Opposition — Fernandez-Guzman v. United States
Supreme Court brief1978
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No. 78-171
In the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1978
Jose L. FERNANDEZ-GUZMAN, PETITIONER
V,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
IN OPPOSITION
Wave H. McCree, Jr.
Solicitor General
Puitip B. HEYMANN
Assistant Attorney General
JEROME M, Fert
WILLIAM C. BROWN
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
In the Supreme Court of the Hnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1978
No. 78-171
Jose L. FERNANDEZ-GUZMAN, PETITIONER
Vv.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
IN OPPOSITION
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 4-15) is
reported at 577 F. 2d 1093. The court of appeals’
memorandum order (Pet. App. 16-27) is unpublished.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
May 23, 1978. A petition for rehearing was denied on
June 30, 1978. The petition for a writ of certiorari was
filed on July 29, 1978. The jurisdiction of this Court is
invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
(1)
tN
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
|. Whether, in ruling on a motion to suppress evidence
discovered during a search incident to a warrantless
arrest, the court is restricted to considering only evidence
recited in the complaints filed after the arrest pursuant to
Fed. R. Crim. P. 5S(a).
2. Whether petitioner's arrest was supported by
probable cause.
RULES INVOLVED
Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a) provides:
In General. An officer making an arrest under a
warrant issued upon a complaint or any person
making an arrest without a warrant shall take the
arrested person without unnecessary delay before the
nearest available federal magistrate or, in the event
that a federal magistrate is not reasonably available,
before a state or local judicial officer authorized by
18 U.S.C. §3041. If a person arrested without a
warrant is brought before a magistrate, a complaint
shall be filed forthwith which shall comply with the
requirements of Rule 4(a) with respect to the showing
of probable cause. When a person, arrested with or
without a warrant or given a summons, appears
initially before the magistrate, the magistrate shall
proceed in accordance with the applicable sub-
divisions of this rule.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(a) provides:
Issuance. \f it appears from the complaint, or from
an affidavit or affidavits filed with the complaint,
that there is probable cause to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the defendant has
committed it, a warrant for the arrest of the
defendant shall issue to any officer authorized by law
to execute it. Upon the request of the attorney for the
government a summons instead of a warrant shall
issue. More than one warrant or summons may issue
on the same complaint. If a defendant fails to appear
in response to the summons, a warrant shall issue.
STATEMENT
Following a bench trial in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, petitioner was
convicted of possessing heroin with intent to distribute it,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) (Pet. App. 5). He was
sentenced to five years’ imprisonment to be followed by a
special parole term of three years (Pet. 8). The cou of
appeals affirmed (Pet. App. 4-27).
Acting on a tip provided by an informant who had
previously provided rel..ble information, federal agents
commenced surveillance of petitioner and his co-
defendant Jose Rodriguez, who they believed were
involved in distributing a large shipment of narcotics.
After they had observed a series of activities that
appeared to be part of the distribution, the agents arrested
petitioner and Rodriguez. At the time of the arrest
petitioner was carrying a bag that contained two
kilograms of heroin (Pet. App. 22-24).
Since the arrests had been made without a warrant, the
arresting officers filed complaints pursuant to Fed. R.
Crim. P. 5(a) at petitioner's ‘initial appearance before the
federal magistrate.' Prior to trial petitioner moved to
'Two complaints were filed simultaneously, one against petitioner
and one against his co-defendant, Jose Rodriguez; since the magis-
trate had both complaints before him at the same time, petitioner
acknowledged that both should be considered in determining whether
the requirements of Rule S(a) were met (Pet. App. 5 n.2).
suppress the heroin on the ground that the complaints did
not show probable cause for his arrest. He contended that
the court was required to limit its consideration to the
contents of the complaints filed after the arrest. Rejecting
the contention that it was limited to considering the
complaints, the district court conducted an evidentiary
hearing and found (Pet. App. I-3) that the arrest and the
seizure of the heroin were supported by probable cause.
The court of appeals affirmed (Pet. Apps. B and C).
ARGUMENT
|. Petitioner contends (Pet. 12-23) that in determining
whether there was probable cause for his arrest the district
court could not consider evidence that was not recited in
the complaint filed after his arrest pursuant to Fed. R.
Crim. P. 5(a). Rule S(a) requires that a person arrested
without a warrant be brought, without unnecessary delay,
before the nearest federal magistrate, and that a
complaint be filed forthwith that complies “with the re-
quirements of [Fed. R. Crim. P.] 4(a) with respect to the
showing of probable cause.”?
This contention is wholly without merit. Whether a
warrantless felony arrest in a public place is consistent
with the Fourth Amendment turns upon the presence or
absence of probable cause at the time the arrest is made.
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976); United
States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); Whiteley v.
*Rule 4(a) requires the complainant to demonstrate “probable
cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
defendant committed it.”
Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971).) It follows that the contents
of the complaint later filed pursuant to Rule 5(a) are not
determinative of the constitutional validity of the arrest.
As the court of appeals correctly observed (Pet. App. 11;
ernphasis in original):
For it remains [true] that if there was in fact probable
cause at the time of the arrest, the arrest was:
constitutional when made and cannot retroactively be
made unconstitutional by a subsequent event, such as
failure to comply with Rule 5(a).
Contrary to petitioner's contention (Pet. 14-15, 18), the
court of appeals’ decision allows the government no
greater latitude under Rule 5 when it does not secure a
warrant than when it follows the “preferred procedure”
and obtains an arrest warrant pursuant to Rule 4. When
a suspect is arrested, in a public place on a felony charge
pursuant to a warrant, and the facts alleged in the
affidavit filed in support of the warrant pursuant to Rule
4a) are insufficient to show probable cause, or the
affidavit is otherwise defective, the government may
nevertheless demonstrate that the arrest was valid by
‘Although petitioner states (Pet, 21) that he has “no disagreement
with the Court of Appeals on the basic proposition that an arrest
warrant is not constitutionally mandated,” he nevertheless urges that
the court of appeals’ decision is in conflict with Watson (Pet. 22):
Conceding the availability of warrantless arrests, and now
[the] presence of the amended Rule S(a), that Rule having been
enacted to preserve the integrity of the Fourth Amendment, it
cannot be said, as the decisions here do, that the Fourth
Amendment didn’t need it. There is a basic constitutionality built
into Rule S(a), just as there is a basic presumption of
constitutionality involved in the statutes involved in Watson.
This argument is without merit. It does not follow from the fact that
legislation is presumed to be consistent with the Constitution that
compliance with statutory procedures is presumed also to be
constitutionally required.
showing that the arresting officers in fact had probable
cause. E.g., United States v. Rose, 541 F. 2d 750, 756 (8th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 908 (1977); United
States ex rel. LaBelle v. LaVallee, 517 F. 2d 750, 753 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1062 (1976); Mayer v.
Moeykens, 494 F. 2d 855, 858 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 926 (1974); Chrisman v. Field, 448 F. 2d 175, 176
(9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 855 (1972); Ray v.
United States, 412 F. 2d 1052, 1053 (9th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Hall, 348 F. 2d 837, 841-842 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 910 (1965); see Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971); Giordenello v.
United States, 357 U.S. 480, 488 (1958);4 United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 60 (1950).5
‘Contrary to petitioner's arguments (Pet, 15-16), Giordenello v.
United States, supra, is consistent with and indeed provides support
for the court of appeals’ decision. The question in Giordenello was
whether the affidavit for an arrest was sufficient to support the
magistrate’s finding of probable cause. The Court concluded that the
affidavit was inadequate because it was composed of only the
complaining officer's conclusory hearsay statements and did not
include the reasons for his belief or even a statement that he had
spoken to the declarant. 357 U.S. at 486. The Court concluded that
the government could not raise the argument that the arrest was valid
despite the invalidity of the warrant for the first time in the Supreme
Court, but it further observed that in the event of a retrial, the
government could seek to justify petitioner's arrest without reference
to the warrant. 357 U.S, at 487-488.
‘Petitioner's allegation (Pet. 24-29) that the complaint contained
criminally reckless misrepresentations was rejected by the court of
appeals, which found (Pet. App. 19) no bad faith and, at most,
“carelessness.” In any event, for the reasons stated above, the
contents of the complaint are irrelevant to the constitutional validity
of petitioner's arrest. Franks v, Delaware, No, 77-5176 (June 26,
1978), which holds that the sufficiency of an affidavit in support of a
search warrant should be judged without reference to false statements
made knowingly or with reckless disregard of the truth, is simply
3. Finally, petitioner contends (Pet. 29-31) that there
was not probable cause for his arrest. After a careful
review of the record, however, the court of appeals
concluded that the district court had not erred in finding
probable cause (Pet. 19-24). This determination involves
only the application of settled principles of law to the
specific facts of this case, and in light of the concurrent
findings by both courts below, it presents no issue
warranting review by this Court. Berenyi v. Immigration
Director, 385 U.S. 630, 635 (1971); Graver Mfg. Co. v.
Linde Co., 336 U.S. 271, 275 (1949),
In any event, petitioner's claim is unfounded. Briefly,
the evidence at the suppression hearing showed that on
July 12, 1976, a DEA agent received information from an
informant who had provided reliable information on at
least 50 occasions that a large quantity of heroin had
arrived in Chicago for Oscar Mancillas, and that Jose
Rodriguez was to take an active part in its distribution
(Tr. 20; Pet. App. 20-22). The informant had previously
advised that petitioner distributed narcotics for Mancillas
(Tr. 7-8, 21-22), At about 9:00 p.m. on July 12, DEA
agents observed petitioner emerge from Rodriguez’
residence, look up and down the street, and then drive
away in a black Cadillac (Pet. App. 22). After circling the
block a few times, petitioner drove to the alley at the rear
of the house he had just left. Rodriguez, who was carrying
inapposite. The validity of the Seizure of the evidence in Franks
depended upon the validity of the warrant, whereas the sufficiency or
accuracy of the post-arrest complaint in the present case had no
bearing on the lawfulness of petitioner's arrest or the seizure of
evidence incident thereto.
“Tr,” refers to the transcript of the suppression hearing.
a grocery-type brown paper bag with red writing on it,
then came out of a rear exit; after looking furtively
up and down the alley, he joined petitioner in the
automobile (id. at 23). The two men proceeded to an
apartment on West Pierce, where they left the brown bag
after a brief stay. Around 11:30 that evening both
men again left Rodriguez’ residence and drove in separate
cars to the West Pierce apartment. About midnight, pe-
titioner emerged from the apartment carrying a brown
bag which appeared to be the one Rodriguez had left
there earlier. Rodriguez appeared immediately thereafter
carrying a scale box of a type used in the weighing of
narcotics. After looking about them, the two men drove
away in different directions. They were stopped and
arrested shortly thereafter, and the bag was found to
contain two kilograms of heroin.
Given the totality of the evidence known to the
arresting officers—-including the reliable informant’s tip
about the drug distribution to take place on July 12 and
the suspicious late-night activities of petitioner and
Rodriguez, who was observed carrying narcotics para-
phernalia—the courts below properly concluded that
there was probable cause for petitioner's arrest.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
Wape H. McCres, JR.
Solicitor General
Puitie B. HEYMANN
Assistant Attorney General
JEROME M. FEIT
WILLIAM C, BROWN
Attorneys
OcTOBER 1978
DOJ-1978-10
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