Petition — Raimondi v. Court of Appeals of Maryland

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER. TERM, 1979 —

NO. . DER 9-8 5 @

THOMAS PAUL RAIMONDI,

Petitioner,

mt) OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND

(| y3" Respondent.

¢ PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

" lO THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

RAYMOND R. DICKEY

1120 Connecticut Ave., N. W.

10th Floor

Washington, D. C. 20036

(202) 857-4000

JEROME A. DASHNER

112 Equitable Building

Baltimore, Maryland 21202

(301) 727-2412

Attorneys for Petitioner

THE PAUL M. HARROD COMPANY, BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21234

VS Md b07, 463 Ard (234

INDEX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT: —

II.

The Petitioner was deprived of due process of

law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment

to the Constitution of the United States by the

Court’s failure to consider Petitioner’s full

pardon and Md. Ann, Code, Article 10, Section

22 (1957) in denying Petitioner’s Petition for

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The Petitioner was deprived of due process of

law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment

to the Constitution to the United States by the

Court’s denial of reinstatement to the Bar

without any evidence contrary to the recom-

mendations for reinstatement by the Inquiry

Panel and the Review Board .................

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7°

Page

Ill. The Petitioner was deprived of due process of

law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment

to the Constitution of the United States by the

Court’s failure to render a separate considered

opiniox: in denying Petitioner’s Petition for

ee he cae pee Sa bans wee ea

{V. The Petitioner was deprived of the equal

protection of the law guaranteed by the

Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution

of the United States by the Court’s denial of the

Petitioner’s Petition for Reinstatement without

SI bw ene eo ee ee ee

V. The Petitioner was subject to cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amend-

ment to the Constitution of the United States

by the Court’s denial of the Petitioner’s Petition

for Reinstatement without any rational basis .... .

Ge bul oss wi ey ce Wea ee ee hee eb bd owe

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Barton, In re, 273 Md. 377, 329 A.2d 102 (1974)

Braverman, In re, 271 Md. 196, 316 A.2d 246 (1974) ...11

Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill,

Se ee as 5 ka vie Fae ek cee ee

Drier, In re, 258 F.2d 68 (3d. Cir., 1958)

oeeoere eee ee we wee ee

RATE TT?

iii

Page

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) ............6..4- 15

Garland, Ex Parte, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 333 (1867) ......... 8,14

ee Es OT as ok oo i ek sc deme ice 15

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, rehearing denied,

Pag 3 og. | SEs re et rae ree 15

Griffin v. State of California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S. Ct.

we NT ae 2 See ae eee eee ee 14

Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131 (1916)............... 9

Keenan, In re, 310 Mass. 166, 37 N.E. 2d. 516(1941)........

Konigsberg v. State of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957). .. .8, 10

Meyerson, In re, 190 Md. 671, 59 A.2d 489 (1948) ........ 13

Marchineon. fn 00; 399 UB. 158 CIGSSS osc ce awe nce sewers 6

Raimondi, Matter of - Md., 285 Md. 607, 403 A.2d

I fe eee ad pone Caleie K o-ore 48 ore 9 9

Rufialo, in- te, 390 U.S. S44 CD9G6) 2 nc cece vee cess 13, 14

Schaeffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511 (1960)............ 9

Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) ... .8

Soovenk wv. Rien, S56 UG: SPA CIGST ik cw ce ec iceecsecess 14

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).......-.-.- ee eee eee 15

United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944). ...............

Wek, Ex Parte, 107 US. BORO io ooo ore c st Shee cwacai 13

Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 369 (1910)............. 15

Vick Wo. ¥. Hooking, 116 US. 356 CISRS) isn ccc ceesces 8

Statutes

Maryland Code Annotated (1957)

I oo a od w a ww ee Ae Oe aw eee 7

pg 2 ae er 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

Page

Constitution of Maryland

Asticie Hi, Section 20s os. o60dé wine 6

Constitution of the United States

Eighth Amondssamt. ..o..4..35544.40 0.50 3,13

Fourteenth Amendment.......... 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 16, 32

Rules

Maryland Rules of Procedure

Rule BV 14... 00 ccs cuit'e ase 3,4

INDEX TO APPENDIX

Petition for Reinstatement to the Maryland Bar......... A. 2

Pardon. .... 2... sis oe an dh eno A. 6

Report and Recommendation of Inquiry Panel.......... A.7

Recommendation of Review Board.................. A. 22

Show Cause Order, Court of Appeals of Maryland ...... A. 24

Bar Counsel’s Response to Show Cause Order.......... A. 25

Response to Bar Counsel’s Answer .................. A. 33

Opinion of Court of Appeals of Maryland, 285 Md. 607,

403 A.2d 1234 (1979) 2... 4 eee A. 37

Motion for Reconsideration ......... ............. A. 53

Denial of Motion for Reconsideration................ A. 62

Docket Entries, Court of Appeals of Maryland......... A. 63

Maryland Code Annotated (1957) Article 10,

Sections 20, 22 . .. ...<«ssssan eee A. 64

1 alt at

a6 Ss

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

NO.

THOMAS PAUL RAIMONDI,

Petitioner,

THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

Thomas Paul Raimondi, Petitioner, prays that a Writ of

Certiorari be issued to review the Judgment of the Court of

Appeals of Maryland entered July 25, 1979 (285 Md. 607,

403 A.2d 1234 (1979). Motion for Reconsideration filed on

August 23, 1979, Motion for Reconsideration denied on

September 10, 1979.

CITATIONS TO OPINION BELOW

The Opinion of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, Misc.

(BV) Nos. 3 & 15, September Term, 1977, reported in 285 Md.

607, 403 A.2d 1234 (1979).

JURISDICTION

The Judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland sought

to be reviewed was filed on July 25, 1979. A timely Motion for

Reconsideration filed on August 23, 1979 was denied on

September 10, 1979. This Petition for Certiorari was filed

within ninety days of the latter date. Jurisdiction of this Court

is invoked under Title 28, Section 1257 (3) of the United

States Code.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Was the Petitioner deprived of due process of law

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution

of the United States by the Court’s failure to consider Peti-

tioner’s full pardon and Md. Annotated Code, Article 10,

Section 22 (1957) in denying Petitioner’s Petition for

Reinstatement?

2. Was the Petitioner deprived of due process of law

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution

of the United States by the Court’s denial of reinstatement to

the Bar without any evidence contrary to the recommendations

for reinstatement by the Inquiry Panel and the Review Board?

a is a ae a a

3. Was the Petitioner deprived of due process of law

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution

of the United States by the Court’s failure to render a separate

considered opinion in denying Petitioner’s Petition for

Reinstatement?

4. Was the Petitioner deprived of the equal protection

of the law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the

Constitution of the United States by the Court’s denial of the

Petitioner’s Petition for Reinstatement, without any rational

basis?

5. Was the Petitioner subject to cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Fighth Amendment to the

Constitution of the United States by the Court’s denial of the

Petitioner’s Petition for Reinstatement, without any rational

basis?

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Petitioner was a licensed attorney and member of the

Bar in the State of Maryland. In April 1970, he was convicted

of attempted bribery and was sentenced to serve eighteen

months imprisonment and pay a $500 fine. Petitioner sub-

' mitted his resignation to the Maryland State Bar which was

accepted with prejudice in December 1972. Petitioner served

five months of the sentence and was paroled in June 1973.

He was discharged from parole in July 1974. In May 1975,

he was granted a full pardon by the Governor of Maryland.

In accordance with Md. Annotated Code, Article 10,

Section 22 (1957), (repealed effective July 1977), the Petitioner

applied for reinstatement to the Bar in May 1977, pursuant to

Md. Rule BV 14. Both the Inquiry Panel and the Review Board

recommended reinstatement. The Maryland Court of Appeals

denied reinstatement by decision filed July 25, 1979 (285 Md.

607, 403 A.2d 1234(1979) ). Motion for Reconsideration filed

on August 23, 1979 was denied on September 10, 1979.

From the decision denying the Petition for Reinstatement

and the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration, the Petitioner

seeks review in this Court.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

THE PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE

PROCESS OF LAW GUARANTEED BY THE

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTI-

TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES BY THE

COURT'S FAILURE TO CONSIDER PETITIONER’S

FULL PARDON AND MARYLAND ANNOTATED

CODE, ARTICLE 10, SECTION 22 (1957) IN

DENYING PETITIONER’S’ PETITION FOR

REINSTATEMENT.

On May 27, 1975 the Governor of the State of Maryland

granted to the Petitioner a full pardon absolving him from the

guilt of his criminal act and exempting him from any pains and

penalties imposed upon him therefore by law (A. 6). Thereafter

the Petitioner in May 1977, filed for reinstatement under the

provision of Article 10, Section 22 of the Annotated Code of

Maryland, pursuant to Md. Rule BV 14 (A. 2).

Article 10, Section 22, Reinstatement after pardon, states:

nl EL RCT NII OS

BTR LOL IEE CLES ERE,

Any attorney heretofore or hereafter suspended

or disbarred from the practice of his profession in this

State because of the conviction of any misdemeanor,

who may have been or may hereafter be pardoned

for such misdemeanor by the Governor of this State,

shall, upon application to the court which issued the

order of suspension or disbarment, be entitled to. be

reinstated as a member of the Bar in good standing;

provided the court, to which said application may be

addressed, shall be satisfied that during the period

of his suspension or disbarment he has not violated

the provisions of Sec. 20 of this article, and that he

is otherwise worthy of reinstatement. Tlic provisions

of this article relating to hearing and appeal in pro-

ceedings for suspension and disbarment shall be

applicable to proceedings for reinstatement under

this section. (Emphasis added). (A. 64)

There is no evidence in the record to show any violation

of Article 10, Section 20, (A. 64). Furthermore, there is no

evidence in the case to support the Court’s conclusion that the

Petitioner is not worthy of reinstatement.

To the contrary, the record is replete with recommendations

for reinstatement by the Inquiry Panel and Review Board

(A. 7, 22) created by the Court’s own rules.

In the joint opinion filed by the Court of Appeals of

Maryland (A. 37) the Court failed to specifically consider

the Petitioner’s full pardon and Md. Code Ann., Article 10,

Section 22, in reaching its decision.

The Court’s failure to consider the Petitioner’s full pardon

and Article 10, Section 22 in its decision to deny reinstatement

is a denial of due process in that by ignoring the statutory

provision it failed to provide a “fair” procedure.

In Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281

U.S. 673, 681 (1930), the Court stated that fairness of pro-

cedure is “due process in the primary sense.” Further, /n re

Murchinson, 399 U.S. 133, 136 (1955), the Court stated that

“a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due

process.”

The Court’s failure to consider the statutory provision

of Md. Code Ann., Article 10, Section 22 is a denial of due

process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu-

tion of the United States.

Furthermore, the Court’s sole reason for denying

Petitioner’s Petition for Reinstatement was for the crime he

committed which resulted in disbarment. The Court by

ignoring the full pardon lawfully granted by the Governor

has substituted its authority and judgment to forgive the

crime, thereby usurping the power of the Executive in vio-

lation of Article III § 20 of the Constitution of the State of

Maryland, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution

of the United States.

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a Stare

Il.

THE PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE

PROCESS OF LAW GUARANTEED BY THE

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTI-

TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES BY THE

COURT’S DENIAL OF REINSTATEMENT TO THE

BAR WITHOUT ANY EVIDENCE CONTRARY TO

THE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REINSTATE-

MENT BY THE INQUIRY PANEL AND THE

REVIEW BOARD.

Under the Rules adopted by the Maryland Court of

Appeals, an Inquiry Panel held a full investigatory hearing

taking into consideration the following four factors: (1) the

nature and circumstances of the Petitioner’s original miscon-

duct; (2) the Petitioner’s subsequent conduct and reformation;

(3> the Petitioner’s present character; (4) the Petitioner’s

present qualifications and competency to practice law. See In

re Barton, 273 Md. 377, 329 A.2d 102 (1974).

The Panel unanimously concluded that the Pciitioner

had sustained his burden of establishing fitness acquired since

his resignation from the Bar with prejudice, (A. 7) and

unanimously recommended that the Petitioner be reinstated

to the Bar of the State of Maryland.

The Review Board (A. 22) concurred in and adopted the

Inquiry Panel’s recommendation that the Petition for Reinstate-

ment should be granted. Thus, the Inquiry Panel and the

Review Board, from the uncontradicted facts in the case, found

that the Petitioner should be reinstated.

The Maryland Court of Appeals, however, without any

evidence to the contrary, reached the decision to deny

reinstatement.

In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232,

238, 239 (1957), in finding that the Petitioner was denied due

process, the Court stated:

“Even in applying permissible standards, officers of

a state cannot exclude an applicant when there is no

basis for their finding that he fails to meet these

standards, or when their action is _ invidiously

discriminatory. Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,

6S. Ct. 1074, 30 L.Ed. 220.”

In Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 333, 379 (1867) the

Court stated that:

“The attorney and counsellor being, by the solemn

judicial act of the Court, clothed with his office, does

not hold it as a matter of grace and favor. The right

which it confers upon him to appear for suitors,

and to argue causes, is something more than a mere

indulgence, revocable at the pleasure of the Court,

or at the command of the legislature.”

See also Konigsberg v. State of California, 353 U.S. 252, 262

(1957), where the Court held that to deny admission to the Bar

for no valid reason denied due process of law to the applicant.

The Court’s decision in denying reinstatement without any

evidence contrary to the recommendation for reinstatement by

the Inquiry Panel and the Review Board is a denial of due

process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution

of the United States.

wren

III.

THE PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE

PROCESS OF LAW GUARANTEED BY THE

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTI-

TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES BY THE

COURT’S FAILURE TO RENDER A SEPARATE

CONSIDERED OPINION IN DENYING PETI-

TIONER’S PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT.

The Maryland Court of Appeals on July 25, 1979, filed

a joint opinion in The Matter of Raimondi and Dippel. The

Court correctly stated “The cases are in no way connected.”

(A. 37).

For the very reason that the cases are in no way connected,

the Petitioner is entitled to a separate considered opinion — an

independent and unbiased evaluation of the evidence within the

framework of the Petitioner’s case.

Although not precisely analogous, there are cases stating

that the failure to allow separate criminal trials in instances

where multiple defendants are charged constitute a denial of

due process where the discretion of the trial judge is abused.

Cf. Schaeffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511 (1960) and Heike

v. United States, 227 U.S. 131 (1916).

The Petitioner is entitled to have the evidence in his case

considered particularly and not generally under the principles

of law and not in the light of the policy of the Court. The

principles of law remain immutable but the policy of the Court

is subject to change.

The Court was prejudiced in its process of considering in

a single opinion the unrelated cases of the Petitioner and

Dippel. Petitioner was convicted of a misdemeanor and par-

doned. Dippel was convicted of a felony. Petitioner was

unopposed for reinstatement. Dippel’s reinstatement was

strongly opposed by two past presidents of the Maryland State

Bar Association (A. 42). Petitioner’s Inquiry Panel and Review

Board recommended reinstatement (A. 7, 22, 48). Dippel’s

Inquiry Panel and Review Board recommended against rein-

statement (A. 40, 45).

The Maryland Court of Appeals abused its discretion in

deciding these unrelated cases together to the detriment of the

Petitioner and constitutes a denial of due process in violation

of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the

United States.

IV.

THE PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF THE

EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW GUARAN-

TEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

BY THE COURT’S DENIAL OF THE PETITIONER’S

PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT WITHOUT

ANY RATIONAL BASIS.

The Court’s decision in denying the Petitioner’s Petition

for Reinstatement was without any rational basis. Both the

Inquiry Panel and the Review Board recommended reinstate-

ment, and there was no evidence offered to the contrary.

In Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252,

262 (1957) the Court noted:

Teor

« Ae ERO GT

“Knoigsberg claims that he established his good

moral character by overwhelming evidence and

carried the burden of proving that he does not

advocate overthrow of the Government. He contends

here, as he did in the California court, that there is

no evidence in the record which rationally supports

a finding of doubt about his character or loyalty. If

this contention is correct, he has been denied the

right to practice law although there was no basis for

the finding that he failed to meet the qualifications

which the State demands of a person seeking to

become a lawyer. If this is true, California’s refusal

to admit him is a denial of due process and of equal

protection of the laws because both are arbitrary and

discriminatory. After examination of the record, we

are compelled to agree with Konigsberg that the

evidence does not rationally support the only two

grounds upon which the Committee relied in rejecting

his application for admission to the California Bar.

(Footnotes omitted).”

In re Braverman, 271 Md. 195, 316 A.2d 246 (1974), the

applicant was guilty of the crime of conspiring to teach and

advocate and to organize the overthrow of the government by

force and violence. Braverman was a convicted, unpardoned

felon and unrepentent. Braverman took the oath to support

the Constitution and laws of State and Nation. The Maryland

Court of Appeals reinstated him, holding that Braverman had

in fact “demonstrated his fitness to be reinstated to practice

law by clear and convincing proof.” 271 Md. at 210, 316 A.2d

at 253.

;

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‘

In denying Raimondi’s Petition, the Court stated that

Petitioner took an oath to support the Constitution and iaws of

Maryland but his crime struck “at the very foundation of our

government.” (A. 57). Braverman also took the same oath to

support the Constitution and laws of Maryland. Did not

Braverman’s crime also “strike at the very foundation of our

government?”

It is respectfully submitted that the evidence in this case

is equally, if not more, clear and convincing then in Braverman,

supra, that the Petitioner has met the basic standards governing

reinstatement. No contrary testimony or evidence was pro-

duced to support the conclusions that Petitioner had not

rehabilitated himself and was not worthy of reinstatement.

The Inquiry Panel “concluded that insofar as the nature

and circumstances of Raimondi’s misconduct is concerned,

his reinstatement would not be prejudicial to the interest of

the public or the administration of justice.” (A. 13). The

Inquiry Panel further “found that Raimondi has met the

burden of establishing that his conduct and reformation since

his release from prison warrant his reinstatement to the practice

of law.” (A. 16). It also found that he “has met the burden

of establishing that his present character merits favorable

consideration for his readmission to the Bar.” (A. 17).

In light of the facts in this case and the Braverman case,

the decision in this case was arbitrary and capricious and

without any rational basis in violation of the equal protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution

of the United States.

THE PETITIONER WAS SUBJECT TO CRUEL AND

UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT IN VIOLATION OF

THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITU-

TION OF THE UNITED STATES BY THE COURT'S

DENIAL OF THE PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR

REINSTATEMENT WITHOUT ANY RATIONAL

BASIS.

The Maryland Court of Appeals states in its opinion

that “there may be a point in time when it is proper to reinstate

to the practice of law even one who has committed a most

heinous crime.” (A. 49). But, despite this language, the Mary-

land Court of Appeals, by denying the Petitioner’s reinstatement

upon the facts in this case, has stated, in effect ‘““NEVER,

NEVER.” This imposes an impossible burden upon the

Petitioner to overcome. Considering the quasi-criminal nature

of disbarment and disciplinary proceeding, the Court’s denial

of Petitioner’s Petition for Reinstatement constituted cruel

and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment

to the Constitution of the United States.

Although the statement to the effect that the purpose of

disbarment is not to punish, but to protect the public is often

made by the Courts, see e.g. In re Barton, 273 Md. 377, 329

A.2d 102, 104 (1974); In re Meyerson, 190 Md. 671, 52A.

489, 491, (1948); Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 288 (1883),

it can hardly be denied that a result of such a proceeding is

often the infliction of a penalty or punishment. As the Court

stated in In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968), a case in which

an attorney was indefinitely suspended from practice for

misconduct of which he was not aware before proceedings

against him began: ‘Disbarment, designed to protect the

public, is a punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer.”

390 U.S. at 550.

In Spevack v. Klein, 385 U. S. 511, 515-516 (1967),

a case dealing with Fifth Amendment protections and the

right of an attorney to seek such protections, the Court noted:

“In this context ‘penalty’ is not restricted to fine

or imprisonment. It means, as we said in Griffin v.

State of California, 380 U. S. 609. 85 S.Ct. 1229,

14 L. Ed. 2d 106, the imposition of any sanction

which makes assertion of the Fifth Amendment

privilege “‘costly”. J/d., 380 U. S. at 614, 85 S. Ct. at

1233.

The threat of disbarment and the loss of professional

standing, professional reputation and of livelihood

are powerful forms of compulsion to make a lawyer

relinquish the privilege... .”

In Ex Parte Garland, 71 U. S. (4 Wall) 333, 337 (1867)

the Court stated:

“And exclusion from any of the professions or any

of the ordinary avocations of life for past conduct

can be regarded in no other light than as punishment

for such conduct.” [Emphasis supplied ]

Of critical importance in attempting to extend the pro-

hibition against cruel and unusual punishment to a disbarment

or related reinstatement proceeding is the statement in Jn re

Ruffalo, 380 U. S. at 551 as to the nature of these types of

proceedings: “These are adversary proceedings of a quasi-

criminal nature. Cf. Jn re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33, 87 S. Ct.

1428, 1446, 182 L. Ed. 2d 527.”

What constitutes cruel and unusual punishment? In

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), this Court, in a plurality

opinion, held that the denaturalization of a citizen. who was

guilty of desertion during wartime was cruel and unusual

punishment. In recognizing the decision of Weems v. U. S.,

217 U. S. 349 (1910) this Court in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S.

at 100-01 stated that:

“The Court recognized in that case that the words

of the Amendment are not precise, and that their

scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its

meaning from the evolving standards of decency

that mark the progress of a maturing society.”

In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, rehearing denied, 429

U. S. 875 (1976), this Court, in the joint opinion of Justices

Stewart, Potter and Stevens, quoting Weems v. United States,

217 U.S. 349, 373, (1910) stated:

“... Thus the clause forbidding ‘cruel and unusual’

punishments is not fastened to the obsolete but

may acquire meaning as public opinion become

enlightened by a humane justice.” J/d., at 378, 30

S. Ct. at 553. See also Furman vy. Georgia, 408 U. S.

at 429-430, 92 S. Ct. at 2823-2824 (Powell, J.,

dissenting).”

It is respectfully submitted that denial by the Maryland

Court of Appeals of Petitioner’s reinstatement is based on

standards above and beyond those standards imposed upon an

individual by society and law, and places the Petitioner in the

onerous position of being unable, by any avenue or vehicle

provided by society or law, to eliminate the burden which in

effect the Court has made eternal. For no more favorable

result could be obtained than the decisions of the Inquiry

Panel and Review Board which both recommended reinstate-

ment after a complete review of the facts and a very thorough

hearing.

To refuse to adopt their recommendations is both arbitrary

and capricious and under the facts in this case the Maryland

Court of Appeal’s decision denying the Petitioner’s Petition

for Reinstatement without a rational basis is cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the

Constitution of the United States.

CONCLUSIONS

The American Bar Association, Canon I, Ethical Considera-

tion, Code of Professional Responsibility, states that when a

lawyer’s disqualification to practice law has terminated,

“members of the Bar should assist such person in being licensed,

or if licensed, in being restored to his full right to practice.”

In re Drier, 258 F. 2d, 68, 69-70 (3d. Cir. 1958).

For the reasons above stated, Petitioner prays that his

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari be granted by this Honorable

Court.

Respectfully submitted,

RAYMOND R. DICKEY, ESQ.

JEROME A. DASHNER, ESQ.

Attorneys for Petitioner

A. |

APPENDIX

IN THE MATTER OF * IN THE

THE REINSTATEMENT OF * COURT OF APPEALS

THOMAS PAUL RAIMONDI * OF MARYLAND

1626 Lochwood Road ° Misc. Docket (BV) 3

Baltimore, Maryland 21218 * September Term, 1977

KKKKKKHKKAKA KKK KK KK

PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT TO THE BAR

Filed May 16, 1977

TO THE HONORABLE, THE JUDGES OF SAID COURT:

Now comes your Petitioner, Thomas Paul Raimondi,

by his attorney, Jerome A. Dashner, and respectfully petitions

for his reinstatement to the Maryland Bar under Rule BV 14

of the Maryland Rules of Procedure and says:

1. That he was convicted by a jury of attempted bribery

in the Criminal Court of Baltimore City on April 24, 1970.

(Docket 1968/7866).

2. That he was sentenced on August 31, 1970 to serve

eighteen (18) months and pay a Five Hundred ($500.00) Dollar

fine.

3. That his resignation with prejudice from the Mary-

land State Bar was accepted on December 29, 1972 by this

Court. (Misc. Docket (BV) 6, 1972).

A. 2

4. That he was incarcerated on January 3, 1973, was

paroled June 5, 1973 and he was discharged from parole on

July 3, 1974.

5. That he was granted a full and absolute Pardon by

the Governor of the State of Maryland on May 27, 1975.

(Copy of which is attached hereto and marked “Exhibit #1’’),

6. That since June 5, 1973 he has been employed as

follows:

a. June 1973: Halcyon Holding Company

b. January 7, 1974 to July 1, 1974: Deputy

National Director -— National Association

for Justice, Washington, D. C.

c. July 1, 1974 to date: State of Maryland,

Department of Licensing and Regulation.

(1) July, 1974 to April, 1976, Inspector,

Maryland State Board of Censors.

(2) April 7, 1976 to date, Hearings Officer,

Insurance Division

. 7. That in the duties of Hearing Officer, Insurance

Division, State of Maryland, your Petitioner has conducted

and presided over some three hundred and fifty (350) hearings

resulting from complaints and proposals arising under Art. 48A

of the Annotated Code of the State of Maryland, and that

in his quasi-judicial capacity in the cenduct of these formal

administrative hearings and in the rendering of written decisions

A. 3

based upon the record, your Petitioner has clearly demonstrated

his competency and knowledge of the current law and his

fitness to be reinstated to the Bar in good standing.

8. That since your Petitioner was paroled on June 5,

1973 he has:

a. Attended graduate school at George Washington

University, Washington, D. C. and the University

of Baltimore and has been awarded the Master

of Public Administration Degree with high

honors from the University of Baltimore on

December 22. 1976;

>. Been admitted to Phi Alpha Alpha, the National

Honorary Society for Public Affairs and Admini-

stration;

c. Served on the Steering Committee for accredi-

tation of the University of Baltimore by the

Mid-Atlantic Association of Colleges and Uni-

versities (1975 to 1977);

d. Founded and served as the first President of

the M.P.A. Student Association, University of

Baltimore (1975 to 1977);

e. Been elected to the Grand Council of Maryland,

Fraternal Order, Sons of Italy in America as a

Grand Trustee;

f. Actively participated in the support of chari-

table and civic activities such as the Baltimore

A. 4

City Fair, the Italian Festival and the Associated

Italian Charities;

g. During this period, maintained a proper home

and provided love, affection and support for his

wife and their six children, three of whom are

now attending college;

9. That in accordance with Article 10, Section 20 of

the Annotated Code of Maryland, he has not practiced law in

this State in any form, either as principal or agent, clerk or

employee of another and has not appeared as an attorney or

counselor of law before any court, judge, justice, board, com-

mission or public officer, or prepared any Will, mortgage

or deed.

10. That the crime of which he was convicted, attempted

bribery, is a misdemeanor.

11. That he applies for reinstatement to the Maryland

Bar in accordance with the provision of Article 10, Section 22

of the Annotated Code of Maryland.

WHEREFORE, your Petitioner respectfully prays that

having been fully rehabilitated and having been granted a

Pardon that this Honorable Court reinstate your Petitioner

as a Member of the Bar in good standing.

A. 5

I DO SOLEMNLY DECLARE AND AFFIRM, under the

penalties of perjury, that the contents of the foregoing docu-

ment are true and accurate.

/s/ Thomas Paul Raimondi _//s/ Jerome A. Dashner

Petitioner 112 Equitable Building

Baltimore, Maryland 21202

717-2412

Attorney for Petitioner

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 14th day of May,

1977, a copy of the aforegoing Petition for Reinstatement

was mailed to L. Hollingsworth Pittman, Fsquire, Counsel

for the Maryland State Bar Association, District Court Building,

Taylor Avenue and Rowe Boulevard, Annapolis, Maryland 21401

/s/ Jermome A. Dashner

A. 6

STATE OF MARYLAND

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

FULL PARDON

BE IT KNOWN, that, WHEREAS a certain THOMAS

PAUL RAIMONDI was convicted of Attempted Bribery of a

State Official in The Criminal Court of Baltimore on April 24,

1970 and on August 31, 1970 was sentenced to serve eighteen

months and pay a fine of $500.00 and costs; and

WHEREAS, the said THOMAS PAUL RAIMONDI has

been recommended to the clemency of the Governor by the

Maryland State Board of Parole,

NOW THEREFORE I, MARVIN MANDEL, GOVERNOR

OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND, having thought proper

the extension of such clemency, do hereby, in pursuance of

the authority vested in me by law, grant unto the said THOMAS

PAUL RAIMONDI a FULL PARDON, absolving him from

the guilt of his criminal act and exempting him from any pains

and penalties imposed upon him therefore by law.

GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND

THE GREAT SEAL OF MARY-

LAND, in the City of Annapolis

on this 27th day of May, 1975

/s/ Marvin Mandel

Governor

/s/ Fred L. Wineland

Secretary of State

“EXHIBIT 1”

A. 7

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF INQUIRY PANEL

File No. 77-4594

Date Forwarded to Panel by Bar Counsel: March 17, 1978

Attorney

Thomas Paul Raimondi

1500 Cranwell Road

Lutherville, Maryland 21093

Nature of Proceeding

On May 16, 1977, a Petition for Reinstatement to the

Maryland Bar was filed by Thomas Paul Raimondi (Petitioner)

under Rule BV14_ of the Maryland Rules of Procedure? .

Pursuant to Rule BV14 d.2., the Court of Appeals reserved

judgment until after hearing, Bar Counsel conducted an

investigation of the allegations of the Petition and on March 17,

1978 the matter was referred to this Panel selected by the

Chairman of the Inquiry Committee, to be heard and deter-

mined in accordance with Section c of Rule BV6.

Petitioner was on April 24, 1970 convicted by a jury in the

Criminal Court of Baltimore City of Attempted bribery of a

Maryland State Senator in connection with the election by the

1The Petition for Reinstatement states that it is filed under Rule

BV14 but also makes reference in paragraph 11 to Article 10, Section 22

of the Annotated Code of Maryland. The latter section was repealed sub-

sequent to the filing of the Petition by Acts 1977, ch. 305 effective

July 1, 1977.

A. 8

Maryland General Assembly of a Governor to serve the

unexpired portion of the term of Spiro T. Agnew who had, in

November, 1968, been elected Vice President of the United

States. Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed on appeal by both

the Court of Special Appeals and the Court of Appeals of

Maryland. The United States Supreme Court denied Certiorari.

Petitioner’s resignation with prejudice from the Bar of the State

of Maryland was accepted by the Maryland Court of Appeals

on December 29, 1972. Petitioner was sentenced to a term of

18 months and a fine of $500. He was incarcerated from

January 3, 1973 through June 5, 1973 and thereupon paroled.

He was discharged from parole on July 3, 1974. Petitioner was

granted a full pardon by Governor Marvin Mandel on May 27

1975,

Statement of the Issues

Rule BV 14 requires that a Petition for Reinstatement shall

set forth facts showing that the Petitioner is (a) rehabilitated

and (b) otherwise entitled to the relief sought. The Court of

Appeals in Jn re Meyerson, 190 Md. 671, 59 A.2d 489 (1948)

and more recently in /n re Braverman, 269 Md. 661, 309

A.2d 468 (1973); 271 Md. 196, 316 A.2d 246 (1974) and In

re Barton, 273 Md. 377, 329 A.2d 102 (1974) has stated that

the ultimate issue is whether the Petitioner can demonstrate

“fitness acquired since unfitness was established by the dis-

barment”. The latter two cases have elaborated further by

stating that in making its recommendation with respect to a

Petition for Reinstatement, the fact finding Panel should

evaluate in particular the following four factors:

1. The nature and circumstances of the Petitioner’s

original misconduct.

A.9

2. The Petitioner’s subsequent conduct and reformation.

3. The Petitioner’s present character.

4. The Petitioner’s present qualifications and competency

to practice law.

In considering these factors and arriving at a recommendation

with respect to the ultimate issue, the Panel is cognizant that

the final judgment convicting Petitioner of attempted bribery

is conclusive proof of his guilt of that crime (Rule BV10 e.1. -

made applicable to these proceedings by Rule BV14 d.5.) and

that the burden lies upon the Petitioner to establish “by clear

and convincing proof” that he has acquired fitness since having

been established to be unfit to practice law (Rule BV14 d.4).

Recommendation

The Panel unanimously recommends that the Petitioner

be reinstated to the Bar of the State of Maryland.

Reasons for Recommendation

The Panel unanimously concludes that the Petitioner has

sustained his burden of establishing fitness acquired since his

resignation from the Bar with prejudice. This conclusion is

based upon the Panel’s following findings from the testimony

and exhibits in the record with respect to the four factors set

out above in the Statement of the Issues.

A. 10

Nature and Circumstances of the

Petitioner’s Original Misconduct

Petitioner was convicted of having attempted in late 1968

to bribe State Senator John J. Bishop, Jr. in order to influence

the outcome of a then pending special election by the Maryland

General Assembly of a new Governor to complete the unexpired

portion of the term of Spiro T. Agnew. That conviction was

affirmed on appeal. Notwithstanding that Petitioner subse-

quently received a Full Pardon from Governor Marvin Mandel

on May 27, 1975, the Panel must conclusively presume that

he did in fact commit that act for which he was convicted.

Nevertheless, the circumstances under which the act was com-

mitted are proper matters for the Panel to consider in making

its recommendation.

Petitioner graduated from the University of Maryland Law

School in 1953, was admitted to the Maryland Bar in October,

1953, served two years on active duty in the United States

Army and commenced practicing law in 1956. He was active in

several political organizations and served for a time as Acting

Zoning Enforcement Officer in Baltimore City and as a Justice

of the Peace. In 1968, he filed as a Republican candidate for

Congress from the Fourth Congressional District and won the

nomination by a narrow margin. Following his nomination he

was introduced to Senator John J. Bishop, Jr. who was respon-

sible for coordinating and directing efforts in Maryland to elect

Republican Congressmen and who, according to Petitioner’s

testimony, had control over the availability of funds from the

National Committee to support such efforts.

Petitioner lost to Congressman George Fallon in the

general election of November, 1968. Petitioner testified that

A. 1]

shortly thereafter he had a conversation with Senator Bishop

concerning the debt which Petitioner’s campaign committee had

incurred and that this conversation evolved into a discussion

and numerous further conversations concerning the then

pending special election by the General Assembly of Maryland

to elect a new Governor to complete the unexpired term of

Spiro T. Agnew. In its indictment (B.C. Ex. 1) filed December 19,

1968 in the Criminal Court of Baltimore City, the Grand Jury

charged that between November 27, 1968 and December 18,

1968 Petitioner attempted in a series of personal and telephone

conversations to bribe Senator Bishop by offering him $75,000 -

$100,000 for the purpose of having Senator Bishop obtain

25-33 votes of the Republican members of the General

Assembly of Maryland, including the vote of Senator Bishop,

in favor of an unnamed gubernatorial candidate selected by

Petitioner or by unnamed persons for whom Petitioner was

allegedly acting, such votes to be cast at such time as the

General Assembly would meet for the purpose of choosing the

Governor of Maryland to fill the unexpired term of Governor

Spiro T. Agnew, Vice President of the United States of America.

Petitioner was tried by a jury and convicted.

Attempted bribery of a State Senator is undoubtedly a

serious crime involving moral turpitude, notwithstanding that it

is a misdemeanor (see State v. Canova, 278 Md. 483, 365 A.2d

988 (1976) ). But for the Executive Pardon which he received

after serving a prison term, Petitioner would be forever dis-

enfranchised and disqualified from holding any office of trust

or profit in this state (Article 27, Section 23 of the Annotated

Code of Maryland). Although Petitioner testified before the

Panel that his series of conversations with Senator Bishop

concerning the pending election of a new Governor were

initiated and pursued by Senator Bishop rather than by

A. 12

Petitioner, he makes no plea that his conviction was founded

upon insufficient evidence. Indeed if he did, this Panel could

not consider such a contention in weighing his Petition for

Reinstatement. We must proceed from the basis that he stands

convicted. Starting from that basis, however, the nature and

circumstances of Petitioner’s misconduct as evidenced by the

record before us lead us to the conclusion that his reinstatement

would not be prejudicial to the administration of justice.

Admittedly, it cannot be said here, as it was in Braverman,

that public attitudes and developments in the law have changed

with respect to the crime of which Petitioner was convicted.

Nevertheless, it is certainly true that a very unique set of cir-

cumstances combined to set the stage for Petitioner’s acts. In

his testimony before the Panel, the then States Attorney,

Charles E. Moylan, Jr., stated that although his office viewed

the crime as serious in terms of its impact on the governmental

structure, “We did not think that there was too great an

imminent danger of its coming to fruition because it was just

a little bit too bizarre to be - - it was a long, long shot even from

the point of view of those attempting to perpetrate it.” (T. Vol.

1 pp. 49-50).

The Panel attaches little weight to the testimony of several

witnesses that Petitioner’s indictment may have been politically

inspired (T. Vol. 1 pp. 59-60; T. Vol. 2 pp. 14-15). However, it

appears to be uncontroverted that no other persons were ever

identified as having acted in concert with Petitioner, it was

never established how Petitioner could ever obtain the funds to

carry through the acts for which he was indicted and convicted

and there was never an identification of any specific candidate

for whom he was attempting to buy votes. These circumstances,

as well as the above noted opinion of the then States Attorney,

A. 13

tend to support Petitioner’s contention (T. Vol. 2 p. 119)

that the offers of money to Senatory Bishop for the stated

purpose of buying votes in the Maryland Legislature were part

of a scheme to publicly embarrass Senator Bishop because of

Petitioner’s bitterness toward the Republican national organ-

ization in Maryland for failing to support his campaign against

Congressman Fallon as he felt it should have.

In the final analysis, based upon the record before it and

its observation of Petitioner during his testimony, the Panel

agrees with the remarks of Norman Polovoy, who has known

the Petitioner both socially and professionally for approxi-

mately 27 years, that what Petitioner did was “stupid”,

“irrational” and ‘“‘out of character’ (Vol. 2 pp. 71-72).

Although it was a serious act, it appears to have been perpe-

trated for purposes of enbarrassing Senator Bishop rather for

any apparent personal gain. The testimony of Dr. Jonas

Rappaport, who examined Petitioner on behalf of Bar Counsel

subsequent to the filing of his Petition for Reinstatement,

confirmed that in his opinion there are no serious defects in

Petitioner’s morality and that Petitioner is unlikely to become

similarly involved in the future.

We conclude that insofar as the nature and circumstances

of Petitioner’s misconduct are concerned, his reinstatement

would not be prejudicial to the interests of the public or to the

administration of justice.

A. 14

The Petitioner’s Subsequent

Conduct and Reformation

The record amply supports the outline in paragraphs 6

and 8 of the Petition for Reinstatement of Petitioner’s employ-

ment, educational advancement and community involvement

since his release from prison in June, 1973. Foilowing such

release he held a part-time position with the Maryalnd State

Board of Censors and took several examinations for other

administrative positions for which he was turned down

because of his conviction. He pursued and obtained a Pardon

in May, 1975, following which he passed a competitive exami-

nation and was selected as a hearing officer in the Insurance

Division for the State of Maryland, a position he has held from

April, 1976 to the present time.

Hearing officers are required to be attorneys but need not

be members of the Bar. Petitioner’s duties, as described by

Insurance Commissioner Edward Birrane, are to conduct

hearings dealing with alleged violations of the State Insurance

Code by insurance companies, agencies, brokers or other

licensees of the Insurance Divison as well as consumer com-

plaints concerning the alleged failure of insurance companies

to observe underwriting rules or to conduct proper claims

procedures, to make findings of fact and conclusions of law

and to render opinions and orders, subject to review by the

Insurance Commissioner. By Petitioner’s own testimony, he

“knew nothing about insurance law”’when he was appointed

a hearing officer although he had had some administrative law

experience. He studied and learned on the job. In Mr. Birrane’s

opinion, Petitioner is an excellent hearing officer, both in his

A. 15

evenhanded conduct of proceedings and his current knowledge

of insurance law in Maryland. This opinion was further con-

firmed by the testimony of Emmanuel Horn, Esq. and hapanee

Waxter, Esq., who have participated in numerous hearings

before Petitioner in his capacity as a hearing officer.

In September, 1975, Petitioner enrolled in a then new

Master in Public Administration program at University of

Baltimore, from which he graduated in June, 1977 with a

Masters Degree and one of the higher grade averages in the

graduating class.

Since his release from prison, Petitioner has been very

active in the Order of the Sons of Italy, having been elected by

his Lodge to be a Grand Trustee, a position which requires

the expenditure of funds and which he has held for 4 youre.

In 1975, he chaired the Italian participation in the Baltimore

City Fair.

Several witnesses testified to Petitioner’s close ties with

his family, and this was evident as well from his own testimony.

Petitioner’s testimony regarding his efforts to seek

employment from the time of his release from prison through

his successful pursuance of a pardon and his subsequent appli-

cation to and acceptance by the Insurance Division as a Hearing

Officer, combined with the furtherance of his education and his

civic activites, impress us that he has made a strong and con-

sistent effort to regain a position of respect in both the legal

community and the community at large.

Bar Counsel has cited Jn re Barton as suggesting that

perhaps the 4% years between the acceptance of Petitioner's

resignation from the Bar and the filing of his Petition for

A. 16

Reinstatement is too brief a period to evidence his reformation.

In the Barton case, approximately 7 years elapsed between

disbarment and the filing of a Petition of Reinstatement, and

the Panel as well as the Court of Appeals concluded that

sufficient time had not passed to be assured of petitioner’s

reformation. In that case, however, the Panel found “certain

present disabilities” in the petitioner’s ‘‘current situation”

which it felt he should rectify before his petition could be

favorably considered. The Court of Appeals’ opinion is not

entirely clear as to what these disabilities were. However,

the opinion states that the gravity of the original offense,

combined with the lack of sufficient evidence that the

petitioner was presently competent to practice law, were the

principal factors underlying the decision to deny the petition.

In Barton, the original offense consisted of several different

instances of misappropriating clients’ funds, and petitioner’s

only steps toward achieving competence to practice again

were to perform some volunteer work for the Delaware Family

Court and the Legal Aid Society in Georgetown, Delaware.

Nothing in the Barton case suggests that in the case of an

isolated act of misconduct such as is here under consideration,

and on the basis of the record of Petitioner’s activities and

accomplishments from June, 1973 to the present which we find

before us, we should conclude that the passage of time has been

too brief for Petitioner to evidence his reformation. On the

contrary, we find that Petitioner has met the burden of estab-

lishing that his conduct and reformation since his release from

prison warrant his reinstatement to the practice of law.

The Petitioner’s Present Character

A dumber of witnesses who have known Petitioner for

20-25 years or more testified favorably as to his honesty and

A. 17

integrity, although several had only intermittent social contacts

with him since his release from prison. Those, such as Com-

missioner Birrane and Emmanuel Horn, who have had

considerable professional contact with him in his capacity as a

hearing officer for the Insurance Commission, were likewise

impressed with his honesty, integrity and sense of fairness.

Several witnesses attested to his close family ties and Colonel

Simon Avara, who has known him only since 1973 though his

activities as a Grand Trustee of the Order of the Sons of Italy,

testified that he has always found Petitioner to be “honest,

upstanding, understanding and a good family man.” We find

that Petitioner has met the burden of establishing that his

present character merits favorable consideration for his

readmission to the Bar.

The Petitioner’s Present Qualifications

and Competency to Practice Law

Bar Counsel contends that Petitioner has not met the

burden of proving his present fitness to practice law because

(1) there exists considerable doubt as to his emotional stability

should he be faced with some of the stresses which might be

expected to arise in the practice of law and (2) since his

resignation from the Bar in 1972, his experience has been

limited to a single field and readmission to the Bar would

permit him to practice in areas in which he may no longer be

qualified.

At the outset of the hearing, Petitioner’s counsel argued

strenuously that Dr. Rappaport’s report (B.C. Ex. 15), as well

as his testimony, should not be considered by the Panel because

they related largely to some emotional problems Petitioner

has had in the past rather than to his present fitness to practice

A. 18

law. The Panel, however, felt that these arguments went to

weight rather than admissibility. Although the few reinstate-

ment cases which the Court of Appeals has decided have made

no mention of psychiatric or psychological examinations, if

there were sufficient evidence linking Petitioner’s misconduct

to persistent and continuing flaws in his character or emotional

makeup, so as to indicate a likelihood that he would again

violate the high standards of our profession if readmitted to the

practice of law, we would not hesitate to recommend against

his reinstatement. However, such was not the thrust of Dr.

Rappaport’s report and testimony. After describing what he

variously characterized as suicide “gestures”, “threats” or

“attempts” which occurred in 1952 following a_ broken

engagement, in 1962 following difficulties arising out of the

activities of a building and loan association in which he was

involved and in 1973 following his sentencing to prison for the

attempted bribery of Senator Bishop, and based further upon

two examinations of Petitioner made for purposes of these

proceedings, Dr. Rappaport concluded that Petitioner has what

he characterized as an “inadequate personality” in that he tends

to break down under circumstances of extreme stress. Dr.

R-vpaport felt that Petitioner’s basic psychiatric makeup is no

different now than when he began practicing law.

Dr. Michael Potash, on the other hand, who examined

Petitioner at the request of his own counsel for purposes of

these proceedings, was of the opinion that as a result of his

incarceration and his experiences since his release from prison,

Petitioner has undergone a radical change in his values and

lifestyle in the direction of more family involvement and career

focus on administrative law, that his earlier problems had

not really involved genuine suicide attempts, that while he

A. 19

might have some immature traits in his personality they are

within nermal limits and that Petitioner has no personality

disturbance whatsoever at the present time.

In the view we take of this matter, it is unnecessary for

us to decide whether there has been a basic change in Petitioner’s

personality or not. We are cognizant of EC 1-6 cited. by Bar

Counsel. However, the authorities in this State indicate quite

uniformly that protection of the public should be our primary

concern in considering a Petition for Reinstatement, and we

believe EC 1-6 must be read in light of that concern. Dr.

Rappaport testified that Petitioner can function quite ade-

quately under normal stresses, that he has treated numerous

practicing attorneys for the same iypes of personality problems

he sees in Petitioner, that Petitioner is not in need of psychiatric

treatment or therapy (although he might benefit from a course

of treatment if he really wanted it), that there is no serious

defect in his morality and that he is basically honest. The only

concern Dr. Rappaport expressed was that a severe threat to

Petitioner’s family security or, if readmitted to practice, his

professional security, might kindle the spark of suicide potential

which Dr. Rappaport feels is still present in Petitioner’s

personality, though to a lesser degree than in the past. Even if

this potential exists, we do not view it as a relevant factor in

determining whether Petitioner’s reinstatement would be

prejudicial to the public interest.

With respect to Petitioner’s limited experience in legal

matters since his resignation from the Bar, Bar Counsel

recognizes the inherent difficulty encountered by one who is

precluded by disbarment from that actual practice of law,

suggesting that perhaps Petitioner could have taken continuing

legal education courses in various fields. He stresses that if

A. 20

readmitted to practice, Petitioner would not be limited as

to a field of practice and well might not limit himself to areas

in which he has some experience and competence.

As the Court of Appeals pointed out in /n re Braverman,

316 A.2d 246, 249 ‘Neither the Maryland Rules nor the

statute describing the duties of the State Board of Law

Examiners provide for reexamination of an applicant for

reinstatement.” In Braverman, 18 years had elapsed between

the petitioner’s disbarment and the filing of his application for

reinstatement and yet the Panel was satisfied that the

petitioner’s testimony outlining his acticity in certain areas of

criminal correctional law and his intention to become a vol-

unteer intern with the Legal Aid Bureau of Baltimore, Inc.

evidenced a sound and responsible attitude toward refreshing

his professional skills. The Panel further stated:

“We are mindful that every attorney is bound by

Maryland Rule 1230 to confrom to the Code of

Professional Responsibility of the American Bar

Association. Canon EC 6-1 provides in part that an

attorney * * * should accept employment only in

matters in which he is or intends to become

competent to handle.”

In that instant case approximately 4% years elapsed between

the acceptance by the Court of Appeals of Petitioner’s resigna-

tion from the Bar and the filing of his Petition for Reinstatement,

and a further 1% years has elapsed since than. During that

period, Petitioner obtained a Master’s degree in Public Admin-

istration and has served for 2% years as a Hearing Officer in the

Insurance Division for the State of Maryland. According to the

testimony of Insurance Commissioner Birrane, his executive

A. 21

assistant, Ted Hickman, and several attorneys who have tried

numerous cases before him, he has performed his duties with

extreme competence. We believe that Petitioner’s accomplish-

ments, as well as his own testimony, evidence a sound and

responsible attitude toward refreshing his professional skills.

We are satisfied that if readmitted to the practice of law,

Petitioner would abide by the requirements of EC 6-1.

For the aforegoing reasons, we recommend that

Petitioner be readmitted to the Bar of the State of Maryland.

/s/ Lawrence A. Kaufman,

Chairman

/s/ Herbert J. Arnold

/s/ Leonard E. Cohen

A. 22

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION

OF MARYLAND

Review Board

JAN 29, 1979

ERNEST M. THOMPSON PLEASE REPLY TO:

CHAIRMAN P.O. Box 1209

Easton, MD 21601

January 26, 1979

B.C. No. 77-459-4

Petitioner Seeking Reinstatement: Thomas Raimondi

Date of Meeting: January 25, 1979

There were eleven (11) members present which constitutes

a quroum.

Due process was accorded Petitioner by Inquiry Panel.

Facts found: Petitioner has the obligation to vuvercome/

meet four principal criteria which are:

1. The nature and conduct of the original

misconduct.

2. Subsequent Conduct and Reformation.

Present Character.

4. Present Qualifications and Competence to

Practice Law.

The decision of the Review Board was by a majority vote

of ten for, with one abstention, as to:

A. 23

Petitioner has met the burden.

The Review Board, therefore, concurs in and adopts the

Inquiry Panel’s recommendation that the Petition for reinstate-

ment should be granted and does hereby fully repeat, adopt and

incorporate by reference thereto all evidence, exhibits, tran-

scripts and other matters introduced before the Inquiry Panel,

as fully as if set forth herein.

/s/ Ernest M. Thompson

Attorney Grievance Commission

of Maryland

A. 24

IN THE MATTER OF ° In The

Court of Appeals

REINSTATEMENT OF ° of Maryland

Misc. Docket (Subtitle BV)

THOMAS PAUL RAIMONDI * No. 3

September Term, 1977

SHOW CAUSE ORDER

The report and recommendation of the Review Board

having been filed with this Court in accordance with Maryland

Rule BV 14 d 2, it is this 8th day of March, 1979

ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that

Bar Counsel show cause on or before April 2, 1979 why the

recommendation of the Review Board in this matter should

not be adopted.

/s/ Robert C. Murphy

Chief Judge

A. 25

IN THE MATTER OF THE * IN THE

PETITION OF * COURT OF APPEALS

THOMAS PAUL RAIMONDI * OF MARYLAND

FOR REINSTATEMENT TO * Misc. Docket (Subtitle BV)

THE BAR OF MARYLAND * No.3

* September Term, 1977

ANSWER TO SHOW CAUSE ORDER

In response to the Order of this Court dated March 8,

1979 to show cause why the recommendation of the Review

Board that the Petition for Reinstatement be granted ought

not to be adopted by this Court, Bar Counsel states as follows:

1. This Court has heretofore recognized four principal

factors to be considered in evaluating a Petition for Reinstate-

ment: ffirst, the nature and circumstances of the original

misconduct which led to the Petitioner’s disbarment; second,

the Petitioner’s subsequent conduct and reformation; third, the

Petitioner’s present character; and, fourth, the Petitioner’s

“present qualifications and competence to practice law”, Jn Re

Barton, 273 Md. 377 at 379. The recommendation of the

Review Board that the Petitioner be reinstated ought not to

be adopted by the Court primarily because the Petitioner is

not presently qualified and competent to practice law.

2. The Review Board found that the Petitioner had

presented clear and convincing evidence of his present quali-

fications and competency to practice law and adopted the

Inquiry Panel’s report which, on this issue, stated, in

pertinent part:

A. 26

“Bar Counsel contends that Petitioner has not

met the burden of proving his present fitness to

practice law because. . . since his resignation from the

Bar in 1972, his experience has been limited to a

single field and readmission to the Bar would permit

him to practice in areas in which he may no longer

be qualified. . . . With respect to Petitioner’s limited

experience in legal matters since his resignation from

the Bar, Bar Counsel recognizes the inherent diffi-

culty encountered by one who is precluded by

disbarment from the actual practice of law, suggesting

that perhaps Petitioner could have taken continu-

ing legal education courses in various fields. He

stresses that if readmitted as to a field of practice and

well might not limit himself to areas in which he has

some experience and competence.

As the Court of Appeals pointed out in Jn Re

Braverman, 316 A.2d 246, 249 ‘Neither the Mary-

land Rules nor the statute describing the duties of

the State Board of Law Examiners provide for a

reexamination of an applicant for reinstatement.”

In Braverman, 18 years had elapsed between the

Petitioner’s disbarment and the filing of his appli-

cation for reinstatement and yet the Panel was

satisfied that the petitioner’s testimony outlining

his activity in certain areas of criminal correctional

law and his intention to become a volunteer intern

with the Legal Aid Bureau of Baltimore, Inc.

evidenced a sound and responsible attitude toward

refreshing his professional skills. The Panel further

stated: ‘We are mindful that every attorney is bound

by Maryland Rule 1230 to conform to the Code of

A. 27

Professional Responsibility of the American Bar

Association. Canon EC 6-1 provides in part that an

attorney * * * should accept employment in matters

in which he is or intends to become competent to

handle.” In the instant case approximately 4% years

elapsed between the acceptance by the Court of

Appeals of Petitioner’s resignation from the Bar and

the filing of his Petition for Reinstatement, and a

further 1% years has elapsed since then. During that

period, Petitioner obtained a Master’s degree in

Public Administration and has served for 2% years

as a Hearing Officer in the Insurance Division for

the State of Maryland. According to the testimony

of Insurance Commissioner Birrane, his executive

assistant Ted Hickman, and several attorneys who

have tried numerous cases before him, he has per-

formed his duties with extreme competence. We

believe that Petitioner’s accomplishments, as well

as his own testimony, evidence a sound and respon-

sible attitude towards refreshing his professional

skills. We are satisfied that if readmitted to the

practice of law, Petitioner would abide by the

requirements of EC 6-1.”

3. This Court has said, ‘‘. . . when we consider a

petition for readmission, our concern is whether this Court can

be assured that the public can rely on the competence and

integrity of the previously disbarred attorney”, Jn Re Barton,

273 Md. 377 at 381. (Emphasis supplied.) And, concerning

Petitioner Barton, this Court said that he “failed to demon-

strate that he is presently equipped to represent clients

competently, The only evidence he offered on this point was

A. 28

that he had done some volunteer work of a clerical nature for

a family court and a legal aid agency, and that he had sub-

scribed to the Daily Record for two years. This effort is not

sufficient to qualify him to be licensed to practice law”, Jn Re

Barton, ibid. The record in the instant case will not support a

finding that Petitioner Raimondi is “presently equipped to

represent clients competently.”

The Petitioner testified as follows:

“Q. What if anything have you done to keep

abreast of the law?

A. Well,no more than I do when I was

practicing law, Mr. Dashner. I read the Daily Record.

We get that. I go to the Bar Library. I have to

research a great deal of law. Let me tell you this,

when I got the job as Hearing Officer for the Insur-

ance Division, | knew nothing about insurance law.

And insurance policies frightened the death out of

me. I used to read it and wonder what they were

talking about, half the times.

I got a lot of training on the job. I got the job

on a Wednesday and Friday I was hearing cases. The

Code says I’m supposed to be trained, but Commis-

sioner Birrane knew that I had an _ extensive

background in azdministrative law. But I had to learn

the Code and I learned it fast. I went to the library,

I read the Code, I talked to the Assistant Attorney

General Tax Division. He gave me the leading cases I

should be aware of. I read Allstate and I read GEICO

and I put a lot of time into it in the first month

A. 29

learning the Code, learning what the insurance

industry is about. I don’t consider myself as muchof_ ,

an expert as Commissioner Birrane, but I’m charged

by the Legislature as being the expert. That’s why I

can conduct hearings.” . .

(T., Page 115, Line 7 to Page 116, Line 9; June 27, 1978)

Seven of the Petitioner’s witnesses at the Inquiry Panel

hearing testified that they had no kivowledge of any efforts

the Petitioner may have made since his conviction and disbar-

ment to learn about important developments in the law and

changes in Maryland statutes and rules: Clement Mercaldo,

hearing of June 20. 1978, T. Page 27, Line 18 to Page 28, Line

2; Honorable Charles Moylan, hearing of June 20, 1978, T.,

Page 47 Lines 13 to 20; Edward Birrane, hearing of June 20,

1978, T., Page 90, Lines 10 to 15; Daniel Martin, hearing of

June 20, 1978, T., Page 105, Line 19 to Page 106, Line 1;

Sidney Blum, hearing of June 20, 1978, T., Page 119, Lines 13

to 17; Honorable Shirley Jones, hearing of June 20, 1978, T.,

Page 129, Line 16 to Page 130, Line 20; Ted Hickman, hearing

of June 20, 1978, T., Page 222, Lines 11 to 18; and Honorable

Milton Allen, hearing of June 27, 1978, T., Page 20, Lines

10 to 15. One witness testified that he had discussed with the

Petitioner the federal rules of evidence and changes to Mary-

land’s mechanic’s lien law: Emanuel Horn, hearing of June 20,

1978, T., Page 61, Line 19 to Page 63, Line 20.

The Petitioner’s position as a hearing officer in the

Insurance Division has required him to familiarize himself with

insurance law and keep abreast of developments in that area

of the law. However, the Petitioner testified that, were he

reinstated, he would not accept a position as a private practi-

tioner in the field of insurance law, transcript hearing of

A. 30

June 27, 1978, Page 206, Line 15 to Page 207, Line 16. The

Petitioner also testified that he has no intention of resuming

the private practice of law, but rather wishes to be reinstated

as a member of the Bar so that he might qualify for a higher-

paying governmental position, transcript of June 27, 1978

hearing, Page 199, Line 20 through Page 200, Line, 18.

4. The Inquiry Panel and the Review Board used the

reasoning of this Court’s decision in Jn Re Braverman, 271

Md. 196 to support their fiading that the Petitioner meets the

fourth principal factor, rather than affirmatively finding, in the

language of the Barton case cited above, that the Petitioner is

“presently equipped to represent clients competently.” In the

Braverman case, this Court adopted a three-judge Panel’s

finding that Petitioner Braverman had shown that he was

qualified and competent to practice law on the following basis:

“Evaluation of Petitioner’s present qualification

and competence to practice law in the light of his

long absence from the Bar presents an issue on which

we find few guidelines. Petitioner’s admission to the

Bar in 1941 presumes certification by the State Board

of Law Examiners that he then possessed the

requisite qualifications. No evidence was presented

suggesting a lack of competence during the period

when he was a member of the Bar from 1941 until

1955. Neither the Maryland Rules nor the statute

prescribing the duties of the State Board of Law

Examiners provide for reexamination of an appli-

cant for reinstatement. It is difficult to distinguish

Petitioner’s position from that of an attorney who

once having been admitted to the Bar devotes himself

to other pursuits for an extended period of time, such

A. 3]

as military service, and after the passage of many

years undertakes an active practice. Petitioner in his

testimony outlined his activity in certain areas of

criminal correctional law and his intention to become

a volunteer intern with the Legal Aid Bureau of

Baltimore, Inc. We believe that Petitioner exhibits

a sound and responsible attitude by recognizing the

need for refreshing his professional skills and by

proposing a course by which he may accomplish this.

We are mindful that every attorney is bound by

Maryland Rule 1230 to conform to the Code of

Professional Responsibility of the American Bar

Association. Canon EC6-1 provides in part that

an attorney * * * should accept employment only

in matters which he is or intends to become

competent to handle.

We are persuaded that Petitioner will abide

by the requirements of this Canon.”

271 Md. 196 at 203, 204.

If the standard to be met by a Petitioner for reinstatement

is only that he must assure the Court that he will abide by

Ethical Consideration 6-1, then Petitioner Raimondi has met

that standard. However, if the standard is that the Petitioner

must be “presently equipped to represent clients competently’’,

then Petitioner Raimondi has not met that standard.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ L. Hollingsworth Pittman

Bar Counsel

A. 32

/s/ James A. Frost

Assistant Bar Counsel

Attomey Grievance Commission

of Maryland

District Court Building

Taylor Avenue and Rowe Blvd.

Annapolis, Maryland 21401

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this 22nd day of March,

1979, a copy of the aforegoing Answer to Show Cause Order

was mailed, postage prepaid, to Jerome A. Dashner, Esquire,

112 Equitable Building, Culvert and Fayette Streets, Baltimore,

Maryland 21202, attorney for Petitioner.

/s/ James A Frost

Assistant Bar Counsel

A. 33

IN THE MATTER OF THE * IN THE

PETITION OF * COURT OF APPEALS

THOMAS PAUL RAIMONDI * OF MARYLAND

FOR REINSTATEMENT TO * Misc. Docket (Subtitle BV)

THE BAROF MARYLAND * No.3

September Term, 1977

RESPONSE TO BAR COUNSEL’S

ANSWER TO SHOW CAUSE ORDER

In response to the Answer to the Show Cause Order

hereinbefore filed by Bar Counsel, your Petitioner respect-

fully states as follows:

Bar Counsel contends that the Petitioner has not met

the burden of proving his present fitness to practice Jaw at

this time because of the fact that during the period of time

from the Petitioner’s voluntary resignation from the Bar to the

present time that the Petitioner has been limited to a single

field of law. The single field of law being the supervision and

control of the insurance industry in the State of Maryland

where the Petitioner has been serving from June, 1976 until

the present time as a Hearing Officer in the Insurance Division

of the State of Maryland.

Petitioner agrees that this Court is concerned that the

public should be able to rely on the competence and integrity

of a previously disbarred attorney.

Petitioner testified at the hearing before the Review

Board that he knew nothing about insurance law when he got

the position as a Hearing Officer for the Insurance Division,

and he, therefore, had to read the Code, talk to the Assistant

A. 34

Attorney General, Tax Division, and spent time in the bar

library reading the leading cases on the subject of insurance.

From this it would appear that the Petitioner did what any

competent individual would do when becoming involved in

an endeavor with which he was unfamiliar.

The Petitioner graduated from the University of Maryland

School of Law in June, 1953, and was originally admitted to

the Bar of this state in October, 1953. During the period of

time he was in law school, the Petitioner was an assistant to

the law librarian.

After practicing law for a short period of time, he became

a member of the United States Army and served with the Judge

Advocate General’s office from September, 1954 until he was

honorably discharged in January, 1956.

Upon being discharged from the Army, Petitioner became

actively engaged in the practice of law from February, 1956

until December, 1972, a period encompassing almost seventeen

years. Petitioner urges upon this Court the proposition that

anyone actively engaged in the general practice of law for

almost seventeen consecutive years generally has come into

contact with many facets of the law, tried many cases before

administrative bodies and courts and has gained a store of legal

knowledge that should remain with him for many years in the

future. In addition to this, Petitioner has filled in approximately

three of the six years that he has not been a member of the

Bar with an administrative position that is quasi judicial. Article

48 (a) Annotated Code of Maryland. The position of hearing

officer requires the research of the law of insurance and other

allied legal fields such as the admissibility of evidence and

preparing written opinions.

A. 35

It is further contended by Bar Counsel that Petitioner

should have been doing something to keep him abreast of

current legal procedures. However, Petitioner was expressly

prohibited by law from being formally associated with a legal

office. Article 10, Section 22 Annotated Code of Maryland.

This was recently changed in July 1, 1977 and now a disbarred

lawyer can be associated with a legal office.

This Court is apparently aware of collegues, attorneys

and judges of this State who were caused to interrupt their

private practice of law for 2, 3, 4 or more years after accepting

positions as Attorney’s General, State’s Attorney, administra-

tive judges and other similar types of legal services dealing with

specific areas of law. Many members of the Bar also spent a

number of years as members of the Armed Forces of the United

States after becoming members of the Bar wherein they had

little, if any, contact with the practice of law. These members

of the Bar who had practiced fora number of years before

spending a considerable period of time away from their law

practices did not forget what they had previously learned or

experienced during their former years of practice but merely

settled back into the general practice of law or those specialties

in which they were previously involved.

Many practicing attorneys in this state would be fearful

of taking the bar examination as they have settled into a

practice involving five or six specialties. Most of these attorneys

refer matters with which they are not familiar to other members

of the firm or attorneys outside of their office who specialize in

these fields.

A. 36

The legal knowledge and experience which your Petitioner

has gained over almost seventeen years of active practice only

needs a little honing and diligent updating to allow him to be a

competent and reliable member of the Bar.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ JEROME A DASHNER

112 Equitable Building

Baltimore, Maryland 21202

727-2412

Attorney for Petitioner

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of April, 1979,

a copy of the aforegoing Response to Bar Counsel’s Answer to

Show Cause Order was mailed to James A Frost, Esquire,

Assistant Bar Counsel, Attorney Grievance Commission of

Maryland, District Court Building, Taylor Avenue and Rowe

Boulevard, Annapolis, Maryland 21401.

/s/ JEROME A DASHNER

Mies. ~-

A. 37

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND

Miscellaneous Docket

(Subtitle BV)

Nos. 3 and 15

September i erm, 1977

Miscellaneous Docket

(Subtitle BV)

No. 3

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR

REINSTATMENT TO THE BAR OF MARYLAND

OF THOMAS PAUL RAIMONDI

kK RK *

Miscellaneous Docket

(Subtitle BV)

No. 15

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR

REINSTATEMENT TO THE BAR OF MARYLAND

OF FRANCIS X. DIPPEL

Murphy, C.J.

Smith

Digges

Eldridge

Orth

Cole

Davidson,

JJ.

Opinion by Smith, J.

Filed: July 25, 1979

A. 38

We decline in these cases to reinstate Francis X. Dippel and

Thomas Paul Raimondi as members of the Bar of this State. The

cases are in no way connected. Because the same principles of

law and policy are applicable in each case, we have consolidated

these two matters for the purpose of an opinion.

Maryland Rule BV14 provides that an attorney’s petition

for reinstatement to the bar shall be filed in this Court. It must

“set forth facts showing that the petitioner is rehabilitated and

is otherwise entiticd to the relief sought.” If we reserve judg-

ment until after hearing, as we did here, Bar Counsel is to

“conduct an appropriate investigation and shall refer the

petition to an Inquiry Panel selected by the Chairman of the

Inquiry Committee.” Thereafter the petition is to be heard and

determined in accordance with Rule BV6 c_ concerning

complaints and investigations and is to be reviewed by the

Review Board in accordance with Rule BV7. Bar Counsel is

then to transmit to us the recommendations of the Review

Board and any evidence. Rule BV14 c 3 then provides that

Rules BV9 e concerning charges and pleadings and Rule BV11 b

concerning disposition of charges in subsequent proceedings

are applicable to proceedings under BV14. A person desiring

reinstatement has the burden under Rule BV14 d 4 “to

establish the averments of the petition by clear and convincing

proof.”

I The law

The four principal factors to be considered in evaluating

a petition for reinstatement to the bar were set forth by Chief

Judge Murphy for the Court in /n re Braverman, 271 Md. 196,

199-200, 316 A.2d 246 (1974), and repeated by Judge Eldridge

A. 39

for the Court in Jn re Barton, 273 Md. 377, 379, 329 A.2d 102

(1974). They are: (1) the nature and circumstances of the

original misconduct; (2) petitioner’s subsequent conduct and

reformation; (3) his present character; and (4) his present

qualifications and competence to practice law. Judge Eldridge

noted in Barton that “the more serious the original misconduct

was, the heavier is the burden to prove present fitness for

readmission to the bar.” /d. at 380.

This Court has said repeatedly that the purpose of

disbarment is not to punish, but to protect the public. See, e.g.,

Barton, 273 Md. at 381; Maryland St. Bar Ass'n. v. Sugarman,

273 Md. 306, 318, 329 A.2d 1 (1974), cert. denied, 420 US.

974 (1975); Maryland St. Bar Ass'n. v. Frank, 272 Md. 528.

533, 325 A.2d 718 (1974); Maryland St. Bar Ass‘n. v. Callanan,

271 Md. 554, 557, 318 A.2d 809 (1974); Maryland St. Bar

Assn. v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 549, 318 A.2d 811 (1974);

Bar Ass'n. v. Marshall, 269 Md. 510,519, 307 A.2d 677 (1973):

Balliet v. Baltimore Co. Bar Ass’n., 259 Md. 474, 478, 270

A.2d 465 (1970); and /n re Meyerson, 190 Md. 671, 675,

59 A.2d 489 (1948). Also, see the opinion by Judge Cardozo

in Matter of Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 84-85, 116 N.E. 782 (1917),

to the same effect.

In Meyerson Judge Markell said for the Court, “Whether

an application for reinstatement is called an application to set

aside a disbarment order or an application for admission to

practice, its essential nature is the same.” He then went on to

quote from /n re Kannan, 310 Mass. 166, 170, 37 N.E.2d 516

(1941), where the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

said, “‘A subsequent petition for admission to the bar involves

a new inquiry as to whether, in the interval following the

rendering of the judgment of removal, the petitioner has

A. 40

become a proper person to hold such office.’’ We again quoted

that language in Maryland St. Bar Ass’n v. Boone, 255 Md.

420, 432, 258 A.2d 438 (1969).

In Meyerson Judge Markell also said for the Court:

As disbarment is not punishment, likewise we think

due regard for the administration of justice does not

permit disbarment and reinstatement to be made

mere adjuncts to reform schools and the parole

system. The authorities that seem to us the best

considered take a different view, which is consistent

with the principles recognized in Maryland. [/d. 190

Md. at 678.]

We quoted that language with approval in Boone, 255 Md. 420,

433.

II Dippel.

Dippel was originally admitted to the Maryland Bar in

November 1947. He practiced law until his disbarment in

1963.! During this period he served one year in the House of

1 In his petition for reinstatement Dippel said that in 1963 while

under indictment he “voluntarily tendered his resignation from the Mary-

land Bar.” It is true that he tendered his resignation to the Supreme

Bench of Baltimore City. It, however, refused to accept Dippel’s resigna-

tion, possibly because it thought “resignation” carried a different

connotation than “disbarment.” A complaint was duly filed with it. It

held a hearing after which it disbarred Dippel on September 13, 1963.

Reference was made in the order of disbarment to the convictions

mentioned in the panel’s opinion here. (Disciplinary proceedings were

handled in the circuit courts of the 23 counties of Maryland and in the

Supreme Bench of Baltimore City prior to the revision of the BV rules

in 1970.)

A. 4]

Delegates and one term in the Maryland Senate. The inquiry

panel summarized the facts surrounding his disbarment.

[It] was precipitated by investigations and subsequent

criminal indictments concerning a scheme devised by

[Dippel] and an accomplice, Henry Edward

Wisowaty, who also was a member of the Maryland

Bar, whereby they would file documents with the

Orphans’ Court of Baltimore City to gain control of

estates of deceased resident aliens, then divest the

estates of all capital assets to their own use, the

assets being apportioned between them. The scheme

included in some cases the preparation of forged

Wills leaving substantial parts of the estate to fictiti-

ous heirs, the payment of fictitious claims, and the

filing of spurious and false documents. As a result of

these activities, six indictments were brought against

[Dippel] for embezzlement, larceny and conspiracy,

the total amounts embezzled for the six estates being

$71,083.46. Eventually, total restitution was made of

that sum, [Dippel] having made restitution in the

amount of $45,083.46, and Wisowaty having made

restitution in the amount of $26,000. In the mean-

time, however, as a result of those indictments,

{Dippel] pleaded guilty to the six indictments

charging embezzlement, and the State’s Attorney

stetted the companion charges of larceny and con-

spiracy. Judge Charles Harris in the Criminal Court

of Baltimore City sentenced [Dippel] to terms

totalling 15 years in the Maryland Penitentiary,

which was later reduced to 5 years after partial

restitution had been made, and after serving approx-

imately 21 months of his sentence [Dippel} was

paroled after one previous parole application had

been denied.

A. 42

T. Hughlett Henry, Jr., Esq., of the inquiry panel, pressed

Dippel as to the reason for his criminal activity. Dippel replied,

“It wasn’t a question of earning money because I was earning

money - $40,000 to $50,000 a year from about 1950. I can’t

say and I will not blame it on my wife or anybody except

stupidity on my own part.” He was then asked whether he

thought “it was just a clever operation,” to which he replied,

“Well, it appeared so easy.”

Upon his release from prison Dippel secured employment

as an insurance consultant through the efforts of friends. There-

after he became employed by the Social Security Administration

on August 8, 1966. He is still employed there as a labor relations

specialist. He was granted a full pardon on November 10, 1976.

The panel heard numerous witnesses. All of those produced

by Dippel praised him, saying what a fine, outstanding gentle-

man he is today, and recommending his reinstatement. Two

past presidents of the Maryland State Bar Association were

produced by Bar Counsel. Each strongly opposed reinstatement.

The Panel recognized the criteria for consideration of a

petition for reinstatement set forth in Barton, Boone, and

Braverman. It addressed itself to each of those criteria. It said

relative to the cause of his disbarment:

The misconduct of [Dippel] which led to the

various investigations, both civil and criminal, result-

ing in indictments and court proceedings, disbarment,

conviction, and sentencing, was of the most severe

nature that an attorney can be guilty and was not a

single, isolated aberration or youthful prank, but a

deliberate plan to scheme and defraud innocent

people out of funds belonging to them.

A. 43

It concluded that his conduct “subsequent to his release from

prison has been exemplary and he has made genuine efforts

to reform himself in his life style, the community, and job.”

It found “no indication that [Dippel’s] present character has

been blemished to any extent which would in itself prohibit

his reinstatement.” Concerning his present qualifications and

competence to practice law, it observed in pertinent part:

[Dippel] has been away from the active practice of

law since at least June of 1963, a period of over 15

years, and his efforts to keep current with Maryland

law have been very limited.

With respect to his competence to practice law,

there is, of course, always some question in the case

of a lawyer who has been unable to practice for 15

years. The criteria set, however, in grave crimes

require a substantial period for rehabilitation and

reformation and it is unlikely, in a case of such

gravity of misconduct leading to disbarment as this,

that a shorter time than 15 years would ever be

acceptable. Hence, to consider competence, we must

measure this applicant against others forbidden to

practice for such a period.

Dippel has proven his competence in a specialized

field of law - labor relations, and has participated as

an advocate in many matters where a licensed lawyer

was not required. He admits he has made only casual

efforts to Keep abreast of the changes in Maryland

case and statute law. He asserts that he would know

A. 44

when he was incompetent and would associate with

him a competent lawyer when the occasion arose.

If this competence criterion were ie only one

standing in the way of reinstateient, it would point

up the need for a rule permitting conditional rein-

statement at the end of a period of refresher legal

education.

The primary consideration deals with the gravity

of the original misconduct and the extent that

Petitioner has shown his reformation and _ the

improbability of a repetition of such conduct if

reinstated. The burden of proof is Petitioner’s and

the graver the misconduct the greater the burden.

The crimes that he committed are peculiarly available

to unscrupulous lawyers and the fraudulent devices

used - false wills, false claims pursued in Court, and

false affidavits to support them - fall within the areas

of the legal training he received at the outset. It is

possible, but not probable, that these fraudulent

schemes could have been carried out by one who was

not a member of the Bar.

A lawyer who uses his legal skills to defraud has been

put in the position to victimize the public through

the sanction of the bar in its prior approval of his

integrity and morality.

a ee!

A. 45

[Dippel] committed crimes not only against the

dignity of the state, but also against his profession

and the Courts of which he was an officer. It is

difficult enough to envision reinstatement of a

lawyer who embezzles funds entrusted to him without

the mitigating circumstances of an irresistible motive.

Petitioner did not commit one embezzlement under

the pressure of dire need of duress. He committed a

series of caretully schemed embezzlements because in

his words, he was “‘stupid - it appeared so easy.” He was

apparently an able lawyer at the time of the original

misconduct and some of his schemes were ingenious,

so the explanation of stupidity is unacceptable.

That the money was easy to take seems the most

reasonable explanation of his fraudulent acts. He

should not have the sanction of the bar to invite the

public to entrust to him more funds that are easy to

take. The Panel has not been persuaded that [Dippel]

has met the heavy burden of proof entitling him to

reinstatement.

Pursuant to Rule BV14 d 2 the Review Board, for which

provision is made in Rule BV7, reviewed the matter. It unani-

mously “concurr[ed] in and adopt[ed] the Inquiry Panel’s

recommendation that [Dippel’s] Petition for Reinstatement

should be denied... .”

III Raimondi

Thomas Paul Raimondi was admitted to practice before

this Court on October 15, 1953. We accepted his resignation

with prejudice on December 29, 1972. (We now refer to such

A. 46

proceedings as disbarment by consent. Rule BV12 d.) Rai-

mondi was convicted in the Criminal Court of Baltimore of

attempting to bribe a member of the General Assembly. This

was all an outgrowth of the election of Governor Spiro T.

Agnew as Vice-President of the United States and the fact that

the General Assembly became obliged to elect a Governor of

Maryland. The details of his wrongdoing are set forth in

Raimondi v. State, 12 Md. App. 322, 278 A.2d 664 (1971),

and Raimondi v. State, 265 Md. 229, 288 A.2d 882, cert.

denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972). He was granted a full pardon

on May 27, 1975.

Raimondi was employed in several different places from

the ‘ime of his release from prison in 1973 until the time that

he passed a competitive examination and was selected as a

hearing officer in the Insurance Division of the State of Mary-

land, a part of the Department of Licensing and Regulation.

As in Dippel’s case, Raimondi was able to produce a num-

ber of individuals who praised him highly and said what a fine

gentleman he is now.

The Raimondi panel also recognized the criteria for con-

sideration of a petition for reinstatement set forth in Barton,

Boone, and Braverman. It seemed a bit inclined to regard the

original misconduct as not grave in nature. It referred to the

fact that the then State’s Attorney “stated that although his

office viewed the crime as serious in terms of its impact on

the governmental structure, ‘We did not think that there was

too great an imminent danger of its coming to fruition because

it was just a little bit too bizarre to be - - it was too long, long

shot even from the point of view of those attempting to perpe-

trate it.’ It said that “[i]n the final analysis, however, based

anime Meas ss hee

iia dette witcubdeneeKEses ube.

A. 47

upon the record before it and its observation of [Raimondi]

during his testimony, the Panel agree[d] with the remarks

of [one witness] who ha[d] known [Raimondi] both socially

and professionally for approximately 27 years, that what

[Raimondi] did was ‘stupid’, ‘irrational’ and ‘out of charac-

ter.” ” It observed that although the crime “was a serious

act, it appear[ed] to have been perpetrated for purposes of

embarrassing [one individual] rather [than] for any apparent

personal gain.” The panel “conclude[d] that insofar as the

nature and circumstances of [Raimondi’s] misconduct are

concerned, his reinstatement would not be prejudicial to the

interests of the public or the administration of justice.”

The panel went on to consider the other criteria. It

referred to Raimondi’s substantial involvement in civic and

fraternal affairs. It “f[ound] that [Raimondi] has met the

burden of establishing that his conduct and reformation since

his release from prison warrant his reinstatement to the practice

of law.” It likewise found that he “has met the burden of

establishing that his present character merits favorable con-

sideration for his readmission to the Bar.” Concerning his

present qualifications and competency to practice law, the

panel concluded by saying:

In the instant case approximately 4% years elapsed

between the acceptance by the Court of Appeals of

[Raimondi’s] resignation from the Bar and the filing

of his Petition for Reinstatement, and a further 1%

years has elapsed since then. During that period,

[he] obtained a Master’s degree in Public Admini-

stration and has served for 2% years asa Hearing

Officer in the Insurance Division for the State of

Maryland. According to the testimony of Insurance

A. 48

Commissioner Birrane, his executive assistant, Ted

Hickman, and several attorneys who have tried

numerous cased before him, he has performed his

duties with extreme competence. We believe that

[Raimondi’s] accomplishments, as well as his own

testimony, evidence a sound and responsible attitude

toward refreshing his professional skills. We are

satisfied that if readmitted to the practice of law,

[he] would abide by the requirements of EC 6-1.

The inquiry panel recommended Raimondi’s reinstatement.

The matter was reviewed by the Review Board pursuant

to Rule BV14 d 2. It “‘concurr{[ed] in and adopt[ed] the

Inquiry Panel’s recommendation that [Raimondi’s] Petition

for reinstatement shouts be granted... .”

IV Dispositions

Where there has been a disbarment for crimes such as

were committed by Raimondi we regard the nature of the

crimes and the circumstances surrounding them as one of the

most important of the criteria to be considered on an appli-

cation for reinstatement. Therefore, we focus in these two

cases on the nature and circumstances of the original conduct.

In so doing we note that in considering such an application

we must remember that, as it was put in Jn re Cannon, 206

Wis. 374, 240 N.W. 441 (1932):

The relation of the bar to the courts is a peculiar

and intimate relationship. The bar is an attache of

the courts. The quality of justice dispensed by the

courts depends in no small degree upon the integrity

Ms Pd Colts eas tein A + on neatee .

A. 49

of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal

and reproach to the administration of justice and

bring the courts themselves into disrepute.

[/d. at 383.]

We note relative to reinstatement the comment in Jn re Morri-

son, 45 S. D. 123, 186 N. W. 556 (1922):

[A court] should endeavor to make certain that it

does not again put into the hands of an unworthy

petitioner that almost unlimited opportunity to inflict

wrongs upon society possessed by a practicing lawyer.

[/d. at 126.]}

There may be a point in time when it is proper to reinstate

to the practice of law even one who has committed a most

heinous crime. We are unable to draw a precise line as to

when that might be. We point out once again Judge Eldridge’s

observation for the Court in Barton, 273 Md. at 380, ‘“‘[T]he

more serious the original misconduct was, the heavier is the

burden to prove present fitness for readmission to the bar.”

It may not have been so labeled, but what courts do when

faced with any application for reinstatement from a previously

disbarred lawyer is to engage in a balancing process. On one

side of the scale is placed the seriousness of the misconduct

which produced disbarment and the court’s duty to society

at large to see that only those persons who are worthy of the

faith and confidence of the general public are permitted to

nandle the affairs of others. In this regard, it must be remem-

bered as Chief Justice Vinson said in Jn Re Isserman, 345 U.S.

286, 289, 73 S. Ct. 676, 97 L. Ed. 1013 (1953), reversed on

other grounds, 348 U.S. 1, 75 S. Ct. 6, 99 L. Ed. 3 (1954),

A. 50

“There is no vested right in an individual to practice law.

Rather there is a right in the Court to protect itself, and hence

society, as an instrument of justice.” On the other side are

placed the subsequent conduct and reformation of such indi-

vidual, his present character, his present qualifications and

competence to practice law, and the fact that the very nature

of law practice places an attorney in a position where an un-

principled individual may do tremendous harm to his client.

In this balancing process consideration must be given to the

length of time which has elapsed since disbarment. Also, it

must not be forgotten that a disbarred attorney was previously

found to possess good moral character. Otherwise, he would

not have been admitted to practice law. Thus, either someone

erred in the earlier evaluation of his character or the weakness

of character producing the earlier misconduct previously failed

to manifest itself. For this reason such an applicant must

undergo an even more exacting scrutiny than he did earlier.

In evaluating the statements from others as to the present

good moral character of an applicant for readmission it must

not be forgotten that a disbarred lawyer - like many people

convicted of so-called “white-collar” crime - had earlier occu-

pied a position in society where it is probable that testimonials

as to his good moral character, similar to that elicited in

connection with his application for reinstatement, could have

been obtained at any point in time prior to knowledge of his

misconduct on the part of those attesting to his good character.

In a number of our prior cases, e. g., Attorney Grievance

Comm'n v. Green, 278 Md. 412, 415, 365 A.2d 39 (1976);

Bar Ass’n of Balto. City v. Posner, 275 Md. 250, 257, 399

A.2d 657, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1016 (1975); and Maryland

St. Bar Ass'n v. Sugarman, 273 Md. 306, 317, 329 A.2d 1

eh, Pe Seat OG E14 sh Kaa

A. 5]

(1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 974 (1975), we quoted from

In re Stump, 272 Ky. 593, 114 S. W. 2d 1094 (1938), con-

cerning the petition for reinstatement of a disbarred attorney:

The ultimate and decisive question is always whether

the applicant is now of good moral character and is

a fit and proper person to be reinstrusted .with

the confidence and privileges of an attorney at law.

This question has a broader significance than its

purely personal aspect. From _ time immemorial

lawyers have in a peculiar sense been regarded as

officers of the court. It is a lawyer’s obligation

to participate in upholding the integrity, dignity,

and purity of the courts. He owes a definite responsi-

bility to the public in the proper administration

of justice. It is of utmost importance that the honor

and integrity of the legal profession should be pre-

served and that the lives of its members be without

reproach. The malpractice of one reflects dishonor

not only upon his brethren, but upon the courts

themselves, and creates among the people a distrust

of the courts and the bar. [/d. at 598.]

Here Dippel made use of his legal training and knowl-

edge to steal from certain estates. Without any apparent

reason other than sheer greed, Dippel engaged in a calcu-

lated campaign of theft. He testified that he “was earning

money - $40,000 to $50,000 a year from about 1950.”

Even in this day of inflation such earings would be regarded

as substantial. Translated into the equivalent of 1979 dollars,

however, his earnings by his account must have been

A. 52

well over $80,000 per year. Thus, greed alone would seem to

have been the only reason behind his crime, a point illustrated

by his statement that it was easy to steal by these forgeries

and other manipulations.

Raimondi was convicted of an attempt to bribe in con-

nection with the highly unusual situation in which the General

Assembly of Maryland was obliged to select a Governor to

serve a little more than two years of the remaining term of

the Governor previously elected by the people. Such conduct

strikes at the very fundamentals of our government, and the

more so when it is perpetrated by a member of the Bar sworn

to support the Constitution and laws of this State. See Mary-

land Code (1957) Art. 10, §10.

Balancing all of the above mentioned factors and parti-

cularly taking into consideration the conduct for which Messrs.

Dippel and Raimondi were disbarred and the time which has

elapsed since then, we are unwilling to once again consitute

them officers of this Court, thereby placing them in a position

where they may handle the affairs of others. Thus, their

petitions for reinstatement will be denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED: PETITIONERS

IN_ EACH INSTANCE SHALL PAY

ALL COSTS, INCLUDING ALL

COSTS OF TRANSCRIPTS, PUR-

SUANT TO MARYLAND RULE

BV 15 b,c.

285 Md. 607, 403 A.2d 1234 (1979),

ee atredtone

I ee a oe

A. 53

IN THE MATTER OF * IN THE

THE PETITION OF * COURT OF APPEALS

THOMAS PAUL RAIMONDI * OF MARYLAND

FOR REINSTATEMENT TO * Misc. Docket (Subtitle BV)

THE BAR OF MARYLAND *_ No. 3

September Term, 1977

* * KK K

MOTION TO RECONSIDER

In accordance with Rule 850, a Motion for Reconsideration

of the decision in the above matter is filed upon the following

grounds:

I. The Petitioner is entitled to a decision in his Petition

for Reinstatement in accordance with the provisions of Article

10, Section 22 of the Annotated Code of Maryland under the

due process law provisions of the XIV Amendment to the

Constitution of the United States.

II. The Court’s decision in denying Petitioner’s reinstate-

ment is tantamount to cruel and unusual punishment in violation

of the VIII Amendment to the Constitution of the United

States, and a violation of the equal protection of the law under

the XIV Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

III. The Petitioner is entitled to a separate considered

opinion under due process of law in accordance with the XIV

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Attached hereto and requested to be made a part hereof

is a Memorandum of Law.

A. 54

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Jerome A. Dashner

112 Equitable Building

Baltimore, Maryland 21202

Attorney for Petitioner

1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 22nd day of August,

1979, a copy of aforegoing Motion to Reconsider and Memor-

andum of Law, was mailed to L. Hollingsworth Pittman, Esq.,

Bar Counsel, Attorney Grievance Committee of Maryland,

District Court Building, Taylor Avenue and Rowe Boulevard,

Annapolis, Maryland 2140]

/s/ Jerome A. Dashner

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT

OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER

THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO A DECISION

IN HIS PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT IN

ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF

ARTICLE 10, SECTION 22 OF THE ANNOTATED

CODE OF MARYLAND UNDER THE DUE

PROCESS OF LAW PROVISIONS OF THE XIV

AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE

UNITED STATES.

The Petition for Reinstatement to the Bar under Par. 11

states that the Petitioner, “applies for reinstatement to the

Maryland Bar in accordance with the provisions of Article 10,

Section 22 of the Annotated Code of Maryland.”

sata a

a nar ahs tka sb cnn eT

A. 55

The Petition for Reinstatement was filed with this Honor-

able Court on May 16, 1977. The above Section 22, of Article

10 was in full force and effect on the date of the filing, even

though the said section was repealed as of July 1, 1977.

In the joint opinion filed by this Court of 25th of July,

1979 no mention is made of Section 22, Article 10 and it is

impossible to ascertain whether the Court took into consider-

ation the provisions of Section 22, Article 10 in reaching

its conclusions as stated in its opinion.

Section 22, Article 10 states in essence that an attorney

pardoned by the Governor, upon application for reinstatement

shall be entitled to be reinstated, provided (1) the Court shall

be satisfied that provisions of Section 20, of Article 10 has

not been violated; (2) aid that the Petitioner is otherwise

worthy of reinstatement.

In reviewing the record there is no evidence to show

any violation of Section 22, Article 10.

There is no evidence in the case to support the conclu-

sion that the Petitioner is not worthy of reinstatement.

To the contrary, the record is replete with recommenda-

tions for reinstatement.

It is respectfully submitted that Section 22, Article 10

is a legislative mandate binding on this Court. If this Court

considers the provisions of Section 22, Article 10 in the light

of the evidence it must reach the conclusion that the Petitioner

should be reinstated. With due respect, the Court’s failure

A. 56

to consider Section 22, Article 10 constitutes a denial of

the Petitioner’s due process of law under the XIV Amendment

to the Constitution of the United States.

Il.

THE COURT’S DECISION IN DENYING PETI-

TIONER’S REINSTATEMENT IS TANTAMOUNT

TO CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT IN

VIOLATION OF THE VIII AMENDMENT TO THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, AND

A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION

OF THE LAW UNDER THE XIV AMENDMENT

TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED

STATES.

“This Court has said repeatedly that the purpose of

disbarment is not to punish, but to protect the public.” See,

Barton, 273 Md. at 381.

In re Myerson, 59A 2d, 489, this Court pointed out that

“disbarment of an attorney does not operate as a permanent

disability.” See Jn re Braverman, 316 A.2d 246, page 253.

In the Braverman case, the applicant was guilty of the

crime of conspiring to teach and advocate and to organize

the overthrow of the Government by force or violence. Braver-

man was a convicted, unpardoned felon and unrepentent.

Braverman took the oath to support the Constitution and

laws of State and Nation. The Court, nevertheless, reinstated

him, holding that Braverman had in fact “demonstrated his

fitness to be reinstated to practice law by clear and convincing

proof.”

—<_s

6 ts sea

ee a

A. 57

In denying Raimondi’s petition, the Court stated that

Raimondi took an oath to support the Constitution and laws

of this State, but his crime struck “at the very foundation

of our government.” Braverman also took the same oath

to support the Constitution and laws of this State. Did not

Braverman’s crime also “strike at the very foundation of our

government?”

It is respectfully submitted that the evidence in this case

is equally, if not more, clear and convincing that the Petitioner

has met the basic standards governing reinstatement.

No contrary testimony or evidence was produced to

support the conclusions that Raimondi had not rehabilitated

himself and was not worthy of reinstatement.

The Raimondi panel “concluded that insofar as the nature

and circumstances of Raimondi’s misconduct is concerned,

his reinstatement would not be prejudical to the interest of

the public or the administration of justice.”

The panel further “found that Raimondi has met the

burden of establishing that his conduct and reformation since

his release from prison warrant his reinstatement to the practice

of law.”

It is also found that he “thas met the burden of establishing

that his present character merits favorable consideration for

his readmission to the Bar.”’

The Inquiry Panel recommended Raimondi’s reinstatement.

A. 58

The Review Board pursuant to Rule BC]4d2. concurred

in and adopted the Inquiry Panel’s recommendation that the

Petition for reinstatement should be granted.

This Court issued a Show Cause Order on March 8, 1979

upon Bar Counsel to show cause why the recommendation

of the Review Board should not be adopted.

Bar Counsel’s answer to the Show Cause Order in no way

questions the Review Board recommendation for reinstatement

under the factors to be considered such as: the nature and

circumstances of the original misconduct, the Petitioner’s

subsequent conduct and reformation, or the Petitioner’s present

character.

The only factor put in question by the Bar Counsel was

the Petitioner’s “present qualifications and competence to

practice law.”

The evidence is clear that Raimondi has no intention

to resume active private practice. However, the evidence

in this case is abundant to support the claim that Raimondi

is competent to practice.

In the Braverman case, the evidence was clear that Braver-

man was not competent but this Court nevertheless found

Braverman competent under the basis that “every attorney

is bound by Maryland Rule 1230 to conform to the Code of

Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association.

Cannon EC6-! provides in part that an attorney . . . should

accept employment only in matters which he is or intends

to become competent to handle.”

A. 59

Bar Counsel further states that “If the standard to be

met by a Petitioner for reinstatement is only that he must

assure the Court that he will abide by Ethical Consideration

6-1, then Petitioner Raimondi has met that standard.”

This Court states in the Raimondi Opinion that “there

may be a point in time when it is proper to reinstate to the

practice of law even one who has committed a most heinous

crime.”

The American Bar Association, Canon I, Ethical Consider-

ation, Code of Professional Responsibility, states that when a

lawyer’s disqualification to practice law has terminated, ‘“‘mem-

bers of the bar should assist such person in being licensed,

or, if licensed, in being restores to his full right to practice.”

In re Drier, 258 F2d, 68, 69-70, (3rd Cu, 1958).

The conclusion of this Court in denying reinstatement

has in effect, stated “never, never’, thereby imposing an impos-

sible burden upon the Petitioner.

It is respectfully submitted that the Court’s denial of

Raimondi’s reinstatement is based on standards above and

beyond those standards imposed upon an individual by society

and law, and places Raimondi in the onerous position of being

unable, by any avenue or vehicle provided by society or law,

to eliminate the burden of a guilt which this Court has made

eternal.

With due respect the Court’s decision is tantamount to

cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the VIII Amend-

ment to the Constitution of the United States.

A. 60

It is further respectfully submitted that in reinstating

Braverman and refusing to readmit Raimondi the Court has not

treated Braverman and Raimondi equally, and therefore this

amounts to a denial of the equal protection of the law under

the XIV Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Ill.

THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO A SEPAR—

ATED CONSIDERED OPINION UNDER THE DUE

PROCESS LAW IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE XIV

AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE

UNITED STATES.

This Court on July 25, 1979 filed a joint opinion in the

Matter of Raimondi and Dippel.

The Court rightly stated “The cases are in no way con-

nected.”

For this reason the Petitioner requests a separate con-

sidered opinion - - an independent and unbiased evaluation

of the evidence within the framework of the Petitioner’s case.

A reading of the “Opinion” without the Dippel references

strongly supports the conclusion that the Petitioner has met

the burden to be reinstated.

The Petitioner respectfully suggests that the evidence

in his case should be considered particularly and not generally

under the principles of law and not in the light of the policy

of the Court.

haa

A. 6]

The principles of law remain immutable but the policy

of this Court is subject to change.

Respectfully this Court’s failure to consider the Petitioner’s

case separately constitutes a denial of due process of law in

violation of the XIV Amendment to the Constitution of the

United States.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Jerome A. Dashner

Attorney for Petitioner

A. 62

COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

Courts of Appeal Building

Annapolis, Md. 2140]

September 11, 1979

Jerome A. Dashner, Esq.

Attomey at Law

112 Equitable Building

Baltimore, Maryland 21202

Re: In the Matter of the Petition for

Reinstatement to the Bar of Maryland of

Thomas Paul Rz2imondi

Misc. Docket (Subtitle BV)

No. 3, September Term, 1977

Dear Mr. Dashner:

The Court has considered the motion to reconsider, filed

in the above-mentioned matter on August 23, 1979, and, for

your information, the motion was denied on September 10,

1979.

Very truly yours,

/s/ James H. Norris, Jr.

Clerk

JHNjr/ojr

cc: L. HoWingsworth Pittman, Esq.

Bar Counsel

< se

tins ae

ee eee eS ere es ee

é ABS See SSS

IN THE MATTER OF THE

PETITION FOR REINSTATE-

MENT TO THE BAR

OF MARYLAND OF

THOMAS PAUL RAIMONDI

May 16, 1977:

May 18, 1977:

January 31, 1979:

March 8, 1979:

March 22, 1979:

May 1, 1979:

July 25, 1979:

August 23, 1979:

September 10, 1979:

* IN THE

* COURT OF APPEALS

* OF MARYLAND

* Misc. Docket (Subtitle BV)

° No. 3

September Term, 1977

Ke KKKAKAK EK *

DOCKET ENTRIES

Petition for reinstatement to the Bar

of Maryland filed by Thomas Paul

Raimondi.

Above petition referred to Bar Counsel.

(BV14 d 2)

Report and recommendation of

Review Board and the Inquiry Panel

report received from Bar Counsel.

Show Cause Order filed. Answer

due April 2, 1979 on why recommen-

dation of Review Board should not

be adopted.

Answer to show cause filed by Attor-

ney Grievance Commission.

Response to Bar Counsel’s Answer

filed.

Petition for reinstatement will be

denied. It is so ORDERED; peti-

tioners in each instance shall pay all

costs, including all costs of transcripts,

pursuant to Maryland Rule BV15 bc.

Opinion by Smith, J. (Consolidated

with Misc. (BV) No. 15, September

Term, 1977, for purpose of opinion.)

Motion to reconsider filed.

Motion denied.

A. 64

ARTICLE 10

ANNOTATED CODE OF MARYLAND

§ 20. Practice during suspension or disbarment.

No attorney during the time of his suspension or disbar-

ment, shall practice law in this State in any form either as

principal or agent, clerk or employee of another and specifi-

cally, without limiting the aforegoing, no such attorney during

his suspension or disbarment from practice of law shall appear

as attorney or counsellor at law before any court, judge, justice,

board, commission or public officer, or prepare any will,

mortgage or deed. (An. Code, 1951, §20; 1939, §20; 1924,

§11; 1912, §10; 1904, §10, 1900, ch. 309. §11A; 1929,

ch. 370, §11.)

§ 22. Reinstatement after pardon.

Any attorney heretofore or hereafter suspended or dis-

barred from the practice of his profession in this State because

of the conviction of any misdemeanor, who may have been

or may hereafter be pardoned for such misdemeanor by the

Governor of this State, shall, upon application to the court

which issued the order of suspension or disbarment, be entitled

to be reinstated as a member of the Bar in good standing;

provided the court, to which said application may be addressed,

shall be satisfied that during the period of his suspension or

disbarment he has not violated the provisions of §20 of this

article, and that he is otherwise worthy of reinstatement. The

provisions of this article relating to hearing and appeal in

proceedings for suspension and disbarment shall be applicable

to proceedings for reinstatement under this section. (An.

Code, 1951, §22; 1939, §22; 1947, ch. 370.)

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.