Petition — Greenfield v. United States
Supreme Court brief1978
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ay Supreme Cours U,
FILED
JUL 5 1978
IN THE
|
Supreme Court of the United paws RODAK, JR, CLERK
OCTOBER TERM, 1978
No. %8-24 *
WILLIAM RUSSELL GREENFIELD, JR., M. D.,
Petitioner
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
James Jerry Wood
Attorney for Petitioner
P. O. Box 4189
Montgomery, Alabama 36101
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Constitutional Provisions and Statues Involved. ......
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Reasons for Granting Writ...................00-
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TABLES OF CASES —
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S, Ct. 1194,
BP Rae SRD LEOOOD 5 boc cvecoscccvecces 2, 7,11
Bollenbach v. United States (1946), 326 U.S. 607,
er ee eee ke Sh bk ae’ bo'c.0.0 00:8 8
ee le Seb hkb py eda w Ee Cows en's 10
United States v. McKeever (S.D. NY 1958), 169 F.
Supp. 426, rev’d on other grounds (2 Cir. 1959),
EE he ee ar gS ee hk sia Gin 0.00 7
United States v. McMillan (8 Cir. 1974), 508 F.2d
101, 104, cert. den, 421 U.S. 916, 95 S.Ct.
Be oe AW LAM FO CRTs ccc ct cccesccecces 7
United States v. Philip Onori (5 Cir. 1976), 535
ESERIES 9S Geen Ee ee 7
United States v. Russell (1973), 411 U.S, 423, 93
S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 ............... 10, 11
Quercia v. United States (1933), 289 U.S. 466, 53
ne oe er cs Cede cee eee ubeise 8
STATUTES
Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 403........... 5, 8, 9
Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 404(b)............. i)
United States Code, Title 21, $841(a)(1) ........... 4
iii
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Amendment Five, Constitution of the United States. 4, 11
1
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Hnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1978
NO.
WILLIAM RUSSELL GREENFIELD, JR., M.D.,
Petitioner,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
TO THE HONORABLE, THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES:
William Russell Greenfield, Jr., M.D, the Petitioner
herein, prays that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review
2 ~
the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit entered in the above-styled case on
June 5, 1978.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit is printed in Appendix A hereto,
infra, page 16. The judgment of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is printed in Appendix
A hereto, infra, page 23.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit (Appendix A, infra, page 23 ) was
entered on June 5, 1978. The jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court is invoked under Rule 19(1)(b), Revised Rules of
the Supreme Court of the United States.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I
Whether the destruction by government agents of four
of the nine taped conversations between the government
agent and the Defendant violated the Defendant’s Con-
stitutional rights under the rule of Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
II
Whether the admission of the five tapes, in which
approximately half of the material was admittedly either
unintelligible, inaudible, or contained gaps, was so pre-
judicial to the Defendant as to violate his constitutional
right to a fair trial.
Ii,
Whether the basic constitutional standards for the ad-
mission of electronically gathered evidence were met es-
pecially when the Court had been advised that the basic
integrity of the tapes and of the government agent who
made the tape$*was in question and where four tapes had
been destroyed without any record and where the tapes
had no clearly defined beginning and ending, and where
there was no agreement by the Court and the lawyers
on much of what was being said on the tapes.
IV.
Whether, in the factual context of this case, consider-
ing the conviction of the Defendant-Appellant on the one
single count on which the Court mistakenly explained the
evidence to the Jury, over the objection of the Defendant,
the Court’s actions were so prejudicial as to require re-
versal.
V.
Whether the Defendant’s Constitutional rights under the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States were violated by the admission of evidence concern-
ing courts on which the Defendant had been previously ac-
quitted.
4
VI
Whether the evidence from the government’s own wit-
nesses established entrapment as a matter of law.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND
STATUES INVOLVED
I,
Constitution of the United States, Amendment V
“no person shall...be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb...nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law.....”’
Il.
Title 21, Section 841(a)(1), United States Code
‘* it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly
or intentionally...to...distribute, or dispense...
[ without a legitimate medical purpose ]....”’
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
William Russell Greenfield, Jr., M.D., was orginally
indicted in the Middle District of Alabama on April 8,
1976. The ten count indictment charged in each count a
violation of Title 21, §841 (a)(1), United States Code.
Dr. Greenfield was orginally tried on May 17, 1976, be-
fore the Honorable Frank M. Johnson, Jr., in a jury trial
which lasted two days. At the conclusion of the trial, the
Jury returned a verdict of guilty on three counts of the in-
dictment, counts VII, VIII, and IX.
On the 19th day of May, 1976, the Court entered an
Order adjudging the Defendant Greenfield guilty and sen-
tenced Dr. Greenfield to the custody of the Attorney
General for a period of two years with a two year special
parole term.
Dr. Greenfield appealed his conviction to the Fifth
Circuit on Appeals and his convictiyn was reversed by that
Court on August 3, 1977.
Prior to his second trial, Dr. Greenfield strenuously ob-
jected to the evidentiary use by the United States of five
tapes obtained by use of electronic surveillance on the
basis that four other tapes had been attempted and des-
troyed by the government agents and five tapes which
were available were unintelligible, contained gaps, con-
tained speakers which were incorrectly identified by the
government, had no determinable beginning and ending,
no verification that they were made on a particular date,
time or location, and that they were not complete. An in
camera hearing on the five tapes was held on September 5,
1977. The Judge allowed the five tapes and government
prepared transcripts to go into evidence over Dr.
Greenfield’s objections.
The Trial Court allowed over objection detailed ‘“proof”’
of prescriptions upon which Dr. Greenfield had previously
been acquitted in violation of Rule 403 Federal Rules of
Evidence.
The Trial Court refused to direct a verdict at the close
of the government’s case and refused to find entrapment
as a matter of law.
After the Jury had begun deliberations, they returned,
asked questions, and received correct responses from the
Judge. The Jury returned to its deliberations. The Trial
Judge ex inero moto, over objection, called the Jury back,
incorrectly told them what some evidence had been, ex-
cused them and after Dr. Greenfield pointed out his error
called the Jury back again to “correct’’ what he had said.
This exchange was on crucial evidence concerning whether
Dr. Greenfield was in his office on certain occasions when
prescriptions were obtained.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was present-
ed with the above questions and although the Court
wrote to each issue the Trial Court was affirmed on June
5, 1978.
REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT
I, Ui, Iii
The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit concerning standards to be met for admission of tape
recordings and transcripts is not consistent with the de-
cisions of the United States Courts of Appeal for the Se-
cond and Eighth Circuits. While there may be no “formu-
listic” standards governing admissibility of tape record-
ings and transcripts there must be a baseline. When the
government admits attempting four tapes which were des-
troyed and produces five times which are unintelligible,
contain gaps, and have no discernible beginning and end-
ing the baseline standard has not been met. The Trial
7
Judge should have discretion, but it isn’t unfettered.
When fifty percent or more of the recorded material is
unintelligible, the trustworthiness of the recordings as a
whole must be questioned. The recordings in this case
simply did not meet the minimum standards of the
United States v. Philip Onori (5 Cir. 1976), 535 F.2d
938 and certainly not those of United States v. McMillan
(8 Circ. 1974), 508 F.2d 101, 104, cert. den, 421 U.S.
916, 95 S.Ct. 1577, 43 L.Ed2d 782 (1975) or United
States v. McKeever (S.D. NY 1958), 169 F.Supp. 426,
rev'd on other grounds (2 Cir. 1959), 271 F.2d 669.
The requirements of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
10 L.Ed.2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963) should at least
preclude the use by the government of the five tapes
when four have admittedly been destroyed. The op-
portunity to evaluate the evidence for exculpatory ma-
terial was totally lost when the agent destroyed these
tapes. The Fifth Circuit ignored th. defense argument on
the missing tapes.
IV.
The Fifth Circuit in considering the issue of the pre-
judice to the Defendant by the Trial Judge’s comments
incorrectly sur»marizes what happened. The Jury returned
and asked a question on an evidentiary matter of the
Court which the Court answered. The Jury went back to
its deliberations. The Court, then ex mero moto, over the
objection of Dr. Greenfield, called the Jury back and in-
correctly explained a critical piece of evidence. After the
Jury again retired the defense called this error to the
Court’s attention and the Court had to call the Jury back
and explain that he had made a mistake. This series of e-
vents involved crucial evidence concerning whether or not
Dr. Greenfield was in his office when the prescription
(upon which he was ultimately convicted) was given to
the undercover agent. The Court incorrectly told the
Jury that Dr. Greenfield was not in his office on two
occasions. This was not the evidence and although the
Court later corrected this misstatement it simply was the
kind of error that cannot be glossed over by making re-
ference to the correctness of the Court’s earlier charge.
While we do not contend that the Court was deliberate-
ly partisan, we do insist that the Jury’s function in eval-
uating the evidence was encroached upon. Further, con-
sidering the Defendant’s conviction on the one count
where the Court had incorrectly stated the Petitioner was
not in the office, it cannot be said that the Judge’s com-
ments were not unfair and prejudicial to the Defendant.
The Petitioner recognizes that a court may analyze and
dissect evidence but the court may not either distort or
add to the evidence. The Trial Judge’s comments in this
case did not meet the standards of Quercia v. United States
(1933), 289 U.S. 466, 53 S.Ct. 698, 77 L.Ed. 1321.
Further, when a trial judge tries to help a jury with its
difficulties he should clear the difficulties away with
“concrete accuracy.” Bollenbach v. United States (1946),
326 U.S. 607, at p. 613. The Trial Judge did not do that
here. He misstated the evidence to the substantial detri-
ment of the Petitioner.
V.
In Petitioner’s first trial he was acquitted on six counts
of the indictment. On his retrial the Court, over the ob-
jection of Defendant, and contrary to Rule 403 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, allowed into evidence copies
of prescriptions which were written by Dr. Greenfield.
The Petitioner recognizes that the Court in its discretion
could allow the government to show the visits by the
undercover agents to Dr. Greenfield’s office on these six
occasions and could show that she obtained prescriptions.
The Petitioner insists that to allow the government to
“prove” charges on which he had been acquitted was
extremely prejudicial.
To allow the government to essentially “try the De
fendant again” on these charges put the Defendant in
jeopardy twice in violation of the Fifth Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States.
The Trial Court abused its discretion in this regard and
the Fifth Circuit sustained the Trial Court on the theory
that the evidence admitted was clearly material. The
Trial Court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence
under Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b). This
evidence, including the copies of the prescriptions, was
highly prejudicial and should not have been admitted be-
cause the probative value was far outweighed by the pre-
judicial impact on the Defendant.
VI.
The evidence established entrapment as a matter of
law. The Trial Court refused to so find and the Fifth
Circuit sustained the Trial Judge. The undisputed evi-
dence was that Dr. Greenfield was treating the under-
cover agent on each and every occassion when she obtain-
ed prescriptions. Five local physicians said what Petitioner
did, under the fact circumstances, was for a legitimate
medical purpose. The evidence clearly reflected that his
10
prescriptions for the undercover agent were at her con-
stant urging, cajoling, importuning and were given her as
a result of her creative lies concerning her need for the
Ionamin.
The record contains no evidence of predisposition on
Dr. Greenfield’s part to write illegal prescriptions. The
government agents created a bogus story. Dr. Greenfield
gave the agent a physical check-up and made a medical
record. He, rather than being disposed to “‘push dope,”’
suggested coffee rather than pills to the undercover agent.
The record is replete with the evidence of the cajoling, ly-
ing and creative activity on the part of the government.
If Greenfield committed a crime he was entrapped.
United States v. Carroll (6 Cir. 1975), 518 F.2d 187.
No criminal design originated with Dr. Greenfield. United
States v. Russell (1973), 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36
L.Ed.2d 366. The requirements of the United States v.
Russell, supra, on this record require the finding, if Dr.
Greenfield committed a crime, he was entrapped.
CONCLUSION
William Russell Greenfield submits that the Writ of
Certiorari should be granted and upon final determination
of this cause the conviction of the Petitioner in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama
should be reversed in that:
(a) That there are material and substantial conflicts
and differences in the standards required in the Second
and Eighth Circuits for the admission of tape recordings
11
and transcripts and the standards required in the Fifth
Circuit;
(b) That these «..ficulties and conflicts are due to
be resolved by the Supreme Court in a manner establish-
ing a baseline requirement for the admission of such evi-
dence;
(c) That the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
failed to observe the requirements of Brady v. Maryland,
supra in evaluating the Petitioner’s claim concerning the
tapes which the government had destroyed;
(d) That the admission of certain evidence, and the
factual context in which it was admitted, violated the
double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States;
(e) That the evidence of record demonstrates that the
Defendant was entrapped, if he committed a crime at all,
utilizing the standards and teachings of United States v.
Russell, supra.
For the reasons outlined, Petitioner respectfully re-
quests this Court to grant his Petition for Writ of Certior-
ari in order that the issues may be fully briefed and de-
cision in favor of Petitioner ultimately reached.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
ames Jerry Wood”
Attorney for Petitioner
Seed |
12
ADDRESS:
P. O. Box 4189
Montgomery, Alabama 36101
DATED: July 5, 1978.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, James Jerry Wood, a member of the Bar of the
Supreme Court of the United States and counsel of record
for William Russell Greenfield, Jr., M.D., Petitioner herein,
hereby certify that on July 5, 1978, pursuant to Rule 33,
Rules of the Supreme Court, I served three copies of the
foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari on each of the
parties herein, as follows:
On the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20530, by depositing such copies in the
United States Post Office, Montgomery, Alabama, first
class postage prepaid, properly addressed to the post off-
ice address of the Solicitor General, Washington, D.C.
20530.
On the Honorable Barry Teague, United States Attorney
for the Middle District of Alabama, Federal Building,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104, by depositing such copies
in the United States Post Office, Montgomery, Alabama,
first class postage prepaid, properly addressed to the post
office address of the United States Attorney, the above-
13 14
named counsel of record, at the Federal Building, Mont-
gomery, Alabama 36104.
All parties required to be served have been served.
DATED 5th day of July, 1978.
\ dgmes Je ood
P, O.Box 4189
Montgomery, Alabama 36104
15
APPENDIX A
OPINION
16
UNITED STATES v. GREENFIELD 4597
UNITED STATES of America,
Plaintiff-Appelle,
Vv.
William Russell GREENFIELD, M. D.,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 77-5617.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
June 5, 1978
On remand, 554 F.2d 179, defendant was convicted
before the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Alabama, Virgil Pittman, Chief Judge, of
knowingly distributing a controlled substance without a
legitimate medical purpose, and he appealed. The Court
of Appeals, Alvin B.“ Rubin, Circuit Judge, held that:
(1) although trial judge inaccurately amended answer to
jury’s factual question, defendant was not denied a fair
trial where only a short time elapsed from misstatement to
correction and comments did not betray partisanship,
add to the evidence or encroach on jury’s functions;
(2) tape recordings are not per se inadmissible because
they are partially inaudible; (3) it was not error to permit
the Government to introduce evidence of contacts be-
tween defendant and government agent prior to earliest
date named in the indictment, during which defendant
also prescribed drugs for the agent, and (4) in view of
17
evidence concerning quantity of drugs, defendant’s in-
quiries and his having prescribed drugs for agent in others’
name, issue of entrapment was for jury.
Affirmed.
1. Criminal Law e859
Although in amended answer to factual question of the
jury the trial judge gave an incorrect summary of part of
the evidence, defendant was not deprived of a fair trial
where only a short time elapsed from misstatement to
correction and when read in context and taking into ac-
count the court’s accurate charge, such comments did not
betray partisanship, add to the evidence or encroach on
the jury’s function.
2. Criminal Law @=438.1
There are no formulistic standards governing admiss-
ibility of tape recordings and transcripts thereof.
3. Criminal Law 438.1
Tape recordings are not per se inadmissible because
they are partially inaudible; issue is whether the unin-
telligible portions are so substantial as to render the re-
cording as a whole untrustworthy and such determination
is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge.
4. Criminal Law 2444
In case of tape recordings and transcripts thereof re-
commended procedure is to hold the prior hearing con-
cerning intelligibility of the tapes and accuracy of the
proposed transcripts, with opposing counsel entitled to
an opportunity to contest the transcripts.
18
5. Criminal Law 2438.1
Although tape recordings were allegedly inaudible, it
was not abuse of discretion to permit the jury to hear
the tapes or read the transcripts thereof where trial judge.
held a prior hearing concerning intelligibility of the tapes
and accuracy of the transcripts, tapes were available to
defendant from time of prior trial and Government laid
a proper foundation for their admission.
6. Criminal Law @369.2(7)
It was not error to permit the Government to introduce
evidence of contacts between defendant and government
agent prior to earliest date named in the indictment, dur-
ing which defendant also prescribed drugs for the agent,
since such evidence was material to issue whether his con-
tinuing prescriptions for the same patient, some written
in the names of other persons, were for legitimate medical
purposes, evidence was not inflammatory, judge issued a
proper limiting instruction and verdict belied notion that
jury may have been swayed into convicting defendant for
being a bad individual. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Pre-
vention and Control Act of 1970, §§ 101 et seq., 401,
401(a)(1), 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 801 et seq., 841, 841(a)(1);
Federal Rules of Evidence, rules 403, 404(b), 28 U.S.C.A.
7. Criminal Law @739.1(2)
Defense of entrapment was for jury, in prosecution
for knowingly distributing a controlled substance without
a legitimate medical purpose, in view of evidence concern-
ing quantity of drugs prescribed, nature of defendant’s
inquiries and his having prescribed drugs for government
agent in others’ name. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevent-
ion and Control Act of 1970, §§ 101 et seq., 401(a)(1),
19
21 U.S.C.A. §§ 801 et seq., 841(a)(1).
8. Drugs and Narcotics 123
Conviction of knowingly distributing a controlled sub-
stance without a legitimate medical purpose was support-
ed by the evidence, including evidence that defendant gave
government agent a prescription for Ionamin without
seeing her. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970, §§ 101 et seq., 401(a)(1), 21
U.S.C.A. §§ 801 et seq., 841(a)(1).
atin
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Alabama.
Before WISDOM, THORNBERRY, and RUBIN, Cir-
cuit Judges.
ALVIN B. RUBIN, Circuit Judge:
Following the reversal of his first conviction on three
of ten counts of knowingly distributing a controlled sub-
stance without a legitimate medical purpose, in violation
of 21 U.S.C § 841(a)(1), United States v. Greenfield, 5
Cir., 554 F.2d 179, the defendant was retried on those
three counts, and convicted on one. He again appeals.
Having considered carefully each of the errors contended
to have been committed at the new trial, we find that
the defendant was fairly tried and affirm the conviction.
See Greenfield, supra, 554, F.2d at 180—181.
{1] After the jury had begun its deliberations, it put
a factual question to the judge. The judge gave a correct
answer that he later amended inaccurately, giving the
jury an incorrect summary of part of the evidence. How-
ever, immediately after the jury left the courtroom, coun-
sel objected, the judge learned that he had been incorrect,
and recalled the jury. He then gave what both sides agree
to be an entirely correct statement of evidence. The jury
thereafter deliberated for some time, and returned a ver-
dict of “not guilty” on two counts, guilty on the third.
Read in context and taking into account also the court’s .
accurate charge, to which no objection is made, the court’s
comments do not betray partisanship, add to the evidence,
or encroach on the jury’s functions. Compare U. S. ».
Cisneros, 5 Cir. 1974, 491 F.2d 1068. They were finally
made entirely accurate, only a short time elapsed from
_ misstatement to correction, and they were not unfair to
the defendant.
[2-5] It is also argued that the court erred in permit-
ting the jury to hear and to read transcripts of conver-
sations between the government’s agent and Dr. Green-
field, recorded through a transmitter in the agent’s shoul-
der bag and broadcast to a receiver in a van parked near-
by. The government attempted to tape conversations on
nine occasions, but could produce audible tapes on only
five; the remaining four tapes were destroyed, and no re-
cords concerning them were kept. The defense argues
that the extant tapes are largely inaudible, confusing,
and substantially untrustworthy.
This court has not adopted any formulistic standard
to guide the admissibility of tapes and transcripts. Tapes
are not per se inadmissible because they are partially in-
audible; the issue is whether the unintelligible portions
“are so substantial as to render the recording as a whole
untrustworthy. This determinations is left to the sound
discretion of the trial judge.”. U. S. v. Avila, 5 Cir. 1971,
443 F.2d 792, 795, cert. denied, 1971, 404 U.S. 944,
92 S.Ct. 295, 30 L.Ed.2d 258.
21
The tapes were available to the defendant from the time
of the first trial. The trial judge followed the course we
have recommended in holding a prior hearing concerning
the intelligibility of the tapes and the accuracy of the pro-
posed transcripts, and in permitting defense counsel to
contest the transcript as proposed by the government,
United States v. Onori, 5 Circ. 1976, 535 F.2d 938, 947-—-
949. Further, the government laid a proper foundation
for the admission of the tapes, as required by U’ S. v.
Biggins, 5 Cir. 1977, 551 F.2d 64, 66. The court did not
abuse its discretion in permitting the jury to hear the
tapes or to read the transcripts in question.
[6] The court did not err in permitting the govern-
ment to introduce evidence of contacts between Dr.
Greenfield and the government’s agent prior to the earliest
date named in the indictment, during which Greenfield
also prescribed drugs for the agent. While Dr. Greenfield
had been earlier acquitted of six counts of violating 21
U.S.C. § 841 that were, predicated on those earlier con-
tacts the evidence admitted was clearly material to the
question whether his continuing prescriptions for the same
patient (some written in the names of other people)
were for a legitimate medical purpose. The evidence was
not inflammatory, the judge issued a proper limiting in-
struction, and the jury’s evidently considered verdict
belies the notion that it may have been swayed into
convicting the defendant for being a bad individual.
Consequently, it cannot be said that judge abused his
discretion in admitting evidence under the Federal Rules
of Evidence, Rules 403 and 404(b).
[7] The judge correctly charged the jury on entrap-
ment; the evidence was not sufficient to require a direct-
ed verdict. There was evidence concerning the quantity
of drugs prescribed, the nature of the doctor’s inquiries,
and of his having prescribed drugs for this patient in a
name other than the patient’s; these warranted the con-
clusing that no legitimate medical purpose underlay his.
prescriptions, and that his purpose in prescribing drugs
without a legitimate purpose was not “implanted” by the
government’s informer. U. S. v. Russell, 1973, 411 U.S.
423, 435-436, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 1644—1645, 36 L.Ed.2d
366.
[8] The defense finally contends that, even viewing
the evidence most favorably for the government, insuffi-
cient evidence exists to support the jury’s verdict under
Glasser v. United States, 1942, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457,
86 L.Ed. 680. There was adequate evidence to support
the jury verdict as to February 11, when Greenfield gave
the government agent a prescription for Ionamin without
seeing her.
For these reasons, the conviction is AFFIRMED.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For The Fifth Circuit
No. 77-5617
D. C. Docket No. CR-76-14-S
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
WILLIAM RUSSELL GREENFIELD, M.D.,
Defandant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Alabama
Before WISDOM, THORNBERRY, and RUBIN,
Circuit Judges.
JUDGMENT
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the
record from the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Alabama, and was argued by counsel;
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, It is now here
ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of
the said District Court in this cause be, and the same is
hereby, affirmed.
June 5, 1978
Issued As Mandate:
—
24
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 77-5617
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appelle.
versus
WILLIAM RUSSELL GREENFIELD, M.D.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Alabama
ORDER:
( ) The motion of
for stay of the issuance of the mandate pending peti-
tion for writ of certiorari is DENIED. See Fifth Cir-
cuit Local Rule 15, as amended January 11, 1972.
(“) The motion of Appellant
for stay of the issuance of the mandate pending peti-
tion for writ of certiorari is GRANTED to and in-
cluding July 5, 1978 the stay to con-
tinue in force until the final disposition of the case by
the Supreme Court, provided that within the period
()
()
above mentioned there shall be filed with the Clerk
of this Court the certificate of the Clerk of the Sup-
reme Court that the certiorari petition has been filed.
The Clerk shall issue the mandate upon the filing of
a copy of an order of the Supreme Court denying
the writ, or upon the expiration of the stay granted
herein, unless the above mentioned certificate shall
be filed with the Clerk of this Court within that time.
The motion for a further stay of the issuance of the
mandate is GRANTED to and including
, under the same conditions as set
forth in the preceding paragraph.
IT IS ORDERED that the motion for a further stay
of the issuance of the mandate is DENIED.
/Circuit Judge
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE
ote
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