motion to affirm — Garfinkle v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County
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MI@HAEL R. CLERK |
United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1978
No. 78-397
SUSAN GARFINKLE et vir.
Appellants,
vs.
SUPERIOR COURT OF CONTRA CosTA COUNTY,
(WELLS FARGO BANK, et al., Real Parties in Interest),
Appellees.
On Appeal from the Supreme Court
of the State of California
Motion to Affirm or Dismiss
Davip W. LENNIHAN
Davip J. BROWN
27th Floor,
Spear Street Tower
One Market Plaza
San Francisco, California 94105
Telephone: (415) 442-0900
Attorneys for Appellees
BROBECK, PHLEGER & HARRISON
Of Counsel
SORG PRINTING COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, 346 FIRST STREET, SAN FRANCISCO 84105
I.
II.
III.
SUBJECT INDEX
ER lO ict = OORT EE ROMER
Argument
A. In California Powers of Sale Derive from Private
esate cea RD eae Ln nee BA Sb OCR Oe
B. The “Pervasive Involvement’’ of the State of Cali-
fornia in Power of Sale Foreclosure Is to Codify
and Restrict, Rather Than to Authorize or En-
CI, TE i csasctcincesncenensiinnsestcnssnranessnncnes
C. “Legislative Involvement” by Codification and Cur-
tailment of Common Law Rights Created by
Agreement Does Not Cause Those Rights or
Their Exercise to Constitute State Action to Which
the Fourteenth Amendment Is Applicable..............
D. Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks...............--.--------0-+0+
ESN SIE Oe SR Ne RE ERS PTC
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
CASES Pages
Adams v. Southern California First National Bank, 492
F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006
SUI i eccetersinscsemestneescnc tolls 3
Armenta v. Nussbaum, 519 $.W.2d 673 (1975) .....--.-.--0--+-- 5
Barrera v. Security Bld. & Investment Corp., 519 F.2d 1166
6. * ) p) 5
Bond v. Dentzer, 494 F.2d 302, (2d Cir. 1974) cert. denied,
GS SIO. GF (1976) nanonnncsicenwsvecccsnssensconersnssntesnensqnsseamipmntnnes 3
Britt v. Britt, 26 N.C.App. 132, 215 S.E.2d 172 (1975);
288 N.C. 238, 217 S.E.2d 678 (1975) ..-cccosn--cccccwsseeeeennees 5,7
Bryant v. Jefferson Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d
521 CO, Che, 1G) annie 4
Charmicor v. Deaner, 572 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1978).....-...... 5
Coffey Enterprises Realty v. Holmes, 233 Ga. 937, 213
SBD GOR CDI) anna nccieeecicnecrenesasenieenisctnarnianiomannetiian 4
Connolly Development Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.3d
ots, 395 020087 (2910s... ee 5
Cramer v. Metropolitan Savings & Loan Ass’n., 401 Mich.
25R,;, BIG ETB BO CGT T cence 5,7
Davidow v. Corporation of America, 16 Cal.App.2d 6, 60
Pad 192 (000) ni 4
Davidow v. Lachman Bros. Investment Co., 76 F.2d 186
Cott Cie. 158) nee
Federal National Mortgage Ass'n. v. Howlett, 521 S.W.2d
428 (1975), rehearing denied, 423 U.S. 1026 (1975)... 5
Federal National Mortgage Ass'n. v. Scott, 548 S.W.2d
SEIT it 5
Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 98 S.Ct. 1729 (May 15,
| Siento niccnssitaeinindsentiain svsesnsecasenenecenerensees 3, 7, 8,9
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED iti
Pages
Garner v. Tri-State Development Co., 382 F.Supp. 377
EE 7
Global Industries v. Harris, 376 F.Supp. 1379 (N.D.Ga.
Ilan ccsatacsncesesccenscecsaqeceseoces 4
Great Falls Nat'l Bank v. McCormick, 152 Mt. 319, 448
0 5
Howlett v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n, 423 USS.
909 (1975), rehearing denied 423 U.S. 1026 (1975)....... 6
Kenly v. Miracle Properties, 412 F.Supp. 1072 (D. Ariz.
ss aaennnssenqenecenens 3
Kennebec, Inc. v. Bank of the West, 88 Wash.2d 718, 565
Sela ea oR 6
Koch v. Briggs, 14 Cal. 256 (1859)............ eels Nesniyees 2
Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 11 Cal.3d 352, 521 P.2d 441
akin caecansenncenspsxnseseceevanensecceee 3
Lancaster Security Inv. Corp. v. Kessler, 159 Cal.App.2d
649, 324 P.2d 634 (1958), appeal dismissed and cert.
ey ee ee 4,6
Lawson v. Smith, 402 F.Supp. 851 (N.D. Cal. 1975).......... 4,7
Leisure Estates of America, Inc. v. Carmel Development Co.,
570 Cae oo Gee. nex. 1974).................................... 6
Levine v. Stein, 560 F.2d 1175 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
EEA 6
Maile v. Carter, 17 Hawaii 49 (1905)................:cceesseesesee 5
Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1976).............. 3
National Airport Corporation v. Wayne Bank, 73 Mich.App.
8s SEE 5,7
National Community Builders, Inc. v. Citizens & Southern
National Bank, 232 Ga. 594, 207 S.E.2d 510 (1974)...... 4
iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
Pages
Northrip v. Federal National Mortgage Ass’n., 527 F.2d
CURE BI) chin 3,5,7
Northrip v. Federal National Mortgage Ass’n., 372 F.Supp.
SOG CRE TTY ahaa eccicetesneincssnibesintincinergmiiononee 7
Ricker v. United States, 417 F.Supp. 133 (N.D.Me. 1976)... 6
Robinson v. McKinney, 4 Dak. 290, 29 N.W. 658 (1886).. 5
Roos v. Belcher, 79 Idaho 473, 321 P.2d 210 (1958) ............ 5
Ruff v. Lee, 230 Ga. 426, 197 S.E.2d 376 (1933) ssatmabeinntties 4
Southern Mutual Investment Corp. v, Thornton, 131 Ga.
App. 765, 206 S.E.2d 846 (1974) ....ccscssssssssesssssseeceeeeeeenee 4
Strutt v. Ontario Savings & Loan Ass’n., 11 Cal.App.3d 547,
Te CIID nics access icscettnieesesntnarnsons 4
Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F.Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975)... 7
United States v. White, 429 F.Supp. 1245 (N.D.Miss. 1977) 6
U. S. Hertz, Inc. v. Niobrara Farms, 41 Cal.App.3d 68, 116
a Teal, GE UG FED sscsstantieescsicssctisnctaremnsianentiereantnorsonens 4
Y Aleman Corporation v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 414 F.
SOND, FS CED NAMIE Y sesiiensesensesivninasinsiantisavencnstoienianecestponeants 4
Young v. Ridley, 309 F.Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1970) ............ 4
CopEs
California Civil Code, Section 2924 ................:.sessssssseeeeeeeseees 2
CONSTITUTIONS
United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment ........ 2, 3, 6, 7
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
RULES
Rule 16, Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States ....
STATUTES
1917 Cal. Stats. Ch. 204
TEXTS
Restatement of Agency 2d, Section 138
State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors’ Rights: an
Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, No. 47, Vol. 2
Southern California L. Rev. 1
v
Pages
2
In the Supreme Court of the
United States
OcTOBER TERM, 1978
No. 78-397
SUSAN GARFINKLE et vir.
Appellants,
vs.
SUPERIOR CouRT OF CONTRA Costa CouNTY,
(WELLS FARGO BANK, et al., Real Parties in Interest),
Appellees.
On Appeal from the Supreme Court
of the State of California
Motion to Affirm or Dismiss
I,
INTRODUCTION
The decision of the Supreme Court of the State of California is
that power of sale foreclosure on deeds of trust in California does
not involve state action within the context of the Fourteenth
Amendment."
1. Appellants’ Jurisdictional Statement states as fact many matters
which are neither true nor relevant. We do not further divert attention
from the constitutional issue by discussing them.
2
The decision is so clearly correct that, without further briefing
or argument, it ought to be affirmed, or the appeal should be dis-
missed for want of a substantial federa! question.
Accordingly, we move under Rule 16 of the Rules of this Court
to affirm the decision of the Supreme Court of the State of
California, or to dismiss the appeal for want of a substantial
federal question.
II.
ARGUMENT
A. In California Powers of Sale Derive from Private Contract.”
Powers of sale, like other powers coupled with an interest, came
into use in California as creations of agreement recognized as
valid at common law, long ago, Koch v. Briggs, 14 Cal. 256
(1859), Restatement of Agency 2d, Section 138.
That fact is evident from the language of the very legislation
with which this appeal is concerned, which commences with the
words:
“Where ... in any transfer in trust made after July 27,
1917... a power of sale is conferred upon the . . . trustee. . .
to be exercised after a breach of the obligation for which such
... transfer is a security... .”” California Civil Code Section
2924.
B. The "Pervasive Involvement" of the State of California in
Power of Sale Foreclosure is to Codify and Restrict, Rather
Than to Authorize or Encourage, Its Use.
California Civil Code, Section 2924, was amended in 1917 to
require recordation of Notice of Default and Election to Sell,
the lapse of three months during which default could be cured,
notice of time and place of sale, and certain sale procedures, all
2. The origins of use of powers of sale in agreements creating security
interests in real property in California are reviewed at length in an article
by Messrs. Burke and Reber entitled: State Action, Congressional Power
and Creditors’ Rights: an E,say on the Fourteenth Amendment, No. 47,
Vol. 2 Southern California L. Rev. 1.
3
as conditions to the exercise of power of sale given in trust deeds.
1917 Cal.Stats. Ch, 204.
The California Legislature thereby did two things. It codified
California common law and it curtailed the rights previously en-
joyed by creditors under California common law. For these two
propositions for which stands the decision of the California
Supreme Court with which this appeal is concerned, the decision
of the California Supreme Court is conclusive, since both proposi-
tions are pure questions of California law.
C. "Legislative Involvement" by Codification and Curtailment
of Common Law Rights Created by Agreement Does Not
Cause Those Rights or Their Exercise to Constitute State
Action to Which the Fourteenth Amendment Is Applicable.
Apart from California decisions such as in this case, in Connolly
Development, Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.3d 803, 553 P.2d 637
(1976) and in Kruger v, Wells Fargo Bank, 11 Cal.3d 352, 521
P.2d 441 (1974), there are numerous Federal decisions in support
of the proposition that codification and curtailment of common
law rights do not remove those rights, nor their exercise from the
private sector. Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 98 S.Ct. 1729 (May
15, 1978); Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802, 806 (9th Cir.
1976); Northrip v. Federal National Mortgage Ass’n, 527 F.2d
23 (6th Cir. 1975); Adams v. Southern California First National
Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006
(1974) ; Bond v. Dentzer, 494 F.2d 302, 311-312, (2d. Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 95 S.Ct. 65 (1974).
More specifically it has been held repeatedly that codification
and curtailment of power of sale rights created by trust deed
agreements do not cause such rights or their exercise to constitute
State action to which the Fourteenth Amendment is applicable.
ARIZONA: Kenly v. Miracle Properties, 412 F.Supp.
1072 (D. Ariz. 1976) (found no state
action)
CALIFORNIA:
DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA:
GEORGIA:
GUAM:
4
Lawson v. Smith, 402 F.Supp. 851 (N.D.
Cal. 1975) (found no state action)
U.S. Hertz, Inc. v. Niobrara Farms, 41 Cal.
App.3d 68, 116 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1974)
(found no state action)
Strutt v. Ontario Savings & Loan Ass’n., 11
Cal.App.3d 547, 90 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1970)
(found no state action)
Lancaster Security Inv. Corp. v. Kessler, 159
Cal.App.2d 649, 324 P.2d 634 (1958)
(found no state action)
Davidow v. Corporation of America, 16 Cal.
App.2d 6, 60 P.2d 132 (1936) (found no
state action)
Davidow v. Lachman Bros. Investment Co.,
76 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1935) (found no
state action )
Bryant v. Jefferson Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n, 509 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(found no state action and waiver)
Young v. Ridley, 309 F.Supp. 1308 (D.D.C.
1970) (found no state action)
Coffey Enterprises Realty v. Holmes, 233 Ga.
937, 213 S.E.2d 882 (1975) (found no
state action)
Global Industries v. Harris, 376 F.Supp.
1379 (N.D. Ga. 1974) (found no state
action)
National Community Builders, Inc. v. Citi-
zens & Southern National Bank, 232 Ga.
594, 207 S.E.2d 510 (1974) (found no
state action)
Ruff v. Lee, 230 Ga. 426, 197 S.E.2d 376
(1933) (due process not violated; implied
finding of no state action)
Southern Mutual Investment Corp. v. Thorn-
ton, 131 Ga. App. 765, 206 S.E.2d 846
(1974) (found no state action)
Y Aleman Corporation v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 414 F.Supp. 93 (D. Guam) (found
no state action)
HAWAII:
IDAHO:
MICHIGAN:
MISSOURI:
MONTANA:
NEVADA:
NORTH
CAROLINA:
NORTH
DAKOTA:
TEXAS:
5
Maile v. Carter, 17 Hawaii 49 (1905) (no
state action or waiver)
Roos v. Belcher, 79 Idaho 473, 321 P.2d 210
(1958) (found notice sufficient)
Northrip v. Federal National Mortgage
Ass’n., 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1975)
(found no state action)
Cramer v. Metropolitan Savings & Loan
Ass’n., 401 Mich. 252, 258 N.W.2d 20
(1977) (found no state action)
National Airport Corporation v. Wayne
Bank, 73 Mich. App. 572, 252 N.W.2d
519 (1977) (found consent and no state
action )
Federal National Mortgage Ass’n. v. Scott,
548 $.W.2d 545 (1977) (found no state
action)
Federal National Mortgage Ass'n. v. How-
lett, 521 S.W.2d 428 (1975), rehearing
denied, 423 U.S. 1026 (1975) (found no
state action)
Great Falls Nat'l Bank v. McCormick, 152
Mt. 319, 448 P.2d 991 (1968) (found
notice sufficient, state action not discussed)
Charmicor v. Deaner, 572 F.2d 694 (9th
Cir. 1978) (found no state action)
Britt v. Britt, 26 N.C. App. 132, 215 S.E.2d
172 (1975). Appeal dismissed for lack of
substantial constitutional question, 288
N.C. 238, 217 S.E.2d 678 (1975) (found
notice sufficient, state action not discussed)
Robinson v. McKinney, 4 Dak. 290, 29 N.W.
658 (1886) (found notice sufficient and
waiver, state action discussed)
Armenta v. Nussbaum, 519 S.W.2d 673
(1975) (found no state action)
Barrera v. Security Bld. & Investment Corp.,
519 F.2d 1166 (Sth Cir. 1975) (found no
state action)
6
Leisure Estates of America, Inc. v. Carmel
Development Co., 371 F.Supp. 556 (S.D.
Tex. 1974) (found no state action)
VIRGINIA: Levine v. Stein, 560 F.2d 1175 (4th Cir.
1977) (found no state action)
WASHINGTON: Kennebec, Inc. v. Bank of the West, 88
Wash.2d 718, 565 P.2d 812 (1977)
(found no state action)
The very question has received the attention of this Court,
recently,* twice.
In Howlett v. Federal National Mortgage Association, 423 US.
909 (1975), rehearing denied 423 U.S. 1026 (1975), appeal from
a decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri, which concluded
that state action was not present in power of sale foreclosure,
codified in statutes not significantly different from those of Cali-
fornia, was dismissed by this Court for want of a substantial
federal question.
In Levine v. Stein, 434 US. 1046 (1978) this Court declined
to review on Writ of Certiorari the decision of the Fourth Circuit
in 560 F.2d 1175 holding that foreclosure by power of sale of
trust deeds which were codified by Virginia statute did not involve
state action to which the Fourteenth Amendment was applicable.
In footnote 8 on page 22 of Appellants’ Jurisdiction Statement
are cited several recent cases as holding power of sale foreclosure
unconstitutional.
They are not in point, or concern materially different legisla-
tion, or have been reversed.
(1) United States v. White, 429 F.Supp. 1245 (N.D. Miss.
1977) and Ricker v. United States, 417 F.Supp. 133 (N.D.Me.
1976) are cases in which the Federal Government itself was the
foreclosing party.
*In 1959 this Court dismissed an appeal and denied certiorari in
Lancaster Security Investment Corp. v. Kessler, 358 U.S. 306, in which
the precise question now before the Court was presented.
5
(2) Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F Supp..1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975)
held North Catolina’s power of sale foreclosure statute not con-
stitutional. The California Supreme Court in its opinion, page 15,
expressed its agreement with the decision of the District Court in
Lawson v. Smith, 402 F.Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal. 1975) that under the
North Carolina statutory scheme, the Clerk of the Superior Court
had duties which were discretionary (they are indeed judicial)
not merely ministerial, and the statutory scheme was, therefore,
significantly unlike the California statutory scheme. It should
be observed, moreover, that in Britt v. Britt, 26 N.C.App. 132,
215 S.E.2d 172 (1975) the North Carolina Court of Appeals
refused to follow Turner v. Blackburn, and North Carolina’s
Supreme Court denied certiorari for want of a substantial con-
stitutional question, at 217 S.E.2d 678.
(3) In Garner v. Tri-State Development Co., 382 F.Supp. 377
(E.D. Mich. 1974) and in Northrip v. Federal National Mortgage
Ass’n., 372 F.Supp. 594 (E.D. Mich. 1974), two district judges of
the Federal District Court found Michigan so involved in power
of sale foreclosures as to cause such foreclosure to constitute state
action.
The 6th Circuit reversed Northrzp (but not on ‘other grounds”
as Appellants state), concluding that state action was absent, at
$27 F.2d 23 (1975).
The Michigan courts have followed the 6th Circuit: Cramer v.
Metropolitan Savings & Loan Association, 401 Mich. 252, 258
N.W.2d 20 (1977); National Airport Corporation v. Wayne
Bank, 73 Mich. App. 572, 252 N.W.2d 519 (1977).
D. Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks.
Appellants urge upon this Court, as they did upon the Supreme
Court of the State of California,® the argument that this Court’s
3. Appellants’ request that this Court remand this case to the California
Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks
ignores the fact that the California Supreme Court considered the signifi-
cance of Flagg Brothers when it denied Appellants’ Petition for Rehearing.
8
decision in Flagg Brothers, Inc, v. Brooks, 98 S.Ct. 1729 (May
15, 1978) supports the conclusion that power of sale foreclosure
involves state action.
In Flagg Brothers, this Court found no state action in private
foreclosure sale of property stored by a warehouseman having a
possessory lien.
The holding in Flagg Brothers is in emphatic accord with the
decision at hand. In Flagg Brothers the Court said:
“Thus the only issue presented by this case is whether Flag¢
Brothers’ action may fairly be attributed to the State of New
York.” (Flagg Brothers, supra, at 1734.)
“This system of rights and remedies, recognizing the tradi-
tional place of private arrangements in ordering relationships
in the commercial world, can hardly be said to have delegated
to Flagg Brothers an exclusive prerogative of the sovereign.
“Whatever the particular remedies available under New
Yor! law, we do not consider a more detailed description of
them necessary to our conclusion that the settlement of dis-
putes between debtors and creditors is not traditionally an
exclusive public function. Cf. United States v. Kras, 409
US. 434, 445-446 (1973). Creditors and debtors have had
available to them historically a far wider number of choices
than has one who would be an elected public official, or a
member of Jehovah’s Witnesses who wished to distribute
literature in Chickasaw, Ala., at the time Marsh was decided.
Our analysis requires no parsing of the difference between
various commercial liens and other remedies to support the
conclusion that this entire field of activity is outside the
scope of Terry and Marsh. This is true whether these com-
mercial rights and remedies are created by statute or decisional
law. To rely upon the historical antecedents of a particular
practice would result in the constitutional condemnation in
one State of a remedy found perfectly permissible in another.
Compare Cox Bakeries v. Timm Moving & Storage, 554
F.2d 356, 358-359 (1977), with Melara, supra, at 805-806,
and n. 7. Cf. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 334-335 (1964)
(Black J., dissenting).
9
“Thus, even if we were inclined to extend the sovereign
function doctrine outside of its present carefully confined
bounds, the field of private commercial transactions would
be a particularly inappropriate area into which to expand it.
We conclude that our sovereign function cases do not sup-
port a finding of state action here.” (Emphasis added; foot-
notes omitted. Flagg Brothers, supra, at 1735-1737)
“This Court, however, has never held that a State’s mere
acquiescence in a private action converts that action into that
of the State.” (Flagg Brothers, supra, at 1737)
*California’s Supreme Court might have said these things in
deciding this case. It might have further quoted from Flagg
Brothers, saying of this case:
“If [California] had no commercial statutes at all, its courts
would still be faced with the decision whether to prohibit
or permit the sort of sale threatened here. . . . If the mere
denial of judicial relief is considered sufficient encourage-
ment to make the State responsible for those private acts, all
private deprivations of property would be converted into
public acts whenever the State, for whatever reason, denies
relief sought by the putative property owner.”
“Not only is this notion completely contrary to that ‘essential
dichotomy,’ . . . between public and private acts, but it has
been previously rejected by [the United States Supreme]
COM. wae
“Here, the State of [California] has not compelled the sale
..., but has merely announced the circumstances under which
its courts will not interfere with a private sale. Indeed, the
crux of [Appellants’} complaint is not that the State has
acted, but that it has refused to act.” (Flagg Brothers, supra,
at 1738.)
Should this court hold not constitutional the legislation in Cali-
fornia concerning power of sale foreclosures, the result would
deprive debtors of safeguards and rights provided by that legisla-
tion, rather than outlaw power of sale foreclosures.
10
III.
CONCLUSION
Since it is apparent from numerous and recent decisions of this
Court, that no state action exists in power of sale foreclosure of
trust deeds in California, and that the California legislation limit-
ing use of power of sale foreclosure is not unconstitutional, the
decision below should be affirmed, or the Appeal should be dis-
missed for want of a substantial federal question.
Respectfully submitted,
Davip W. LENNIHAN
DaviD J. BROWN
Attorneys for Appellees
BROBECK, PHLEGER & HARRISON
Of Counsel
October 5, 1978
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
DAVID W. LENNIHAN states that he is a member of
the Bar of this Court; that on October 5, 1978, he deposited
in the mail at San Francisco, California, five (5) sealed
envelopes, with postage fully prepaid thereon, containing
three (3) copies of the foregoing Motion to Affirm or
Dismiss, addressed as follows:
Supreme Court of California
State Building
350 McAllister Street
San Francisco, CA 94102
Contra Costa County Superior Court
Courthouse
Court and Main Streets
Martinez, CA 94553
Steven M. Kipperman
Kipperman, Shawn, Keker & Brockett
407 Sansome Street, Suite 400
San Francisco, CA 94111
Stanley J. Friedman
Friedman & Sloan
680 Beach Street, Suite 436
San Francisco, CA 94109
Gary Gartinkle
1122 Hilltop Drive
Lafayette, CA 94549
Dav W. Ye
David W. Lennihan
Spear Street Tower
One Market Plaza
San Francisco, CA 94105
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