

no merecen crédito alguno, en torno a las expresiones

falsas de la demandante. Lo Unico que queda en claro

de la prueba es que el demandado, quien por su

negligente desatencién al ser emplazado y por su claro

menosprecio se indiferencia al tramite judicial, se ve en

las puertas del desalojo, trata ahora de buscar el refugio

del Tribunal, al que desatendié al seguir construyendo

con mediada mala fe. Se olvida que en la realizacién de

la justicia no se puede santificar maniobras como la

llevada a cabo por él (Soriano Tavdarez v. Rivera

Anaya, resuelto el 30 de abril de 1979, 79 J.T.S. 42).

Confunde el demandado (en su memorando de

autoridades) el concepto de domicilio con el de posesi6n.

Pretende asirse, ademas, al argumento de la equidad y

reclamar, por primera vez en esta etapa, el derecho a

que se le compense por lo edificado, amparandose en

disposiciones de ley que gobiernan el derecho de

accesién. Aunque la mala fe en el caso ha quedado

claramente sefalada, tampoco tiene el demandado a su

favor estos argumentos en una Mocién de relevo de

sentencia.

Aduce también el demandado que su _ desalojo

constituiria una privaci6on de su propiedad sin el debido

proceso de ley. Aunque también ha sido traida

tardiamente esta defensa, su frivolidad es manifiesta. A

él se le dio oportunidad de traer al Tribunal todas las

‘ defensas que creyera tener disponible a su favor.

Prefirié la desatencién. No puede ahora lamentarse.

“Resulta ridiculo que personas que invaden ilegalmente

y sin derecho alguno inmuebles ajenos planteen como

error... que se les privé del disfrute de su propiedad...”

(Catalan Gonzdlez v. Garcia, 104 D.P.R. 380, 386).

Sobre lo que constituye fraude al Tribunal, que es lo

unico que nos toca aqui resolver, merece destacarse lo

que se dijo en Municipio de Coamo, supra (p. 939)

“La Regla 49.2 contempla dos clases de fraude. Los

distingue establecrendo que en el caso de fraude

entre partes la mocién de relevo debe ser

presentada dentro del término de seis meses. En

los casos de fraude al tribunal puede éste dejar sin

efecto la sentencia sin limitacién de tiempo alguno.

La distincion entre los dos tipos de fraude la hace

Moore de la siguiente forma: ‘Fraude al tribunal,

ereemos, debe cubrir sélo aquellos tipos de fraude

cuyo efecto 0 cuya intencién es mancillar al

tribunal como tal, o que es fraude perpetrado por

oficiales del tribunal, de tal forma que la

maquinaria judicial no pueda ejercer como de

costumbre su imparcial labor de juzgar los casos

que se le presentan para adjudicacién. Fraude

inter partes, sin mas, no ha de considerarse fraude

al tribunal, sino que el remedio se dejara para una

mocién presentada bajo la Regla 60 (b) (3) 0 a

accion independiente”.

Nuestra jurisprudencia ha reconocido que

constituye fraude al tribunal ‘la preparacion, el uso y-

la presentacién en la vista del caso de prueba falsa

obtenida por la parte adversa por medio del soborno y

la instigacién al perjurio...’ ”

Nada hay en el presente caso que permita concluir

que la demandante incurrié en fraude al Tribunal.

Se declara sin lugar la Mocidén de Relevo de

Sentencia.

NOTIFIQUESE.

Dada en Bayamén, Puerto Rico, a 28 de febrero de

1980.

ENRIQUE RIVERA SANTANA

JUEZ SUPERIOR

APENDICE VI

ESTADO LIBRE ASOCIADO DE PUERTO RICO

TRIBUNAL GENERAL DE JUSTICIA

TRIBUNAL SUPERIOR

SALA DE BAYAMON

CIVIL NUM.: 76-2974 (505)

SOBRE: Injunction Posesorio

EPIFANIA PEREZ

VS.

BASILIO VEGA Y LUIS SANTIAGO ORTEGA

C/P GUISO

NOTIFICACION

Lie. Georgina Candal

Apartado 727, Guaynabo, Puerto Rico 00657

~ Ljc. Antonio Cajigas Llanos,

Rodriguez Oquendo Esq. 2B-#142.

Urb. Severo Quifiones, Carolina, Puerto Rico 00630

Senores: ,

Notifico a ustedes que en relacién con ** Mocién de

Reconsideracién** radicada por el demandado Wil-

fredo Santiago el Hon. Juez dict6 la Orden que se

transcribe a continuacion, la cual ha sido archivada

en autos en el dia de hoy:

Orden: “No Ha Lugar”.

ENRIQUE RIVERA SANTANA

JUEZ SUPERIOR

Bayamon, Puerto Rico, a 12 de marzo de 1980.

ROSA M. CARRILLO

SECRETARIA

CERTIFICO: Que envié por correo de esta

notificacion a las partes arriba mencionadas a sus

direeciones indicadas en la misma, hoy 13 de marzo

de 1980, habiendo archivado en los autos copia de esta

notificacién en 13 de marzo de 1980.

Bayamon, Puerto Rico, a 13 de marzo de 1980.

NELLY CRUZ CORE

SECRETARIA AUXILIAR

APENDICE VII

EN EL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO DE PUERTO RICO

NUM. 0-79-455

CERTIORARI

EPIFANIA PEREZ,

DEMANDANTE Y RECURRIDA

BASILIO VEGA Y

LUIS SANTIAGO ORTEGA,

DEMANDADO Y PETICIONARIO

RESOLUCION

San Juan, Puerto Rico, a 18 de octubre de 1979.

A la anterior solicitud de certiorari, no ha lugar.

Lo acord6é el Tribunal y certifica el Secretario. Los

Jueces Asociados senores Rigau y Negron Garcia no

intervinieron.

ERNESTO L. CHIESA

SECRETARIO

APENDICE VIII

EN EL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO DE PUERTO RICO

NUM.: R-80-131

REVISION

EPIFANIA PEREZ GUZMAN,

DEMANDANTE Y RECURRIDA

BASILIO VEGA VEGA Y

LUIS SANTIAGO ORTEGA,

DEMANDADO Y RECURRENTE

RESOLUCION

San Juan, Puerto Rico, a 15 de mayo de 1980.

A la anterior mocion de reconsideracion, no ha lugar.

Lo acordé el Tribunal y certifica el Secretario. EF]

Juez Presidente sefior Trias Monge y el Juez Asociado

senor Rigau no intervinieron.

ERNESTO L. CHIESA

SECRETARIO

a .

APENDICE Ix

EN EL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO DE PUERTO RICO

NUM. R-80-131

REVISION

EPIFANIA PEREZ GUZMAN,

DEMANDANTE Y RECURRIDA

BASILIO VEGA VEGA Y

LUIS SANTIAGO ORTEGA,

DEMANDADO Y RECURRENTE

Mocion solicitando Traduccién y Certificacién de

las opiniones y ordenes emitidas en presente caso

AL HONORABLE TRIBUNAL:

Comparece el recurrente por conducto de los

abogados que suscriben y muy respetuosamente

expone, alega y solicita:

PRIMERO: Que en el presente caso la parte

recurrente esta preparando un recurso de certiorari

para ante el Tribunal Supremo de Estados Unidos.

SEGUNDO: Que la regla 23 (J) del reglamento del

Tribunal Supremo de Estados Unidos requiere que se

someta el recurso de Certiorari con copia de las

ordenes y opiniones emitidas en el caso por el

Tribunal del estado.

La Regla 37 del Reglamento del Tribunal Supremo

de Estados Unidos requiere que cuando un record

que se tramita al Tribunal Supremo conste en

lenguaje extranjero este, esté traducido bajo la

autoridad de la Corte inferior.

TERCERO: Que la parte recurrente precisa que

para cumplir con las antes citadas reglas este

Honorable Tribunal provea una traduccion oficial de

las siguientes opiniones en este caso.

Sentencia emitida por el Tribunal Superior de

Bayamon el 3 de agosto de 1977.

Orden de Lanzamiento emitida por el Tribunal

Superior de Bayamon el 27 de marzo de 19738.

Mandamiento emitido por el Tribunal Superior

de Bayamon el 5 de abril de 1978.

. Resolucién emitida por el Tribunal Superior de

Bayamon el 20 de febrero de 1979.

Resolucién declarando no ha lugar al Certiorari

emitido por el Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico

el 18 de octubre de 1979.

Resolucié6n emitida por el Tribunal Superior el

28 de Febrero de 1980.

Orden declarando no ha lugar a la Mocién de

Reconsideracién del Tribunal Superior de

Bayamon del dia 12 de marzo de 1980.

Orden declarando no ha lugar a la peticién de

Revisién emitida por el Tribunal Supremo de

Puerto Rico el dia 17 de abril de 1980.

Orden declarando no ha lugar a la Mocién de

Reconsideraci6n emitida por el Tribunal Supre-

mo de Puerto Rico el dia 15 de mayo de 1980.

Por todo lo cual, la parte recurrente solicita muy

respetuosamente de este Honorable Tribunal que a

tenor con las reglas 23 y 37 del Tribunal Supremo de

Estados Unidos se sirva ordenar y suministrar la

traduccién de las 6érdenes y resoluciones antes

enumeradas. :

| a

CERTIFICACION

Lertifico que he enviado copia fiel y exacta de la

presente mocién al Ledo. Cajigas Llamas en su

direccién calle 2-B No. 142, Urb. Severo Quifionez,

Carolina, P.R.

En San Juan, Puerto Rico a 6 de junio de 1980.

GEORGINA CANDAL

FRANCISCA SANTIAGO NEGRON

Servicios Legales de Puerto Rico

Apartado 727

Guaynabo, Puerto Rico

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.