Petition — Metro Truck Body, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board
Supreme Court brief1980
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1980
No. _é » Maes : e}
METRO TRUCK Bopy, INC.,
Petitioner,
VS.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BoarD,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CASTELLANOS & O’NEILL
FRANCIS J. O'NEILL, Esq.
1346 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90017
Telephone: 213/484-1772
Attorneys for Petitioner
METRO TRUCK Bopy, INC.
ERK |
PANDICK PRESS, WEST COAST, 1945 S. FIGUEROA, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA (213) 747-4321
)
SUBJECT INDEX
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1980
INDEX
AUTHORITIES CITED
CASES PAGE
United States Supreme Court: No.
N.L.R.B. v. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 333, (1946)..........c0000 ll
United States Court of Appeals: METRO TRUCK Bopy, INC.,
N.L.R.B. v. Air Control Prods. of St. Petersburg, Inc., 335 sas
Sih 05, ORC AB cs aici nectcesicks 12, 13 reenene
N.L.R.B. v. Bata Shoe Co., 377 F.2d 821 (C.A. 4) ....0...... 12,13 VS.
N.L.R.B. v. IDEAL LAUNDRY AND DRY CLEANING
CO SUR EIG ee eee 12 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS Boar,
N.L.R.B. v. JOCLIN MFG. CO., 134 F.2d 627...........c.s0000000 12 Respondent.
N.L.R.B. v. ORTRONIX, INC., 380 F.2d 737 (C.A. 5) ........ 12
N.L.R.B. v. POINSETT LUMBER MFG., 221 F.2d 121...... 12
N.L.R.B. v. SUN DRUG CO., 359 F.2d 408..............0:0000++ 12, 13 PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
N.L.R.B. v. WILKENING MFG. CO., 207 F.2d 98, 100 ....... 13 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES RUBBER COMPANY v. N.L.R.B., 373 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Fa ee 0b B catiietaece niece Fat CTE Oe 12
National Labor Relations Board Decisions:
Metro Truck Body, Inc., 223 NLRB Crses 988 ........... cece 5 To the Honorable, the Chief Justice and Associate Justices
Metro Truck Body, Inc., 230 NLRB Cases 28 .................000es 4
of the Supreme Court of the United States.
STATUTES METRO TRUCK BODY, INC., the petitioner herein,
prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of
~~ oi. tees epee Re ‘he United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
ationa abor Keilations Act, as amende tat. " : Sy ;
73 Stat. 519, 88 Stat. 395, 29 J.S.C. 151, et seq. )............00 4 CRONE Oe SRE Fae Ye oe tev eee
II UTP cate hnccia deer ete ee oie ee 5
a) Daan dn Nis area caenaean ne RL 3,4, 6 ; OPINIONS BELOW
gg |G RSE IGA Se UN MOSLAN AEE rr na P= © : i
Section I csicka lotsa de-stlbvos case sascha iccaamatakieiacsataueseisae sdeas iiadiuanda 4 The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Section I Nak patie cnipeanrincapacatepialienshaapiedisinebatations ovceecons 5 ) Ninth Circuit is unreported and is printed in Appendix A
aa ee | autached hereto, infra
Federal Rules of Evidence: The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
Gee Re ae oe Sol ec 2, 3,10, 11 ! the Ninth Circuit is printed in Appendix B, hereto, infra.
Rules of the United States Supreme Court:
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JURISDICTION
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth was entered on March 10, 1980. A timely petition for
rehearing was denied on February 25, 198v.
The jurisdiction of the Court is invoked under 28 USC
9/254 and Rule 19.1(b) of the Rules of the United States
Supreme Court; where a Court of Appeals has, in effect, by
ignoring the issue presented on appeal, decided an important
question of federal law which has not been, but should be,
settled by this court; to wit: what standards should apply to a
“true translation” of a NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD ballot from English to Spanish and for markings in the
Spanish language on the ballots counted and certified for the
Union in an NLRB election. This question affects more than
the parties to this action since it effects a large population of the
United States who are Spanish speaking in administrative and
judicial proceedings involving the use and translation of the
Spanish language. At issue is the interpretation and application
of Rule 604 of Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and
Magistrates, and Rule 604 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
both sections requiring a “true translation.”
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the finding of fact by the NLRB‘ that:
On September 1, 1976, a majority of employees in the
appropriate unit in a secret ballot election conducted by NLRB
designated the Union as their collective bargaining representa-
tive,? is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a
whole where the record does not comply with Rule 604 of the
Federal RULES OF EVIDENCE.
' NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD is herein referred
to as NLRB.
2 Transcript of Record, Pleadings, Volume 1, page 116, herein
referred to as (R. 116). References preceding a semicolon are to the
NLRB findings; those following, to the evidence.
3
2. Whether the NLRB has conducted a fair hearing re the
meaning of the Sth and 14th Amendment of the United States
Constitution “due process” clause where the NLRB has denied:
(a) A hearing on the alleged charge herein of Viola-
tion of NLRAS Section 8(a)(5) and Section 8(a)(1), 29
U.S.C. 158(a)(5) and 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), and has
granted summary judgment that was opposed by the
company,‘ and has entered its orders that are sought to be
enforced herein.
STATUTES INVOLVED
Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 604, provides:
“An interpreter is subject to the provisions of these rules
relating to qualification as an expert and the administration of
an oath or affirmation that he will make a true translation.”
Rules of Evidence— United States Supreme Court Version,
Rule 604 provides:
“An interpreter is subject to the provisions of these rules
relating to qualification as an expert and the adminstration of
an oath or affirmation that he will make a true translation.”
29 USC 160(3)e provides:
“The Board shall have power to petition any court of
appeals of the United States, . . ., wherein the unfair labor
practice in question occurred or wherein such person resides or
transacts business, for the enforcement of such order and for
appropriate temporary relief or restraining order, and shall file
in the court the record in the proceedings, as provided in
Section 2112 of title 28, United States Code (28 USC § 2112).
oes The findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact
if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as
a whole shall be conclusive.”
3 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT is herein referred to
as NLRA.
4METRO TRUCK BODY, INC. is herein referred to as the
“Company.”
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States provides in pertinent part as follows:
“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law... .”
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Nature of the case
NLRB has filed an application herein pursuant to NLRA,
as amended (61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519, 88 Stat. 395, 29 U.S.C.
151, et seq.) The basis of the application herein is Section
10(e) of NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 160(e) for the enforcement of its
orders issued against the Company on June 14, 1977 and
reported at 230 NLRB Cases 285 (R. 111-121); infra,
Appendix C.
The NLRB orders are in part based on findings of fact and
conclusions of law made in a representation proceeding under
Section 9 of NLRB, 29 U.S.C. 159, (NLRB Case Number 31-
RC-3127), the record of said proceeding being before this
Court pursuant to Section 9(d) of NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 159(d).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth District
had jurisdiction of this application, because the alleged unfair
labor practices are alleged to have occurred at the Company’s
plant in Torrance, California, within this Court’s jurisdiction.
2. Course of Proceedings
(a) Representation Proceeding
The Union filed a representation petition on March the 10,
1975 with NLRB (R. 3-4). On March 13, 1975, the Union
filed a charge with NLRB alleging that the Company violated
Sections 8(a)(3) and (8)(a)(1) of NLRA, 29 US.C.
® Decisions and Orders of the NLRB, Volume 230, Page 28.
5
138(a)(3) and 138(a)(1) when it discharged eight (8) em-
ployees because they were “illegal aliens.” On April 20, 1976,
the NLRB dismissed NLRB General Counsel’s Complaint,
which case is reported, as Metro Truck Body, Inc. 223 NLRB
Cases 988.
In conformity with NLRB policy to delay representation
proceedings until the unfair labor charges are resolved, the
representation hearing pursuant to Section 9(c) of NLRA, 29
U.S.C. 159(c) was postponed until after the dismissal of the
Section 8 charges; the hearing on the representation proceed-
ings was held on July 28, 1976 (R. 5), before Hearing Officer
SHERI ROSS. Decision and Direction of Election was entered
on August 5, 1976 by the Regional Director pursuant to
authority delegated by NLRB under Section 3(b) of NLRA, 29
U.S.C. 153(b).
The company filed its REQUEST FOR REVIEW OF
DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTION on August 18,
i976 with NLRB (R. 12), which was denied on August 26,
1976 by NLRB (R. 17).
The representation election was held on September the Ist,
1976 (R. 19-20).
At that time, the Company objected to the Tally of Ballots
and indicated that it would file formal Ojections to Tally of
Ballots (R. 29).
The Company filed its OBJECTIONS TO TALLY OF
BALLOTS AT ELECTION (R. 21) and OBJECTIONS TO
ELECTION (R. 29) on September 9, 1976.
The Regional Director purusant to delegated authority
(supra) entered his Supplemental Decision and Certification of
Representative on September 29, 1976 (R. 47-50).
The Company filed itt REQUEST FOR REVIEW OF
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION OF REGIONAL DIRECTOR
AND CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE on October
8, 1976 with NLRB (R. 51), which was denied by NLRB on
November |, 1976 (R. 60).
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(b) The Unfair Labor Practices Proceeding
The Union filed a Charge against the Company on January
10, 1977, alleging violations of Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5)
of NLRA in that the Company has failed and refused to
bargain in good faith with the Union (R. 61); the Regional
Director of NLRB filed his complaint thereon on February 3,
1977 (R. 62-66); the Company filed an Answer to Complaint
on February 14, 1977 (R. 67).
General Counsel for NLRB filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment on March 2, 1977 (R. 71); the Company filed its
OBJECTIONS TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
on March 31, 1977 (R. 86).
NLRB entered its Decision and Order granting Summary
Judgment on June 14, 1977 (R. 111-121), which is the basis for
the Application for Enforcement herein.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal entered its Order For
Enforcement on March 10, 1980.
3. Statement of Facts Relevani to the Issues
(a) “Majority” of the employees in a unit required for
Representation Certification.
The official NLRB ballot that was used at the election had
the following instructions:
“MARK AN ‘X’ IN THE SQUARE OF YOUR CHOICE
MARQUESE CON UNA ‘X’ DENTRO DEL CUADRO
DE SU SELECCION
YES NO
SI NO
in response to the question in English and Spanish:
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“Do you wish to be represented for purposes of collective
bargaining by—
AUTOMOTIVE EMPLOYEES, LAUNDRY DRIVERS
& HELPERS LOCAL 88, INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS,
WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA”6
(R.18).
The spanish translation for “YES” on the official ballot
was “SI” namely one capital “S” and one capital “I”. There
were no markings placed over the “I” on the official ballot, i.e.
no accent mark nor any dot. In Spanish the meaning of the
word is changed by the use of a dot or an accent when writing
the word (R. 24).
In the instant case, two of the ballots had written in the box
under the word “YES” — “SI”, the handwritten Spanish word
“si” (R. 48). The hand written “si” was dotted; it was not
printed in Capital Letters as set forth in the official ballot
(R. 18). In Spanish, a handwritten “si” with a dot over the “i”
means “if’’ and not “yes”; “yes” in Spanish has to be written
with an accent such as “‘s1”, (R. 24-25).
The two ballots in question were counted as Votes for the
Union by BEVERLY JOHNSON, a staff member of NLRB
(R. 19-20). Before the election, BEVERLY JOHNSON admit-
ted that she did not understand Spanish (R. 26). During the
counting of the ballots the Company objected to BEVERLY
JOHNSON counting the two questioned ballots as affirmative
ballots cast for the Union, and noted at the bottom of the
official Tally of Ballots that formal objections to the Tally
would be filed later (R. 19).
6 Herein referred to as the “Union.”
FN es i ee i
8
The NLRB tally of votes show that:
1. Approximate number of eligible voters 22
2. Void ballots 0
3. Votes cast for PETITIONER 13
oi eet oe ge
6. Votes cast against participating labor
organization(s) u
7. Valid votes counted 22
(R. 19).
OBJECTIONS TO TALLY OF BALLOTS AT ELEC- |
TION were filed by the Company on September 1976, (R. 21)
on the following grounds:
i. The mark “si” in Spanish does not mean “yes” but
rather “if when it is written with a dot as was written in
the two (2) ballots in question... .. .
2. The markings, “si” clearly identify the voters as
Spanish Speaking, and therefore destroy the “SECRECY”
of the ballot that is mandated by the NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT. (R. 21-22).
On September 29, 1976 the Regional Director of NLRB
made a finding of fact in SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE that “the word
“si” printed in the square designated for “yes” votes indicates a
clear choice for union representation.” (R. 48)
Based on said finding of fact in the representation proceed-
ing, the NLRB concluded in the Unfair Labor Practice case
that:
“4. Since September 29, 1976 the above-named labor
organization has been and now is the certified exclusive
representative of all employees in the aforesaid appropri-
ate unit for the purpose of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.”
9
and entered its order thereon that is sought to be enforced
herein. (R. 119-120)
The Company raised the same issues in REQUEST FOR
REVIEW OF SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION OF REGIONAL
DIRECTOR AND CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTA-
TIVE (R. 51 at 53-54); and in ANSWER TO COMPLAINT
(R. 67 at 68); and in OBJECTIONS TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (R. 86 at 88-90).
(c) Denials of hearings re;
(1) Unfair Labor Charges.
On October 8, 1976 the Company filed REQUEST FOR
REVIEW OF SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION OF REGIONAL
DIRECTOR AND CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTA-
TIVE on the grounds that:
(1) That the regional director’s decision of a substan-
tial factual issue is clearly erroneous on the record and
such error prejudicially affects the rights of a party.
(2) That a substantial question of law or policy is
raised because of, (a) the absence of, or (b) a departure
from, officially reported Board precedent. (R. 51)
The text of said request clearly sets forth the substantial
factual issue of the finding by the Regional Director of a
“majority of emplo 2es in the unit” as determined by the
counting of the two questioned ballots that had “si” written in
the “YES” box (R. 53-54).
Said Request for Review on the grounds of substantial
questions of fact and law and policy was denied by the Board
(R. 60).
On January 8, 1977 the Union filed an Unfair Labor
Practice charge based on the failure of the Company to bargain
(R. 61).
General Counsel for NLRB filed the complaint (R. 62)
which the Company answered (R. 67) raising the same issues
listed above. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was
granted without hearing (R. 111). The company filed its
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OBJECTIONS TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
setting forth the above issues and the continual refusal of the
NLRB to review them. No hearing was ever granted on these
issues by the Board.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THIS WRIT
1. First Question Presented
The question of what standards for a “True Translation”
should apply to translations from the English language to other
languages, such as Spanish, and from other languages, such as
Spanish, to English in judicial and administrative proceedings
have never been decided by this court. This issue is presented
clearly and simply in this case and affects more than the parties
to this proceeding. Vast portions of the population of the
United States of America are now non-English speaking and
need accurate translations in judicial and administrative pro-
ceedings, if those proceedings are to conform to our standards
of Evidence and Due Process.
Section 10(b) of the NLRB amended provides that, so far
as practicable, unfair labor practice proceedings shall be con-
ducted in accordance with the rules of evidence applicable in
the district courts of the United States.
Federal Rule of Evidence Section 604 provides that: “An
interpreter is subject to the provisions of these rules
relating to qualification as an expert and the administration
of an oath or affirmation that he will make a true
translation.”
The whole election results are in question because “SI”
translated has no meaning without a dot or accent mark.
The only person qualified to translate Spanish in the record
of the Representation Proceeding is ANITA L. CASTEL-
LANOS (R. 24). NLRB staff member BEVERLY JOHNSON
who tallied the votes disqualified herself as a Spanish Inter-
preter before the election was held (R. 26).
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The only evidence in the record of a “true translation
under oath by a qualified interpreter is that of ANITA L.
CASTELLANOS. She certified that “si” when written with a
dot over the “i” means “if” and not “tyes”.
To interpret “si” otherwise is not a true translation of the
Spanish word “si” which is required by Federal Rules of
Evidence Section 604.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the
determination of whether a majority of employees in a unit has
indicated representation by a Union, be made in accordance
with such formal (emphasis added) rules or procedure as the
Board may find necessary to adopt in the sound exercise of its
discretion. NLRB v. TOWER CO., 329 US. 324, 333, 91 L.Ed.
322, 328. To date the Board has not adopted any formal rules
with regards to “marked ballots” nor has the Board in the
present case cited us to any such formal rule.
2. Second Question Presented
(a) Substantive Due Process
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution
would seem to require that a record of evidence be without
ambiguity where translations to and from the English Language
are involved. More than just a resemblance to the meaning of
the. English must be demonstrated. It must convey the true
meaning and not a similarity of meaning to be a basis for the
determination of rights and duties to follow from the evidence
presented to a judicial tribunal or an administrative tribunal.
Without this standard of a true translation, the judicial or
administrative proceeding becomes a farce.
(b) Procedural Due Process
A fair hearing is required.
“DUE PROCESS” CLAUSE OF THE 14th AMEND-
MENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
REQUIRES A FAIR HEARING WHERE THE EM-
PLOYER CHALLENGES THE RESULTS OF AN
ELECTION.
© Red ae a tt ad Ra ke a tlle Aa? dane Vie:
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12
In NLRB v. ORTRONIX, INC. 380 F.2d 737 (C.A. 5), the
court held that an NLRB hearing is necessary and indispensible
if an employer challenges the results of an election since the
employer can meet ‘is burden of showing the election was
unfairly conducted only through the presentation of evidence in
support of his charges.
The court stated:
“In our view there exist numerous substantial and material
issues of fact. . . which call for a formal hearing and the
failure of the Board to provide one was a denial of
procedura! due process.”
The court cited its own UNITED STATES RUBBER COM-
PANY vy. NLRB, 373 F.2d 602 (C.A. 5) in support of its
holding.
In NLRB v. BATA SHOE CO., 377 F.2d 821 (C.A. 4), the
court held:
“To borrow the words of Judge Brown, writing for the
Fifth Circuit, ‘it is clear that Section 8(a)(5) orders which
rest on crucial factual determinations, made after ex parte
investigations, and without a hearing cannot stand.’ NLRB
v. AIR CONTROL PRODS. of ST. PERTERSBURG,
INC., 335 F.2d 245, 249, (C.A. 5, 1964).”
The court in the BATA case supra went on to define what were
substantial and material factual issues raised so as to necessitate
a hearing:
“The determination however, of whether substantial and
material factual issues have been raised so as to necessitate
a hearing is a question of law and ultimately a question for
the courts.”
citing UNITED STATES RUBBER CO. v. NLRB, supra,
NLRB v. SUN DRUG CO., 359 F.2d 408, NLRB v. IDEAL
LAUNDRY & DRY CLEANING CO., 330 F.2d 712, NLRB v.
JOCLIN MFG. CO., 134 F.2d 627, and NLRB v. POINSETT
LUMBER MFG. 221 F.2d 121.
13
In discussing the need for a hearing the court stated at
page 826 in the BATA case, supra:
“A hearing is unnecessary, therefore, where if all the facts
contended for by the objecting party were credited no
ground is shown which would warrant setting aside the
election. NLRB v. AIR CONTROL PRODS. OF ST.
PETERSBURG, INC., supra; accord NLRB v. SUN
DRUG CO., supra; NLRB v. WILKENING MFG. CO., 207
F2d 98, 100.”
In the instant case, it would appear that if the contention of
the Company were all credited on each of the grounds sepa-
rately stated, there would be grounds for setting aside the
election on each of those grounds:
FIRST: If the intent of the two persons who wrote “si” in
the box for marking an “X” for the Union Representation, was
to write “if’’ as the literal meaning of the Spanish word “si”
means, and not “yes”, which is written in Spanish with an
accent as “si”, then under Section 9(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act the union did not receive more than one vote of
the majority of the votes cast as required by the National Labor
Relations Act. In this case, the union would receive only 11
votes which would not be enough under the rules and statute
requiring one more than majority. In this case there were 22
votes cast, and a majority would be eleven, but the Board Rules
require one more, to wit: Twelve (12) votes.
SECOND The whole ballot is in question because 11 of
those who were voting marked the ballot in the YES-“SI” Box.
The facts show that 15 of the 22 employees voting were Spanish
speaking. The ambiguity in the mistranslation of the English
word “YES” leaves in doubt the intent or meaning of the
employees who are spanish speaking who marked an X in the
YES-“SI” box. Did they mean “yes” or did they mean “if”?
14
CONCLUSION
This court has never interpreted what is meant by a “true
translation” by the Federal Rules of Evidence. This case
presents clearly and simply the issue that effects a large
minority of the population of the United States. Those who do
not speak nor understand the English language. It clearly
presents to the Court an opportunity to not only clarify the
Federal Rules of Evidence as it effects this large minority in
daily judicial and administrative proceedings but also give
meaning to the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
amendments where translations to and from the English lan-
guage are involved in the courts and administrative agencies of
the United States of America.
| |
‘ Respectfully submitted.
a
: CASTELLANOS & O’NEILL
;
u
3 BY:
FRANCIS J. O'NEILL, Esq.
*
4 Attorneys for Petitioner
: MetRO TRUCK Bopy, INc.
i
: CASTELLANOS & O'NEILL
; Attorneys at Law
1346 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90017
Telephone: (213) 484-1772
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