Reply Brief — Smith v. Harris

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In the Supreme Coustin ROBAK, JR., CLERK

OF THE

United States

OcTOBER TERM, 1979

No. 79-423

JEANINE R. SMITH,

Petitioner,

VS.

PATRICIA ROBERTS HARRIS, SECRETARY OF HEALTH,

EDUCATION AND WELFARE,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF

RONALD A. ZUMBRUN

JOHN H. FINDLEY

THOMAS E. HOOKANO

Pacific Legal Foundation

455 Capitol Mall, Suite 600

Sacramento, California 95814

Telephone: (916) 444-0154

Attorneys for Petitioner

CHRISTOPHER H. COLLINS

Pacific Legal Foundation

1990 M Street, N.W., Suite 550

Washington, D.C. 20036

Telephone: (202) 466-2686

Of Counsel

November, 1979

In The Supreme Court

OF THE

United States

October Term, 1979

No. 79-423

JEANINE R. SMITH,

Petitioner,

VS.

PATRICIA ROBERTS HARRIS, SECRETARY

OF HEALTH, EDUCATION and WELFARE,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court

of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF

The subject of the petition for writ of certiorari in this case

is whether the posthumous payment of underpaid Supplemen-

tal Security Income (SSI) benefits to the representative payee

of a deceased eligible beneficiary as reimbursement for the

provision of necessities of life on a credit basis, is proper

pursuant to Section 1631 of the Social Security Act (Act), 42

U.S.C. § 1383. In opposing the petition, the Secretary of

Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) states that a reading of

the Act itself, and of its legislative history, indicates that the

Secretary correctly denied payment of these benefits. More-

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over, the Secretary argues that this is a question more appropri-

ate for Congress than for the courts, because the particular

method of payment advocated by the petitioner would fulfill an

“additional purpose” not already within the spirit or letter of

the law.

There is no need for congressional intervention in this

matter. Congress has already spoken by establishing a program

to provide the necessities of life to the needy aged, blind and

disabled. Neither the Act itself, nor its legislative history, nor

the overall policy behind the Act precludes the method of

payment advocated by the petitioner. Petitioner does not wish

to extend this statute beyond its congressionally intended

bounds, but instead challenges the Secretary’s interpretation of

the statute in a manner which runs contrary to the language,

purpose and intent of the Act.

The Secretary correctly asserts that the interpretation of a

statute “by those charged with its execution should be followed

unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong.” E.I. du

Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 54-55 (1977)

(emphasis added). Although deference to the interpretation of

the appropriate government agency is proper, statutory con-

struction is ultimately a judicial function. Austasia Intermodal

Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Comm’n., 580 F.2d 642, 644

(D.C. Cir. 1978), citing FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380

U.S. 374, 385 (1965). Moreover, this Court has recently held

that “[a]lthough an agency’s interpretation of the statute under

which it operates is entitled to some deference, ‘this deference is

constrained by our obligation to honor the clear meaning of a

statute, as revealed by its language, purpose and history.’ ”

Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 2369

(1979). The petitioner asserts that the Secretary’s inter-

pretation in this instance is incorrect, and accordingly should

not be followed. The Secretary’s interpretation of the statute,

by précluding the retroactive payment of then-current benefits

to representative payees as reimbursement, while allowing such

payment to beneficiaries themselves and to eligible spouses of

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deceased beneficiaries, runs counter to the express wording and

the overall policy of the Act to provide for the current needs of

eligible beneficiaries.

Although Congress did not squarely address the particular

question before this Court in a specific clause or section of the

Act, or in the legislative history of the Act, it is clear from a

common sense reading of the statute, in light of its overall

policy, that the position advocated by the petitioner is proper,

and will “best effectuate the purposes” of the program. 42

U.S.C. § 1383(a)(1). This Court has held that “where [a]

statute’s language seem(s) insufficiently precise, the ‘natural

way’ to draw the line ‘is in light of the statutory purpose’ ”.

United States v. An Article of Drug ... Bacto-Unidisk ..., 394

U.S. 784, 799, rehearing denied 395 U.S 954 (1969). In these

instances, “the court must discern the applicable legislative

intent by ... starting from the area where the legislative intent is

readily discernible, and projecting to fair and reasonable

corollaries of that intent for the specific issue ...”” Montana

Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm’n., 445 F.2d 739, 746 (D.C.

Cir. 1970), cert. denied 400 U.S. 1013 (1971). Moreover, a

statute should not be interpreted “‘so narrowly as to defeat its

obvious intent,” United States v. Braverman, 373 U.S. 405, 408

(1963), or in a manner “which produce(s) absurd or nugatory

results.” In re United States, 563 F.2d 637, 642 (4th Cir. 1977).

As more fully explained by Judge Merrill of the Ninth

Circuit in his dissenti1g opinion below (Petition at A-12 to A-

14) the opinion of the majority of the Court of Appeals

incorrectly embraces the inconsistencies in the Secretary’s inter-

pretation and application of the Act. Judge Merrill correctly

asserted that neither the Act, nor its legislative history, nor the

Secretary’s regulations would preclude payment of benefits in

the manner sought. In fact, he observed that the practice of the

Secretary in some instances has been to allow underpayments to

representative payees. Judge Merrill, in examining whether the

Secretary’s position “ ... can be said to satisfy the general

congressional policy underlying the act[,] ... would say no.”

(Petition at A-14).

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CONCLUSION

This case presents issues which affect the very lifeblood of

millions of needy Supplemental Security Income beneficiaries.

The decision of the Secretary and the courts below will have

devastating consequences for those beneficiaries who must

attempt to rely on credit arrangements to obtain the necessities

of life while awaiting the lengthy process of SSI eligibility

determination. Neither the Social Security Act nor its legisla-

tive history precludes the type of payments sought by the

petitioners. Moreover, the regulations of the Secretary, to the

extent that they preclude these payments, are invalid. For these

reasons, and for the reasons set forth in the petitioner’s brief,

the petition for writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

RONALD A. ZUMBRUN

JOHN H. FINDLEY

THOMAS E. HOOKANO

Pacific Legal Foundation

455 Capitol Mall, Suite 600

Sacramento, California 95814

Telephone: (916) 444-0154

Attorneys for Petitioner

CHRISTOPHER H. COLLINS

Pacific Legal Foundation

1990 M Street, N.W., Suite 550

Washington, D.C. 20036

Telephone: (202) 466-2686

Of Counsel

November, 1979