Opposition — Pierorazio v. United States

re Supreme Court, U. &

FILED

No. 78-324 NOV 1 1978

.

MIGHAEL RGDAK, JR., CLERK

Iu the Supreuve Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

FRANK PIERORAZIO and JESSE CAPPS, PETITIONERS

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

WADE H. MCCREE, JR.

Solicitor General

PHILIP B. HEYMANN

Assistant Attorney General

JEROME M. FEIT

WILLIAM C. BROWN

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

Page

I igi crete Sic cat ccsigscginaimenictmnntani 1

Pe ar ee ae 1

Questions presented 2

IT AES Sc ee a 3

Be at ERC en i SRE Aes sae ee 4

EEL RARER Ie CR NEC ee Te cm 15

CITATIONS

Cases:

Berenyi v. Immigration Director, 385 U.S.

Es of CAE LS Sits EEE! a Se 6

Berlin v. United States, No. 77-548 cert.

Gen Geese eee 11,12

Calhoun v. State, 34 Md. App. 365, 367

p< | jac PERE F Ce ANOS AL EnT Se Se rad 11

Franks v. Delaware, No. 77-5176 (June

26, 1978) _...... AeA eCei Pay ASE Ot rin NE 9

Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 781 _. 14, 15

Graver Mfg. Co. v. Linde Co., 336 U.S.

Es eral atala, 6

Mares v. United States, 409 F.2d 1083,

cert. denied, 394 U.S. 963 _.._. LUE an ae 14

Stone v. United States, No. 77-690, cert.

denied, 434 U.S. 1064 11, 12

United States v. Canon, 404 F. Supp. 841. 13

United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252... 6

United States v. Gigante, 538 F.2d 502 _ 13

United States v. Kalustian, 529 F.2d 585. 11, 12

United States v. Kirk, 534 F.2d 1262, cert.

denied, 430 U.S. 906

II

Cases—Continued

United States v. Landmesser, 553 F.2d

} | TEST

United States v. Leftwich, 461 F.2d 586,

cert. denied, 409 U.S. 915 .

United States v. Losing, 560 F.2d 906,

cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 . ni

United States v. McCoy, 478 F. 2d 176. oa

United States v. Mitchell, 556 F.2d 371 ~

United States v. Quesada, 512 F.2d 1043,

cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946

United States v. Rodriguez, 546 F.2d 302.

United States v. Sisca, 503 F.2d 1337,

cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1008 . e

United States v. Sklaroff, 506 F.2d 837,

cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874

United States v. Spagnuolo, 549 F. 2d 705.

United States v. Steinberg, 525 F.2d 1126,

cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 -

United States v. Ventresca, 380 U. S. 102.

Wisniewski v. United States, 353 U.S.

TO sisansipsnssnndnninninssisciiacegee aiden

Statutes:

70 Stat. 573 -

18 U.S.C. (1964 ed.) 1403(a) .

18 U.S.C. $638(1) (2). ae

18 U.S.C. 2518(3)(c)

18 U.S.C. 2618(8) (a)

1 USO OG) eee

21 U.S.C. 846

Iu the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 78-324

FRANK PIERORAZIO and JESSE CAPPS, PETITIONERS

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. Al-

A9) is reported at 578 F.2d 48.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered

on May 31, 1978 (Pet. App. A10-A11). A petition

for rehearing was denied on June 27, 1978 (Pet.

App. A16-A17). Mr. Justice Brennan extended the

(1)

2

time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to

and including August 26, 1978, and the petition was

filed on August 25, 1978. The jurisdiction of this

Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support

petitioners’ conspiracy convictions.

2. Whether 21 U.S.C. 843(b) applies to the use of

a telephone to facilitate an attempt or a conspiracy

to distribute controlled substances.

3. Whether the affidavit in support of the appli-

cation for an order authorizing a wire interception

was insufficient because it incorporated by reference

a prior affidavit of another government agent involved

in the investigation.

4. Whether the application for the order authoriz-

ing the wire interception sufficiently established that

other investigative methods were inadequate or un-

likely to succeed.

5. Whether the tapes of the monitored conversa-

tions should have been excluded on grounds of failure

of the government to present them for immediate

sealing as required by 18 U.S.C. 2518(8) (a).

6. Whether the prosecutor’s reference in his open-

ing statement to the anticipated testimony of a wit-

ness who later refused to testify requires reversal of

petitioners’ convictions.

3

STATEMENT

Following a second jury trial* in the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsyl-

vania, both petitioners were convicted of conspiring

to distribute a controlled substance, methampheta-

mine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846. In addition,

petitioner Pierorazio was convicted on two counts of

using a communication facility (a telephone) to fa-

cilitate the distribution and attempted distribution

of controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

843(b). On the conspiracy count, petitioner Pierora-

zio was sentenced to three and one-half years’ im-

prisonment to be followed by two years’ special pa-

role, and petitioner Capps was sentenced to two years’

imprisonment and two years’ special parole. On the

two Section 843(b) counts, Pierorazio received sen-

tences of three and one-half years’ imprisonment,

both to be served concurrently with his sentence on

the conspiracy count. The court of appeals affirmed

(Pet. App. Al-A9).

On June 1, 1976, based upon a finding that prob-

able cause existed to believe that petitioner Pierorazio

was using a telephone at 31 East Wildey Street in

Philadelphia in conspiring to distribute methampheta-

mine, the district court authorized agents of the Drug

Enforcement Administration (DEA) to monitor con-

versations on that telephone (A. 1la-12a).* It was

1 The jury could not reach a verdict after the first trial (Pet.

App. A2).

2“A ” refers to the appendix filed by petitioners in the court

of appeals. We are lodging a copy of this appendix with the

Clerk of this Court.

4

soon discovered that through the use of a switching

service provided by the telephone company thgé great

majority of the calls coming into the East Wildey

Street telephone were being diverted to Pierorazio’s

home telephone on Tulip Street in Philadelphia (A.

82a-83a). Once transferred, these conversations could

not be monitored by the agents conducting the inter-

ception of the East Wildey Street telephone (7bid.).

Consequently, a second interception authorization was

obtained to permit the monitoring of the telephone at

Pierorazio’s residence (A. 65a-68a).

In these conversations, which were generally con-

ducted in the guarded idiom of the drug trade,* Pier-

orazio and Capps discussed their methamphetamine

distribution operation, and Pierorazio made numerous

arrangements to buy, sell, and trade methampheta-

mine (A. 967a-1023a).

ARGUMENT

1. Petitioners contend that the evidence was insuf-

ficient to establish that the object of their conspiracy

was to distribute methamphetamine, as charged in

the indictment, rather than some other substance

(Pet. 15-17).

’The government presented the expert testimony of DEA

Special Agent Ellis M. Hershowitz to explain to the jury the

meaning of some of the drug terminology used in the conver-

sations.

5

This contention is without merit. Although no

methamphetamine was seized from petitioners during

the course of the conspiracy, it is settled that a drug

distribution conspiracy may be proved even though

the government has not actually seized the drugs in-

volved. United States v. Quesada, 512 F.2d 1043

(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946 (1975). In-

deed, a conspiracy may exist even if the participants

do not succeed in their goal to obtain and distribute

controlled substances. See United States v. Mitchell,

556 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1977).

Petitioners’ monitored conversations introduced at

trial contained ample proof that they were engaged

in the distribution of methamphetamine, rather than

any other controlled substance. In the conversations,

the quantity of the drug to be delivered is frequently

referred to in terms of “lines” or “T’s”, and while

the term “line” is used in connection with either

methamphetamine or cocaine, the evidence established

that the term “T” (originally meaning a level tea-

spoon) is normally used to refer to methamphetamine

alone (Tr. 322-323, 387, 450).* Moreover, the

government expert testified that the term “meth”

(used by a customer in referring to Pierorazio’s

product) is never used to refer to anything but meth-

*The fact that the substance involved was methampheta-

mine, rather than cocaine, is also shown by a conversation

in which Pierorazio and his caller contrasted “Big C’’, or

cocaine, which was readily available around town with “the

regular stuff” that Pierorazio could not then provide (Tr. 333;

A. 975a-976a).

6

amphetamine (Tr. 403-404; A. 1006a). Accordingly,

the court of appeals properly rejected petitioners’

claim of insufficiency in the evidence (Pet. App. A8).

This factual determination does not merit further

review. See Berenyi v. Immigration Director, 385

U.S. 630, 635 (1967); Graver Mfg. Co. v. Linde Co.,

336 U.S. 271, 275 (1949).°

2. Pierorazio also asserts that his convictions on

two counts of violating 21 U.S.C. 843(b)—which

proscribes the use of a communications facility (here,

a telephone) in facilitating the commission of certain

narcotics felonies—must be reversed because the evi-

dence was insufficient to show that the specific distri-

butions discussed over the telephone were in fact

consummated (Pet. 12-15).° We do not agree that

the evidence is insufficient to show that the operation

involved the actual distribution of methamphetamine,

and the court of appeals did not so hold (Pet. App.

A3).

° Petitioners’ claim (Pet. 16-17) that the decision below

conflicts with United States v. Cooper, 567 F.2d 252 (3d Cir.

1977), is incorrect. Cooper involves the application of the rule

that once a conspiracy has been shown to exist, only slight

evidence of a defendant’s participation may suffice to establish

his complicity in the conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.

Petitioners suggest only that the commodity they were dis-

tributing was not proven; they do not deny that their partici-

pation in the scheme was sufficiently established by the inter-

cepted calls revealing their central position in the conspiracy.

Consequently, this case does not involve the “slight evidence”

rule.

* The sentences on these convictions were concurrent with

the sentence on the conspiracy count, which is unaffected by

this claim.

7

The contention is, in any event, without merit.

Section 843(b) prohibits the use of the telephone in

facilitating inchoate crimes like attempts and conspir-

acies as well as consummated offenses. It is not sig-

nificant that 18 U.S.C. (1964 ed.) 1403(a) (70 Stat.

573), the predecessor of Section 843(b), referred

specifically to attempts and conspiracies, while Sec-

tion 843(b) does not. As the court below explained

(Pet. App. A6-A7; emphasis in original; footnotes

omitted) :

Section 843(b) makes criminal the use of a

telephone “in committing, or in causing or facili-

tating the commission of any act or acts consti-

tuting a felony under any provision of this sub-

chapter [subchapter I] or subchapter II of this

chapter [Chapter 13 of Title 21].” Included

within subchapter I is § 846, which makes it a

felony for a person to attempt or conspire to

commit any offense defined in subchapter I (such

as distribution or possession with intent to dis-

tribute, defined as offenses in § 841). In other

words, attempt to distribute a controlled sub-

stance, conspiracy to distribute a controlled sub-

stance, attempt to possess a controlled substance

with intent to distribute it, and conspiracy to

possess a controlled substance with intent to dis-

tribute it, are all felonies under provisions of

subchapter I. As such, they are plainly included

within the terms of § 843(b). We can discern

nothing in the legisiative history, nor has any

policy been advanced, which would call for a

different result. Hence, the fact that particular

language found in former § 1403(a) was there-

8

after omitted from § 843(b) does not persuade

us that Congress intended to preclude a § 843

(b) facilitation conviction where the underlying

felony is attempt or conspiracy under § 846.

This interpretation of Section 843(b) is in accord

with the analysis of all other courts of appeals that

have considered this question. See United States v.

Losing, 560 F.2d 906, 913 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434

U.S. 969 (1977); United States v. Rodriguez, 546

F.2d 302, 307-308 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.

Steinberg, 525 F.2d 1126, 1133 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.

denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976); see also United States

v. Kirk, 534 F.2d 1262 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,

430 U.S. 906 (1977) ; United States v. Sisca, 503 F.2d

1337 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1008 (1974).’

3. Petitioners argue that their monitored conver-

sations should have been suppressed because an affi-

davit in support of a wire interception application

may not incorporate by reference a prior affidavit by

another law enforcement officer, and, absent recourse

to this earlier affidavit, the application for the second

interception order in this case failed to set forth facts

establishing probable cause (Pet. 17-19).

It is well established that “[o]bservations of fellow

officers of the Government engaged in a common in-

vestigation are plainly a reliable basis for a warrant

applied for by one of their number.” United States

v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 111 (1965). Accordingly,

7 As petitioners note (Pet. 14), the court of appeals in this

case rejected the contrary conclusions of two district courts in

its own circuit (Pet. App. A5-A6). That rejection does not

establish a conflict warranting review by this Court.

-_—>=-~-

9

it was perfectly proper for Agent Fekete of the DEA,

the affiant supporting the application for the intercep-

tion at Pierorazio’s residence, to rely on the informa-

tion provided by a fellow agent in the affidavit filed

in support of the prior East Wildey Street intercep-

tion. See United States v. McCoy, 478 F.2d 176

(10th Cir. 1973). The fact that Agent Fekete, in

addition to summarizing new evidence obtained in the

investigation, simply incorporated by reference the

prior affidavit rather than setting out its entire con-

tent afresh, is immaterial. See United States v. Land-

messer, 553 F.2d 17, 21 (6th Cir. 1977).*

8 Petitioners also suggest (Pet. 17-18) that the second affi-

davit contained material misrepresentations. Agent Fekete did

state at the suppression hearing that a subsequent review of

the tapes of the original intercept led him to alter his analysis

of the two conversations described in the affidavit to some

extent (Tr. 140-145, 147-148; A. 221a-226a, 228a-229a). It is

not clear that this re-evaluation would deprive the conversa-

tions of the significance attributed to them in the affidavit.

Compare Tr. 27-28, A. 183a-184a and Tr. 144, A. 225a with Tr.

148-149, A. 229a-230a (the first conversation); compare Tr.

162, A. 243a with Tr. 152-153, A. 233a-234a (the second con-

versation). In any event, the entirely accurate statement in

the affidavit that the call- on the originally intercepted tele-

phone were being automatically transferred to the telephone

for which interception authority was sought was sufficient,

with the original affidavit that was incorporated by reference,

to constitute probable cause for the issuance of the second

authorization. The two additional calls reported were thus not

necessary to the sufficiency of the affidavit. There is no indi-

cation that the inaccuracies in the affidavit were the result of

deliberate falsehood or a reckless disregard for the truth.

Accordingly, under Franks v. Delaware, No. 77-5176 (June 26,

1978), petitioners were not even entitled to a hearing on their

claim that the warrant contained misrepresentations. They

10

4, Petitioners next contend that the applications

for electronic surveillance did not satisfy the require-

ments of 18 U.S.C. 2518(1)(¢c) because they did not

explain whether “other investigative procedures have

been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear

to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dan-

gerous.”

The record refutes this claim. The affidavits reveal

a history of physical surveillance of Pierorazio and

his associates, utilization of a number of informants,

and analysis of telephone toll records. While these

conventional methods had succeeded in disclosing that

Pierorazio and others were dealing in controlled sub-

stances, they had failed to reveal the entire scope of

the conspiracy or produce sufficient evidence for a

successful prosecution. The affidavits pointed out why

these methods were unsuccessful: The confidential

informants and witnesses described in the affidavit

had refused to testify in court (A. 41a); infiltration

by undercover agents was not possible because Piero-

razio dealt only with close associates (ibid.); and

the execution of search warrants would not identify

Pierorazio’s co-conspirators or sources of supply

(ibid.). The affidavits further informed the court

that the conspirators were alert to the possibility of

surveillance (citing at least one instance of overt

counter-surveillance activity (A. 84a)), and pointed

out that, in any event, continued visual surveillance

would not disclose direct evidence of the drug deal-

nevertheless were permitted to explore this matter fuliy at the

hearing on the motion to suppress, and the district court con-

cluded that their attack on the affidavit was without merit.

ll

ings conducted inside the premises (A. 41a, 84a-

85a).°

Petitioners assert (Pet. 20-22) that the circuits

have adopted different standards for determining

compliance with 18 U.S.C. 2518(1)(c). Whether or

not this is true at the present time, the affidavits in-

volved here, which contain detailed factual allegations

concerning the alternative techniques attempted and

why they were unsuccessful in this particular case,

are clearly sufficient to meet the most stringent in-

terpretation of Section 2518(1)(c). Accordingly,

even assuming there is some difference in the stand-

ards used, this case does not directly present that

issue.”

* Relying on Calhoun v. State, 34 Md. App. 365, 367 A.2d 40

(Ct. Spec. App. 1977), petitioners also make the argument that

because a prior affidavit was incorporated by reference, the

government did not meet the statutory requirement of Section

2518(3) (c). In Calhoun, however, the court simply held that

where the new affidavit did not even allege that normal investi-

gation means would be ineffective, the statutory requirement

was not met by the incorporation in it of a prior affidavit mak-

ing that allegation as to a different interception at a different

time. That defect is not present here. Agent Fekete’s affidavit

not only contained the required allegation, but it also contained

additional facts showing the necessity for the interception

(A. 8la-85a). The prior affidavit was properly incorporated

to show additional facts supporting Fekete’s allegations.

7° As we have frequently noted in our filings in this Court

(see, e.g., Berlin v. United States, No. 77-548, cert. denied,

434 U.S. 1012 (1978); Stone v. United States, No. 77-690,

cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978)), the Ninth Circuit in

United States v. Kalustian, 529 F.2d 585 (1975), appeared to

require more specificity in supporting affidavits than has been

required by other circuits. But Kalustian has not been accepted

12

5. Petitioners also contend (Pet. 22-25) that their

monitored conversations should have been suppressed

because the government failed to make the recordings

available for judicial sealing “‘[i]mmediately upon the

expiration of the * * * order” as required by 18 U.S.C.

2518(8) (a). ;

There was, however, no delay in sealing the tapes

at issue here.** The interception of Pierorazio’s tele-

phone concluded at 8:00 p.m. on Friday, July 2, 1976

(A. 98a). Immediately following the three-day holi-

day weekend, the tapes were evidently prepared for

judicial sealing on July 6, and the district judge

sealed them on July 7 (A. 108a). Thus, only one

work day, and less than five days in all, intervened

between the expiration of the interception order and

the sealing of the tapes.** This was substantial com-

by any other circuit, or even consistently followed in the

Ninth Circuit. In United States v. Spagnuolo, 549 F.2d 705

(9th Cir. 1977) that circuit retreated somewhat from the

Kalustian standard, and it is not clear that the Ninth Circuit

will continue occasionally to apply a more stringent stand-

ard than is utilized by the other circuits. In any event, this

Court has declined numerous requests to review decisions

alleged to be in conflict with Kalustian. See, e.g., Berlin v.

United States, supra; Stone v. United States, supra, and cases

cited in our oppositions therein. Nothing has happened recently

to justify any change in this refusal to review what is, at

heart, an intra-circuit conflict of little continuing importance.

Cf. Wisniewski v. United States, 353 U.S. 901 (1957).

11 No tapes made pursuant to the original authorization were

presented at trial; therefore, there is no need to consider

whether those tapes were promptly sealed.

2 The district court, in denying petitioners’ suppression

motion, specifically ruled that “there is insufficient evidence

to warrant a finding that the integrity of the tapes of the inter-

13

pliance with Section 2518(8)(a). United States v.

Sklaroff, 506 F.2d 837, 840-841 (5th Cir.). cert. de-

nied, 423 U.S. 874 (1975) (14-day delay in sealing

constitutes substantial compliance) ; United States v.

Canon, 404 F. Supp. 841, 849 (N.D. Ala. 1975)

(seven-day delay in sealing constitutes substantial

compliance).

6. Petitioners’ final contention is that their con-

victions should be reversed because the prosecutor, in

his opening statement, adverted to the testimony of

a potential witness who he could not reasonably have

expected to testify at trial (Pet. 26-29).

During his opening statement the prosecutor stated

(Tr. 16):

And it’s also the Government’s expectation

that you will hear at least one of the participants

in the telephone calls, other than Mr. Capps and

Mr. Pierorazio, a person by the name of Rose-

marie Schulz, testify as to her involvement in a

particular telephone call with the defendant

Frank Pierorazio.

Even though she was granted immunity, however,

cepted communications which the government seeks to have

admitted has been violated or that the tapes have in any man-

ner been tampered with or altered” (A. 158a). During the in-

terval between the expiration of the intercept and judicial

sealing, the tapes were carefully protected. They were initialed

and heat sealed in evidence bags when removed from the re-

corder, then kept in a locked cabinet in Agent Fekete’s office to

which no other agent had access (A. 651a-657a).

'In United States v. Gigante, 538 F.2d 502 (2d Cir.

1976), upon which petitioners rely, the court properly sup-

pressed tapes where sealing delays ranged from 8 to 13

months.

14

Schulz refused to testify.“ For this conduct she was

held in contempt and jailed by the trial judge (Tr.

246-252).

Petitioners’ argument that the prosecutor could not

reasonably have expected Schulz to testify is refuted

by the record. Schulz herself had pleaded guilty to

distributing methamphetamine on May 3, 1976, and,

in conjunction with a plea bargain in that case, had

agreed to testify (and had testified) in a related

probe of police corruption (Tr. 166-182). Indeed, in

a meeting one month prior to trial, Schulz had in-

formed the prosecutor that she would testify if

granted immunity because she “wouldn’t go to jail,

even for one day, for somebody else” (G. Ex. 21;

A. 793a). In light of this information and the grant

of immunity, the prosecutor had every reason to be-

lieve that Schulz would, in fact, testify.

Moreover, it is well established that a new trial

is not required whenever the prosecutor’s opening

remarks are not supported in every detail by evidence

presented at trial. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731

(1969) ; Mares v. United States, 409 F.2d 1083, 1085

(10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 963 (1969) ;

cf. United States v. Leftwich, 461 F.2d 586, 590 (3d

Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 915 (1972). Many things

may happen during the course of a trial to prevent the

presentation of all the expected evidence by the gov-

ernment. A witness’s contumacious refusal to testify

4 Schulz indicated that she was afraid to testify because of

the possibility that she would suffer physical harm (Tr. 181-

183).

15

is one of those things. But variances between the

opening statement and the evidence actually intro-

duced, like other improprieties of argument, do not

require a new trial unless the discrepancies are

“so gross as probably to prejudice the defendant

and the prejudice has not been neutralized by the

trial judge before submission of the case to the jury.”

United States v. Leftwich, supra, 461 F.2d at 590.

The trial judge here properly instructed the jury that

the case was to be decided on the evidence, which

“does not include arguments or statements of coun-

sel” (Tr. 679-681; see also Tr. 17).” See Frazier v.

Cupp, supra, 394 U.S. at 736. Under these circum-

stances, the courts below properly refused to grant

petitioners a new trial because of the brief reference

by the prosecutor to Schulz’s expected testimony.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

denied.

Respectful. submitted.

WADE H. MCCREE, JR.

Solicitor General

PHILIP B. HEYMANN

Assistant Attorney General

JEROME M. FEIT

WILLIAM C. BROWN

OCTOBER 1978 Attorneys

18 No request was made for a specific instruction to disre-

gard the portion of the opening statement pertaining to

Schulz’s expected appearance.

Wy ov. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE; 1978 276523 171