Petition — Perry v. United States

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES

October Term, 1979

DON H. PERRY

Petitioner,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

DODD DOP DODD DODD OD LO LO OOO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

No. CR-78-1645

DDO DODD ODD OD OD DCD OD OLD ODO OO Or rr van

DENNIS L. BLEWITT

CLIFFORD J. BARNARD

5019 Holmes Place

Boulder, Colorado 80303

Attorneys for

Defendant-Petitioner

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Subject Index

. Opinions Delivered in Courts Below .................006

es sc ccscsdbacsesecsevcscnccens

_ onstitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules

Nee icadubeccveserecsccss

Tn SSO BEPC ET OLE EE EET EE EEE

OIC TT EET CEPOELTTT TEST TEELEEE

| Bemeom fer Gememting the Wil ...........................005.

. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD ISSUE A

WRIT OF CERTIORARI IN THIS CASE BE-

CAUSE THE TENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF AP-

PEALS’ HOLDING IN THIS CASE IS CON-

TRARY TO THE SUPREME COURT HOLDING

IN THE ANALOGOUS CASE OF DRAPER v.

WASHINGTON, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) AND BE-

CAUSE THE SUPREME COURT HAS NEVER

PREVIOUSLY PRESENTED CONSTITUTIONAL

GUIDELINES BY WHICH TO DETERMINE

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE APPLI-

CA ee rh, ULE, FIC) 21.000. ..0cccecscees

. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD CLARIFY

THE CONFUSION IN THE CIRCUITS CON-

CERNING SCIENTER, KNOWLEDGE, INTENT,

AND WILLFULNESS THAT EXISTS IN CON-

STRUING THE CULPABILITY NEEDED TO

CONVICT A CITIZEN FOR FAILING TO SUP-

PLY TAX INFORMATION CONTRARY TO 26

rats saa sndiececvcosssscsccsesecscsecs

C. A CITIZEN SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO RELY

UPON HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE STH

AMENDMENT WITHOUT HAVING TO BE OR

PROFESS TO BE A CRIMINAL ................00...08. 12

SEIN cosite dich sae recevipronb ice eatin ion cn dau eaianedtiseaas 13

APPENDIX

Ba ae Sic ua seh occurance eerie 14-27

B. Constitution of the United States ........0....0c.cccceee. ef

BS HT ITE Pansies op p> ahisabap aval vaso bindsatneaedetovencs 28

SP See We edocs liens wecocesinc 28

iii

CASES CITED

Bishop Vv. U.S. 412: US. FAB GTi ccc cv rer eesansscsovevess 1]

Cnr FEF Fe UF re FE aa Midis eccntscnedaccinerness 9,18

Draper v. Washington 372 U.S. 487 ........... 6,7,9,10,18,19

Career 0. Sf GEA: OO ose icciniscisnerivnieeneeses 12,13,15

PU CEFF oe BI vais cn vci nn eis sasrendivesenes 13

Miranda’ ¥. Arizona FO4 UB. FAD o.cvevececcccussevessccsess 10,13

Fe Ve NE STE FAs FO neck scans erecscducesccrenscseees 21

ec I EFI a ski ri csdntpicnbresbuessaisdactuanvinss 11

CFS. ¥; MOMS TIL FI. FIG Sones vicsesccclicnncascses 13

Ch Fi Ser I SE ides camera tp cdevnvaevdsesaves 21

SF ae 0 ee EE cals oad ce wk 3 rnd adabseediisskeebareretoes 13

CF ae. ORR BO I, BIL ik od snctincasccevsccccdiceass 13

FB is BE IE FUE TP GRE. eis coevaviccebucenscesercsceasense 1]

7 os Fs PCR BPN PI ons ndavessnsecs casbivevecanas 10, 11

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Sr oa I ot AD cdo hdanhices Copavs anise sasiavaewenes 1]

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES

October Term, 1979

DON H. PERRY

Petitioner,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

ORO DN DDD DADA ODD ODDO DODD IO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

No. CR-78-1645

OOOO DADO D DQ DD OD DDO DOOD

Petitioner, Don H. Perry, by his attorney, prays that a

Writ of Certiorari issue to review the opinion of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Tenth (10th) Circuit entered

on October 1, 1979, with mandate stayed pending Certiorari.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Tenth Circuit, which is attached hereto as Appendix A, was

filed on the Ist day of October, 1979, with mandate stayed

pending Certiorari.

Ul.

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is invoked pur-

suant to 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

Ui.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Constitutional and statutory provisions are set forth in Ap-

pendix B.

IV.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

|. Has the Court of Appeals denied the Defendant a meaning-

ful appeal and thus denied him due process of law as guaranteed

by the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution when it ruled

on the Defendant's appeal issues without a transcript of over

one-half of the Defendant’s trial?

2. What is the correct scienter, knowledge, intent, and will-

fulness needed for the culpability to convict a citizen for failing

to supply tax information contrary to 26 U.S.C. 87203?

3. Does a person have to be a criminal or wrongdoer in order

to fall under the purview of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.

Constitution?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Information charging Mr. Don H. Perry with willfully failing

to supply necessary information on his 1974, 1975, and 1976

1040 Income Tax Return forms, contrary to 26 U.S.C. 7203,

was filed on March 13, 1978. He was convicted June |, 1978, on

all three counts and was sentenced to three concurrent one year

sentences with one year to be suspended if the Defendant were

to perform 320 hours of work for the government. Prior to his

trial on May 30, 1978, the Court denied the following motions

filed on behalf of the Defendant: Motion to Dismiss Due to

Lack of Jurisdiction; Motion to Grant the Defendant Immun-

ity; Motion to Dismiss Due to Prosecutorial Misconduct; Mo-

tion for Change of Venue Due to Prejudicial Publicity; Motion

for Continuance Due to Prejudicial Publicity; Motion to Dis-

miss Due to Prejudicial Publicity; and Motion to Permit Coun-

sel for Defendant to Perform Voir Dire Questioning.

Evidence at a two day trial showed that for the three years

in question, the Defendant had filed 1040 Income Tax Return

forms supplying his name, his wife’s name and a few other

items of information. However, he declined to answer other

questions such as the amount of income he had earned,

claiming his right as a United States citizen to Fifth Amend-

ment guarantees, attaching various pieces of literature and

court decisions which supported his position.

Mr. Perry testified that he had objected to certain questions

on his 1974, 1975 and 1976 Income Tax Return forms because

he felt that the requirement that he supply this information

violated his First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Thirteenth and

Sixteenth Amendment rights. The Defendant’s main conten-

tions were that this violated his First Amendment right to

freedom of religion, since his faith, the Mormon Church, re-

quires him to uphold the Constitution as the Supreme Law of

the Land, and that this violated his Fifth Amendment right,

which denies the government the right to compel a person to

testify against himself.

At trial, the Court refused to permit testimony as to the

Defendant's belief that his First Amendment rights had been

violated by the requirement that he supply this information,

ruling that the First Amendment was no defense to the charge.

Throughout the trial and in instructing the jury at the close of

the trial, the Court stated that a person could not claim any right

under any of the Amendments other than the Fifth Amend-

ment. Furthermore, the Court stated that the Fifth Amendment

privilege would only apply in those cases where a person could

show that he or she had received income from illegal sources or

believed that he or she had received income from illegal

sources. The Defendant did not do this,

The Court refused to give all but one of the Defendant's

proposed instructions. Among those instructions denied were

the Defendant's instructions with regard to ex post facto laws,

the equal inference rule, and all instructions tendered by the

Defendant which dealt with the Defendant's Fifth Amendment

right, the definition of good faith, and the definition of willful-

ness,

The Defendant filed a timely appeal and made a timely re-

quest and $1,100.00 deposit to the U.S. District Court reporter

for a transcript of the entire trial. In response to the reporter's

request for a deposit, the Defendant paid the reporter

$1,100.00,

Approximately five months after the conclusion of the trial,

the reporter who had worked for the District Court reporter

supplied the Defendant with a transcript of the second day of

testimony only and the return of verdict on the third day of the

trial,

The Defendant continued to make repeated requests for a

transcript of the missing portion of the trial, which included the

choosing of the jury, the first day of testimony, closing argu-

ments, motions on jury instructions and the jury instructions.

After several hearings, it was determined by the District Court

that the transcript notes for those portions of the trial had been

lost, and that it would be impossible for the reporter to supply

the Defendant with the transcript for these one and a half days

of trial,

The Defendant then followed Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, Rule l(c), which provides the proper procedure to

be followed when a transcript of a court proceeding is unavail-

able, attempting to prepare a statement of the evidence, Be-

cause this process was attempted nine months after the trial

had been held, the Defendant and his counsel found it nearly

impossible to reconstruct the relevant events which occurred

at trial. Each of these three participants had different recollec-

tions of what had occurred at the trial, and none of them could

remember protions of what occurred at trial, Therefore, the

Defendant and his two counsel each wrote a statement of their

recollections of the evidence.

The government took no action and presented no statement

of the U.S. Attorney's recollection of what happened at trial,

On April 20, 1979, the U.S. District Court, the Honorable

Judge Matsch presiding, held a hearing to determine what

records should be transmitted to the Court of Appeals. The

Court stated that it could make no additions to the statements

because the Court could not reniember what had occurred at a

trial which took place 11 months before that hearing. The Court

stated that it could add nothing to the statement and, due to its

lack of recollection of the trial, it was simply forwarding the

defense statements of evidence to the Court of Appeals. The

District Court entered no order with specific findings of fact as

to what happened at the unreported portions of the trial.

After this hearing, counsel for the Defendant attempted to

write the Defendant's opening brief. However, without the

transcript for one and a half days of trial, counsel discovered

that it was impossible to address several issues which were

imperative for the Defendant's appeal.

The Defendant submitted to the Court of Appeals a Motion

to Remand this matter and a Motion for Reconsideration of

Appellant's Motion to Remand this matter to the District Court

so that the District Court could determine whether or not the

record as it then stood was sufficient to protect the Defendant's

rights on appeal, Both of these motions were denied by the

Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals

Vi.

REASON FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

A. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD ISSUE A WRIT

OF CERTIORARI IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THE

TENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS’ HOLD-

ING IN THIS CASE IS CONTRARY TO THE SU-

PREME COURT HOLDING IN THE ANALOG-

OUS CASE OF DRAPER v. WASHINGTON, 372

U.S. 487 (1963) AND BECAUSE THE SUPREME

COURT HAS NEVER PREVIOUSLY PRESENTED

CONSTITUTIONAL GUIDELINES BY WHICH

TO DETERMINE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF

THE APPLICATION OF F.R.A.P., RULE 10(c),

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 10(c) reads as

follows:

CEEDINGS WHEN NO REPORT WAS MADE OR

WHEN THE TRANSCRIPT IS UNAVAILABLE. If no

report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial

was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, the appellant

may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings

from the best available means, including his recollection.

The statement shall be served on the appellee, who may

serve objections or propose amendments thereto within

10 days after service. Thereupon the statement and any

objections or proposed amendments shall be submitted

to the district court for settlement and approval and as

settled and approved shall be included by the clerk of the

district court in the record on appeal.

In the case at bar, the Defendant followed the rule, but con-

tends that it did not provide him with a sufficient record on

appeal from which he could argue many of his issues, and, thus,

that the application of the rule denied him due process of law as

guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of the United States Con-

stitution,

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals did not delineate any

general guidelines that could be used to determine that the

Defendant's claim was without merit nor are there any con-

stitutional guidelines previously set down by the Supreme

Court to determine this specific issue. Therefore, the Supreme

Court should issue a writ of certiorari in this case.

In the case of Draper. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the

Supreme Court held that transcripts are not always necessary

and that alternate methods may be used at times if those

methods place before the appellate court an equivalent report

of the happenings upon which the appeal is based. Draper, at

495, Although Draper dealt with a state's procedure for deter-

mining when an indigent defendant must be given a free trans-

cript, it would appear that this same rule would apply to federal

courts and would be th. basis for holding that F.R.A.P., Rule

10(c) is constitutional on its face.

This Court held in Draper that with regard to certain is-

sues raised by the defendants, the trial court's ruling that

these issues were frivolous was insufficient; in order for the

appellate court properly to consider these issues, it had to

have before it a transcript of portions of the trial relevant to

these points. Draper, at 499-500. Although alternate methods

of reporting may be permissible at times, they were insuffi-

cient in the Draper case to determine whether or not the

state had established a proper foundation for the introduction

of a gun and coat and were insufficient to determine the de-

fendants’ appeal issues relating to identification and perjury.

Draper, at 496-497. The Supreme Court stated that without a

transcript of these portions of the trial, the defendants were

denied due process of law. Draper, at 499.

The Defendant argues that the application of F.R.A.P., Rule

10(c) in the case at bar has placed him ina position similar to the

position of the defendants in Draper. Just as the alternate

method used by the state courts in Draper was insufficient to

protect those defendants’ constitutional rights, the application

of F.R.A.P., Rule 10(c) in this case has been insufficient to

protect this Defendant's constitutional right to due process of

law.

Without a transcript and with no mention in the Statements

of Evidence of the answers to the voir dire questions, with no

jury instructions and with no record relating to the trial court's

rulings on instructions and admissability of evidence regarding

the Defendant's religion and religious beliefs, it has been im-

possible for the Defendant to present, demonstrate or argue the

following issues which were raised by him before, during and

after trial, well in advance of any suggestion that the transcript

would be unavailable: (a) whether a fair jury was chosen to sit

in this trial or whether the jury was prejudiced by pre-trial

publicity; (b) whether a fair jury was chosen to sit in this trial or

whether the jury was prejudiced by prosecutorial musconduct:

jury in this trial or whether the trial court should have permitted

defense counsel to ask questions on voir dire; (d) whether the

trial court erred when it refused to permit testimony about the

Defendant’s religion, religious beliefs and how these de-

monstrated the Defendant’s good faith belief that he had a right

to act as he did; and (e) whether the trial court erred when it

denied the Defendant’s orally presented jury instructions.

Neither the trial court nor the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals

made any specific findings that the record as it was transmitted

on appeal was a sufficient record upon which the Defendant

could base and argue his specific appeal issues. The trial court

honestly admitted that it had such an insufficient recollection of

the trial that it could make no comments about the trial. The

Court of Appeals then discussed the missing transcript by

denying the Defendant's claim without any reference to the

specific issues raised by the Defendant.

lhe Court of Appeals first stated that Draper and Coppedge

v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962) did not apply to the case

at bar. (Op. 6-8). It then stated that it was not impressed, “with

counsel's contention that he is unable to recall possible trial

errors.” (Op. 8). The Court of Appeals misunderstood the

Defendant's position in this matter: the Defendant remem-

bered many of the trial errors and thus listed twenty-three of

them in his Docketing Statement, but without a transcript of the

missing portions of the trial, he cannot demonstrate these er-

FOrS:

The Court of Appeals then stated that it was the burden of the

Defendant to establish that he had been prejudiced by the lack

of a transcript. The Defendant had made claims before trial,

claims during trial and claims after trial that he had been pre-

judiced by the trial proceeding. The fact that he cannot now

demonstrate these claims which were all made long before

there was any suggestion that the transcript would be unavail-

able should in itself demonstrate that the Defendant has been

prejudiced by the lack of a transcript. If the Court of Appeals by

its opinion is requiring the Defendant to give it specific demon-

strations of prejudice, it is placing the Defendant in an impossi-

ble position: according to this reasoning, the Defendant must

have a transcript of the proceedings in order to demonstrate

that the lack of a transcript has prejudiced him. This is a

position analogous to the untenable and unconstitutional posi-

tion in which many indigent defendants were placed when

trying to obtain free transcripts: they were denied free trans-

cripts since their appeals issues were frivolous and only the

transcripts could demonstrate that their appeal issues were not

frivolous. Draper v. Washington, supra, Coppedge v. United

States, supra. Just as the indigents’ untenable position was

held to deny them due process of law, the Defendant's position

should be held to deny him due process of law in this case.

The Court of Appeals then went on to state that there was a

‘reasonably complete™’ transcript (Op. 9) and that ‘‘failure to

fill in the tax return”’ cases ‘‘are very difficult to defend.” (Op.

9). The Court of Appeals appeared to imply that since cases

such as this one are difficult to defend, there is less need for a

complete transcript. The Defendant claims that the nature of

the case has no relevance to due process of law. Even the most

difficult cases to detend, such as in Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 436 (1966), require that the defendant be given due proc-

ess of law. Furthermore, the issues on appeal for which a

transcript is most needed are not issues related to the failure to

fill in a tax return; they are more fundamental issues dealing

with defendants’ rights to fair trials.

In addressing the issue of the lack of a transcript, the Court of

Appeals in the case at bar never addressed the issue of whether

or not the record was sufficient to accord the Defendant a

meaningful appeal, except when it stated, ** . . . the transcript

is reasonably complete, and so it is not a per se case of due

process violation."’ (Op. 9). The Court of Appeals basically

denied the Defendant's contention without addressing the

issue and certainly without setting up any constitutional

guidelines by which to determine the constitutionality of

F.R.A.P., Rule 10(c).

The Defendant asserts that the Supreme Court should issue

writ of certiorari in this case in order to determine whether or

not the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals is in conflict with the

Supreme Court’s ruling in Draper v. Washington, supra, and in

order to hand down specific constitutional guidelines to deter-

mine the constitutionality of the application of F.R.A.P., Rule

10(c).

B. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD CLARIFY THE

CONFUSION IN THE CIRCUITS CONCERNING

SCIENTER, KNOWLEDGE, INTENT, AND

WILLFULNESS THAT EXISTS IN CONSTRUING

THE CULPABILITY NEEDED TO CONVICT A

CITIZEN FOR FAILING TO SUPPLY TAX IN-

FORMATION CONTRARY TO 26 U.S.C. 87203.

In U.S. v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 97 S.Ct. 22 (1976), this

court conntinued the specific intent guidelines set forth in U.S.

v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 45 S. Ct. 223 (1933) and Bishop v.

U.S., 412 U.S. 346 (1972) in construing the requisite intent

needed to prove a criminal violation under 26 U.S.C. 87203.

In Pomponio, this court made it clear that the requisite intent

was a specific and not a general intent. The jury was instructed

that the government must prove that the defendants **.. .

purposely intended to violate a known legal duty.’’ This con-

cept has been followed in the Third Circuit in U.S. v. Vitiello,

363 F.2d 240 (C.A. 3rd, 1966), the Eighth Circuit in U.S. v.

Pohlman, 522 F.2d 974 (C.A. 8th, 1975), and Seventh Circuit in

U.S. v. McCorckle, 511 F.2d 482 (C.A. 7th, 1975). However,

the Tenth Circuit has construed the intent requirement as if it

were general intent. U.S. v. Dillon, 566 F.2d 702 (C.A. 10th,

1977).

In Dillon, the defendant, apparently relying on the Bishop

concept that the government must show bad motive or evil

purpose, assumed that the converse would negate the intent

element. He therefore argued that he made a good faith attempt

to test the validity of the tax laws. In its attempt to cut off

testimony concerning beliefs about the constitutionality of tax

laws, the court affirmed a test of general intent contrary to

Bishop and Pomponio, supra. The only element of intent in

Dillon is that the defendant acted intentionally as distinguished

from accidentally. This is contrary to the holding of Bishop.

Hence, when the trial court gave an instruction following the

dictates of Dillon, supra, it contravened this court’s holding in

Bishop and Pomponio, supra.

In the case at bar, the trial court also excluded evidence

concerning the defendant's religious beliefs and testimony re-

garding his beliefs in rights guaranteed him under other

amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The jury was instructed

that the First, Fourth, Sixth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amend-

ments were not a defense. However, the court did not allow, in

its instruction, the jury to consider state of mind and scienter.

Even though reliance on these amendments is not a defense,

the defendant’s state of mind is relevant in a criminal case to

show intent. In applying Dillon, the court made the crime an

offense of strict liability, which conflicts with the circuits’ and

this court’s rulings.

C. A CITIZEN SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO RELY

UPON HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE 5TH AMEND-

MENT WITHOUT HAVING TO BE OR PROFESS

TO BE A CRIMINAL.

The trial court ruled that in order to rely upon his rights under

the Sth Amendment in this case, the Defendant must face some

_ possibility of prosecution by having committed a criminal act.

The trial court ruled that the petitioner had to have a good faith

reliance on the Sth Amendment to be afforded due protection

and to be able to rely on the protection when filing his tax

return.

The Defendant enumerated and appended his reasons for not

providing information on his 1040 return and did not make a

blanket Sth Amendment refusal without explanation.

The trial court determined that his reliance on the U:S.

Constitution was not in good faith and therefore not a defense

because the Defendant had not committed a crime and there-

fore would not have incriminated himself. He ruled that the

essence of the amendment was a privilege against self-

incrimination and if there could be no incrimination, there

could be no privilege.

Petitioner disagrees with this concept. The Fifth Amend-

ment to the Constitution of the United States of America con-

fers a right, not a privilege. Secondly, it is a right afforded all

citizens, not just wrongdoers or criminals. If, as the trial court

held, one must have been a wrongdoer and face possible prose-

cution to rely on the rights guaranteed by the Sth Amendment,

then only criminals are so protected. This was not the intent of

the draftsmen.

It has been held that the right must be asserted [Garner vy.

U.S., 424 U.S. 648 (1976)j unless a person is in custody and

about to be interrogated [Wiranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436

(1966)). A clear reading of the Amendment shows that the

essence Is the compulsion. It states, in part, that "*No person

shall... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness

against himself... ° 26 U.S.C. 87206, provides for a penalty

of perjury for willfully subscribing a false return. The require-

ment compels data from the citizen and imposes sanctions for

not supplying this data. The term ‘‘in any criminal case’* has

included IRS instituted proceedings vs. Goldsmith, 272 F.

Supp. 924 (D.C. N.Y.), U.S. v. Malnick, 348 F. Supp. 1723

(D.C. Fla).

The Tenth Circuit has also ruled that assertion of the Sth

Amendment ts not a defense as a matter of law. U.S. v. Irwin,

561 F.2d 198 (10th Cir. 1977). However, this is in conflict with

the intent of U.S... Sullivan, 274. U.S. 259 (1927) and Garner v.

U.S., 424 U.S. 648 (1976) and causes traps for the unwary

similar to the situation in Pauldine v. U.S., 500 F.2d 1369.

If tax returns were totally privileged and not secured by

govermental agencies, the type of problem would not exist.

Since courts have ruled that the right must be exerted or lost, a

good citizen who wants to preserve his right must assert it. By

holding that the citizen must be a wrongdoer to do this without

being prosecuted, has the effect of amending the Sth Amend-

ment, applying it only to criminals.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Petition for Writ of Certiorari

should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

DENNIS L. BLEWITT

CLIFFORD J. BARNARD

Attorneys for

Defendant-Petitioner

APPENDIX A

NOT FOR ROUTINE PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

No. 78-1645

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-A ppellee,

DON H. PERRY,

Defendant-A ppellant.

F2d

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Dis-

trict of Colorado (D.C. No. 78-CR-87)

Carole C. Dominguin, Assistant U.S. Attorney (Joseph Do-

lan, United States Attorney, on the brief), for Plaintiff-

Appellee.

Dennis L. Blewitt (Clifford J. Barnard, on the brief), for

Defendant-Appellant.

Heard before DOYLE, BREITENSTEIN and LOGAN,

Circuit Judges.

DOYLE, Circuit Judge.

This criminal prosecution arises pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §

7203, which statute prohibits persons required to pay tax and to

make a return from willfully failing to supply information re-

quired by law or regulations. Defendant is charged with failing

to furnish information required by law in three separate counts.

Count I alleges that during the year 1974, the defendant re-

ceived gross income of an amount which required him to file

a return and furnish information, and that he willfully and

knowingly failed to supply it to the District Director of Inter-

nal Revenue on his 1040 return, contrary to 26 U.S.C. § 7203.

Count II is in identically the same form except that it pertains to

the year 1975 and again alleges the failure to supply information

in his 1040 return. Count III has to do with the calendar year

1976. It also charges the willful and knowing failure to supply

information on Form 1040.

Conviction was had on all three counts, and the defendant

appeals from the judgment which provided a sentence of one

year in prison on each count, the sentences to run concurrently.

Sentence on Count II was suspended on the condition that the

defendant perform 320 hours of volunteer service with either

the National Park Service or the U.S. Forest Service.

The defendant was shown by the evidence to be a person of

good moral character and was active in his church. He offered in

his defense that he had studied the Constitution, the Bill of

Rights, and a work called The Rights of Taxpayers. He attended

seminars which dealt with tax laws, and it also appeared that he

was and is a Certified Public Accountant and had contact with

the Internal Revenue Service in his profession as a C.P.A. He

was aware of the procedures for challenges relating to the filing

of tax returns. He said that in preparing the tax returns in

question he had relied on Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648

(1976), and United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927). He

claimed a Fifth Amendment right to freedom from self-

incrimination in his 1974, 1975 and 1976 tax returns. He claimed

this right, he said, after he had been told that he had such right

by Mr. Bachman, presumably the agent. He further testified

that he had noted on his tax returns objections to specific

questions on grounds that the answers were violative of the

First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Thirteenth and Sixteenth

Amendments.

As an accountant, he said that he was familiar with the

minimum level of income that would require the filing of an

income form. He was, of course, familiar with the intricacies of

income tax reporting.

He filed many appendices to his tax returns. These were

obtained from packets which he had accumulated from other

sources. In October 1975, defendant said that he attended a tax

strike convention and was one of the arrangers of that conven-

tion. He indicated that he had received refunds for income tax

returns filed for the taxable years 1968-1972. Thus, he was not

Strange to the matter of filing returns and to the legal necessity

for filing them.

An examination of the docketing statement filed in this case

reveals that the defendant set forth a total of 23 trial court

errors. Most of his complaints about the trial had to do with the

refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury regarding such things

as his good faith understanding of the requirements of the law or

to his good faith belief that he had filed sufficient return, al-

though he had not, and as this good faith affected the element of

willfulness, and the refusal of the court to instruct the jury that

willfulness required the doing of an act with evil motive to

disobey or disregard the law. A further instruction which was

not given which he said ought to have been was to the effect that

the I.R.S. could not reject a return as improper or incomplete

until it had given the taxpayer a hearing to determine whether

the answer to the questions really would incriminate him.

Another deficiency which he claimed was in the instructions. It

was the failure of the court to instruct the jury that defendant

had a good faith privilege under the Fifth Amendment which

could be asserted on his return; that he could not be convicted

for an erroneous claim of privilege asserted in good faith; that

the court should have instructed the jury in the phrases submit-

ted by the defendant regarding religious beliefs, e.g. that the

Constitution was a sacred document and that he was following

such a belief. He asserts the error of the trial court in instructing

the jury that the First Amendment right to religious freedom

was nota defense in this case. Also asserted was the proposition

that only basic disclosures such as name and address had to be

given on an income tax return and that the Fifth Amendment

privilege against self-incrimination could be claimed in all other

questions.

The above description of alleged errors which are advanced

on appeal are set forth above so as to show ina general way the

nature of the appeal. The appellant’s purported returns were of

the same character as the contentions in that they followed the

tax resistance philosophy. The returns, one of which is ap-

pended hereto, illustrates this. It seeks to make a formal filing,

but at the same time to avoid furnishing the vital information

which the income tax law requires.

Counsel has not argued all of the 23 points listed and we find it

unnecessary to discuss all of the points. Furthermore, we do not

discuss all of the points that are argued in the brief. These latter

are not necessarily the ones which are advanced in the docket-

ing statement. We limit our discussion to those matters which

pose a question which is not untenable on its face.

The first point is that of lack of a complete transcript of the

evidence. This is due to the disappearance of some of the notes

of the reporter. The notes which the reporter had, those which

had not disappeared, were transcribed. The trial court allowed

the appellant to fully utilize the Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, Rule 10 (c), which makes provision for a situation

such as the instant one. The rule declares that if no report of the

evidence of a trial was made or if a transcript was unavailable,

that the appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or

proceedings from the best available means, including his recol-

lection. This statement is then served on the appellee, who has

time to make objections or propose amendments. Thereupon,

the statement and any objections or proposed amendments are

to be submitted to the court for settlement and approval and, if

settled and approved, can be included by the clerk in the record

on appeal,

The government did not object to the three versions of the

missing transcript which were prepared independently by the

two counsel for the defendant and by the defendant himself. The

court submitted all three to us, and these are reported in Sup-

plemental Volume I of the record on appeal.

It would seem that the gap that has been complained about is,

for the most part, that which contains the voir dire examination

of the jury, the opening statements of counsel, and other of the

proceedings during the early part of the trial. Missing also are

some of the concluding parts of the evidence and proceedings.

However, the testimony that is transcribed, together with the

numerous exhibits which are offered and the summaries that

were submitted, provide a fairly complete picture of the prose-

cution’s evidence, the defendant's evidence and the nature and

general character of the case, and so the transcript is not as

incomplete as counsel would have us believe. The defense is,

for the most part, transcribed — the defendant's testimony and

the testimony of associates who expressed their high regard for

him and for his reputation in the community as a good citizen

and honest man.

Defendant-appellant relies on the Supreme Court's decisions

in Draper v, Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), and Coppedge v.

United States, 369 U.S, 438 (1962). Coppedge is a case which

involves an indigent who sought to appeal in forma pauperis.

The court of appeals denied the application to proceed in forma

pauperis and did so without opinion. The Supreme Court ruled

that it was error to deny the application and that he was entitled

to counsel and to a free transcript. The basic issue in the case

was whether the lower courts were justified in denying the right

to prosecute the appeal based upon the insubstantiality of the

issues, Thus, Coppedge is not direct authority in support of the

cause at bar involving as it does the question whether there is a

deprivation of Fifth Amendment due process growing out of the

loss of parts of the transcript.

Draper v. Washington, supra, was much more similar to the

Coppedge case than to our case. Here again, the issue was

whether the defendants were entitled to a free transcript. The

trial judge ruled that each of the contentions of the appellant

were not only lacking in merit, but that they were patently

frivolous and that guilt had been established by overwhelming

evidence, This ruling was affirmed by the supreme court of the

State of Washington. The Supreme Court held that the record

before the trial court and the state supreme court was insuffi-

cient and that the refusal to allow defendants to have a stenog-

raphic record constituted a violation of the due process clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment. The case was reversed on the

ground that the trial court's determination that the appeal was

frivolous constituted an inadequate substitute for a full appel-

late review such as that which was available to nonindigents in

the State of Washington where the effect of the court's finding

was to deprive the accused of a full review of the trial.

Draper, like Coppedge, does not furnish direct support to the

defendant-appellant’s contention. It is arguably supportive ina

minor way in that it emphasizes the importance to appellate

review of a record including the transcript.

In denying relief in this case we do not deny the contribution

to the appeal of the clerk's record and the transcript of the

testimony. At the same time, the transcript is not indispensable.

The main reason for this is that the appellate process is con-

cerned with questions of law. It does not weigh the facts, even

though it is frequently called on to consider them in relationship

to the legal issues presented. The defendant says in effect that

failure to provide a verbatim transcript deprives him of the right

to address the trial issues which counsel are unable to re-

member, or, as applied to this case, it violates his right under the

due process clause. A further argument is that, in the alterna-

tive, he is entitled to an express ruling by the district court as to

the necessity of a trial transcript in relationship to the violation

of the Fifth Amendment. He requests a remand for this purpose.

We must deny this latter request along with appellant's other

demands.

As to the first point raised, we are not impressed with coun-

sel’s contention that he is unable to recall possible trial errors.

Our reaction to that is that he should have the burden of estab-

lishing that he has been prejudiced. He should not ask us to

presume this.

As to the second point, we have already noted that the trans-

cript is reasonably complete, and so it is mot a per se case of due

process violation. It should be added that this kind of case oon

(failure to fill in the tax return) is very difficult to defend. After

all, the income tax has itself been validated by vote of the states.

The Sixteenth Amendment was adopted following a ruling by

the Supreme Court that an Act of Congress without aid of a

specific constitutional amendment was unconstitutional.' So,

therefore, there is little room for defending against a statute

authorizing the Internal Revenue Service to compel submission

of a return containing relevant information. Self-incrimination

does have a place here, but it does not operate in the abstract. It

must be directed to specific questions, and it must be shown that

they do in truth call for information which would incriminate the

accused,

As to the contention that it was necessary for the district

court to furnish a finding as to violation of the Fifth Amend-

1, The Amendment provides:

The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on

incomes, from whatever source derived, without appor-

tionment among the several States, and without regard to

any census or enumeration

This Amendment passed the Congress in 1909, and ratification by the

legislatures of the several states was completed on February 3, 1913. Thus, to

contend that the income tax is unconstitutional is to say that the Constitution

itself is unconstitutional.

ment, we must reject this also. We have previously considered

this issue and resolved it against the defendant, and we see no

reason for reversing that ruling.

Draper is cited under this heading as authority. It is said that

the Supreme Court ruled in that case that the Washington Su-

preme Court could not determine whether the indigents had the

right of a transcript based on the record before it. As appears

above, we are not subject to this handicap.

_. The next argument advanced by the defendant-appellant ts

that the voir dire questioning by the trial court was inadequate

and thus it did not serve to establish that the jurors summoned

were fair and impartial.

In denying the motion to allow defense counsel to voir dire

the prospective jurors, the trial court's written ruling is as

follows:

(It is) ORDERED that the motion is denied and counsel

for the defendant should submit in writing no later than 8:30

A.M. on May 30, 1978, such specific questions as counsel

reasonably can anticipate are needed for the selection of a

fair and impartial jury for the trial of this case.

The essence of the argument is an attack upon the system

which allows the trial court to conduct the voir dire examina-

tion. But, this court has long held that the conduct of the voir

dire examination by the judge rather than counsel is not an

abuse of discretion. See United States v. Grismore, 546 F.2d

844 (10th Cir. 1976), and United States v. Addington, 471 F.2d

560 (10th Cir. 1973).

Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure pro-

vides that the court may permit the defendant or his attorney

and the attorney for the government to conduct the examination

of prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. It

further provides that if the court conducts the examination, it

shall permit the defendant or his attorney and the attorney for

the government to supplement the examination by such further

inquiry as it deems proper or shall itself submit to the prospec-

tive jurors such additional questions by the parties or their

attorneys as it deems proper. Thus, the rule gives the trial court

a wide discretion in carrying out this highly important examina-

tion. No specific contention is made that the trial court failed to

discharge its duty. It is not, for.example, said that the court

refused to submit questions submitted by the defendant or that

its examination was otherwise incomplete or erroneous.

In Grismore, supra, this court pointed out that it was the

practice in the Tenth Circuit for the court to ask the voir dire

questions. It was there said: ‘‘It is discretionary with the trial

judge to permit the attorneys to supplement the questioning, but

the court has discretion in deciding what questions are to be

asked. The court's discretion will not be disturbed.”’ 546 F.2d at

848.

Since the defendant has not advanced a specific objection to

the voir dire questioning in the instant case, we must conclude

that there was no failure on the part of the trial court to carry out

the requirements of the law. Again, we cannot presume that the

counsel were prejudiced in their exercise of peremptory chal-

lenges.

ITf.

The defendant complains about a news release of the district

attorney's office which stated that defendant had been charged

with certain offenses and implied that the defendant was guilty

of these offenses. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, a

motion for a continuance, and a motion for change of venue. All

motions pointed to the publicity. It is to be noted that the court

did grant a continuance from May 8 to May 30, saying that the

ends of justice, by ordering the continuance, would be best

served and would outweigh the public interest in giving the

defendant a speedy trial. The news release which is apparently

relied on would appear to have been a description of the charge.

The text of this is as follows:

On March 9, 1978, the United States Attorney's office filed

an information charging DON H. PERRY of Lakewood,

Colorado with wilfully failing to supply information on his

Form 1040 individual income tax returns for the years 1974,

1975, and 1976.

According to the information, PERRY had received gross

income of approximately $44,325.36 for the years involved,

If found guilty of these charges, PERRY could face up to

one year in prison and a $10,000 fine or both on each count

contained in the information.

Another of these, which is contained in the record, is to the

same effect:

The U.S. Attorney's office today announced the filing of

charges against eight Colorado residents for submitting

fraudulent income tax withholding certificates (Forms W-4

and W-4E) to their employers. Named in the informations

filed with the U. S. District Court were RUSSELL C.

HUDLER, KENNETH W. OLSON, STEPHEN L.

PEISTER, and PATRICK C. RYAN.

Possible penalties upon conviction include fines of up to

$500 and imprisonment for up to one year or both.

The motion to dismiss due to prosecutorial misconduct was

filed in response to the fact that the filing of these charges was

publicized. We are unable to perceive either misconduct or

error in the refusal of the trial court to find such misconduct.

The trial court issued a ruling in writing in connection with its

denial of the motion to dismiss in which it said that the motion

did not state good cause. a

Our conclusion also is that there is no specific showing of the

existence of good cause in connection with the assertion that the

trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss, alleging

prosecutorial misconduct. Our ruling is the same as to the

contention that the trial court should have granted a change of

venue predicated on prosecutorial misconduct. Just because

cases were filed does not give rise to the necessity for change of

venue.

We have considered the other contentions which are raised

by the defendant and are of the opinion that they are wholly

lacking in merit and that the arguments must be rejected.

The judgment of the district court should be and the same is

hereby affirmed.

‘

itic question on the grounds c

Answering said question in the manner requested way subjece

Lauivia

thee speclfile objection is made to the s

amendment to the U.S.

“ne faith

This means

UBIECT-

Constitution,

taxpayer Co possible self{-incrimination, therefore the Privilege its exerted on this return.

ve,

The attached memorandum (13 pages) is an integral pare of this return.

‘nm

2 4 04a i § individual Income Tax Return 1978 | This space for 179 wie onty

For the veer Jenuery 1-Oecember 31, Dy /b. ur Hiner Lasedle your Bus cntin: » 1916 ert: :

frame ()f Joint return, give frat Mammen end inivaels of beVY eaont Nene i“ esncrel security n

x $54 + 43%

* |_Dor H. Perry

3 Present hume eaaress (Number Bnd Si/eet Incivaing eDariMent Number, (GF fural (outed For Prwacy Act Nuliicetun, + sat » pociel secur

&} 2485 Lewts Street S40 pege 5 Of lustruciiwns. | i H

3 City, twee OF put Olina, Biele and di” Code Ocew | Yous } Husitiunniiin

1 Singie (Chock only ONE bos) be Kugular (f) Yourself ( Spouse aon roar yl 1

2 oO Married filing Joint roturn (even If only one hed Income) b First noms of your depundunt children whe

ny 3 yy Married tiling separately. If spouse Is also filing give lived with you Wri, Mlehette,

4s Spwure D daniel Beuusily Mummies In Comgineled space sure i Toby, Tyler, Alleta enn > 5

ond enter full —

< pame ine > ¢ Number of other dependents (from line 7) . mB Lo

3 | 4 ( Unmaned thead of Household, Sea page 7 of auucuons | | d Total (add lines 6a, 0,andc). » - + 2 + om

5D Quautying wedowler) with 6 child (Year Blind. » « «+ () Yourseif Cj Spouse Uecss y

spouse died & 19 ). See page 7 of Instructions f TOTAL (edd lines 6dande) . . » « « « » &

7 Quner cepencents: WD) hersurarip 22 Mentme teed te geez | 16) Cid _ scsenoont | vol, Ament teeioned ter Soomndoat.o

(a) heme dasing yous, wile Bo D,

income of 3/40

by YOU. UW 100% | Oy OFmins

@ uel wile AL Wd boyencen

“ Reusen

(it tess than $8,000, see pace 2 of Instructions on “Earnad income Credit.") .. MSe.

18 Balance. Subtract line 17¢ trom line 16 end enter pi arr not

19 Credits (trom lind 54) sw we ee ee ee eee

23a Total Federal income tax withheld, taiven forme a zie [

b 1976 estim Veit em 1319 taaia)o

20 Balance. Subtract line 19 from line 18 end enter difference (but not Tess than zero)

23> |___None

8 Presidential Election vo you wish to casignate $1 of your taxas for this fund? , Chis AR

Campaign Fund. . If jount return, does your spouse wish to designate $17 . Yes ii NO | 108 Or tmiuse peed 16's

° 9 en Te Haas Tomy ols weal, rae + #1 Xone

3 Dividends (72 ) |__, 20b tess exclusion __|._..., Balance pe |_10¢ None

p (/t gross ‘Gudends nae ‘se Gewioutons ave over $400, list in Part | of Skene GB.)

" or less, enter without

é g| 32 Income other than wages, dividends, and Interest (from line 37) « » 6 + + 6 6 + 2! Od)

£|2 13 Total (add lines 9, 10c, 11 end 12) . Se ee eeeeeesveerese se 13: Object

° 380 Gupuact Ino 24 teminn1d 2 2 cc cc cee eee ee te 8 8 8 le Ohices.

& b Disability Income exclusion (sick pey) (ettach Form 2440). 6 2 6 6 + 6 + 6 + | 25RD) Non

F |

| | Tax Table | | Tax Rate Sen Yorz Schedule D

S Tae = Scneduly : | | Form 2555 Os. 1tom 4778 | 18 | Object

17a Multipty $35.00 dy the number of exemptions on line 6d. 5 « As > keveee soe pede 30 of Inetiec!

bb Enter 2% of line 47 but not move than $180 (330 it bax 3 ls sheched) ae ig) ae

nzero) » » |28'

19 |

Tat, Payments and Credits

¢ Amou ioe eee + Mee

@ Other oe! nee) ns b4:d 8 3 230 Nonc.

24 TOTAL (add lin Te eae it a

25 if line 22 is than line = enter Sopa DUE IRS

26 if line 2H enter amount OVERPAID . «. «

a Amount of line 060%eR Salles en sae - ss

Due or Refund

(Crech here D> (). it Form i Smee OF Is attached. See page 10 of Instructions)»

aS.

-26_'No Overpayr

LR ELE

| 9”

eee

Amount of hine 2h 10 be eredv'ed on 1977 estimated tos be | 28 |

Please attach Check of Money Order here

Nae: pee we Rese 66 44) lniw moves

awed y 2 0-422

T ei oe cane wt eteeen, | sencere thal | here Grameen) (8 ftleim, Me ledih, LOM Eernng pe gee) Died Metemrets. gre ce Lhe tte OF Rey beewmmge pewd “-

tod Cwmrpiola, Dec! tae apes) ty

Of RD Prepere bas 007 Laon

i >

ma ee) Wois|V" Fieger evans Gal vovlene's toes, Taw)

“at nations — Fe oe

orm 1940 (1976) Poue

fs Part be. Income other thon Waves, Dividends and Interest

29 Susmess income of (loss) (attach Scnecule C) . . . 1 1 6 ew tt ew ew ew te 8 24 1 Object |

30a Net gain or (loss) from sale or exchange of capital assets (attach Scnedul@O) . . . ws va 0d ject wa

BD SO% of caprtel gern GistridDutions (mot reported on Scnuvvie O—see page 1U of instructions). |_300) None

31 Net gain of (1088) trom Supplemental Schedu'e of Gains ond Losses (uttuch Form 4797) . . . |_34.| None

32a Pensions, annuities, rents, royaites, partners ips, estates or trusts, etc. (attach Schedule £) . |328) Obiect

D Fully tasabdle pensions and annuities (not repored on Schedule E—see page 10 of Instructions) |_329|_ None

33 bs income or (1088) (attach Schedule) ww we ww ww 33_|_Obdjece

34 State income tax refunds ( Sionsere svoscuon—ouners tee pone 10 ef instnecuans so ese « « [-34|_ None

. S ig ce 8S ce eS. hr oe ‘eo 0 o (aS) None

36 Otner (state nature and source—see page 11 of Instructions) > Objecc

Total (ads lines 27 through 36). Enter here andoniinel2 . . . . ss ss > | 37 OQhiecr

Pperetn Adjustments to income

38 Mowng eapense (attach Form 3903) . . 1. ss ee Seow ne ele o 0 « o (ee) None

39 Employee business expense (attach Form 2306) . 2 2 6 0 0 0 6 0 oe ‘se o « (39) Xone

408 Payments to an indivic ry from attached Form 5329, Partili, . . » |.403) None _

Db Payments tu @ Keogh (H.R. 10) retirement plan. 6. 6 ws ew et th hl hl hl hl 40d | None

41 Forfeited interest penalty for premeture wiihdrawal (see page 12 of Instructions) . .'. » . |41 |) None

42 Total (add linus 38 throuy:) 41). Entur ere and onine 14, . . . . , gg gg, Pm | 42 | Nane

Boe Tax Computation

43° Adjusted gross Income (from line 15c). 'f you Mave unearned income and can be claimed as a

Gependent on your parent's return, check Nere p» ~ and see page 9 of instructions. « « |.43 | Obiece

44a |! you emus Geaucuons, check here Be (, and enter total ven Scheds de A, Kan 60, ond sttach Schedeto A

b Standard deduction! you do nct <item: 128 Geductions, check here (7), and:

it you checaed | 2 OF 5, enter the greater of $2,100 OR 16% of line 43—dut not more than $2,800 ° 4 Be

tne = on | 1 or 4, enter the greater of $1,700 OR 16% of ine 43-—dut not more than $2,400

45 Subdtract line 44 from line 43 and enter Cilference (Uut Not less than zero) . . « 6 6 8 4s_| Odject

46 tAvilioly toll number of caumptions Cluued on ine Cl by $750 . «ww we et tl 46; 4,500

47° Taxable income, Subtract ine 46 trom line 45 and enter diference (but not less than zero) . . | 4, | Object }

your tas in Tas Tabla, Enter taa on line 16 and chece appropiate bua

D. income averaging from Schedule GC. tas tum Form 2555 of masimum tas trom form 47275 Enter tas on line 16 ang chece soasooriaie bus.

Boies Creaits

48 Crecit for hw elderly (attach Schedules R&RP) «ww ww eee th he 48 _| None

SO investment credit (ottach form 3468) 2. 0 so sc cee oe eee oe ee 50_) Obiect

51 na ton cregit (ottsch Form 2ti6) . 1. s oe sc cee eee eee toes 5) / Mose

52 butions to lor public office credit (see page 12 of Instrucuons) ... . . . |52_) Obiece |

53 Work incenuve (WIN) Creat (attach Form 4874) . 2. 1 es ew we ee wh oe ew ee $3_|_Nove

_54 Total (odd lines 48 through 53). Enter here and online 19... ss ew se Dm | 53 | Ohiore

Pa ther Taxes

56 Minimum tax. Check here > (7), and attacn Form 4625. , «1 ww ow we et 56 | Xone '

57 Tas ono > trom FOR PV 6c gw 5 oe es 6 57 | None oad

59 Social security tax on tip income not reported to employer (attach Form 4137) . . « « » « $9 | Vann !

60 Unccilected employee social security tag on tos (from Forms W-2) . « 1 6 6 ew ew ew 60 | wan |

Total (add lines 55 through 61). Enter here andon tine 21. . . s,s ss, & | 62:' nriia--

garsuss Cilier Payments

63 Cucess FICA, RATA, of FICA/RATA tax withneld (two or more employers—see puge 13 of Instructions) . |_63_! Nop |

64 Cradst tor Federal tas 6% scecal lysis, nomhichway gasoine and ludricating o (attach Form 4136). 2. we 64 for. we

66 Vurel (ariel tres U5 trou Uo). Enter here andonine23e > | 66!, |

OVA Cre Fert OF O11 1D

APPENDIX B

Constitution of the United States

Amendment [1.]

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of

religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging

the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the

people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Govern-

ment for a redress of grievances.

Amendment [IV.]

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches

and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall is-

sue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-

tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched,

and the persons or things to be seized.

Amendment [V.]

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other-

wise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment

of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval

forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of

War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the

same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor

shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness

against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law; nor shall private property be

taken for public use, without just compensation.

Amendment [ VI.]

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the

right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the

State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-

ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by

law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the ac-

cusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to

have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his

favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.

26 USC 87203

TITLE 26-PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION

7203. Willful Failure to File Return, Supply Information, or

Pay Tax.

Any person required under this title to pay any estimated

tax or tax, or required by this title or by regulations made

under authority thereof to make a return (other than a return

required under authority of section 6015 or section 6016),

keep any records or supply any information, who willfully

fails to pay such estimated tax or tax, make such return,

keep such records, or supply such information, at the time or

times required by law or regulations, shall, in addition to

other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor

and, upon conviction therof, shall be fined not more than

$10,000, or imprisoned not more than | year, or both, to-

gether with the costs of prosecution.

(Aug. 16, 1954, c. 736, 78A Stat. 851).

Rule 10(c) F.R.A.P.

INGS WHEN NO REPORT WAS MADE OR WHEN THE

TRANSCRIPT IS UNAVAILABLE. If no report of the evi-

dence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a

transcript is unavailable, the appellant may prepare a state-

ment of the evidence or proceedings from the best available

means, including his recollection. The statement shall be

served on the appellee, who may serve objections or propose

amendments thereto within 10 days after service. Thereupon

the statement and any objections or proposed amendments

shall be submitted to the district court for settlement and ap-

proval and as settled and approved shall be included by the

clerk of the district court in the record on appeal.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.